TCREUR_Public/130614.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, June 14, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 117



HYPO ALPE ADRIA: Austria Rejects "Bad Bank" Option


TECH FINANCE: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Sr. Secured Notes


DECO 7: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Csf'
ESSENTIAL PUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes
HAUS 1998-1: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class B-IO Notes to 'B-'
KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: Vodafone Deal Credit Positive for 'BB' Rating


EXCEL MARITIME: Lenders Begin Voting on Prepackaged Plan


LANSDOWNE MORTGAGE: Swap Collateral Pact No Impact on Ratings
SUNDAY BUSINESS: Seeks Rescue Deal with Creditors


SUNRISE SRL: Moody's Confirms 'Ba3' Ratings on Two Tranches


BALTIKUMS BANK: Board OKs Decision to Wind Up Investment Mgt Unit


UKIO BANKAS: Administrator Plans to Keep Hearts Club Running


MARFRIG ALIMENTO: Sell-Off May Cue Rating Watch Negative Removal


HIDROELECTRICA SA: Likely to Exit Insolvency on June 26
* ROMANIA: Excess Debt Main Cause of Corporate Insolvencies


IBERIAN MINERALS: S&P Affirms, Withdraws 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
UNION FENOSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Subordinated Debt Rating


NOBINA AB: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa1' CFR for Business Reasons
PERSTORP HOLDING: S&P Cuts Corp. Rating to 'CCC+'; Outlook Stable

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BROADWAY BOULEVARD: In Administration, Closes Forever
CAT PLC: Set to Go Into Liquidation
COMBINED ELECTRICAL: Goes Into Voluntary Liquidation
DEBT HELP: High Court Winds Up Two Debt Management Companies
INDEPENDENT VILLAS: To Go Into Liquidation; Blames Cash Flow Woes

VIRIDIS PLASTICS: High Court Orders Plant Owner Into Liquidation
* UK: Scotland Introduces Bankruptcy Bill


SAMARKAND BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings


* BOOK REVIEW: Creating Value through Corporate Restructuring



HYPO ALPE ADRIA: Austria Rejects "Bad Bank" Option
Michael Shields at Reuters reports that Austrian Finance Minister
Maria Fekter said on Wednesday the country is seeking "creative"
ways to clean up ailing nationalized lender Hypo Alpe Adria,
rejecting the option of a "bad bank" that would hit state
finances before elections.

According to Reuters, Ms. Fekter also said she was confident she
could get more time from the European Commission for an orderly
wind-down of the bank that Austria took over in 2009 and which
eked out a small profit last year.

In a parliamentary debate, Ms. Fekter rebuffed Greens party
deputy leader Werner Kogler's appeal to set up a state bad bank
that could absorb toxic assets from Hypo and pave the way for the
selloff of its operating units that Brussels has demanded take
place by the end of 2013, Reuters relates.

"What Mr. Kogler wants means carving all the loss-making parts
out of the bank and saddling taxpayers with this.  This is
maximizing losses for taxpayers.  It is also not the most
creative solution," Reuters quotes Ms. Fekter as saying.

With elections due by September, Ms. Fekter has resisted mounting
pressure to set up a state-owned bad bank for Hypo, which the
head of the agency overseeing aid to the banking sector has
estimated could boost the ratio of state debt to GDP by up to 5
percentage points, Reuters notes.

The bank was pushed to the brink of insolvency by a decade of
overly ambitious lending and expansion into the Balkans, Reuters

Ms. Fekter, as cited by Reuters, said she was working instead on
options including investment companies, funds and foundations
that would not send state debt and deficits soaring.

European Union Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia said in
March that Hypo faced possible closure for failing to adequately
restructure, Reuters recounts.

According to Reuters, Ms. Fekter said intensive talks were under
way with the Commission, which could force Hypo to repay more
than EUR2 billion in state aid it has got since Vienna had to
nationalize it to avoid a collapse with regional repercussions.

Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann has estimated that winding
down Hypo could cost up to EUR7 billion, and has angered the
banking sector by suggesting that it absorb the costs, Reuters

Hypo Alpe-Adria International AG is a subsidiary of BayernLB.  It
is active in banking and leasing.  In banking, HGAA serves both
corporate and retail customers and offers services ranging from
traditional lending through savings and deposits to complex
investment products and asset management services.


TECH FINANCE: Moody's Assigns (P)B3 Rating to Sr. Secured Notes
Moody's Investors Service assigned a provisional (P)B3 rating to
the senior secured notes issued by Tech Finance & Co S.C.A. and a
(P)B3 rating to the senior secured term loan raised by Tech
Finance & Co S.C.A. Concurrently, Moody's affirmed Technicolor's
B3 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and B3-PD Probability of Default
Rating (PDR). The outlook on all ratings remains stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings for debt instruments in
advance of the final sale of securities or conclusion of credit
agreements. Upon a conclusive review of the final documentation,
Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the rated
capital instruments. A definitive rating may differ from a
provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

This new financing will contribute to improving Technicolor's
liquidity and to extend its debt maturity profile beyond 2016,
when the MPEG LA licensing pool, the group's largest profit
contributor, will expire.

Tech Finance & Co S.C.A., an independent, stand-alone special
purpose vehicle intends to issue senior secured notes and to
raise a senior secured term loan. The proceeds raised by these
debt instruments will be ultimately used to purchase part of
Technicolor's existing bonds and loans through separate tender
and consent processes which require a 50.1% consent of existing
private placements and two thirds of the existing credit facility
loans. For financial reporting purposes, Technicolor expects to
consolidate Tech Finance S.C.A. in its consolidated financial

The new debt structure aims at avoiding the structural
subordination of any new debt issued by Technicolor SA to its
outstanding debt that results from the current debt arrangements.
The new debt structure should also provide the new debt holders
with a similar or even slightly stronger claim on Technicolor's
cash flows than under the legacy debt.

The existing debt of Technicolor S.A. acquired by Tech Finance &
Co S.C.A. will not be cancelled prior to its maturity in 2016/17
given the fact that the receivables of Tech Finance & Co S.C.A.
against the existing debt are pledged as collateral for the new
debt issued by Tech Finance & Co S.C.A., which will give the new
debt holders an indirect claim into the top holding company
Technicolor SA. In 2016/17 Moody's notes that the existing debt
comes due and Tech Finance & Co S.C.A.' claim against Technicolor
SA will be settled cashless through a string of different
intercompany transactions.

Moody's understands that the onlending of proceeds from and to
Tech Finance & Co S.C.A. via different intercompany transactions
is used to avoid an accumulation of cash within Tech Finance & Co
S.C.A. given the mismatch between the interest and principal
received by the Tech Finance & Co S.C.A. on the purchased
existing debt and the amounts owed on the new debt. However,
Moody's cautions that the implementation of various intercompany
onloans creates some complexity. For the instrument ratings
Moody's assumed that all onloans are enforceable, which is a
requirement for the transaction to work.

Based on the envisaged capital structure, Moody's would apply the
following ranking to Technicolor's debt instruments. Moody's
might revisit the relative ranking of Technicolor's debt
instruments in 2016/17 once the group's existing debt comes due.

At the top of its debt waterfall Moody's would rank the new
EUR100 million super senior revolving credit facility raised by
Thomson Licensing, the group's main cash generating subsidiary
owning substantially all of the groups licenses in the Technology
segment. Moody's understands that the revolving credit facility
matures in 2018 and has essentially the same security package as
the new senior debt raised by Tech Finance & Co S.C.A. but on a
first priority basis. The security package predominantly consists
of the pledge on certain internal loans which are implemented as
part of this structure, share pledges and pledges over several
bank accounts. Moody's would also see an undrawn $125 million
credit facility, provided by Wells Fargo at the top of its debt
waterfall given that it is secured by a pledge of liquid customer
accounts receivables, generally from U.S. customers, and certain
bank accounts. Given that Moody's ranks trade creditors in line
with the most senior significant piece of debt Moody's would also
rank trade creditors at level one.

At rank two Moody's would see the new secured indebtedness raised
by Tech Finance & Co S.C.A. Moody's understands that both the
senior secured notes and senior secured term loans are secured by
the existing debt owed by Technicolor SA to Tech Finance & Co
S.C.A. after closing of the tender offer, the receivables and
other rights with respect to certain intercompany loans as well
as certain share pledges and bank accounts. The new senior
secured notes and loans rank pari passu vis--vis each other but
junior to the super senior revolving credit facility raised by
Thomson Licensing. The new debt raised by Tech Finance & Co
S.C.A. does not directly benefit from upstream guarantees, but
due to the fact that the tendered legacy debt will not be
cancelled, there is an indirect claim on the upstream guarantees
which the legacy debt is benefiting from.

The remaining stub debt issued by Technicolor SA but not tendered
benefits roughly from a similar collateral as the new debt, but,
due to the fact that Moody's assumes the upstream guarantee from
Thomson Licensing is of limited value to legacy debt holders, and
that the new debt has a direct claim on Thomson Licensing, it
believe that the holders of the legacy debt rank slightly below
the holders of the new debt being issued. Therefore, Moody's
ranked the legacy debt at three in its debt waterfall.

At the bottom of the debt waterfall Moody's would rank unfunded
pension obligations and lease rejection claims as they are

Positioning Of The Corporate Family Rating

Technicolor's B3 corporate family rating reflects (i) the group's
high reliance on its Technology segment which accounts for around
two thirds of group EBITDA, (ii) Moody's expectation that the
licensing revenues generated by the Technology segment will drop
in 2016 when an important licensing agreement expires, and the
risk that the group may be unable to offset such loss with
revenues from other activities, (iii) Moody's expectation of
gradual decrease in demand for physical media, particularly DVDs,
in the longer-term which could lead to a decline of earnings
generated by the Entertainment Services segment which accounts
for one third of group EBITDA and (iv) the limited EBITDA and
cash flow contribution of the Connected Home segment.

On the positive side the rating takes into account (i) the
group's ability to generate positive free cash flow, (ii)
Technicolor's adequate liquidity, (iii) the reduction of the
group's debt by EUR164 million in 2012 from the proceeds of an
equity injection and the disposal of its Broadcast business, as
well as (iv) low and gradually declining leverage relative to the
rating category, which, however, is expected to increase
significantly in 2016/17 year-on-year with the expiry of
important licenses in the Technology segment and related
reduction in EBITDA.

Moody's expects that the group will continue to generate positive
and meaningful free cash flow over the next two to three years,
which it expects Technicolor to use to reduce gross debt whilst
maintaining adequate headroom under the covenants of its debt

Technicolor SA and Tech Finance & Co S.C.A.'s ratings were
assigned by evaluating factors that Moody's considers relevant to
the credit profile of the issuer, such as the company's (i)
business risk and competitive position compared with others
within the industry; (ii) capital structure and financial risk;
(iii) projected performance over the near to intermediate term;
and (iv) management's track record and tolerance for risk.
Moody's compared these attributes against other issuers both
within and outside Technicolor SA and Tech Finance & Co S.C.A.'s
core industry and believes Technicolor SA and Tech Finance & Co
S.C.A.'s ratings are comparable to those of other issuers with
similar credit risk. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Issy-les-Moulineaux, France, Technicolor is a
leading provider of solutions for the creation, management,
delivery and access of video for the Communication, Media &
Entertainment industries operating in three business segments.
Technicolor's smallest segment in terms of revenues, the
Technology segment, accounts for around two thirds of group
EBITDA in 2012 and generates revenues through the licensing of
patents and trademarks. The Entertainment Services segment
accounting for around one third of group EBITDA in 2012 mainly
provides creative services as well as services related to the
manufacturing and distribution of Blu-Ray and DVD discs for the
global media and entertainment industry. The Connected Home
segment, which achieved break-even EBITDA in 2012 provides set-
top boxes, gateways, managed wireless tablets and other connected
devices to Pay-TV operators and network service operators for the
delivery of digital entertainment, data, voice and smart home
services to their customers. In 2012 Technicolor generated
revenues of EUR3.6 billion.


DECO 7: Fitch Downgrades Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Csf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded DECO 7 - Pan Europe 2 plc's (DECO 7)
class D to G notes, as follows:

EUR104.3m class A2 (XS0246470214) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook

EUR108.5m class B (XS0244895073) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
revised to Negative from Stable

EUR53.9m class C (XS0244895586) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

EUR17.6m class D (XS0244896048) downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BB-sf';
Outlook Negative

EUR35.8m class E (XS0244896394) downgraded to 'CCsf' from
'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 20%

EUR19.4m class F (XS0246471881) downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
RE 0%

EUR16.4m class G (XS0246474042) downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf';
RE 0%

EUR35.3m class H (XS0246475445) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 0%


The downgrade of the class D to G notes and revised Outlook on
the class B notes reflect the protracted and expensive workout of
the largest loan in the pool, the Karstadt Kompakt loan (38.0% of
the pool balance). The affirmations of the classes A2, B and C
notes are driven by the sequential repayment of EUR122.0 million
following the refinancing of the Stettiner-Carree property in
Berlin, which formed part of the collateral securing the Tiago
loan (24% of the pool balance).

The Karstadt Kompakt loan is secured by a portfolio of 30 vacant
retail properties in secondary locations across western Germany
previously let to the department store chain, Hertie Gmbh, which
became insolvent in July 2008. As the properties are vacant, any
potential investor will likely seek to secure a pre-let prior to
completing an acquisition. Coupled with the need for capital
expenditure in order to refurbish and/or redevelop the
properties, this limits the universe of potential investors and
thus exerts downwards pricing pressure.

In the absence of rental income, the repayment of liquidity
drawings and the payment of fees related to liquidation and
workout are being funded from sales proceeds. This resulted in a
principal loss at the October 2012 interest payment date (IPD).
Proceeds from the sole property sold since Fitch's last rating
action were used not to repay principal but in indemnifying the
security agent and repaying liquidity drawings, raising the loan-
to-value ratio (LTV) to 181.5% from 172.4%. Due to the distressed
characteristics of the collateral, Fitch expects heavy principal
losses, as demonstrated by the Fitch A-note LTV of 160%.

The Tiago loan (24.3% of the pool) was originally secured by
three office properties in Germany (two in Frankfurt and one in
Berlin). In January 2013, the loan was extended until January
2014, while a revaluation of the collateral showed a decline to
EUR268.5 million from EUR362.0 million at closing. At the same
time, a restructuring of the loan involved the Berlin property
being refinanced and the loan paid down by EUR121.9 million.
Fitch expects the loan to repay in line with its estimated LTV of

The World Fashion Centre loan (22.8% of the pool) is secured by
two adjoining office properties on the outskirts of Amsterdam
used mainly as showrooms for tenants from the fashion industry.
Since Fitch's last rating action, the LTV has decreased to 61.0%
from 65.6% as a result of a cash sweep and scheduled
amortization. Fitch views an orderly repayment of the property as
very challenging, demonstrated by a Fitch LTV of 134%. This is
primarily due to the high level of vacancy (18.1%) -- higher than
the expected structural vacancy for this type of asset -- and to
a very short weighted average lease length (WALL) of 2.5 years.
The debt yield of the loan currently stands at 8.2%, whereas
Fitch believes the collateral would trade at a double digit
yield. This suggests that losses could arise at loan maturity in
April 2014.

The Procom loan (12.3% of the pool balance) is secured by a
portfolio of eight retail properties located across Germany. In
October 2012, the loan failed to repay (at the end of a two-year
extension) and was duly transferred to special servicing.
Although Fitch's A-note LTV of 87% suggests imminent refinancing
is challenging, the full cash sweep that commenced in October
2012 will continue to deleverage the loan, and therefore improve
the prospects of an orderly repayment.

The Schmeing loan (2.4% of the pool balance) is secured by three
fully-occupied retail properties located in western Germany with
a short WALL of 3.5 years. In September 2012, following a
collateral revaluation, the LTV increased to 121% from 75% at
closing in 2005. The loan is expected to suffer a loss.

Rating Sensitivities

A lack of evidence of good progress working out the Karstadt
Kompakt loan in the months ahead -- such as too few asset sales
or asset proceeds below Fitch's expectations -- could have a
detrimental effect on recoveries and therefore on the ratings of
the notes.

ESSENTIAL PUBLIC: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class E Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Essential Public Infrastructure
Capital II GmbH's (EPIC II) notes, as follows:

Class A+ affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Negative
Class A affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Negative
Class B affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Negative
Class C affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative
Class D affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook Negative
Class E affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation reflects sufficient credit enhancement (CE)
relative to the current ratings and the stable credit quality of
the reference portfolio since the last review in July 2012. CE
has increased for all the notes due to structural deleveraging.

The Negative Outlook continues to reflect the reference
portfolio's significant exposure to the peripheral eurozone
countries and significant obligor concentration. As of the March
2013 investor report, the reference portfolio's exposure to
Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Hungary was 32% of the

Since the last review, Fitch has withdrawn its credit opinion on
one asset in the reference portfolio as the originator was unable
to provide updated project information required by Fitch to
maintain the credit opinion. Fitch used a conservative default
probability and recovery rate assumption for this asset in its
analysis of the reference portfolio.

The current portfolio comprises 39 loans from 32 obligors with
only one loan in the construction phase rated 'BB+*'/Stable.
Fitch notes that this loan has a higher default risk and lower
recovery rates compared with loans in the operation phase. The
largest obligor accounts for 10.5% whereas the top ten largest
obligors account for 61% of the reference pool. The weighted
average rating of the portfolio is 'BBB-*'/'BB+*', with 51% of
the pool rated below investment grade. The weighted average
recovery rate has not changed significantly since the last
surveillance review.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch incorporated additional sensitivity stresses on the notes'
ratings in its analysis. The stresses addressed a drop in
recovery rates by 25% and a downgrade of the portfolio's
underlying assets by one notch each. Both sensitivities would
result in a downgrade of one rating category for all the notes.

The notes' ratings are linked to the credit quality of the
certificates of indebtedness (Schuldscheine) issued by KfW
(AAA/Stable/F1+). Therefore, if KfW was downgraded below
'AAA'/'F1+', any note rated higher would also be downgraded.

Fitch notes that as part of the stabilisation measures in
relation to Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, Depfa Bank plc has
transferred all but one assets of the reference portfolio to FMS
Wertmanagement. Depfa Bank plc still holds the role of servicer
of the reference obligations.

HAUS 1998-1: Fitch Downgrades Rating on Class B-IO Notes to 'B-'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded two and affirmed one tranche of
Haus 1998-1 as follows:

Class B1 (ISIN DE0002317021): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

Class B2 (ISIN US419139AD27): downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'A+sf';
Outlook Negative

Class B-IO (ISIN DE0002317088): downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'A+sf';
Outlook Negative

Key Rating Drivers

Losses on Terminated/Foreclosed Loans:

In April 2013, the issuer reported a loss of EUR1.3 million on
EUR1.4 million of terminated and/or foreclosed loans, equating to
a period loss severity of 94%. This loss was in excess of the
levels seen to date and was allocated to the unrated class B3
tranche, which acts as a first loss piece, thereby reducing the
level of credit support available to the rated tranches to almost
half. Fitch believes that the loss recognition was a result of a
clean-up of the terminated and/or foreclosed portion of the
portfolio, leaving an additional EUR1.4 million of loans pending
loss recognition in the upcoming payment dates.

Given the second-lien nature of the portfolio, Fitch's analysis
indicates that losses on the remaining 8.2% of terminated and/or
foreclosed loans are expected to remain high, leaving a limited
margin of safety for the class B2 notes, which have 7.9% credit
enhancement. Consequently, Fitch believes that there is an
increasing probability of losses being allocated to the class B2

Irreversible Pro-Rata Allocation of Scheduled Proceeds:

Scheduled proceeds received from borrowers are allocated pro-rata
amongst the notes, while prepayments are used to amortize the
most senior tranche, presently B1 notes. As of May 2013, 49% of
the tranche balance of the class B3 note was amortized, while 41%
of the original note balance accounted for allocated losses. The
transaction structure does not feature a switch which would halt
this pro-rata allocation of scheduled proceeds to the first loss
piece. As the class B3 notes continue to amortize, the risk of
the balance of the first loss piece being insufficient to
mitigate the loss recognition on the remaining loans including
already terminated and/or foreclosed loans increases. As a
result, the agency believes that the class B2 notes are
increasingly likely to see loss allocation, as reflected in the
downgrade to 'B-sf'.

The agency also notes that increased credit enhancement of 52.5%,
which has resulted from the sequential amortization of the
unscheduled proceeds has been beneficial to the senior class B1
noteholders. Fitch's analysis shows that this level of credit
enhancement provided by subordination is sufficient to withstand
the 'AAAsf' stresses, and has therefore affirmed the ratings on
the class B1 notes.

Rating Sensitivities

Further negative rating actions on the notes may be triggered by
sudden deterioration of the portfolio and an increase in the loss
severities from loans that are or continue to be terminated
and/or foreclosed.

KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: Vodafone Deal Credit Positive for 'BB' Rating
Vodafone could be downgraded by one-notch, if it acquires Kabel
Deutschland Holding (KD) without taking other measures to reduce
debt, Fitch Ratings says.

The potential transaction would increase FFO adjusted net
leverage to above 2.5x (2.4x at end March 2013), which we see as
a key threshold for Vodafone's 'A-'/Stable rating. Acquiring KD,
which generated EUR848 million of adjusted EBITDA in the twelve
months to December 2012, could cost Vodafone about EUR10 billion
on a debt-free basis. Vodafone could take a number of steps to
offset this possible deterioration in credit metrics, including
selling some, or all, of its stake in Verizon Wireless. We would
expect to hold a rating committee if Vodafone announced an offer
to buy KD or a similar European operator.

The strategic challenge facing Vodafone is whether it should
remain mobile-focused, aiming to offer the best service and value
for mobile broadband connectivity, or whether it should beef up
its fixed-line capabilities to match its European competitors.
Germany is Vodafone's largest market and a KD acquisition would
give Vodafone a high-speed broadband network to compete more
effectively against Deutsche Telekom as fixed and mobile services
increasingly integrate.

Vodafone has said it would take decisions on European fixed-line
infrastructure on a country-by-country basis and that it could
obtain this infrastructure by buying an existing operator,
building its own or agreeing a wholesale deal with an incumbent.
We do not expect Vodafone to make acquisitions in all of its
major European markets. It is building a fiber network in Spain
with France Telecom while fixed-mobile integration is less of a
risk in the UK as fixed-line incumbent BT Group does not have a
national mobile network. However, we believe Vodafone is still
looking for a fixed-line solution in Italy, which could point to
further acquisition risk.

Vodafone has a strong liquidity position and a possible purchase
of KD could be financed from existing cash and investments and by
drawing down on existing credit lines. We expect to publish a
more detailed Special Report on Vodafone in the next few weeks,
which will examine the challenges it faces in Europe and the
potential impact of a sale of its Verizon Wireless stake.

Vodafone confirmed that is has made a preliminary approach to KD
regarding a possible offer for the company. Fitch rates KD's
operating subsidiary, Kabel Deutschland Vertrieb und Service
GmbH, at 'BB'/Stable. An acquisition by Vodafone would be credit
positive for this rating.


EXCEL MARITIME: Lenders Begin Voting on Prepackaged Plan
Bill Rochelle, the bankruptcy columnist for Bloomberg News,
reports that creditors of Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd. began
voting on a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganization where secured
lenders owed US$771 million will take ownership while current
owner Gabriel Panayotides in substance buys an option to regain
part ownership.

The report relates that lenders are to finish voting by June 28,
meaning that the in-court reorganization process could begin by
the month's end.

The plan, the report relates, will give the lenders restructured
secured notes for US$771 million plus all of the new stock.
Trade suppliers owed US$16.5 million will be paid in full in the
ordinary course of business to avoid having the vessels seized.
Other unsecured creditors and holders of the convertible notes,
with claims totaling US$163 million, are to have a 3 percent
recovery, according to the company's disclosure statement.  Their
recovery will come from a US$5 million cash-flow note to be
issued by a non-bankrupt joint-venture affiliate named Christine
Shipco LLC.

According to the report, Excel claims the company's enterprise
value ranges from US$575 million to US$625 million, with a
midpoint of US$600 million.  Based on the midpoint, the
disclosure statement shows a 77 percent recovery by the senior

The report shares that Mr. Panayotides is scheduled to buy
60 percent of the stock from the lenders for a US$10 million
unsecured note and the turnover to the company of a US$20 million
escrow account.  He will have the right to buy another 15 percent
by March 2015 for US$20 million.  If he doesn't buy the
additional stock, the lenders' equity ownership will rise to 75
percent.  If he purchases the additional stock, the new notes
will mature in 2018.  Otherwise, they mature a year earlier.

The Bloomberg report discloses that the new notes require first
principal payments in April 2014 and will pay interest partly
with issuance of more notes.  The reorganization plan is based on
the notion contained in U.S. bankruptcy law referred to as the
1111(b) election.  Employing the election, the lenders carry over
the entire amount of their secured debt to the reorganized

                     About Excel Maritime

Based in Athens, Greece, Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd. -- is an owner and operator of dry
bulk carriers and a provider of worldwide seaborne transportation
services for dry bulk cargoes, such as iron ore, coal and grains,
as well as bauxite, fertilizers and steel products.  Excel owns a
fleet of 40 vessels and, together with 7 Panamax vessels under
bareboat charters, operates 47 vessels (5 Capesize, 14 Kamsarmax,
21 Panamax, 2 Supramax and 5 Handymax vessels) with a total
carrying capacity of approximately 3.9 million DWT.  Excel Class
A common shares have been listed since Sept. 15, 2005, on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the symbol EXM and, prior to
that date, were listed on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX)
since 1998.

The company blamed financial problems on low charter rates.

The balance sheet for December 2011 had assets of US$2.72 billion
and liabilities totaling US$1.16 billion.  Excel owes US$771
million to secured lenders with liens on almost all assets.
There is US$150 million owing on 1.875 percent unsecured
convertible notes.

The company had a US$211.6 million net loss on revenue of
US$356.9 million in 2011.


LANSDOWNE MORTGAGE: Swap Collateral Pact No Impact on Ratings
Moody's reports that Investec's proposal to enter into a swap
collateral account bank agreement and into an amendment deed to
modify certain provisions of the relevant Liquidity Facility
Agreements, Bank Agreements, Cash Management Agreements, GIC
Agreements, Master Definitions Agreements, Trust Deeds and
Conditions of the Notes, would not, in and of itself and as of
this time, result in the downgrade or withdrawal of the notes
rating assigned to Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 1 plc ("LMS
1") and Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 2 plc ("LMS 2").

The entering into of a swap collateral account bank agreement
would permit Barclays Bank Plc (A2/P-1) as swap counterparty to
comply with its obligations under the relevant swap agreements.
Similarly, the amendments of the transaction documents listed
above through the execution of an amendment deed would allow
Investec to (i) modify certain triggers placed on Barclays Bank
Plc (A2/P-1) as Liquidity Facility Provider and on the Authorized
Investments, (ii) terminate the GIC Agreements between Allied
Irish Banks plc (Ba2/NP) and (iii) put in place new GIC
Agreements between Barclays Bank plc and the relevant issuers.

Moody's has determined that the amendments, in and of themselves
and at this time, will not result in the downgrade or withdrawal
of the notes ratings currently assigned to Lansdowne Mortgage
Securities No. 1 plc and Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 2 plc.
However, Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact
associated with the proposed amendment, and Moody's is not
expressing any opinion as to whether the amendment has, or could
have, other non-credit related effects that may have a
detrimental impact on the interests of note holders and/or
counterparties. In assessing the impact of the execution of the
swap collateral account bank agreement of the amendment deed on
the ratings of the Notes, Moody's considered, among other things,
the fact that modifications made to the documentation do not
affect Moody's triggers and criteria and the low ratings.

The last rating action for Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 1
plc was taken on September 12, 2012:

EUR258M A2 Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Feb 01, 2012, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf).
The notes remain on review for downgrade.

The last rating action for Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 2
plc was taken on March 17, 2011:

EUR372.75M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec
2, 2010 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR15.75M M1 Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2,
2010 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR11.8M M2 Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 2,
2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

The methodology used in these ratings was Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in May 2013.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.

SUNDAY BUSINESS: Seeks Rescue Deal with Creditors
Irish Independent reports that the publisher of the Sunday
Business Post was scheduled to hold seven creditors meetings in
Dublin yesterday, June 13, to seek support from parties owed
EUR2.5 million for a rescue deal that will see most of them lose

The plan will see the newspaper sold to investors led by media
executive Paul Cooke for EUR2,750,000, Irish Independent says.

According to Irish Independent, creditors of the newspaper range
from super secured PRSI payments due to the Revenue Commissioner,
which will be paid in full, to the former owners Thomas Crosbie
Holdings, which will receive no payout.

Examiner Michael McAteer needs the scheme to be backed by a
majority of at least one class of impaired creditors, Irish
Independent notes.

The Sunday Business Post is an Irish national Sunday newspaper.


SUNRISE SRL: Moody's Confirms 'Ba3' Ratings on Two Tranches
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed at A2 (sf) the ratings of
Series 1A and Series 2A notes, at Ba1 (sf) the ratings of Series
1B and Series 2B notes and at B3 (sf) the ratings of Series 1C
and Series 2C notes issued by Sunrise Srl. Sufficient credit
enhancement, which protects against sovereign and counterparty
risk, primarily drove the confirmation actions.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated by
Moody's on August 2, 2012. This transaction is an asset-backed
securities transaction backed by consumer loans originated by
Agos SpA (NR).

Ratings Rationale:

These confirmations primarily reflect the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness and the revision of key collateral
assumptions and increased exposure to lowly rated counterparties
has had no negative effect on the ratings of the senior notes in
these two transactions.

The current level of credit enhancement available under the Class
A notes of Series 2006 and Series 2007 (24.3%), as well as under
the Class B Notes of both Series (9.9%) and under the Class C
notes of both Series (3.45%) is sufficient to support a
confirmation of all ratings. Credit enhancement is in the form of
a non-amortizing reserve fund (3.45%) and subordination. Moody's
also took into account the significant level of gross excess
spread in its analysis (approximately 5%).

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Italian country ceiling is A2, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Italian issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Italian receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determines the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

- Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
this transaction, which it updated on December 18, 2012.

According to the updated methodology, Moody's increased the CoV,
which is a measure of volatility.

The current default assumption is 4.5% of the current portfolio
and the assumption for the fixed recovery rate is 15%. Moody's
has increased the CoV to 62.2% from 37.5%, which, combined with
the revised key collateral assumptions, resulted in a portfolio
credit enhancement of 18%.

- Moody's Has Considered Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.

In this transaction, Agos (NR) acts as servicer and transfers
collections every day to the issuer's account which resides at
Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank (A2/P-1). The
reserve funds are also held at Credit Agricole Corporate and
Investment Bank. Moody's has incorporated into its analysis the
potential default of Agos, which could expose the transaction to
a commingling loss on the collections.

Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank acts as swap
counterparty. As part of its analysis, Moody's assessed the
exposure to the swap counterparty, which does not have a negative
effect on the rating levels at this time.

- Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in its Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed

When remodeling the transactions affected by these rating
actions, some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new


The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions", published in May 2013 and
"The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March

List Of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Sunrise Srl

EUR911M Series 1 A Notes, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Aug
2, 2012 Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

EUR60.2M Series 1 B Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
Aug 2, 2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR28.7M Series 1 C Notes, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on
Aug 2, 2012 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR457.5M Series 2 A Notes, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on
Aug 2, 2012 Downgraded to A2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

EUR30.25M Series 2 B Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
Aug 2, 2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR12.25M Series 2 C Notes, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on
Aug 2, 2012 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BALTIKUMS BANK: Board OKs Decision to Wind Up Investment Mgt Unit
The Board of Baltikums Bank has approved a decision to liquidate
its investment management subsidiary Baltikums Asset Management
in connection with restructuring of the investment business and
reduction of general holding expenses.

The company was established in July 2006 and its sole shareholder
is Baltikums Bank. An application for annulment of the asset
management license previously issued to Baltikums Asset
Management has been filed with the Financial and Capital Market
Commission. Liquidation of Baltikums Asset Management will take
up to 6 months and will be performed according to legally
regulated procedure.

Baltikums Bank AS is a leading independent private bank in Latvia
and the largest in terms of assets under management. The
Baltikums Bank group consists of: Baltikums Bank AS; Baltikums
Luxembourg S.A.; BB Broker Systems SIA; Baltikums International
SIA; CityCap Service SIA; Kamaly Development UAB; ZapDvina
Development SIA; Rostman Ltd.; Pils Pakalpojumi SIA. The
Baltikums Bank group has a branch in Cyprus and representative
offices in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Almaty, Kyiv, Baku and


UKIO BANKAS: Administrator Plans to Keep Hearts Club Running
BBC News reports that the administrator of Hearts' main creditor,
which is to be liquidated, plans to keep the Scottish Premier
League club running as a going concern.

According to BBC, a court in Lithuania has upheld a decision to
liquidate Ukio Bankas, which Hearts owe GBP15 million.

Insolvency practitioner Gintaras Adomonis, of accountancy firm
UAB Valnetas, hopes to sell the Tynecastle outfit, BBC states.
He insists, the report notes, that he has "no reason or desire to
harm Hearts."

"Ukio Bankas has now to deal with lots of debts and return the
funds to its creditors," BBC quotes Mr. Adomonis as saying.

"In the ongoing processes, we must at all times consider the best
interest of the creditors of Ukio Bankas.

"Heart of Midlothian Plc is one of the companies indebted to the
bank.  There are several possible alternatives to dealing with
this case, but our initial assessment indicates that most likely
the most extensive return for Ukio Bankas creditors may be
achieved by keeping the club operating.

"For now, we have no reason or desire to harm Hearts, so our
primary initiative, having solved the regulatory and other
issues, is contemplated to be the sale of Hearts."

Ukio Bankas, formerly controlled by Hearts' majority shareholder,
Vladimir Romanov, holds 29.9% of Hearts shares, while UBIG, the
investment group in which Romanov still has a controlling
interest, own 50%, BBC discloses.

Hearts also owe GBP10 million to UBIG, which is claiming
insolvency, BBC says.

Earlier this week, BBC Scotland learned Hearts had paid the
majority of the GBP100,000 they owed HM Revenue and Customs, BBC

                        About Ukio Bankas

Ukio Bankas AB is a Lithuania-based commercial bank, which is
involved in the provision of banking, financial, investment, life
insurance and leasing services to individuals and companies.  It
is Lithuania's sixth largest lender by assets.  The Central Bank
suspended Ukio Bankas' operations on Feb. 12, 2013, after it was
established the lender had been involved in risky activities.  A
majority 64.9% of Ukio Bankas had been owned by Russian born-
businessman Vladimir Romanov.


MARFRIG ALIMENTO: Sell-Off May Cue Rating Watch Negative Removal
Fitch Ratings views positively Marfrig Alimento S.A.'s
announcement that it will sell to JBS S.A. certain Seara assets.
This transaction, which is subject to the approval of CADE, the
Brazilian antitrust authority, would result in JBS assuming
BRL5.85 billion (US$2.9 billion) of Marfrig's bank debt with
maturities between 2013 and 2017.

Fitch views it likely that the closing of the transaction would
result in the stabilization of Marfrig's ratings at the 'B'
category and the removal of its ratings from Rating Watch
Negative. Pro forma for the sale, it is expected that Marfrig's
net debt-to-EBITDA ratio would decline to about 3.5x from its
current level of 5.1x as of March 31, 2013. While Marfrig would
have lower leverage, it would also have significantly less
product and geographic diversification. As a result, the
importance of Marfrig's more volatile protein business would

Uncertainties remain regarding Marfrig's strategy for managing
and growing its remaining businesses. In Fitch's opinion, the
potential for additional asset sales exists. In the current
transaction, Marfrig is selling its Seara Brazil (Seara)
business, an asset which until recently was considered of
strategic importance to the company. Marfrig purchased Seara from
Cargill in 2009 for US$900 million. Marfrig more than tripled
Seara's business, from US$1.7 billion in revenues and US$76
million of EBITDA in 2009 to about US$4.5 billion in revenue and
estimated pro forma EBITDA of US$300 million in 2012. The
addition of some assets from BRF S.A. (BRF) in the middle of 2012
was key to this growth, as it more than doubled Seara's
production capacity.

Fitch currently rates Marfrig as follows:

Marfrig Alimentos S.A.

-- Local currency IDR 'B';
-- Foreign currency IDR 'B';
-- National scale rating 'BBB'(bra)';
-- BRL300 million 3rd debentures issue (1st tranche)
-- BRL300 million 3rd debentures issue (2nd tranche)

Marfrig Overseas Ltd.

-- Foreign currency IDR 'B';
-- US$375 million senior unsecured notes due 2016 'B/RR4';
-- US$500 million senior unsecured notes due 2020 'B/RR4'.

Marfrig Holdings (Europe) B.V.

-- Foreign currency IDR 'B';
-- US$600 million senior unsecured notes due 2017 'B/RR4'.
-- US$750 million senior unsecured notes due 2018 'B/RR4'.

All ratings are currently on Rating Watch Negative.


HIDROELECTRICA SA: Likely to Exit Insolvency on June 26
Luiza Ilie at Reuters reports that Hidroelectrica SA, is likely
to exit insolvency on June 26, a year after it was hit by a
drought and a string of loss-making contracts.

Hidroelectrica was declared insolvent and underwent restructuring
largely because of deals under which it sold the bulk of its
output for less than market prices, causing losses of US$1.4
billion over six years and prompting an investigation by the
European Commission, Reuters recounts.

According to Reuters, Hidroelectrica's manager Remus Borza, as
quoted by newspaper Ziarul Financiar, said "I have filed the
reorganization plan in court. . . . If the judge approves the
plan, the company exits insolvency on June 26."

Hidroelectrica SA is a Romanian state-owned hydropower producer.

Hidroelectrica entered the insolvency process on June 20, 2012,
in order to be re-organized.  Euro INSOL was appointed the
judicial administrator.  On March 31, 2013, Hidroelectrica had
some 4,900 employees, down from over 5,200 recorded when the
company entered the insolvency process.

* ROMANIA: Excess Debt Main Cause of Corporate Insolvencies
-----------------------------------------------------------, citing an analysis made by Casa de
Insolventa Transilvania insolvency specialists, reports that
excess debt is the main cause of most insolvencies in Romania.

Half of the companies that went insolvent in the last two years
were overly indebted, discloses.  Management
mistakes and a drop in consumption come second and third, and
were each found in 43% of the cases, says.
The review covered 650 insolvency cases and the initial report
made by the insolvency firm for each of them,
relates.  According to, Rudolf Vizental,
managing partner of Casa de Insolventa Transilvania, said that in
most cases, insolvency comes as a mix of causes, usually 2 or 3
factors, including management errors and external factors.

Mr. Vizental said that in the majority of cases -- 90% -- the
management sees or admits insolvency long after the situation
occurs, and usually 18 months after that point, which drops the
chances for the company to get back on track,

According to, continued losses come fourth
among the main reasons for insolvency, while being part of a
group of companies comes firth, having appeared in 9% of the
cases.  A drop in consumption usually affects retail companies,
while the lack of profit, companies in production, Romania- states.  In 4% of the cases, losing the main
contract, unfair competition or the death of the main shareholder
led to insolvency, says.

The rate of insolvencies in Romania is one of the highest in the
region, says, citing a new study by
consultancy firm Coface.  Last year, 23,665 Romanian companies
went insolvent and the number is set to rise by 10% in 2013, recounts.

Romania ranks second in Central Europe for insolvencies, with a
rate of 5.67% of the total number of active firms, which number
close to 420,000, discloses.


IBERIAN MINERALS: S&P Affirms, Withdraws 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has affirmed its
'B+' long-term corporate credit rating on Iberian Minerals Corp.,
a mining company that is registered in Jersey and has assets in
Spain and Peru, and is 100% owned by Trafigura.  S&P subsequently
withdrew the rating at the issuer's request.  At the time of the
withdrawal, the outlook was stable.

The rating reflected S&P's assessment of the group's business
risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk profile as

Iberian Minerals' EBITDA soared to about US$160 million in 2013
from roughly US$21 million the previous year.  The company
benefited from higher-priced hedge contracts compared with 2012,
covering the bulk of its copper and silver production.  The
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio is currently
below 1.0x, but S&P expects it to increase in the coming years up
to 3.0x, as the company will invest to expand its Spanish

S&P assumes that Iberian Minerals will make capital expenditures
of about US$300 million over 2013-2014, and will therefore
attract new project loan funding or receive financial support
from its parent, Trafigura.

UNION FENOSA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Subordinated Debt Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Gas Natural SDG, S.A.'s Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB+'. The Outlook is Stable.

The affirmation reflects Fitch's view that Gas Natural will
continue to generate positive free cash flow and report strong
credit metrics in the short to medium term. Fitch acknowledges
that the company may face further energy market weakness and
regulatory pressure, especially in Spain and this may affect its
updated strategy, which will be published in the following
months. The Stable Outlook stems from our belief that the company
will be able to mitigate external headwinds within the parameters
of the current rating guidance.

Key Rating Drivers

Strong Metrics
The Stable Outlook is underpinned by Fitch's expectations that
Gas Natural's leverage will continue decreasing in the short to
medium term, with FFO adjusted net leverage improving to around
3.9x in 2013 and 3.4x in 2014 from 4.1x in 2012. Conversely, we
believe that FFO interest cover will remain around 4.9x in 2014
from 4.7x in 2013. This does not reflect the possible regulatory
changes in Spain.

Balanced Business Profile
The ratings are supported by Gas Natural's integrated strong
business profile in both gas and electricity. A significant
portion of the company's earnings (52% of FY12's EBITDA) are
regulated and mainly derived from its gas and electricity
distribution activities in Spain and Latam providing cash flow
visibility. The company also benefits from quasi-regulated assets
as a result of long-term contracted generation (PPAs) in Latam,
which represented around 18% of EBITDA in FY12.

Tariff Deficit Exposure
Gas Natural's exposure to tariff deficit had slightly decreased
in March 2013 (EUR889 million) compared with December 2012
(EUR1.1 billion) as a result of higher securitized and collected
amounts in Q113 (EUR420 million) compared with creation of new
tariff deficit (EUR251 million) during the period. The reduction
of tariff deficit exposure is credit positive as it impacts
leverage ratios given Fitch's approach to include tariff deficit
amounts in the ratios and only assumes a cash collection once
this has taken place. This assumption is due to high market risk
and volatility in this type of transactions in the past.

New Regulatory Measures
The Spanish government has announced its intention to implement
further regulatory measures to sort out the generation of future
tariff deficit. The outcome of this revision is expected by the
end of June 2013. Fitch's current projections for the company do
not include any negative impact from these new measures as the
result is still uncertain. Fitch will closely monitor this
process and adapt its projections accordingly. However, we
understand that Gas Natural might adapt its new business plan to
the outcome of the new set of measures to offset potential
negative impact.

Sovereign Exposure
The Stable Outlook is also underpinned by Fitch's approach within
which Spain's sovereign rating (BBB/Negative) would need to be
downgraded by three notches in order to likely trigger a
downgrade of Gas Natural. The company generated around 57% of
FY12 EBITDA in Spain. Fitch does not expect this to significantly
change in 2013, but it may reduce over the long term as the
company continues to invest outside Spain.

Preferred Shares
Gas Natural has repaid back around 90% of Union Fenosa Financial
Services USA LLC's preferred shares (EUR609 million) with a 7%
discount. While the remaining 10% remains in the balance sheet,
the transaction was credit neutral as Fitch gave no equity credit
to this issuance.

Fitch highlights that Union Fenosa Preferentes, S.A.'s preferred
shares (EUR750 million) do not receive equity credit either given
that the issuer does not have the full ability to defer coupon
payments under certain circumstances.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that may potentially lead to a
positive rating action include:

-- Further reduction of leverage with FFO adjusted net leverage
   around 3.0x or below on a sustained basis and FFO interest
   coverage around 5.5x or above on a sustained basis.

-- Improvement in the operating and regulatory environment.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to a negative
rating action include:

-- An increase of leverage with FFO adjusted net leverage above
   4.0x and FFO interest coverage below 4.5x on sustained basis.

-- Substantial deterioration of the operating environment or
   further government measures substantially reducing cash flows.


Gas Natural's liquidity position remains strong. It had around
EUR5.1 billion of committed available credit lines with more than
15 entities and EUR4.5 billion of available cash as of March
2013. This liquidity should enable it to cover debt maturities in
2013 and 2014 (EUR4.1 billion). We expect Gas Natural to generate
positive free cash flow in 2013-2015.


Gas Natural SDG, S.A.

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'BBB+', Outlook Stable
Short- term IDR affirmed at 'F2'

Gas Natural Fenosa Finance BV

Senior unsecured affirmed at 'BBB+'
Commercial paper affirmed at 'F2'

Gas Natural Capital Markets, S.A.

Senior unsecured affirmed at 'BBB+'

Union Fenosa Financial Services USA LLC

Subordinated debt affirmed at 'BB+'

Union Fenosa Preferentes, S.A.

Subordinated debt affirmed at 'BB'


NOBINA AB: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa1' CFR for Business Reasons
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the Caa1 corporate family
rating and Caa1-PD probability of default rating of Nobina AB.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Nobina AB is the largest Nordic bus transportation company,
operating in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark.

PERSTORP HOLDING: S&P Cuts Corp. Rating to 'CCC+'; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on Sweden-headquartered specialty
chemicals producer Perstorp Holding AB to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue ratings on Perstorp's
EUR270 million first-lien 9.0% secured notes and US$380 million
first-lien 8.75% secured notes, both due August 2017, to 'B-'
from 'B'.  The recovery rating on the first-lien notes is
unchanged at '2', indicating S&P's expectation of substantial
(70%-90%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

In addition, S&P lowered its issue rating on Perstorp's
US$370 million second-lien senior secured notes due September
2017 to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'.  The recovery rating on the second-
lien notes is unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's expectation of
negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

The downgrades reflect S&P's downward reassessment of Perstorp's
liquidity to "less than adequate" from "weak."  S&P's
reassessment indicates its view that Perstorp's liquidity risk is
heightened because the covenants on its revolving credit facility
(RCF) and mezzanine facilities tighten in the coming quarters.
In addition, S&P's reassessment reflects that Perstorp's
operating performance in 2013 will be weaker than it previously
anticipated.  Consequently, S&P has revised downward its estimate
of 2013 EBITDA from continued operations (excluding Perstorp's
formaldehyde business Formox) to Swedish krona (SEK) 1.0 billion-
SEK1.1 billion from our previous estimate of SEK1.3 billion.
Consequently, S&P believes that Perstorp's Standard & Poor's-
adjusted leverage may reach a very high 10x in 2013, compared
with its previous assumption of about 8x.

Furthermore, S&P has revised its assessment of Perstorp's
business risk profile downward to "weak" from "fair" to reflect
its opinion that the company's resilience to difficult European
macroeconomic conditions is lower than it anticipated.  In the
first quarter of 2013, Perstorp's reported EBITDA declined to
SEK245 million, a 36% decrease from the same period in 2012, due
to the appreciation of the Swedish krona, raw material cost
pressures, and soft demand. In addition, S&P also believes that
Perstorp's disposal of its stable and profitable Formox business
-- while positive for liquidity -- is somewhat negative for
Perstorp's business risk profile.

S&P understands that Perstorp will use the Formox disposal
proceeds of about SEK1 billion to support its ongoing high
capital expenditures (capex) of about SEK0.6 billion in 2013.
The company will use capex notably for its strategic growth
projects Valerox and Caprolex.  S&P views Perstorp's healthy cash
balances of about SEK1.4 billion at March 31, 2013 (boosted by
the Formox disposal proceeds), as the company's key liquidity
source in 2013.  S&P no longer treats Perstorp's SEK550 million
RCF as a liquidity source in S&P's calculations, due to the tight
headroom under the RCF's financial covenants.

In S&P's view, Perstorp has sufficient cash balances to meet its
financial commitments and support its investments in 2013.

However, S&P could lower the ratings if Perstorp's liquidity
deteriorated more rapidly than it currently anticipates, for
example, if Perstorp breached its covenants and could not draw on
the committed EUR30 million of equity support from PAI.  In
addition, S&P believes that Perstorp's current leverage may not
be sustainable if EBITDA drops materially below SEK1 billion in
2013, and does not meaningfully recover in 2014-2015 as a result
of management's cost-rationalization actions and contributions
from growth projects.

Rating upside is unlikely in 2013, in S&P's view, but could occur
if Perstorp's EBITDA improved to SEK1.3 billion-SEK1.4 billion on
a sustainable basis.  S&P believes this corresponds to better
EBITDA headroom under financial covenants of at least 25%-30% and
adjusted debt to EBITDA (excluding the shareholder loan) of about

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BROADWAY BOULEVARD: In Administration, Closes Forever
David Powell at Daily Post News reports that a well known
nightclub closed making 15 workers redundant after a buyer could
not be found.

The Broadway Boulevard in Llandudno had stayed open -- although
another threatened club Chicago's in Wrexham closed recently --
despite their parent company Atmosphere Bars and Clubs Ltd going
into administration last month due to cashflow problems,
according to Daily Post News.

The report notes that administrators Deloitte, a business
advisory firm, tried to find a new buyer for the venues, but
without result.

"Deloitte has confirmed that the Broadway Boulevard has closed,"
the report quoted a spokeswoman for administrators Deloitte as

The report notes that the spokeswoman said 15 full and part-time
staff are being made redundant.  Most are part-time due to the
nature of the business, she added, the report relates.

The Milton Keynes-based firm employs 75 full-time staff and 418
part-time in 24 licensed premises across England and Wales.

According to the report, Daniel Butters and Adrian Berry, of
Deloitte, were appointed joint administrators in May.

In a statement from Deloitte at that time, Mr. Butters said:
"Unfortunately, as a consequence of cash flow problems, the
decision was taken by the directors of Atmosphere Bars and Clubs
to place the company into administration," the report discloses.

Broadway Boulevard is in the former Grand Theatre, built in 1901.
The building was later used for BBC broadcasts during the war.
In later years, it hosted non-alcoholic nights for younger
teenagers, student nights and theme nights.

CAT PLC: Set to Go Into Liquidation
Cambrian News Online reports that the Centre for Alternative
Technology's business arm, CAT plc, is poised to go into

A meeting of CAT plc creditors will be held on June 19, where a
statement of affairs and an estimated amount of their claims will
be presented, and -- potentially -- a liquidator nominated, the
report says.

According to Cambrian News, directors of CAT plc decided to
voluntarily wind up the company in February, due to spiralling
debts caused by a drop in visitors, and the high cost of
repairing the cliff railway.

That decision caused the loss of over GBP1 million for 2,000
shareholders who had purchased A and B shares for GBP1 each in
1991, the report relays.

The report notes that CAT has confirmed that all staff from the
wound-up plc have been transferred to CAT Charity Ltd, with the
exception of 11 people from the Quarry cafe and shop, whose
positions have been made redundant.

COMBINED ELECTRICAL: Goes Into Voluntary Liquidation
Insider Media reports that Combined Electrical & Engineering
Services Ltd has gone into voluntary liquidation with the loss of
all jobs after being hit by its major customer falling into

Tim Ball-- -- restructuring services
partner at Mazars in Poole, has been appointed as liquidator of
Combined Electrical & Engineering Services Ltd (CEES), which was
established in 1990, the report relates.

Insider Media notes that a total of 50 per cent of its work had
been supplied by South East Water (SEW) but early last year, CEES
was told to trade directly with a main contractor, Birmingham-
headquartered Enpure, for the SEW work.

But Enpure entered administration in September 2012 and Insider
later revealed creditors of the company were likely to lose out
on GBP23 million.

At its peak, CEES employed 40 members of staff and had a turnover
of GBP3.7 million, the report discloses.

According to the report, the liquidator said CEES took steps to
cut costs with redundancies in early October 2012 but by spring
2013 it became clear the turnover was too low to stop the cash
situation becoming worse.

Following a review of its financial liabilities, it was decided
to place the company into voluntary liquidation owing more than
GBP800,000, relays Insider Media.

DEBT HELP: High Court Winds Up Two Debt Management Companies
Two Cheshire-based companies that claimed to offer debt
management services to clients in financial difficulties, were
wound up by the High Court on June 3, 2013, on public interest
grounds following an investigation by the Insolvency Service.

Debt Help Direct Limited (DHD) and Money Worries Limited (MW),
both based in Wilmslow, Cheshire were wound up for taking money
from clients but failing to pass it on to creditors as expected.
The petition to wind up the companies was brought on behalf of
the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

The investigation showed that both companies targeted people who
were unable to pay their debts and set up debt management plans
in which the clients paid a regular amount to be distributed to
the creditors.

However, the investigation showed that, even though between them,
the companies received over GBP1.3 million from clients in a two-
month period in early 2013, a large proportion appeared not to
have been paid to the creditors. Furthermore, DHD owed over
GBP125,000 in overdue tax to HM Revenue and Customs , while MW
owed just over GBP420,000.

"These companies targeted individuals who were already in severe
financial difficulties and the 'services' provided by these
companies simply made matters much worse. They claimed to offer a
service and failed to deliver. The winding up orders should serve
as a warning that the Insolvency Service will crack down on
companies that operate in this way," said Alex Deane, an
Investigation Supervisor with The Insolvency Service.

The Insolvency Service recently launched proposals for a debt
management plan protocol to ensure that consumers who pay for
advice and assistance with managing their debts are protected.

The petition to wind up the company in the public interest was
presented to the High Court under s124A of the Insolvency Act
1986 on April 10, 2013, following confidential enquiries carried
out by Company Investigations under section 447 of the Companies
Act 1985, as amended.  A Provisional Liquidator was appointed to
the companies on April 12, 2013, and the companies were wound up
on June 3, 2013.

INDEPENDENT VILLAS: To Go Into Liquidation; Blames Cash Flow Woes
Duncan Brodie at reports that Independent Villas Ltd
is to go into liquidation, blaming cash-flow problems and tough
trading conditions.

Independent Villas, based at Kesgrave, near Ipswich, acted as a
booking agent for independently-owned villas, mainly in Portugal,
the report notes.

According to the report, customers already abroad will be able to
complete their holidays as planned but the liquidators, from East
Anglian accountancy firm Larking Gowen, said that all outstanding
bookings made through Independent Villas have now been cancelled. relates that Andrew Kelsall -- -- director of business
recovery at Larking Gowen, said customers who had paid for their
accommodation by credit card were advised to claim against their
card issuer. However, anyone who had paid, whether a deposit or
in full, by cheque or in cash would become a creditor of the
company, the report relays.

A meeting of creditors to place the company into liquidation has
been called for July 2, the report adds.

VIRIDIS PLASTICS: High Court Orders Plant Owner Into Liquidation
Will Date at reports that the future of the Welsh
Government-subsidized plastics bottle recycling plant in
Blackwood, South Wales, is in severe doubt, after the High Court
ordered Viridis Plastics UK, the owner of the plant, into
liquidation. reported in January that the plant had been
closed since late December 2012 as Irish-owned Viridis had sought
to financially restructure its operations to enable it to run the
plant at a profit.

According to, Viridis acquired the plant in
May 2012 aided by repayable finance from the Welsh Government,
after the previous owner Plastics Sorting Limited was placed into
administration in February of the same year.

In April 2013, the report recalls, Judge Welch at the High Court
in Newcastle upon Tyne ordered that the company be wound down,
following an application from Lincolnshire-based bottle recycler
ECO Plastics, which claimed that it had failed to pay debts in
excess of GBP30,000 for coloured PET bales delivered to the Welsh
plant in late 2012.

As a result of the ruling, notes, Viridis
Plastics UK was placed into compulsory liquidation last month,
with the government's Liquidation Service appointed as the
receiver. quotes a spokesman for the Insolvency Service, as
saying that: "A notice of appointment will be published shortly
and creditors will be asked to send a proof of debt. We have
already met with the directors of the company to establish how
many creditors are owed money."

* UK: Scotland Introduces Bankruptcy Bill
BBC News reports that new bankruptcy legislation aiming to strike
a better balance between the rights of debtors and the rights of
creditors has been introduced.

The Bankruptcy and Debt Advice (Scotland) Bill 2013 will provide
for improved financial advice, BBC says.

According to BBC, it will also ensure that those who "can pay"
their debts "should pay".

The legislative reform promises to create a more efficient
process and allow people to apply for bankruptcy online, BBC

AiB is an agency of the Scottish government which has
responsibility for administering personal bankruptcy processes;
administering the Debt Arrangement Scheme (DAS) and recording
corporate insolvencies in Scotland, BBC discloses.


SAMARKAND BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had revised its
outlook on Uzbekistan-based Samarkand Bank to stable from
positive and affirmed its 'CCC/C' long- and short-term
counterparty credit ratings on the bank.  S&P then suspended the
ratings on Samarkand Bank because of a lack of timely information
to maintain appropriate surveillance.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view of the now reduced
probability of an upgrade of Samarkand Bank, given that the flow
of information from the issuer is insufficient.

The ensuing suspension of the ratings reflects Standard & Poor's
lack of receipt of timely information that it considers to be of
satisfactory quality from the issuer, in accordance with its
applicable criteria and policies.  In particular S&P has not
received Samarkand Bank's recent financial statements or any
other information related to the bank's current or prospective

S&P may reinstate the ratings on Samarkand Bank after the receipt
and analysis of the information it needs to maintain the ratings,
and if S&P believes such information will be supplied on an
ongoing basis.  If S&P do not receive sufficient and reliable
information to maintain surveillance on the ratings within the
next six months, it will withdraw the ratings.


* BOOK REVIEW: Creating Value through Corporate Restructuring
Author: Stuart C. Gilson
Publisher: Wiley
Hardcover: 516 pages
List Price: $79.95
Review by David M. Henderson

Most business books fall into two categories. The first is very
important. It is like that stuff you have to drink before you
have a colonoscopy. You keep telling yourself, this is very
good for me, while you would rather be at the beach reading
Liar's Poker or Barbarians at the Gate.

Stuart Gilson, of the Harvard Business School, has managed to
write a book important to everybody in the distressed market
that is also quite enjoyable. His prose is fluid and succinct
and a pleasure to read. But don't take my word for it. The
dust jacket endorsements come from Jay Alix, Martin Fridson,
Harvey Miller, Arthur Newman, and Sanford Sigoloff. At a
collective gazillion dollars a billing hour, that's a lot of

Be advised that this is designed as a text book. The case study
format might be off-putting to some. The effect can be jarring
as you read the narrative history of the case and suddenly
confront the financial statements without any further clue as to
what to do, but this must be what it is like for the turnaround
manager. Even after reading several of the cases, when I got to
the financials I had that sinking feeling of, what do I do now?
If you read carefully, clues to the solutions are in the

The book is divided into three "modules", bizspeek for sections:
Restructuring Creditors' Claims,. Restructuring Shareholders'
Claims, and Restructuring Employees' Claims. The text covers 13
corporate restructurings focusing on debt workouts, vulture
investing, equity spinoffs, tracking stock, assete divestitures,
employee layoffs, corporate downsizing, M & A, HLTs, wage
givebacks, employee stock buyouts, and the restructuring of
employee benefit plans. That's a pretty comprehensive survey,
wouldn't you say?

Dr. Gilson's chapter on "Investing in Distressed Situations" is
an excellent summary of the distressed market and a good
touchstone even for seasoned vultures.

Even in the two appendices on technical analysis, this book is
marvelously free of those charts and graphs that purport to show
some general ROI of distressed investing. Those are cute,
aren't they? As Judy Mencher has famously said, "You can buy
the paper at 50 thinking it's going to 70, but it can just as
easily go to 30 if you are not willing to act on it." Therein
lies the rub and the weakness, if inevitable, of this or any
book on corporate restructurings. As Dr. Gilson notes, no two
are alike, and the outcome is highly subjective, in our out of
Court, but especially in Chapter 11. Is the Judge enthralled by
Jack Butler as Debtor's Counsel or intimidated by Harvey Miller
as Debtor's Counsel? Are you holding "secured" paper only to
discover that when it was issued the bond counsel forgot to
notify the Indenture Trustee of the most Senior debt? Is
somebody holding Junior paper that you think is out of the money
only to have Hugh Ray read the fine print and discover that the
"Junior" paper is secured? This is the stuff of corporate
reorganizations that is virtually impossible to codify into a

That said, this is an especially valuable text for anybody
working in the distressed market. As a Duke grad, I tend to be
disdainful of all things Harvard, but having read Dr. Gilson's
book, I am enticed to encamp by the dirty waters of the Charles
long enough to take his course, appropriately entitled,
"Creating Value Through Corporate Restructuring.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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