/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130610.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, June 10, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 113
Headlines
B U L G A R I A
* BULGARIA: Company Insolvency Proceedings Up 243% in 2012
F R A N C E
NOVASAUR SAS: Board Asks for More Details on Debt Restructuring
G E R M A N Y
PRIME 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Three Note Classes
G R E E C E
SEANERGY MARITIME: Ernst & Young Raises Going Concern Doubt
I R E L A N D
DYFIN PUBLICATIONS: Faces Liquidation; Up to 20 Jobs at Risk
QUINN INSURANCE: Judge OKs Addt'l EUR60MM Insurance Fund Drawdown
SUNDAY BUSINESS: Consortium Offers to Buy Business for EUR750,000
L U X E M B O U R G
HEAT MEZZANINE: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws C Class B1 Notes Rating
OXEA SARL: High Leverage Margin Cues Moody's to Cut CFR to B2
N E T H E R L A N D S
GOLDENTREE CREDIT: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
MESDAG BV: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CC'
SNS REAAL: Posts EUR1.6-Bil. Net Loss in First Quarter 2013
P O L A N D
* POLAND: Business Bankruptcies Down 27% Y/Y to 60 in May
R U S S I A
RENAISSANCE FINANCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Issuer Ratings to B3
RENAISSANCE FINANCIAL: Moody's Cuts National Scale Credit Rating
* SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
S P A I N
TDA 19 MIXTO: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR6MM C Notes to 'Ba2'
GAT ICO-FTVPO 1: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR3.2MM Notes to Ba3
URALITA: Turns to Private Equity Firms for Loans Amid Debt Woes
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
BRUNTWOOD ALPHA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B'
DUNFERMLINE ATHLETIC: June 18 Deadline Set for Potential Bidders
EUROTUNNEL GROUP: UK Antitrust Watchdog Blocks Ferry Plan
KERLING PLC: S&P Affirms 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Dev.
LAINDON REGENERATION: In Administration, Traders More Uncertain
MEDIAGROUND LTD: In Administration After Cancellation of Event
TRURO CITY: Creditors Agree to Company Voluntary Arrangement
X X X X X X X X
* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 3 to June 7, 2013
*********
===============
B U L G A R I A
===============
* BULGARIA: Company Insolvency Proceedings Up 243% in 2012
----------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that the local unit of French credit insurance
agency Cofa said on Friday insolvency proceedings against
Bulgarian companies last year increased by 243%, the sharpest
growth rate in Southeast Europe.
According to SeeNews, the agency said in a press release that a
total of 1,339 Bulgarian companies entered insolvency in 2012.
The agency said that high financial and operating leverage, high
financial costs, volatile prices of raw materials and low
liquidity were the main reasons for bankruptcies in the country,
SeeNews relates.
Serbia was the only country in the region where fewer companies
slipped into insolvency last year, SeeNews notes.
Details about insolvency proceedings in SEE follow:
2012 2011 Change
---- ---- ------
Bulgaria 1,339 390 243.3%
Croatia 3,033 1,106 174.2%
Romania 23,665 21,499 10.1%
Serbia 8,333 14,828 -43.8%
Slovenia 980 704 39.2%
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F R A N C E
===========
NOVASAUR SAS: Board Asks for More Details on Debt Restructuring
---------------------------------------------------------------
Francois de Beaupuy at Bloomberg News reports that Saur Executive
Chairman Olivier Brousse said the supervisory board of Novasaur
S.A.S. has asked for more details on its debt restructuring
proposed by creditors including BNP Paribas and Natixis.
According to Bloomberg, Mr. Brousse also said in an interview on
BFM Business radio that Saur may be put into administration if it
fails to find an agreement with creditors by June 30.
Mr. Brousse, as cited by Bloomberg, said that a pool of 63 banks
may write off almost EUR1 billion of Saur debt in exchange for
majority or even most of the company's capital. He said that
talks between Saur shareholders and creditors have gotten tougher
in recent days, though an agreement isn't far, Bloomberg notes.
Mr. Brousse added the water market has become very competitive
though remains profitable, Bloomberg relates.
Novasaur S.A.S., headquartered in Guyancourt, France, is the
third largest provider of water and sanitation services as well
as waste management services in France.
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G E R M A N Y
=============
PRIME 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'C' Ratings on Three Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed PRIME 2006-1 Funding Limited
Partnership's notes as follows:
EUR97,126,969 Class A notes (ISIN: XS0278567994): affirmed at
'Bsf'; Outlook Negative
EUR15,000,000 Class B notes (ISIN: XS0278569776): affirmed at
'CCCsf'; assigned RE45%
EUR20,000,000 Class C notes (ISIN: XS0278570519): affirmed at
'Csf'; assigned RE0%
EUR13,900,000 Class D notes (ISIN: XS0278571756): affirmed at
'Csf'; assigned RE0%
EUR13,000,000 Class E notes (ISIN: XS0278572135): affirmed at
'Csf'; assigned RE0%
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Two additional principal deficiency ledger (PDL) events have
occurred since the last performance review in June 2012. The
total outstanding PDL balance has increased to EUR40 million from
EUR35.5 million at last review, lowering the credit protection
available to the notes. Given the transaction's scheduled
maturity in August 2013, default on the class C, D and E notes
appears inevitable. Their current ratings reflect this situation
and have thus been affirmed.
Fitch notes the high single obligor concentration within the
transaction. The pool has become even more concentrated compared
with the last review as a result of the additional PDL reducing
the performing pool balance. The largest exposure accounts for
11.2% of the performing portfolio amount and the top five
obligors for 56%, which makes the transaction the most
concentrated among German mezzanine SME CLOs.
The reduced credit protection for the class A notes could only
provide for a default of the two largest obligors. The class B
notes could only sustain a default of the largest obligor. In
Fitch's view, the current ratings of these notes are commensurate
with this situation, which led to their affirmation. The agency
also maintained the Negative Outlook on the class A notes to
reflect their sensitivity to event risk. The other rated classes
do not have sufficient credit protection to provide for default
of the largest obligor.
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Given the bullet maturities, Fitch regards refinancing risk as a
key risk. All of the loans are bullet loans maturing on the same
day in July 2013. According to information provided by the
transaction arranger, a large portion of the companies in the
portfolio have arranged refinancing. Among the remaining
companies, Fitch expects weaker borrowers to have difficulties
refinancing loans at maturity, which could lead to additional
defaults. Fitch is in contact with the transaction arranger and
will review any available information on the repayment and
refinancing plans of the borrowers.
Due to the subordinated nature of the securitized loan
instruments, Fitch expects no recoveries.
Fitch assigns Recovery Estimates (REs) to all notes rated 'CCCsf'
or below. REs are forward-looking, taking into account Fitch's
expectations for principal repayments on a distressed structured
finance security. Fitch has assigned REs of 45% to the class B
notes and 0% to the class C, D and E notes.
The transaction is a cash securitization of subordinated loans to
German medium-sized enterprises. Currently, approximately two-
thirds of the loans feature a loss participation mechanism, and
the remainder incorporates a deferral option for fixed annual
interest. The portfolio companies were selected by the
originating banks HSH Nordbank AG (A-/Stable/F1), Landesbank
Baden-Wuerttemberg (A+/Stable/F1+) and Haspa
Beteiligungsgesellschaft fuer den Mittelstand mbH (NR).
===========
G R E E C E
===========
SEANERGY MARITIME: Ernst & Young Raises Going Concern Doubt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. filed April 26, 2013, its annual
report on Form 20-F for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012.
Ernst & Young (Hellas) Certified Auditors Accountants S.A., in
Athens, Greece, expressed substantial doubt about Seanergy
Maritime's ability to continue as a going concern. The
independent auditors noted that the Company has not complied with
the principal and interest repayment schedule and with certain
covenants of its loan agreements, which in turn gives the lenders
the right to call the debt. "In addition, the Company has a
working capital deficit, recurring losses from operations,
accumulated deficit and inability to generate sufficient cash
flow to meet its obligations and sustain its operations."
The Company reported a net loss of US$193.8 million on US$55.6
million of net vessel revenue in 2012, compared with a net loss
of US$197.8 million on US$104.1 million of net vessel revenue in
2011.
The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2013, showed
US$121.0 million in total assets, US$222.6 million in total
liabilities, and a stockholders' deficit of US$101.6 million.
A copy of the Form 20-F is available at http://is.gd/ZUaTHq
Athens, Greece-based Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. is an
international company providing worldwide seaborne transportation
of dry bulk commodities. The Company owns and operates a fleet
of seven dry bulk vessels that consists of three Handysize, two
Supramax and two Panamax vessels. Its fleet carries a variety of
dry bulk commodities, including coal, iron ore, and grains, as
well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizer and steel products.
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I R E L A N D
=============
DYFIN PUBLICATIONS: Faces Liquidation; Up to 20 Jobs at Risk
------------------------------------------------------------
Laura Slattery at The Irish Times reports that Dyflin
Publications is to go into voluntary liquidation.
The publisher has called a meeting of creditors and will appoint
a liquidator on June 17, the Irish Times says, citing a notice
published in the Daily Star.
About 18-20 jobs -- contract and freelance positions -- are
believed to be at risk and it is understood that staff have been
informed of the company's financial position, the Irish Times
discloses.
The future for Dyflin's titles and contract publishing business
is unclear, the Irish Times notes.
Dyflin Publications is the 25-year-old company behind the
magazines Prudence, Confetti and House and Home.
QUINN INSURANCE: Judge OKs Addt'l EUR60MM Insurance Fund Drawdown
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tim Healy at Irish Independent reports that the administrators of
Quinn Insurance have been given the go-ahead to draw down another
EUR60 million from the State's Insurance Compensation Fund.
The latest ruling by the High Court brings the bill linked to
Quinn Insurance to EUR1.118 billion, Irish Independent notes.
The High Court heard that the sale of three hotels owned by Quinn
Insurance has been agreed, raising a combined value of EUR67
million, Irish Independent relates. The deals will conclude
soon, Irish Independent states.
Quinn Insurance's Irish business, except healthcare, was sold in
a deal involving US giant Liberty Insurance last year, Irish
Independent recounts.
Bernard Dunleavy, for the administrators, said they had settled
insurance claims for the first four months of 2013 for some
EUR14.5 million less than the sums reserved to meet those claims,
Irish Independent relates.
According to Irish Independent, Mr. Dunleavy said that an
additional EUR40 million had been saved following the successful
conclusion of a dispute between the administrators and Liberty
concerning the methodology for calculating the assets of Quinn
Insurance.
Mr. Dunleavy on Thursday presented the 13th report of the joint
administrators, Michael McAteer and Paul McCann of Grant
Thornton, who were appointed in March 2010, Irish Independent
recounts.
Mr. Justice Nicholas Kearns approved their application for the
additional EUR60 million drawdown from the insurance fund,
bringing the total approved for drawdown to EUR1.118 million,
Irish Independent discloses.
On March 30, 2010, following an application by the Central Bank
of Ireland, the High Court appointed joint provisional
administrators to Quinn Insurance Limited.
SUNDAY BUSINESS: Consortium Offers to Buy Business for EUR750,000
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Irish Independent reports that a consortium of
Key Capital and newspaper executive Paul Cooke have reached
agreement in principal to buy the Sunday Business Post newspaper
out of examinership.
According to Irish Independent, the offer is to buy the business
for EUR750,000 which will be used to pay off company debt.
Under the terms now being finalized, staff at the newspaper must
agree to sacrifice previously agreed redundancy terms for any
future jobs cuts, Irish Independent discloses. In exchange a 6%
stake in the newspaper will be handed to employees through an
employee shareholder trust, Irish Independent says.
Staff had until Friday, June 7, to accept the plan, Irish
Independent notes.
The company behind the Sunday Business Post was put into
Examinership after most of its parent group Thomas Crosbie
Holdings went into Recievership in March, Irish Independent
relates.
The Sunday Business Post is an Irish national Sunday newspaper.
===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================
HEAT MEZZANINE: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws C Class B1 Notes Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed H.E.A.T Mezzanine S.A. Compartment 2's
class B1 notes (ISIN: XS02512933261) at 'Csf' and assigned a
Recovery Estimate (RE) of RE0%. Simultaneously, Fitch has
withdrawn the rating.
The issuer has chosen to stop participating in the rating
process. Therefore, Fitch will no longer have sufficient
information to maintain the rating. Given the expected delisting
of the notes, the rating is no longer considered analytically
meaningful. Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or
analytical coverage for H.E.A.T Mezzanine S.A. Compartment 2.
OXEA SARL: High Leverage Margin Cues Moody's to Cut CFR to B2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded to B2 from B1 the corporate
family rating and to B2-PD from B1-PD the probability of default
rating of Oxea S.ar.l. (Oxea), the ultimate holding company of
the subsidiary guarantors to the group's senior secured credit
facilities. In addition, Moody's has downgraded to B3 from B2 the
rating on the outstanding EUR427 million of equivalent senior
secured notes due 2017, issued by Oxea's subsidiary Oxea Finance
& Cy S.C.A. ("OF"). Concurrently, Moody's has changed the outlook
on the ratings of Oxea and its subsidiary to stable from
negative.
The rating agency has also downgraded the provisional rating on
Oxea's proposed first-lien senior secured credit agreement to
(P)B1 from (P)Ba3, as well as the provisional rating on the
company's proposed EUR248 million second-lien senior secured
credit facility due 2020 to (P)Caa1 from (P)B3.
Oxea recently announced its intention to increase the amount of
debt issuance associated with its upcoming proposed refinancing
transaction to the equivalent of approximately EUR1.1 billion
from EUR1.0 billion. Moody's expects the increased first-lien
senior secured credit facility to consist of (1) an undrawn
multi-currency revolving credit facility (RCF) due 2018 amounting
to EUR120 million equivalent; (2) a term loan B-1 facility due
2019 totaling EUR450 million (up from EUR200 million); and (3) a
term loan B-2 facility also due 2019 totaling the equivalent of
approximately EUR408 million (down from EUR550 million
equivalent).
Oxea plans to use the proceeds from this revised proposed
transaction to (1) redeem its outstanding EUR427 million of
equivalent senior secured notes due 2017, issued by OF; (2) fund
a dividend to shareholders of approximately EUR618 million
(increased from the rating agency's original expectation of
EUR511 million); and (3) pay related transaction fees. The
majority of Oxea's shareholders are funds managed or advised by
private equity firm Advent International Corporation.
"Today's downgrade of Oxea's CFR to B2 largely reflects the
company's prior weak positioning in the B1 rating category and
that its high financial leverage, ongoing shareholder-friendly
financial policy and significant exposure to a challenging
European environment for commodity chemicals provide better
positioning at the B2 level," says Anthony Hill, a Moody's Vice
President - Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Oxea.
Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of debt instruments and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the debt. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.
Ratings Rationale:
Downgrade of CFR To B2 From B1
The downgrade of Oxea's CFR to B2 primarily reflect the company's
high financial leverage, which Moody's now expects will be around
5.9x debt/EBITDA (up from the rating agency's original
expectation of 5.4x debt/EBITDA, and on a Moody's-adjusted basis)
for the 12 months ending March 31, 2013 and pro forma for the
transaction. While Moody's expects Oxea to reduce leverage over
the coming quarters and achieve a leverage ratio of around 5.3x
debt/EBITDA by financial year end (FYE) December 31, 2013, it
also expects the company to generate low levels of unencumbered
future free cash flow (FCF) and remain significantly exposed to
the challenging European demand for many commodity chemicals,
which the rating agency expects will exist through at least 2013
(Europe accounted for 47% of Oxea's FYE 2012 sales).
Additionally, the company is exposed to cyclical and highly
variable raw materials costs, especially the price of propylene,
which accounted for nearly 60% of Oxea's FYE 2012 total raw
material costs and is tied to general trends in oil prices.
Furthermore, Moody's believes that Oxea's financial policy
continues to demonstrate a prioritization of shareholder
dividends ahead of the maintenance of financial flexibility.
Globally, the oxo chemicals industry continues to be fairly
consolidated, with very high capacity utilization rates of around
85%-90%. The tight supply-versus-demand balance makes it
necessary for Oxea to ensure sufficient investments in its
current plants and its global expansion projects in order to
maintain its competitive position in the market with key
customers. Moody's expects that weakness in European demand will
continue to exert pressure on Oxea's European margins. The rating
agency expects the combination of weaker margins and higher
capital expenditure (capex) to reduce Oxea's financial
flexibility and considers that, as a result, the company would
find it difficult to cope with any exogenous event that would
further reduce earnings or cash flows.
However, more positively, the B2 CFR also reflects Moody's
positive view that Oxea (1) is a leading pure-play merchant
producer of oxo chemicals for the global chemicals market with a
track record of maintaining and growing market share positions
across a diverse product line; (2) has a proven ability to
generate solid cash flows through global and European economic
cycles; (3) has a resilient business model, as demonstrated by
solid operating performance, and an ability to pass through
material and production costs while simultaneously improving
overall group marginal income despite the challenging trading
environment in Europe; and (4) notwithstanding Moody's forward-
looking concerns regarding the company's leverage, has
demonstrated a solid track record of deleveraging through
voluntary prepayments and improvements in revenues, EBITDA, and
cash flow generation.
Moody's believes that Oxea's liquidity, pro forma the
transaction, will comfortably cover its near-term requirements.
Pro forma for the transaction, Moody's expects the company to
exhibit an adjusted cash balance of approximately EUR34 million.
Internally generated cash flow and the undrawn EUR120 million RCF
should cover the company's ongoing basic cash needs, such as debt
service and amortization, working capital needs and expected
capex (including expansionary capital investments).
Using Moody's Loss Given Default (LGD) methodology, the PDR is
equal to the CFR. This is based on a 50% recovery rate, as is
typical for a debt capital structure that primarily consists of
senior secured facilities. Also in accordance with Moody's LGD
methodology, the RCF and first-lien senior secured credit
facility are rated (P)B1, one notch above the B2 CFR. This is due
to the first-lien senior secured facility's ranking priority over
the subordinated EUR248 million notional second-lien senior
secured credit facility, which is rated (P)Caa1, two notches
below the CFR. The second-lien senior secured credit facility is
notched downwards from the CFR, reflecting its subordinated
ranking in the capital structure.
Change of outlook to stable from negative
The change of outlook on the ratings to stable from negative
reflects the rating agency's view that, despite the challenging
trading environment in Europe, Oxea will continue to deliver
solid operating performance, stable credit metrics, and modest
deleveraging over the next 18 months.
What could change the rating up/down
Positive pressure on the rating could materialize if Oxea were to
sustainably achieve a Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio
approaching 4.0x, and sustain positive free cash flow generation.
Conversely, Moody's would consider downgrading Oxea's ratings if
the company fails to modestly deleverage over the next 18 months
and/or its liquidity profile deteriorates due to (1) a weakening
of its operational performance; (2) acquisitions; or (3) an
aggressive financial/dividend policy. Quantitatively, Moody's
would likely downgrade Oxea's ratings if over the next 18 months
(1) the company's Moody's-adjusted EBITDA margin falls
sustainably to the low teens, on a percentage basis; (2) its
debt/EBITDA ratio moves towards 5.5x; or (3) its Moody's-adjusted
RCF/debt ratio falls sustainably below 10%.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Chemical Industry published in December 2009. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.
Headquartered in Luxembourg, Oxea S.ar.l. is a leading global
producer of oxo intermediates and derivatives with a key product
portfolio of oxo chemical products and well-established market
positions in Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, and South
America. Oxo chemicals are critical to the production of other
chemicals used in a variety of industries such as automotive,
construction, industrial goods, consumer and retail,
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, agriculture and packaging. For the
fiscal year ended December 31, 2012, Oxea reported revenues and
EBITDA of EUR1.5 billion and EUR193 million, respectively.
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
GOLDENTREE CREDIT: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
credit ratings to Goldentree Credit Opportunities European CLO
2013-1 B.V.'s floating- and fixed-rate class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C,
D, and E notes. At closing, Goldentree Credit Opportunities
European CLO 2013-1 B.V. will also issue unrated subordinated
class of notes.
GoldenTree Credit Opportunities European CLO 2013-1 LLC is the
transaction's co-issuer. GoldenTree Asset Management LP acts as
collateral manager.
S&P's preliminary ratings reflect its assessment of the
preliminary collateral portfolio's credit quality. The portfolio
at closing is expected to be diversified, primarily comprising
broadly syndicated speculative-grade U.S. and European senior
secured term loans and senior secured bonds.
S&P's ratings also reflect the credit enhancement available to
the rated notes through the subordination of cash flows payable
to the subordinated notes. S&P subjected the preliminary capital
structure to a cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes.
In S&P's analysis, it used the target par amount, the covenanted
weighted-average spread, the covenanted weighted-average coupon,
the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates, and the initial
foreign exchange rate. S&P applied various cash flow stress
scenarios, using four different default patterns, in conjunction
with different interest rate and foreign exchange stress
scenarios for each liability rating category.
The ratings assigned to the notes are commensurate with S&P's
assessment of available credit enhancement following its credit
and cash flow analysis. S&P's analysis shows that the credit
enhancement available to each rated class of notes was sufficient
to withstand the scenario default rates and defaults applicable
under the supplemental tests outlined in S&P's corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.
At closing, S&P considers that GoldenTree Credit Opportunities
European CLO 2013-1, incorporated in the Netherlands, will likely
comply with S&P's bankruptcy-remoteness criteria for special-
purpose entities (SPEs) under its European legal criteria.
GoldenTree Credit Opportunities European CLO 2013-1 is a cash
flow corporate loan CLO securitization of a revolving pool,
comprising senior secured loans and bonds issued by European and
U.S. borrowers.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.
The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1586.pdf
RATINGS LIST
Goldentree Credit Opportunities European CLO 2013-1 B.V.
EUR226 Million, GBP15.336 Million Senior Secured And Mezzanine
Secured Deferrable Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes Series 2013-1
Class Prelim. Prelim.
rating amount
(mil.)
A-1 AAA (sf) EUR82.000
A-2 AAA (sf) EUR35.000
A-3 AAA (sf) GBP15.336
B AA (sf) EUR39.000
C A (sf) EUR21.000
D BBB (sf) EUR21.000
E BB (sf) EUR28.000
MESDAG BV: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Mesdag (Delta) B.V.'s class A, B and
E floating-rate notes due 2020 and affirmed classes C and D as
follows:
EUR380.2m class A (XS0307565928) downgraded to 'BBBsf' from
'Asf'; Outlook Negative
EUR45m class B (XS0307574599) downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf';
Outlook Negative
EUR51.1m class C (XS0307576701) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
Negative
EUR61.4m class D (XS0307578749) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate RE80%
EUR47.0m class E (XS0307580307) downgraded to 'CCsf from 'CCCsf';
RE0%
EUR24.9m Class F (XS0307581370) not rated
KEY RATING DRIVERS
The downgrades are driven by the ongoing underperformance in the
secondary Dutch property market, as reflected in the declining
value of the securitized collateral over time as well as in the
slow but steady downwards trend of the interest coverage ratio
(ICR).
The EUR609.6 million securitized loan continues to be secured on
61 secondary office and retail/ shopping center assets located in
the Netherlands (no asset sales or substitutions have taken place
since the last rating action in June 2012). The latest
revaluation reported an increase in the whole loan-to-value ratio
(LTV) to 91% from 84.6%, although Fitch's estimate is in excess
of 100%.
The revaluation has resulted in a breach of the 85% LTV cash
sweep trigger. While this does not constitute an event of
default, all excess rent will henceforth be utilized to redeem
the loan, a little over six months prior to automatic cash sweep
commencement in January 2014. With a weighted average lease term
of 6.8 years, cash sweep now and (should the loan fail to repay
in 2016) also in the tail period until 2020 bond maturity
(especially if rates stay low) might prove a useful source of
credit enhancement.
However ICR is on a falling trajectory. In April 2013, 1.36x was
reported on the securitized loan and 1.28x on the whole facility,
below the ratios both in April 2012 (1.41x/1.32x) and at closing
in July 2007 (1.48x/1.39x). This steady reduction is the result
of decreased gross and net rent, in spite of largely unchanged
occupancy (reported at 78.8% in April 2013). Falling market rents
are outside the control of the sponsor's efforts in re-letting
space when it becomes empty, and rather reflect the weakness in
the Dutch property sector responsible for the downgrades and the
Negative Outlooks on the classes A, B and C notes.
Rating Sensitivities
Should rents and market values in Dutch secondary property
continue to fall, the ratings would be subject to increasing
downwards pressure.
SNS REAAL: Posts EUR1.6-Bil. Net Loss in First Quarter 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------
Matt Steinglass at The Financial Times reports that SNS Reaal,
the Dutch bancassurer nationalized in February to prevent
insolvency, has taken an impairment of EUR2 billion at its
troubled property finance division for the first quarter of 2013.
The charge led to a net loss for the quarter of EUR1.6 billion,
the FT discloses. It comes on top of EUR941 million in
impairments at the property finance division last year, which led
to a 2012 net loss of EUR972 million for the group, the FT notes.
The rescued bank is moving to recognize massive losses on real
estate assets that its previous management team had refused to
acknowledge, forcing the state to intervene, the FT states.
Gerard van Olphen, the new chief executive appointed in February
following the nationalization, said the group was seeking to move
the property finance division into a separately managed entity,
the FT relates. This will allow the bank to split off its real
estate division from its healthier businesses, including its
Zwitserleven insurance arm and a profitable retail banking
operation, the FT says.
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the Dutch finance minister, nationalized SNS
Reaal in February after independent auditor reports concluded the
troubles at the property finance unit threatened the bank's
solvency and a search for private buyers failed, the FT recounts.
The state injected EUR2.2 billion in capital and wiped out the
interests of the bank's shareholders and junior creditors, some
of whom continue to pursue legal action, the FT relates.
The government said a collapse of the bank, the Netherlands'
fourth largest, would have posed a systemic risk to financial
stability in the country, the FT notes.
The European Commission has given provisional approval to the
nationalization, but demanded that SNS Reaal present a
restructuring plan by August 22 for review, according to the FT.
===========
P O L A N D
===========
* POLAND: Business Bankruptcies Down 27% Y/Y to 60 in May
---------------------------------------------------------
Maciej Onoszko at Bloomberg News reports that state-owned Export
Credit Insurance Corporation KUKE said in an e-mailed statement
on Friday business bankruptcies in Poland fell 27% y/y to 60 in
May from 83 in April and 82 in May 2012.
According to Bloomberg, KUKE said that the number of bankruptcies
fell to 898 in the last 12 months, compared with 920 in April.
KUKE cut its 2013 forecast for Polish bankruptcies to 1,150 from
1,300, citing deeper-than-expected monetary easing and better-
than-expected economic growth in the first quarter, Bloomberg
relates.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
RENAISSANCE FINANCIAL: Moody's Downgrades Issuer Ratings to B3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the long-term foreign- and
local-currency issuer ratings of Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited to B3 from B2. The Not-Prime foreign- and local-currency
short-term ratings remain unchanged. The outlook on the issuer
ratings is negative.
The rating action is based on the audited IFRS accounts for 2012
and the unaudited management accounts for January-May 2013.
Ratings Rationale:
Moody's says the downgrade of Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited's long-term issuer ratings to B3 is driven by the
company's deteriorated financial profile given the (1)
significant losses incurred in 2012 due to negative revaluation
of financial assets (i.e., equity investments in several
companies invested over a long-term horizon) and write-downs of
receivables from the Renaissance Group companies as well as
losses from core operations; and (2) weakening of the company's
liquidity profile.
Losses in 2012
Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's revenues from operating
activities (excluding one-off items) materially decreased to less
than US$30 million in 2012, vs. approximately US$170 million in
2011. As a result, capital expenditure (capex) significantly
exceeded operating revenues and Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited reported a loss from core operations of over US$290
million or over 30% of the 'beginning period equity' in 2012.
In addition, the revaluation of Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited's financial assets resulted in further losses of $97
million. The company also made a $141 million impairment charge
on exposures to Renaissance Group companies directly into equity.
Some Signs of Recovery in Profitability Following Ownership
Change
Moody's notes that after the new shareholder ONEXIM group took
de-facto operational control of Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited in November 2012, the controlling company re-aligned the
business model by significantly reducing the large platform (held
in anticipation of market recovery) in order to match lower
business volumes. As a result, according to unaudited management
accounts, Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's operational
activity returned to positive in January-May 2013.
Capital and Liquidity
As a result of the aforementioned losses in 2012, Renaissance
Financial Holding Limited's total equity impairments amounted to
US$520 million, albeit partially offset by a US$185 million
injection from the new shareholder at year-end 2012. At the same
time, Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's leverage increased
to 9x at year-end 2012 from 5x at year-end 2011, while the
equity-to-asset ratio declined to 12% at year-end 2012 from 17%
at year-end 2011. Given that the majority of long-term financial
assets have already been marked down and exposures to Renaissance
Capital companies (controlled by ONEXIM) already reflect their
fair value, Moody's does not expect a significant impact on
equity from further negative asset revaluations, and the
company's capital base is still sufficient to absorb substantial
market losses.
As at May 2013, Renaissance Financial Holding Limited sold over
US$150 million of financial assets, and the company plans further
sales of up to US$270 million in 2013-14.
In addition to financial assets, Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited also has exposures to its holding company (Renaissance
Capital Investments Limited -- which is also controlled by
ONEXIM) that exceed US$920 million. The rating agency says that
any efforts to substitute such sizeable exposures with liquid
assets would likely to be lengthy process.
Moody's recognizes ONEXIM's prolific provision of capital and
liquidity support towards Renaissance Financial Holding Limited
(e.g., US$500 million in 2008 and US$400 million in 2012), and
the rating agency considers that further liquidity and capital
support is likely, given the public assurance by ONEXIM's senior
management.
Negative Outlook
The negative outlook on the ratings of Renaissance Financial
Holding Limited reflects Moody's assessment of the potential risk
that the company would be unable to: (1) restore its liquidity;
and (2) successfully rebuild a profit-generating business model
(given intense competition and changed market realities, and
given the possibility that any future losses will negatively
impact financial indicators such as capital and liquidity).
What could change the ratings down/up
Negative pressure could be exerted on Renaissance Financial
Holding Limited's ratings (1) if the company is unable to restore
its liquidity profile; and (2) as a result of a continued
operational loss-making performance. Any significant reduction of
capital as a result of further losses could also have further
negative rating implications.
Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's ratings are unlikely to
be upgraded in the medium term (i.e., the next 12 to 18 months).
However, the rating outlook may be changed to stable if the
company (1) improves its liquidity profile; and (2) achieves
significant improvements in core profitability.
Principal Methodologies
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Securities Industry Methodology published in May 2013.
Renaissance Financial Holding Limited is the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) investment banking division of ONEXIM.
Apart from the CIS, the company has operations in Africa, Asia,
the UK, Cyprus and other jurisdictions. The company reported
total consolidated assets of US$4.8 billion and total equity of
approximately US$580 million under (audited) IFRS at year-end
2012.
RENAISSANCE FINANCIAL: Moody's Cuts National Scale Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has downgraded the long-term
national scale credit rating (NSR) of Renaissance Financial
Holding Limited to Baa3.ru from Baa1.ru.
Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's Baa3.ru NSR now maps to
the B3 global scale long-term local-currency rating (assigned by
Moody's Investors Service).
The rating action is based on the audited IFRS accounts for 2012
and the unaudited management accounts for January-May 2013.
Ratings Rationale:
Moody's Interfax says the downgrade of Renaissance Financial
Holding Limited's NSR to Baa3.ru is driven by the company's
deteriorated financial profile given the (1) significant losses
incurred in 2012 due to negative revaluation of financial assets
(i.e., equity investments in several companies invested over a
long-term horizon) and write-downs of receivables from the
Renaissance Group companies as well as losses from core
operations; and (2) weakening of the company's liquidity profile.
Losses in 2012
Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's revenues from operating
activities (excluding one-off items) materially decreased to less
than US$30 million in 2012, vs. approximately US$170 million in
2011. As a result, capital expenditure (capex) significantly
exceeded operating revenues and Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited reported a loss from core operations of over US$290
million or over 30% of the 'beginning period equity' in 2012.
In addition, the revaluation of Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited's financial assets resulted in further losses of US$97
million. The company also made a US$141 million impairment charge
on exposures to Renaissance Group companies directly into equity.
Some Signs of Recovery in Profitability Following Ownership
Change
Moody's Interfax notes that after the new shareholder ONEXIM
group took de-facto operational control of Renaissance Financial
Holding Limited in November 2012, the controlling company re-
aligned the business model by significantly reducing the large
platform (held in anticipation of market recovery) in order to
match lower business volumes. As a result, according to unaudited
management accounts, Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's
operational activity returned to positive in January-May 2013.
Capital and Liquidity
As a result of the aforementioned losses in 2012, Renaissance
Financial Holding Limited's total equity impairments amounted to
US$520 million, albeit partially offset by a US$185 million
injection from the new shareholder at year-end 2012. At the same
time, Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's leverage increased
to 9x at year-end 2012 from 5x at year-end 2011, while the
equity-to-asset ratio declined to 12% at year-end 2012 from 17%
at year-end 2011. Given that the majority of long-term financial
assets have already been marked down and exposures to Renaissance
Capital companies (controlled by ONEXIM) already reflect their
fair value, Moody's Interfax does not expect a significant impact
on equity from further negative asset revaluations, and the
company's capital base is still sufficient to absorb substantial
market losses.
As at May 2013, Renaissance Financial Holding Limited sold over
US$150 million of financial assets, and the company plans further
sales of up to US$270 million in 2013-14.
In addition to financial assets, Renaissance Financial Holding
Limited also has exposures to its holding company (Renaissance
Capital Investments Limited -- which is also controlled by
ONEXIM) that exceed US$920 million. The rating agency says that
any efforts to substitute such sizeable exposures with liquid
assets would likely to be lengthy process.
Moody's Interfax recognizes ONEXIM's prolific provision of
capital and liquidity support towards Renaissance Financial
Holding Limited (e.g., US$500 million in 2008 and US$400 million
in 2012), and the rating agency considers that further liquidity
and capital support is likely, given the public assurance by
ONEXIM's senior management.
What Could Change The Ratings Down/Up
Negative pressure could be exerted on Renaissance Financial
Holding Limited's rating as a result of (1) its inability to
restore its liquidity position; and (2) as a result of a
continued operational loss-making performance. Any significant
reduction of capital as a result of further losses could also
have further negative rating implications.
Renaissance Financial Holding Limited's rating is unlikely to be
upgraded in the medium term (i.e., the next 12 to 18 months).
However, some positive pressure could be exerted on the rating if
the company (1) improves its liquidity profile; and (2) achieves
significant improvements in core profitability.
Principal Methodologies
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Securities Industry Methodology published in May 2013.
Renaissance Financial Holding Limited is the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) investment banking division of ONEXIM.
Apart from the CIS, the company has operations in Africa, Asia,
the UK, Cyprus and other jurisdictions. The company reported
total consolidated assets of US$4.8 billion and total equity of
approximately US$580 million under (audited) IFRS at year-end
2012.
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia.
About Moody's and Moody's Interfax
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).
* SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had affirmed its 'BB+'
long-term issuer credit rating and its 'ruAA+' Russia national
scale rating on Russia's Samara oblast. The outlook is stable.
The ratings reflect S&P's view of Russia's developing and
unbalanced institutional framework, as well as Samara Oblast's
limited budgetary flexibility and predictability, and low
economic wealth compared with international peers'. A further
constraint is the oblast's lack of reliable long-term financial
planning. The ratings are supported by S&P's expectation that
the oblast will maintain modest debt and positive liquidity. Low
contingent liabilities and moderately sound budgetary performance
also support the ratings.
Samara Oblast is one of Russia's key industrial regions, with oil
production and refining providing an estimated 16% of gross
regional product (GRP). S&P forecasts economic growth to
continue over the next three years, but GRP per capita to stay
below US$12,000 until 2015. S&P also expects the oblast's tax
base to remain dominated by a few large taxpayers. In 2012, the
oblast's 10 largest taxpayers provided more than 35% of its tax
revenues, with an estimated 13% from subsidiaries of Oil Company
Rosneft OJSC. In S&P's view, this modest concentration might
expose the oblast's budget revenues to the volatility of world
oil prices and changes in the national tax regime over the long
term.
Russia's developing and unbalanced institutional framework
hinders long-term financial planning and further limits the
predictability of Samara Oblast's financial indicators. It also
leaves the region little flexibility in revenues and expenditure.
S&P expects that in 2013-2015 more than 90% of the oblast's total
revenues will come from state-regulated taxes and transfers from
the federal government. The oblast's modifiable revenues, mainly
transport tax and non-tax revenues, will likely not exceed a low
6% of its operating revenues.
The oblast's financial management has some leeway regarding
budget expenditure. In 2012, in line with a federal mandate, the
oblast started raising public-sector salaries, and the newly
appointed governor urged the oblast's management to review and
cut some discretionary operating spending to minimize overall
spending growth and stabilize the oblast's debt burden. Together
with additional tax revenues from the oblast's largest taxpayers,
these measures resulted in a very strong operating balance of
13.3% of operating revenues and a positive balance after capital
accounts.
Nevertheless, in S&P's base-case scenario for 2013-2015 it
expects the oblast's exceptional 2012 results to level off and
budgetary performance to gradually weaken given the slowdown in
economic and budget revenue growth that S&P forecasts and the
need to continue to raise salaries and other social-related
spending. S&P therefore forecasts operating balances of 6%-9% of
operating revenues.
On the capital side, the oblast will have to address
infrastructure development needs and invest in preparation for
the Federation of International Football Association's (FIFA)
World Cup in 2018, to be hosted by the city of Samara.
Currently, the oblast's draft plan for the World Cup shows the
total amount required at about Russian ruble (RUB) 210 billion
(about US$6.7 billion). This is equivalent to about 1.4x the
total budget revenues S&P forecasts for 2013. The oblast expects
the federal government to provide 80% of the total amount and
intends to finance the remaining 20% from its budget. In S&P's
base case, it expects that during the approval process of the
amount and cofinancing with the federal government the program
will be adjusted so that it doesn't require significant
additional borrowing. S&P also expects deficits after capital
accounts to widen modestly to about 3%-5% of total revenues over
the next three years.
In S&P's view, the oblast's tax-supported debt will therefore
remain relatively low in an international context, gradually
increasing to about 40% of consolidated operating revenues in
2015.
The oblast's contingent liabilities will likely remain low over
the next three years thanks to its limited involvement in the
regional economy and a relatively financially healthy municipal
sector.
S&P considers Samara Oblast's liquidity position to be
"positive," as defined in S&P's criteria. S&P expects the
oblast's average cash reserves to exceed debt service falling due
within the next 12 months throughout 2013. However, S&P views
its access to external liquidity as "limited", given the
weaknesses of the domestic capital market.
In S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes that the oblast will
continue placing amortizing bonds with maturities of five to
seven years, which should reduce debt service to about 8.5% of
operating revenues in 2015 from about 10% in 2013.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that in 2013-2015 Samara
Oblast's budgetary performance will remain moderately sound, with
average deficits after capital accounts below 5% of total
revenues, but subject to volatility and gradual weakening due to
the need to increase expenditure. S&P also assumes that the
oblast will maintain its positive liquidity position.
S&P could take a negative rating action within the next 12 months
if in line with its downside scenario the oblast's liquidity
position were to weaken, with average net free cash reserves
falling below 100% of annual debt service. This could happen if
the oblast incurred new debt with shorter maturities than S&P
forecasts in its base-case scenario, or if it depleted its
currently ample cash reserves.
S&P could take a positive rating action if the oblast documented
and maintained a cautious financial debt and liquidity management
policy, which in S&P's view would allow for sound budgetary
performance and positive liquidity over the medium term.
However, ratings upside is unlikely for the next 12 months, in
S&P's view.
=========
S P A I N
=========
TDA 19 MIXTO: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR6MM C Notes to 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of eight
notes in four Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions: TDA 14 MIXTO, FTA; TDA 16 MIXTO, FTA; TDA 17
MIXTO, FTA and TDA 19 MIXTO, FTA. At the same time, Moody's
confirmed the rating of one junior note in TDA 17 MIXTO, FTA.
This rating action concludes the review of four notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 2012 and four
notes placed on review on November 23, 2012, following Moody's
revision of key collateral assumptions for the entire Spanish
RMBS market.
Ratings Rationale:
This downgrade action primarily reflects the insufficiency of
credit enhancement to address sovereign risk. Moody's confirmed
the ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and structural
features provided enough protection against sovereign and
counterparty risk.
The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.
Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk
Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.
The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.
Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions
Moody's has maintained its MILAN CE assumption in all four
transactions and maintained its lifetime loss expectation (EL)
for TDA 14 MIXTO, FTA and TDA 19 MIXTO, FTA for both subpools and
for TDA 16 MIXTO, FTA and TDA 17 MIXTO, FTA for subpool B.
Moody's has changed its lifetime loss expectation (EL) to 0.60%
from 0.50% for subpool A in TDA 16 MIXTO, FTA and to 0.70% from
0.58% for subpool A in TDA 17 MIXTO, FTA.
Exposure to Counterparty Risk
Moody's rating review takes into consideration the exposure to
the relevant servicers acting as collection account bank for the
four transactions. Treasury Accounts are held by Barclays Bank
PLC for TDA 14 MIXTO, FTA, TDA 16 MIXTO, FTA and TDA 17 MIXTO,
FTA and BNP Paribas for TDA 19 MIXTO, FTA. The sweeping frequency
to the treasury account is monthly in TDA 14 MIXTO, FTA and TDA
17 MIXTO, FTA for both subpools, daily, weekly or monthly
depending on the entity in TDA 16 MIXTO, FTA and TDA 19 MIXTO,
FTA. Moody's concluded that the presence of the account banks did
not impact the ratings.
Moody's also notes that, there is no swap in place to protect the
transactions against interest rate risk for TDA 14 MIXTO, FTA,
TDA 16 MIXTO, FTA and TDA 17 MIXTO, FTA. The revised rating of
the notes is not negatively impacted by this exposure given the
high excess spread on the pool.
Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes
In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.
As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.
Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment".
The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework", published in May 2013 and
"The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.
In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.
As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.
List of Affected Ratings:
Issuer: TDA 14 MIXTO, FTA
EUR18.7M B1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR8.1M BNC Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
Issuer: TDA 16 MIXTO, FTA
EUR15.1M B1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR9.1M B2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
Issuer: TDA 17 MIXTO, FTA
EUR14M B1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR2.2M B2 Notes, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: TDA 19 MIXTO, FTA
EUR19.2M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Confirmed at A3 (sf)
EUR6M C Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR7.5M D Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
GAT ICO-FTVPO 1: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR3.2MM Notes to Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of four notes in
one Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities transaction:
GAT ICO-FTVPO 1, FTH. At the same time, Moody's confirmed the
ratings of the senior note of GAT ICO-FTVPO 1, FTH and
furthermore confirmed four junior notes in GAT ICO-FTVPO 1, FTH.
The downgrade has been prompted by insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk in GAT ICO-FTVPO 1
This rating action concludes the review of seven notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 2012 and two
notes placed on review on November 23, 2012, following Moody's
revision of key collateral assumptions for the entire Spanish
RMBS market.
Ratings Rationale:
This downgrade action primarily reflects the insufficiency of
credit enhancement to address sovereign risk. Moody's confirmed
the ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and structural
features provided enough protection against sovereign and
counterparty risk.
The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.
Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk
Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.
The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.
Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions
Moody's has maintained its lifetime loss expectation (EL) as well
as its MILAN CE assumption in the transaction.
Moody's has maintained the EL assumptions for the combined
portfolio of GAT ICO-FTVPO 1, FTH and its four sub-portfolios
from Caixa Catalunya, Caixa Manresa, Caixa Penedes and Caixa
Terrassa at 1.48%, 1.25%, 1.75%, 1.23%, 1.50% respectively.
Moody's has maintained all the MILAN CE assumptions at 10% for
the combined portfolio of GAT ICO-FTVPO 1, FTH and its four sub-
portfolios from Caixa Catalunya, Caixa Manresa, Caixa Penedes and
Caixa Terrassa.
Exposure to Counterparty Risk
The exposure to the account bank in GAT ICO FTVPO 1, FTH which is
Barclays Bank PLC (A2/P-1) does not have a negative impact on the
outstanding ratings for this transaction. For the transaction
there is no negative impact from exposure to swap counterparties.
Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes
In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.
As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.
Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment".
The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework", published in May 2013 and
"The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.
In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.
As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.
List of Affected Ratings:
Issuer: GAT ICO-FTVPO 1, FTH
EUR331.6M A(G) Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR9.8M B(CA) Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov
23, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade
EUR3.3M B (CM) Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul
2, 2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade
EUR2.7M B(CP) Notes, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov
23, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade
EUR2M B(CT) Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR3.2M C(CA) Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR2.3M C(CM) Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR1.5M C(CP) Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR1.5M C(CT) Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
URALITA: Turns to Private Equity Firms for Loans Amid Debt Woes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and Henny Sender at The Financial Times
report that after five years battling its most severe downturn
since the Spanish civil war, Uralita felt that it was running out
of options.
The company faced debt repayments this year and next, the FT
relates. And with no recovery in sight, Uralita's banks were not
in a lending mood, the FT notes.
In 2007, the family-owned company boasted healthy profits and
more than EUR1 billion in sales, the FT recounts. But it lost
money in 2012, with revenues down 40%, due to the collapse in the
Spanish construction market, the FT discloses.
Its banks, including Santander, the country's largest, and
Bankia, which was bailed out last year, indicated that they would
push back the payments for another year -- but only if Uralita
sold assets, recalls Javier Gonzalez, Uralita's general counsel,
the FT recounts.
Left with the unpalatable prospect of selling profitable
operations to satisfy its lenders, Uralita looked for alternative
sources of funds, the FT discloses. Four private equity groups,
including New York-based KKR and Blackstone, competed to offer a
loan, the FT says. In April the company borrowed EUR320 million
over seven years from KKR to repay all existing creditors, the FT
relates. The loan will also help fund new investments at its pan-
European thermal insulation business, the FT states.
Uralita is a Spanish building materials supplier.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
BRUNTWOOD ALPHA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Bruntwood Alpha PLC's class A, B, and C notes.
The rating actions follow S&P's review of the underlying loans'
credit quality by applying its updated European commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) criteria.
Two loans secure the transaction, which had January 2014 maturity
dates. In February 2013, the noteholders approved a
restructuring of the transaction. Changes included the extension
of the maturity date for the Bruntwood 2000 loan until January
2016, and the extension of the notes' legal final maturity date
to January 2019 from January 2017.
BRUNTWOOD 2000 LOAN (52.0% OF THE POOL BALANCE)
The whole loan and securitized balance is GBP229.2 million. As
part of the transaction's restructuring, the loan's maturity date
has been extended to January 2016 from January 2014.
The loan is currently secured on 22 mainly office properties in
greater Manchester, central Manchester, Liverpool, Warrington,
and Leeds. The current reported occupancy for the portfolio is
90.7% compared with 96.3% at closing.
The current trailing interest coverage ratio (ICR) is 1.63x and
the current look forward ICR is 1.35x. Based on a September 2012
valuation of GBP299.9 million, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is
76.4%.
In S&P's opinion, this loan is unlikely to experience losses in
its base case scenario.
BRUNTWOOD ESTATES LOAN (47.0% OF THE POOL BALANCE)
The whole loan and securitized balance is GBP80.4 million. On
the April 2013 interest payment date, the borrower prepaid
GBP123.1 million on the loan. The loan matures in January 2014.
The loan is currently secured on 19 mainly office properties in
central Manchester, greater Manchester, and Liverpool. The
portfolio's reported occupancy rate is 74.6% compared to 89.2% at
closing.
The current trailing ICR is 1.65x and the current look forward
ICR is 1.24x. Based on a September 2012 valuation of GBP109.3
million, the LTV ratio is 73.5%.
In S&P's opinion, this loan is unlikely to experience losses in
its base case scenario.
Following S&P's review and the application of its updated
European CMBS criteria, it considers that the amount of available
credit enhancement for the class A and B notes is no longer
sufficient to mitigate asset credit risk at their current rating
levels. S&P has therefore lowered its ratings on these classes
of notes.
In addition, S&P's analysis indicates that under its stress
scenarios, the class C notes' credit characteristics are
commensurate with a 'B (sf)' rating. S&P has therefore lowered
to 'B (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its rating on this class of notes.
Bruntwood Alpha closed in February 2007. The notes have a
January 2019 legal final maturity date and a GBP309.5 million
balance.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
Bruntwood Alpha PLC
GBP440 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Lowered
A BBB (sf) A (sf)
B BB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)
C B (sf) BB (sf)
DUNFERMLINE ATHLETIC: June 18 Deadline Set for Potential Bidders
----------------------------------------------------------------
Richard Wilson at Herald Scotland reports that two parties are
lining up bids for Dunfermline Athletic Football Club plc, with
the intention of securing a route out of administration for the
company that owns Dunfermline Athletic before the beginning of
next season.
The fans group, Pars United, is one of the likely bidders, while
the other remains unidentified, with the highest offer made to
administrators BDO securing the purchase, Herald Scotland
discloses.
The groups, who are considered the only serious, credible
interested parties, must submit their bids by June 18, Herald
Scotland notes. The following day, a meeting will be held at
which all creditors will vote on proposals to pursue a Company
Voluntary Arrangement, Herald Scotland states. This requires a
50% vote, after which the administrators will immediately set a
date for another creditors meeting to vote on the CVA proposal,
which is penciled in for July 12, according to Herald Scotland.
That vote requires 75% backing, and a favorable vote is followed
by a 28-day period during which appeals can be lodged, Herald
Scotland notes. However, BDO have sought assurances from the
Scottish Football League that if the CVA vote is successful, the
league will consider DAFCplc as having successful exited
administration before the beginning of next season, and so
avoiding a points sanction for Dunfermline's campaign in the
second division, Herald Scotland states. The timescale is short
for that reason, but also because there is only enough funding to
take the business into the middle of July, according to Herald
Scotland.
The situation is complicated by the fact that East End Park Ltd.,
which owns the stadium, is also now in administration, Herald
Scotland states.
Little is known about the second group planning to bid for the
club and stadium, although several influential figures close to
the situation have always assumed Gavin Masterton, the former
majority shareholder, would attempt to buy East End Park Ltd.,
back out of administration, since the stadium has regularly
generated profit through hosting events, Herald Scotland says.
According to a report published by administrators Bryan Jackson
and Robert Barclay of BDO LLP, the club went into administration
owing around GBP12 million to creditors, Herald Scotland relates.
A large share of that is due to companies connected to Masterton,
with GBP5.8 million owed to East End Park Limited, Herald
Scotland notes.
There are 128 trade creditors due a total of GBP1.9 million,
including a number of football-related companies, Herald Scotland
discloses. Money owed to employees, stands at around GBP166,000,
Herald Scotland states.
With KPMG controlling East End Park Ltd., they will have a
significant say in the CVA vote, since 75% need to vote in favor
to recoup money owed, according to Herald Scotland.
According to The Scotsman's Martin Hannan, Dunfermline Athletic's
fans must raise nearly GBP175,000 in five weeks or the club will
definitely be liquidated.
That was the stark warning issued on Friday by the club's
administrator, who confirmed that only an anonymous individual
and the Pars United fan grouping are in the running to buy the
club, the Scotsman relates. It was confirmed on Friday night
that possible buyer, businessman Ronnie Weymes, has definitely
withdrawn his own bid and is "in talks" with Pars United, the
Scotsman reales.
Mr. Jackson has taken the view that the club founded in 1885
cannot continue in administration past mid-July as the Scottish
Football League's agreed disciplinary sanctions -- a 10-point
deduction and the payment of a GBP150,000 bond -- would
automatically take effect at the start of the season, making
Dunfermline worthless and unable to be sold as a going concern,
the Scotsman discloses. Mr. Jackson, as cited by the Scotsman,
said: "It is either a CVA or liquidation - there is no other
option. If I cannot get a CVA approved by the creditors in July,
apart from us running out of money to run the club, the sanctions
will kick in and that will be that. I have to be stark, because
that is the way I see it. I would say it's 50-50 at the moment."
Pars United confirmed on Friday night that their plan for
ordinary fans to raise GBP100,000 and "patrons" to raise œ400,00
is on course, with GBP27,000 in from the former and œ300,000
pledged by the latter, leaving GBP173,000 to be found, the
Scotsman discloses.
Dunfermline Athletic Football Club is a Scottish football team
based in Dunfermline, Fife, commonly known as just Dunfermline.
EUROTUNNEL GROUP: UK Antitrust Watchdog Blocks Ferry Plan
---------------------------------------------------------
Scott Flaherty of BankruptcyLaw360 reported that U.K. competition
regulators said they will block Groupe Eurotunnel SA from running
ferry service across the English Channel, finding the French rail
operator's GBP65 million (US$85.8 million) purchase of three
ferries from the now-defunct SeaFrance SA might result in higher
prices.
According to the report, the U.K. Competition Commission said in
a statement that allowing Eurotunnel -- which operates rail
service between the U.K. and continental Europe through the
Channel Tunnel -- to add ferry services to its existing business
would extend the company's market share.
About Eurotunnel
Headquartered in Folkestone, United Kingdom and Calais, France,
Eurotunnel Group (aka Groupe Eurotunnel S.A.) --
http://www.eurotunnel.co.uk/-- operates a fleet of 25 shuttle
trains, which carry cars, coaches and trucks. It manages the
infrastructure of the Channel Tunnel and receives toll revenues
from train operating companies whose trains pass through the
Tunnel.
The British and French governments have granted Eurotunnel a
concession to operate the Channel Tunnel until 2086.
Eurotunnel Group files reports in the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission under the names of Eurotunnel PLC (ETNUF.PK)
and Eurotunnel S.A. (ETTFF.PK).
At Dec. 31, 2006, Eurotunnel's balance sheet showed GBP5.25
billion in total assets, GBP6.56 billion in total liabilities
and GBP1.32 billion in shareholders' deficit.
Safeguard Protection
Eurotunnel obtained Aug. 2, 2006, an order placing the channel
operator under the protection of the Court pursuant to the new
safeguard legislation (Procedure de sauvegarde). At the end of
2006, the group's creditors and bondholders approved a plan to
decrease its GBP6.2 billion debt to GBP2.84 billion.
On Jan. 15, 2007, the Court approved Eurotunnel's safeguard
plan, backed by the court-appointed representatives to the
company and to the creditors.
For the first half ended June 30, 2007, Group Eurotunnel posted
net loss of EUR32 million compared with a net loss of EUR105
million for the same period in 2006.
Since the completion at the end of June 2007 of the exchange
tender offer launched by Groupe Eurotunnel SA, TNU SA and TNU
PLC (fka Eurotunnel S.A. and Eurotunnel Plc) and their
subsidiaries TNU became a subsidiary of Groupe Eurotunnel SA.
KERLING PLC: S&P Affirms 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Dev.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on U.K.-based polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and caustic soda
producer Kerling PLC to developing from negative. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit rating on
Kerling.
In addition, S&P affirmed its 'B-' issue ratings on Kerling's
senior secured debt. The recovery rating on this debt is
unchanged at '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-
50%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.
The outlook revision follows the recent announcement by Kerling's
parent Ineos AG (not rated) of its intention to merge its PVC
activities with those of Belgium-based chemicals group Solvay
S.A. into a 50%-50% joint venture. The outlook revision reflects
S&P's view that Kerling's credit quality would improve if the
merger proceeds.
"We understand that Ineos and Solvay are still to obtain anti-
trust approvals for the merger (which we understand will occur
toward the end of the year) and are still to sign a legally
binding agreement. However, we currently believe that the
reported net leverage of the combined entity would be less than
4x, or less than 5x on a Standard & Poor's-adjusted basis. This
assumes that Solvay contributes its PVC activities to the joint
venture without a material amount of debt, and factors in 2012
EBITDA of EUR257 million pro forma for the merger (on sales of
EUR4.3 billion). The net leverage of the combined entity is well
below Kerling's own adjusted leverage of 9.5x at year-end 2012.
Kerling's year-end 2012 adjusted debt amounted to EUR1.22
billion, which comprised reported net debt of EUR0.95 billion and
EUR290 million of adjustments," S&P said.
In addition, S&P believes that the combined group would benefit
from important synergies, asset base flexibility, and a strong
competitive position. In S&P's view, this should result in
upside to Kerling's stand-alone EBITDA and improvements in its
free cash flow over the medium term.
On the negative side, the letter of intent that Ineos and Solvay
have signed includes an exit clause with call and put options,
whereby Ineos would have to acquire Solvay's 50% stake in the
joint venture between the fourth and sixth years (2017-2019)
after the joint venture's establishment, on the basis of 5.5x
mid-cycle EBITDA. In S&P's view, this could entail important
releveraging risk, which S&P understands will be mitigated by
certain conditions under the exit agreement. Simultaneously with
the merger, Kerling intends to sell its 50% share in its
competitive Norwegian Rafnes cracker to Ineos' sister company
Ineos Group Holdings S.A. S&P understands that divestment
proceeds are likely to be in the order of EUR200 million-EUR250
million, and that Kerling will use them to make an upfront cash
payment to Solvay on completion of the transaction.
The developing outlook on Kerling reflects the risk of a
downgrade in 2013 if liquidity weakens, or management's actions
are insufficient to counteract difficult conditions in the PVC
industry, such that 2013 EBITDA does not recover from the 2012
trough. The developing outlook also reflects the possibility of
an upgrade if the merger with Solvay's PVC assets proceeds and
as a result, Kerling's adjusted leverage drops to sustainably
less than 5x. The outcome will depend on S&P's review of the
combined entity's final debt structure and contingent risks under
Solvay's exit agreement and the agreement of anti-trust
authorities.
S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Kerling's liquidity
strengthens and its adjusted debt to EBITDA improves to about
5.5x-6.0x on an ongoing basis.
LAINDON REGENERATION: In Administration, Traders More Uncertain
---------------------------------------------------------------
Echo News reports that Laindon Regeneration, the owner of the
rundown Laindon Shopping Centre has gone into administration,
plunging traders into more uncertainty.
Laindon Regeneration, which bought the Sixties-built centre six
years ago, promised a GBP75 million redevelopment including a new
shopping mall, Morrisons supermarket and 213 homes, but those
plans have never come to fruition, according to Echo News.
The report notes that traders have been given written notice of
the company's demise and told to pay rent to Scanlans Consultant
Surveyors, an asset management company hired by the
administrators.
Echo News says that the latest development is not all bad news.
The report relates that Basildon Council had set aside GBP500,000
to fund legal work to compulsorily purchase the center, but
leader
The report relays that Tony Ball says the administration order
could reduce that figure.
"Of course, it is unfortunate if any businesses go into
administration, because people involved in it will have lost
money. However, the administration process may actually make it
easier for the council's partner to obtain the site. . . . It may
be it can be acquired without compulsory purchase, meaning less
cost to taxpayers," the report quoted Mr. Ball as saying.
MEDIAGROUND LTD: In Administration After Cancellation of Event
--------------------------------------------------------------
David Turner at mixmag reports that the organizers of Brixton 02
Academy's Playground Festival have been forced into
administration following the cancellation of an event.
Due to poor ticket sales, Mediaground Ltd had initially cancelled
but it has now been announced that will not go ahead either after
an investor pulled out, according to mixmag News.
The report relates that digitalism, James Zabiela, Leftfield and
Squarepusher were all due to perform over the two nights and
further announcements are to be made regarding ticket refunds and
a rescheduled event at London's Koko on July 13.
The report discloses that a Mediaground statement read: "After
seven years of running events we appreciate all the support we
have had so far although Mediaground Ltd has been left with no
option but to file for insolvency moving forward."
TRURO CITY: Creditors Agree to Company Voluntary Arrangement
------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Truro City's owners have agreed a deal with
all the club's creditors.
A Company Voluntary Agreement (CVA) has been arranged which takes
debts of up to GBP4.5 million down to around GBP80,000, BBC
discloses.
It means Truro, who were relegated from the Conference South,
will drop just one division to the Southern Premier League,
rather than three divisions, BBC says.
According to BBC, Truro will pay their GBP80,000 debt over a
period of three years.
Had they not restructured their debts by June 8 they would not
have been allowed to join the Southern Premier League, BBC notes.
Philip Perryman and fellow businessman Peter Masters took over
the club last October after former owner Kevin Heaney went
bankrupt, BBC recounts.
"Some of the debts were questionable, which the administrator
looked into," BBC quotes Mr. Masters as saying. "Others were
bona fide and with the goodwill of creditors they've written
their debts off.
Truro have yet to announce who their new manager will be, having
relieved Lee Hodges of his duties last month after the club
stated it could no longer afford to pay his wages, BBC relates.
Truro City Football Club is a professional football club based in
Truro, Cornwall.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 3 to June 7, 2013
---------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *