TCREUR_Public/130617.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, June 17, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 118

                            Headlines



C Y P R U S

CYPRUS POPULAR: Fitch Affirms 'D' Issuer Default Ratings


F R A N C E

TECH FINANCE: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to EUR745MM Loan Facility


G E O R G I A

BANK OF GEORGIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term FC/LC IDRs


G E R M A N Y

PB DOMICILE: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on EUR15.4MM Class E Notes


G R E E C E

* Greek Banks' Risks Remain High But Recap Provides Buffer


H U N G A R Y

EMG MEDIACSOPORT: Budapest Court Extends Debt Payment Moratorium


I R E L A N D

MONSOON ACCESSORIZE: Exits Examinership; 200 Jobs Secured
SUNDAY BUSINESS: Court Set to Decide on Rescue Plan on Wednesday
* Revised Repossession Law May Help Curb Irish Bank Arrears


I T A L Y

ATLANTE FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on EUR136.8MM Loan


K A Z A K H S T A N

HOUSING FINANCE: Restructuring Needed to Prevent Losses, IMF Says


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC PROGRAM: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
JUBILEE CDO III: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on Class D Notes
POLYCONCEPT FINANCE: Moody's Rates US$395MM Sr. Facilities Ba3
POLYCONCEPT INVESTMENTS: S&P Rates US$315MM Sr. Term Loan 'B'


R U S S I A

NOTA BANK: S&P Assigns 'B/B' Counterparty Ratings; Outlook Stable
RED & BLACK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class C Notes


S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O

KOMBINAT ALUMINIJUMA: Montenegro Gov't Files Bankruptcy Motion


S P A I N

PYME BANCAJA: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on EUR28.8MM Class D Notes
SANTANDER EMPRESAS: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class F Notes
VIAJES MARSANS: Former Head Found Guilty in Suit Over Bankruptcy


T U R K E Y

* BURSA TURKEY: Fitch Upgrades Long-Term Currency Ratings to 'BB'
* IZMIR TURKEY: Fitch Lifts LT Foreign Currency Rating From BB+


U K R A I N E

INTERPIPE LTD: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
TAVRIKA BANK: Law Firm Approves Quantitative Tender for Debts


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CARLETON CREDIT: Doubtful Debts Prompt Insolvency
CO-OP BANK: Expects to Unveil Capital Plans; Probe to Begin
EASTLEYS WEB: In Administration, Cuts 24 Jobs
HIGHER EDUCATION: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on Two Note Classes
INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-term IDR

JUST VANS: Barclays Bank Lost GBP2-Mil.+ After Administration
RMAC SECURITIES: S&P Raises Rating on Class M2c Notes to BB-
* LTVs and CCJs Drive Defaults for UK Non-Conforming Mortgages


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's: Looser Insurance Control Increases Risks for Creditors
* Moody's: High-Yield Bond May Issue for EMEA Sectors Top $60BB
* Moody's: Oversupply Keeps Shipping Industry Outlook at Negative
* Fitch: Deposit Set-Off Risk Remote for SF & CVB in EU Countries
* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 10 to June 14, 2013


                            *********


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C Y P R U S
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CYPRUS POPULAR: Fitch Affirms 'D' Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cyprus Popular Bank's (CPB) Long and
Short-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'D', Viability Rating
(VR) at 'f', Support Rating at '5' and Support Rating Floor at
'No Floor'. Simultaneously, the agency has withdrawn CPB's
ratings as the bank is under resolution and the ratings are no
longer considered analytically meaningful by Fitch. As a result,
Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage of
CPB.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation and withdrawal follow the resolution of the bank,
which is underway, in line with the Resolution of Credit and
Other Institutions Law of 2013.

In accordance with the law, the Central Bank of Cyprus, in its
capacity as resolution authority, approved the transfer of CPB's
good assets and liabilities (including insured deposits and
central bank funding) to Bank of Cyprus (RD), which has now been
completed. Bank of Cyprus will assume the continuation of CPB's
banking activity.

Fitch understands that CPB's current balance sheet largely
contains non-performing assets, and on the liabilities side bonds
and uninsured deposits (deposits above EUR100,000), which are
expected by Fitch to be subject to credit losses when the bank
completes the resolution process. Fitch expects this to take
place in the near future.

CPB's ratings reflect the fact that CPB is being resolved, which
may result in losses imposed on senior creditors. According to
Fitch's rating definitions, 'D' ratings indicate an issuer that
in Fitch's opinion has entered into bankruptcy filings,
administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal
winding-up procedure, or which has otherwise ceased business.

The rating actions are:

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'D'; withdrawn
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'D'; withdrawn
Viability Rating affirmed at 'f'; withdrawn
Support Rating affirmed at '5'; withdrawn
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'NF'; withdrawn
Senior notes affirmed at 'C'/'RR6'; withdrawn



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F R A N C E
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TECH FINANCE: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to EUR745MM Loan Facility
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'B' issue
rating to Tech Finance & Co S.C.A.'s proposed EUR745 million term
loan facility (including euro and U.S. dollar tranches) due 2020,
and US$330 million senior secured notes due 2020.  Tech Finance
is an orphan special purpose vehicle that will engage in certain
financing activities relating to Technicolor S.A.  The new debt
amounts are based on 90% tender on the loans and 75% tender on
the notes and might vary according to the success of the
transaction.

The issue rating on the underlying proceeds loans to Thomson
Licensing is 'B'.  The recovery rating on the proposed proceeds
loans is '3', reflecting S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-
70%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating to Thomson Licensing SAS, the main provider of
intellectual property licensing services to consumer electronic
manufacturers and service providers.  The outlook is stable.

S&P has also placed its 'B' issue ratings on the existing bank
facilities and notes at Technicolor level on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

The rating on Thomson Licensing mirrors that on its ultimate
parent Technicolor S.A.  S&P views Thomson Licensing as a
strategically important" subsidiary of Technicolor, as S&P's
criteria define the term, because it is fully indirectly-owned by
Technicolor, generates the majority of Technicolor group's
EBITDA, and holds most of its intellectual property.

The issuance structure is, in S&P's view, particularly complex.
However, S&P's equalization of the issue rating on the proposed
debt to be issued by Tech Finance reflects its view that the
proposed notes and loans will benefit from a direct pass through
of the economic benefit of the back-to-back proceeds loans
borrowed by Thomson Licensing.

The recovery rating of '3' on the proceeds loans is initially
supported by the claim against Thomson Licensing, an entity that
S&P views as having substantial value.  However, it is
constrained by the complexity and documentation risks in the
proposed structure, the fairly weak security package, prior
ranking debt in the waterfall, and S&P's view of the relatively
unfavorable insolvency jurisdiction in which Technicolor
operates.

The CreditWatch placement on Technicolor's existing bank
facilities and notes reflects S&P's view that on completion of
the proposed transaction recovery prospects, including on any
untendered existing debt, will fall significantly, leading to a
downward revision of the recovery rating.

The ratings are subject to final documentation and any change to
the structure, pass-through features or other legal aspects of
the transaction could have a significant effect on the ratings on
the proposed notes and loans.  In addition, S&P's valuation
metrics depend heavily on the amount and split of debt tendered
for repayment.  S&P will provide additional valuation detail when
it resolves the CreditWatch on the new issuance after the tender
is completed and the final debt structure and composition is
known.

The stable outlook on Thomson Licensing reflects that on
Technicolor.



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G E O R G I A
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BANK OF GEORGIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term FC/LC IDRs
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) and Viability Ratings (VRs) of Bank of Georgia (BoG), TBC
Bank (TBC), ProCredit Bank (Georgia) (PCBG) and JSC Liberty Bank
(LB). The Outlooks on the banks' Long-term IDRs are Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS: VRS OF ALL BANKS, BoG, TBC and LB's IDRs,
BoG's SENIOR DEBT

The affirmation of BoG's, TBC's, PCBG's and LB's VRs, and (with
the exception of PCBG) their Long-term IDRs, reflects the still
reasonable prospects for the Georgian economy, notwithstanding
the recent slowdown in growth, and the banks' generally sound
financial metrics, management and governance.

The banks' asset quality ratios remain reasonable, with non-
performing loan ratios (NPLs, loans overdue by 90 days) ranging
from 1% to 4% of gross loans and restructured loans also
moderate. Fitch views the banks' near-term prospects as
reasonable, given the agency's forecast of 4.3% GDP growth for
the Georgian economy in 2013 and low impairment charges at this
point in the economic cycle. In light of the latter, banks'
internal capital generation capacity should remain reasonable,
supported by fairly wide margins. Capital levels are high, as
reflected in Fitch core capital (FCC) ratios ranging between
about 15% and 27% at end-2012. Liquidity is good, providing a
solid buffer to absorb any unexpected funding outflows, and
refinancing risk is limited in view of the international
financial institutions that are the main providers of long-term
funding.

At the same time, the agency notes that the banks' current levels
of capitalization are warranted given the fairly high-risk
operating environment in Georgia and the potentially cyclical
performance of both the economy and the banks. Although Fitch's
base case expectation is for still solid growth in the near to
medium term, political uncertainty and downside risks to economic
performance have increased following the change of government in
2012. Furthermore, with the exception of LB, capital ratios
should be viewed in light of banks' high levels of FX lending,
which would expose them to indirect credit risks if there was a
sharp depreciation of the local currency. To an extent this risk
is already captured in the banks' tighter regulatory capital
ratios (at around 16% for BoG and PCBG, 14% for TBC and 12% for
LB at end-2012), as the National Bank of Georgia requires that
banks to apply a 175% risk-weighting to FX loans. Sizeable
holdings of fixed and foreclosed assets also reduce the banks'
level of free capital.

As an additional source of risk, Fitch also notes the banks'
expansion in segments (notably in retail, micro and SMEs) where
some of them have a shorter track record of lending, and which
are gradually becoming more leveraged. BoG and TBC also have
significant exposures to more risky long-term project finance
loans. The agency also believes that growing competition could
lead to a gradual weakening of underwriting at a time when
margins are tightening, although softening of both lending
standards and credit spreads has been limited to date.

BoG's and TBC's 'bb-' VRs are further supported by their well-
established franchises and dominant market shares. At end-2012,
the two banks accounted for over 60% of the sector's assets.

The equalization of PCBG's VR with those of BoG and TBC,
notwithstanding PCBG's significantly smaller size, reflects the
bank's superior track record of asset quality and performance
through the cycle and its good corporate governance and risk
management, reflecting its participation in the ProCredit group
of banks.

LB's VR of 'b' reflects its more limited track record and
franchise, faster growth and more moderate profitability and
capitalization relative to peers. Pre-impairment profitability
was equal to a moderate 6% of average loans in 2012, but
constrained by weak cost efficiency and a high level of liquid
assets. The bank's FCC ratio was a reasonable 15% at end-2012,
but capitalization is managed tightly relative to minimum
regulatory requirements, with the regulatory ratio only just
above the required 12% at end-Q113. In Fitch's view, the bank's
loss absorption capacity is only moderate in light of the bank's
fairly aggressive retail lending strategy (with 35% retail loan
growth targeted in 2013) and somewhat untested loan book in this
respect. LB's credit profile benefits from lending being almost
fully GEL-denominated, and from the absence to date of
significant wholesale funding. However, significant reliance on
government and municipal funding brings concentration risk and
some volatility to the deposit base.

KEY RATING DRIVERS: BOG's, AND LB'S SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOORS

The affirmation of BoG's and LB's '4' Support Ratings and 'B'
Support Rating Floors (SRFs) reflects Fitch's view of the limited
probability of support being available from the Georgian
government. In Fitch's view, the authorities would likely have a
high propensity to support BoG in light of the bank's systemic
importance (37% share of sector assets at end-2012) and LB given
its social function as the country's primary distributor of
pensions and social benefits. LB's Support Rating and SRF also
consider the support made available to the bank in 2009. At the
same time, the Support Ratings and SRFs are constrained by the
potentially limited ability of the authorities to provide
support.

KEY RATING DRIVERS: TBC'S SUPPORT RATING AND SRF

The affirmation of TBC's '4' Support Rating reflects Fitch's view
of the limited probability of support from the bank's IFI
shareholders, which together hold a 57% stake in the bank.
However, some doubt remains about the ability and readiness of
the IFIs to provide coordinated and timely support in case of
need, particularly in view of their ultimate likely exit from the
shareholder structure.

Fitch has assigned a SRF of 'B' to TBC, reflecting its view of
the limited probability of support available from the Georgian
government in light of the bank's systemic importance (26% share
of banking sector assets at end-2012).

KEY RATING DRIVERS: PCBG'S IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

The affirmation of PCBG's Long-term IDRs at 'BB', one notch above
the sovereign rating (BB-/Stable), and Support Rating at '3'
reflects Fitch's view of the moderate probability of support from
the bank's 100% shareholder, ProCredit Holding AG & Co. KGaA
(BBB-/Stable). Fitch views the propensity of PCH to provide
support as high, but PCBG's ability to receive and utilize this
support could be restricted by transfer and convertibility
restrictions, as reflected in Georgia's Country Ceiling of 'BB'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: VRS OF ALL BANKS

An upgrade of the VRs of BoG, TBC and PCBG, and hence of the
Long-term IDRs of BoG and TBC, would likely require a sovereign
upgrade, a favorable macro backdrop, a marked reduction in
foreign currency lending and still strong bank financial metrics
and asset quality ratios, notwithstanding increasing levels of
competition.

LB's VR, and hence its Long-term IDR, could be upgraded in case
of an extended track record of profitable growth, a further
strengthening of the bank's franchise and somewhat greater loss
absorption capacity.

Conversely, a marked deterioration in the operating environment
potentially leading to a sovereign downgrade, would put downward
pressure on each of the banks' VRs. A material weakening of asset
quality ratios would also be negative for the VRs, particularly
if Fitch considered it indicative of a weakening of underwriting
standards.

Fitch notes that the banks' VRs are currently underpinned by high
capital ratios. Consequently, any significant relaxation of
regulatory capital requirements, for example due to the planned
transition to Basel II/III risk weightings in Georgia, if
followed by a marked reduction in capital levels, could also put
downward pressure on the banks' VRs.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: SUPPORT RATINGS AND SRFS OF BOG, TBC AND LB

Fitch does not expect any change to BoG's, LB's or TBC's Support
Ratings or SRFs given the Stable Outlook on Georgia's sovereign
rating. However, any changes in the sovereign ratings could
result in revisions of the SRFs.

Any change in Fitch's view of support available to PCBG from PCH,
or in the Georgian Country Ceiling, would likely result in a
change to PCBG's Long-term IDRs.

The rating actions are:

Bank of Georgia

Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB-';
Outlook Stable

Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'

Support Rating: affirmed at 4

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B'

Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BB-'

TBC Bank

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
Stable

Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'

Support Rating: affirmed at '4'

Support Rating Floor: assigned at 'B'

ProCredit Bank (Georgia)

Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB';
  Outlook Stable

Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'

Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

JSC Liberty Bank

Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable

Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'

Support Rating: affirmed at '4'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B'



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PB DOMICILE: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on EUR15.4MM Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed PB Domicile 2006-1 PLC as follows:

EUR19.5mn Class D (ISIN DE000A0GYFL1): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
Stable Outlook

EUR15.4mn Class E (ISIN DE000A0GYFM9): affirmed at 'BBsf';
Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

The transaction is a synthetic securitization referencing a
portfolio of residential mortgage loans originated by Deutsche
Postbank AG (A+/Stable/F1+). The outstanding note balance as of
the May 2013 payment date was EUR34.9 million referencing the
outstanding protected portfolio. The total asset portfolio
balance stands at EUR1.38 billion. This is the reference for
calculating the excess spread of 57bps per annum.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Following the time call on Nov. 28, 2011, the class A1+ to C
notes were paid in full and the class D notes were partially
redeemed. The remaining outstanding notes reflect the amount of
overdue reference claims as of the early redemption date less net
proceeds received from synthetic excess spread after offsetting
realized losses, cures and removals (due to breaches of
eligibility criteria) since the call date.

The available excess spread can recover previously allocated
losses until note maturity and depends on the prospective
reference portfolio's repayment rate which has increased to 19%
from 12% since our last review.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The repayment rate, recoveries, removals and cures influence the
transaction's performance. The most relevant for our analysis is
the repayment rate. The faster the portfolio amortizes, the less
excess spread is available to cover losses.

Fitch expects for the respective rating scenarios that the notes
will be repaid by synthetic excess spread and proceeds from
recoveries. The redemption mechanism has already resulted in
significant repayment of the notes and full recovery of losses.



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G R E E C E
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* Greek Banks' Risks Remain High But Recap Provides Buffer
----------------------------------------------------------
Greek banks continue to face significant asset quality and
profitability pressures, which if not contained could lead to
renewed capital weakness and funding vulnerabilities, Fitch
Ratings says. However, banks face these challenges from a better
financial position after their recapitalization and with funding
conditions having improved.

The largest four Greek banks' improved standalone financial
strength as expressed by their Viability Ratings and a more
stable macroeconomic environment in Greece as reflected by the
sovereign upgrade to 'B-' were the key drivers for our recent
one-notch upgrade of these banks' Issuer Default Ratings to 'B-'.
"We believe the banks are unlikely to receive further support in
light of the scarce resources at the Greek authorities' disposal.
Therefore, we revised these banks' Support Rating Floor to 'No
Floor'," Fitch says.

"We expect problem loans to continue to rise in 2013, but at a
slower pace than in 2012. At end-2012 non-performing loan ratios
were 20-30%, but there were signs of a slower rate of increase in
Q412. We believe the banks' profitability will remain weak with
high loan impairment charges and subdued revenue in an economy
contracting by 4.3% in 2013. However, earnings and capital
pressure could start to ease in 2014 as we forecast unemployment
to peak at 28.5% at end-2013 and for GDP to return to growth in
2014, albeit by only 0.3%.

"There are also some signs that funding conditions are improving.
System deposits rose by 13% for the nine months to March,
reflecting improved depositor confidence. But this is likely to
be fragile following the Cypriot banking crisis and with
structural imbalances remaining. The four banks' aggregate net
loans/deposits ratio improved by 10pp to a still-high 132% at
end-2012. They remained reliant on the central bank to fund 25%
of their assets at end-Q113, although funding costs have reduced
since they regained access to ECB funds in January.

"The four Greek banks received support from the Hellenic
Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) under the IMF/EU program.
Together with the completion of private capital-raising,
potential issuance of contingent convertible bonds to be fully
subscribed by the HFSF and taking into account recent bank
acquisitions, their pro-forma European Banking Authority core
capital ratios will be above the 9% required by the authorities.

"We expect Eurobank to be the only bank to remain fully state-
owned. Alpha Bank has attained the 10% private shareholder
participation threshold required to avoid nationalization.
Piraeus Bank will also meet the target as its right issue is
secured by foreign investors. National Bank of Greece is likely
to follow suit," Fitch said.



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H U N G A R Y
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EMG MEDIACSOPORT: Budapest Court Extends Debt Payment Moratorium
----------------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that Est Media said on Friday the Budapest
Municipal Court extended to 240 days a payment moratorium granted
to EMG Mediacsoport under a bankruptcy procedure by a resolution
dated June 10.

The moratorium will expire on November 23, 2013, under the court
resolution, MTI-Econews discloses.

EMG initiated bankruptcy procedures against itself in March, this
year, MTI-Econews recounts.

EMG Mediacsoport is a unit of Est Media.



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MONSOON ACCESSORIZE: Exits Examinership; 200 Jobs Secured
---------------------------------------------------------
Irish Independent reports that Monsoon Accessorize Ireland Ltd.
emerged from examinership on Friday.

The process has saved 200 jobs and 11 shops in Ireland, Irish
Independent discloses.

The company had been under court protection since early March,
Irish Independent notes.

Seven shops will close, including four Accessorize stores in
Dublin, Cork and Limerick and three Monsoon Accessorize stores in
Newbridge, Liffey Valley and Waterford, Irish Independent says.

According to Irish Independent, Friday's deal sees Monsoon's
parent company write off a debt of more than EUR5.6 million and
agree to invest in the business to secure its long-term future.

Monsoon Accessorize Ireland Ltd. is a women and children's
fashion and accessories retailer.


SUNDAY BUSINESS: Court Set to Decide on Rescue Plan on Wednesday
----------------------------------------------------------------
BreakingNews.ie reports that a rescue plan for the Sunday
Business Post will be put before the High Court for approval this
Wednesday.

The examiner who was appointed to steer the newspaper out of its
current difficulties plans to sell the business to investors led
by media executive Paul Cooke, BreakingNews.ie discloses.

The High Court has heard most of the company's creditors back the
proposed takeover deal, BreakingNews.ie relates.

According to BreakingNews.ie, examiner Michael McAteer has told
the court it is regrettable media reports have given the
erroneous impression that the success of the scheme is assured
and that the court proceedings are merely a formality.

The Sunday Business Post is an Irish national Sunday newspaper.
Accountant Michael McAteer of Grant Thornton was appointed as
interim examiner of Post Publishing Ltd., which owns the Sunday
Business Post' newspaper, at the High Court in Dublin by Mr.
Justice Peter Kelly, in March 2013.


* Revised Repossession Law May Help Curb Irish Bank Arrears
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ireland's proposed revised repossession law could help bank
arrears to level off in 2014 by returning to the banks their
recovery powers to resolve some long-term mortgage arrears, Fitch
Ratings says. However, it may take some time before repossession
numbers pick up.

Fitch says "We expect repossessions to rise -- from a very low
0.3% of arrears in 2012, according to the IMF -- when the draft
Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Bill 2013 is passed into
legislation. Repairing the gap in the law should raise customer
engagement and help normalize the recovery process for banks. The
draft bill, together with central bank-imposed targets to reduce
arrears through providing sustainable solutions, could help the
banks to bring the high level of mortgage arrears under control.

"But the rate of foreclosure may be slow at first, as the
proposed law will not apply retrospectively - and lenders will
need to start legal proceedings again. It should take some time
to clear the backlog of previously adjourned cases, and this may
raise the costs involved.

"The speed at which repossessions may rise will be influenced by
the way in which customer behavior changes following a credible
threat of repossession, and the extent that customers seek a
personal insolvency arrangement (PIA). The new bill proposes to
give the court power to adjourn a repossession case for two
months initially, so that a borrower can make a proposal for a
debt arrangement under the personal insolvency framework that
became operational in Q2.

"We do not expect a wide-scale take-up of such arrangements for
delinquent borrowers, since a bank can vote against a PIA
proposal that it believes is an inappropriate solution. However,
the provision for borrowers to seek a PIA could add to the length
of time before repossessions rise, even though the draft bill
would remove the block for certain foreclosures."

The proposed legislative change will help reduce the foreclosure
period for loans originated prior to Dec. 1, 2009. But if the
time taken to complete repossessions is to shorten by a
meaningful extent, then additional measures to enhance the
efficiency of the process would also be needed.

Asset quality could receive some immediate benefit when the
revised law is in place, as there could be fewer customers that
had been previously unwilling to pay following rumors of
potential debt forgiveness. The authorities have made it clear
that large-scale debt relief will not be forthcoming, and the new
bill supports this stance.

The proposed legislation is designed to address deficiencies in
the Land and Conveyancing Reform Act 2009, which repealed certain
sections of the previous legislation, specifically in relation to
repossession rights. The Dunne judgment in 2011 ruled that
lenders could only repossess homes where mortgage borrowers had
defaulted if they demanded full repayment before 1 December 2009.
This prevented banks from foreclosing many mortgages in long-term
arrears. The new bill has passed through the committee stage in
the lower house of the Irish parliament, and is scheduled to come
into operation in Q313.



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ATLANTE FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on EUR136.8MM Loan
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Atlante Finance S.r.l.'s notes as
follows:

EUR151,516,203 class A notes (ISIN IT0004069032): affirmed at
'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR28,800,000 class B notes (ISIN IT0004069040): affirmed at
'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR136,800,000 class C notes (ISIN IT0004069057): affirmed at
'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmations reflect the notes' available credit enhancement
(CE) which has increased as a result of de-leveraging in the
underlying portfolio. As of March 2013 the pool outstanding
principal balance was equal to EUR470.6 million representing
34.3% of its original level at closing.

The collateral pool features high degrees of single obligor and
industry concentration, albeit these are mitigated by the
composite nature of the pool which does not consist of commercial
loans only (accounting for 57.7% of the pool balance) but
includes a large portion of residential loans (39.7%) and also a
marginal portion of loans granted to Italian public entities
(2.6%). Nevertheless the largest 10 obligor groups account for
about 28% of the overall pool balance and the largest industry
(real estate) has been estimated to account for about 28.6% of
the overall pool balance.

Loans in arrears were equal to 3.2% of the pool balance as of
March 2013, down from 10.1% as of March 2012, however these do
not include 180+ days past due loans and bad loans (sofferenze)
which are classified as defaulted and account for about 9.4% and
14.7% of the current pool balance respectively. However the
available performance reports are somewhat ambiguous with respect
to the proportion of non-performing loans in the portfolio. The
performing portfolio amounts to EUR360 million. Based on the
performing collateral the available credit enhancement for class
A, B and C is 57.9%, 49.9% and 11.9% respectively.

Cumulative defaulted loans as a percentage of the original pool
balance reached 16.1%, up from 13.2% as of March 2012. Recoveries
as a percentage of defaulted loans are equal to 40.2%, up from
37.6% in March 2012. The reported recovery rates are
significantly below estimated recoveries, given the low loan to
value ratios of the underlying mortgages. Fitch has taken this
into account in the analysis and has given reduced credit to
recoveries for non-performing loan collateral.

In terms of counterparty risk the servicer of this portfolio is
Unipol Banca S.p.A. which is unrated by Fitch. However payment
interruption risk is largely mitigated by a liquidity facility
agreement entered into between the issuer and The Royal Bank of
Scotland plc (RBS, 'A'/'F1'/Stable) pursuant to which RBS has
committed to make available for the issuer up to EUR63.8 million
in case of payment shortfall relating to interest due and payable
on the rated notes and other items payable in priority thereto by
the issuer.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier to the assets in the
pool would result in a downgrade of two to three notches for the
class C notes whereas for class A and B the impact would be
muted.

Applying a 0.75x recovery rate multiplier to the assets in the
pool would result in a downgrade of one to two notches for the
class C notes whereas for class A and B the impact would be once
again muted.

This transaction is a cash flow securitization of an initial
EUR1.4bn static pool of commercial mortgage loans granted to
Italian SMEs, residential mortgage loans granted to consumer
households in Italy and unsecured loans granted to Italian local
public entities. All these loans were originated and are serviced
by Unipol Banca S.p.A. Atlante Finance S.r.l. is a limited
liability special purpose vehicle incorporated under the laws of
Italy.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


HOUSING FINANCE: Restructuring Needed to Prevent Losses, IMF Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that the
International Monetary Fund said Iceland's government should
restructure Housing Finance Fund to protect the country against
potential losses.

The HFF's "mandate and institutional set-up need to be reviewed,
preferably by independent experts, to find a permanent and
financially viable solution," Bloomberg quotes the IMF as saying
in a report presented in Reykjavik on Friday.  The country's
Financial Supervisory Authority "should be closely involved,
starting with a review of capital adequacy."

Iceland's government is struggling to find a solution for the
HFF, which has about US$4.2 billion in bonds outstanding,
Bloomberg notes.  Landsbankinn hf said on June 12 that the lender
is striving to escape insolvency as its inflation-linked home
loans lose ground to regular mortgages sold by commercial banks,
Bloomberg relates.  Iceland's treasury may be on the hook for
more than ISK100 billion (US$830 million) from financial
difficulties at the country's biggest mortgage provider,
Bloomberg recounts.

"We would recommend conducting a comprehensive review of how to
find an economic and financially viable solution to HFF,"
Bloomberg quotes Daria Zakharova, IMF mission chief to Iceland,
as saying in an interview on Friday.  "That would involve looking
at the role of the HFF.  Going forward, should it be involved in
commercial mortgages or should its role maybe be narrowed to
helping with social housing issues?"

Housing Finance Fund is a state-backed mortgage provider.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC PROGRAM: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered the rating on the
class D notes in E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2007-III (E-
MAC 2007-III).  At the same time, S&P is affirming the ratings on
the class A1, A2, B, C, and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's performance review, its credit
and cash flow analysis using the most recent information received
from the servicer, and the application of its Dutch residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria.

Total delinquencies in this transaction have been rising for the
past year and currently stand at 1.68%.  This mirrors the
deteriorating performance of the E-MAC transactions, in which 90+
days delinquencies are higher than those in S&P's Dutch RMBS
index.  The reserve fund in this transaction is at its required
amount and is currently amortizing.

A key factor in S&P's analysis is the decline in Dutch house
prices, which in its view has been most significant over the past
nine months.  S&P's calculations show that the weighted-average
indexed loan-to-value (LTV) ratio has increased since S&P's
previous full credit and cash flow review in October 2011.

S&P has incorporated the Dutch house price decline into its
analysis, which has consequently increased its weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and weighted-average loss severity
(WALS) assumptions in this transaction.

Rating    WAFF (%)     WALS (%)
AAA       16.87        42.15
AA        13.18        38.63
A          9.37        33.55
BBB        6.01        30.33
BB         4.20        25.04

Since S&P's previous review in October 2011, the available credit
enhancement for all classes of notes has increased.  The reserve
fund is currently at its required level of 0.3% of the current
balance.  Delinquencies of more than 90 days have increased by
0.40% to 1.07%.

E-MAC 2007-III's class A1, A2, and B notes have sufficient credit
enhancement to pass S&P's cash flow stress tests above their
current rating levels.  However, S&P's ratings on these classes
of notes are constrained by its long-term issuer credit rating
(ICR) on Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A.
(Rabobank Nederland), the guaranteed investment contract and
liquidity facility provider.  The ratings are also constrained by
S&P's long-term ICR on Credit Suisse AG, the currency and
interest rate swap provider.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AA-
(sf)' ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P has also affirmed its 'A (sf)' rating on the class C notes
and its 'CCC (sf)' rating on the class E notes, based on the
results of its cash flow analysis.  At the same time, S&P lowered
its ratings on the class D notes to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)'.
The level of credit enhancement available to this class has not
increased sufficiently to offset S&P's increased WAFF and WALS
assumptions.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

E-MAC Program B.V. Compartment NL 2007-III
EUR243 Million And US$415.6 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate
Notes

Ratings Affirmed
Class               Rating
A1                  AA- (sf)
A2                  AA- (sf)
B                   AA- (sf)
C                   A (sf)
E                   CCC (sf)

Rating Lowered
                          Rating
                    To             From
D                   BB- (sf)        BB (sf)


JUBILEE CDO III: Moody's Affirms 'Caa2' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Jubilee CDO III B.V.:

EUR32M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Jubilee CDO III B.V.:

EUR43M (current balance is EUR 38.0M) Class A-2 Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 24,
2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR13M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3
(sf)

EUR6M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jul 22, 2011 Upgraded to Caa2
(sf)

Moody's has also withdrawn the ratings of the following notes
issued by Jubilee CDO III B.V. as they have redeemed in full:

EUR222M (current balance is EUR 0.0M) Class A-1 Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on May 27, 2011
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Jubilee CDO III B.V., issued in January 2004, is a Collateralized
Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high
yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by Alcentra
Limited. This transaction ended its reinvestment period on 20
April 2009.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from the amortization of the class A1 and A2
notes, which have been paid down by 100% and 12%, or EUR37.54
million and EUR5.02 million respectively, since the last rating
action in April 2012.

As a result of this deleveraging, the overcollateralization
ratios (or "OC ratios") have increased since the rating action in
April 2012. As of the latest trustee report dated 10 April 2013
(which does not reflect the amortization of classes A1 and A2
that is detailed in the same note valuation report), the Class A,
B, C and D OC ratios are reported at 213.15%, 128.87%, 111.03%
and 104.36% respectively, versus February 2012 levels of 167.74%,
120.04%, 107.61% and 102.70% respectively.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR103.8 million, defaulted par of EUR2.1 million, a weighted
average default probability of 27.49% with a weighted average
life of 3.25 years, a weighted average recovery rate upon default
of 43.90% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of
16 and a weighted average spread of 3.55%. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 82.6% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
15%. In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes:
Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing and
sovereign risks -- Approximately 38% of the portfolio are
European corporate rated B3 and below and maturing between 2014
and 2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
Approximately 6.49% of the portfolio are exposed to obligors
located in Spain and Ireland. Moody's considered a model run
where the base case WARF was increased to 5070 by forcing ratings
on 25% of such exposure to Ca. This run generated model outputs
that were within one notch from the base case results for classes
A2, B and C and three notches for class D.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Portfolio Amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Delevering may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the liquidation agent, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.

3) Moody's also notes that 51% of the collateral pool consists of
debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through
Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures to obligors
bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a stress
applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

4) Long-dated assets: Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio
includes a number of investments in securities that mature after
the maturity date of the notes. As of April 2013, reference
securities that mature after the maturity date of the notes
currently make up approximately 31.4% of the underlying reference
portfolio. These investments potentially expose the notes to
market risk in the event of liquidation at the time of the notes'
maturity.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in May 2013.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. Therefore,
Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

On March 12, 2013, Moody's released a report, which describes how
sovereign credit deterioration impacts structured finance
transactions and the rationale for introducing two new parameters
into its general analysis of such transactions. In the coming
months, Moody's will update its methodologies relating to multi-
country portfolios including the one for collateralized loan
obligations (CLOs) as well as for other types of collateralized
debt obligations (CDO), asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). Once those
methodologies are updated and implemented, the rating of the
notes affected by these rating actions may be negatively
affected.


POLYCONCEPT FINANCE: Moody's Rates US$395MM Sr. Facilities Ba3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba3 rating to
Polyconcept Finance B.V.'s proposed US$395 million in senior
secured first lien credit facilities. Moody's also affirmed the
company's Corporate Family Rating at B2 and Probability of
Default Rating at B2-PD. The outlook is stable.

Proceeds from the proposed first lien senior secured credit
facilities, coupled with additional proceeds from a proposed
US$125 million second lien senior secured term loan (unrated) and
available cash on hand, are expected to be used to refinance
existing debt (unrated) and to pay fees and expenses. Moody's
also withdrew ratings assigned to the previously proposed $540
million senior secured credit facilities that did not close.

The following ratings have been assigned, subject to review of
final documentation:

US$80 million senior secured first lien revolving credit facility
at Ba3 (LGD 3, 32%)

US$315 million senior secured first lien term loan at Ba3 (LGD 3,
32%)

Ratings affirmed:

Corporate Family Rating at B2

Probability of Default Rating at B2-PD

Ratings withdrawn:

US$100 million super-priority first lien revolving credit
facility at Ba2 (LGD 1, 4%)

US$440 million senior secured first lien term loan at B2 (LGD 4,
50%)

Ratings Rationale:

Polyconcept's B2 Corporate Family Rating reflects the company's
modest scale and earnings volatility due to cyclical and
fragmented industry characteristics and the highly discretionary
nature of its products. The rating is also constrained by the
company's high leverage of more than 6.0 times (including Moody's
standard accounting adjustments as well as Moody's treatment of
25% of the company's preferred stock as debt). The ratings also
reflect Moody's concerns with near term operating challenges
facing Polyconcept due to unfavorable economic headwinds in
Europe and execution risks associated with its business
transition. Positive rating consideration is given to the
company's leading market niche, diverse geographic presence,
customer base and broad product offering within the promotional
product category, and overall good margins.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that financial
leverage will remain high despite modest de-leveraging via free
cash flow. The outlook also reflects Moody's view that economic
headwinds and execution risks in Europe could hinder
Polyconcept's earnings growth despite the expected moderate
revenue growth in the coming year. The stable outlook also
reflects Moody's expectation that the company will maintain an
adequate liquidity profile.

A meaningful deterioration in revenue growth or operating margin
trends due to sustained lower demand for promotional products or
challenges from its business transition in Europe could exert
downward pressure on ratings. Credit metrics that could result in
a downgrade include debt/EBITDA levels remaining above 6.5x, or
EBITA/interest coverage falling below 1.5x. A weakened liquidity
profile could also affect ratings negatively.

A rating upgrade is unlikely in the near term given the cyclical
nature of the industry in which the company operates. Over the
longer term, ratings could be upgraded if Moody's comes to expect
strong, sustained revenue growth as well as improved margins.
Quantitatively, upgrade pressure would develop if debt/EBITDA
falls below 5x and EBITA/interest coverage can be sustained above
2.0x.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Consumer Durables published in October 2010. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Polyconcept Finance, BV, headquartered in the Netherlands,
designs, sources, distributes and decorates promotional products
through its main offices in the US, the Netherlands, France, Hong
Kong and China. With annual sales of over US$870 million, the
company supplies a wide range of promotional, lifestyle and gift
products to several hundred thousand companies ranging from small
enterprises to global corporations in over 100 countries with a
focus on Europe and North America.


POLYCONCEPT INVESTMENTS: S&P Rates US$315MM Sr. Term Loan 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned ratings to
Netherlands-based Polyconcept Finance B.V.'s proposed US$395
million first-lien senior secured credit facilities, composed of
an US$80 million revolving credit facility expiring 2018 and a
US$315 million senior secured term loan due 2019.  S&P rated the
proposed first-lien senior secured credit facilities 'B' (the
same as S&P's 'B' corporate credit rating on direct parent
Polyconcept Investments B.V.) with a recovery rating of '3',
indicating expectations for meaningful (50% to 70%) recovery for
lenders in the event of a payment default.  Polyconcept also
plans to issue a US$125 million second-lien senior secured term
loan, which will be unrated.  The company has indicated that it
will use the proceeds from the proposed debt issuance to repay
existing debt and pay transaction fees and expenses.  The ratings
are based on proposed terms and are subject to review upon
receipt of final documentation.

The 'B' corporate credit rating on Polyconcept Investments
reflects S&P's view that the company has a "vulnerable" business
risk profile and a "highly leveraged" financial risk profile.
Key credit factors in S&P's business risk profile assessment were
Polyconcept's narrow business focus in a highly competitive and
fragmented industry, and vulnerability to reduced discretionary
spending on promotional products in an economic downturn.  Other
key credit factors were Polyconcept's breadth of product
offerings, geographic and customer diversification, and scale as
one of the largest promotional products suppliers in North
America and Europe.

"Our view of Polyconcept's financial risk profile reflects our
estimate that credit measures following the transaction will be
in line with the ratios indicative of a highly leveraged
financial risk profile, which include adjusted leverage of more
than 5x and funds from operations (FFO) to total debt of less
than 12%.  Our adjusted credit measures include approximately
US$575 million in preference shares, which we treat as debt
according to our criteria.  We estimate that pro forma for the
proposed refinancing transaction, credit measures will be weak--
adjusted leverage for the 12 months ended March 31, 2013, will be
more than 10x (or close to 5x excluding debt treatment of
preference shares), and FFO to total debt will be less than 7%
(or about 14% excluding preference shares)," S&P said.

Rating List

Polyconcept Investments B.V.
Corporate credit rating                 B/Stable/--

New Ratings
Polyconcept Finance B.V.
Senior secured
  US$80 mil. revolver due 2018             B
   Recovery rating                       3
  US$315 mil. term loan due 2019           B
   Recovery rating                       3



===========
R U S S I A
===========


NOTA BANK: S&P Assigns 'B/B' Counterparty Ratings; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had assigned its
'B' long-term and 'B' short-term counterparty credit ratings to
Russia-based Nota Bank.  The outlook is stable.  At the same
time, S&P assigned an 'ruA-' Russia national scale rating to the
bank.

The ratings on Nota Bank reflect the 'bb' anchor for a bank
operating predominantly in Russia, and the bank's "moderate"
business position, "moderate" capital and earnings, "weak" risk
position, "average" funding and "average" liquidity, as S&P's
criteria define these terms.  The stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) is 'b'.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Nota Bank will
continue to gradually develop its commercial franchise while
generating sufficient earnings internally to maintain current
moderate levels of capitalization.

A positive rating action, although S&P considers it to be remote,
is possible if the bank stabilizes its growth rates while
maintaining better-than-average asset quality measures and
sufficient capitalization.  This would be evidence for S&P of a
lower risk appetite and stronger creditworthiness of borrowers.

S&P would consider a negative rating action if loan growth
outpaced earnings-generation capacities, which led to pressure on
Nota Bank's capital position and a RAC ratio below 5%.  Capital
pressure could also come from rising credit losses that would
reduce earnings power.


RED & BLACK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on three Russian RMBS
deals: Red & Black Prime Russia MBS No.1 Limited, Russian
Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A and Moscow Stars B.V.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Legal Uncertainty Risk For Moscow Stars

The class A notes' rating is constrained by a maximum six-notch
uplift above the originator's Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) according to Fitch's criteria addressing legal risks in
emerging market securitizations. On 16 April 2013, the originator
(CB Moskommertsbank, MKB) was downgraded to 'CCC'. As a result,
the class A notes are capped at 'BB'.

Performance Within Expectations

The affirmations and Stable Outlook reflect the transactions'
good performance, which is in line with Fitch's expectations.

Red&Black

Defaults are defined as loans in arrears by more than six months
and no defaults have been reported since January 2012. Cumulative
defaults stand at 2% of the initial balance. Loans in arrears by
more than three months (excluding defaults) are a low 1.1% of the
current balance. Excess spread has been sufficient for
provisioning and thus there has not been a reserve fund draw to
date.

Russian MBS

To date, no defaults have been reported, even though five loans
(0.9% of the current balance) are in arrears by more than six
months. Loans in arrears by more than three months stand at 1.3%
of the current balance. The current volatility of the proportion
of the portfolio in arrears is due to the small number of loans
remaining in the transaction. Excess spread has been sufficient
for provisioning and thus there has not been a reserve fund draw
to date.

Moscow Stars

To date, cumulative defaults are estimated at 9.2% of the
original pool balance, which is due to the more conservative
default definition compared with the other two transactions
(defined as loans in arrears by more than three months). Loans in
arrears by less than three months stand at 6.2% of current
balance, of which 5.4% of the current balance is in arrears by
less than one month. However, as the reserve fund is ranked
higher than the class C principal deficiency ledge (PDL) in the
waterfall, all excess spread has been trapped to replenish the
reserve fund while the class C PDL continues to build up as a
result of provisioning for defaults. Therefore, although the
class C PDL (US$3.6 million) reduces the credit support for the
notes, the reserve fund has increased by US$5.3 million, which
provides extra liquidity and subordination to the rated notes.

Sufficient Credit Enhancement (CE)

CE for all tranches of the three transactions has more than
doubled since closing. CE for the class A notes stands at 37%,
47% and 81% of Red&Black, Russian MBS, and Moscow Stars
respectively. The notes of Red&Black and Russian MBS are paying
principal on a pro-rata basis and will revert to a sequential
basis once the outstanding balance of the notes is below 10% of
the initial balance, leading to faster CE build-up for the rated
notes thereafter. Currently, the outstanding note balance is 21%
and 14% of initial note balance for Red&Black and Russian MBS,
respectively. For Moscow Stars, the notes are paying down
sequentially with no pro-rata trigger in place, which coupled
with ongoing replenishment of the reserve fund, should help
further build-up of CE.

Tail Risk For Russian MBS Mitigated

The current pool balance of Russian MBS is 13% of the initial
pool balance and so the transaction is entering its latter
stages, which leads to more volatile collateral performance and
higher credit risk. Fitch considers that CE for the rated notes
is sufficient to mitigate tail risk.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Ratings Cap

Red&Black and Russian MBS may maintain ratings up to one notch
above the Russian Federation's Country Ceiling (BBB+) because
their structures include off-shore liquidity facilities, which
cover at least six months of senior expenses and interest
payments, mitigating transfer and convertibility risk. The senior
note ratings are therefore sensitive to changes in the sovereign
rating.

The senior note ratings are capped at six notches above the
originators' Long-term IDR and are therefore sensitive to changes
in the creditworthiness of the originators.

The rating actions are as follows:

Red & Black Prime Russia MBS No.1 Limited

  Class A (ISIN: XS0294882823): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class B (ISIN: XS0294883987): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class C (ISIN: XS0294884282): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
  Stable

Russian Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A

  Class A (ISIN: XS0254447872): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class B (ISIN: XS0254451395): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class C (ISIN: XS0254451551): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
  Stable

Moscow Stars B.V.

  Class A (ISIN: XS0307297225): downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBB-
  sf'; Outlook Stable

  Class B (ISIN: XS0307297811): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
  Stable



=====================================
S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O
=====================================


KOMBINAT ALUMINIJUMA: Montenegro Gov't Files Bankruptcy Motion
--------------------------------------------------------------
Petar Komnenic at Reuters reports that the Montenegrin government
filed a court motion on Friday to consider bankruptcy for
Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica, which faces having its
electricity cut off over unpaid bills.

According to Reuters, the debt of the company, which is jointly
owned by the state and the Central European Aluminium Company of
Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska, amounts to some EUR350
million (US$467 million), equivalent to one tenth of gross
domestic product.

The company soaks up EUR3 million of state subsidies every month
and lost EUR16.2 million in the first quarter of the year,
Reuters discloses.

Reuters relates that court-appointed manager Veselin Perisic said
the motion, initiated by the finance ministry, foresees
bankruptcy management taking control of KAP cash flow, assets and
liabilities until the court rules on July 16 whether to declare
the company bankrupt.

"The bankruptcy management will also prevent unauthorized sale of
KAP assets and all potential mismanagement," Reuters quotes
Mr. Perisic as saying.

KAP's woes have left the country of 700,000 facing being cut off
from European power this week unless grid operator CGES pays for
the electricity it has been providing to KAP from a European
interconnector, under a ruling by the European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Electricity, Reuters notes.

CGES, as cited by Reuters, said it took power from the
interconnector to supply KAP after utility EPCG and state-run
Montenegro Bonus suspended supply to the company, citing unpaid
bills of more than EUR70 million.

CGES urged the government on Friday to secure payment of KAP's
bills, saying that otherwise it would shut off power to the plant
today, June 17, at 3:00 p.m., Reuters relates.

Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica is an aluminium plant.  The
company is Montenegro's single biggest industrial employer.  It
is jointly owned by the state and the Central European Aluminium
Company of Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska.



=========
S P A I N
=========


PYME BANCAJA: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on EUR28.8MM Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed PYME Bancaja 5, F.T.A.'s notes, as
follows:

EUR21.4m class A3 (ISIN ES0372259020): affirmed at 'AA-sf';
Outlook Negative

EUR62.7m class B (ISIN ES0372259038): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
Outlook Negative

EUR24.1m class C (ISIN ES0372259046): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
Recovery Estimate revised to RE 50%

EUR28.8m class D (ISIN ES0372259053): affirmed at 'Csf'; RE 0%

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation on the class A3 reflects a rating cap on Spanish
structured finance of 'AA-sf' and a Negative Outlook due to the
Outlook on the Kingdom of Spain ('BBB'/Negative/'F2').

The affirmation of the class B and C notes reflects the high
levels of credit enhancement (CE). CE has been increasing as a
result of deleveraging, which has offset deteriorating portfolio
performance. Current defaults are up to EUR23.3 million from
EUR20.8 million in June 2012 or 18.56% of the current balance. In
addition, the reserve fund declined to EUR6.9 million from EUR8.7
million at the previous review, below its required level of
EUR28.8 million.

The class C notes are approximately 50% supported by performing
collateral. Of the remaining collateral, the recovery would need
to be approximately 33% for the note to be paid in full. The
current weighted average recovery rate is approximately 38%.

The Negative Outlook for the class B notes reflects the notes'
vulnerability to rising obligor concentration in the portfolio.
The largest obligor currently accounts for 2.9% of the portfolio
balance, up from 2.4% in June 2012.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The agency incorporated two additional stress tests in their
analysis to determine the ratings' sensitivity. The first
addressed a reduction of recovery expectations, whereas the
second simulated an increased default probability. In both stress
tests, class A3's ratings are stable. However, in both scenarios
a rating action on classes B and C would be likely.

PYME Bancaja 5, F.T.A. (the issuer) is a static cash flow SME CLO
originated by Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, Castellon y Alicante
(Bancaja), now part of Bankia S.A. ('BBB'/Negative/'F2'). On
closing the issuer used the note proceeds to purchase a EUR1.15bn
portfolio of secured and unsecured loans granted to Spanish small
and medium enterprises and self-employed individuals.


SANTANDER EMPRESAS: Fitch Affirms 'C' Rating on Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed FTA, Santander Empresas 3 as followed:

EUR216.3m class A2 (ISIN ES0337710018): affirmed at 'A+sf';
Outlook Stable

EUR92.3m class A3 (ISIN ES0337710026): affirmed at 'A+sf';
Outlook Stable

EUR39.7m class B (ISIN ES0337710034): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
Stable

EUR117.3m class C (ISIN ES0337710042): affirmed at 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable

EUR70m class D (ISIN ES0337710059): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
Negative

EUR45.5m class E (ISIN ES0337710067): affirmed at 'CCsf'; revised
RE to 0% from 20%

EUR45.5m class F (ISIN ES0337710075): affirmed at 'Csf'; RE0%

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the transaction reflects its stable
performance since the previous annual review in July 2012. Since
then, classes A2 and A3 were amortized by EUR117 million in
total, reducing their outstanding balance to 12% and 14.7% of
their initial notional, respectively. As a result credit
enhancement increased on the senior notes. For class A2 and A3 it
increased to 48.1% from 40.8% over the past year and for class B
to 41.3% from 35.8%.

However, natural amortization was not sufficient to set-off the
effects of the reduction of the reserve fund by EUR13 million
throughout the past year. As a consequence, credit enhancement on
notes D to F decreased. The reserve fund is currently underfunded
by roughly EUR38 million. The reduction of the reserve fund was
expected as delinquencies had increased prior to last year's
review and defaulted since then. Delinquencies have stabilized
again with arrears over 90 days representing 2.57% of the
portfolio and arrears over 180 days 2.11%.

The transaction is exposed to payment interruption risk should
the servicer Banco Santander S.A. ('BBB+'/Negative/'F2') default.
The underfunded reserve fund is not sufficient to mitigate the
impact of a disruption to the collection process and maintain
timely payments to the noteholders. Class A2, A3 and B are capped
to 'A+sf'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The agency has tested the transaction's sensitivity to an
increase of the default probability of loans by 25%, as well as a
decrease of recovery assumptions on collateral securing the loans
by 25%. In neither scenario would a rating action be triggered.


VIAJES MARSANS: Former Head Found Guilty in Suit Over Bankruptcy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sinikka Tarvainen at Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports that Gerardo
Diaz Ferran, the former head of Marsans, was on Friday found
guilty of leading his company to bankruptcy.

According to DPA, a Madrid court ordered Gerardo Diaz Ferran and
other former managers of the travel group Marsans to pay back
about EUR400 million (US$520 million).  The court also barred
Mr. Diaz Ferran from administering anyone else's property for 15
years, discloses.

Mr. Diaz Ferran is also under a separate investigation over
asset-stripping and money-laundering in the Marsans case, DPA
notes.  He has been in preventative custody since December, DPA
relates.

Mr. Diaz Ferran headed the employers' organization CEOE from 2007
to 2010, DPA recounts.

Viajes Marsans S.A. operates as a tour operator.  The company
arranges tours and holidays.  The company is based in Madrid,
Spain. Viajes Marsans S.A. operates as a subsidiary of Grupo
Marsans S.A.

In June 2010, a court in Madrid declared Spain's Viajes Marsans
S.A. insolvent, which has 550 travel agencies and EUR166.2
million (US$204 million) in annual revenue.  Judge Ana Maria
Gallego noted that a "situation of general suspension of payments
to creditors" was deduced from complaints filed by up to 21
different business groups, including Ricoh, Europcar, Avis, Mapa
Tours and H10 Hotels and a subsequent petition for bankruptcy
protection filed by Marsans.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


* BURSA TURKEY: Fitch Upgrades Long-Term Currency Ratings to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Metropolitan Municipality of Bursa's
Long-Term foreign and local currency ratings to 'BB' from 'BB-'
and National Long-Term rating to 'AA-(tur)' from 'A+(tur)'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term ratings are Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects a deficit reduction leading to a
stabilization of debt relative to current revenue, strong
budgetary performance and improving self-financing capacity on
capex. The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that Bursa will
be able to service its high indebtedness despite significant
exposure to foreign currency denominated debt.

Bursa's operating margin increased to 48% in 2012 from 43% a year
earlier. This was supported by strong growth of tax revenue by
18% in 2012 and the administration's control of growth of
expenditure. Fitch forecasts that strong operating margins will
continue to result in safe debt servicing capacity in 2013-2015.

The municipality had high direct debt at 132% of current revenue
at end-2012. However, a reduction of the deficit, strong growth
of revenue and local currency appreciation in 2012 noticeably
reduced Bursa's debt in relative terms from 146% of current
revenue in 2011. Bursa's deficit before debt movement improved to
7% of total revenue in 2012 from 56% in 2011. Moreover, strong
operating performance results in safe debt coverage ratios.

Bursa's external debt represented 49% of direct risk at end-2012
and amounted to TRY447 million obtained from international
financial institutions. It is guaranteed by the National
Treasury. However, the debt exposes Bursa to significant unhedged
foreign currency risk. Depreciation of the Turkish lira in 2008
and 2011 had considerable adverse effects on the budget.

Turkish metropolitan administrations have high capital
expenditure responsibilities, primarily in transport
infrastructure. Bursa's capex peaked in 2011 at 53% of total
expenditure. However, capex declined to 45% of total expenditure
in 2012, strengthening Bursa's self-funding capacity. Current
balance could cover 65% of capex in 2012, up from 37% in 2011.
Fitch expects Bursa's capex to stabilize at about 40% of total
expenditure in 2013-2015.

Bursa's public sector consists of five entities contributing to
Bursa's TRY194 million indirect risk at end-2012. Most of the
debt (83%) relates to the provider of water services. The public
sector debt is self-supporting. Similar to other large
metropolitan areas, Bursa supports its public sector with regular
operating and capital transfers.

Bursa is the fourth-largest contributor to national GDP with a
share of 4% and accounting for about 3% of the national
population in 2011. It has a fairly diversified economy that
provides a stable and dynamic tax base for the local budget.
Bursa is the center of the nation's automotive industry.
Continued diversification of the economy will further strengthen
the tax base.

Rating Sensitivities

Sustained strong budgetary performance and continued reduction of
debt would lead to an upgrade. Conversely, sharp increase of
external and domestic debt leading to pressure on debt coverage
ratios would lead to a downgrade.


* IZMIR TURKEY: Fitch Lifts LT Foreign Currency Rating From BB+
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Metropolitan Municipality of Izmir's
Long-Term foreign currency rating and Long-Term local currency
rating to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'. The agency also upgraded Izmir's
National Long-Term Rating to 'AA+(tur)' from 'AA(tur)'. The
Outlooks on the Long-Term Ratings are Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade reflects decreasing debt, strong budgetary
performance, robust local economy and improved self-financing
capacity on capex. It also reflects high capex needs, foreign
currency denominated debt and a loss-making municipal companies
and public entities.

The Stable Outlook reflects Izmir's strong economy which should
lead to continued dynamic tax growth and increasing revenue.
Despite a projected moderate increase in debt levels, Izmir's
forecast operating performance should enable the municipality to
maintain strong fiscal performance and sound debt coverage
ratios.

Izmir has a strong budgetary performance with operating margin
over 60% in 2012 leading to strong debt coverage ratios. One
year's operating balance was more than enough to repay all direct
risk in 2012. Fitch forecasts that strong operating margins will
continue to result in safe debt servicing capacity in 2013-2015.

Izmir has consistently demonstrated balanced or closed to
balanced budgets. Coupled with growing revenue, this resulted in
a decrease in direct risk to 43% of current revenue in 2012 from
over 200% in 2006. Fitch expects Izmir's direct risk to remain at
about 50% of current revenue in 2013-2015.

Izmir's external debt represented 36% of direct risk at end-2012
and amounted to EUR108m obtained from the European Investment
Bank. It is guaranteed by the National Treasury. However, this
debt exposes Izmir to unhedged foreign currency risk.

Turkish metropolitan administrations have high capital
expenditure responsibilities, primarily in transport
infrastructure. Izmir's five-year average capex accounted for
over 45% of total expenditure. However, Izmir's self-financing
capacity on capex is above its national and international peers.
Current balance could cover 112% of capex in 2012 and the figure
has not fallen below 75%. Fitch expects these ratios to remain
strong in 2013-2015.

Izmir has a compact public sector comprising 10 public companies.
However, the overall financial results of the municipal companies
and public entities are often negative and require regular
budgetary injections from Izmir. Their debt amounted to TRY441m
or 27% of operating revenue at end-2012.

Izmir has a well-diversified and dynamic economy with wealth
indicators above the national average. It is an important
industrial and transportation hub located by the Aegean Sea.
Izmir contributed about 8% of GDP, 10% of national tax receipts
and accounted for 5% of the national population in 2011.

Rating Sensitivities

Continued reduction of direct and indirect debt along with an
upgrade of the sovereign would lead to a positive rating action.
Conversely, sharp growth of debt leading to deterioration of debt
coverage ratios and/or a sharp increase in foreign currency
exposure would cause a downgrade.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


INTERPIPE LTD: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukrainian-based Interpipe Limited's
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-'. The senior secured
rating on the company's 2017 Eurobonds (RR4) has also been
affirmed at 'B-'. The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Stable.

The affirmation reflects Interpipe's satisfactory 2012 results,
which were broadly in line with the agency's expectations,
although they underperformed the company's own base case. This
was due to a combination of a delay in commissioning of its new
1.3mt electric arc furnace (EAF), a lower than expected quota for
pipe sales into the Russian market, and higher working capital
needs. As a result, Fitch understands that Interpipe has recently
approached its lenders regarding an increase in permitted working
capital limits (the existing US$150 million limit having been
fully utilized), and the waiver of expected leverage covenant
breaches over the remainder of 2013.

Interpipe's large 2014 scheduled debt repayments remain a key
risk factor. Although the Outlook is Stable, we intend to
undertake a further review of the company in late-Q313, when we
will discuss with management its plan to deal with the 2014
repayments.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Debt Repayments
Mandatory debt repayments under the 2011 restructuring agreement
total US$206 million in 2013, and then ratchet up to US$307
million in 2014. Under Fitch's base rating case, the repayments
due in 2013 appear manageable with half understood to have been
paid in May, and the remainder expected to be met from a
combination of free cash flow (FCF) generation and remaining
balance sheet cash. Fitch's 2014 base case shows that the
scheduled repayments are achievable, albeit with limited room for
underperformance. However, the company's reduced overall debt
burden at that time (gross debt of 2.5x-3.0x) may permit other
options such as a debt rescheduling or refinancing beforehand.

EAF Commissioning
After a 12-month delay, minimum performance levels for the
company's new EAF were achieved in H113 with full output expected
from Q313. The EAF resolves the company's key historical
operational weakness, its lack of internal self-sufficiency in
steel billets. Once the EAF is in full production, Interpipe will
be largely self-sufficient in billets, but will continue to
externally purchase around 200,000 tonnes of hot rolled coil for
welded steel-pipe production.

Forecast Financial Performance
Fitch expects Interpipe to achieve mid-to high single digit
revenue growth in both 2013 and 2014. EBITDAR for 2013 expected
to be in the range of US$340 million-US$360 million, rising to
around US$440 million in 2014 as the EAF achieves full
production. Fitch expects the company to be moderately FCF
positive in 2013 rising to over US$150 million in 2014.

Restructuring Agreement
The restructuring agreements provide for a retranching of bank
debt. The US$200 million Eurobonds have been extended to August
2017, after the final maturity of the bank debt. All bank
debtholders and bondholders benefit from a general security
package including guarantees/sureties from key operating/trading
subsidiaries, and pledges of shares, major PPE items, intra-group
receivables, and a portion of inventory and off-take agreements.

Lenders under the SACE facility benefit from various first-
ranking pledges including over the equipment and shares of Steel
One, which owns the EAF. EAF noteholders have a second-ranking
pledge with other bank debt/bondholders having a third-ranking
pledge.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

-- The key driver of future rating action will be the company's
   ability to meet its debt repayment schedule, particularly in
   2014, when US$307 million of repayments are due. Adherence to
   the scheduled repayments, with the associated improvement in
   leverage and coverage ratios, could result in positive rating
   action.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- Underperformance of the company's business plan in 2013/14
   resulting in an inability to meet scheduled debt repayments.


TAVRIKA BANK: Law Firm Approves Quantitative Tender for Debts
-------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that Serhiy Kryzhanivsky, head of
Kryzhanivsky and Partners, said the law firm supports the holding
of a tender among Ukrainian banks to refinance the credit and
financial institution and buy Tavrika Bank's debts.

"Our law firm proposes the following way out of the difficult
situation regarding the liquidation of Tavrika Bank.  It implies
the holding of a quantitative tender among Ukrainian banks to
support the liquidity of the bank and buy its debts, which is in
line with Ukrainian law," Mr. Kryzhanivsky said at a press
conference at Interfax-Ukraine on Thursday.

Mr. Kryzhanivsky said that the bank had been artificially brought
to bankruptcy, Interfax-Ukraine notes.

On March 20, 2013, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) decided to
revoke the banking license and liquidate Bank Tavrika, Interfax-
Ukraine relates.

In April 2013, the liquidator of Tavrika Bank, Natalia Solovyova,
said that the number of individual depositors of Tavrika Bank at
the moment of the introduction of temporary administration was
38,000, and almost 1,900 of them had a deposit of over
UAH200,000, Interfax-Ukraine recounts.

Bank Tavrika was founded in 1991.  According to the National Bank
of Ukraine, as of January 1, 2013, in terms of total assets (UAH
2.653 billion), the bank ranked 60th among the 175 banks
operating in Ukraine.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CARLETON CREDIT: Doubtful Debts Prompt Insolvency
-------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Carleton Credit Union, which holds savings
of around GBP390,000, has gone bust.

However, all the savers in Carleton Credit Union will get their
money back under the government's Financial Services Compensation
Scheme, BBC discloses.

The last set of accounts for Carleton Credit Union showed that it
had made a GBP37,00 provision for doubtful debts, BBC notes.

Due to its small size, those doubtful debts were enough to tip
the credit union into insolvency, BBC says.

Country Armagh-based Carleton Credit Union has around 600
members.


CO-OP BANK: Expects to Unveil Capital Plans; Probe to Begin
-----------------------------------------------------------
Max Colchester, Margot Patrick and David Enrich at Dow Jones
Newswires report that Co-op Bank is expected to unveil plans to
fill its capital hole by imposing losses on bondholders and
selling loan portfolios.  Bondholders may be asked to tender
their debt for less than face value, or exchange it for new
instruments, Dow Jones discloses.

Co-op Bank, a mutually owned lender, emerged in recent years as a
leading challenger to the cloistered group of top British banks,
Dow Jones notes.  With support from politicians and regulators,
Co-op Bank was destined to get even bigger through the planned
purchase of 632 branches from Lloyds Banking Group PLC, Dow Jones
states.

Now it faces a capital hole estimated at GBP1.25 billion (US$1.96
billion), its credit rating has fallen to junk status, the Lloyds
deal has been abandoned and its chairman and chief executive have
announced their departures, Dow Jones  discloses.

According to Dow Jones, tomorrow, June 18, British lawmakers will
begin probing why Co-op Bank, which has close ties to the U.K.'s
Labour Party and was chaired by a Methodist minister with limited
banking experience, was selected to buy the Lloyds branches in a
government-approved deal.  Lawmakers will question Lloyds's
chairman and CEO about the deal, Dow Jones says.

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1.  The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.


EASTLEYS WEB: In Administration, Cuts 24 Jobs
---------------------------------------------
This is South Devon reports that administrators were called into
Recompense Ltd, which trades as Eastleys of Paignton and Brixham,
by a law finance company.

Some 24 staff were made redundant while the fight is on to save
20 others, according to This is South Devon.

David Wilson -- david.wilson@begbies-traynor.com -- , joint
administrator with Ian Walker -- ian.walker@begbies-traynor.com
--  from Begbies Traynor of Leeds, told This is South Devon in an
interview: "We were appointed by Law Finance to administrate
Recompense Ltd which has two offices.  They were owed a fairly
substantial sum.  I cannot disclose the exact figures at this
stage."

The report notes that Mr. Wilson said one part of the business,
dealing with personal injury and payment protection insurance,
had been sold, not to anybody locally.

"That has helped the situation . . . We are now looking for a
purchaser for the balance of the business, the private client
business, and until we find somebody we won't be able to make any
comment about the staffing situation.  We are trying our utmost
to preserve as many jobs as possible.  We are in discussions with
two or three people at the moment and would hope to reach a
conclusion as quickly as possible.  Anyone who takes over the
caseload, name and practice, offices and everything else would
need staff to run it," the report quoted Mr. Wilson as saying.

The report notes that law Finance Group provides legal funding to
lawyers and their clients.

The report relates that last summer Eastleys called in
administrators who sold the company's assets and business.  The
administrators at the time said the practice had liabilities of
around GBP3million.

The report says that the taxman was then one of the biggest
creditors, being owed around GBP825,000.  The final figures were
not known at that time.

The report discloses that the business and assets of Eastleys was
sold to Recompense, a limited liability company, of which the
directors were Matthew Roddan and Dr Irene Webb, who were also
the directors of Eastleys.


HIGHER EDUCATION: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on Two Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed The Higher Education Securitised
Investment No.1 plc (Thesis), a transaction backed by student
loans, as follows:

GBP29.4m Class A3 notes affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RR 40%

GBP7.9m Class A4 notes affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RR 40%

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects that the transaction's performance has
remained stable since the last review. The 'CCCsf' rating
reflects the uncertainty regarding the full repayment of the
class A3 and A4 notes, which in Fitch's opinion no longer benefit
from any sizeable margin of safety.

Fitch considers that the transaction has negative excess spread,
meaning that some principal collections are used to cover senior
expenses and interest on the accrual facility and the notes. This
is despite the receipt of certain transaction interest income
which is in excess of the yield expected on the portfolio, and
the origins of which have yet to be explained by the transaction
servicer and the cash manager. According to Fitch's calculations,
the transaction's excess spread for the April 2013 collection
period would be -0.36% of the qualifying portfolio per year if
the excess interest collections are taken into account, or -0.83%
if they are not. In the agency's view, the net redemption of the
accrual facility, which provides liquidity support to the
transaction, is due to the receipt of proceeds from loan
cancellations.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch estimates that the class A3 and A4 notes would be fully
repaid only if no more than 4% of the loans in deferment became
eligible for repayment and subsequently default, and if the
excess interest is accounted for. The Recovery Estimate of 40% is
consistent with Fitch's expectations in a scenario where the
excess interest falls away from the next payment date onwards.
The class A3 and A4 notes, which rank equally in the priority of
payments, currently benefit from credit enhancement of 10.3%.

The non-defaulted loan portfolio now comprises around 76.1%
deferred loans, 7.7% loans in repayment status without arrears,
and 16.2% loans in repayment status with arrears. The large
proportion of deferred loans does not in itself impair the
transaction, as the UK government is essentially committed to
compensate the issuer for any loan still outstanding 25 years
after origination, if not in arrears, at principal plus any
unpaid accrued interest. The subsidy paid by the UK government
ensures a net asset yield, after subsidy, of Libor one month plus
1.482% per year of the non-defaulted portfolio balance.

The impairment of the rated notes may arise from defaults on
loans in repayment status, or on loans currently on deferment and
moving to repayment status as a result of the borrower's
improving income. The current impairment of the junior, non-rated
notes in the transaction essentially comes from the cumulative
defaults of around GBP116 million to date, the equivalent of
11.3% of the closing portfolio balance.

Thesis is a securitization of floating-rate student loan
receivables, originated in the UK by the government-owned Student
Loan Company Limited, with a final legal maturity date on 30
April 2028.


INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-term IDR
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Provident Financial plc's (Provident)
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB' and International
Personal Finance plc's (IPF) Long-term IDR at 'BB+'. The Outlook
on both IDRs is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, SENIOR DEBT AND SUBORDINATED DEBT

Both Provident and IPF have proven track records in working with
non-standard borrowers in the home credit (HC) sector and
rigorously managing their significant credit and operational
risks. Both companies consistently generate strong pre-dividend
capital and maintain moderate (and in IPF's case, modest)
leverage. Revenues and impairment charges are high for both
companies, reflecting their business models, but the proportion
of impairment to revenues has remained relatively stable at both
companies.

IPF's ratings are pressured by the company's complete reliance
(albeit increasingly diversified in terms of maturity and
investors) on market funding. Both companies' ratings are also
restrained by their limited business diversification. However,
refinancing risk for both companies is somewhat mitigated by
being funded longer than they are lent.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs, SENIOR DEBT AND SUBORDINATED DEBT

As reflected by the Stable Outlooks, Fitch does not envisage
taking any positive or negative rating action in the short to
medium term on either company. Upside potential for the ratings
of both companies is limited. On the other hand, negative rating
action could be taken if their leverage increases significantly
or if their liquidity position deteriorates suddenly, or if they
face a greater refinancing risk because of weakened market
conditions. Negative rating pressure could also apply if arrears
increase significantly as a result of weakened credit controls or
a deterioration in the economic environments in which they
operate. Given the volatile nature of emerging markets, the
latter is a more significant risk for IPF.

Both companies continue to face significant regulatory risks
deriving from fairly frequent investigations into high-cost
credit. So far, neither company's business model has been
materially affected by additional regulations, although IPF
reported higher early settlement rebate (ESR) costs in 2012 and
Q113 following the implementation of the EU Consumer Credit
Directive in Poland and in the Czech Republic in 2011. The
continuing regulatory scrutiny of consumer credit acts as a
potential negative rating driver for both companies.

Senior debt ratings at both companies are driven by their Long-
term IDRs and are sensitive to any movement in them. Provident's
subordinated debt is notched once from its Long-term IDR and is
sensitive to any movement in it.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - PROVIDENT's IDR

Provident's Long-term IDR is boosted by its focus on the UK
market, which although mature, has allowed credit conditions to
be relatively stable. This results in minimal FX risk compared
with IPF but has also led to stagnant revenue growth in the HC
business as well as limited geographic diversification.

However, business diversification has increased following the
expansion of credit card lending through its subsidiary, Vanquis
Bank. Vanquis Bank has been growing fast and is generating a
large part of the company's profit growth. It focuses on a
slightly different customer segment than HC, as its customers
have more stable and verifiable income sources. This business can
be undertaken more remotely than HC, where weekly home visits are
necessary.

Vanquis Bank has also provided the group with funding
diversification, as its banking license means it is able to raise
deposits from retail customers. These have been growing quickly
and are becoming a material proportion of total drawn funding
(approximately one-third at end-Q113). However, Vanquis Bank
cannot provide funds to the parent and the HC business remains
reliant on wholesale funds. Refinancing risk has also reduced
following the extension of key bank facilities in 2012 and the
increase in available funding headroom (GBP319 million at end-
Q113), which should be sufficient to fund the planned growth to
end-2015.

Because of Vanquis Bank's banking license, the group is subject
to consolidated supervision and has to meet minimum capital
ratios.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - PROVIDENT's IDR

Fitch views that expansion into the credit card business has not
significantly raised the credit risk. However, negative rating
pressure would arise if there was a deterioration in credit
quality resulting from a relaxation of credit controls or higher
operational risk. Additional credit and operational risks could
stem from Vanquis Bank's expansion into Poland.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IPF's IDR

Fitch believes that credit, operational and FX risks are higher
at IPF than at Provident because of its presence in and exposure
to emerging markets. Its strategy includes expanding into new
markets, and possibly into new products, to help growth
generation. This leaves it open to greater operational and credit
risk until it establishes a long enough track record. The company
is fully reliant on market funding (IPF is not allowed to take
deposits). These risks, together with the overall risks facing
this industry cap the ratings firmly below investment grade.

However, the company's profits are strong thanks to fast growth
in receivables in its operating markets, and despite higher ESR
costs, and adverse FX movements in 2012. Its strong cash and
capital generation along with modest leverage provide some uplift
to the ratings. Fitch expects revenue growth and diversification
to continue as IPF expands into new markets (Bulgaria and
Lithuania) and develops new products in 2013, although it will
likely take several years for the benefits to become material.

Refinancing risk at IPF has reduced as during 2012, key bank
facilities were extended into 2015. Fitch's base case is that IPF
will continue to be able to issue in the markets in 2013. This
was tested with a GBP11 million Hungarian forint issue in January
2013 and a retail bond issue raising GBP70 million in May 2013.
Moreover, IPF had GBP159.5 million funding headroom at end-2012,
which in Fitch's view provides an additional cushion to fund
business expansion should wholesale markets become disrupted.

Dividend payouts are lower at IPF than at Provident, and a
greater proportion of internally generated capital is retained,
leading to more modest leverage than at Provident.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IPF's IDR

Upside potential to the IDRs is limited. The ratings could be
downgraded if there was an increase in leverage, significant
deterioration in the funding position, asset quality and
performance, or a threat to the business model due to regulatory
or competitive challenges.

The rating actions are:

Provident Financial plc:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Stable Outlook
Senior unsecured Long-term debt: affirmed at 'BBB';
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'

International Personal Finance plc:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+', Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'BB+'


JUST VANS: Barclays Bank Lost GBP2-Mil.+ After Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
News and Star reports that a bank official told a jury that it
lost more than GBP2.1 million when the Carlisle-based vehicle
hire firm Just Vans went into administration.

Janine Donnelly, from Barclays Bank, was giving evidence in the
trial of the hire firm's owner Richard Dixon, according to News
and Star.  Mr. Dixon of Longthwaite Farm Court, Warwick Bridge,
denies three counts of fraudulent trading between January 2006
and October 2008, the report relates.

The report notes that the jury has already heard how the collapse
of his Cotehill based business saddled banks with losses of
GBP4.5 million, allegedly because he sold 290 vehicles he had not
fully paid for.

The report discloses that in court, Mrs. Donnelly confirmed that
in total Barclays had advanced Just Vans GBP4.7 million but the
bank was ultimately left with a loss of GBP2.13 million after it
recovered some of the Just Vans vehicles which it still owned.

The report relays that Mrs. Donnelly said the terms of the
finance advanced to the business meant Just Vans could not
dispose of vehicles it had unless the finance on them was settled
with the bank.
Mrs. Donelly shares to News and Star news that she described a
schedule of Just Vans vehicles which included some which Barclays
officials believe Dixon sold without settling the finance on them
first, the report discloses.

The report notes that after the firm went into administration,
the bank appointed a firm to recover the vehicles it still owned
because finance was outstanding.  But some of the buyers were
able to claim protection under the Consumer Credit Act, the
report says.

The case continues.


RMAC SECURITIES: S&P Raises Rating on Class M2c Notes to BB-
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the
class M2c notes in RMAC Securities No. 1 PLC's series 2006-NS3
and affirmed its ratings on all the other classes of notes of
this series.  S&P also affirmed its ratings on all the classes of
notes in RMAC Securities No. 1's series 2006-NS2.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the March 2013 investor reports and loan-level data.  As with the
other RMAC transactions S&P rates, RMAC Securities No. 1 PLC's
series 2006-NS2 and 2006-NS3 transactions benefit from highly
seasoned assets and decreasing arrears.  The weighted-average
seasoning of the loans is 85 months in series 2006-NS2 and 80
months in series 2006-NS3.  Arrears over 90 days represent 15.10%
of the pool in series 2006-NS2 and 16.45% of the pool in series
2006-NS3, down from 21.42% and 20.65%, respectively, in December
2011.

S&P's current weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and
weighted-average loss severity (WALS) calculations have improved
for these transactions since its previous review on March 30,
2012.  These metrics have improved primarily because seasoning
has increased and arrears have declined.  The current WAFF and
WALS at each rating level for these transactions are listed
below.

RMAC Securities No. 1 PLC Series 2006-NS2

Rating         WAFF      WALS
level           (%)       (%)
AAA           44.57     37.51
AA            38.03     33.35
A             31.38     25.63
BBB           26.20     21.35
BB            21.34     18.30
B             18.91     15.49

RMAC Securities No. 1 PLC Series 2006-NS3

Rating         WAFF      WALS
level           (%)       (%)
AAA           47.59     42.13
AA            40.73     37.99
A             33.74     30.12
BBB           28.48     25.62
BB            23.25     22.36
B             20.72     19.32

Using S&P's WAFF and WALS calculations for RMAC Securities No.
1's series 2006-NS2 in its cash flow model, all the classes of
notes pass its cash flow stresses at their current rating levels.
S&P caps the ratings on the class A2a and A2c notes at the level
of the rating on the swap counterparty plus one notch.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its ratings on the class A2a and A2c notes.
The cash flow results indicate that despite the positive trends
in performance, there is still insufficient credit enhancement
for the other classes of notes in this series to pass stresses at
higher rating levels.  S&P has therefore affirmed its ratings on
the class M1a, M1c, M2a, M2c, and B1c notes.

The class M2c notes in series 2006-NS3 now pass 'BB-' cash flow
stresses and S&P has therefore raised its rating on this class of
notes.  The class A2a, M1a, M1c, and B1c notes pass cash flow
stresses at their current rating level.  Again, S&P caps the
rating on the class A2a notes at the level of the rating on the
counterparty plus one notch.  S&P has therefore affirmed its
rating on the class A2a notes.  The cash flow results indicates
that the credit enhancement available is not high enough for the
class M1a, M1c, and B1c notes to pass stresses at higher rating
levels.  S&P has therefore affirmed the ratings on all these note
classes.

The currency swap agreements do not meet the expectations laid
out in S&P's counterparty criteria.  However, the swap agreement
uses replacement language in line with S&P's previous
counterparty criteria.  Therefore, the highest potential rating
on the notes in this transaction is equal to the issuer credit
rating on the swap provider plus one notch.

                         CREDIT STABILITY

S&P's credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that it would expect at each rating level
over one- and three-year periods, under moderate stress
conditions, are in line with its credit stability criteria.

RMAC Securities No. 1 PLC's series 2006-NS3 and 2006-NS2 are U.K.
nonconforming RMBS transactions that closed in 2006.  Paratus AMC
Ltd. (formerly known as GMAC-RFC Ltd.) originated the loans.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class          Rating

RMAC Securities No.1 PLC
EUR365.9 Million, GBP317.2 Million, US$243 Million
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 2006-NS2

Ratings Affirmed

A2a           A+ (sf)
A2c           A+ (sf)
M1a           A+ (sf)
M1c           A+ (sf)
M2c           BBB- (sf)
B1a           B (sf)
B1c           B (sf)
B2a           B- (sf)

RMAC Securities No.1 PLC
EUR200 Million, GBP389.5 Million, US$421.6 Million
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 2006-NS3

Ratings Raised

M2c            BB- (sf)           B (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2a            AA- (sf)
M1a            BBB (sf)
M1c            BBB (sf)
B1c            B- (sf)


* LTVs and CCJs Drive Defaults for UK Non-Conforming Mortgages
--------------------------------------------------------------
High loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and County Court Judgments (CCJ)
are the primary default drivers for UK non-conforming mortgages,
says Moody's Investors Service in a Special Comment report
entitled "UK Non-Conforming Mortgages: LTV and County Court
Judgments are Key Drivers of Defaults."

While LTV has less impact in non-conforming loans than in prime,
it remains the key default driver. Remortgaging is a bigger
driver of default in the non-conforming sector than the prime
sector, while the opposite holds true for self-employment as a
default driver. Servicers surveyed are cautiously optimistic
regarding the performance of the non-conforming market in the
next 12 months.

"Servicers surveyed have not observed the emergence of any new
payment problem trends and are confident that repossessions
levels would not increase in the absence of large shocks to
unemployment and interest rates," say Emily Rombeau and Chen Xue,
two Moody's Associate Analysts and authors of the report. "Within
the next 12 months, we expect that repossessions across UK non-
conforming residential mortgage-backed securities will stabilize
at around 0.70% to 0.90%, below the 3.58% peak reached in
February 2009," add Ms. Rombeau and Ms. Xue.

In Moody's view, borrowers with a higher LTV are less able to
resolve payment problems by trading out of their property.
Currently, loans with an LTV higher than 80% have a repossession
rate 2.2 times greater than those with an LTV of less than 80%.
Moreover, Moody's believes that the performance difference
between borrowers with satisfied or live CCJ at the time of
origination and those with none will remain elevated as the
current unavailability of non-conforming products and tight
credit conditions in the prime sector significantly reduce their
ability to refinance as a result of their impaired credit status.

Moody's notes that, prime loans with LTVs above 80% have a
repossession rate 10.8 times greater than those with LTVs below
80%, while the same rate is only 2.2 times as high for non-
conforming loans. This discrepancy suggests that the
predictability of LTV as a default driver is muted as a result of
the increased presence of adverse characteristics in the non-
conforming sector, especially in very low LTV loans.

Remortgaging is a bigger driver of default in non-conforming
sector than the prime sector, with non-conforming remortgages
having a 1.4 times greater likelihood of being repossessed versus
purchase loans. Conversely, self-employment is a bigger driver of
repossession in the prime sector at 1.3 times versus 1.2 times
for non-conforming remortgages.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's: Looser Insurance Control Increases Risks for Creditors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The global increase in cases of regulatory forbearance in the
insurance industry exacerbates long-term risks for creditors,
says Moody's Investors Service in a new Special Comment published
entitled "Global Insurance: Increased Regulatory Forbearance
Poses Risks For Insurance Creditors."

While temporary relaxation of conservative regulatory
requirements is generally aimed at limiting market disruption, it
is a high-risk strategy that can be credit negative.

"Regulatory forbearance offers relief from short-term pressures
and creates time for insurance companies to adapt their
strategies to a challenging environment. In some cases, a
temporary relaxation of regulatory requirements that, with
hindsight, were conservative, can allow firms to continue trading
and re-build capital buffers. But forbearance can also increase
risk exposures and elevate risk appetite. Insurers might take
more risks than regulators would typically allow and/or delay
corrective action to shore up their financial positions in the
face of adverse market conditions," explains Simon Harris a
Managing Director in Moody's Financial Institutions Group.

Moody's says that the relaxation of regulatory standards can
encourage insurers to retain deteriorating assets or businesses.
In Europe, insurance regulatory forbearance -- in Italy,
Switzerland and the Netherlands for example -- has focused on
reducing pressure arising from falling asset values or
persistently low interest rates. These practices may encourage
insurers to retain, or even increase their exposure to assets
that ultimately incur losses, or delay de-risking initiatives to
reduce product guarantees or reliance on spread income. If the
affected companies fail to recover, creditors could experience
even greater losses than if the forbearance had not been
extended.

"We believe that frequent regulatory forbearance may reflect a
weakening of regulatory control. As regulators soften or by-pass
their own controls over capitalization, forbearance may undermine
investors' confidence, as solvency ratios become difficult to
understand and predict, causing customers and investors to feel
less protected," adds Nadine Abaza, a Moody's Associate Analyst
for European Insurance.

Regulatory forbearance does not affect Moody's assessment of
capital but typically signals credit weakness. Moody's evaluation
of insurers credit profiles is driven by the credit challenges
leading to regulatory forbearance, such as falling asset values
and weakened capitalization. In the rating agency's view, the
credit impact of any forbearance measures, to be evaluated case-
by-case, will vary depending on the economic environment, the
strength of existing regulatory frameworks, market conditions and
issuer specifics prevalent at that time.


* Moody's: High-Yield Bond May Issue for EMEA Sectors Top $60BB
---------------------------------------------------------------
With 13 new public ratings and US$11 billion of high-yield bond
issuance in May, the year-to-date issuance by speculative-grade
rated companies in EMEA has reached US$60 billion, says Moody's
in the June edition of its "High Yield Interest -- European
Edition" publication.

"This figure compares with the total of US$70 billion for the
whole of 2012, which was a record year," says Chetan Modi, head
of Moody's European leveraged finance team. "Although the pace of
issuance may now decrease in the near term given current market
turbulence, we still see a strong pipeline that is driven by
refinancing needs and the overriding trend of bank
disintermediation."

The June edition also reveals that Moody's EMEA speculative-grade
universe now exceeds 300 names, with the growth in the rated EMEA
speculative-grade market being led by LBOs that are mostly
refinancing loans with bonds.


* Moody's: Oversupply Keeps Shipping Industry Outlook at Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook for the global shipping industry will remain negative
over the next 12-18 months, as the supply of vessels will likely
continue to outstrip demand in most shipping services, says
Moody's Investors Service in its latest Industry Outlook on the
sector published entitled "Global Shipping Industry: Sustained
Oversupply Keeps Outlook Negative."

The global shipping industry's outlook has been negative since
July 2011.

"Substantial oversupply will constrain freight rates for at least
the next 18 months, particularly weighing on earnings in the dry-
bulk and crude oil tanker segments, while falling US crude oil
imports and declining European demand are likely to depress
seaborne deliveries," says Marco Vetulli, a Vice President -
Senior Credit Officer in Moody's Corporate Finance Group and
author of the report. "We expect aggregate EBITDA in the global
shipping industry to decline by around 5%-10% in 2013."

Shipping companies concentrated on the crude oil tanker segment
or focused on the dry-bulk sector, such as Navios Maritime
Holdings, Inc. (B2 negative), are more likely to be adversely
affected by these trends.

Moody's outlook for the product tanker segment is more favorable.
Companies, such as Sovcomflot JSC (Ba2 stable) and Navios
Maritime Acquisition Corp. (B3 stable), could continue to benefit
from demand growth linked to the shift in refining capacity to
Asia and the Middle East, leading to a slight improvement in
freight rates.

Moody's does not expect to see a major improvement in the
container segment's financial performance in 2013 as it is the
most sensitive to bunker fuel costs, which are likely to remain
high. However, the container segment has the potential to
outperform other shipping sectors this year if players maintain
market discipline through proactive fleet management, such as
laying up ships to reduce supply, and control costs.

Rated Japanese conglomerates -- Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha
(NYKK, Baa2 negative) and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. (MOL, Baa3
negative) -- are better positioned to ride out choppy conditions
because they have healthy liquidity, benefit from solid
relationships with banks and are part of large groups.

Shipping finance will remain tight with selective bank lending
continuing. In general, rated shipping companies have stronger
liquidity than the industry average, which should enhance their
ability to weather challenges posed by the weak operating
environment. The strongest operators may also have access to bond
financing.

Moody's could change its outlook to stable if it believes that
the supply-demand gap is likely to narrow over the coming 12-18
months, such that supply exceeds demand by no more than 2% or
demand exceeds supply by up to 2%. For the outlook to stabilize,
the industry's aggregate EBITDA growth would also need to be
within a range of -5 to +10%. Market prospects should improve in
2014 as the amount of oversupply declines. However, downside
risks remain high as the global economic recovery appears to have
lost momentum in recent months.


* Fitch: Deposit Set-Off Risk Remote for SF & CVB in EU Countries
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says strong political support for depositors makes
the risk of losses to structured finance and covered bond
investors from borrowers setting-off their loan payment
obligations against insured domestic bank deposits highly remote
in most EU countries.

Proposals for the development of deposit guarantee schemes (DGS)
and the move towards bank resolution regimes that protect insured
depositors are evidence of this continuing political commitment.
Even in the Cyprus bail-out, where an initial "stability levy" on
all deposits was proposed, deposits under EUR100,000 were
ultimately protected. As long as obligors are confident that they
will not ultimately face nominal losses of deposits, we would not
expect set-off to be invoked.

"If borrowers are confident of being reimbursed in full from a
DGS, we do not think the issue of set-off would arise. Nor do we
think that bank resolution regimes will bail-in insured
depositors, giving them a second line of support if a DGS was not
sufficiently liquid to meet depositors' claims on a timely basis.
Reflecting the political support for depositors, we recently
commented on the risks posed to banks' senior unsecured debt from
the resulting subordination," Fitch says.

"If a large bank fails, a DGS can be dependent on the ability and
willingness of the host sovereign to provide additional
liquidity. The example of Iceland, where the authorities
protected Landsbanki's domestic depositors but did not make
payments to depositors of the UK and Dutch Icesave branches,
supports our view that political support is stronger for domestic
than overseas deposits. In SF transactions and covered bond
programs, the depositor and deposit-taking bank are typically
domiciled in the same country. In addition, it is usually the
case that relatively few obligors have deposits of more than the
EUR100,000 insured limit that would not be covered by a DGS.

"Overall, while DGS and bank resolution cannot be assumed to
protect all depositors in all scenarios, and current political
thinking could change, we think any risk of set-off losses is
captured in scenarios up to the rating caps that apply to SF
transactions and covered bond programs in relation to sovereign-
related or liquidity gap and systemic risks. Due to the
remoteness of the risk, we will not expect to factor additional
loss in our rating analysis in most EU transactions and programs
in respect of potential borrower set-off of insured deposit
balances.

"Our analysis also takes into account country-specific and
transaction or program-specific provisions regarding set-off.
Even if bank deposits are ultimately lost, obligors would not
normally be automatically able to set them off against amounts
owed under loans that have been assigned to an SF deal or covered
bonds program, although these provisions are largely untested. In
many EU countries, laws relating to set-off are far from clear,
with little, if any, existing case law. So even if there was an
attempt to invoke set-off by borrowers, this would likely be
subject to protracted legal challenge -- a prospect which could
deter most borrowers from pursuing this route.

"We expect to publish a special report on this topic within the
next few weeks and are currently identifying whether this
analysis of EU insured deposit set-off risk will have any impact
upon existing ratings of SF notes or covered bonds. Where any
rating may be affected, we expect to indicate this via Rating
Watch Positive actions when the special report is published.

The principles of how we address set-off in our analysis for SF
transactions and covered bonds are reflected in our "Counterparty
Criteria for Structured Finance and Covered Bonds" at
www.fitchratings.com."


* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 10 to June 14, 2013
-----------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *