/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130527.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, May 27, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 103
Headlines
F R A N C E
DOUX: Court Extends Administration Period
* French Prime RMBS Performance Stable in March, Says Moody's
G E R M A N Y
CONTINENTAL AG: Schaeffler Deal May Be Weakening as Accord Ends
IVG IMMOBILIEN: Calls for Establishment of Creditors' Committees
G R E E C E
DRYSHIPS INC: Posts US$116.6-Mil. Net Loss in First Quarter
I R E L A N D
ASHFORD CASTLE: Red Carnation Buys Business for EUR20 Million
BRENNAN GROUP: Three Hotels in Receivership
I T A L Y
SISAL HOLDING: Moody's Assigns 'B2-PD' PDR; Outlook Stable
L U X E M B O U R G
KLOECKNER PENTAPLAST: Moody's Rates EUR225-Mil. PIK Notes Caa1
N E T H E R L A N D S
FREE RECORD: Files for Bankruptcy; Mulls Options
R U S S I A
BANK AVANGARD: Moody's Affirms B2 Deposit Ratings, E+ BFSR
RUSSIAN STANDARD: Fitch Rates Upcoming Sub. Debt Issue 'B(EXP)'
S L O V E N I A
* SLOVENIA: Lawmakers Approve Changes to Insolvency Legislation
S P A I N
BANCO SANTANDER: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Preference Shares Rating
FONCAIXA AUTONOMOS 1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B Notes to Ba1
FTPYME TDA 7: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR11.2MM C Notes to Caa2
PESCANOVA SA: Chairman to Testify as Official Suspect on July 1
* Spanish SME ABS Performance Improving in March, Moody's Says
T U R K E Y
* Turkey's Upgrade No Impact on 8 ABS Transactions, Moody's Says
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
IAC PLASTICS: In Administration, Seeks Buyer
NORTEL NETWORK: Retirees Fight Objection to US$1.3-Bil. Claims
RANGERS FOOTBALL: Duff & Phelps Cleared of Conflict of Interest
ROYAL BANK: Moody's Corrects Rating on Tier 2 Notes to Ba2
* Moody's Notes Stable Performance of UK Prime RMBS in February
* Moody's: UK Buy-To-Let RMBS Performance Improves in February
* UK Non-Conforming RMBS Performance Stable in Feb., Says Moody's
* Christopher Howard to Join Sullivan & Cromwell's London Office
X X X X X X X X
* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 20 to May 24, 2013
*********
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F R A N C E
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DOUX: Court Extends Administration Period
-----------------------------------------
Dean Best at just-food reports that Doux has secured another
extension to its period in administration.
According to just-food, a court in the French town of Quimper on
May 23 gave the company's management another six months in
administration, which started last June.
The ruling is the fourth time Doux, which went into
administration with debts of EUR430 million (US$556.5 million)
has had its period in administration extended, just-food notes.
The company has restructured the business, selling off plants and
modernizing others, just-food relates. Earlier this month,
however, Doux had to shut its last abattoir for fresh products
after it failed to attract a buyer, just-food recounts.
According to just-food, a spokesperson for Doux said the renewed
period in administration would include meetings over the possible
move by French investment fund, Developpement & Partenariat (D&P)
to become the company's majority shareholder.
D&P has proposed to acquire Doux's debt from Barclays and take
two-thirds of the French group's capital in return, just-food
discloses. The Doux family and BNP Paribas will account for the
remaining third of the group's capital, just-food states.
The spokesperson, as cited by just-food, said Doux would also use
the extension of the period in administration to try to continue
to improve profits and secure better payment terms from its
suppliers.
Doux is a French poultry group.
* French Prime RMBS Performance Stable in March, Says Moody's
-------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the French prime residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) market has been stable during the six-month
period to March 2013, according to the latest indices published
by Moody's Investors Service.
From September 2012 to March 2013, the 90+ day delinquency trend
stabilized around 0.5% of the outstanding portfolio balance. The
level of CIF ASSETS 2001-1 delinquencies has decreased by half
since March 2012 as loans that benefit from payment holidays are
now reported as having deferred installments as opposed to being
in arrears. Cumulative defaults recorded 0.8% in March 2013 but
were stable overall during the preceding six-month period.
Cumulative net defaults averaged 0.4% of the original portfolio
balance. Moody's annualized total redemption rate (TRR) trend
remained at 9.5% in March 2013.
Since October 2011, Moody's has not rated any new transactions in
the French prime RMBS market.
As of March 2013, the seven Moody's-rated French prime RMBS
transactions had an outstanding pool balance of EUR28.99 billion.
This constitutes a year-on-year increase of 1.5% compared with
EUR28.57 billion for the same period in the previous year. This
increase is mainly the result of CIF Assets' tap issuances in
October 2012.
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G E R M A N Y
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CONTINENTAL AG: Schaeffler Deal May Be Weakening as Accord Ends
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that Schaeffler Group's decision to end its
investment agreement with Continental AG ('BB'/Stable) is another
illustration that structural and financial links between the two
groups are gradually weakening. "We are therefore reassessing our
view on the linkage strength between Continental and Schaeffler
and its impact on the former's ratings. This may lead to a
positive rating action and lead Continental's ratings to converge
towards its standalone credit profile in the 'BBB' rating
category if we assume that we will see further evidence of the
linkage weakening," Fitch says.
Schaeffler said that it will unilaterally terminate its
shareholder's agreement with Continental in May 2014, the
earliest possible date included in the accord, as key provisions
expired in 2012 and the agreement has no practical relevance.
Nonetheless, uncertainty remains high about the future
relationship between both groups. From an operational standpoint,
Fitch believes that Schaeffler's decision will not have any
material impact on industrial and business cooperation in the
short-term.
"We also believe that Schaeffler's strategy with regards to its
participation in Continental remains extremely unclear despite
Schaeffler's comments that Continental will remain a key long-
term partner. Schaeffler's decision to end their investment
agreement may mean that they intend to reduce their participation
in Continental but we believe that Schaeffler may also maintain
its stake at its current 49.9% level. Indeed, the investment
agreement was not preventing Schaeffler from reducing its
participation. Therefore, ending the accord does not constitute
any trigger enabling Schaeffler to sell a stake," Fitch says.
"Continental's ratings continue to reflect our assessment of the
company's standalone credit profile being consistent with a low
'BBB' rating. However, the ratings also incorporate our view of
the Schaeffler Group and Continental's consolidated credit
quality, including a one-notch uplift to reflect the ring-fencing
in place and creditor protection included in Continental's
existing bond and loan documentation. In particular, we believe
that Schaeffler's controlling influence and ability to extract
cash from Continental is limited owing to a ring-fencing between
the two groups."
IVG IMMOBILIEN: Calls for Establishment of Creditors' Committees
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alexander Kell at Bloomberg News reports that IVG Immobilien has
asked for the establishment of creditors' committees for talks
about financing strategy.
According to Bloomberg, the company plans to hold a conference
call with all creditors on May 28 at 3:00 p.m. CET to inform
about next steps.
The company plans to present a "financing concept" at its annual
general meeting in August, Bloomberg discloses.
Debt Restructuring
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 9,
2013, Bloomberg News related that IVG Immobilien, which plans to
restructure EUR4 billion (US$5 billion) of debt, said the
company's first-quarter loss widened as the value of its
properties fell. The company said in a statement on May 7 that
the net loss swelled to EUR45.1 million from EUR4.6 million a
year earlier, Bloomberg disclosed. The value of IVG's properties
dropped by EUR42.5 million, Bloomberg noted.
IVG Immobilien is a German-based real estate company.
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G R E E C E
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DRYSHIPS INC: Posts US$116.6-Mil. Net Loss in First Quarter
-----------------------------------------------------------
DryShips Inc. on May 22 reported unaudited financial and
operating results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2013.
First Quarter 2013 Financial Highlights
* For the first quarter of 2013, the Company reported a net
loss of $116.6 million, or US$0.30 basic and diluted loss per
share.
Included in the first quarter 2013 results are:
* Losses on the sale of four newbuilding drybulk vessels, of
US$75.3 million, or US$0.20 per share.
Excluding the above items, the Company's net results would have
amounted to a net loss of US$41.3 million, or US$0.10 per share.
* The Company reported Adjusted EBITDA of US$112.0 million for
the first quarter of 2013, as compared to US$104.1 million
for the first quarter of 2012.(2)
Recent Events
* In March 2013 and April 2013, the Company sold its
newbuilding Capesize bulk carriers Hull 1241 and 1242, to an
unaffiliated third party and its newbuilding Very Large Ore
Carriers Hulls 1239 and 1240, to an entity related to Mr.
George Economou. These four vessels had remaining yard
installments of approximately US$178 million against which
the Company had no committed debt. Under the terms of the
sale agreements, the Company will make payments of only US$29
million, thus eliminating approximately US$149 million in
capital expenditures.
* On February 28, 2013, Ocean Rig signed definitive
documentation for a US$1.35 billion syndicated secured term
loan facility to partially finance the construction costs of
the newbuilding drillships Ocean Rig Mylos, Ocean Rig Skyros
and Ocean Rig Athena, scheduled for delivery in August 2013,
October 2013 and November 2013, respectively. The facility
has a five-year term and a repayment profile of approximately
11 years and bears interest at LIBOR plus a margin.
* On February 14, 2013, the Company completed a public offering
of an aggregate of 7,500,000 common shares of Ocean Rig owned
by DryShips. The Company received approximately US$123.1
million of net proceeds from the public offering.
(1) The net result is adjusted for the minority interests of 41%
of Ocean Rig not owned by Dryships Inc. common shareholders
as of March 31, 2013.
(2) Adjusted EBITDA is a non-GAAP measure; please see later in
this press release for reconciliation to net income.
George Economou, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, commented:
"During the first quarter of 2013, we entered into agreements to
sell four of our bulk carriers under construction in China. We
did not have any bank financing in place for these vessels.
Under the terms of the sale agreements, we will make payments of
only US$29 million, effectively eliminating US$149 million in
capital expenditures. We have now reduced our newbuilding
program to six bulk carriers, two of which are scheduled for
delivery in 2013, for which we have time charters and bank
financing in place, and four of which are scheduled for delivery
in 2014, for which we are considering our options.
Now that our unfunded capital expenditures have been reduced
significantly, we are in discussions with our lenders to lower
our debt service requirement. These developments are expected to
reduce our cash outflow and lower our cash breakeven levels.
Even though there has been a recent spike in some drybulk charter
rates, we continue to be defensive about the short-term prospects
of the shipping markets. Asset prices seem to be holding up but
we do not expect any positive sustainable development in charter
rates this year.
We are a pure shipping company with spot market exposure and a
shareholding in Ocean Rig. Ocean Rig's capital and resources are
completely separated from those of DryShips. We continue to be
bullish about the prospects for Ocean Rig, whose contract backlog
currently stands at approximately US$4.9 billion over three
years."
Financial Review: 2013 First Quarter
The Company recorded a net loss of US$116.6 million, or US$0.30
basic and diluted loss per share, for the three-month period
ended March 31, 2013, as compared to a net loss of US$47.5
million, or US$0.12 basic and diluted earnings per share, for the
three-month period ended March 31, 2012. Adjusted EBITDA was
US$112.0 million for the first quarter of 2013, as compared to
US$104.1 million for the same period in 2012.(3)
For the drybulk carrier segment, net voyage revenues (voyage
revenues minus voyage expenses) amounted to US$36.9 million for
the three-month period ended March 31, 2013, as compared to
US$72.4 million for the three-month period ended March 31, 2012.
For the tanker segment, net voyage revenues amounted to US$10.8
million for the three-month period ended March 31, 2013, as
compared to US$7.2 million for the same period in 2012. For the
offshore drilling segment, revenues from drilling contracts
increased by US$83.4 million to US$246.4 million for the three-
month period ended March 31, 2013, as compared to US$163.0
million for the same period in 2012.
Total vessels', drilling rigs' and drillships' operating expenses
and total depreciation and amortization increased to US$144.9
million and US$82.7 million, respectively, for the three-month
period ended March 31, 2013, from US$106.9 million and US$82.0
million, respectively, for the three-month period ended March 31,
2012. Total general and administrative expenses increased to
US$36.2 million in the first quarter of 2013, from US$34.0
million during the comparative period in 2012.
Interest and finance costs, net of interest income, amounted to
US$56.9 million for the three-month period ended March 31, 2013,
compared to US$50.8 million for the three-month period ended
March 31, 2012.
About DryShips Inc.
Headquartered in Athens, Greece, DryShips Inc. (NASDAQ: DRYS) is
an owner of drybulk carriers and tankers that operate worldwide.
Through its majority owned subsidiary, Ocean Rig UDW Inc.,
DryShips owns and operates 10 offshore ultra deepwater drilling
units, comprising of 2 ultra deepwater semisubmersible drilling
rigs and 8 ultra deepwater drillships, 3 of which remain to be
delivered to Ocean Rig during 2013 and 1 is scheduled for
delivery during 2015. DryShips owns a fleet of 46 drybulk
carriers (including newbuildings), comprising of 12 Capesize, 28
Panamax, 2 Supramax and 4 Very Large Ore Carriers (VLOC) with a
combined deadweight tonnage of about 5.1 million tons, and 10
tankers, comprising 4 Suezmax and 6 Aframax, with a combined
deadweight tonnage of over 1.3 million tons.
The Company reported a net loss of US$288.6 million on
US$1.210 billion of revenues in 2012, compared with a net loss of
US$47.3 million on US$1.078 billion of revenues in 2011.
The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2012, showed
US$8.878 billion in total assets, US$5.010 billion in total
liabilities, and shareholders' equity of US$3.868 billion.
Going Concern Doubt
Ernst & Young (Hellas), in Athens, Greece, expressed substantial
doubt about DryShips Inc.'s ability to continue as a going
concern, citing the Company's working capital deficit of
US$670 million at Dec. 31, 2012, and in addition, the non-
compliance by the shipping segment with certain covenants of its
loan agreements with banks.
As of Dec. 31, 2012, the shipping segment was not in compliance
with certain loan-to-value ratios contained in certain of its
loan agreements. In addition, as of Dec. 31, 2012, the shipping
segment was in breach of certain financial covenants, mainly the
interest coverage ratio, contained in the Company's loan
agreements relating to US$769,098,000 of the Company's debt. As
a result of this non-compliance and of the cross default
provisions contained in all bank loan agreements of the shipping
segment and in accordance with guidance related to the
classification of obligations that are callable by the creditor,
the Company has classified all of its shipping segment's bank
loans in breach amounting to US$941,339,000 as current at
Dec. 31, 2012.
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I R E L A N D
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ASHFORD CASTLE: Red Carnation Buys Business for EUR20 Million
-------------------------------------------------------------
InsolvencyJournal.ie reports that Ashford Castle, which was
placed in receivership in 2011, has been sold to UK-based
hotelier group Red Carnation Hotels for EUR20 million, less than
half of the EUR50 million price paid by Gerry Barrett in 2008.
According to InsolvencyJournal.ie, this sale will result in 160
jobs being maintained which is welcome news and a positive
outcome for the receivership process.
Ashford Castle is a five star hotel and resort located in Cong,
Co Mayo.
BRENNAN GROUP: Three Hotels in Receivership
-------------------------------------------
independent.ie reports that Brian Brennan, a hotelier who helped
to raise millions of euro to rebuild areas of Sri Lanka
devastated by a tsunami, has praised his staff after three of his
hotels went into receivership.
Three of the four hotels in the Brennan Group -- the Arklow Bay,
Clonmel Park Hotel in Tipperary and the Springhill Court Hotel in
Kilkenny -- have gone into receivership, according to
independent.ie
The report relates that a fourth hotel in the group, the Green
Isle in Dublin, is not affected and continues to trade as normal.
The report says that Hotel Asset Management Services, a company
set up to manage hotels in trading difficulties, confirmed that
it had been appointed to manage the three affected hotels.
A spokeswoman insisted it was "business as usual" at all three
hotels and that they would be managed as going concerns, the
report discloses.
"I just want to thank all the staff for their support over the
last 20 years," the report quoted Mr. Brennan as saying.
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I T A L Y
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SISAL HOLDING: Moody's Assigns 'B2-PD' PDR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B2-PD probability of default
rating (PDR) to Gaming Invest S.ar.l. (Gaming Invest), the parent
holding company of Sisal Holding Istituto di Pagamento S.p.A.
(Sisal). Concurrently, Moody's removed the provisional rating
designations assigned to the B2 corporate family rating (CFR) of
Gaming Invest and the B1 rating of the EUR275 million senior
secured notes issued by Sisal. The provisional rating
designations were assigned pending the execution of a proposed
refinancing transaction that would result in the maturity
extension of some of Sisal's senior secured credit facilities,
which Moody's understands has now finalized. The outlook on all
ratings remains stable.
Affected ratings:
Issuer: Gaming Invest S.ar.l.
Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B2
Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B2-PD
Issuer: Sisal Holding Istituto di Pagamento S.p.A.
EUR275 million, 7.25% GTD SR SEC GLOBAL NOTES due 2017,
Assigned B1
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Gaming published in December 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Headquartered in Milan, Italy, Sisal is an Italian gaming and
convenience payment service provider. For the financial year
ended December 31, 2012, Moody's estimates that the company's
Moody's-adjusted revenues and EBITDA, pro forma the transaction
and on an unaudited basis, will be approximately EUR823 million
and EUR174 million, respectively. Moody's expects 100% of the
company's 2012 revenues to have been generated from Italy.
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L U X E M B O U R G
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KLOECKNER PENTAPLAST: Moody's Rates EUR225-Mil. PIK Notes Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive Caa1 rating to
the EUR225 million PIK notes due 2017 issued by Kleopatra
Holdings 1 S.C.A. (the Issuer, a parent company of Kloeckner
Pentaplast). Concurrently, Moody's has withdrawn the B2 corporate
family rating (CFR) and the B2-PD probability of default rating
(PDR) at Kleopatra Holdings 2 S.C.A. (KP Parent), and assigned a
B2 CFR as well as a B2-PD PDR to Kleopatra Holdings 1 S.C.A.
Moody's has also affirmed all other ratings. The outlook remains
stable.
Ratings Rationale:
The definitive Caa1 rating on the EUR225 million PIK notes
reflects that the final terms and conditions of the notes are in
line with Moody's expectations.
Following the successful placement of the PIK notes, the changed
position of the CFR and PDR from KP Parent to the level of the
Issuer reflects Moody's incorporation of the PIK notes into
consolidated metrics. After May 15, 2015, the interest on the PIK
notes is payable in cash, provided Kloeckner Pentaplast of
America Inc. and KP Germany Erste GmbH have sufficient restricted
payment capacity to upstream cash. Before May 15, 2015, the
Issuer can elect to pay the interest in PIK or cash.
Although the consolidated financial statements may continue to be
reported at the level of KP Parent, the PIK notes indenture
requires that a description of any material differences in the
financial condition between the Issuer and KP Parent on a
consolidated basis, including the outstanding Indebtedness of the
Issuer must be included in the footnotes of the accounts. Moody's
therefore expects to retain access to sufficient information
going forward to maintain the ratings at the Issuer's level.
The Issuer's B2 corporate family rating remains constrained by
the group's somewhat commoditized product portfolio as well as
the price competitive nature of the industry. In addition,
Moody's considers that the group's exposure to the price
volatility of resin -- given that only about 40% of contracts
contain automatic pass-through mechanisms -- still represents a
major risk to its ability to deliver on expectations.
Outlook
The outlook on all ratings is stable. It reflects Moody's
expectations that the group's solid market positions and high
share of sales towards non-discretionary pharma and food end-
markets will continue to support its operating performance and
lead to a Moody's adjusted Debt/EBITDA ratio to below 6.0x
(including the PIK Notes) by the end of September 2013.
What Could Change The Rating Up/Down
A deterioration in profitability, caused for instance by
increasing competition or challenges to manage volatile raw
material costs resulting in material negative free cash flow or
the inability to improve Debt/EBITDA as adjusted by Moody's
towards 6.0x as well as tightening headroom under the company's
financial covenants could put negative pressure on the ratings.
Conversely, upwards pressure could build should KP manage to
significantly reduce leverage to below 5.0x (including the PIK
Notes), measured as debt/EBITDA, on a sustainable basis on the
back of improvements in operating profitability. Furthermore, the
rating could enjoy upwards pressure were KP to improve free cash
flow generation to above 5% of total debt and interest cover in
terms of EBIT/Interest towards 1.5x.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Packaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containers
published in June 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Kleopatra Holdings 1 S.C.A., with legal domicile in Luxembourg,
is the ultimate holding company of German plastic packaging
manufacturer Klockner Pentaplast, a global leader in the
manufacturing of rigid plastic films for the pharmaceutical,
food, medical, electronics and other packaging industry. The
group generated EUR1.2 billion of sales in the last twelve months
ending September 2012.
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N E T H E R L A N D S
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FREE RECORD: Files for Bankruptcy; Mulls Options
------------------------------------------------
DutchNews.nl reports that Free Record Shop on Friday filed for
bankruptcy but hopes are high for a restart.
"Together with the curator, we will assess if a restart is
possible," DutchNews.nl quotes the company as saying in a
statement. "We are also looking to see if the shops can be kept
open in the meantime. There is a very good chance the Free
Record Shop will remain a high street fixture."
The Free Record Shop group has been hit by the surge in online
music and DVD sales and is currently in the process of
reorganizing its operations, DutchNews.nl discloses.
Last month, it emerged investment company ProCures, which took
over the Selexyz and De Slegte bookshop chains last year, was in
talks to take over the company, DutchNews.nl recounts. According
to the Financieele Dagblad, ProCures is involved in the restart
talks, DutchNews.nl notes.
The company's Belgian outlets are not affected, DutchNews.nl
states.
Free Record Shop is Dutch independent retail group. The company
has 140 shops in the Netherlands and a workforce of 755.
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R U S S I A
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BANK AVANGARD: Moody's Affirms B2 Deposit Ratings, E+ BFSR
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the B2 long-term local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Bank Avangard (Russia), as
well as the standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of
E+, equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b2. The
bank's Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-currency deposit
ratings and its B2 long-term local currency senior unsecured debt
rating were also affirmed. The outlook on the bank's BFSR and the
long-term ratings is stable.
Moody's affirmation of Bank Avangard's ratings is primarily based
on the bank's audited financial statements for 2012 prepared
under IFRS.
Ratings Rationale:
Moody's notes that Bank Avangard's ratings are constrained by the
bank's high credit risk appetite, whereby its aggregate exposure
to the top-20 borrowers exceeded 3x Tier 1 capital level at year-
end 2012, and the volume of related-party loans (net of loans
collateralized by the bank's own promissory notes) stood at 93%
of Tier 1 capital as of the same reporting date. These metrics,
albeit comparable with the bank's B2 rated peers, negatively
affect Moody's assessment of the quality of Bank Avangard's
capital. Moreover, Bank Avangard's ownership structure, whereby
the bank is ultimately controlled by a single individual, Mr.
Kirill Minovalov, coupled with the elevated exposure to other
businesses of the same individual and dependence on the
shareholder business links, renders Bank Avangard vulnerable to
key-man risk.
At the same time, Bank Avangard's ratings are underpinned by its
improving core revenues, with a high proportion of risk-free fee
and commission income which -- in 2012 -- accounted for 26% of
total operating revenues (up from 22% in 2011) and thus started
to fully cover the bank's personnel expenses for the respective
period. Furthermore, Bank Avangard possesses good territorial
coverage and is consistently expanding its market franchise in
servicing medium-sized entities, having entrenched its positions
in a number of business segments, such as internet banking,
plastic cards business and co-branding services.
Moody's further explains that Bank Avangard's global local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of B2/Not Prime are derived from
the bank's b2 BCA, and -- in accordance with Moody's joint
default analysis methodology -- do not incorporate any
probability of external support.
What Could Move The Rating Up/Down
Any upgrade of Bank Avangard's ratings is unlikely to materialize
in the foreseeable future given its high credit risk appetite and
weaknesses in the bank's corporate governance practices. In a
longer term, positive pressure could stem from (1) improved
credit risk diversification in terms of single-borrower and
related-party exposures; and (2) further strengthened
profitability and capital adequacy.
Bank Avangard's ratings could be downgraded if the bank (1)
further increases its related-party exposures and single-name
credit concentration as a proportion of its capital; and/or (2)
faces material loan book impairment, especially if such
impairment affects any large loans in the bank's portfolio. On
top of this, any substantial risks relating to the bank's
individual shareholder or his other businesses (including
political, financial and/or legal risks), should they
materialize, will likely trigger increased risks for Bank
Avangards' business and financial standing thus potentially
leading to a downgrade of the bank's ratings.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.
Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Bank Avangard reported total
audited IFRS assets of US$3.6 billion and total shareholder
equity of US$497 million as at year-end 2012. The bank's total
IFRS profits for 2012 was US$47 million.
RUSSIAN STANDARD: Fitch Rates Upcoming Sub. Debt Issue 'B(EXP)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russian Standard Bank's (RSB;
B+/Stable/b+) upcoming "new style" subordinated debt issue with
write-off features a 'B(EXP)' expected rating. The issue has
Recovery Rating of 'RR5'. The final rating is contingent upon the
receipt of final documents conforming to information already
received.
Key Rating Drivers
RSB's "new style" Tier 2 subordinated debt issue has been rated
one notch lower than the bank's Viability Rating (VR). This
includes (i) zero notches for additional non-performance risk
relative to the VR, as Fitch believes these instruments should
only absorb losses once a bank reaches, or is very close to, the
point of non-viability; and (ii) one notch for loss severity,
(one notch, rather than two, as these issues will not be deeply
subordinated, and will actually rank pari passu with "old style"
subordinated debt in case of a bankruptcy).
The issue will have coupon/principal write-down features, which,
in accordance with recently adopted Russian legislation, will be
triggered in case (i) the bank's core Tier 1 capital adequacy
ratio decreases below 2%; or (ii) bankruptcy prevention measures
are introduced in respect to the bank by the Deposit Insurance
Agency. The latter is possible as soon as a bank breaches any of
its mandatory capital ratios or is in breach of certain other
liquidity and capital requirements.
For more details on Fitch's approach on rating subordinated debt
issues of Russian banks see "Implementation of New Capital Rules
in Russia: Moderately Positive, Unlikely to Lead to Rating
Changes" dated April 19, 2013 at www.fitchratings.com.
Rating Sensitivities
The issue's rating is linked to the bank's VR and would therefore
likely be upgraded or downgraded following similar action on the
VR.
Downward pressure on RSB's VR, and consequently the issue's
ratings, could stem from (i) a further material increase of
contingent risks or weakening of capitalization as a result of
the on-going shareholder acquisition of CEDC; (ii) a significant
liquidity squeeze; or (iii) significant asset quality
deterioration, driven for example by a marked downturn of
operating environment.
The gradual rebuilding of the bank's capitalization, along with
moderation of group risks could result in an upgrade of RSB's VR
and the issue ratings.
===============
S L O V E N I A
===============
* SLOVENIA: Lawmakers Approve Changes to Insolvency Legislation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Cerni at Bloomberg News reports that Slovenian lawmakers
approved changes to the country's insolvency legislation designed
to accelerate corporate restructuring and aid the ailing banking
industry.
Lawmakers voted for changes the government said will lower the
debt burden at companies and spur an economic recovery, Bloomberg
says, citing a live broadcast on public broadcaster TV Slovenija
in the capital Ljubljana. The overhaul is supported by the
central bank, which said in February previous legislation allowed
owners to drag out the insolvency process, causing an
"unnecessary" wave of bankruptcies that in turn affected banks'
business, Bloomberg relates.
Slovenian banks, including Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d., the
nation's largest, are struggling with bad loans that represent
almost a fifth of the nation's total output as the government
pushes forward an economic overhaul meant to reassure investors
and the European Union the country can make it without outside
assistance, Bloomberg discloses.
According to Bloomberg, banks in the Adriatic nation will
transfer bad loans to the bank asset-management company starting
next month to help clean up their balance sheets.
=========
S P A I N
=========
BANCO SANTANDER: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Preference Shares Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDR) of Banco Santander, S.A. (Santander) and Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) at 'BBB+' and CaixaBank, S.A. at 'BBB'.
The Rating Outlook on the Long-term IDRs is Negative. At the same
time, the agency has also affirmed the IDRs of these three banks'
Spanish banking subsidiaries, issuing vehicles and of CaixaBank's
bank holding company La Caixa.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VRS AND SENIOR DEBT RATINGS
The IDRs and senior debt ratings of the three largest Spanish
banks are driven by their stand-alone creditworthiness, as
expressed by their VRs. The affirmation of their VRs primarily
reflects their leading retail franchise in Spain, which supports
good funding and liquidity bases. The VRs also reflect an
adequate level of loss absorption buffers and capital and
relatively resilient asset quality versus domestic peers, despite
macro-economic pressure in Spain.
In the case of Santander and BBVA, their VRs are one notch above
Spain's sovereign rating, reflecting their geographically
diversified strong retail franchises, which uphold solid pre-
impairment operating profitability and place the banks in a
better position than other domestic banks to absorb credit
shocks. Benefits of international diversification include, but
are not limited to, the ability of subsidiaries to upstream
dividends, the financial flexibility related to the potential
disposal of stakes in subsidiaries, and in some cases fungibility
of liquidity and capital. Santander generated only 16% of its
pre-impairment operating profitability from Spain and BBVA 32% in
Q113.
While this diversification positively differentiates Santander
and BBVA from more domestically-focused Spanish banks, like
CaixaBank, in Fitch's view it does not entirely insulate them
from the challenging environment in Spain. At the current
sovereign rating level ('BBB'/Negative Outlook), the uplift above
the sovereign is limited to one notch as Fitch considers that
there is a close correlation between bank and sovereign credit
risk. Performance and asset quality of Santander's and BBVA's
Spanish businesses are vulnerable to the adverse economic
environment. Funding access, stability and costs for banks are
also typically closely linked to broad perceptions of sovereign
risk.
While Fitch expects operating earning generation to be under
pressure in 2013 due to low interest rates and limited volumes,
operating profitability and net income of these three banks
should benefit from lower impairment charges, though these
charges should remain at high levels due to a still tough
operating environment in Spain.
At end-2012 impaired loan (NPL) ratios at Santander (4.8%), BBVA
(5.5%) and CaixaBank (8.6%, excluding Banco de Valencia) were
better than the sector average (10.4%) and all three entities
currently have NPL reserve coverage in excess of 70%, which Fitch
views as adequate to cover their expected losses in the absence
of further stress.
The three banks are primarily funded by deposits and are
improving their funding and liquidity, mainly through loan de-
leveraging. Fitch expects these banks to benefit from the
restructuring of the Spanish banking system, for example as a
result of flight to quality but also due to a reduction of excess
capacity. While they also have wholesale market funding, the
banks hold ample unencumbered assets and have the capacity to
access debt markets. Santander's and BBVA's funding is supported
by subsidiaries being locally funded.
In Fitch's opinion the three banks are adequately capitalized,
particularly BBVA. The latter's Fitch core capital (FCC)/weighted
risks ratio was 9.5% at end-2012, while Santander's was 8.5% and
CaixaBank's 8.1%. All three banks have improved their
capitalization in the past few years, excluding CaixaBank's
corporate activities. Santander's and CaixaBank's FCC is held
back by goodwill from acquisitions and tax loss carry-forwards.
Fitch expects FCC for the three banks to improve swiftly upon a
return to more normalized profitability, supported by the
recovery of deferred tax assets (DTAs).
The Negative Outlook on the IDRs of the three entities included
in this comment mirrors the Rating Outlook on Spain's sovereign
rating. These entities have a large presence in the Spanish
market and ratings are highly correlated, especially in the case
of domestically focused CaixaBank.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, VRS AND SENIOR DEBT RATINGS
While one notch above the sovereign, Santander's and BBVA's VR
and IDR are sensitive to a potential downgrade of the Spanish
sovereign rating. Downward rating pressure may also arise from a
marked deterioration of asset quality and/or profitability as a
result of a sustained tough operating environment in Spain or
other key geographies for these banks and a reduction in the
capacity of the parent to upstream dividends from banking
subsidiaries.
Santander's and BBVA's upward rating potential would arise from
an outstanding overall financial performance, in terms of
profitability, asset quality, funding and capital at their
Spanish parent level in combination with an improvement of the
sovereign credit dynamics.
CaixaBank's IDRs and senior debt ratings would be downgraded only
if the bank's VR and Support Rating Floor (SRF) are
simultaneously downgraded. The bank's VR will be downgraded if
asset quality weakening is more intense than currently assumed,
from a failure to create synergies from recent bank acquisitions
and/or because of any unforeseen liquidity shock. A downgrade of
Spain's sovereign IDRs would also trigger a downgrade of
CaixaBank's IDRs. Any potential for upgrading CaixaBank's IDRs,
VR and senior debt ratings is limited by Spain's economic
environment.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - LA CAIXA'S IDRS AND VR
La Caixa's ratings are driven by those of its 72.8%-owned
CaixaBank, which is seen by Fitch as its main operating
subsidiary. While their credit profiles are highly correlated, La
Caixa is notched down once from CaixaBank to highlight the
dilution of its stake in CaixaBank to about 62%, once CaixaBank's
mandatory convertible bonds are converted in 2015; and high
double leverage, although this is expected to reduce. The Outlook
remains Negative, matching that of CaixaBank, and reflects
Spain's weak economic environment.
Debt currently totals around EUR7.1 billion, mainly related to
subordinated borrowings maturing between 2017 and 2020. Since
June 2011, when La Caixa was converted into a holding company,
EUR1.5 billion of debt has been repaid, some of it ahead of
schedule, reflecting the bank's focus on reducing leverage.
However, Fitch estimates La Caixa's double leverage ratio to be
somewhere between moderate and high at close to 120%. Further
reduction in double leverage is expected by Fitch during the
remainder of 2013.
La Caixa's debt-servicing ability depends on the cash flows from
CaixaBank and a portfolio of equity stakes held by another
subsidiary (Criteria CaixaHolding). The largest stakes of
Criteria CaixaHolding are in Gas Natural SDG, S.A. (BBB+/Stable)
and Abertis Infraestructuras, S.A. (BBB+/Negative), whose
dividends have proven to be stable. In the event of stress,
further liquidity could be obtained from partial asset sales
and/or secured borrowings.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - LA CAIXA'S IDRS AND VR
La Caixa's VR (and hence IDRs) is sensitive to any rating action
on CaixaBank. A downgrade could also arise from any unforeseen
material weakening of cash flows, which could ultimately affect
La Caixa's debt-servicing ability, and/or from the need to make
significant write-downs on any of its equity investments,
especially on CaixaBank and/or Criteria CaixaHolding. On the
other hand, upgrade potential for La Caixa's VR and IDRs is
currently very limited.
KEY RATING DRIVERS -SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
The SRFs of Santander, BBVA and CaixaBank reflect Fitch's view
that there is a high likelihood of support from the authorities
if ever needed. For Santander and BBVA this is due to their
systemic importance both domestically and internationally, while
for CaixaBank this reflects its domestic importance.
La Caixa's SR of '5' and SRF of 'No Floor' reflect that La Caixa
is viewed by Fitch as a bank holding company and hence support
from the authorities cannot be relied upon, if needed.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS
The banks' SR and SRF are sensitive to any change in assumptions
around the authorities' ability (as reflected in Spain's rating)
or willingness to provide timely support.
The SRs and SRFs are also sensitive to a change in Fitch's
assumptions around the availability of sovereign support for
Spanish banks. There is a clear political intention to ultimately
reduce the implicit state support for banks in Europe. This might
result in Fitch revising SRFs downwards in the medium term. In
this context, Fitch is paying close attention to on-going policy
discussions around support and 'bail in' for eurozone banks.
Until now, senior creditors in Spanish banks have been supported
in full, but resolution legislation is developing quickly and the
implementation of creditor 'bail in' is starting to make it look
more feasible for taxpayers and creditors to share the burden of
support for banks.
KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND
OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES
Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital instruments issued by
Santander, BBVA, CaixaBank and by La Caixa are all notched down
from their VRs in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each
instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss
severity risk profiles, which vary considerably. Their ratings
are primarily sensitive to any change in the VRs of Santander,
BBVA or CaixaBank.
Unnim Banc's upper tier 2 and preferred stock are still not
performing but have been placed on Rating Watch Positive (RWP)
reflecting a higher likelihood of coupons being resumed on these
instruments post-merger with BBVA. Upon completing the merger
process, Unnim Banc's upper tier 2 debt will be upgraded to 'BB+'
and preferred stock to 'BB-'.
KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBSIDIARIES
Santander Consumer Finance (SCF) is 100% owned by Santander and
it benefits from being an integral part of the group and a core
business of the group, as it manages most of the consumer finance
operations.
Banesto's ratings have been affirmed and withdrawn as it was
merged into Santander on May 6, 2013 and it ceased to exist as a
legal entity.
Unnim Banc is a 100%-owned bank subsidiary of BBVA. Fitch
considers Unnim Banc to be part of BBVA's core banking business
in Spain and it will be merged into the parent by end-May or in
June, at which point Unnim Banc will cease to exist as a separate
entity. Once this occurs, Fitch will withdraw the ratings of
Unnim Banc.
Banco de Valencia (BdV) is a 98.9%-owned bank subsidiary of
CaixaBank and is fully consolidated into the group accounts.
BdV's IDRs are aligned with those of CaixaBank, because Fitch
considers BdV to be a core subsidiary of the group and, as
indicated by the European Commission on Nov. 27, 2012, BdV will
be merged into CaixaBank, at which point BdV will cease to exist
as a separate entity. Once the latter occurs, which is expected
in the second half of 2013, Fitch will withdraw the ratings of
BdV.
Until Unnim Banc and BdV cease to exist, their IDRs are sensitive
to the same factors that would drive a change in BBVA's and
CaixaBank's IDRs. Unnim Banc's and BdV's SRs are sensitive to a
change in the level of importance of the bank within BBVA and
CaixaBank, which is seen as unlikely.
The impact, if any, on Santander's, Banesto's and Unnim's covered
bonds will be covered in a separate comment.
The rating actions are as follows:
Santander:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
VR: affirmed at 'bbb+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor (SRF): affirmed at 'BBB'
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating and certificates of
deposit: affirmed at 'BBB+'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating, commercial paper and
certificate of deposits: affirmed at 'F2'
Market-linked senior unsecured securities: affirmed at 'BBB+emr'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Preference shares: affirmed at 'BB-'
Santander International Debt, S.A. Unipersonal
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating: affirmed at 'F2'
Market-linked senior unsecured securities: affirmed at 'BBB+emr'
Santander International Preferred, S.A. Unipersonal
Preference shares: affirmed at 'BB-'
Santander Commercial Paper, S.A. Unipersonal
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F2'
Santander Finance Capital, S.A. Unipersonal
Preference shares: affirmed at 'BB-'
Santander Finance Preferred, S.A. Unipersonal
Preference shares: affirmed at 'BB-'
Santander Financial Issuance Ltd.
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Santander Perpetual, S.A. Unipersonal
Upper Tier 2: affirmed at 'BB+'
Santander US Debt, S.A.U.
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'
SCF:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating and commercial paper:
affirmed at 'F2'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Banesto
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative; withdrawn
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'; withdrawn
VR: affirmed at 'bbb-'; withdrawn
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'; withdrawn
Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'; transferred to
Santander
Short-term debt rating: affirmed at 'F2'; transferred to
Santander
Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB+'; removed from
Positive Watch; transferred to Santander
Preferred stock: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B'; removed from
Positive Watch; transferred to Santander
Market-linked senior unsecured securities: affirmed at
'BBB+emr'; transferred to Santander
Banesto Financial Products plc:
Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'; transferred to
Santander
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating and commercial paper:
affirmed at 'F2'; transferred to Santander
BBVA:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Negative Outlook
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
VR: affirmed at 'bbb+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
SRF: affirmed at 'BBB'
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating and commercial paper:
affirmed at 'F2'
Market-linked senior unsecured securities: affirmed at 'BBB+emr'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Preference shares: affirmed at 'BB-'
BBVA Capital Finance, S.A. Unipersonal
Preference shares: affirmed at 'BB-'
BBVA International Preferred, S.A. Unipersonal
Preference shares: affirmed at 'BB-'
BBVA Senior Finance, S.A. Unipersonal
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating and commercial paper:
affirmed at 'F2'
BBVA U.S. Senior, S.A. Unipersonal
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating and commercial paper:
affirmed at 'F2'
Unnim Banc
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Lower tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Upper tier 2 subordinated debt: 'CC', placed on RWP
Preferred stock: 'C', placed on RWP
Senior state-guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'BBB+'
CaixaBank:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
VR: affirmed at 'bbb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating and commercial paper:
affirmed at 'F2'
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
Lower tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Upper tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB'
Preferred stock: affirmed at 'B+'
Banco de Valencia:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
La Caixa:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
VR: affirmed at 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
SRF: affirmed at 'No floor'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB+'
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'BBB'
FONCAIXA AUTONOMOS 1: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class B Notes to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed at A3 (sf) the rating of the
Serie A2 notes issued by Foncaixa Empresas 3, FTA and upgraded to
Ba2 (sf) from B2 (sf) the rating of the Serie B notes in this
deal. At the same time, Moody's has confirmed at A3 (sf) the
rating of the Class A notes issued by Foncaixa Autonomos 1, FTA
and downgraded to Ba1 (sf) from Baa3 (sf) the rating of the Class
B notes in this deal. Sufficient credit enhancement, which
protects against sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily drove
the upgrade and confirmation actions. Conversely, the lack of
credit enhancement drove the downgrade action on the junior notes
issued by Foncaixa Autonomos 1.
This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated
by Moody's on 2 July 2012. These two transactions are Spanish
asset-backed securities transactions backed by loans to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS) originated by Caixabank
(Baa3/P-3).
Ratings Rationale:
These confirmations primarily reflect the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness and the revision of key collateral
assumptions and increased exposure to lowly rated counterparties
has had no negative effect on the ratings of the senior notes in
these two transactions.
Furthermore, the current level of credit enhancement available
under the Serie B notes (14.6%) of Foncaixa Empresas 3, which is
in the form of a reserve fund, is sufficient to support an
upgrade to Ba2 (sf) from B2 (sf). Borrower concentration limited
the upgrade on this tranche given that the three biggest debtors
represent almost 9.0% of the pool balance.
Conversely, insufficient credit enhancement (18.3%) under the
Class B notes of Foncaixa Autonomos 1 has driven the downgrade of
that tranche to Ba1 (sf) from Baa3 (sf).
Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk
Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.
The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.
Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determines the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.
Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions
Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
the two transactions, which it updated on 18 December 2012.
According to the updated methodology, Moody's increased the CoV,
which is a measure of volatility.
For Foncaixa Empresas 3, the current default assumption is 14.3%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 50%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 84.6% from
46.44%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, resulted in a portfolio credit enhancement of 21.5%.
For Foncaixa Autonomos 1, the current default assumption is 16.9%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 50%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 87.55%
from 37.71%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, resulted in a portfolio credit enhancement of 26%.
Moody's Has Considered Exposure to Counterparty Risk
The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.
In these two transactions, Caixabank (Baa3/P-3) acts as servicer
and transfers collections every day to the issuers' accounts
which also reside at Caixabank. The reserve funds are also held
at Caixabank for both transactions. Moody's has incorporated into
its analysis the potential default of Caixabank, which could
expose each transaction to a commingling loss on the collections
and the reserve fund.
Caixabank acts as swap counterparty in both transactions. As part
of its analysis, Moody's assessed the exposure to the swap
counterparty, which does not have a negative effect on the rating
levels at this time.
Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes
In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.
As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.
Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in its Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", 02 July 2012.
In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.
As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
When remodeling the transactions affected by this rating actions,
some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new approach.
Methodologies
The methodologies used in these ratings were " Moody's Approach
to Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitisations" published in
May 2013, and "The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance
Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines" published
in March 2013.
List of Affected Ratings
Issuer: FONCAIXA AUTONOMOS 1, FTA
EUR960.5M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR169.5M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: Foncaixa Empresas 3, FTA
EUR820M Serie A2 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul
2, 2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade
EUR280M Serie B Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
FTPYME TDA 7: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR11.2MM C Notes to Caa2
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of the Class B
and C notes both in FTPYME TDA 7, FTA and in GC FTGENCAT CAIXA
TARRAGONA 1, FTA. At the same time, Moody's confirmed the ratings
of the Class A1, A2(CA) notes in FTPYME TDA 7, FTA and the Class
AS and AG notes in GC FTGENCAT CAIXA TARRAGONA 1, FTA. Both
transactions are Spanish asset-backed securities transactions
backed by loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS).
Banco Guipuzcoano and Catalunya Banc SA (B1/NP) originated the
portfolio of FTPYME TDA 7, FTA and GC FTGENCAT CAIXA TARRAGONA 1,
FTA transactions, respectively. The negative rating actions are
prompted by the insufficiency of credit enhancement to address
sovereign risk. The determination of the applicable credit
enhancement that drives these rating actions reflects the
introduction of additional factors in Moody's analysis to better
measure the impact of sovereign risk on structured finance
transactions.
Ratings Rationale:
This rating action reflects primarily the impact of sovereign
risk. Both Spanish ABS SME affected by this rating action are
negatively impacted by the introduction of new adjustments to
Moody's modeling assumptions accounting for the impact of the
deterioration of the sovereign's credit condition. Ratings in
both transactions also reflect by the revision of key collateral
assumptions. Moody's confirmed the ratings of securities whose
credit enhancement and structural features provided enough
protection against sovereign and counterparty risk.
Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk
Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.
The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables is
A3. The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required
credit enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.
Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for SF and the
applicable credit enhancement for this rating uniquely determine
the volatility of the portfolio distribution, which is typically
measured as the coefficient of variation (COV) for ABS
transactions. All things equal, a higher applicable CE for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable CE both translate into a higher COV.
Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions
Moody's has maintained its recovery rate assumptions for both
transactions, which it updated on 18 December 2012 and has
revised its mean default assumptions in both transactions because
of worse-than-expected collateral performance since the last
review of the Spanish SME sector in Q4-2012.
For FTPYME TDA 7, FTA Moody's has increased its CoV from 41.6% to
66.55%. Together with the increased assumptions on mean default
rate of 24% and the recovery rate of 50%, this volatility
increase corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 28.7%.
For GC FTGENCAT CAIXA TARRAGONA 1, FTA Moody's has increased its
CoV from 50% to 77.85%. Combined with the increased assumptions
on mean default probability of 24% and the recovery rate of 60%,
this volatility increase corresponds to a portfolio credit
enhancement of 24.6%.
-- Counterparty Exposure Has Decreased
The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the limited exposure to commingling risk.
Counterparties in both transactions include Banco Guipuzcoano and
Catalunya Banc SA (B1/NP), respectively, which service the SMEs
portfolios; and Barclays Bank PLC (A2/P-1), which acts as the
issuer account bank in both transactions. The servicers transfers
collections every five business days and every two business days
from the collection accounts to the issuer account banks,
respectively. The reserve fund represents 4.9% and 7.8% of the
current pool balance in FTPYME TDA 7, FTA and GC FTGENCAT CAIXA
TARRAGONA 1, FTA, respectively.
As part of its analysis, Moody's also assessed the exposure to
Credit Agricole (A2/P-1) and CECABANK S.A. (Ba1 Watch DNG/NP) as
swap counterparties in FTPYME TDA 7, FTA and GC FTGENCAT CAIXA
TARRAGONA 1, FTA, respectively. The downgraded ratings of the
notes, which reflect the insufficiency of credit enhancement to
address sovereign risk, are consistent with this exposure.
Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes
In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.
As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.
Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.
In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.
As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
When remodeling the transactions affected by these rating
actions, some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.
The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitisations", published in May
2013 and "The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance
Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published
in March 2013.
The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies with the publication of the Special Comment
"Structured Finance Transactions: Assessing the Impact of
Sovereign Risk", published in March 2013.
List of Affected Ratings
Issuer: FTPYME TDA 7, FTA
EUR230.3M A1 Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR18.3M A2(CA) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR20.2M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR11.2M C Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: GC FTGENCAT Caixa Tarragona, FTA
EUR104.3M AS Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR93.2M AG Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR25.7M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR16.8M C Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
PESCANOVA SA: Chairman to Testify as Official Suspect on July 1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Manuel Baigorri at Bloomberg News reports that Manuel Fernandez
de Sousa, the chairman of Pescanova SA ousted last month, will
testify as an official suspect at Spain's National Court on
July 1.
According to Bloomberg, National Court judge Pablo Rafael Ruz
said he is able to partially admit complaints including false
financial information, false accounting, price and media
manipulation and insider trading.
Bloomberg relates that Mr. de Sousa said in an interview with
radio station Cadena Ser earlier on Thursday Pescanova's real
value is higher than its actual liabilities.
Mr. de Sousa told Cadena Ser that the company doesn't have EUR3
billion in hidden debt, Bloomberg notes.
Mr. de Sousa, as cited by Bloomberg, said Pescanova faced cash
problems and was affected by lack of access to credit after
reorganization of Spanish banking industry.
Pescanova is a Galicia-based fishing company. The company
catches, processes, and packages fish on factory ships. It is
one of the world's largest fishing groups.
Pescanova filed for insolvency on April 15 on at least EUR1.5
billion (US$2 billion) of debt run up to fuel expansion before
economic crisis hit its earnings. The Pontevedra mercantile
court in northwestern Galicia accepted Pescanova's insolvency
petition on April 25. The court ordered the board of directors
to step down and proposed Deloitte as the firm's administrator.
* Spanish SME ABS Performance Improving in March, Moody's Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of Spanish asset-backed securities backed by
loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS) slowed its
worsening pace in the three month period ending in March 2013
according to the latest indices published by Moody's Investors
Service.
While the 90-360 day delinquency rate continued to increase to
5.6% in March 2013 from 3.6% in March 2012, such delinquency rate
decreased from the 5.8% peak reached in December 2012 mostly due
to the delinquencies changes in transactions originated by
Santander. These transactions represent a high part of the
outstanding portfolio balance and after increasing quickly to
10.3% in December 2012 from 5.9% in September, the 90-360
delinquencies decreased to 9.4% in March 2013. The 90-360
delinquencies Index line without Santander shows that the
delinquencies remained stable since December at 4.3% but have
increased from 3.2% in March 2012 and remained at the highest
historical level.
Cumulative defaults increased to 3% from 2.7% in December 2012
and from 2.1% in March 2012. The weakest transactions are those
originated by Cantalunya Banc and Banco Cam where defaults are
higher than in other transactions being them at 5.6% and 5.4%,
respectively.
Moody's outlook for Spanish SME ABS collateral performance
remains negative. The Spanish economy remains in recession and
the rating agency expects GDP to contract 1.4% in 2013. Moody's
expects that the unemployment rate will continue to rise to 27.4%
in 2013, up from 25.1% in 2012.
As of March 2013, 78 Spanish SME ABS transactions were
outstanding, with a total portfolio balance of EUR29,899 million
decreasing from EUR35,212 million in December 2012. This
represents the lowest portfolio balance since June 2007. Moody's
rated only one new transaction in the first quarter of 2013: IM
Grupo Banco Popular Empresas V, FTA.
===========
T U R K E Y
===========
* Turkey's Upgrade No Impact on 8 ABS Transactions, Moody's Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that the ratings of eight
outstanding Turkish (future flows) asset-backed securities (ABS)
transactions would remain unaffected by the upgrade of Turkey's
government bond rating to Baa3 from Ba1 (stable) on May 16, 2013,
and the affirmation of the local-currency deposit ratings on
May 20, 2013 of the Turkish banks acting as originator in the
transactions.
Under Moody's rating methodology, and in the absence of any
transaction-specific concerns, the rating assigned to a future
receivables transaction is linked to the local-currency deposit
rating of the originator.
While Moody's upgraded the foreign-currency deposit ratings of 12
Turkish banks, the rating agency affirmed the local-currency
deposit ratings of Akbank TAS, Denizbank A.S., Turkiye Garanti
Bankasi AS, Turkiye Is Bankasi AS, Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO
and Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi AS, which are the originators of the
eight outstanding Turkish future receivables transactions.
Moody's has affirmed the senior debt and the local currency
deposit ratings and current outlooks for these banks, based on
unchanged support assumptions. In most cases, the ratings of the
banks affected by these actions benefit from several notches of
uplift from their baseline credit assessment (BCA) because of
government and/or parental support assumptions.
The rating affirmations of the banks reflect Moody's assessment
of the willingness and capacity of the banks' parent groups to
provide support in the event of need, as well as each bank's
relative systemic importance to the Turkish financial system as a
deposit-taker and lender.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
IAC PLASTICS: In Administration, Seeks Buyer
--------------------------------------------
prw.com reports that Industrial Anti-Corrosives, the Burnley-
based plastics firm which trades under the name IAC Plastics, has
gone into administration.
Kerry Bailey -- kerry.bailey@bdo.co.uk -- and Jon Newell --
jon.newell@bdo.co.uk -- of BDO are acting as joint administrators
to the business, which employs 39 staff and is continuing to
trade as a going concern while a buyer is sought, according to
prw.com.
"Unfortunately the economic climate and difficult trading
conditions have significantly affected the business. Though the
company has a good customer base, in recent months it has not
been possible to generate the necessary volume to make the
business viable. . . . However, the business has a sound
reputation and strong order book. Our objective is to sell the
company as a going concern and it will continue to trade whilst
the options are explored. . . . The future of the workforce
remained unclear. BDO said all staff had been retained "at this
time, though the joint administrators are assessing the situation
and some redundancies are possible," the report quoted Mr. Bailey
as saying.
IAC, which celebrated its 35th anniversary last November,
produces engineering plastics and components, including the
Corromide brand of cast nylon products, such as rods, tubes
sheets and custom castings.
NORTEL NETWORK: Retirees Fight Objection to US$1.3-Bil. Claims
--------------------------------------------------------------
Law360 report that Nortel Network Corp.'s British retirees asked
a Delaware bankruptcy judge to strike an objection to their
US$1.3 billion in claims, contending the response by the defunct
telecom's U.S. unit does not properly address any of the pension
fund's allegations.
The trustee for Nortel's U.K. pension plan, which seeks to
recover at least US$1.3 billion from Nortel Networks Inc., the
Canadian company's U.S. arm, on behalf of British retirees, says
the objection should be nixed since it fails to conform to the
provisions of the Bankruptcy.
About Nortel Networks
Headquartered in Ontario, Canada, Nortel Networks Corporation and
its various affiliated entities provided next-generation
technologies, for both service provider and enterprise networks,
support multimedia and business-critical applications. Nortel
did business in more than 150 countries around the world. Nortel
Networks Limited was the principal direct operating subsidiary of
Nortel Networks Corporation.
On Jan. 14, 2009, Nortel Networks Inc.'s ultimate corporate
parent Nortel Networks Corporation, NNI's direct corporate parent
Nortel Networks Limited and certain of their Canadian affiliates
commenced a proceeding with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) seeking
relief from their creditors. Ernst & Young was appointed to
serve as monitor and foreign representative of the Canadian
Nortel Group. That same day, the Monitor sought recognition of
the CCAA Proceedings in U.S. Bankruptcy Court (Bankr. D. Del.
Case No. 09-10164) under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
That same day, NNI and certain of its affiliated U.S. entities
filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 09-10138).
In addition, the High Court of England and Wales placed 19 of
NNI's European affiliates into administration under the control
of individuals from Ernst & Young LLP. Other Nortel affiliates
have commenced and in the future may commence additional creditor
protection, insolvency and dissolution proceedings around the
world.
On May 28, 2009, at the request of administrators, the Commercial
Court of Versailles, France, ordered the commencement of
secondary proceedings in respect of Nortel Networks S.A. On June
8, 2009, Nortel Networks UK Limited filed petitions in U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for recognition of the English Proceedings as
foreign main proceedings under Chapter 15.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross presides over the Chapter 11
and 15 cases. Mary Caloway, Esq., and Peter James Duhig, Esq.,
at Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, in Wilmington, Delaware,
serves as Chapter 15 petitioner's counsel.
In the Chapter 11 case, James L. Bromley, Esq., at Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP, in New York, serves as the U.S.
Debtors' general bankruptcy counsel; Derek C. Abbott, Esq., at
Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell LLP, in Wilmington, serves as
Delaware counsel. The Chapter 11 Debtors' other professionals
are Lazard Freres & Co. LLC as financial advisors; and Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions LLC as claims and notice agent.
The United States Trustee appointed an Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors in respect of the U.S. Debtors. An ad hoc
group of bondholders also was organized.
Fred S. Hodara, Esq., at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, in
New York, and Christopher M. Samis, Esq., at Richards, Layton &
Finger, P.A., in Wilmington, Delaware, represent the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
An Official Committee of Retired Employees and the Official
Committee of Long-Term Disability Participants tapped Alvarez &
Marsal Healthcare Industry Group as financial advisor. The
Retiree Committee is represented by McCarter & English LLP as
Delaware counsel, and Togut Segal & Segal serves as the Retiree
Committee. The Committee retained Alvarez & Marsal Healthcare
Industry Group as financial advisor, and Kurtzman Carson
Consultants LLC as its communications agent.
Several entities, particularly, Nortel Government Solutions
Incorporated and Nortel Networks (CALA) Inc., have material
operations and are not part of the bankruptcy proceedings.
As of Sept. 30, 2008, Nortel Networks Corp. reported consolidated
assets of US$11.6 billion and consolidated liabilities of US$11.8
billion. The Nortel Companies' U.S. businesses are primarily
conducted through Nortel Networks Inc., which is the parent of
majority of the U.S. Nortel Companies. As of Sept. 30, 2008, NNI
had assets of about US$9 billion and liabilities of US$3.2
billion, which do not include NNI's guarantee of some or all of
the Nortel Companies' about US$4.2 billion of unsecured public
debt.
Since the commencement of the various insolvency proceedings,
Nortel has sold its business units and other assets to various
purchasers. Nortel has collected roughly US$9 billion for
distribution to creditors. Of the total, US$4.5 billion came
from the sale of Nortel's patent portfolio to Rockstar Bidco, a
consortium consisting of Apple Inc., EMC Corporation,
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Microsoft Corp., Research In
Motion Limited, and Sony Corporation. The consortium defeated a
US$900 million stalking horse bid by Google Inc. at an auction.
The deal closed in July 2011.
Nortel has filed a proposed plan of liquidation in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court. The Plan generally provides for full payment
on secured claims with other distributions going in accordance
with the priorities in bankruptcy law.
RANGERS FOOTBALL: Duff & Phelps Cleared of Conflict of Interest
---------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Duff and Phelps, which acted as
administrators for the former Rangers Football Club, has been
cleared of any conflict of interest over its appointment.
Complaints about the role of Duff and Phelps were made to the
Insolvency Practitioners Association (IPA), BBC notes.
These came after a BBC film highlighted previous dealings between
the firm and Rangers' then owner, Craig Whyte, BBC relates.
According to BBC, after a "thorough investigation" the IPA said
it concluded Duff and Phelps "complied with the relevant
guidance".
The BBC understands that the role of Duff and Phelps during the
administration, alongside other aspects of events which led to
the financial collapse of the club, remains under active
investigation by the liquidators, BDO.
Rangers was forced into administration on Feb. 14 last year by HM
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) over non-payment of tax totaling about
GBP14 million, BBC recounts. Duff and Phelps' David Whitehouse
and Paul Clark were appointed as joint administrators, BBC
discloses.
"The investigation committee of the Insolvency Practitioners
Association has advised complainants of the outcome of the
disciplinary investigation into Paul Clark and David Whitehouse,
partners of Duff and Phelps and the former joint administrators
of Rangers Football Club Plc," BBC quotes the IPA as saying in a
statement.
"The complaints centered on whether the insolvency practitioners
were in breach of the insolvency profession's code of ethics when
accepting their appointment.
"The investigation committee, made up of independent
practitioners and lay members, has, over the past 13 months,
carried out a thorough investigation of the administration of
Rangers Football Club and the actions of the joint administrators
in agreeing to accept the appointment and has concluded that the
practitioners complied with the relevant guidance and
legislation."
About Rangers Football Club
Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club. The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv. The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services. Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary. The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action. Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.
ROYAL BANK: Moody's Corrects Rating on Tier 2 Notes to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service corrected the rating of the US$2,250,
000,000 6.125% subordinated Tier 2 Notes due 2022, issued by the
Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, to Ba2 from Ba3 (Royal Bank of
Scotland Group plc; US780099CE50; Ba2). In its February 19, 2013
rating action, Moody's rated this instrument as if it contained
coupon deferral features, which it does not. The error has now
been corrected, and this rating action reflects that change.
* Moody's Notes Stable Performance of UK Prime RMBS in February
--------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the UK prime residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) market continued its stable trend in the three-
month period leading up to February 2013, according to the latest
indices published by Moody's Investors Service.
From November 2012 to February 2013, the 90+ day delinquency
trend increased to 2% from 1.8% of the outstanding portfolio.
Outstanding repossessions remained stable at 0.1%. Cumulative
losses increased to 0.4% from 0.3%. Moody's annualized total
redemption rate (TRR) trend averaged 14% in the three-month
period up to February 2013.
Moody's outlook for the collateral performance of UK prime RMBS
in 2013 is stable.
In the three-month period ending February 2013, Moody's assigned
ratings to Gosforth Funding 2012-2 plc containing GBP2.9 billion
of loans originated by Northern Rock Asset Management (Aa3,
Prime-1, negative), and Virgin Money.
As of February 2013, the 81 Moody's-rated UK prime RMBS
transactions had an outstanding pool balance of GBP196.1 billion,
which constitutes a year-on-year decrease of 29.7%. This is
largely due to the redemption of two Master Trusts (Mound
Financing and Lothian Mortgages). In addition, Langton Securities
redeemed three series.
* Moody's: UK Buy-To-Let RMBS Performance Improves in February
--------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the UK buy-to-let (BTL) residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) market continued to improve in the
three-month period leading up to February 2013, according to the
latest indices published by Moody's Investors Service.
In the three-month period to February 2013, the 90+ day
delinquency trend decreased to 0.9%, from 1% in November 2012. In
the same period, outstanding repossessions and cumulative losses
remained stable at 0.2% and 0.7%, respectively. Moody's
annualized total redemption rate (TRR) trend averaged 4.2% in the
three-month period to February 2013.
Moody's outlook for the collateral performance of UK BTL RMBS in
2013 is stable.
On February 21, 2013, Moody's confirmed the Aaa(sf) ratings of
the senior notes in eight Paragon Mortgages transactions
following the execution of restructuring proposals. At the same
time, Moody's downgraded the ratings of 10 senior and four junior
notes in another four Paragon transactions excluded from this
restructuring process.
In the three-month period through February 2013, Moody's rated
two transactions in the UK BTL RMBS market:
Cambric Finance Number One Plc, originated by Platform Funding
Limited (not rated), issued GBP1.4 billion.
Mercia No.1 plc, originated by Godiva Mortgages Limited (not
rated), a wholly owned subsidiary of Coventry Building Society
(A3, Prime-2 deposits, stable), issued GBP1.4 billion.
As of February 2013, the 30 Moody's-rated UK BTL RMBS
transactions had an outstanding pool balance of GBP28.9 billion.
Compared with the GBP37.0 billion pool balance for the same
period in the previous year, this constitutes a 221% year-over-
year decrease. This is mainly due to the redemption of Pendeford
Master Issuer.
* UK Non-Conforming RMBS Performance Stable in Feb., Says Moody's
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the UK non-conforming residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) market remained stable over the three-
month period ending February 2013, according to the latest
indices published by Moody's Investors Service.
In February 2013, the 90+ day delinquency index for UK non-
conforming RMBS was 16.1%, below the 21.0% peak reached in June
2009. Outstanding repossessions remained at 0.8% of the current
outstanding balance, which is substantially below the peak of
3.6% reached in February 2009. Cumulative losses increased
further, although at a slower pace, reaching 2.4% of the original
balance in February 2013.
Weighted-average loss severity (percentage of properties sold)
was 28.0%, although different vintages and series demonstrated
substantial volatility. The average loss severity is currently
below its June 2010 peak of 33.4%. Whilst performance has
stabilized in many UK non-conforming RMBS transactions, Moody's
notes the high delinquency levels and has accounted for this
level of arrears by assuming that all currently delinquent
borrowers will default in a less favorable environment.
Furthermore, low redemption rates, which were 5.3% in February
2013, are far below the pre-2009 levels of 20%-40%. In Moody's
view, these low redemption rates indicate that the portfolios
will remain outstanding for a significant time, exacerbating
future performance uncertainty.
Moody's outlook for the collateral performance of UK non-
conforming RMBS transactions in 2013 is stable.
The total current outstanding pool balance of all 81 Moody's-
rated transactions in the UK non-conforming RMBS market dropped
to GBP19.9 billion in February 2013, a year-over-year decrease of
6.6%. Moody's has not rated any UK non-conforming RMBS
transactions since January 2009.
* Christopher Howard to Join Sullivan & Cromwell's London Office
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP disclosed that Christopher J. Howard will
be joining the firm as a partner. He will be based in the firm's
London office, which was established in 1972.
At Sullivan & Cromwell, Mr. Howard will advise international
corporations, investment and commercial banks and financial
sponsors on corporate restructurings and financings throughout
Europe, the Middle East and the U.S.
"We are delighted Chris will be joining us," said Joseph C.
Shenker, Chairman of Sullivan & Cromwell. "His expertise in
cross-border restructurings and finance will support our clients'
increasingly global engagements."
"S&C is an extraordinary firm that has executed some of the
world's largest restructurings and financings. I have worked
closely with a number of S&C partners over the years and look
forward to bringing additional English law depth to the firm's
highly-successful restructuring, distressed M&A and finance
practices," said Mr. Howard.
Richard C. Morrissey, Managing Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell's
London Office said, "The addition of Chris, a leader in English
law restructuring and finance who has broad knowledge working
across jurisdictions, will enhance our ability to handle pan-
European restructuring as well as support our expanding finance
practice."
Andrew G. Dietderich, who leads S&C's U.S. Restructuring Practice
added, "Chris's outstanding reputation in cross-border
restructurings will complement S&C's experience in major global
restructurings, including Kodak and Chrysler. Our restructuring
engagements are rarely confined to one jurisdiction, and the
entire team in the U.S. looks forward to working side-by-side
with Chris in the years to come."
Scott D. Miller, who coordinates the firm's U.S. and European
practices added, "Chris joins a firm with a long history of
working seamlessly across international borders. He will be
fully integrated into our practice and available to our clients
from all over the world."
Mr. Howard, 43, is qualified to practice in both England and New
York, and is the co-author (with Bob Hedger) of the leading text,
Restructuring Law & Practice.
About Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP is a global law firm that advises on
major domestic and cross-border M&A, finance, corporate and
restructuring transactions, significant litigation and corporate
investigations, and complex regulatory, tax and estate planning
matters. Founded in 1879, Sullivan & Cromwell has approximately
800 lawyers located in offices in London, New York, Washington,
Los Angeles, Palo Alto, Frankfurt, Paris, Hong Kong, Beijing,
Tokyo, Melbourne and Sydney.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 20 to May 24, 2013
---------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *