TCREUR_Public/130513.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

              Monday, May 13, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 93

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

COMPAGNIE GENERALE: Moody's Confirms Ba2 CFR; Outlook Negative


G E R M A N Y

TRIONISTA TOPCO: Moody's Assigns 'B2' CFR; Outlook Stable
TS CO.MIT: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'D'


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Issues Interim Management Statement
GILLESPIE CLO: BNY Mellon Deal No Impact on Moody's Ratings
MONSOON ACCESSORIZE: High Court Protection Extended Until June 12
* IRELAND: More Retailers May Go Into Examinership Over Rent Woes


I T A L Y

ANDROMEDA FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class A1 Notes to 'BB'
MONTE DEI PASCHI: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to Ba1
MONTE DEI PASCHI: Moody's Lowers Debt & Deposit Ratings to B2


N E T H E R L A N D S

DRYDEN XXVII: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class E Notes
* Dutch Insurers Continue to Face Competition and Tough Market


R O M A N I A

* ROMANIA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Credit Ratings; Outlook Stable


S L O V E N I A

* SLOVENIA: To Sell 15 State Firms & Raise Tax to Avoid Bailout


S P A I N

AYT CEDULAS: Moody's Takes Multiple Rating Actions on SMICBs
AYT FTPYME: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on EUR34MM Class F3 Notes
AYT ICO-FTVPO I: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B2'
UCI 9: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR9.4MM Class C Notes to 'B1'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CLAVIS SECURITIES 2006-01: S&P Raises Rating on M2a Notes to BB+
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Asset Risks Cue Moody's to Cut Ratings to Ba3
DANIEL CONTRACTORS: Nears Administration; 1,300 Jobs at Risk
DUKEDOM LTD: Falls Into Administration, Closes Bars
POWERSAFE COMMUNICATIONS: In Administration, Cuts 5 Jobs

PRESBYTERIAN MUTUAL: Representatives Agree to Director Ban
PROFMEDIA: S&P Lowers Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
SCOTTISH COAL: Hargreaves Named Preferred Bidder for Assets


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 6 to May 10, 2013


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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COMPAGNIE GENERALE: Moody's Confirms Ba2 CFR; Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed Compagnie Generale de
Geophysique-Veritas Ba2 Corporate Family Rating ("CFR") and Ba2-
PD Probability of Default Rating ("PDR").

Moody's has concurrently confirmed the Baa3 ratings on the $79
million senior secured RCF due 2014 at CGGVeritas Services Inc.
and the US$200 million senior secured RCF due 2014 at CGGVeritas,
as well as the Ba3 ratings on the company's US$650 million senior
notes due 2021, 9.5% US$350 million senior notes due 2016, and
the 7.75% US$400 million senior notes due 2017. The outlook on
all ratings is negative.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions follow the completion by CGGVeritas of the
acquisition of the Geoscience division of Fugro N.V. as well as
first quarter results that exceeded Moody's expectations. The
US$1.3 billion acquisition was financed in line with the rating
agency's expectations, consisting of a EUR414 million capital
increase, a EUR360 million convertible bond due 2019 and a EUR225
million vendor loan. This in combination with better than
expected performance, has resulted in Moody's expectations for
leverage (Moody's adjusted net Debt to EBITDA less Multiclient
Amortization) falling to around 3.0x by FY2013 and continuing to
decline in FY2014.

CGGVeritas' CFR and PDR remain unchanged at Ba2 and Ba2-PD
respectively. This reflects (i) CGGVeritas' high level of fixed
costs and exposure to the highly cyclical seismic industry; and
(ii) Moody's expectation that continued increases in seismic
industry demand and pricing will result in through-the-cycle
leverage strengthening from the current weak levels above 3.0x.
At the same time, ratings are supported by (i) the group's
position as a leader in seismic equipment (through Sercel) and
among the two largest players in marine seismic services
worldwide following the acquisition of Fugro's Geoscience
division; (ii) its geographic diversification; and (iii) its good
liquidity position.

In 2012, CGGVeritas reported group revenue up 7% and operating
income up 78%, mainly as a result of improvements in the Services
division from Land Contract. Moody's adjusted net Debt to EBITDA
less Multiclient Amortization improved to 3.0x (before the Fugro
acquisition was completed) and free cash flow fell to $57
million. 1Q 2013 results showed some strength, including a rise
of 11% year-on year (YoY) in group revenue and a 124% increase
YoY in reported EBIT, with gains in the renamed Acquisition and
GGR divisions offsetting weakness in Sercel. The company stated
that the integration of the acquisition is on track and
progressing as planned and it confirmed its 2013 objectives,
including 25% revenue growth and generation of positive free cash
flow.

CGGVeritas' liquidity is good for its near-term requirements. As
of March 31, 2013, it had unrestricted cash of US$468 million and
US$209 million available under its US$279 million RCFs (although
they mature in January and February 2014). Moody's expects
positive free cash flow during the remainder of FY2013 despite
over US$600 million in capex. The rating agency expects this is
sufficient to cover debt payments amounting to around US$240
million over the next 12 months. Covenant headroom related to the
RCFs is acceptable and should improve as a full year of the
Geoscience division is accounted for.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that leverage
will remain high for the current rating category in the near term
following the acquisition of Fugro's Geoscience division.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

There is potential for upward pressure on the CFR or outlook if
the company continues to show performance in line with its 2013
objectives, integration of the acquisition continues on track and
the market environment is supportive. Conversely, a downgrade of
the CFR could occur if liquidity or performance weakens,
translating into through-the-cycle leverage materially above 3x.

The Baa3 and Ba3 instrument ratings incorporate the weak
positioning of the CFR shown by the negative rating outlook. If
the outlook were subsequently to revert to stable, then the notes
and the bank facilities could be upgraded. Commensurately, a
downgrade of the CFR by one notch may not lead to a downgrade of
the notes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Oilfield Services Rating Methodology published in December 2009.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

CGG Veritas ranks among the top three players in the seismic
industry. It is listed on both Euronext Paris and the New York
Stock Exchange, with a market capitalization of approximately
EUR3.4 billion.



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G E R M A N Y
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TRIONISTA TOPCO: Moody's Assigns 'B2' CFR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's assigned a B2 corporate family rating (CFR) and a B2-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) to Trionista TopCo GmbH
("ista"), the intermediate holding company of energy sub-metering
group ista international GmbH.

At the same time Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B1
instrument rating with an LGD3 37% on the proposed senior secured
credit facilities to be raised at the level of Trionista HoldCo
GmbH, a subsidiary of Trionista TopCo GmbH and a provisional
(P)Caa1 rating with an LGD6 90% to the EUR525 million senior
subordinated notes to be issued by Trionista TopCo GmbH. The
outlook on the ratings is stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings for debt instruments in
advance of the final sale of securities or conclusion of credit
agreements. Upon a conclusive review of the final documentation,
Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the
different capital instruments. A definitive rating may differ
from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

The B2 CFR reflects: i) ista's strong and robust profitability
with a reported EBITDA-margin of over 42% in FY2012 supported by
the group's high market penetration, particularly in Germany, ii)
good revenue visibility and stability driven by the non-
discretionary nature of demand and long-term contracts, iii) high
entry barriers and low customer churn rates, as well as iv) a
supportive regulatory environment and focus on energy efficiency.

These positive factors are offset by (i) the group's high
leverage with a Moody's adjusted debt/ EBITDA of 7.6x in FY2012
pro-forma the newly implemented capital structure, (ii) its
limited ability to generate positive free cash flows, and hence
pay down debt, due to the challenge to cope with increasing
capital spending requirements in the upcoming years in line with
projected business growth and combined with high interest
payments on the new debt, and (iii) ista's lower profitability in
regions outside Germany (accounting for around 45% of group
revenues in FY2012), which may dilute the group's earnings levels
as sub-metering penetration rates in these markets increase.

The stable outlook reflects the good level of revenue visibility
and Moody's expectation of a stable operating performance in the
mid-term. It also incorporates the company's expectation to
achieve a slightly improved Moody's adjusted leverage of around
7.4x debt/ EBITDA in the current financial year, driven by an
improvement in EBITDA, and that the group is able to maintain a
satisfactory liquidity profile. Given the high interest burden
and substantial capex requirements in the upcoming years as well
as the stability of the business we do not expect a meaningful
deleveraging going forward.

ista's B2 rating could be upgraded if Moody's adjusted Debt/
EBITDA could be reduced to levels below 7.0x, interest cover rise
above 1.5x EBIT/ interest expense and EBITDA margins be
maintained at current levels on a sustainable basis.

ista's rating could come under pressure if Moody's adjusted Debt/
EBITDA ratio increased to above 8.0x and/or adjusted EBIT/
interest were to fall below 1.0x and adjusted EBITDA margins
reduced to levels below 40%. Also Moody's would consider revising
downward its ratings should ista fail to maintain positive free
cash flow generation in any financial year with no signs of
improvement.

Liquidity:

Based on the new financing structures Moody's believes that
ista's liquidity would be adequate but with limited cushion for
higher than expected working capital swings or negative free cash
flows that would have to be financed by existing cash sources.
This assessment is supported by Moody's assumption of a cash
balance just sufficient to manage the seasonality of the
company's cash collection during the year, availability under the
new revolving credit facility (EUR150 million) and a stable
ongoing cash flow generation. Moody's also assumes a comfortable
covenant headroom to be agreed in the new financing contracts.

Structural Considerations:

The senior secured credit facilities which will be issued by
Trionista HoldCo GmbH are guaranteed by operating entities
representing at least 80% of the consolidated group EBITDA. These
will benefit from first-priority security interests over the
shares of Trionista HoldCo GmbH and Trionista Capital GmbH,
receivables of Trionista HoldCo GmbH, and pledge of proceeds loan
from Trionista TopCo GmbH and Trionista HoldCo GmbH. They rank
pari passu with all other senior secured instruments but ahead of
the subordinated bond.

The senior subordinated notes which will be issued by Trionista
TopCo GmbH are guaranteed on a senior subordinated basis by
operating entities representing at least 80% of the consolidated
group EBITDA. The subordinated notes will benefit from second-
priority security interests over the shares of Trionista HoldCo
GmbH and Trionista Capital GmbH, receivables of Trionista HoldCo
GmbH, and pledge of proceeds loan from Trionista TopCo GmbH and
Trionista HoldCo GmbH and rank behind the senior secured notes
and senior secured bank facilities.

In Moody's analysis of the priority of claims within the
suggested capital structure the senior secured notes (approx.
EUR500 million) and senior secured bank facilities (approx.
EUR1,150 million) as well as trade payables rank prior to the
senior subordinated notes (approx. EUR525 million). As a result
of Moody's Loss Given Default analysis the senior secured notes
are rated one notch above the corporate family rating. The senior
subordinated notes are rated two notches below the corporate
family rating given their claims contractually ranking behind the
senior secured notes and senior secured bank facilities in a
default scenario.

The proposed new capital structure of ista also includes
preferred equity certificates (PECs) of EUR500 million which
Moody's treated as 100% equity due to the long maturity of the
instrument (2028), its non-cash interest characteristic and full
subordination to all other debt of the group.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Essen (Germany) ista is a leading provider of
energy services which provides sub-metering of heating use and
water consumption for individual housing units and ancillary
services. In FY2012 ista group had revenues of EUR710 million and
thereof around 55% were generated in Germany.


TS CO.MIT: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC
(sf)' its credit ratings on TS Co.mit One GmbH's class E and F
notes.

The rating actions follows S&P's review of the transaction using
the latest available information report (dated March 26, 2013),
which includes the distribution of available funds on the March
2013 payment date.

On the March 2013 payment date, the class E and F notes missed
their interest payments.  The issuer had insufficient funds to
pay interest in accordance with the transaction's priority of
payment provisions.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)' its ratings on the class E and F notes.

TS Co.mit One is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in July 2006.  A portfolio of senior
unsecured payment claims on the issuer against German small and
midsize enterprises (SMEs) under certain corporate promissory
notes (Schuldscheindarlehen) backs the transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

                 Rating
Class       To                From

TS Co.mit One GmbH
EUR503 Million Floating-Rate Asset-Backed Notes


Ratings Lowered
E           D(sf)           CC(sf)
F           D(sf)           CC(Sf)



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I R E L A N D
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ALLIED IRISH: Issues Interim Management Statement
-------------------------------------------------
Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C., delivered to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission an interim management statement disclosing
that strategic actions taken in 2012 have delivered an
improvement in the Bank's overall operating performance in the
first quarter of 2013.  Product repricing has had a continued
positive effect on the net interest margin (NIM) in the first
quarter, the second consecutive quarter of progress on NIM.  This
repricing and the ending of the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee
Scheme (ELG) for new liabilities announced on 26 February and
effective as of March 28, 2013, are expected to benefit operating
income for the remainder of 2013 and beyond.

Cost reduction remains a priority at the Group and the benefits
of the initiatives undertaken in 2012 are beginning to be seen.
For the quarter, both staff costs and other expenses are
materially lower year on year, as expected.

AIB is on track to achieve its target of returning to pre-
provision operating profit for the full year 2013.

EUR19.6bn of non-core deleveraging was completed by the end of
first quarter of 2013, which is c. 95% of the year end 2013
EUR20.5bn non-core deleveraging target as originally set by the
Central Bank of Ireland.  AIB expects to have fully achieved the
non-core deleveraging target by the 3rd quarter of 2013 at levels
comfortably within the PCAR 2011 capital assumptions.

Following growth of EUR2.9bn in 2012, customer accounts continued
to increase in the first quarter of 2013 and there has been no
material impact on balances as a result of the expiry of the ELG.
This ongoing progress in deleveraging and growth in customer
accounts has driven continued improvement in the Group's loan to
deposit ratio to c. 110%.  Use of Monetary Authority funding has
further reduced by EUR2.6bn since December 2012 to EUR19.6bn as
of end March 2013.

                           Asset Quality

The Group's loan portfolios are performing in line with
expectations and bad debt provisions for 2013 are expected to
trend significantly lower from levels in 2012 based on current
expected economic performance.  Continued progress has been made
in the first quarter of 2013 in relation to offering sustainable
permanent solutions for mortgage and SME customers in financial
difficulty and AIB is committed to meeting or exceeding the
targets set by the Central Bank of Ireland in relation to
mortgage arrears.

                              Capital

AIB's capital ratios remain strong.  Risk Weighted Assets have
reduced, driven by further deleveraging in the first quarter of
2013 and the Group's core tier one capital ratio was 15 percent
at the end of March 2013.

                       About Allied Irish Banks

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- http://www.aibgroup.com/-- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary
shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at
shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-
voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On
April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount
of CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby
increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

The Company reported a loss of EUR2.29 billion in 2011, a loss of
EUR10.16 billion in 2010, and a loss of EUR2.33 billion in 2009.

Allied Irish's consolidated statement of financial position for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2011, showed EUR136.65 billion in total
assets, EUR122.18 billion in total liabilities and EUR14.46
billion in shareholders' equity.

Allied Irish's balance sheet at June 30, 2012, showed EUR129.85
billion in total assets, EUR116.59 billion in total liabilities
and EUR13.26 billion in total shareholders' equity.


GILLESPIE CLO: BNY Mellon Deal No Impact on Moody's Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has determined that Gillespie CLO PLC
(the "Issuer") leveraged loan cash flow CLO's entry into the Deed
of Novation and Amendment between, amongst others, Deutsche
International Corporate Services (Ireland) Limited (the "Exiting
Administrator") and The Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Dublin
Branch (the "New Administrator") dated, May 1, 2013, and the
performance of the activities contemplated therein will not, in
and of itself, and at this time, cause the current Moody's
ratings of the Notes issued by the Issuer to be reduced or
withdrawn. Moody's does not express an opinion as to whether the
amendment could have other, non credit-related effects.

The Deed may be summarized as follows: to amend the Corporate
Services Agreement and novate the rights and obligations of the
Exiting Administrator thereunder, to the New Administrator. The
Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV, Dublin Branch will act as the new
administrator for this transaction.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found in the Rating
Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.

Moody's will continue monitoring these ratings. Any change in the
rating will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.

On October 14, 2011 Moody's Investors Service upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by Gillespie CLO:

EUR97,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (current outstanding balance of EUR86,976,516), Upgraded to
Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR65,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable
Funding Multi-Currency Notes due 2023 (current outstanding
balance of GBP17,774,243, US$22,915,458, and EUR14,969,918
unfunded), Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR40,000,000 Class A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR26,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Baa3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR20,700,000 Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR18,000,000 Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 B3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;

EUR15,000,000 Class E Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2023 (current outstanding balance of EUR14,748,992), Upgraded to
B2 (sf); previously on June 22, 2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade.


MONSOON ACCESSORIZE: High Court Protection Extended Until June 12
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that Monsoon Accessorize Ireland Ltd. has
been granted further High Court protection from creditors until
June 12.  That date marks the maximum 100 days of protection
available under the examinership granted to Monsoon Accessorize
on March 13, the Irish Times notes.

According to the Irish Times, the further period was granted on
Thursday by Mr. Justice Brian McGovern, to allow for more time to
finalize a survival plan.

The chain, which employs 269 people in 18 stores around the
country, is looking to close at least 10 of those outlets and
renegotiate rents with landlords for others, the Irish Times
discloses.

Rossa Fanning, for examiner Declan McDonald, said the four notice
parties to the examinership, including the Revenue, had consented
to the application for more time, the Irish Times relates.  The
counsel, as cited by the Irish Times, said this was an
examinership in which rents and dealing with landlords were an
important part of the process.

Monsoon Accessorize Ireland Ltd. is a women's clothing and
accessories chain.


* IRELAND: More Retailers May Go Into Examinership Over Rent Woes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jerome Reilly at Independent.ie reports that an avalanche of
retailers will go into examinership in the next few months to
escape sky-high rents, following landmark cases involving fashion
retailer Pamela Scott and DIY giant B&Q.

And a major legal change which means that small businesses under
pressure will be able to opt to enter examinership in the less
expensive Circuit Court, rather than the High Court, will also
increase the number of companies seeking the 100-day protection
that the examinership process offers, Independent.ie discloses.

According to one of the country's leading experts on
examinerships, fear of reputational damage stopped many of the
big names going into examinership in the past, Independent.ie
notes.

"That has all changed now.  Even [last] week, in the wake of the
successful exit from examinership of Pamela Scott and B&Q, we
have seen a massive increase in the number of inquiries,"
Independent.ie quotes Neil Hughes, of Hughes Blake Chartered
Accountants, which was involved in a majority of examinership
cases that came before the Irish courts last year, as saying.

Asked why so many landlords wait for a company to go into
examinership before agreeing to reduce rents, Mr Hughes said in
many cases it was understandable, Independent.ie relates.

"Typically a landlord is also in a position of some difficulty.
They may have a bank behind them and the bank may have Nama
behind them so you have very strong pressure on the landlord to
keep the rents exactly where they are," Mr. Hughes, as cited by
Independent.ie, said.

"There is always the thought in the landlord's mind that 'they
[the tenant] are not really going to go into examinership'."



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I T A L Y
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ANDROMEDA FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class A1 Notes to 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Andromeda Finance S.r.l.'s class A2
notes and the underlying rating (without the benefit of SACE SpA
('A-'/Rating Watch Negative) guarantee) of the class A1 notes to
'BB' from 'BB+'. The Outlook is Negative. Fitch has also
maintained class A1 notes' 'A-'rating (with the benefit of a SACE
guarantee) on Rating Watch Negative, in line with SACE's rating.

Key Rating Drivers:

Merchant Revenues Under Pressure:

The downgrade reflects a continuing decline in wholesale power
prices and a significant downward revision of forecasted power
prices by external market consultant, Poyry. The revision of the
forecast reflects protracted economic downturn in Italy, with
power prices expected to remain at around EUR60/MWh (real) for
the next five to six years. About 20% of project revenues are
from the sale of electricity at market prices, while 80% of
revenues come from the fixed feed-in-tariff (FIT) under the
Italian regulatory framework for solar plants (Conto Energia).

Lower Expected Debt Metrics:

As a result of the revision of the market price forecast, the
average expected debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) under Fitch's
base case has declined to 1.24x from 1.31x (excluding the first
two calculation dates). Under Fitch's more conservative rating
case, which is based on 1y P90 production estimate and an
additional 5% haircut to market advisor's price forecast, the
decline of the average DSCR is to 1.14x from 1.19x (excluding the
first two calculation dates). The debt service coverage profile
now also exhibits a downward sloping trend, which is a weaker
feature.

Operating Performance In Line With Expectations:

Electricity generation in H212 and Q113 was negatively affected
by cold weather and lower solar irradiation. However, even over
the worst affected past six months, cumulative generation was
still in line with Fitch's base case expectation (P50 less 2%),
after adjusting for unavailability of the plant in November 2012
caused by a flood (for which business interruption insurance
compensation has been agreed). Fitch views that more than two
years of operating data at or above Fitch's base case projections
confirm the reliability of the solar resource forecast. Operating
costs have largely been in line with the projections to date.

Regulatory Pressures May Continue:

The Negative Outlook reflects continuing regulatory uncertainty.
Substantial increases in solar photovoltaic (PV) capacities in
Italy in 2011 and 2012 in the context of a severe economic
downturn have created a burden on consumers who ultimately cover
the cost of the FITs. The government has so far intervened by
introducing a cap on the total PV system incentives paid and
several new regulations related to grid safety and stability,
while the previously approved FITs have been preserved. Fitch
expects that the project company will continue to be affected by
more stringent regulatory requirements and may incur higher costs
of complying with the new regulations. In particular, the impact
of the new regulation on production forecasting introduced in
January 2013 remains unclear due to delayed information from the
public authorities.

Fitch assessed the key rating drivers in accordance with the
'Rating Criteria for Solar Power Projects' as follows: Revenue
Risk (Price) - Midrange, Revenue Risk (Volume) - Stronger,
Operating Risk - Midrange, Debt Structure - Midrange, Debt
Service - Weaker.

RATING SENSITIVITIES:

-- Negative: Electricity generation persistently below the P50
   estimate, or below the 1yP90 estimate for several periods;
   higher-than-expected failure rates or operating costs;
   further declines in market prices; material adverse changes
   in the regulatory framework affecting PV installations.

-- Positive: Recovery of market prices supported by revised
   market advisor's forecast, energy production consistently at
   or above P50 for multiple years of operations supported by
   a revised solar resource study.

The transaction is a securitization of two project loans
(Facility A1 and Facility A2) under law 130/99 (the Italian
securitization law). The loan facilities were extended by BNP
Paribas and Societe Generale to Andromeda PV S.r.l. (the project
company) to build and operate two PV plants of 45.1MW and 6.1 MW
(a total 51.2MW) in Montalto di Castro, Italy. The terms of the
loans effectively mirror those of the rated notes, with payments
under Facility A1 and Facility A2 servicing the class A1 notes
and class A2 notes, respectively. The class A1 notes' rating and
Outlook reflect the first-demand, irrevocable and unconditional
guarantee provided by SACE. The guarantee provided by SACE to the
issuer is in respect of the project company's obligations under
Facility A1 and not on the class A1 notes directly.


MONTE DEI PASCHI: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Ba1 from Baa1 on review
for downgrade the ratings of the residential covered bonds issued
by Banca Monte Dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) (deposits B2 negative,
bank financial strength rating E/baseline credit assessment caa3
negative). This follows Moody's downgrade of MPS's ratings, on
May 9, 2013.

This rating action on the covered bonds concludes the review
initiated on February 4, 2013. The covered bonds are governed by
the Italian legal framework.

Ratings Rationale:

This downgrade is prompted by the downgrade of the issuer's
ratings. The TPI assigned to these transactions remains unchanged
at "Improbable". Moody's TPI framework constrains the rating of
MPS's residential mortgage covered bonds at its current level.

Key Rating Assumptions/Factors

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the issuer's
probability of default (measured by the issuer's rating); and (2)
the stressed losses on the cover pool assets following issuer
default.

The cover pool losses are an estimate of the losses Moody's
currently models if the relevant issuer defaults. Moody's splits
cover pool between market risk and collateral risk. Market risk
measures losses stemming from refinancing risk and risks related
to interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses may also
include certain legal risks). Collateral risk measures losses
resulting directly from the cover pool assets' credit quality.
Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral score.

The cover pool losses for this program are 28%, with market risk
of 23% and collateral risk of 5%. The collateral score for this
program is currently 7.5%. The over-collateralization (OC) in
this cover pool is 70.4%, of which MPS provides 20.5% on a
"committed" basis. The minimum OC level that is consistent with
the Ba1 rating target is 1.5%, in addition to the OC posted to
cover set-off and commingling risk in the ACT test. These numbers
show that Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its
expected loss analysis.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which indicates the likelihood that the issuer will make
timely payments to covered bondholders if the issuer defaults.
The TPI framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain
number of notches above the issuer's rating.

For MPS's residential mortgage covered bonds, Moody's assigned
TPI of Improbable remains unchanged.

Sensitivity Analysis:

The issuer's credit strength is the main determinant of a covered
bond rating's robustness. The TPI Leeway measures the number of
notches by which Moody's might downgrade the issuer's rating
before the rating agency downgrades the covered bonds because of
TPI framework constraints.

The TPI Moody's assigns to MPS's residential and commercial
covered bonds is Improbable. The TPI Leeway for these programmes
is limited, and thus any downgrade of the issuer ratings may lead
to a downgrade of the covered bonds.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (1) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting both the issuer's senior unsecured rating
and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the issuer; or (3)
a material reduction of the value of the cover pool.

Rating Methodology:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in July 2012.


MONTE DEI PASCHI: Moody's Lowers Debt & Deposit Ratings to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Banca Monte dei Paschi di
Siena S.p.A (MPS)'s long-term debt and deposit ratings to B2 from
Ba2. At the same time, the standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) of E was remapped to a standalone baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of caa3 from caa1. All ratings on the bank's
long-term debt instruments and programs are affected by this
action, including all the ratings of MPS Capital Services. The
outlook on the long-term deposit ratings is negative, reflecting
primarily the pressures from the currently challenging operating
environment in Italy on MPS's credit profile. The standalone BFSR
has no outlook.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's said that the downgrade of the standalone BCA to caa3
from caa1 reflects increasing pressure on MPS's (i)
profitability, (ii) asset quality and (iii) capitalization,
despite the Eur4.1 billion capital injection from the Italian
government received in February 2013(1).

Firstly, with regard to profitability, MPS reported a net loss
for 2012 of Eur3.2billion (EUR1.6 billion when adjusted to
exclude an additional goodwill impairment of EUR1.5 billion).
This was significantly affected by loan loss provisions of EUR2.7
billion -- more than double the amount booked in 2011. In its
business plan the bank targets a pre-tax profit of more than
Eur1.2 billion by 2015 mainly via (i) aggressive cost cutting
which aims to reduce operating expenses by more than EUR400
million, equivalent to almost 10% of total operating costs, and
(ii) a significant expected reduction of loan loss provisioning
requirements in 2015. With regards to the bank's cost cutting
plan, Moody's cautions that the cost reductions, while
challenging but potentially achievable, could be offset to some
degree by lower revenues due to the bank's deleveraging
objectives, as well as due to the economic headwinds and low
interest rate environment facing the bank. In this context,
Moody's noted that it had recently revised downward its Italian
GDP growth projections for 2013 from -1.0% to -1.8%; for 2014,
the growth projections are limited to 0.2%.

Secondly, with regard to asset quality, Moody's notes that the
ongoing recessionary environment is also a key challenge which
could make it difficult for MPS to reduce its cost of credit in
line with its business plan to 77 basis points in 2015, compared
to 188bp in 2012 (the bank has not provided specific guidance for
2013 and 2014), assuming that the bank doesn't further lower its
provisioning levels in relation to problem loans. According to
Moody's calculations, problem loans now stand at 16% of gross
loans (significantly above the system average of 10.6%(2)), while
the coverage of problem loans with provisions has declined to 53%
which, though above the system average, is below the pre-crisis
level of 60% in 2007. Moody's believes that significant
macroeconomic pressures will cause problem loans to increase
further as a percentage of gross loans in 2013 and 2014.

Thirdly, regarding capitalization, Moody's says that, as a result
of the expectation of high loan loss charges, the bank is likely
to be challenged to strengthen its capital adequacy through
internal profit generation. In December 2012 MPS's pro-forma core
tier 1 ratio stood at 11.3%, including a substantial EUR4.1
billion of capital from the Italian government (so-called Monti
bonds), which provide 440 basis point of core tier 1 capital.
This is only slightly above the average for larger Italian banks,
reported by the Bank of Italy to be 10.5% (3). Moody's cautions
that these Monti bonds include significant step-up clauses on
interest (which could be paid with new shares issued at market
price in case of losses) and principal, which will make these
instruments increasingly expensive to hold. In this context,
Moody's notes that MPS is planning to repay these bonds. Moody's
also notes that this government capital injection was only just
sufficient to cover the prior capital shortfall below the 9% Core
Tier 1 ratio according to EBA stress tests and capital
definitions and additional extraordinary losses on structured
transactions incurred in 2012 after the EBA exercise.

Moody's says that it believes that there is uncertainty regarding
the feasibility of MPS's plans to redeem the Monti bonds given
questions around internal capital generation and uncertain
prospects for external capital raises beyond the Eur1 billion
planned for 2014. According to Moody's adverse scenario, taking
into account (i) the low core profitability of the bank, (ii) the
Monti bonds in the capital structure of MPS, and (iii) the
limited prospects for new capital from the bank's other non-
government shareholders, Moody's is concerned that the risk of
burden sharing with creditors in order to ensure its adequate
capitalization has risen and would be significant under an
adverse scenario.

The downgrade of the deposit rating mainly reflects the remapping
of the BCA to caa3. The downgrade of the deposit rating however
also takes into account the Italian government's increasing Debt-
to-GDP ratio, as well as growing political pressure at the
national and international level to protect a government's
financial flexibility from the (contingent) liabilities stemming
from its banking system. As a result the uplift for the debt and
deposit rating, from the standalone BCA, has been reduced to four
notches, from five previously, due to Moody's expectation of
reduced systemic support.

The outlook on MPS's long-term deposit rating is negative, to
reflect the challenges posed by the weak operating environment;
the negative outlook is also in line with the outlook on the
Italian sovereign and with most Italian banks.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down

There is no upside pressure on the ratings at present in view of
the negative outlook. However the BCA could remain at caa3 if the
bank's problem loans stabilize over 2013, and if the bank will be
able to provide an achievable plan to repay its government bonds
within a limited timeframe. The deposit rating of B2 could be
confirmed if, in addition to the BCA remaining at caa3, our
assessment of the probability of systemic support remains high
throughout and beyond the current challenges for the bank.

Conversely, the standalone BCA could be lowered if asset quality
deteriorates further, with problem loans approaching 20% of total
gross loans. The B2 could also be downgraded as a result of a
lowering of the BCA, or in the event that willingness and/or
ability of the Italian government to support its banking system
decreases over the next 12 months.

MPS Capital Services

Moody's has also concluded the review on MPS's corporate and
investment banking subsidiary, MPS Capital services, which
remains fully integrated with and closely correlated to the
parent. The ratings of MPS Capital Services follow the ratings of
MPS.

List of Affected Ratings:

1. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) and its fully backed
vehicles MPS Capital Trust I and Monte Paschi Ireland Limited

- Senior unsecured debt and EMTN, and bank deposits: B2 with
negative outlook; (P)B2

- Subordinate debt and EMTN: Ca with negative outlook; (P)Ca

- Tier III EMTN: (P)Ca

- Junior subordinate and EMTN: C(hyb) with no outlook; (P)C

- Preferred stock: C(hyb) with no outlook

2. MPS Capital Services

- Long-term bank deposits: B2 with negative outlook

(1) Unless noted otherwise, data in this press release is sourced
from company's reports, or Moody's Banking Financial Metrics.

(2) Source: Bank of Italy's 5th Financial Stability Report,
published in April 2013. Moody's adjusts these numbers and only
incorporates 30% of the "incagli" (watchlist) category.

(3) Source: Bank of Italy's 5th Financial Stability Report,
published in April 2013.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology Name published in
June 2012.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DRYDEN XXVII: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings to
Dryden XXVII Euro CLO 2013 B.V.'s EUR249 million fixed- and
floating-rate class A-1A, A-1B, B-1A, B-1B, C-1A, C-1B, D, and E
notes.  At closing, Dryden XXVII Euro CLO 2013 also issued an
unrated subordinated class of notes.

S&P's ratings reflects its assessment of the credit quality of
the collateral portfolio, which has a weighted-average 'B+'
rating. The portfolio at closing was diversified, primarily
comprising broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured
term loans and senior secured bonds.

S&P's ratings also reflect the credit enhancement available to
the rated notes through the subordination of cash flows payable
to the subordinated notes.  S&P subjected the capital structure
to a cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate
for each rated class of notes.

In S&P's analysis, it used the target par amount, the covenanted
weighted-average spread, the covenanted weighted-average coupon,
and the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates.  S&P applied
various cash flow stress scenarios, using four different default
patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate stress
scenarios for each liability rating category.

Under the transaction documents, if the concentration of the pool
comprising assets paying a fixed rate of interest is between 20%
and 40%, no additional hedging is required.  S&P modeled the mix
of fixed- and floating-rate assets at the maximum and minimum
levels under the transaction documents.  S&P also biased defaults
toward fixed-rate assets during low interest-rate environments
and toward floating-rate assets during high interest-rate
environments.

The ratings assigned to the notes are commensurate with S&P's
assessment of available credit enhancement following its credit
and cash flow analysis.  S&P's analysis shows that the credit
enhancement available to each rated class of notes was sufficient
to withstand the defaults applicable under the supplemental tests
(not counting excess spread) outlined in S&P's corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

In S&P's analysis, it considered that the transaction documents'
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate the
transaction's exposure to counterparty risk under its 2012
counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's criteria for nonsovereign
ratings that exceed eurozone (European Economic and Monetary
Union) sovereign ratings, it considers the transaction's exposure
to country risk to be sufficiently mitigated at the assigned
rating levels as the concentration of the pool comprising of
assets in countries rated lower than 'A-' is limited to 10% of
the aggregate collateral balance.

In S&P's opinion, the transaction's legal structure is
bankruptcy-remote, in accordance with its "European Legal
Criteria For Structured Finance Transactions," published on Aug.
28, 2008.

Dryden XXVII Euro CLO 2013 is a European cash flow corporate loan
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) securitization of a
revolving pool, comprising euro-denominated senior secured loans
and bonds issued by European borrowers.  Pramerica Investment
Management Ltd. acts as collateral manager.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:

        http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1448.pdf

RATINGS LIST

Dryden XXVII Euro CLO 2013 B.V.
EUR300 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Class                 Rating          Amount
                                   (mil. EUR)

A-1A                  AAA (sf)         69.00
A-1B                  AAA (sf)        100.50
B-1A                  AA (sf)           9.40
B-1B                  AA (sf)          21.60
C-1A                  A (sf)           11.60
C-1B                  A (sf)            6.40
D                     BBB (sf)         13.00
E                     BB+ (sf)         17.50
Subordinated          NR               51.00

NR--Not rated.


* Dutch Insurers Continue to Face Competition and Tough Market
--------------------------------------------------------------
The negative outlook on the Dutch insurance industry principally
reflects Moody's expectation of an adverse economic environment
and ongoing competition that will continue to impair
profitability, says Moody's Investors Service in a new Industry
Outlook entitled "Dutch Insurance: Adverse Economy and Margin
Pressures Underlie Negative Outlook."

The main drivers of the negative outlook include (1) a further
contraction in Dutch life insurance, driven by the slowdown of
the mortgage market; (2) a shift of the life business model, as
insurers will target pension volumes at the expense of margins;
(3) high competition in non-life insurance; and (4) increasing
pressure on health insurance profitability.

Moody's says that the slowdown of the Dutch economy will have a
knock-on effect on the overall demand for insurance products. "In
particular, our expectation of a mortgage market slowdown will
negatively affect life insurers, because mortgage-related savings
and protection products represent an important part of life
insurance sales", explains Benjamin Serra, a Moody's Vice
President for European Insurance and co-author of the report.

Moody's says that the Dutch life market will also continue to
shrink because of customers' preference for banking products.
"Insurers will increasingly focus on pensions to grow their
earnings, and we expect that they will target volumes at the
expense of margins to build market shares with the hope of
creating economies of scale", adds Nadine Abaza, a Moody's
Associate Analyst and co-author of the report.

In non-life, high competition will limit insurers' ability to
increase prices and offset rising claims. Moody's believes that
combined ratios will remain high, despite insurers' focus on
operating costs. "In particular, we expect a continued
deterioration in disability claims which are partly correlated
with the economic environment", says Nadine Abaza. In addition,
insurers are increasingly moving towards more direct
distribution, which will reinforce intense pricing competition.

Moody's expects that increasing political oversight aimed at
controlling price increases in basic health will limit insurers'
ability to offset rising healthcare costs. The demand in
supplementary health -- currently the most profitable area for
health insurers -- will also decline as a direct consequence of
the economic downturn in the Netherlands.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


* ROMANIA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Credit Ratings; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB+/B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign
credit ratings on Romania.  The outlook is stable.

The ratings on Romania are constrained by Romania's comparatively
low per capita GDP, developing institutions, and vulnerability to
external shocks owing to its still-high, albeit declining,
external debt.  The ratings are supported by the government's
commitment to continued fiscal consolidation as well as by the
economy's potential to strengthen further by attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI).  Since 2009, the fiscal deficit has been
declining, the current account deficit has narrowed, and the
economy has started to rebalance.

S&P believes that economic growth will strengthen steadily in
2013-2015 primarily due to rising investment, facilitated by the
increased use of EU funds and a recovery in FDI, which will
support household spending and exports.  However, in S&P's
opinion, economic performance will be constrained by weak
administrative capacity, which will constrain EU funds
absorption, and by slow progress in implementing broader
structural reforms. The government is in the process of
restructuring state-owned enterprises, particularly in the energy
and transport sectors, but S&P believes there may be a reluctance
to close loss-making companies or sell state assets.  As a result
of these factors, S&P do not expect growth to exceed 3% over the
medium term.

In S&P's opinion, Romania's government will continue to
consolidate its public finances largely in line with specified
targets.  S&P believes that external imbalances, indicated by the
current-account deficit, will remain more moderate than in the
recent past.  S&P also assumes that the parent companies of
Romanian banking subsidiaries will not significantly reverse
their cross-border advances.

The ratings could come under pressure if, against S&P's
expectations, the pace and extent of fiscal consolidation were to
slow beyond what it currently foresees, or if the authorities
were to deviate from its structural reform strategy.  The ratings
could also come under downward pressure if Romania's external
deficits were to widen significantly without improving the
country's long-term growth potential.

Conversely, S&P could raise the ratings if the government
continues to push through with structural measures to improve
competitiveness and potential growth, while building a sustained
track record of fiscal prudence as external pressures diminish.



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


* SLOVENIA: To Sell 15 State Firms & Raise Tax to Avoid Bailout
---------------------------------------------------------------
Marja Novak at Reuters reports that Slovenia pledged to sell 15
state firms and raise VAT on Thursday in a desperate bid to avoid
an international bailout, but gave little detail and delayed the
spending cuts investors say are needed to stabilize its finances.

The much-anticipated package offered no timeframe for the sell-
off of state firms including the country's second largest bank,
its biggest telecoms operator and the national airline, Reuters
discloses.  Nor did it say how much they were worth, Reuters
notes.

It also said cuts to the public sector wage bill would have to
await the outcome of negotiations with unions, Reuters relates.

According to Reuters, Prime Minister Alenka Bratusek said the
package, which includes a rise in value added tax from July 1 to
22% from 20%, would be enough to prevent the tiny Alpine country
following Cyprus in the euro zone queue for a bailout from the
European Union and International Monetary Fund.

The plan was set to go to the European Commission, the EU's
executive arm, last Friday, Reuters notes.



=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT CEDULAS: Moody's Takes Multiple Rating Actions on SMICBs
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of three Spanish
multi-issuer covered bonds (SMICBs), upgraded the rating of one
series and changed the review status of four series from
direction uncertain to downgrade and three series from downgrade
to direction uncertain.

These actions follow updates on Spanish bank ratings since the
last rating action in October 2012, and updated information on
the underlying mortgage pools.

At the same time, Moody's (i) maintained the rating and review
for downgrade status of forty series and (ii) maintained the
rating and review for direction uncertain status of six series.
Moody's also maintained the current rating of one series which
was previously not under review.

Non-prime ratings affected by this action are:

AyT Cedulas Cajas VIII, FTA - Sub-Loan A; B2 (sf)
AyT Cedulas Cajas VIII, FTA - Sub-Loan B; Caa1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's has downgraded the rating of three series and kept them
on review for downgrade. This follows the rating downgrade to
some of the underlying cedulas' issuers backing the SMICB
(Participants), since Moody's last review in October 2012.

Moody's has upgraded one series which is callable and changed its
review status to uncertain. This follows a multi-notch upgrade of
the credit rating of the weakest participant in this series
pursuant to its acquisition by a stronger entity.

Moody's has changed the ratings of three series from review for
downgrade to review with direction uncertain because of an
improvement in the credit profile of the portfolios resulting
from either (i) an improvement in the expected loss of the SMICBs
since Moody's last review, mainly due to the absorption of weaker
participants by stronger ones or (ii) some underlying
participants' credit ratings being now on review for upgrade
compared to the last review. These positive developments are
partially offset by some of the underlying participants' ratings
being currently on review for downgrade.

Moody's has changed the ratings of four series from review with
direction uncertain to review for downgrade because the expected
loss for these series has worsened mainly due to downgrade of
some of the underlying participants since Moody's last review in
October 2012.

Moody's notes that Spain's country ceiling remains at A3. As a
result, the highest achievable rating for Spanish covered bond
also remains at A3.

Key Rating Assumptions/Factors:

The ratings assigned by Moody's address the expected loss posed
to investors.

SMICBs can be considered as a repackaging of a pool of Spanish
covered bonds. Each SMICB is backed by a group of Spanish covered
bonds (Cedulas Hipotecarias, CHs) that are bought by a Fund,
which in turn issues SMICBs. Moody's rating for any SMICB is
determined after applying a two-step process:

First step: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the SMICB.

The main driver of the expected loss (EL) of a SMICB is the
credit strength of the CHs backing the SMICBs. If the CHs
perform, the SMICBs will be fully repaid. CHs are rated according
to Moody's published covered bond methodology. In the absence of
any other support (for example, such as a reserve fund), the EL
of the SMICB is determined directly from the weighted-average EL
(weighted by their outstanding amounts) of the CHs backing the
SMICB.

The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond Model (COBOL),
which determines EL as a function of (i) the issuer's probability
of default (measured by its long-term rating); and (ii) the
stressed losses on the cover pool assets, following issuer
default.

Second step: A secondary rating target for SMICBs is the timely
payment.

Under the SMICB rating approach, Moody's gives value to two
primary liquidity supports that improve the probability of timely
payment if any CH backing the SMICBs fails to make a payment on a
scheduled payment date. These are (i) the maturity extension on
the SMICBs, which should ensure that a period of at least two
years is available following any default on the CH (this period
would be available to realize the value of the assets backing the
CH); and (ii) a liquidity facility (LF) that is available to
cover interest payments on the SMICBs. Under the SMICB rating
method, the LF benefiting any SMICB can be sized to improve the
timely payment of the SMICB to a level commensurate with the
SMICBs' ratings.

Sensitivity Analysis:

The robustness of a structured multi-issuer covered bond rating
largely depends on the underlying issuer's' credit strength, and
the support provided by the liquidity facility and reserve fund,
if any.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the SMICBs might occur in certain
limited circumstances, such as (i) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting the issuers' senior unsecured rating; (ii) a
multiple-notch downgrade of the issuers or downgrade to low sub-
investment grade; or (iii) a material reduction of the value of
the cover pool.

As the euro area crisis continues, the rating of covered bonds
remains exposed to the uncertainties of credit conditions in the
general economy. The deteriorating creditworthiness of euro area
sovereigns as well as the weakening credit profile of the global
banking sector could negatively impact the ratings of covered
bonds.

Rating Methodology:

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Covered Bonds", published in July 2012 and " Moody's
Approach to Rating Spanish Multi-Issuer Covered Bonds," published
in September 2009.


AYT FTPYME: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on EUR34MM Class F3 Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AyT FTPYME II, F.T.A's notes, as
follows:

EUR6.8m Class F2 (ISIN ES0312363015): affirmed at 'AA-sf';
Outlook Negative

EUR27.3m Class T2 (ISIN ES0312363023): affirmed at 'AA-sf';
Outlook Negative

EUR34.0m Class F3 (ISIN ES0312363031): affirmed at 'BB+sf';
Outlook Stable

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the notes reflects the stable portfolio
performance. Loans in arrears of more than 90 days account for
1.41% of the portfolio, up from 1.36% in April 2012. Arrears of
more than 90 days peaked at 3.91% in October 2012. The balance of
defaulted assets in the portfolio has increased to EUR4.6 million
from EUR4.3 million one year ago.

The class F2 and T2 notes' rating and Outlook are limited by the
rating of the Kingdom of Spain ('BBB'/Negative/'F2'). The highest
achievable rating for Spanish structured finance transactions is
'AA-sf', five notches above the sovereign's rating. See "Fitch:
SF Impact of Spanish, Italian & Irish Sovereign Rating Actions",
dated 1 Feb 2012 at www.fitchratings.com, for details of Fitch's
view on the link between sovereign Issuer Default Ratings and
structured finance ratings for eurozone countries.

The transaction is exposed to a lowly rated servicer (Banco Mare
Nostrum, 'BB+'/Rating Watch Negative (RWN)/'B). The resulting
payment interruption risk is mitigated by the reserve fund (RF)
in the structure. The RF balance is currently EUR12.2 million, up
from EUR12.0 million in April 2012.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier or a 0.75x recovery rate
multiplier to all assets in the portfolio would not result in a
downgrade of the notes.

AyT FTPYME II, F.T.A. is a static securitization of a EUR500
million initial portfolio of Spanish SME loans originated and
serviced by six savings banks now consolidated into Bankia S.A.
('BBB'/RWN/'F2'), CaixaBank S.A. ('BBB'/Negative/'F2'), Banco
Mare Nostrum S.A. ('BB+'/RWN/'B'), Kutxabank S.A. ('BBB-
'/Negative/'F3'), Unnim Banc S.A. ('BBB+'/Negative/'F2').


AYT ICO-FTVPO I: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of six junior
notes and confirmed the ratings of seven notes in four Spanish
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions: AyT
Colaterales Global Hipotecario Caja Cantabria I, AyT ICO-FTVPO
Caja Vital Kutxa, AyT ICO-FTVPO I, FTA and VAL Bancaja 1, FTA.
Insufficiency of credit enhancement to address sovereign risk and
the update in Moody's MILAN CE assumption prompted these
downgrades.

This rating action concludes the review of eleven notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 2012. This rating
action also concludes the review of two notes placed on review on
November 23, 2012, following Moody's revision of key collateral
assumptions for the entire Spanish RMBS market.

Ratings Rationale:

These downgrades reflect primarily the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk. Furthermore, Moody's took
into consideration the revised MILAN CE assumption in the case of
AyT ICO-FTVPO Caja Vital Kutxa based on current portfolio
characteristics. Moody's confirmed the ratings of securities
whose credit enhancement and structural features provided enough
protection against sovereign and counterparty risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement that
drives these rating actions reflects the introduction of
additional factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the
impact of sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk:

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions:

Moody's has not revised the lifetime expected loss assumptions in
the four transactions and maintained the values at 4.50% in AyT
Colaterales Global Hipotecario Caja Cantabria I, 1.27% in AyT
ICO-FTVPO Caja Vital Kutxa, 1.93% in AyT ICO-FTVPO I, FTA and
4.42% in VAL Bancaja 1, FTA.

During its review Moody's also reassessed the MILAN CE
assumptions of the transactions underlying portfolios based on
available loan-by-information. As a result, Moody's increased the
MILAN CE in AyT ICO-FTVPO Caja Vital Kutxa to 11.60% from 10.00%.
Moody's maintained the MILAN CE assumption at 15.00% in AyT
Colaterales Global Hipotecario Caja Cantabria I, 14.00% in AyT
ICO-FTVPO I, FTA and 15% in VAL Bancaja 1, FTA.

Exposure to Counterparty:

Moody's rating analysis took into consideration the exposure of
the senior notes in VAL Bancaja 1, FTA to Banco Santander (Spain)
(Baa2/P-2) acting as issuer account bank. Moody's concluded that
this risk did not have a negative impact on the outstanding
ratings.

Moody's rating analysis assessed as well the exposure to
Kutxabank, S.A. (Ba1/NP), that acts as swap counterparty in AyT
ICO-FTVPO Caja Vital Kutxa and the exposure to CECABANK S.A. (Ba1
under review for DNG/NP) that acts as swap counterparty in AyT
ICO-FTVPO I, FTA and AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario Caja
Cantabria I. Moody's concluded that these exposures are not
negatively impacting the ratings of the notes.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes:

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increase portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework, published in March 2013
and The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines published in March 2013.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in Approach to
Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance
Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment published in July
2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, for AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario
Caja Cantabria I the inputs for priority of payment trigger and
the reserve fund amortization trigger have been corrected during
the review.

List of Affected Securities:

Issuer: AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario Caja Cantabria I

EUR203.5M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR12.7M B Notes, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR10.3M C Notes, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: AyT ICO-FTVPO Caja Vital Kutxa

EUR140.4M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR7.7M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR6.9M C Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: AyT ICO-FTVPO I, FTA

EUR303M A(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR11.45M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR12.45M C Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: VAL BANCAJA 1, FTA

EUR88.3M A1 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR170M A2 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR26.7M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR15M C Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


UCI 9: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR9.4MM Class C Notes to 'B1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of three senior
notes and six junior notes in five Spanish residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transactions: UCI 5, FTA; UCI 6, FTA;
UCI 7, FTA; UCI 8, FTA and UCI 9, FTA. At the same time, Moody's
confirmed the ratings of two senior notes in UCI 5, FTA and UCI
6, FTA respectively.

The rating action concludes the review of seven notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 2012 and four
notes placed on review on November 23, 2012, following Moody's
revision of key collateral assumptions for the entire Spanish
RMBS market.

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade action primarily reflects the insufficiency of
credit enhancement to address sovereign risk as well as linkage
to counterparty. Moody's confirmed the ratings of securities
whose credit enhancement and structural features provided enough
protection against sovereign and counterparty risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk:

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions:

Moody's has maintained its lifetime loss expectation (EL) as well
as its MILAN CE assumption in all three transactions. Expected
loss assumptions remain at 0.44% for UCI 5, FTA, 0.61% for UCI 6,
FTA, 0.52 for UCI 7, FTA, 0.47% for UCI 8, FTA and 0.6% for UCI
9, FTA. Moody's EL review takes into consideration that for UCI
5, 6 and 7 defaults or losses are not reported. The MILAN CE
assumptions remain at 10% for all five UCI transactions.

Exposure to Counterparty Risk:

The conclusion of Moody's rating review takes into consideration
the exposure to Santander UK PLC (A2, P-1), which acts as issuer
account bank for all five UCI transactions and Union de Creditos
Inmobiliarios S.A. (NR) which acts as servicer and collection
account. Moody's also notes that, there is no swap in place to
protect the transactions against interest rate risk, however the
revised rating of the notes are not negatively impacted by this
exposure given the high excess spread on the pool.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes:

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Methodologies:

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in March 2013,
and "The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance
Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines" published
in March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Fondo de Titulizacion UCI 5

EUR253M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR12M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: UCI 6 Fondo De Titulizacion De Activos

EUR436.4M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR20.6M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: UCI 7

EUR438.6M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR16.4M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: UCI 8 Fondo De Titulizacion De Activos

EUR580.2M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR19.8M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: UCI 9 Fondo De Titulizacion De Activos

EUR1198.1M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR42.5M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR9.4M C Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CLAVIS SECURITIES 2006-01: S&P Raises Rating on M2a Notes to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on all classes of notes in Clavis Securities PLC's series
2006-01.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its ratings on the class A3a and A3b notes;

   -- Raised and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
      the class M1a, M1b, and M2a notes;

   -- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
      on the class B1a and B1b notes; and

   -- Affirmed its rating on the class B2a notes.

Following S&P's May 30, 2012 downgrade of Danske Bank A/S (A-
/Positive/A-2), rating triggers under the guaranteed investment
contract (GIC) and liquidity facility documentation were breached
in the transaction.  The issuer has been unable to replace Danske
Bank to remedy these breaches.  Therefore, a standby liquidity
drawing was made and all funds held in the GIC account were
transferred to the transaction account.

S&P has been advised that funds held in the transaction account
earn a nominal interest rate.  Funds previously held in the GIC
account received a LIBOR-linked interest rate.  S&P has modeled
this change in its cash flow models by assuming that funds held
in the transaction account earn no interest.  On Dec. 10, 2012,
S&P placed its ratings on the class M1a, M1b, M2a, B1a, and B1b
notes on CreditWatch negative, until it conducted a full review
of the effect this change has on S&P's ratings on these classes
of notes.

During S&P's review of this transaction, it became aware of an
error relating to certain inputs in its modeling of the interest
rate swap.  S&P's previous review assumed no credit to the margin
component of the bank basis rate (BBR) linked mortgage loans.
This error was present when S&P took rating actions in this
transaction on March 21, 2012.  As part of the rating actions,
S&P has rectified this error by giving credit to the margin
component of the BBR-linked mortgage loans.  The correction
specifically affects S&P's ratings on the M1a, M1b, and M2a
notes.

The application of S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria linked the
maximum achievable ratings in this transaction to its long-term
issuer credit rating (ICR) on Danske Bank.  As Danske Bank is no
longer a counterparty for this transaction, the maximum
achievable ratings are no longer linked to S&P's long-term ICR on
Danske Bank.  The ratings are however now linked to S&P's long-
term ICR on Barclays Bank PLC (A+/Negative/A-1), as currency swap
counterparty, resulting in a maximum potential rating of 'A+
(sf)'.

The rating actions follows S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that it has received.
S&P has observed an increase in the weighted-average loan-to-
value ratio since its March 2012 review.  Over the same period,
90+ days delinquencies have fallen and seasoning has increased.

The decreased arrears and increased seasoning have led to a lower
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) compared with S&P's
March 2012 review.  Below are the WAFF and weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) that S&P has used in its analysis.

Rating     WAFF     WALS
level       (%)      (%)

AAA       37.01    38.12
AA        30.10    33.55
A         24.01    25.25
BBB       19.07    20.54
BB        14.50    17.31
B         12.54    14.34

Overall, the changes to S&P's cash flow analysis have had varying
effects at each rating level and on each class of notes.  The
correction to the benefit S&P gives to the interest rate swap in
its analysis has been positive for all classes of notes.
However, S&P's assumption that funds held in the transaction
account earn no interest has an increasingly negative effect,
when moving down the capital structure.

The class A3a and A3b notes pass S&P's cash flow scenarios at the
'A+ (sf)' rating level.  Given the increase in the maximum
potential ratings in this transaction, S&P has raised to 'A+
(sf)' from 'A (sf)' its ratings on the class A3a and A3b notes.

The class M1a, M1b, and M2a notes pass S&P's cash flow scenarios
at higher rating levels than those currently assigned, primarily
due to the changes to S&P's cash flow analysis.  The correction
to the benefit S&P gives to the interest rate swap more than
compensates for its assumption that funds held in the transaction
account earn no interest.  S&P has therefore raised and removed
from CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class M1a, M1b, and
M2a notes.

At the same time, S&P has affirmed and removed from CreditWatch
negative its ratings on the class B1a and B1b notes, and has
affirmed its rating on the class B2a notes.  Overall, the changes
to S&P's cash flow analysis have had a neutral effect, and it
considers that S&P's ratings remain commensurate with the
levels achieved in its cash flow analysis.

S&P's credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that S&P would expect at each rating
level for time horizons of one year and three years under
moderate stress conditions is in line with S&P's credit stability
criteria.

Clavis Securities' series 2006-01 is a U.K. residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction backed by nonconforming
residential mortgages originated by GMAC Residential Funding Co.
LLC.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class               Rating
            To                From

Clavis Securities PLC
EUR333.25 Million and GBP371.35 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-
Rate Notes Series
2006-01

Ratings Raised

A3a         A+ (sf)           A (sf)
A3b         A+ (sf)           A (sf)

Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

M1a         A- (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M1b         A- (sf)           BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg
M2a         BB+ (sf)          BB (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B1a         B+ (sf)           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B1b         B+ (sf)           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

B2a         B- (sf)


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Asset Risks Cue Moody's to Cut Ratings to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior debt
ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from A3/Prime
2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1. The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.

The lowering of the BCA reflects Moody's opinion that (1) the
bank faces the risk of further substantial losses in its non-core
portfolio, as demonstrated recently by the unexpectedly
significant deterioration of its commercial real estate (CRE)
exposures, that will exert downward pressure on capital ratios
that are already low relative to its peers'; (2) its
vulnerability to losses is heightened by the low level of
provisions held against its lending portfolio; and (3) the bank's
slow progress in realizing merger-related revenue and cost
benefits has diminished its ability to replenish capital through
earnings. Together, these imply a risk of write-downs on junior
debt instruments and, potentially, the need for external support
to maintain regulatory capital levels. These risks are
incompatible with a BCA above the 'b' category.

Consistent with the lower b1 BCA, Moody's downgraded the ratings
of the bank's subordinated and junior subordinated debt to B2 and
B3 (hyb), respectively, from Baa2 and Baa3 (hyb).

Moody's is maintaining the one notch uplift from the BCA that it
incorporates into the deposit and senior debt ratings reflecting
the assumption of a moderate potential for systemic support
likely to be forthcoming from the UK authorities in the event of
need for a medium-sized institution such as Co-operative Bank.

Moody's has also extended the review for downgrade -- initiated
on July 30, 2012 -- on all the bank's long-term ratings and BFSR.
The review for further downgrade will allow Moody's to examine
the effectiveness of the bank's plan to strengthen its capital
structure, improve profitability and reduce its cost base once
the full implications of the Prudential Regulatory Authority
(PRA) review are known by the bank, which is not expected until
end-May 2013.

Ratings Rationale:

The lowering of the BCA to b1 reflects Moody's view that the
bank's 2012 revaluation of its risk exposures announced in March
indicates that the significant deterioration in the credit
quality of the bank's non-core portfolio has exceeded the bank's
expectations and that its earlier valuation reserves and
provisions built against these risks may well be inadequate. Most
of these risks stem from the legacy portfolio of Britannia
Building Society, which the Co-operative Bank acquired in 2009.
Moody's believes that the bank underestimated the risks of that
acquisition, especially against the backdrop of the continued
weak economic environment. Moreover, the bank's ability to
generate the earnings needed to replenish capital, if higher
losses materialize, is diminished by its slow progress in
realizing merger-related revenue and cost benefits.

Moody's believes that the combination of (1) low capital levels;
(2) a low problem-loan coverage ratio relative to other UK banks;
and (3) weak internal capital-generation capacity suggests that
the bank's capacity to absorb future losses is now too low to
support an investment grade rating and that it possesses only
speculative standalone strength, subject to high credit risk in
the absence of extraordinary external support. The ratings
assigned to the bank's subordinated and junior subordinated debt
reflect the possibility that losses may be imposed on holders of
these securities in order to achieve the capitalization levels
that the UK regulators require.

Capital Levels Are Low, Relative To Those of Its Peers

The bank reported a Basel 2.5 Core Tier 1 ratio of 8.8% at end
2012 (which improved to 9.2% in January 2013 following a
securitization transaction), which is considerably lower than
those of its UK peers. In addition, Co-operative Bank reported a
fully-loaded Basel III CET1 ratio of 6.3% (which improved to 6.7%
in January). This is already below the new target capital ratio
of 7% outlined by the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) before any
further adjustments to its capital requirements and or resources
that may come as a result of the PRA review, which is responsible
for ensuring that UK banks have capital plans that will enable
them to meet the 7% target. The prudence of asset valuations and
the adequacy of provisions are two areas of focus under the PRA's
review. The bank's particularly low CET1 ratio is driven by
substantial capital deductions for anticipated losses in excess
of the currently low level of provisions on the non-core
portfolio, which accounts for approximately six times its Tier 1
capital, highlighting its weak loss-absorption capacity.

CRE Exposures Prompt Increase in Problem Loans:

According to Moody's calculations, the bank's problem loan ratio
increased to 10.9% at year end 2012 from 8.1% in 2011. Although
the non-performing loan ratio of the bank's core portfolio
remains stable, the quality of its non-core book has
significantly weakened due to the deterioration of its CRE
exposures. The considerable increase in impairments indicates
that the initial fair-value protection created following the
merger with Britannia Building Society significantly
underestimated the losses this portfolio would experience. In
addition, the limited efforts to effect asset disposals, compared
with UK peers' aggressive deleveraging of non-core assets, may
have resulted in the bank overestimating asset values and
underestimating potential expected losses.

2013 Profitability Will Remain Subdued; Balance-Sheet
Deleveraging Could Improve Capital Ratios:

Moody's considers that the bank's profitability will remain
subdued during 2013 due to low interest margins, further losses
in its non-core portfolio and a high cost base, as reflected in
its reported cost to income ratio of 74% at year end 2012, which
is high for a retail/SME-focused bank in the UK. Co-operative
Bank posted a loss before taxes of GBP673.7 million in 2012
compared with a profit before tax of GBP54.2 million in 2011. The
loss was mainly driven by a significant increase in impairment
losses to GBP468.7 million (GBP114.9 million in 2011), close to
four times the impairment losses recorded in 2011.

Moody's believes that Co-operative Bank is unlikely to be able to
generate a significant amount of capital through earnings. As
such, to maintain capital ratios at the level required to satisfy
its ongoing regulatory objectives, Moody's would expect to see
the bank deleveraging its balance sheet and receiving additional
support from its parent (Co-operative Banking Group Ltd
(unrated)) following their announcement to dispose some assets,
such as its life and general insurance businesses. Moody's
believes that there is material uncertainty as to whether these
actions alone will be sufficient to maintain the capital base at
the required level given the losses the bank may experience in
its non-core portfolio.

Decision To Cancel Verde Assets Acquisition Implies That Any
Future Growth Will Need To Be Organic:

Co-operative Group also announced on April 24, 2013 that it would
no longer proceed with the acquisition of the assets and
liabilities (known as "Verde") that Lloyds Banking Group has been
required to sell by the European Commission. While the
abandonment of the deal is not a material driver of this action,
had it proceeded to completion the deal would have strengthened
Co-operative Bank's franchise and increased its customer base.
However, Moody's believed that the deal would have also posed a
number of challenges in terms of capital, liquidity and execution
risk. Its abandonment implies that future growth targets will be
met through organic growth, which Moody's considers as
challenging given the bank's current capital position.

What Could Move the Ratings Down/Up

Negative pressure on Co-operative Bank's ratings would stem from
further deterioration in its Core Tier 1 capital driven by
further loses or insufficient remediation actions to maintain and
increase capital ratios above minimum regulatory requirements. In
addition, a further decline in profitability and efficiency
ratios would exert negative pressure on the ratings. Since the
debt and deposit ratings benefit from systemic support uplift,
they remain sensitive to any further changes in Moody's support
assumptions or the credit quality of the UK government (Aa1
stable).

There is no short-term upward pressure on the ratings, reflected
by the review for downgrade. However, in the long term, upward
pressure might develop on the ratings following (1) significant
improvements in the bank's capital position; (2) further
reductions in its non-core portfolio; and (3) improvements in its
profitability and efficiency ratios.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.


DANIEL CONTRACTORS: Nears Administration; 1,300 Jobs at Risk
------------------------------------------------------------
Gaurav Panchal at Bloomberg News, citing London's Times
newspaper, reports that Daniel Contractors is close to bringing
in administrators after it ran into financial difficulties.

According to the Times, 1,300 engineering jobs may be at risk.

Deloitte is on standby and could be brought in as early as this
week, the Times notes.

Daniel Contractors is an engineering company based in the United
Kingdom.


DUKEDOM LTD: Falls Into Administration, Closes Bars
---------------------------------------------------
chroniclelive.co.uk reports that Pier 39 and Breeze on South
Parade in Whitley Bay, North Tyneside, shut after owners Dukedom
Ltd went into administration.

Now a bid by Prosperity Properties Ltd to turn the adjacent bars
into 14 apartments has been backed by North Tyneside councilors,
according to chroniclelive.co.uk.

The report relates that the closure of Pier 39 and Breeze, which
occupied a prime spot on the South Parade strip, sparked concerns
about the decline of the town's clubbing scene.  Two more bars in
the area, Easy Street, in South Parade, and 42nd Street, in East
Parade, also shut their doors in January, the report notes.

The report discloses that owners Ladhar Leisure said the decision
to close those sites was made due to declining trade on the
Whitley Bay circuit over the last few years.

The report says that among the points made by three objections to
the flats venture were that the council should do more to help
bars stay open "and restore Whitley Bay to the town it was and
should be" and "the nightlife is what draws people to the town."

A further objection was that an area recognised as a commercial
leisure and drinking hub is not suited to residential use, the
report adds.


POWERSAFE COMMUNICATIONS: In Administration, Cuts 5 Jobs
--------------------------------------------------------
Milford & West Wales Mercury reports that Powersafe
Communications Limited has gone into administration with the loss
of five jobs.

Sister company Powersafe Limited -- which deals with bigger
projects involving the ports and refineries as opposed to
smaller-scale contracting -- will continue to operate from the
company's premises as normal, according to Milford & West Wales
Mercury.

"Powersafe Communications Limited dealt with contracting, which
was down to what contracts are on at the moment and that was not
a lot.  We had to lay off some of our employees because we could
not keep them on.  It's not a nice sort of outcome, but we're
still here," the report quoted owner Tony Edwards as saying.

Mr. Edwards said a number of factors had weakened the company,
including a project being pulled and the length of time it took
to sell one of the company's buildings at Western Tangiers, the
report notes.

According to Mr. Edwards, some of the money, which would normally
have come into the company's hands last year, was diverted to the
Olympics, and while money had been made elsewhere off the back of
London 2012, Pembrokeshire had suffered, the report discloses.

The administration process in being handled by Bridgestones.

Powersafe Communications Limited is a Haverfordwest-based safety
and security company.


PRESBYTERIAN MUTUAL: Representatives Agree to Director Ban
----------------------------------------------------------
UTV Live News reports that the High Court has heard
representatives of the collapsed Presbyterian Mutual Society have
agreed not to act as company directors for periods of up to six
years.

Undertakings given by each of the men have led to a resolution of
disqualification proceedings against them, UTV discloses.

The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI) was
seeking to have the society's former chief executive and five
directors declared unfit to run a company over their alleged role
in the PMS, UTV says.

But on the eve of a planned two-week hearing, a judge was asked
to dismiss the case against them by consent, UTV relates.

According to UTV, Michael Humphreys QC, for DETI, revealed: "Each
of the respondents has given an undertaking not to act as a
director for a particular period of time.

"The Department can accept undertakings when it's expedient and
in the public interest. That's the agreed position."

Mr. Justice Deeny requested the details for each representative,
stating that the public was entitled to know, UTV discloses.

Under the terms of the settlement, 54-year-old Colin Ferguson,
from Hallstown Road in Lisburn -- who acted as chief executive of
the PMS -- agreed to a six-year period when he would not act as a
company director, UTV notes.

Four of the former PMS directors -- David James Clements, David
McConaghy, Albert McCormick and Samuel McFarland -- gave
undertakings not to act as company directors for four years, UTV
states.  A fifth director agreed to a three-year period, UTV
says.

Nearly 10,000 Presbyterians lost access to their savings when the
society was forced into administration in November 2008 after a
run on its funds, UTV recounts.

A rescue package underwritten by the Westminster government and
the Northern Ireland Executive was agreed in 2011, UTV relates.

DETI had made a series of allegations of unfitness against some
of the directors, discloses.

Presbyterian Mutual Society is based in Belfast, Northern
Ireland.


PROFMEDIA: S&P Lowers Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
long-term corporate credit rating on Russia-based diversified
media holding company ProfMedia to 'B' from 'B+' and placed it on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

At the same time, S&P revised downward the recovery rating on the
senior unsecured notes issued by ProfMedia-Finance LLC to '5'
from '4', and lowered the issue ratings on these notes to 'B-'
from 'B+'.  The issue rating on the notes is one notch below the
corporate credit rating.

The downgrades mainly reflect ProfMedia's weaker operating
performance in 2012 than S&P expected, owing to unforeseen
revenue and earnings volatility at its key content production
business, and lower overall profitability compared with its main
peers.  In addition, the likely deconsolidation of ProfMedia's
Internet business has limited its business diversity.  S&P has
therefore revised its business risk profile assessment downward
to "weak" from "fair."

The rating actions also reflect the substantial increase in the
group's Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage in 2012, and its
opinion that ProfMedia is unlikely to meaningfully deleverage
this year.  Furthermore, S&P views the group's financial policy
of refinancing its significant debt maturities at the last
possible moment as very aggressive and risky.  S&P nevertheless
anticipates that the company will make further progress on its
refinancing talks with potential lenders over the coming weeks
and that the group's shareholder would provide financial support
to repay debt maturities in a timely manner if needed.

In S&P's base-case assessment, it assumes that ProfMedia will
report revenue growth in line with that of the Russian
advertising market.  Because S&P expects slower growth in 2013-
2014, it believes ProfMedia will report mid-single-digit
percentage like-for-like revenue growth in 2013--excluding
revenues from the digital segment, which the group will likely
deconsolidate in 2013 following a merger with SUP Media.  S&P
notes, however, that if ProfMedia's launch of a new channel
"Pyatniza" is successful and manages to reach a higher audience
share than that of the company's discontinued "MTV" channel, this
might result in higher growth for consolidated revenues.

Given the deconsolidation of the digital segment and the launch
of a new channel, S&P expects the company's EBITDA generation to
remain sensitive to large investment in content acquisition, as
in previous years.  Generation of EBITDA will, however, be
important to finance growth in this segment.  Consequently, S&P
believes that ProfMedia's leverage will continue to fluctuate,
depending on the company's appetite for content acquisition.
However, S&P thinks that ProfMedia's adjusted debt to EBITDA will
be 4x-5x (3.5x-4.0x excluding the shareholder loan), which S&P
views as rating-commensurate.  In addition, S&P thinks free
operating cash flow will improve and reach a breakeven level no
earlier than 2014 on the back of revenue growth and lower
investments in content.

The ratings reflect ProfMedia's relatively high financial
leverage, highly volatile cash flow generation, and likely
negative free cash flow in the near term.  Exposure to Russia's
cyclical media industry, decreasing diversification in terms of
revenues and EBITDA, and complex regulatory environment also
constrains the ratings.  These risks are moderated by the
company's strong market position in its core content business,
leading position in radio broadcasting, and the fact that it
gains about one-third of its revenues from less cyclical non-
advertising markets.

S&P will closely monitor ProfMedia's discussions with lenders and
aim to resolve the CreditWatch negative placement by the middle
of June 2013.  S&P will, in particular, focus on any significant
advances in these discussions that could lead to funding
commitments from banks or the company's shareholder over the next
few weeks.  S&P could consider a multiple-notch downgrade if the
company was unsuccessful in obtaining such funding commitments to
refinance its RUB3 billion bonds in a timely manner.  S&P could
affirm the ratings if the company was successful in obtaining
committed funding to refinance its upcoming maturities by mid-
June.


SCOTTISH COAL: Hargreaves Named Preferred Bidder for Assets
-----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that liquidators for Scottish Coal have named a
preferred bidder for some of its assets.

BBC relates KPMG said it had chosen County Durham-based
Hargreaves Services as the best way of resuming operations and
bringing mining jobs back to the coal fields.

The liquidators did not specify which assets were involved, BBC
notes.

Scottish Coal, which operated six open cast mines across
Scotland, folded last month with the loss of 600 jobs, BBC
relates.

Earlier this year, Hargreaves bought the rights to take over the
assets of Scotland's second biggest open-cast mining firm, ATH
Resources, which was put into administration in December, BBC
recounts.

The sector has been in crisis because of a slump in coal prices,
BBC says.

According to BBC, KPMG chose energy and waste group Hargreaves as
preferred bidder for "various" Scottish Coal assets after
considering a number of offers.

In a statement, KPMG, as cited by BBC, said: "Following
consideration of the offers received, the interim liquidators
will now be working with Hargreaves to finalize the acquisition
of various properties, plant and equipment and stocks owned by
the companies."

The sale is expected to take between four and six weeks to
complete, BBC states.

Scottish Coal is an open cast mining firm.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 6 to May 10, 2013
--------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *