TCREUR_Public/130624.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, June 24, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 123

                            Headlines



B E L A R U S

* Moody's Affirms Deposit Ratings of Five Belarusian Banks


B U L G A R I A

CSKA SOFIA: Declares Insolvency; Seeks Merger with Another Club


G E R M A N Y

BRENNTAG AG: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Corp. Rating; Outlook Positive
CART 1: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC'


G R E E C E

FREESEAS INC: Receives Non-Compliance Notice From NASDAQ
* Moody's Notes Worsening Greek RMBS Performance in May 2013


I T A L Y

A-LEASING SPA: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR29.85MM C Notes to B1
BANCA MONTE: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Preferred Stock Rating


R U S S I A

IBA-MOSCOW: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to RUB3-Bil. Bond Issue
TATNEFT OAO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
* KRASNOYARSK REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Currency Ratings
* Fiscal Pressures Unlikely to Affect Ratings for Russian Regions


S P A I N

BBVA EMPRESAS 6: Moody's Confirms B3 Rating on EUR156MM C Notes
CASER SA: Moody's Cuts Insurance Financial Strength Rating to B1
CODERE SA: Creditors Agree to Extend Financing thru June 28
FTA SANTANDER 2007-1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
TDA CAM 10: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Note Classes to 'BB+'


S W E D E N

NORTHLAND RESOURCES: Distributes Reorganization Plan to Creditors
SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Spyker Mulls New Court Action v. GM Over Sale


U K R A I N E

METINVEST BV: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Unlikely to Claw Back Money From Former Head
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: DBRS Cuts Subordinated Debt Rating to 'CC'
COGGLES: Hut Group Buys Firm Out of Administration
COUNTYROUTE PLC: S&P Affirms 'B+' Sr. Secured Bank Loan Rating

DUNFERMLINE FC: Preferred Bidder to Be Identified This Week
EQUIDEBT: In Administration, Cuts 60 Jobs
HEARTS FC: Morisons And HBJ Gateley Lead Advice On Administration
NEW LOOK: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to GBP808MM Sr. Secured Notes
RBS CAPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on 3 Hybrid Instruments to 'BB+'

ROWERECORD ENGINEERING: Creditors Set to Lose GBP15 Million
VICTORY CHRISTIAN: Heads Into Receivership, Owes EUR18 Million


X X X X X X X X

* Euro-Zone Finance Ministers Agree on Bailout Fund Guidelines
* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 17 to June 21, 2013


                            *********


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B E L A R U S
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* Moody's Affirms Deposit Ratings of Five Belarusian Banks
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the deposits ratings of
five Belarusian banks: Belarusbank, Minsk Transit Bank, BPS-
Sberbank, Belinvestbank, and Belagroprombank. These banks' long-
term deposit ratings carry a negative outlook.

The affirmation of Belarusian banks' deposit ratings follows
Moody's affirmation of the B3 local-currency government bond
rating of Belarus as well as the B3 foreign-currency bond ceiling
and the Caa1 foreign-currency bank deposit ceiling on June 14,
2013.

Concurrently, Moody's has also affirmed the standalone bank
financial strength ratings (BFSRs) of Belarusbank, Minsk Transit
Bank, BPS-Sberbank, Belinvestbank, and downgraded
Belagroprombank's BFSR to E, equivalent to a baseline credit
assessment of caa1, from E+/b3.

Ratings Rationale:

These deposit rating affirmations, with negative outlooks,
reflect Moody's view that the current ratings sufficiently
capture the Belarusian banks' high vulnerability to the elevated
risks associated with their exposure to government debt and the
national economy. In Moody's opinion, the Belarusian economy
faces significant macroeconomic risks that could constrain
economic growth and destabilize government finances, with adverse
consequences for banks' credit profiles.

Moody's expects that the banks' asset quality will deteriorate
given (1) weaker exports and domestic economic activity, which
will negatively affect borrowers' credit standing; and (2) lower
subsidies to borrowers from the government, especially if
economic imbalances grow and external financing conditions
tighten.

Despite no immediate liquidity concerns for Belarusian banks,
their liquidity remains vulnerable due to a high share of long-
term investment loans funded with short-term deposits. The banks'
local-currency needs are typically addressed by borrowings from
the National Bank of Belarus and from other banks. However,
Moody's says that the banks' foreign-currency liquidity positions
are fragile, given the low level of FX liquid assets and because
depositor confidence in Belarus remains low, which continues to
pose the risk of deposit withdrawals. The negative outlook on the
banks' deposit ratings and standalone BFSRs of Belarusbank, Minsk
Transit Bank and BPS-Sberbank reflects these challenges.

Affirmation of standalone BFSRs of Belarusbank, BPS-Sberbank,
Minsk Transit Bank and Belinvestbank

The affirmation of the standalone BFSRs of Belarusbank, BPS-
Sberbank, Belinvestbank and Minsk Transit Bank, reflects Moody's
view that these ratings sufficiently capture the main credit
weaknesses of these institutions, including: (1) the high
sensitivity of their financial fundamentals to the continuing
vulnerability of the Belarus economy; (2) deficiencies in their
corporate governance practices; and (3) potentially vulnerable
asset quality and liquidity positions. At the same time, for
Belarusbank, BPS-Sberbank and Belinvestbank, their BFSRs are
supported by their market positions and ongoing funding and/or
capital governmental/parental support. For Minsk Transit Bank,
its BFSR is supported by its stronger liquidity profile and
profitability, relative to its peers.

Downgrade of Belagroprombank's Standalone BFSR

The lowering of Belagroprombank's standalone credit strength to
E/caa1 is driven by the bank's more vulnerable asset quality,
relative to its Belarusian peers. Over 60% of Belagroprombank's
loans are granted to the higher-risk agriculture sector or to the
companies related to agriculture.

At the same time, Belagroprombank's B3 long-term local-currency
deposit rating continues to incorporate a very high probability
of systemic support which results in one notch of uplift from the
bank's BCA of caa1. This support assumption takes into account
the bank's important role in the local banking system.

Bank ratings affected by the rating action:

Belarusbank:

- Long-term local-currency deposit rating affirmed at B3

- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating affirmed at Caa1

- Short-term foreign and local-currency deposit ratings affirmed
   at Not Prime

- BFSR affirmed at E+

All long-term ratings and the BFSR carry a negative outlook.

Belagroprombank:

- Long-term local-currency deposit rating affirmed at B3

- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating affirmed at Caa1

- Short-term foreign and local-currency deposit ratings affirmed
   at Not Prime

- BFSR downgraded to E

BFSR carries a stable outlook. All long-term ratings carry a
negative outlook.

Belinvestbank:

- Long-term local-currency deposit rating affirmed at B3

- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating affirmed at Caa1

- Short-term foreign and local-currency deposit ratings affirmed
   at Not Prime

- BFSR affirmed at E

BFSR carries a stable outlook. All long-term ratings carry a
negative outlook.

BPS-Sberbank:

- Long-term local-currency deposit rating affirmed at B1

- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating affirmed at Caa1

- Short-term foreign and local-currency deposit ratings affirmed
   at Not Prime

- BFSR affirmed at E+

All long-term ratings and the BFSR carry a negative outlook.

Minsk Transit Bank:

- Long-term local-currency deposit rating affirmed at B3

- Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating affirmed at Caa1

- Short-term foreign and local-currency deposit ratings affirmed
   at Not Prime

- BFSR affirmed at E+

All long-term ratings and the BFSR carry a negative outlook.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

All banks affected by the review are headquartered in Minsk,
Belarus:

- Belarusbank reported audited total (IFRS) assets of $13.5
   billion as of end-December 2012.

- Belagroprombank reported audited total (IFRS) assets of $6.6
   billion as of end-December 2012.

- BPS-Sberbank reported audited total (IFRS) assets of $3.7
   billion as of end-December 2012.

- Belinvestbank reported audited total (IFRS) assets of $2.1
   billion as of end-December 2012.

- Minsk Transit bank reported audited total (IFRS) assets of
   $381.8 million as of end-December 2012.



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B U L G A R I A
===============


CSKA SOFIA: Declares Insolvency; Seeks Merger with Another Club
---------------------------------------------------------------
Angel Krasimirov at Reuters reports that CSKA Sofia declared
bankruptcy on Saturday and will seek a merger with another club
to play in the top flight next season.

"CSKA that we know exists no more," Reuters quotes CSKA coach
Hristo Stoichkov as saying at a news conference.  "We'll start
afresh, without debts."

"CSKA must now find another team with which to merge in order to
use their license and remain in Bulgaria's first division."

Mr. Stoichkov, as cited by Reuters, said CSKA will not play in
next season's Europa League despite qualifying for the
competition by finishing third in the domestic table.

Speculation has been rife in local media that CSKA and four-times
champions Litex Lovech could merge to save costs with the two
clubs having discussed the possibility in January, Reuters
discloses.

However, CSKA will play in the amateur championship next season
if they fail to merge with another first division club in time
for the start of the Bulgarian league on July 20, Reuters notes.

The 31-times Bulgarian champions said in a statement that the
club has transferred their 6.5 million shares to Mr. Stoichkov,
Reuters relates.

"After talks with Hristo Stoichkov, we took a common decision to
transfer him all the club's shares," Reuters quotes Dimitar
Borisov, one of the club's owners, as saying.  "We, as owners
have absolutely no financial claims."

"As responsible people, we decided that Hristo Stoichkov will
take the decisions about the future of the club.  We took these
actions because of the grave financial situation of CSKA and our
inability to support the club."

CSKA have been struggling financially in recent years and have
just escaped a European ban by Europe's football governing body
UEFA over debts in the last two seasons, Reuters recounts.  The
Reds were barred from the Champions League in 2008-09 after
failing to meet the licensing criteria, Reuters relates.

CSKA Sofia is a Bulgarian football club.



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G E R M A N Y
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BRENNTAG AG: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Corp. Rating; Outlook Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive from stable the
outlook on all the ratings of Brenntag AG. The rating agency also
affirmed the Ba1 corporate family rating (CFR) and Ba1-PD
probability of default rating of the company. Concurrently,
Moody's has affirmed the Ba1 rating, with a loss given default
(LGD) assessment of LGD4 (50%), on the company's senior unsecured
guaranteed notes maturing in 2018.

"Our positive outlook on Brenntag's Ba1 ratings recognizes the
ability of Brenntag to maintain a stable financial performance
even under persisting weak general economic conditions in its
reference European markets, given its large scale and the breadth
of its geographic and product diversification, which underpin its
strong business profile," says Gianmarco Migliavacca, a Moody's
Vice President - Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Brenntag.
"The change in outlook also acknowledges the progress made by the
company in improving its credit metrics, and our expectation of
its ability to gradually achieve further improvements over time."

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects Moody's expectation that Brenntag
will, over time, be able to further improve its credit metrics,
which have remained broadly stable over the last 12 months and
already slightly improved compared to 2011 levels. In 2013,
Moody's expects that Brenntag will achieve low single-digit
revenue and EBITDA growth, mainly due to the expected full-year
positive impact of a number of small bolt-on acquisitions
completed in the second half of 2012 and early 2013. The rating
agency expects that this should offset the anticipated flat or
slightly negative organic growth in Brenntag's operations over
the coming quarters, particularly in Europe, which accounts for
nearly 47% of its consolidated revenues. Furthermore, the outlook
reflects Moody's expectation that the company will remain
committed to a prudent financial policy and conservatively funded
acquisition strategy. The rating agency expects that Brenntag
will continue to target small bolt-on acquisitions that would be
relatively easy to integrate within its existing network and
provide the company with further geographic and product
diversification opportunities.

Brenntag's ratings also positively reflect its (1) large scale as
a leading global chemical distributor; (2) its strong business
profile, characterized by material product and geographic
diversification, further enhanced by recent acquisitions; and (3)
the stability of its operating profitability over time, which
reflects the nature of an asset-light distribution business model
characterized by a structurally low fixed-cost base and high
inventory turnover. These factors mitigate the low operating
margins Brenntag is displaying, which are typical for the
distribution industry.

Liquidity

As of March 2013, Brenntag's good liquidity position was
supported by cash balances of EUR353 million and the company's
EUR500 million committed revolving credit facility (which is
virtually unused and remains available until July 2016). These
resources, together with the stable and positive funds from
operations that Moody's anticipates Brenntag will generate over
the next 12-18 months, should be more than adequate to cover the
company's main cash outflows. These outflows are represented by
dividends (approximately EUR127 million in Q2 2013), modest
maintenance capex in the region of EUR80-90 million per annum,
temporary working capital outflows, as well as modest scheduled
debt repayments in 2013. Brenntag's main single cash outflow in
2014 is related to the repayment of its EUR220 million
securitization facility due June 2014, under which nearly EUR180
million is currently drawn. However, Moody's anticipates that the
company will proactively manage this upcoming maturity in order
to retain substantial headroom to accommodate other likely cash
outflows related to the funding of small bolt-on acquisitions.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure could be exerted on Brenntag's rating if the
company were to continue to improve its leverage profile and
operate with a ratio of gross debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by
Moody's) that is sustainably below 3.0x, whilst increasing its
retained cash flow (RCF)/debt (as adjusted by Moody's)
sustainably above 20%. Moreover, to achieve a rating upgrade,
management would need to evidence a prudent financial policy
characterized by moderate size acquisitions with limited recourse
to additional debt.

Conversely, negative pressure could be exerted on the rating if
the group's gross debt/EBITDA ratio were to increase, and remain,
above 4.0x and its RCF/debt ratio were to fall below 15%. Any
deviation from the announced acquisition policy -- particularly
with regard to the avoidance of transformative debt-funded
acquisitions -- could also exert downward pressure on the rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Distribution & Supply Chain Services published in November 2011.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Brenntag is the world's largest independent chemical distributor,
with 2012 revenues of EUR9.7 billion. The group has market-
leading positions in Europe and in Latin America, a strong
presence in North America, where it ranks as the number three
player, and a meaningful presence in the highly fragmented Asia-
Pacific region. Brenntag, a former division of Stinnes AG, a
German logistics group, was sold to funds advised by Bain Capital
in an LBO in 2004, and in September 2006 to funds advised by BC
Partners in a secondary LBO. Following the IPO in 2010 on the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the private equity funds gradually
exited, and in 2012 the free float of the group became 100%.


CART 1: S&P Downgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on CART 1 Ltd.'s class
A+, A, B, C, and D notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its
rating on the class E notes.

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's updated
criteria for European collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
backed by small and midsize enterprises (SMEs), which S&P has
used as a starting point to perform its credit analysis.  S&P has
also assessed the transaction's performance using the March 2013
and May 2013 investor reports and portfolio data from the
servicer.

On Jan. 17, 2013, when S&P's updated European SME CLO criteria
became effective, it placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on the class A+, A, B, C, and D notes.

                       PERFORMANCE OVERVIEW

Since S&P's Nov. 4, 2011 review, the portfolio has continued to
replenish, in line with the conditions set out in the transaction
documents.  Total replenishments since closing amount to
EUR4.4 billion.  The reference portfolio may replenish until
June 2014.

The cumulative defaulted notional amount (defaults being defined
in the transaction documents as bankruptcy or failure to pay for
90 days or more), including interest, has risen to
EUR122.2 million from EUR94.4 million at S&P's last review.
Taking into account replenishments, cumulative defaults equal
about 2% of the initial and replenished portfolio amount.  At the
same time, the aggregate amount of outstanding defaulted loans,
which includes defaulted interest amounts, equals EUR43.9 million
(2.58% of the initial pool balance) compared with EUR34.6 million
at S&P's last review.

Furthermore, following the liquidation of two additional
defaulted obligations, the issuer has allocated further losses to
the unrated class F notes, which act as a first-loss piece (the
class with the lowest payment priority in the structure).  The
class F notes' allocable losses are EUR49.35 million, compared
with EUR33.63 million at S&P's last review.  As a result, the
available credit enhancement for the rated notes has decreased
compared with S&P's last review.

From the information provided to S&P by the servicer, it sees
that liquidation has occurred up to about two years after credit
events.  S&P anticipates that the issuer will allocate further
losses to the class F notes on future interest payment dates as
more defaulted loans complete their workout procedures.  In S&P's
analysis, ir took this expected loss allocation into account by
decreasing its credit enhancement assumptions.

Credit Enhancement

       Class        Credit enhancement (%)
         A+                10.2
         A                  9.7
         B                  6.6
         C                  5.5
         D                  3.1
         E                  0.2

In addition to the reference obligations currently undergoing
workout, the originator classifies EUR36.84 million, representing
2.24% of the total reference pool, as defaulted.  To date, these
reference obligations have not triggered a credit event (default)
under the transaction documents.  However, S&P believes they risk
triggering further credit events and incurring losses for the
transaction.  Therefore, S&P has considered them as defaulted in
its analysis.

The transaction has comparatively high obligor group
concentrations.  Concentration levels have remained largely
unchanged since S&P's last review with the top obligor group
accounting for about 3.6% of the portfolio balance, while the
largest 10 obligor groups account for about 21.7%.  S&P notes
that the transaction complies with the various obligor group
concentration limitations as set out in the transaction documents
at closing.

                         CREDIT ANALYSIS

As a result of the portfolio's comparatively high obligor group
concentration levels, S&P has determined the portfolio's scenario
default rates (SDRs) at all rating levels using its CDO Evaluator
model.  S&P based its SDR calculations on a weighted-average life
of 1.7 years, and a target portfolio rating of 'bb', which S&P
derived from three factors:

   -- A weighted-average Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
      (BICRA) score, calculated using the BICRA of each of the
      countries present in the portfolio;

   -- The five-year average observed default frequency of the
      originator's overall loan book; and

   -- The transaction portfolio's credit quality, considering the
      credit quality of the originator's overall loan book.

To derive S&P's loan-level rating inputs for its CDO Evaluator
model, it mapped--to a Standard & Poor's rating--the originator's
internal performing credit scores assigned to the various
obligors in the transaction's portfolio.  S&P did this to ensure
that the portfolio's weighted-average rating equals the
portfolio's target 'bb' rating.

     Rating level     Scenario default rate (%)
       BBB                    13.9
       BBB-                   12.5
       BB-                    10.0
       B-                      7.8
       CCC                     6.7
       CCC-                    6.2

                      RECOVERY RATE ANALYSIS

At each liability rating level, S&P assumed a weighted-average
recovery rate (WARR) by considering the asset type, its
seniority, and the country recovery grouping.

The portfolio includes both senior-secured and senior-unsecured
reference obligations.  Losses on defaulted reference obligations
include foregone interest, which is capped at 9.3% of the amount
of reference obligation liquidations.  S&P has taken these
factors into account in its analysis and has consequently
determined its recovery assumptions for the transaction at
various rating scenarios to be:

      Rating level         Recovery assumptions (%)

       BBB                      26.3
       BB                       32.4
       B/CCC                    35.1

S&P applied the recovery rates to the SDRs at each rating level
to calculate the scenario loss rates (SLR = SDR x [1 - recovery
rate]).

RATING-SPECIFIC SCENARIO LOSS RATES

      Assigned rating      Scenario loss rates (%)

       BBB                       10.2
       BBB-                       9.2
       BB-                        6.8
       B-                         5.1
       CCC                        4.3
       CCC-                       4.1

                        SUPPLEMENTAL TESTS

S&P applied the largest obligor default test to the class A+, A,
B, C, D, and E notes.  The application of the largest obligor
test did not constrain S&P's ratings on the class A+, A, B, C, D
and E notes.

The class A+ and A notes' credit enhancement is commensurate with
'BBB (sf)' and 'BBB- (sf)' ratings, respectively.  S&P has
therefore lowered to 'BBB (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its rating on the class A+ notes.  At the
same time, S&P has lowered to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on the class A
notes.

According to S&P's analysis, the available credit enhancement for
the class B notes, taking into consideration the sensitivity of
this class to a marginal increase in its recovery rate
assumption, is sufficient in its view to support a 'BB- (sf)'
rating.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)'
and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on the class B
notes.

According to S&P's analysis, the class C notes' available credit
enhancement, is commensurate with a 'B- (sf)' rating.  S&P has
therefore lowered to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its rating on the class C notes.

The class D notes' available credit enhancement is sufficient to
sustain the default of the largest obligor group in the
portfolio. However, it is not sufficient to maintain its current
rating, when compared with the calculated default rate.  S&P has
therefore lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative S&P's rating on the class D notes.

The class E notes' available credit enhancement remains
sufficient to support its current rating, in S&P's view.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class E notes.

S&P has not subjected the transaction to its largest industry and
region default tests as none of the ratings on the notes fall
into a 'AAA' or 'AA' rating category.

CART 1 is a balance-sheet synthetic collateralized debt
obligation transaction that closed in June 2007.  The reference
portfolio includes loans, revolving credit facilities, and other
claims that Deutsche Bank AG or any of its subsidiaries or
affiliates originated and granted to predominately German SMEs
and larger companies.  Subordination is the only source of credit
enhancement for the rated notes, which redeem sequentially,
starting with a reduction of the unfunded senior portion.
Realized losses are allocated to the notes in reverse order of
seniority, starting with the unrated class F notes.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To               From

CART 1 Ltd.
EUR263.5 Million Floating-Rate Credit-Linked Notes

Ratings Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A+          BBB (sf)         A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A           BBB- (sf)        A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BB- (sf)         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
C           B- (sf)          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D           CCC (sf)         B+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

E           CCC- (sf)



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FREESEAS INC: Receives Non-Compliance Notice From NASDAQ
--------------------------------------------------------
FreeSeas Inc. received a letter from The NASDAQ Stock Market,
notifying the Company that for the last 30 consecutive business
days, the closing bid price of the Company's common stock has
been below US$1.00 per share, the minimum closing bid price
required by the continued listing requirements of NASDAQ set
forth in Listing Rule 5450(a)(1).

In accordance with Listing Rule 5810(c)(3)(A), the Company has
180 calendar days, or until Dec. 16, 2013, to regain compliance
with the Rule.  To regain compliance, the closing bid price of
the Company's common stock must be at least US$1.00 per share for
a minimum of 10 consecutive business days during the Compliance
Period.  The NASDAQ notification has no effect at this time on
the listing of the Company's common stock on the NASDAQ Capital
Market.

If the Company does not regain compliance by Dec. 16, 2013,
NASDAQ will provide written notification to the Company that its
common stock may be delisted.  The Company may, however, be
eligible for an additional grace period of 180 calendar days if
it satisfies the continued listing requirement for market value
of publicly held shares and all other initial listing standards
(with the exception of the Bid Price Rule) for listing on the
NASDAQ Capital Market, and submits a timely notification to
NASDAQ of its intention to cure the deficiency during the second
compliance period, by effecting a reverse stock split of the
shares of its Common Stock, if necessary.  The Company may also
appeal NASDAQ's delisting determination to a NASDAQ Hearings
Panel.

There is no assurance as to the price at which the Company's
common stock will trade.  The Company intends to actively monitor
the bid price for its common stock during the Compliance Period,
and if the common stock continues to trade below the minimum bid
price required for continued listing, the Company's board of
directors will consider its options to regain compliance with the
continued listing requirements.

                        About FreeSeas Inc.

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as
Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands
on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding
company of ship-owning companies.  The management of FreeSeas'
vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands
company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's
Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal
shareholders.

The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one
Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities,
including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as
"major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel
products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks."  As of Oct.
12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational fleet is
approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its fleet is 15
years.

Freeseas disclosed a net loss of US$30.88 million in 2012, a net
loss of US$88.19 million in 2011, and a net loss of US$21.82
million in 2010.  The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2012,
showed US$114.35 million in total assets, US$106.55 million in
total liabilities and US$7.80 million in total shareholders'
equity.

RBSM LLP, in New York, issued a "going concern" qualification on
the consolidated financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31,
2012.  The independent auditors noted that the Company has
incurred recurring operating losses and has a working capital
deficiency.  In addition, the Company has failed to meet
scheduled payment obligations under its loan facilities and has
not complied with certain covenants included in its loan
agreements.  It has also failed to make required payments to
Deutsche Bank Nederland as agreed to in its Sept. 7, 2012,
amended and restated facility agreement and received notices of
default from First Business Bank.  Furthermore, the vast majority
of the Company's assets are considered to be highly illiquid and
if the Company were forced to liquidate, the amount realized by
the Company could be substantially lower that the carrying value
of these assets.  These conditions among others raise substantial
doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern.


* Moody's Notes Worsening Greek RMBS Performance in May 2013
------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the Greek residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) market continued to weaken during the three-
month period up to May 2013, according to the latest indices
published by Moody's Investors Service.

In May 2013, 90+ day delinquencies of Greek RMBS transactions
increased but remained in a narrow and low range between 1.2%-
2.8%, with the exception of one transaction. The weighted average
90+ day delinquency trend increased to 4.7% of the current
balance in May 2013, up from 3.6% in May 2012. In the same period
the 90+ day delinquencies of Estia Mortgage Finance II PLC, the
worst performer in the Greek RMBS market, rose to 8.8%, from
6.4%.

Similarly, the cumulative defaults transactions increased but
remained in a narrow and low range between 0.4%-1.4% of original
balance, with the exception of Estia Mortgage Finance II PLC,
which recorded 5.4% in May 2013. The weighted-average cumulative
default trend increased to 1.7% of the original balance in May
2013, from 1.1% in May 2012.

The continuing deterioration in performance is driven by the weak
economic environment and high unemployment levels in Greece.
While the reserve funds of four transactions are currently below
their target levels, no transactions have fully drawn their
reserve funds.

In May 2013, the current outstanding pool balance of Greek RMBS
transactions was EUR2.7 billion, compared with EUR3.0 billion in
May 2012, a 11% year-over-year decrease as a result of planned
amortization. In total, 11 Moody's-rated RMBS transactions
launched since 2004 have been included in the index. The number
of transactions has decreased over time and currently only seven
transactions remain outstanding.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


A-LEASING SPA: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR29.85MM C Notes to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of the Class A
and Class B notes and confirmed the ratings of the Class C notes,
in Pharma Finance 2 S.r.l. Sufficient levels of credit
enhancement, which protect against sovereign and counterparty
risk, primarily drove the rating actions.

At the same time, Moody's affirmed the ratings of the Class A
notes and downgraded the ratings of the Class B and the Class C
notes in A-Leasing Finance S.r.l. Insufficient credit enhancement
to address sovereign risk and exposure to counterparty risk has
prompted these negative rating actions.

Both transactions are Italian asset-backed securities (ABS)
transaction backed by lease installments. In addition, Pharma
Finance 2 is backed by a small portion of loans. The installments
in Pharma Finance 2 were originated by Comifin S.p.A. (unrated)
and extended to Italian pharmacists only whereas the installments
in A-Leasing Finance were originated by A-Leasing S.p.A.
(unrated) and extended to borrowers in different industries.
these rating actions conclude the reviews for downgrade initiated
by Moody's on August 2, 2012 and March 13, 2013, respectively.

Ratings Rationale:

Pharma Finance 2

These rating actions on Pharma Finance 2 primarily reflect 1) the
availability of sufficient credit enhancement to address
sovereign and increased counterparty risk and 2) the good
performance of the deal, which is in line with Moody's
expectation. The current credit enhancement levels are 97.2% for
the Class A notes, 55.5% for Class B notes and 21.1% for the
Class C notes. Credit enhancement has built up to these levels as
a result of the deleveraging since the end of the revolving
period in May 2007, as evidenced by the low pool factor of 7.5%.

The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's modeling
assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration in
sovereign creditworthiness has had no negative effect on the
ratings in this transaction.

A-Leasing Finance

The rating actions on A-Leasing Finance primarily reflect 1) the
lack of sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and
increased counterparty risk and 2) the worse-than-expected
performance since its closing in June 2008. The current credit
enhancement levels are 64.9% for the Class A notes, 42.4% for
Class B notes and 20.2% for the Class C notes. In contrast to
Pharma Finance 2 the credit enhancement levels for the Class B
and the Class C notes in A-Leasing Finance are insufficient to
mitigate sovereign and counterparty risk which has resulted in
downgrades.

The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's modeling
assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration in
sovereign creditworthiness mainly lead to these rating actions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Italian country ceiling is A2, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Italian issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Italian receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determine the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions

Following Moody's update of its methodology, the rating agency
increased the CoV, which is a measure of volatility, in Pharma
Finance 2, to 150.5% from 74.0%. Together with the unchanged
assumptions on the mean default probability of 3.0% on current
pool balance and the recovery rate of 30.0%, this volatility
increase corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 20.0%.

Following Moody's update of its methodology, the rating agency
increased the CoV in A-Leasing Finance to 49.6% from 40.0%.
Together with the unchanged assumptions on the mean default
probability of 23.0% on current pool balance and the recovery
rate of 50.0%, this volatility increase corresponds to a
portfolio credit enhancement of 26.0%.

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
these transactions, which it updated on December 18, 2012.

Counterparty Exposure

The conclusion of Moody's rating reviews also takes into
consideration the counterparty exposure.

Comifin acts as servicer and Credit Agricole Corporate and
Investment Bank (A2/P-1) as swap counterparty and issuer account
bank in Pharma Finance 2. Collections are transferred monthly
from the collection account to the issuer account. The reserve
fund represents 21.1% of the current pool balance.

A-Leasing. acts as servicer, BNP Paribas S.A. (A2/P-1) as swap
counterparty and BNP Paribas Securities Services (A2-P-1) as
issuer account bank in A-Leasing Finance. Collections are
transferred to the issuer account every time there is an amount
higher than EUR50,000 in the collection account. The reserve fund
is fully depleted whereas the debt reserve account accounts for
4.2% of the current pool balance and is also held at BNP Paribas
Securities Services.

Moody's has incorporated into its analysis the potential default
of the servicer, which could expose the transactions to a
commingling loss on the collections and to a loss of the monies
held in the reserve account.

In addition, Moody's considered the potential effect of
originator insolvency on the recoveries in both transactions. If
the originator became insolvent, Moody's would expect recoveries
on defaulted lease contracts to be approximately 15%.

The rating agency also assessed the exposure to the swap
counterparties in both transactions, which does not have a
negative effect on the rating levels at this time.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse-normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of the occurrence of each default scenario and the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

When remodeling these transactions affected by this rating
action, Moody's adjusted some inputs to reflect the new approach.

Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating Multi-Pool Financial Lease-Backed Transactions in Italy",
published in June 2006, "Moody's Approach to Rating EMEA SME
Balance Sheet Securitisations", published in May 2013, and "The
Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published in March
2013.

The revised approach to incorporating country risk changes into
structured finance ratings forms part of the relevant asset class
methodologies, which Moody's updated and republished or
supplemented on March 11, 2013 ("Incorporating Sovereign Risk
into Multi-Pool Financial Lease-Backed Transactions in Italy"),
along with the publication of its Special Comment "Structured
Finance Transactions: Assessing the Impact of Sovereign Risk".

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: A-Leasing Finance S.r.l

EUR230.85M A Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR30.2M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 13,
2008 Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR29.85M C Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 13,
2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Pharma Finance 2 S.r.l.

EUR123.3M A Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2012
Downgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR8.2M B Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Nov 16, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR5.5M C Notes, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Aug 2,
2012 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


BANCA MONTE: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Preferred Stock Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena's
(MPS) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB', Short-term
IDR at 'F3', Support Rating (SR) at '2' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) at 'BBB'. The Outlook is Negative. At the same time Fitch
maintained MPS's Viability Rating (VR) at 'b' on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN).

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, SR, SRF AND SENIOR DEBT

MPS's Long-term IDR is at its SRF and therefore based on support
from the Italian authorities. The affirmations of the IDRs, SR
and SRF reflect Fitch's unchanged view that there is a high
probability that MPS would continue to receive support from the
Italian government given its systemic importance domestically.
MPS received EUR2.2 billion new capital from the government in
the form of hybrid instruments issued by the bank in Q113 in
addition to EUR1.9 billion hybrid capital received from the
government in 2009.

The terms of the government hybrid instruments issued in Q113
include an option for the bank to convert the instruments into
common shares. This, and the possibility that coupon payments for
these new hybrid instruments under certain circumstances can be
paid in the form of MPS's shares, means that the state could
become a shareholder of the bank in the future, which underpins
Fitch's view of a high probability of continued support for
senior creditors.

The Negative Outlook on MPS's Long-term IDR mirrors the Negative
Outlook on Italy's 'BBB+' Long-term IDR and reflects Fitch's view
that MPS's SRF would most likely be revised downward if the
Italian sovereign was downgraded. A downward revision of the SRF
would result in a downgrade of the bank's Long-term IDR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, SR, SRF AND SENIOR DEBT

MPS's IDRs, SR, SRF and senior debt ratings are sensitive to a
change in Fitch's assumptions about the availability of sovereign
support for the bank. A downgrade of Italy's sovereign rating
would likely result in a downward revision of the SRF, and
therefore a downgrade of the Long-term IDR, as it would indicate
a reduction in the authorities' ability to provide support.

The SRF and SR would also come under pressure if Fitch considered
that the propensity of the authorities to provide support to all
senior creditors had changed, which is not currently factored
into the agency's analysis. In particular, Fitch's view on
support is sensitive to developments within the regulatory and
legal framework, particularly emanating from the European
Commission with regard to bail-ins, centralized regulatory
oversight and adjustments to deposit insurance schemes.

Fitch currently expects that the Italian authorities will be able
to provide support to MPS, but the European Commission has not
yet granted its final approval for the provision of state aid,
which the bank has already received. MPS's SR and SRF would come
under pressure if changes or limitations in the provision of
state aid to MPS increased the risk of reduced government support
to all senior creditors, which Fitch currently does not factor
into MPS's SR and SRF.

Any downward revision of MPS's SRF would lead to a downgrade of
the bank's IDRs. In line with Fitch's criteria, the bank's Long-
term IDR is the higher of the VR and the SRF.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - VR

MPS's VR reflects the agency's opinion that although the
prospects for MPS's ongoing viability remain weak in a difficult
operating environment, the injection of hybrid capital from the
government has provided an additional buffer to absorb potential
future losses. The RWN on the VR reflects the fact that the state
aid provided to MPS has not yet been approved by the European
Commission, thus creating some uncertainty.

MPS's VR reflects Fitch's expectation that the bank's operating
performance will remain weak and that asset quality is likely to
deteriorate further as the Italian economy remains in recession.
The VR also reflects the credit and market risk the bank is
exposed to through its securities portfolio, which at end-2012
included EUR25.8bn Italian government bonds.

In Fitch's opinion, MPS faces challenges in implementing its
business plan, and a revised restructuring plan has been
submitted following the receipt of state aid for approval to the
European Commission. MPS's capitalization relies on government
hybrid capital, the cost of which is high, which will make
internal capital generation difficult.

MPS reported a EUR3.2 billion net loss for 2012, which included
the impact of EUR1.65 billion goodwill impairment and EUR3
billion loan impairment charges. For Q113, the bank made a EUR101
million net loss as loan impairment charges remained high, and
Fitch expects a weak operating performance for 2013. Asset
quality deteriorated further in Q113, and gross impaired loans at
end-March 2013 were equal to a high 18.8% of gross loans. The
bank has worked on improving cost efficiency, and 2012 and Q113
results confirmed that cost reduction efforts were ahead of plan.

MPS's end-2012 Fitch Core Capital (FCC)/weighted risks ratio,
which excludes EUR4.1 billion government hybrid capital, was weak
at 4.7%. The government hybrid capital, injected in part in 2009
and in part in Q113, is included in Fitch eligible capital (FEC).
The increase in government hybrid capital in Q113 strengthens the
bank's FEC/weighted risks ratio to an estimated 9.3% based on
end-2012 risk-weighted assets on a pro-forma basis. In Fitch's
opinion, this is still low given the high volume of unreserved
impaired loans, which at end-2012 were equal to 194% of the
bank's equity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - VR

The bank's VR factors in weak operating profitability and is
based on Fitch's expectation that pressure on profitability and
asset quality will persist, but that any operating loss that
could arise from continued asset quality deterioration or from
the bank's securities portfolio would be manageable with MPS's
current capitalization. Losses that would require an injection of
fresh capital to ensure the bank's viability would result in a
downgrade of the VR. An upgrade of the VR would require a
stabilization of the bank's performance and signs that the bank
can generate adequate operating profit and improve asset quality,
which Fitch believes will prove challenging.

Fitch will review the RWN once the final decision of the European
Commission's final decision regarding the state aid is reached.
An approval of state aid based on the bank's restructuring plan,
which Fitch believes is the most likely outcome, would likely
result in an affirmation of the VR and a removal of the RWN. If
the state aid is not approved or material changes to the proposed
restructuring plan are required, Fitch will review the potential
impact of the additional European Commission requirements on the
bank's viability.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID
SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by MPS are all
notched down from MPS's VR in accordance with Fitch's assessment
of each instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss
severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.

The ratings of the bank's Upper Tier 2 and Tier 1 instruments and
preferred securities reflects Fitch's opinion that these notes'
non-performance risk in the form of non-payment of coupon is high
in the coming years. The receipt of state aid means that in case
of reporting a net loss MPS will be obliged not to make coupon
payments where the terms of the instruments allow for non-
payment. The Upper Tier 2 notes are rated one notch above the
Tier 1 instruments to reflect the cumulative coupon on these
instruments, whereas coupon payments on Tier 1 instruments is
non-cumulative.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID
SECURITIES

The ratings of subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued
by MPS are sensitive to any change in MPS's VR and to changes in
Fitch's assumptions on the probability and severity of non-
performance of these notes. The RWN on the bank's Lower Tier 2
debt rating reflects the RWN on MPS's VR.

The rating actions are:

MPS:

-- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Negative
-- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
-- VR: 'b'; RWN maintained
-- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
-- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB'
-- Debt issuance programme (senior debt): affirmed at 'BBB'
-- Senior unsecured debt, including guaranteed notes: affirmed
    at 'BBB'
-- Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'B-'; RWN maintained
-- Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'CCC'
-- Preferred stock and Tier 1 notes: affirmed at 'CC'



===========
R U S S I A
===========


IBA-MOSCOW: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to RUB3-Bil. Bond Issue
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based IBA-Moscow's (IBAM) RUB3
billion bond issue a final 'BB' rating. The issue benefits from
recourse to IBAM's parent, International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA,
'BB'/Stable/'b-').

The bond has a 10.75% interest rate and a three-year tenor with
an early redemption option in December 2014. Should IBAM fail to
make an interest or principal payment under the terms of the
bond, bondholders will benefit from a put option, allowing them
to sell the bonds to IBA.

IBA's offer to purchase the bonds in case of a default by IBAM
represents an irrevocable undertaking and ranks equally with
IBA's other senior unsecured obligations, save those preferred
under Azerbaijan law. Under Azerbaijan law, retail depositors
rank ahead of other senior unsecured creditors. Retail deposits
accounted for 25% of IBA's total liabilities at end-2012,
according to the bank's unconsolidated statutory accounts.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES

The assignment of the final rating follows the completion of bond
placement, which was initially assigned an expected 'BB(EXP)'
rating.


TATNEFT OAO: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed OAO Tatneft's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BB+'. The Outlook is Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

Relatively Small Scale, Lack of Diversification

With the daily output of 0.51m barrels of oil equivalent (boe),
Tatneft is a small- to medium-sized oil company. The company's
major assets are located in the Republic of Tatarstan, Russia
(BBB-/Stable). The company's largest deposit Romashkinskoye
provides up to 60% of the total crude oil output.

Comfortably Long Reserve Life

As of January 2013 the company had 6.2bn bbl of crude oil and
condensate reserves which provide 33 years of reserve life with
2012 output of 187.4m bbl - the longest amongst Russian peers.
However, oil reserves are mature, which results in higher lifting
costs compared with Russian peers. In 2012, the company reported
average lifting costs of RUB220 per 1 bbl (+9.5% yoy).

Full Utilization of Taneco Refinery in 2012

In December 2011, the company commissioned the Taneco refinery
plant with an annual capacity of 7mmt. It was fully utilized in
2012 with 6.9mmt of refined products output. Up to 30% of the
company's crude oil is currently refined in Taneco.

The change of the company's sales structure in favor of refined
products and domestic market lowered the relative amount of
export duties to 29.1% of gross revenue in 2012 compared with
32.2% in 2011. As a result, the company improved its EBITDAR per
1 bbl of crude oil output in 2012 by 16% yoy to RUB653 from
RUB565 in 2011. Fitch views positively the change in the
company's business model due to the commissioning of Taneco.

Conservative Capital Structure

The company has a conservative capital structure with funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage of 0.68x at end-2012.
Fitch expects Tatneft to show positive free cash flow in 2013-
2014, which will contribute to further deleveraging to 0.5x by
end-2013 and to 0.2x by end-2014. Fitch's base case expectations
do not include Tatneft's possible investments in the doubling
Taneco's capacity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- FFO adjusted gross leverage sustainably below 1.0x
- FFO interest coverage above 10.0x
- Ability to maintain stable crude oil output

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- FFO adjusted gross leverage sustainably above 2.0x
- FFO interest coverage below 10.0x

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

-- Foreign currency Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Stable
    Outlook

-- Foreign currency Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'


* KRASNOYARSK REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Currency Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Krasnoyarsk Region's Long-
term foreign and local currency ratings at 'BB+'. The agency has
also affirmed the region's National Long-term rating at 'AA(rus)'
and Short-term foreign currency rating at 'B'. The Outlook on the
Long-term ratings is Positive.

The rating action also affects Krasnoyarsk Region's two
outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds of RUB22.3 billion.

Key Rating Drivers

The ratings reflect the region's satisfactory budgetary
performance, its good liquidity and moderate debt. They also take
into account the concentrated tax base and exposure of the
region's economy to business cycles in the primary sectors. The
Positive Outlook reflects the region's ability to withstand
temporary deterioration of budgetary performance and expected
improvement in budgetary performance.

Fitch expects Krasnoyarsk to post a slightly improved budgetary
performance in 2013-2015 with margins restoring to about 11%-15%.
The region's operating balance decreased to 7% of operating
revenue in 2012 (2011: 16.6%). Changes in the fiscal regime
enacted in 2012 led to reduced profits and stagnation of the
region's tax revenue, while its opex increased. The region's
deficit before debt variation widened to 16.6% of total revenue
in 2012 (2011: 2.5%).

Taxation represented 85.9% of Krasnoyarsk region's operating
revenue in 2012 (2011: 85.5%). The region's tax base remains
concentrated as the 10 largest taxpayers accounted for 48% of
proceeds in 2012 (2011: 56%). The local economy's exposure to
fiscal changes and/or volatile business cycles in the primary
sectors is likely to remain in the medium term.

Fitch expects the region's economy to expand at about 3%-4% in
2013-2015. Economic growth in the region is underpinned by
development of natural resources and non-ferrous metallurgy. The
region's strong industrial profile supports above the national
average wealth metrics.

Krasnoyarsk region funded sizeable capital outlays, amounting to
27% of total spending in 2012. The region's self-financing
capacity decreased with current balance and capital revenue
covering 48.6% of capex (2011: 91.1%). Fitch expects a gradual
improvement in the region's capex self-financing capacity in the
medium term, along with maintenance of capex at about 22%-25% of
total spending.

Fitch expects the region's direct risk to be at about 23% of
current revenue and about 2.4 years of current balance by end-
2013, and 24%-25% and about 2 years respectively, in the medium
term. Krasnoyarsk resorted to extra borrowing for capex financing
and its direct risk increased to RUB27.4 billion in 2012 (2011:
RUB14.1 billion). It was composed of 94.5% domestic bonds and
5.5% budget loans contracted from the federal government.

Fitch expects continued liquidation of cash accumulated by the
region in 2013-2015. Krasnoyarsk depleted part of its cash in
2012, reducing cash reserves to RUB17.6 billion (2011: RUB27.6
billion) to fund capex. The region deposits its access cash in
commercial banks, with earned interest revenue on deposits of
RUB0.7 billion in 2010-2011.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Stronger budgetary performance with double-digit margins
providing debt coverage ratios in line with the agency's
expectations would be positive for the ratings.


* Fiscal Pressures Unlikely to Affect Ratings for Russian Regions
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Although Russian regions will experience an increase in their
financial leverage in 2013, this is unlikely to have immediate
rating implications, says Moody's Investors Service in a new
Special Comment entitled "Russian Regions Face Growing Fiscal
Pressure."

Moody's expects that subdued tax growth driven by Russia's
economic deceleration and increasingly rigid expenditure profiles
will likely lead to growing financing deficits in 2013. This is
likely to force regions to moderately increase their net direct
and indirect debt to around 38% of total revenue on average from
32.4% in 2012.

Nevertheless, Moody's does not envisage any immediate credit
implications for most rated Russian regions in 2013 given that
(1) lengthening maturities on new loans from the local banks will
provide greater stability despite growing funding costs; (2) the
federal government has historically and will continue to provide
liquidity support; and (3) deficit and debt levels remain
consistent with current ratings.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BBVA EMPRESAS 6: Moody's Confirms B3 Rating on EUR156MM C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one notch the junior
tranche of BBVA Empresas 5 and upgraded by three to four notches
the ratings of the junior and mezzanine tranches of BBVA Empresas
3 and BBVA Empresas 6. At the same time, Moody's confirmed the
ratings of six tranches (rated from B3 (sf) to A3 (sf)) of BBVA
Empresas 3, BBVA Empresas 4, BBVA Empresas 5 and BBVA Empresas 6.
While increased counterparty risk and exposure to borrower
concentration triggered the downgrade of the junior tranche of
BBVA Empresas 5, sufficient credit enhancement, which protects
against sovereign and counterparty risk, primarily drove the
rating upgrades and confirmations.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated
by Moody's on July 2, 2012. The four transactions are Spanish
asset-backed securities transactions backed by loans to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS) that were originated by Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentina S.A (BBVA, Baa3/P-3).

Ratings Rationale:

This rating action primarily reflects the availability of
sufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign and increased
counterparty risk. The introduction of new adjustments to Moody's
modeling assumptions to account for the effect of deterioration
in sovereign creditworthiness has had no effect on the ratings of
six classes of notes in the four transactions. Furthermore, the
current level of credit enhancement available under the Class C
notes of BBVA Empresas 3 (63.5%) and under the Class B notes of
BBVA Empresas 6 (39.7%) in the form of reserve funds and/or
subordination is sufficient to support the following upgrades: to
Baa1 (sf) from Ba2 (sf) for the Class C notes of BBVA Empresas 3
and to Baa3 (sf) from Ba3 (sf) for the Class B notes of BBVA
Empresas 6.

While sovereign risk is largely mitigated by the high level of
credit enhancement (39.0%) as of March 2013, increased
counterparty risk and exposure to borrower concentration drove
the downgrade of the Class B notes of BBVA Empresas 5. As the
credit enhancement is entirely in the form of a reserve fund held
at BBVA, the Class B notes are strongly linked to BBVA's rating.
In addition, the exposure to the five biggest borrowers in the
transaction amounts currently to 15%, which could lead to large
losses should any of these borrowers default. As a result,
Moody's downgraded the Class B notes to Baa1 (sf) from A3 (sf).

The credit enhancement levels in BBVA Empresas 3 on March 25,
2013 were 126.7%, 84.6% and 63.5% for the Class A, B and C notes,
respectively. The cumulative defaults in the collateral pool adds
up to 5.5% of the initial pool balance as of April 2013.

The credit enhancement level in BBVA Empresas 4 on February 25,
2013 was 103.9%, which is entirely in the form of a reserve fund.
The cumulative default recorded in the collateral pool adds up to
3.0% of the initial pool balance as of the end of April 2013.

The credit enhancement levels in BBVA Empresas 5 on March 14,
2013 were 82.9%, and 39.0% respectively for the Class A and B
notes. The cumulative default recorded in the collateral pool
adds up to 0.8% of the initial pool balance as of mid-May 2013.

The credit enhancement levels in BBVA Empresas 6 on May 14, 2013
were 71.5%, 39.7% and 19.1% respectively for Class A, B and C
notes. There is limited cumulative default recorded in the
collateral pool as of mid-May 2013.

- Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling is A3, which is the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables.
The portfolio credit enhancement represents the required credit
enhancement under the senior tranche for it to achieve the
country ceiling. By lowering the maximum achievable rating, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Under the updated methodology incorporating sovereign risk on ABS
transactions, loss distribution volatility increases to capture
increased sovereign-related risks. Given the expected loss of a
portfolio and the shape of the loss distribution, the combination
of the highest achievable rating in a country for structured
finance and the applicable credit enhancement for this rating
uniquely determines the volatility of the portfolio distribution,
which the coefficient of variation (CoV) typically measures for
ABS transactions. A higher applicable credit enhancement for a
given rating ceiling or a lower rating ceiling with the same
applicable credit enhancement both translate into a higher CoV.

- Moody's Revises Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's maintained its default and recovery rate assumptions for
the transactions, which it updated on December 21, 2012.
According to the updated methodology, Moody's increased the CoV,
which is a measure of volatility.

For BBVA Empresas 3, Moody's current default assumption is 18.2%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 45%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 56.5% from
40.0%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, corresponded to a portfolio credit enhancement of
24.7%.

For BBVA Empresas 4, Moody's current default assumption is 17.1%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 45%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 60.3% from
48.5%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, corresponded to a portfolio credit enhancement of
24.6%.

For BBVA Empresas 5, Moody's current default assumption is 14.9%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 42.5%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 60.1%
from 42.6%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, corresponded to a portfolio credit enhancement of
21.5%.

For BBVA Empresas 6, Moody's current default assumption is 20.2%
of the current portfolio and the assumption for the fixed
recovery rate is 46.5%. Moody's has increased the CoV to 57.8%
from 40.1%, which, combined with the revised key collateral
assumptions, corresponded to a portfolio credit enhancement of
26.0%.

In addition, Moody's incorporated stress scenarios in its
analysis to cover for the fact that the pools in Empresas 5 and 6
are highly concentrated and that this concentration levels are
not embedded in its CoV and portfolio credit enhancement levels,
which assume a granular portfolio.

- Moody's Has Considered Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the increased exposure to commingling due to
weakened counterparty creditworthiness.

In the four transactions, BBVA acts as servicer and transfers
collections on the second business day following receipt to the
issuers' account held by BBVA. Moody's has incorporated into its
analysis the potential default of BBVA as servicer and issuer
account bank, which could expose the transaction to a loss of the
reserve fund as well as a three-month commingling loss.
Ultimately, the linkage to BBVA only negatively affects the Class
B notes in BBVA Empresas 5 because of the size of the reserve
fund.

The four transactions are also exposed to BBVA acting as swap
counterparty. As part of its analysis, Moody's took into account
the counterparty risk related to these swaps, which has no
negative impact on the ratings of the notes at this time.

- Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in its Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, Moody's has remodeled the
transactions and adjusted a number of inputs to reflect the new
approach.

Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitisations", published in May
2013 and "The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance
Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published
in March 2013.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 3, FTA

EUR2210M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR260M B Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR130M C Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18,
2011 Assigned Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 4, FTA

EUR1700M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 5, FTA

EUR975M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR275M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 6, FTA

EUR804M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR240M B Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR156M C Notes, Confirmed at B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


CASER SA: Moody's Cuts Insurance Financial Strength Rating to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Caser S.A.'s Insurance
Financial Strength Rating (IFSR) to B1 from Ba2. The rating
remains on review for further downgrade in line with the review
of the owner savings banks.

Rating Rationale

Caser has a meaningful indirect and direct exposure to Spanish
saving banks, namely through its ownership, its high reliance on
the saving banks' distribution network to sell insurance
products, and a significant exposure to saving banks' debts and
deposits. The downgrade reflects Moody's view of Caser's
increasing business alignment to its bank owners and distribution
partners combined with a gradual increase in the financial
connections between Caser and the banks. In Moody's view, the
ratings of Caser's main banking owners -- whose standalone credit
assessments are on average in the B range -- constrain Caser's
rating, driven by the increasing financial and operational
linkages between the banks and the insurer.

Moody's believes that Caser's results for 2012, as well as recent
developments in Q1 2013, indicate the increasing level of
financial and operating linkages between Caser and its owner
banks. Caser distributes largely through its owner banks and has
significant investment exposure to these banks, which weigh on
the company's asset quality and capitalization.

Regarding Caser's investment quality, a high proportion of the
investment exposure to its owner banks are in deposits and senior
debt. However, Caser reported substantial exposure to hybrid debt
in savings banks at EUR1,029 million at YE2012 (around 13% of
invested assets or 114% of shareholders' equity). A substantial
number of these hybrids are issued by banks who have received
capital support from the EU and have consequently suffered ,or
will suffer, sizeable losses.

These hybrids are largely associated to bancassurance agreements
in life savings business, which included a number of ad-hoc
contractual agreements in relation to guaranteed yield, liquidity
and funding. Nevertheless given some banks' restructuring
framework following the Memorandum of Understanding agreed
between Spain and the Eurogroup in July 2012, the associated
contractual agreements need to be reconsidered.

As a result of this, Caser made a 2012 loss after tax of around
EUR283 million mainly driven by ,inter-alia, impairments in
investments (pre-tax EUR395 million) as well as further
additional negative one-offs. Nevertheless, Moody's notes that
the ultimate loss in some Spanish savings banks' hybrid paper
continues to be uncertain given a) the substantial ownership of
the banks through the Spanish government's Fund for Orderly Bank
Restructuring (FROB) and b) their unlisted status following the
distressed exchange and uncertainty over the ultimate loss on
conversion. As a result, Moody's expects that Caser is likely to
incur additional investment losses in 2013.

In addition, Caser's liquidity and leverage profile deteriorated
in 2012. The company experienced a substantial number of
surrenders in the liabilities associated to the aforementioned
hybrids as a result of certain contractual features. At YE2012,
Caser reported life net-outflows at EUR675 million and a circa 8%
decline in provisions. As of Q1 2013, Caser reported a 5%
increase in life premiums up to EUR387 million and a EUR214
million life net-outflow, equivalent to a decline of around 12%
in provisions. Caser expects an increase of surrenders by 18%
over 2013 in comparison to 2012, which will be met through a
combination of divestments in both investments and bancassurance
agreements, and lines of credit or other forms of funding
negotiated with parent banks. Furthermore, Moody's notes Caser's
substantial liquid assets in deposits and government debt should
help to mitigate potential further stresses on the company's
liquidity.

In Q1 2013, Caser has also taken a collaterized loan of EUR110
million with Bankia to help meet potential surrenders at a
relatively low interest rate (Euribor+90bps). In addition,
Moody's notes that Caser has increased operational leverage
levels in recent years, although still commensurate with the
rating level.

Moody's also believes that the ongoing restructuring and
consolidation of Spanish saving banks will weaken Caser's long-
term franchise, which will weigh on its profitability. Whilst
Caser has recently signed agreements in non-life with Ibercaja
and Liberbank, the company expects a decline in top line premiums
of 12% in 2013 due to the exit of agreements with Banca Civica
and Bankia.

Positively, Moody's expects the company's technical results to
continue to be a credit strength as evidenced by the good
combined ratios reported in recent years (five year-combined
ratio at 95% at YE 2012) and a low-risk business profile
predominantly orientated to retail non-life.

In addition, Caser's solvency position continues to be relatively
good at around 1.9x (solvency margin at EUR448 million), down
from around 2.2x (solvency margin at EUR596 million) due to the
sizeable investment losses. Caser also reported a positive impact
on the company's tangible capital by EUR250 million in Q1 2013
following the exit of agreements in Bankia and Banca Civica.
Nevertheless, the quality of capital remains weak in Moody's
opinion, with intangibles representing 68% of shareholder's
equity at YE2012.

Focus of The Review

Moody's review for Caser is in line with the review on most
Spanish savings banks, and will consider the potential for
further deterioration in Caser's capitalization, profitability or
franchise strength, in line with any further weakening in the
owner banks' stand-alone credit quality.

The following rating was downgraded and remains on review for
further downgrade:

Caser S.A.- insurance financial strength rating B1

Headquartered in Madrid, Spain, CASER is the ninth largest
insurance group in Spain, with a market share of approximately
3.5% at year-end 2012. It offers an extensive range of life, non-
life and pension products, distributing its products mostly
through Spanish savings banks. CASER reported consolidated gross
premiums written of circa EUR2,0 billion and Shareholders' Equity
(including minority interests and valuation reserves) of EUR906
million at year-end 2012.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Moody's says that an upgrade of the IFSRs is unlikely at the
moment given the review for downgrade.

Downwards pressure on the IFSR could develop following ii) a
downgrade in Spanish saving banks' baseline credit assessments
(i) material deterioration in capitalization following further
deterioration in Caser's investment quality beyond own estimates
and/or (iii) significant deterioration in the group's operating
performance with a combined ratio consistently above 100% and
returns on capital below 4%.

Methodologies Used

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Global Rating
Methodology for Life Insurers published in May 2010, and Moody's
Global Rating Methodology for Property and Casualty Insurers
published in May 2010.


CODERE SA: Creditors Agree to Extend Financing thru June 28
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jim Silver at Bloomberg News reports that Codere SA said in a
Spanish regulatory filing the company's creditors agreed to
extend senior facilities agreement to June 28, allowing for
completion of documents for previously announced financing
accord.

On June 13, Codere said the company agreed to a six-month
financing plan, with offer valid until June 21, subject to
completion of documentation, Bloomberg relates.

Codere SA is a Spain-based company engaged, together with its
subsidiaries, in the operation of activities related to the
private gaming sector, principally in the operation of arcade and
slot machines, sports betting houses, bingo halls, casinos and
racetracks.  The Company has presence in Spain, Italy, Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1 the
corporate family rating and from Caa1-PD to Caa2-PD the
probability of default rating of Codere S.A. Concurrently,
Moody's has downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2 the ratings on Codere
Finance (Luxembourg) S.A.'s EUR760 million worth of 8.25% senior
notes due 2015 and USD300 million worth of 9.25% senior notes due
2019. S&P said the outlook on all ratings is negative.


FTA SANTANDER 2007-1: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded FTA Santander Consumer Spain Auto
07-1's class D notes to 'Dsf' from 'CCsf' and subsequently
withdrawn the rating. The remaining notes have paid in full
(PIF).

FTA Santander 2007-1 was called on March 20, 2013 using proceeds
from the sale of the portfolio. The rating actions reflect the
final distribution of the portfolio sale proceeds to noteholders.

As a result of the portfolio sale, the class A, B and C notes
have been PIF as they received all interest and principal that
was owed to them upon the redemption. The uncollateralized class
D notes were paid off up to EUR20.8 million (EUR19.2 millio loss)
using the remaining proceeds from the depleted reserve fund.


TDA CAM 10: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Note Classes to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from
'AA- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit
ratings on TDA CAM 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class
A2, A3, and A4 notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its
'CCC- (sf)' rating on the class B notes and its 'D (sf)' ratings
on the class C and D
notes.

The transaction's performance has deteriorated since S&P's last
review on Feb. 8, 2012.

The level of 90+ days arrears has increased to 7.49% in March
2013, from 5.57% a year before.  In addition to this increase,
delinquencies have rolled over into defaults.  As a result, the
level of defaults over the outstanding balance of the assets is
6.37%, compared with 5.07% a year before.  S&P expects this
rollover into defaults to continue eroding the credit
enhancement, as all of the mechanisms put in place to protect the
senior notes have now been breached.  These notes are now
directly exposed to the portfolio's potential defaults.

The swap counterparty, Cecabank S.A. (BB+/Negative/B), has not
been replaced after breaching a rating trigger under the
transaction documents in April 2012.  The swap documents reflect
S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria and establish that upon the loss
of a 'BBB+' long-term issuer credit rating (ICR), the swap
counterparty should be replaced.

According to S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, it links its
ratings on the notes to its long-term ICR on the swap
counterparty as without the support of the swap, given the
assets' deteriorating performance, the notes would achieve lower
ratings. S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)'
and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class
A2, A3, and A4 notes.

At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'CCC- (sf)' rating on the
class B notes and its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C and D
notes.

TDA CAM 10 closed in December 2007 and securitizes residential
mortgage loans granted to individuals to purchase a property.
Banco CAM, which has merged with Banco de Sabadell S.A., is the
originator of the transaction.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an residential mortgage-backed security
as defined in the Rule, to include a description of the
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms available
to investors and a description of how they differ from the
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms in
issuances of similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope
securities initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or
after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                 Rating
            To                    From

TDA CAM 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.424 Billion Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          BB+ (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A3          BB+ (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A4          BB+ (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

B           CCC- (sf)
C           D (sf)
D           D (sf)



===========
S W E D E N
===========


NORTHLAND RESOURCES: Distributes Reorganization Plan to Creditors
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Northland Resources S.A. disclosed that the Reorganization Plan
regarding Northland Sweden AB, Northland Resources AB, Northland
Logistics AB, and Northland Logistics AS was set to be
distributed to all the creditors of the companies via mail on
June 19.

On June 19, the companies also filed a request for composition
proceedings to Lulea District Court.

The Reorganization Plan and the request for composition
proceedings are available at Northland's web site,
http://www.northland.eu

                       About Northland

Northland is a producer of iron ore concentrate, with a portfolio
of production, development and exploration mines and projects in
northern Sweden and Finland.  The first construction phase of the
Kaunisvaara project is complete and production ramp-up started in
November 2012.  The Company expects to produce high-grade, high-
quality magnetite iron concentrate in Kaunisvaara, Sweden, where
the Company expects to exploit two magnetite iron ore deposits,
Tapuli and Sahavaara.  Northland has entered into off-take
contracts with three partners for the entire production from the
Kaunisvaara project over the next seven to ten years.  The
Company is also preparing a Definitive Feasibility Study for its
Hannukainen Iron Oxide Copper Gold project in Kolari, northern
Finland and for the Pellivuoma deposit, which is located 15 km
from the Kaunisvaara processing plant.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 1,
2013, Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Caa3 corporate
family rating and bond rating of Northland Resources AB.
Concurrently, Moody's has applied the 'limited default' ('/LD')
indicator to the company's Ca-PD probability of default rating
(PDR), to reflect the recently missed interest payment on its
outstanding notes, which the rating agency considers a default
according to its definition of default.  As a result, Moody's PDR
for Northland has been affirmed at Ca-PD/LD.  In addition, the
outlook on all ratings remains negative.


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Spyker Mulls New Court Action v. GM Over Sale
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Spyker Cars, owner of Saab Automobile,
plans new court action against General Motors which it claims
lost it US$3 billion (GBP1.95 billion) by blocking the sale of
the Swedish carmaker.

Spyker bought Saab from GM in 2010 and kept the right to use the
US carmaker's technology to build vehicles, BBC recounts.

It wanted to sell Saab to a Chinese firm in 2011, but GM blocked
it, saying the sale would forfeit that right, BBC notes.

A judge threw out Spyker's previous case last year against the US
giant, BBC relates.

Spyker's claim has been that the deal was blocked by GM because
it did not want competition in China, and that GM's blocking
tactics caused Saab to collapse, BBC states.

GM said at the time of the previous court case that Spyker bought
Saab knowing its financial history, pointing out that Saab had
granted it a contractual right to agree, or not, to the
transaction and that those terms had been spelled out, BBC
recounts.  At the time GM called the allegations "baseless", BBC
notes.  According to BBC, Saab was already in a fragile state
when Spyker bought it out from GM, eventually filing for
bankruptcy at the end of 2011.

A last attempt to raise money from China's Youngman group was
blocked by GM because of the dispute over the transfer of
technology, BBC discloses.

GM first bought a 50% stake and management control of Saab in
1989, then gained full ownership in 2000, BBC notes.

           About Saab Automobile AB and Saab Cars N.A.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.  Saab halted production in March 2011 when it ran out of
cash to pay its component providers.  On Dec. 19, 2011, Saab
Automobile AB, Saab Automobile Tools AB and Saab Powertain AB
filed for bankruptcy after running out of cash.

Some of Saab's assets were sold to National Electric Vehicle
Sweden AB, a Chinese-Japanese backed start-up that plans to make
an electric car using Saab Automobile's former factory, tools and
designs.

On Jan. 30, 2012, more than 40 U.S.-based Saab dealerships filed
an involuntary Chapter 11 petition for Saab Cars North America,
Inc. (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 12-10344).  The petitioners,
represented by Wilk Auslander LLP, assert claims totaling US$1.2
million on account of "unpaid warranty and incentive
reimbursement and related obligations" or "parts and warranty
reimbursement."  Leonard A. Bellavia, Esq., at Bellavia Gentile &
Associates, in New York, signed the Chapter 11 petition on behalf
of the dealers.

The dealers want the vehicle inventory and the parts business to
be sold, free of liens from Ally Financial Inc. and Caterpillar
Inc., and "to have an appropriate forum to address the claims of
the dealers," Leonard A. Bellavia said in an e-mail to Bloomberg
News.

Saab Cars N.A. is the U.S. sales and distribution unit of Swedish
car maker Saab Automobile AB.  Saab Cars N.A. named in December
an outside administrator, McTevia & Associates, to run the
company as part of a plan to avoid immediate liquidation
following its parent company's bankruptcy filing.

On Feb. 24, 2012, the Court granted Saab Cars NA relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Donlin, Recano & Company, Inc., was retained as claims and
noticing agent to Saab Cars NA in the Chapter 11 case.

On March 9, 2012, the U.S. Trustee formed an official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors and appointed these members: Peter Mueller
Inc., IFS Vehicle Distributors, Countryside Volkwagen, Saab of
North Olmstead, Saab of Bedford, Whitcomb Motors Inc., and
Delaware Motor Sales, Inc.  The Committee tapped Wilk Auslander
LLP as general bankruptcy counsel, and Polsinelli Shughart as its
Delaware counsel.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


METINVEST BV: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukrainian-based METINVEST B.V.'s Long-
Term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'. The
senior unsecured rating on the company's 2015 and 2018 Eurobonds
has also been affirmed at 'B'/'RR4'. The Outlook on the Long-Term
IDR is Stable.

The ratings continue to be supported by Metinvest's position as a
leading integrated low-cost steel and iron ore producer in
Ukraine. Fitch notes that FY12 was a challenging year for steel
producers globally, with Metinvest's EBITDA margin contracting to
15.2%, well down from 26.4% in FY11. Despite volatile demand
conditions and strong pressure on commodity prices, the company
managed to maintain a stable financial profile. Over the medium-
term, Metinvest's credit metrics are expected to remain in line
with the assigned ratings given the company market leading
position and solid operating profile.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

- Ratings Constrained by Sovereign:

Metinvest's Long-term foreign currency IDR remains constrained by
Ukraine's sovereign ratings (Long-Term foreign and local currency
IDR 'B'/Stable), given the company's exposure to Ukraine for raw
materials, the location of its major plants and the size of
Ukraine as a significant end-market for its products. Absent the
Sovereign constraint Fitch continues to view Metinvest's stand-
alone rating at 'BB-'.

- Low-Cost Producer:

Metinvest's ratings reflect its scale as one of the largest
Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) producers of steel and
iron ore, with domestic sales at 26% of total revenue, a low-cost
production base and more than 100% self-sufficiency in iron ore
and 65% in coking coal. The ratings also factor in Metinvest's
close proximity to raw material sources, Black Sea ports and key
end markets.

- Weaker Steel Market Conditions:

Fitch expects Metinvest's financial metrics to remain under
pressure in 2013 despite lower leverage year on year. Funds from
operations (FFO) gross leverage is expected to decrease to around
2.5x for FYE 2013 based on a return to positive free cash flow
(FCF) generation, from 3.2x at end-2012. EBITDA margins are
expected to contract to between 12%-13% from 15.2% in 2012, on
the back of moderately weaker steel demand/prices and lower
average iron ore prices.

RATING SENSITIVITIES:

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- Change in Sovereign Rating:

The ratings would be adjusted in the event of a change in the
Ukrainian sovereign rating. The ratings could be upgraded if
Metinvest's reliance on Ukraine materially declined, although
this is not expected over the rating horizon. Such action would
be considered in combination with maintenance of a sound credit
profile including FFO gross leverage below 2.5x over the medium
term, and expectations for positive FCF on average.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- Financial Profile:

Negative rating action could result from a sustained weakening of
the company's financial profile as shown by FFO gross leverage
above 2.5x and/or an EBIT margin below 6% on a sustained basis.

The rating actions are:

-- Long-Term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B', Outlook
    Stable

-- Short-Term foreign and local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

-- Senior Unsecured foreign currency rating: affirmed at 'B'
    (RR4)

-- Long-Term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+', Outlook
    Stable

-- Short-Term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

-- National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AA+(UKR)', Outlook
    Stable

-- National Short-Term Rating: affirmed at 'F1+(UKR)'



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Unlikely to Claw Back Money From Former Head
---------------------------------------------------------------
James Quinn at The Telegraph reports that the Co-operative Group
is unlikely to be able to claw back any money from the former
chief executive, Peter Marks, or the former bank head, Neville
Richardson, despite the revelation that the bank had a GBP1.5
billion capital shortfall and bondholders would have to take a
loss.

Senior sources have indicated that because of the mutual's
complicated structure, it is highly unlikely that either man will
be affected by the investigation into possible clawbacks the Co-
op is undertaking, the Telegraph notes.

The news is likely to irritate bondholders in the Co-op Bank
asked to take haircuts on their investments, the Telegraph says.

The bank earlier said its bonds would be "bailed in" to help fill
part of the shortfall, in a complex transaction which will see
part of the bank list on the London Stock Exchange, the Telegraph
relates.

The GBP1.5 billion capital "black hole" was the result of Co-op's
merger with Britannia Building Society in 2008, and in particular
commercial real estate loans written by Britannia, the Telegraph
notes.  Mr. Marks oversaw the merger, and Mr. Richardson, who
left the Co-op in 2011, ran the combined banking business having
originally run Britannia, the Telegraph discloses.

Mr. Marks sat on the board of the Co-op Bank but was actually
paid by the group, the Telegraph states.  When he left in May he
did so without a pay-off, and without a sizeable Co-op pension
pot as the result of an earlier decision to have his pension
contributions paid as an allowance in lieu of pension provision,
the Telegraph notes.

Mr. Richardson resigned in July 2011 with a GBP4.6 million pay-
off, the Telegraph relates.  It is thought the Co-op has no
rights to these funds, the Telegraph says.

According to the Telegraph, a Co-op spokesman said the board was
mindful of its obligations, but the subject of clawbacks was for
the bank remuneration committee.

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1.  The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded The Co-operative Bank PLC's (CB)
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB-' from 'BBB-',
Short-term IDR to 'B' from 'F3' and Viability Rating to 'bb-'
from 'bbb-'. The Long-term IDR and VR have been placed on Rating
Watch Evolving (RWE). The bank's Support Rating has been
downgraded to '5' from '3'and its Support Rating Floor revised to
'No Floor' ('NF') from 'BB+'.

Fitch has also downgraded the bank's long-term senior debt to
'BB-' from 'BBB-' and placed it on RWE, and downgraded its
subordinated debt ratings to 'CC' from 'BB+' (Lower Tier 2) and
'BB-' (Upper Tier 2) and placed them on RWE.

The rating impact, if any, from the rating actions on the bank's
covered bonds will be detailed in a separate comment.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The downgrade of CB's IDRs and VR reflects Fitch's concerns that
the bank's capital requirements are greater than originally
anticipated. CB has indicated that it requires GBP1.5 billion of
additional capital. This is sizeable in relation to the bank's
reported equity. CB's recapitalization plan includes an injection
of capital from its parent and a liability management exercise.
Full details of the liability management exercise have not yet
been disclosed but Fitch's understanding is that an exchange
offer to junior subordinated bondholders will result in GBP1
billion of additional common equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital by end-
2013. A further GBP500 million of CET1 capital will be injected
by the Co-operative Group in 2014, conditional on the exchange
offer becoming effective.

The Prudential Regulation Authority has stated that the need for
higher capital reflects expected future losses and an assessment
of the future cost of conduct redress. CB has indicated that the
targeted fully-loaded Basel III CET1 ratio is at least 9% at end-
2013 and to increase in the following years.

The downgrade of the IDRs and VR also considers Fitch's view that
the bank's franchise is likely to have been damaged given
negative sentiment surrounding the bank since April 2013. There
are signs that confidence among some depositors and investors may
be weakening and execution risks associated with new management's
objective of addressing the various operational challenges within
the bank present a considerable challenge.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The ratings have been placed on RWE, indicating on the downside
the presence of execution risks in the recapitalization plan but
also upside ratings potential if the plan is achieved. Various
corporate and investor agreements need to be put in place before
the plan can proceed. Furthermore, the exact details of the plan
have not yet been announced.

Depending on the outcome of the liability management exercise and
the amount of fresh equity received by the bank, as well as
impact of the lower debt servicing costs, the bank's IDRs, VRs
and senior debt may be upgraded. If the plan is implemented as
outlined, Fitch considers that the outcome should be positive for
senior debt holders. The RWE would result in an upgrade if CB can
raise the full amount of capital targeted and stabilize its
franchise combined with new management setting down a
sustainable, credible longer-term strategic plan.

CB's IDRs, VRs and senior debt may be downgraded further if
regulators require additional actions, if the market uptake of
the planned debt for equity exchange offer is lower than expected
or if the plan to recapitalize the bank to an acceptable level
within an acceptable time frame fails.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID
SECURITIES

CB's Upper and Lower Tier 2 Instruments (subordinated debt) have
been downgraded to 'CC'/RWE from 'BB+' and 'BB-', respectively.
The downgrade reflects the plan to redeem these bonds at rates
below par value and to exchange them into a combination of bank
shares and Cooperative Group debt. As a result, these bondholders
are expected to suffer losses. Fitch considers that sufficient
pressure exists for most junior debt holders to accept the offer
and thus avoid more adverse consequences in the event that they
do not take up the offer. Given the outline terms of the offer,
Fitch considers this constitutes a distressed debt exchange on
those securities under its criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID
SECURITIES

The ratings of the Upper and Lower Tier 2 Instruments could be
downgraded further or upgraded by one notch once additional
details of the exchange are announced. At that time, Fitch will
be in a position to undertake a meaningful assessment of
recoverability.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The downgrade of the bank's Support Rating and revision of the
Support Rating Floor is consistent with Fitch's view of a clear
political intention to ultimately reduce implicit support for
banks in the UK. In addition, Fitch believes CB's systemic
importance is reducing given the scaling back of the bank's scope
and ambition. Fitch considers CB to be more of a niche player,
positioned as an alternative to the UK's major banks.

The rating actions are:

-- Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BBB-'; placed on
    RWE

-- Short-term IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'

-- Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bb-' from 'bbb-'; placed on
    RWE

-- Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '3'

-- Support Rating Floor: revised to 'NF' from 'BB+'

-- Senior unsecured notes Long-term rating: downgraded to 'BB-'
    from 'BBB-'; placed on RWE

-- Senior unsecured notes Short-term rating: downgraded to 'B'
    from 'F3'

-- Lower Tier 2 subordinated notes: downgraded to 'CC' from
    'BB+'; placed on RWE

-- Upper Tier 2 subordinated notes: downgraded to 'CC' from
    'BB-'; placed on RWE


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: DBRS Cuts Subordinated Debt Rating to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has downgraded the ratings of The
Co-operative Bank plc.  The Bank's Long-Term debt and deposit
ratings have been downgraded to BBB (low), from BBB (high), and
the Short-Term debt and deposit ratings have been downgraded to
R-2 (middle) from R-1 (low). The dated subordinated debt of the
bank has been downgraded to CC from BBB (low) and the Perpetual
subordinated bonds have been downgraded to CC from BB (high). All
of the ratings remain Under Review with Negative Implications.
The Intrinsic Assessment for the bank is now BBB (low). DBRS has
also changed its Support Assessment for the Bank to SA3 from SA2
and therefore the Bank's Long-Term debt and deposit ratings are
no longer positioned above the Intrinsic Assessment.

The rating action follows the June 17, 2013 announcement by The
Co-operative Group (Group) and the Bank that the Bank requires an
additional GBP 1.5 billion of equity capital. The Bank plans to
raise approximately GBP 1 billion in 2013 through an exchange
offer to holders of the Bank's dated subordinated debt, Perpetual
subordinated bonds, and non-cumulative preference shares
(unrated). In addition a further GBP 500 million is to be raised
in 2014 through the sale of the Group's life assurance and asset
management business, and its general insurance business, as well
as through a cost saving programme at the bank and through the
deleveraging of the bank's non-core assets, including potentially
asset sales. Although full details on the exchange offer will not
be known until October 2013 the Bank has announced that
subordinated bondholders will be offered an exchange into a
mixture of senior debt issued by the Group (and potentially also
a fixed income instrument issued by the Bank dependent on take-
up) and equity in the Bank. As a result of this, a minority
equity stake in the Bank will be listed. Given the magnitude of
the capital requirement DBRS expects that some form of coercion
will be required to ensure that the required take-up of the offer
is achieved. DBRS also highlights that the proposal has broader
negative implications for bank creditors as it is not in line
with the normal creditor hierarchy that would see equity being
wiped out before subordinated debt holders are required to take a
loss.

The downgrade of the Bank's senior rating and intrinsic
assessment to BBB (low) reflects the strategic challenges facing
the bank and its new management team, including the listing of a
minority stake in the bank, the potential damage to the franchise
as a result of the capital issues and the exit from certain
corporate business, and the continuing need to finalise the
integration of Britannia. Additionally DBRS expects the bank to
report another substantial loss in 2013 as a result of the
deterioration in asset quality, especially within the Bank's
commercial real estate loan portfolio. Downward pressure on the
senior ratings is mitigated to a certain degree by the capital
that is proposed to be raised by the Bank through the exchange
offer and the support from the Group. However, if the exchange
offer is not successful and the capital not raised, then it is
likely that a further multi-notch downgrade would result.

The ratings also take into account the Bank's relatively solid,
albeit limited, customer franchise and the strength of its
funding profile. DBRS considers that the Bank's core operations,
which have remained marginally profitable, can support the Bank
in its eventual return to profitability.

The UK banking system is dominated by a small number of large
banks and DBRS notes that there is a desire on the part of the
authorities and other parties to promote competition by
encouraging smaller banks such as The Co-operative. Nevertheless,
the change in the Support Assessment to SA3 from SA2 reflects
DBRS's view that the likelihood of the UK Government stepping in
to provide support which would benefit the senior bondholders of
a mid-sized bank such as the Co-operative Bank is low, and indeed
the example of the Co-operative provides further evidence that
the authorities in the UK look to bail-in subordinated debt when
capitalisation is weak.

As a result of the likely coercive nature of the exchange offer
and DBRS's expectation of substantial losses for bondholders the
dated subordinated debt and the Perpetual subordinated bonds have
been downgraded to CC and remain Under Review with Negative
Implications until full details on the exchange are known. A
further downgrade of these instruments to D is likely if, when
the exchange offer details are available, DBRS is of the opinion
that the exchange offer is coercive. DBRS has widened the
notching on these instruments beyond the standard notching
discussed in our published methodologies due to the high
likelihood that substantial losses will be borne by the
bondholders.

All of the Bank's ratings remain Under Review with Negative
Implications. The review will focus on the outcome of the
exchange offer as well as the medium-term business plan that will
be presented by the new management team in August. In addition
with regard to the subordinated debt instruments the review will
also focus on the full details of the exchange offer.


COGGLES: Hut Group Buys Firm Out of Administration
--------------------------------------------------
MPDClick reports that online retailer the Hut Group has acquired
premium fashion retailer Coggles out of administration.

The report recalls that Coggles went into administration in May
after various failed attempts to restructure.

"Our primary duty is to bring about the optimum return for
creditors and the offer from the Hut Group was an extremely good
deal," the report quoted Andy Clay --
andy.clay@begbies-traynor.com -- of Begbies Traynor as saying.

The report notes that joint administrators have completed a deal
for the Hut Group to take some of Coggles' assets, including
stock and all intellectual property such as the brand and the
company's domain names.

The report relates that following the deal, the Hut Group will
take the ailing retailer online, as part of its prestige
division.

"Whil[e] it is sad to see Coggles disappearing from the high
street for the time being, and the loss of employment for the
remaining staff, it is positive that the business will continue
as part of a large and successful specialist online retail
group," summarized Mr. Clay after the news broke on June 18.

Coggles is a York-based upscale fashion chain.


COUNTYROUTE PLC: S&P Affirms 'B+' Sr. Secured Bank Loan Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised upward to
'1' from '3' its recovery rating on the GBP88 million senior
secured bank loan due 2026 and issued by U.K.-based
concessionaire CountyRoute (A130) PLC.  A recovery rating of '1'
indicates S&P's expectation of very high (90%-10%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'B+' long-term issue rating on the senior
secured bank loan.  The outlook on the loan is negative.

In addition, S&P revised upward to '1' from '6' its recovery
rating on the GBP5.5 million subordinated secured mezzanine bank
loan due 2026 and issued by CountyRoute.  S&P is keeping its 'B-'
long-term issue rating on the subordinated secured mezzanine loan
on CreditWatch, where it was placed with negative implications on
Jan. 11, 2013.

The upward revision of the recovery ratings on CountyRoute's debt
is the result of a change to S&P's recovery analysis to reflect
its updated base-case assumptions for projected performance.  For
the purpose of S&P's recovery analysis, it assumes an event of
default in 2023, reflecting the point of weakest project
liquidity in its base case.  The hypothetical default date
follows a peak S&P currently expects in future major maintenance
expenditure and is closer to the debt maturity date, and
therefore reflects lower outstanding amounts of debt.
Consequently, the projected recovery prospects have improved.

"Our updated base case incorporates flat traffic volumes for
financial 2014 (ending March 31, 2014), followed by a recovery in
financial 2015.  This is followed by steady overall growth in
total traffic volumes of 1.0%-1.5% thereafter.  This compares
with CountyRoute's current forecasts of more than 2.0% growth
each year until financial 2016, followed by 1.5% thereafter.  Our
base case also incorporates the latest information we have for
CountyRoute's forecast major maintenance amounts," S&P said.

"However, we note that CountyRoute's assumptions for both future
traffic volume growth and major maintenance costs are under
review.  In our view, the review could result in an upward
revision of future major maintenance expenditure, which would be
negative both for the project's annual debt service coverage
ratios (ADSCRs) and its liquidity.  We will update our own base
case following the outcome of this review, which we currently
anticipate will conclude in September this year," S&P noted.

The negative outlook on the senior secured debt rating reflects
S&P's view of the potential effect of an upward revision of
future major maintenance expenditure, and the current weak growth
trends in traffic volume on the road.

S&P could lower the rating if the amount of major maintenance
expenditure forecast is higher than currently indicated,
resulting in a further decline in the project's forecast ADSCRs
and liquidity.  A similar outcome could result if the future
development of traffic volumes is worse than S&P anticipates.

S&P could take a positive rating action if the forecast financial
profile of the project were to improve.  This could occur, for
example, if the original construction contractor were to accept
partial or full responsibility for the rectification of
underlying road defects, or if traffic volumes were to grow
faster than S&P forecasts.  However, S&P currently views such a
situation as less likely.

The ongoing CreditWatch negative placement on the subordinated
debt rating reflects S&P's view of the potential for a lock-up on
future payments resulting from a requirement to fund future major
maintenance expenditure, or from continued traffic
underperformance.

S&P would lower the subordinated debt rating, potentially by more
than one notch, if CountyRoute's updated projected ADSCRs
indicate an increased likelihood of a payment lock-up, or should
the current weak traffic volume growth persist.

Alternatively, S&P could remove from CreditWatch and affirm the
subordinated debt rating if the updated forecast ADSCRs and
liquidity remain substantially in line with its projections.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement following the
completion of CountyRoute's review of its assumptions for both
future traffic volume growth and major maintenance costs, which
S&P currently expects in September this year.


DUNFERMLINE FC: Preferred Bidder to Be Identified This Week
-----------------------------------------------------------
BBC Sport reports that Dunfermline administrator Bryan Jackson
hopes to have a preferred bidder for the club by the middle of
this week.

Fans' group Pars United are vying to take over the ailing Fife
outfit, along with another anonymous party, BBC Sport notes.

"I've got meetings with both interested parties to go through the
conditions, some of which are not acceptable," Mr. Jackson told
BBC Scotland.

"We really have to identify one quickly because we have a
provisional date for our CVA meeting on July 12."

Mr. Jackson's firm BDO decided to proceed with the offer of a
company voluntary arrangement following a meeting with the club's
creditors, BBC Sport relates.  But, to complicate matters, the
company which controls East End Park stadium is also in the hands
of administrators, BBC Sport states.

"The added complication we have is the administrator for East End
Park will have to be happy with who we want to go with," BBC
Sport quotes Mr. Jackson as saying.

"There is no point in getting the stadium but not the club and
vice versa."

According to BBC Sport, Pars United's fund-raising campaign has
been widely publicized, while the rival offer remains shrouded in
mystery, with Mr. Jackson admitting that their proof of funding
"has not yet been fully evidenced".  However, he did add "our
feeling is that both parties are credible bidders".

Dunfermline Athletic Football Club is a Scottish football team
based in Dunfermline, Fife, commonly known as just Dunfermline.


EQUIDEBT: In Administration, Cuts 60 Jobs
-----------------------------------------
Stratford Herald reports that Equidebt has suffered the ultimate
embarrassment for a business of its type -- financial failure.

Equidebt went into administration with the immediate loss of 60
jobs and the remaining small number of staff also facing the
prospect of redundancy, according to Stratford Herald.

The report relates that in a stroke of ill fortune, it would
normally associate with the people it has spent its time chasing
for cash, the company now finds itself in the hands of
administrators Ernst & Young.

Equidebt is a debt collection company based in Wellesbourne.


HEARTS FC: Morisons And HBJ Gateley Lead Advice On Administration
--------------------------------------------------------------
Hannah Gannage-Stewart at The Lawyer reports that Morisons
Solicitors and HBJ Gateley have been appointed to advise on the
administration of Edinburgh football club Heart of Midlothian
Football Club.

A notice was lodged to put the club into administration June 19
after wrangling between Lithuanian parent company UBIG, which was
pushing for BDO administrators to be appointed, and the club's
management, which preferred KPMG, according to The Lawyer.

The report relates that BDO partner trio Bryan Jackson, James
Stephen and Trevor Birch were ultimately appointed to handle the
case.  They are being advised by Edinburgh and Glasgow firm
Morisons, which has fielded a team led by Glasgow-based corporate
partner Peter Duff -- peter.duff@morisonsllp.com -- with
assistance from solicitor Keith Anderson --
Keith.Anderson@morisonsllp.com

HBJ Gateley is acting for the club's management, with a team led
by Edinburgh insolvency and disputes partner Simon Catto --
SCatto@hbjgateley.com

Baltic firm Tark Grunte Sutkiene, the report adds, is also
advising the administrators, led by Vilnius insolvency partner
Vidmantas Drizga -- vidmantas.drizga@tgslegal.com -- with
associate partner Deimante Korsaite --
deimante.korsakaite@tgslegal.com


NEW LOOK: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to GBP808MM Sr. Secured Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned New Look Retail Group Limited's (New
Look; 'B-'/Stable) GBP808 million senior secured notes issued by
New Look Bondco I plc a final 'B' rating with a Recovery Rating
of 'RR3'. The rating action follows the review of final terms of
the bond issue principally conforming to information already
received by Fitch.

As expected, the proceeds have been used to repay all
indebtedness under the previous senior facilities agreement and
mezzanine facility agreement, in addition to funding the cash
tender of approximately half of the previously outstanding PIK
loans. In conjunction with the tender offer, New Look will
exchange the remaining PIK liabilities for a new PIK loan
facility issued through a special purpose vehicle located within
the restricted group that matures in November 2018. The new notes
rank as senior secured obligations and benefit from guarantees
from certain operating subsidiaries representing over 97% of the
restricted group's adjusted EBITDA.

New Look's 'B-' IDR reflects the aggressiveness of the proposed
recapitalization. However, this is offset by its established
market leadership in the UK, favorable medium-term industry
trends and improving operating performance in recent quarters.
From a business risk standpoint, Fitch views New Look as
possessing a number of company-specific traits consistent with a
higher rating. However, the company's financial profile and
limited expected de-leveraging potential, are more in line with a
low-rated 'B' issuer and are viewed as constraining factors for
New Look's ratings.

Key Rating Drivers

Established Market Position
Fitch considers New Look's high fashion content and value
proposition as differentiating factors compared with its
immediate peer group. This has resulted in a strong brand
position in the UK value clothing segment, which is benefiting
from a long-term structural change, largely driven by increased
acceptance of value retail brands. New Look is further supported
by the multi-channel offering comprising over 1,100 owned and
franchised stores worldwide (590 owned stores in the UK) and a
fast-growing e-commerce and mobile-commerce presence. These
company-specific traits justify a high 'B'/low 'BB' rating
category but the rating is constrained by the company's reliance
on the UK market.

E-Commerce Expansion
New Look aims to improve EBITDA back to the previous highs of
FY10. However, the mix of EBITDA is fundamentally different with
the share of UK retail profit expected to contribute a lower
percentage of overall group EBITDA in the coming years with the
e-commerce division generating an increasing percentage of growth
in group EBITDA from FY13. Fitch views management's growth
assumption as reasonable based on current trends and results
achieved in recent periods. More broadly, these expectations are
consistent with industry trends as online retailing is expected
to grow at 15.1% (CAGR) from 2012 to 2016.

Subdued UK Consumer Environment
Although New Look plans to increase its overseas exposure, its UK
division remains a major part of its business, contributing 78%
of group revenue and 93% of group underlying operating profit in
FY13. The UK consumer environment remains subdued as unemployment
is still high, household incomes remain squeezed and the real
wage continues to fall. As a result, competition among clothing
retailers is very high with promotions and discounting being the
new norm in the industry.

Improving Operating Performance
Despite the strong brand franchise, operating performance in
recent years has been affected by several factors, both internal
and external. This includes a one-off event with the departure of
40% of its key buyers when New Look moved its headquarters from
Weymouth to London. As a result, there was inconsistent ranging,
pricing and quality in its products, which led to increased
markdowns and depressed profitability in FY11 and FY12. The poor
operating performance has since reversed, as evidenced by a 29%
year-on-year improvement in reported adjusted EBITDA in FY13.
Fitch expects the UK retail sector to remain under pressure
driven by weak consumer confidence and above-average supply chain
inflation. In FY13, New Look reported sales increased by 2.5%
(FY12: -0.9%) and EBITDA margin improved to 12.7% (FY12: 9.6%).
Further gradual improvement in profitability is factored in
thereafter.

Aggressive Financial Profile
Fitch characterizes New Look's financial profile as aggressive.
This is prompted by the partial refinancing of the old Holdco PIK
loan with additional debt issued at the same restricted group as
the issued senior secured notes, which justifies the 'B-' IDR
despite the extended debt maturity profile. In addition, Fitch
has included the new PIK facility in its calculation of leverage
metrics. Several characteristics that support this approach
include guarantees from operating subsidiaries within the
restricted group, option to pay interest in cash and
transferability of rights and obligations. Fitch projects FFO-
adjusted net leverage to increase to around 7.1x (cash-pay FFO-
adjusted net leverage of 6.0x) by FYE14 (March 2014). In Fitch's
definition of FFO-adjusted net leverage (including PIK), this is
weak relative to the 'B' median for the sector at 6.0x. FFO fixed
charge cover (including cash interest and rents) is equally
considered weak at 1.5x.

Senior Secured Notes' Rating
The 'B'/'RR3' senior secured rating reflects Fitch's expectations
that the enterprise value of the company -- and resulting
recovery for its creditors -- will be maximized in a
restructuring (going concern approach) rather than a liquidation
due to the relatively asset-light nature of the business.
Furthermore, a default scenario would likely be triggered by
unsustainable financial leverage, possibly as a result of
increasingly weak consumer spending or poor acceptance of the
company's product roll-outs. As such, Fitch has applied a 25%
discount to FY13 EBITDA and believes a distressed multiple of
5.0x is appropriate. This results in above-average expected
recoveries (51%-70%) for senior secured noteholders in the event
of default.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a positive rating action include:

- FFO-adjusted net leverage (including PIK) consistently below
   and expected to be sustained below 6.5x

- FFO fixed charge cover (including cash interest and rents)
   consistently above 1.7x - 2.0x

- EBITDA margins at or above 15% driven by core business
   improvement

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a negative rating action include:

- FFO-adjusted net leverage (including PIK) consistently above
   8.5x

- FFO fixed charge cover (including cash interest and rents)
   consistently below 1.2x

- EBITDA margins below 10%

- Inability to maintain positive free cash flow delaying
   deleveraging potential


RBS CAPITAL: S&P Raises Rating on 3 Hybrid Instruments to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has raised to
'BB+' from 'C' the ratings on the three hybrid instruments issued
by RBS Capital Funding Trust V, VI, and VII, after the
announcement by The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (the group)
that coupon payments will resume on June 30, 2013.  This follows
the expiry of restrictions on coupon payments in April 2013,
which the European Commission (EC) imposed on RBS N.V.

The ratings on the notes reflect S&P's 'bbb' assessment of the
stand-alone credit profile of RBS N.V., which it views as "core"
to the group, as S&P's criteria defines this term.  The ratings
also reflect S&P's view that the notes:

   -- are subordinated, for which S&P deduct one notch; and

   -- are a gone concern or "non-viability contingent capital"
      instrument, for which S&P deducts a further notch.

S&P rates the notes on the basis that cash flows from RBS N.V.--
as the operating entity -- service the debt and not on the
guarantee from the non-operating holding company, RBS Holdings
N.V. Therefore, S&P do not deduct a further notch for structural
subordination.

The 'BB+' rating is in line with S&P's ratings on Royal Bank of
Scotland PLC hybrids.


ROWERECORD ENGINEERING: Creditors Set to Lose GBP15 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------
Kaleigh Watterson at Insider News Wales reports that creditors of
Rowecord Engineering Ltd. are set to lose out on almost GBP15
million after the company fell into administration.

The company entered administration on April 29 after suffering
financial problems from disputes on contracts and overrunning
engineering projects, Insider News Wales recounts.

According to Insider News Wales, the company owes GBP23.7 million
to its unsecured creditors.  This includes GBP5.6 million to
subcontractors, GBP5.4 million to trade creditors and GBP4.5
million in taxes, Insider News Wales notes.

Employees are owed GBP2.9 million in redundancy pay, Insider News
Wales says.  They are also owed a further GBP316,000 in wages and
holiday pay as preferential creditors, Insider News Wales states.

Preferential creditors are expected to be repaid in full and
there is set to be a dividend for unsecured creditors but the
administrators currently estimate a GBP14.7 million deficiency,
according to Insider News Wales.

Newport-based Rowecord Engineering Ltd. is UK's third largest
structural steel engineering company.


VICTORY CHRISTIAN: Heads Into Receivership, Owes EUR18 Million
--------------------------------------------------------------
Independent.ie reports the trustees of Victory Christian
Fellowship are reeling from a tumultuous couple of weeks.

The Victory Christian Fellowship went into receivership owing
EUR18 million to Bank of Scotland, according to Independent.ie.

The report relates that receivers sent in to take possession of
the church's three prime properties were blocked by staff and
some of the congregation.

The report relates that when the trustees failed to show up in
court to answer accusations that they had ignored court orders, a
High Court judge gave directions to hunt them down.

The report discloses that Brendan Hade, his elegant wife Sheila,
and their friend, Gerry Byrne, narrowly escaped jail when they
agreed to facilitate a peaceful handover of the church's three
Dublin properties to the bank's receivers.

This includes Kilmacud House in Stillorgan, 39 Westland Row and a
state-of-the-art prayer center in Firhouse that was built five
years ago, the report notes.

The report says that the church has come under media scrutiny in
the past for encouraging people to donate a tenth of their
earnings to the church, and other money-generating schemes.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Euro-Zone Finance Ministers Agree on Bailout Fund Guidelines
--------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Fidler, Gabriele Steinhauser and Christopher Lawton at
The Wall Street Journal report that euro-zone finance ministers
agreed on guidelines Thursday for how their bailout fund could
directly shore up failing banks in the bloc's weak economies.

Euro-zone leaders pledged in June 2012 that they intended to
break the destabilizing link between weak banks and governments
with shaky finances by allowing their EUR500 billion (US$660
billion) rescue fund to directly inject capital into banks,
rather than go through the host government, the Journal relates.

This step would help "break the vicious circle between banks and
sovereigns by diluting the link between them," the Journal quotes
Olli Rehn, the European Union's economics commissioner, as
saying.

But the maximum amount ministers agreed to devote to the task was
small compared with likely needs in a major banking crisis, the
Journal notes.  They agreed to limit such direct investments to
EUR60 billion of the EUR500 billion fund, and would make any such
capital injections through a special subsidiary, the Journal
relates.  They said they hoped to have the new facility in place
by the second quarter of 2014 - in time for anticipated stress
tests aimed at determining the strength of euro-zone banks, and
before the European Central Bank starts supervising them,
according to the Journal.

Ministers also set strict conditions for allowing direct
recapitalizations, the Journal says.  National governments will
remain solely responsible for raising a bank's capital buffer to
the minimum set by bank regulators of 4.5% of bank assets,
weighted according to risk, the Journal states.

Even after that, a bank's home country will have to contribute at
least 20% to any recapitalization through the fund, called the
European Stability Mechanism, the Journal says.  That amount will
go down to 10% two years after the ESM gets the new instrument,
the Journal discloses.

The ministers left open the possibility that Thursday's decision
could benefit euro-zone countries that have already used bailout
loans to prop up troubled banks, the Journal notes.

"It will have to be decided case-by-case and by mutual
agreement," the Journal quotes Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who presides
over the Eurogroup meetings, as saying.  "It's up to the member
states to apply for it."


* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 17 to June 21, 2013
-----------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *