/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130701.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, July 1, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 128
Headlines
A U S T R I A
CAT OIL: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
HYPO ALPE-ADRIA: May Need Up to EUR2 Billion in Extra Capital
B E L G I U M
BASS MASTER: Fitch Places 'BB' Class D Tranche Rating on RWN
C Y P R U S
* CYPRUS: Delays EUR1BB Bonds Repayment; S&P Cuts Rating to SD
F R A N C E
LABCO SA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-term Issuer Default Rating
SOLAREZO: Enters Bankruptcy Proceedings on Lack of Capital
G E R M A N Y
KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
TITAN EUROPE 2006-2: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
I T A L Y
SEAT PAGINE: Board Approves Debt Restructuring Proposal
K A Z A K H S T A N
CASPIAN ENERGY: Fails to Pay 9.34-Mil. Debt to Meridian
L U X E M B O U R G
ION TRADING: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
SODRUGESTVO GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
S P A I N
AUTOVIA DEL CAMINO: S&P Cuts SPUR Rating to BB+ on Weak Traffic
BANCO MARE: Fitch Bases CH Rating on 'BB+' Issuer Default Rating
CAJAS RURALES: Fitch Bases Cedulas Territoriales Rating on BB IDR
FTA PYMES: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on EUR34MM Class C Notes
PESCANOVA SA: Obtains EUR56-Mil. Syndicated Loan From Banks
T U R K E Y
CALIK HOLDING: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B-'
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
ARK: Bought Out of Administration by JD Sports
ARQIVA PP: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on GBP600MM Senior Notes
BAR ROMA: Faces Closure After No Buyer Found
EXPRO HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating
NORD ANGLIA: Moody's Cuts Sr. Secured Notes Rating to 'B3'
UNITED BISCUITS: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
* UK: May-April Company Administrations Up 20% in England & Wales
X X X X X X X X
* Weak Economy Strains Eastern European Businesses' Cash Flow
* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 24 to June 28, 2013
*********
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A U S T R I A
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CAT OIL: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Austria-based oil field services provider C.A.T.
oil AG (CAToil) to 'BB' from 'BB-'. S&P affirmed its 'B' short-
term corporate credit rating on CAToil. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P raised the Russian national scale rating on
CAToil to 'ruAA' from 'ruAA-'.
The upgrade reflects S&P's expectation that the company will
retain healthy credit metrics in the medium term, thanks to its
conservative financial policy and growing profits. S&P believes
that CAToil should further benefit from growing demand for
drilling services in Russia's core oil provinces which should
help increase profits and cash flows, and that the company's
capital expenditures will remain balanced. S&P expects free
operating cash flow (FOCF) to be neutral to positive in 2013-
2014, and adjusted leverage to remain below 0.5x. S&P's
assessment is based on its forecast of improving operating
margins stemming from both the high quality of CAToil's assets
and its expectation of continued solid market conditions.
S&P has raised its assessment of CAToil's financial risk profile
to "intermediate" from "significant." The business risk profile
remains "weak." CAToil's low leverage, with gross debt of EUR55
million as of March 31, 2013, improving funds from operations
(FFO), and strong liquidity underpin the improvement in the
financial risk profile.
"We foresee that CAToil's EBITDA will continue to grow in 2013,
mainly due to the five new sidetracking units that were put into
operation in the first half of the year and the additional
fracturing fleet that is expected to start work in the third
quarter. The company reported EBITDA of EUR24 million for the
first three months of 2013, 71.9% higher than in the same period
last year. We anticipate that CAToil's ratio of debt to EBITDA
will stay below 0.5x over the next two years. We also expect the
ratio of FFO to total debt to remain well above 100% over the
same period. At the same time, we expect CAToil to maintain a
conservative financial policy, low leverage, and "strong"
liquidity," S&P said.
The business risk profile of CAToil is unchanged at weak,
reflecting S&P's view of CAToil's small scale and limited
diversity, of operations in Russia and Kazakhstan, and the
cyclical and competitive nature of the oil field services
industry. S&P also notes the company's relatively concentrated
customer base. These weaknesses are partly offset by the
company's modern and technologically advanced fleet, its strong
market position in hydraulic fracturing and sidetrack drilling,
and longstanding business relationships with the Russian major
oil and gas groups.
S&P views industry conditions currently to be favorable, with
increasing demand. Drilling volumes in Russia have been
increasing (by 10% in 2012 alone) to support production at
maturing fields, and S&P expects demand for services to grow
faster than supply in 2013-2014. New reserves, difficult-to-
recover reserves that are being brought into operation, and a
growing share of more higher-value-added drilling services (such
as horizontal drilling and sidetracking) should support demand.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's belief that CAToil will
continue to improve its operating performance on the back of
solid demand for its activities strengthened by favorable market
conditions for enhanced oil recovery services in Russia and
Kazakhstan. S&P also anticipates that the company will prudently
fund its expansion, such that it does not hurt the forecast
improvement in the company's financial performance. Furthermore,
S&P anticipates that CAToil will maintain debt to EBITDA of less
than 0.5x, which we view as strong for the rating.
S&P could lower the rating if CAToil's expansion is much higher
than anticipated, leading to large negative FOCF and resulting in
higher debt levels than anticipated. Downside rating pressure
could also occur if demand weakens significantly or if the
company becomes more aggressive in dividend payments to
shareholders. The debt-to-EBITDA ratio deteriorating to above 1x
in normal business conditions or up to 1.5x in a downturn could
be a downgrade trigger.
Further upgrades are unlikely in the near term, given the
exposure to Russia, the high sector volatility, and the
relatively small scale of operations. An upgrade would therefore
imply a significant change in the business risk profile such as
higher diversification and a larger scale, which S&P views as
unlikely over the short to medium term.
HYPO ALPE-ADRIA: May Need Up to EUR2 Billion in Extra Capital
-------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News reports that Hypo Alpe-Adria-
Bank International AG, the nationalized Austrian lender, may need
as much as EUR2 billion (US$2.6 billion) in extra capital due to
concessions Austria will make to win state aid approval from the
European Union.
According to Bloomberg, two people with knowledge of the
situation said that a restructuring plan for the lender, due in
two days, foresees tighter deadlines for asset sales, curbs on
new business and a larger unit for winding down assets.
The people said that the measures will reduce the value of the
Klagenfurt, Austria-based lender's units and lead to a loss that
will trigger the capital requirement, Bloomberg relates. They
said that the amount could be lower if a unit to wind down the
bank's bad assets is set up, Bloomberg notes.
Andreas Perotti, a spokesman for the Finance Ministry, said the
plan is being completed on schedule, Bloomberg discloses.
Bad Bank
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 14,
2013, Reuters disclosed that Austrian Finance Minister Maria
Fekter said the country was seeking "creative" ways to clean up
ailing nationalized lender Hypo Alpe Adria, rejecting the option
of a "bad bank" that would hit state finances before elections.
Ms. Fekter also said she was confident she could get more time
from the European Commission for an orderly wind-down of the bank
that Austria took over in 2009 and which eked out a small profit
last year, according to Reuters.
Hypo Alpe-Adria International AG is a subsidiary of BayernLB. It
is active in banking and leasing. In banking, HGAA serves both
corporate and retail customers and offers services ranging from
traditional lending through savings and deposits to complex
investment products and asset management services.
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B E L G I U M
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BASS MASTER: Fitch Places 'BB' Class D Tranche Rating on RWN
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed two tranches of Bass Master Issuer NV/SA
Series 0-2008-1 on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) and affirmed two
tranches, as follows:
Class A (ISIN BE0002364363) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN BE0002365378) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN BE0002366384) 'Asf'; placed on RWN
Class D (ISIN BE0002367390) 'BBsf'; placed on RWN
The transaction is a prime RMBS master trust program comprising
Belgian residential mortgage loans originated by BNP Paribas
Fortis (Fortis; A+/Stable).
Key Rating Drivers
The affirmations of the class A and B notes reflect the stable
performance of the EUR26.0 billion underlying portfolio, which is
in line with Fitch's expectations. The RWN on the class C and D
notes reflects expectations of structural changes.
Stable Performance Trends
Arrears have remained relatively stable (three-months-plus
arrears remain below 1.1% of the current portfolio balance). As
of April 2013, cumulative gross defaults, defined as loans
denounced by the servicer, as a percentage of the initial plus
repurchases portfolio balance stood at a low level of 0.6%.
Sufficient Credit Support
Fitch based its analysis on a worst-case portfolio, relying on
the purchase conditions of new mortgage receivables. The analysis
showed that the current level of credit support remains
sufficient for the class A, B, C and D notes to withstand Fitch's
stresses at their respective rating levels.
Credit enhancement is provided by subordination and a reserve
fund and totals 11% for the class A notes, 8% for the class B
notes, 5% for the class C notes and 1% for the class D notes.
The transaction benefits from the liquidity and credit support
provided by the interest rate swap agreement, which guarantees an
excess margin and the payment of servicing fees. Furthermore, the
risk of a loss in liquidity in case of servicing disruption is
mitigated by the provision to fund an adequately sized cash
reserve if, upon a downgrade of Fortis below 'A'/'F1', the
borrowers are not notified to pay directly into the issuer
account.
Rating Sensitivities
Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors, in particular the effect of increasing unemployment, or
further declines in house prices in excess of Fitch's standard
assumptions that could lead to a fall in recovery rates.
Fortis currently performs various roles, including those of
servicer, account bank provider and swap counterparty.
Consequently, a deterioration in Fortis's credit profile could
affect the transaction's operational performance.
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C Y P R U S
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* CYPRUS: Delays EUR1BB Bonds Repayment; S&P Cuts Rating to SD
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Cyprus's debt ratings have been downgraded
to "default" after it announced it would delay paying back EUR1
billion (US$1.3 billion; GBP860 million) of bonds.
Standard & Poor's lowered the island's credit ratings to
"selective default" from CCC/C, BBC relates.
Cyprus will swap government bonds maturing in 2013 through to the
first quarter of 2016 with new debt that matures at between five
and 10 years, BBC discloses.
The EU country has to do the bond swap to meet the terms of its
bailout, BBC notes.
According to BBC, S&P said on Friday that the "exchange
materially changes the terms of the affected debt and constitutes
what we consider a distressed exchange."
"We view the extension of maturities without what we find to be
adequate offsetting compensation as the exchange of new debt on
less favorable terms to the existing debt."
Earlier this year, Cyprus secured a loan package worth 10bn euros
from its EU partners and the International Monetary Fund, BBC
recounts. This included a tax on large deposits and thorough
banking reform, which will raise EUR13 billion, BBC discloses.
An early proposal to raise money through a levy on all Cypriot
bank deposits -- including those below EUR100,000 -- caused panic
in financial markets and was quickly withdrawn, BBC notes.
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F R A N C E
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LABCO SA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-term Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed France-based clinical laboratory
services company Labco SA's Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
at 'B+'. The Outlook is Stable. Fitch has also affirmed the
senior secured notes at 'BB-' with a Recovery Rating of 'RR3' and
the super senior revolving credit facility rating at 'BB' with a
Recovery Rating of 'RR2'.
Key Rating Drivers
Market-Leading Positions: Labco is the largest medical
diagnostics company in France and Iberia. It is also the second-
largest diagnostic company, with a pan-European presence, in
Western Europe. Labco continues to benefit from this geographical
diversity through reduced reliance on single healthcare systems.
Stable End-Markets: Healthcare markets are underpinned by
favorable demographics and socioeconomic factors. While these
drivers vary from country to country the overall trend is
positive.
Modest Q113 Performance: Like-for-like Q113 revenue was down by
0.8% compared to the prior year (excluding the impact of the UK
joint venture with Sodexo), and recurring EBITDA increased by
0.3%. Organic performance was supported by growth in Belgium and
France and the effect of acquisitions completed in 2012.
Government cost-containment measures in most of Labco's markets
are expected to continue to put pressure on organic growth
Low Organic Growth expected to Remain: Despite favorable
demographics, Fitch expects price reductions by the ultimate
payer of the tests, such as governments and insurance companies,
to hold back growth. Price reductions are expected at average
yearly rates of between 1% and 3% due to cost containment
measures, particularly in countries where the regulator is the
payer. In our view future growth will mainly be achieved through
acquisitions, rather than organically.
Slow Deleveraging Expected: Despite a slowdown in Labco's
acquisition pace in 2012 and 2013, credit metrics are expected to
improve slightly, helped by recent acquisitions leading to EBITDA
margin improvements over time. Expected end-2013 (pro forma for
acquisitions) funds from operations (FFO) net adjusted leverage
(x) and FFO interest cover (x) are likely to improve to 6.1x and
2.0x, respectively, from 6.2x and 1.8x in 2012 based on Fitch's
projections.
New Law on Medical Biology: The new law adopted by the French
Senate in May 2013 requires Labco to rely on new ownership
structures for future acquisitions in France. This may lead to a
more complicated ownership structure and its implementation will
initially be more time-consuming for Labco. The new law also
limits Labco's ability to sell or transfer currently owned and
future assets and shares of clinical laboratories.
Above Average Recovery Prospects:
Fitch continues to apply a distressed EV/EBITDA multiple of 6x
when assigning bespoke recoveries to Labco. This is a slight
discount to the average EBITDA multiple at which Labco typically
acquires laboratories in need of restructuring. Recoveries on the
senior secured notes remain at the low end of Fitch's 'RR3'
range, of 51% to 70%. This provides limited headroom in the
recovery rating for additional senior secured debt. However the
likely continued draw down of the revolving credit facility for
acquisitions should increase Labco's enterprise value in the
long-term and therefore supports the 'RR3' rating.
Rating Sensitivities
Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:
- FFO net adjusted leverage greater than 6.25x and FFO interest
charge cover of less than 1.5x on a sustained basis (both on
a pro forma basis annualizing the EBITDA of any acquisitions).
- Since Labco's ability to source, execute and extract
additional
cost savings from acquiring laboratories at attractive EBITDA
multiples is a key factor underpinning the current rating, a
larger acquisition not complying with these parameters could
also lead to a negative rating action.
Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:
- Continued industry leading profitability with at least mid-
single digit free cash flow as a percentage of revenue.
- FFO net adjusted leverage below 4.5x and FFO fixed charge
cover
above 2.5x on a sustained basis
SOLAREZO: Enters Bankruptcy Proceedings on Lack of Capital
----------------------------------------------------------
PV-Tech reports that Solarezo has entered bankruptcy proceedings
in an effort to restructure its finances having a reported EUR50
million order backlog with only a 65MW production capacity.
According to PV-Tech, reports said that the company was seeking
working capital to meet orders but raising funds proved
difficult. Chemical group DRT was said to have almost a quarter
stake in the company and had offered half the working capital
needed to continue operations, PV-Tech relates.
Solarezo is a France-based module manufacturer.
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G E R M A N Y
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KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'BB'
long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based cable operator
Kabel Deutschland Holding AG (KDH). The outlook is stable.
At the same time S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue rating on the
group's EUR700 million senior secured notes due 2018, and 'B+'
issue rating on the EUR400 million senior notes due 2017. The
recovery rating on the senior secured notes remains unchanged at
'2', and the recovery rating on the senior notes is unchanged at
'6.'
The affirmation reflects S&P's view that the announced
acquisition of KDH by U.K-based telecom operator Vodafone Group
PLC is unlikely to have a significant near-term impact on KDH's
operating prospects or S&P's assessment of its financial risk
profile in the next 12 months. S&P also expects an only gradual
integration of Vodafone's fixed-line business with retail
customers into KDH's operations, following the expected closing
of the transaction in the fourth quarter of 2013. Without any
explicit financial support from the higher-rated Vodafone, S&P
would not immediately envisage an enhancement of its assessment
of KDH's stand-alone credit profile (SACP).
S&P understands that after the transaction KDH intends to
maintain a near-term target leverage range of 3.0x to 3.5x net
debt to EBITDA, as adjusted by the group. As a result, S&P
expects the group's ratio of Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to
EBITDA to remain at 4.0x to 4.5x in the next 12 months, with no
near-term prospects of additional deleveraging as a result of the
proposed acquisition.
On June 24, 2013, Vodafone announced an all-cash tender offer of
EUR87 per share for KDH, and KDH's management board has stated
its intention to recommend the offer to its shareholders. The
transaction is expected to close in the fourth quarter of
calendar year 2013, subject to a minimum acceptance rate of 75%
and regulatory approval. S&P understands that, following a
successful close of the transaction, Kabel Deutschland will
remain a separate legal entity within the Vodafone group and will
be responsible for Vodafone's fixed-line retail business in
Germany.
The ratings on KDH continue to reflect S&P's assessment of the
group's business risk profile as "satisfactory" and financial
risk profile as "aggressive."
The business risk profile is supported by KDH's stable and very
profitable utility-like cable-TV (CATV) revenues and the
potential for further solid revenue growth in the near term via
further uptake of broadband Internet, telephony, and pay-TV
services. Nevertheless, the group faces significant competition
from Deutsche Telekom AG and from various technology platforms,
such as satellite TV, digital terrestrial TV, and Internet-
Protocol TV.
In S&P's base-case assessment, it expects high-single-digit
organic year-on-year revenue growth in fiscal 2014, compared with
a 7.7% increase in revenues in fiscal 2013. S&P also expects KDH
to generate adjusted EBITDA, as defined by the group, of about
EUR930 million-EUR950 million in fiscal 2014, up from
EUR862 million in fiscal 2013.
KDH's financial risk profile is constrained, in S&P's view, by
the group's still-high Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA
ratio, which stood at 4.6x as of March 31, 2013. In addition,
S&P expects significant subscriber acquisition costs and fierce
competition for broadband Internet and telephony services, as
well as the group's additional infrastructure investments, to
constrain free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation in the next
12 to 18 months, compared with FOCF of EUR74 million in fiscal
2013, despite S&P's expectation of higher EBITDA. The financial
risk is supported by the group's long-term capital structure and
moderately conservative financial policy.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that KDH will
maintain a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of
4.0x-4.5x and generate solid FOCF over the next 12 months. S&P
believes FOCF will increase to at least 5% of gross financial
debt in fiscal 2015, with good prospects of reaching about 10% in
the medium term.
S&P could lower the ratings if KDH's adjusted leverage ratio
deteriorated permanently to more than 4.5x as a result of large
shareholder distributions or significant acquisitions. Lower
FOCF prospects due to weaker EBITDA growth and increasing
subscriber-growth related investments could also trigger a
downgrade.
S&P could raise the rating if KDH's credit measures improved
because of continued revenue and earnings growth and the use of
free cash flow for debt reduction. In S&P's opinion, an upgrade
would be supported by a reduction and maintenance of KDH's ratio
of debt to EBITDA, as adjusted by Standard & Poor's, at 3.5x-4.0x
and FOCF in excess of 10% of gross financial debt. In addition,
assuming completion of the proposed acquisition by Vodafone,
explicit financial support from Vodafone or a significant
operational integration could support ratings upside in the
medium term.
TITAN EUROPE 2006-2: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Titan Europe 2006-2 PLC's class A, B, and C notes. At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class D, E, F, G, H,
and J notes.
Titan Europe 2006-2 is a German commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction originally backed by four
multifamily housing loans.
The rating actions follow S&P's review of the underlying loans
and has applied its 2012 European CMBS criteria.
PETRUS PORTFOLIO LOAN
The loan fully repaid on Jan. 31, 2013. According to the April
2013 cash manager report, sale proceeds of EUR208 million were
allocated to the class A noteholders.
VELVET PORTFOLIO LOAN
The loan was sold on April 5, 2013. According to the April 2013
cash manager report, the cash manager distributed sale proceeds
of EUR125.6 million to the class A noteholders and allocated non-
accruing interest (NAI) amounts of 15.4 million to the class H
and J noteholders.
MARGAUX PORTFOLIO LOAN (86% OF THE POOL)
The loan is currently secured by German residential units. The
outstanding securitized balance reported in the April 2013
investor report is EUR273.4 million.
The Margaux portfolio loan entered into special servicing in July
2012, following failure to repay at loan maturity.
The current securitized loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 102.3%,
based on a June 2012 valuation of EUR237.2 million.
The Margaux loan is cross-defaulted with the Petrus portfolio
loan. This means that any remaining surplus proceeds from the
Petrus portfolio will be available to be applied toward the
repayment of amounts due under the Margaux portfolio loan,
following completion of any applicable sale price adjustment and
the payment of all fees, costs, and expenses for the Petrus
portfolio sale. The final amount to be distributed is yet to be
determined, but, according to the April 2013 investor report, the
cash manager will apply approximately EUR4 million of surplus
proceeds toward the Margaux loan in July 2013. S&P has
considered this amount in its analysis.
S&P has assumed principal losses on this loan under its base-case
scenario.
LABRADOR PORTFOLIO LOAN (14% OF THE POOL)
The loan is currently secured by German residential units. The
outstanding securitized balance reported in the April 2013
investor report is EUR43.8 million.
The loan entered special servicing in November 2010 due to a
payment default. Under an agreement with the insolvency
administrator, no debt service payments are being made.
The current securitized LTV ratio is 91.4%, based on a February
2011 valuation of EUR47.9 million.
S&P has assumed principal losses on this loan under its base-case
scenario.
INTEREST SHORTFALLS
S&P understands that the excess spread, which is distributed to
the class X notes, is not available to mitigate interest
shortfalls. The issuer relies on the liquidity facility to
address timely payment of interest on the notes. However, the
transaction documents indicate that the liquidity facility is not
available to cover interest shortfalls under the notes, if such
shortfalls have resulted from periodic or special servicing fees.
According to the April 2013 cash manager report, the class H and
J notes have experienced interest shortfalls. The shortfalls
arose due to the size of the special servicing fees and expenses.
S&P therefore believes that the class B, C, D, E, F, and G notes
may become vulnerable, to different degrees, to interest
shortfalls on future interest payment dates.
COUNTERPARTY CRITERIA
The liquidity facility agreement does not fully comply with S&P's
current counterparty criteria. Under these criteria, the
liquidity facility provider cannot support ratings on securities
that are higher than S&P's long-term issuer credit rating (ICR)
on the counterparty.
S&P's current counterparty criteria therefore caps its ratings in
this transaction at its long-term ICR on HSBC Bank PLC (AA-
/Negative/A-1+), in its role as liquidity facility provider.
RATING RATIONALE
S&P's ratings in Titan Europe 2006-2 address timely payment of
interest, payable quarterly in arrears, and payment of principal
not later than the legal final maturity date (in January 2016).
The available credit enhancement for the class A, B, and C notes
has increased following the repayment of the Petrus and Velvet
loans.
S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class A notes is now sufficient to cover its expectations
of property value losses under higher rating level scenarios.
However, S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria constrain its rating on
the class A notes at 'AA- (sf)'. Therefore, S&P has raised to
'AA- (sf)' from 'A- (sf) 'its rating on the class A notes.
S&P's analysis also indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class B and C notes is sufficient to cover
its expectations of property value losses under higher rating
level scenarios. However the increase in ratings remains
constrained due to liquidity risk. S&P has therefore raised to
'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on the class B notes and
to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.
S&P's analysis indicates that the amount of available credit
enhancement for the class D notes is sufficient to cover its
expectations of property value losses and cash flow disruption
under their current rating level scenarios. Therefore, S&P has
affirmed its 'B (sf)' rating on the class D notes.
In S&P's opinion, the class E notes remain highly vulnerable to
principal losses and interest shortfalls in our base-case
scenario. Therefore, S&P has affirmed its 'CCC+ (sf)' rating on
the class E notes.
S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class F and G notes
because they are highly vulnerable to principal losses under its
base-case scenario and experienced interest shortfalls on the
January 2013 payment date.
At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the
class H and J notes because these classes of notes continue to
experience interest shortfalls. The issuer has also applied NAI
amounts to the class H and J notes, which has reduced the
principal balance used for calculating interest on these classes
of notes on future interest payment dates.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17-G7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating Rating
To From
Titan Europe 2006-2 PLC
EUR862.169 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Raised
A AA- (sf) A- (sf)
B BBB+ (sf) BB+ (sf)
C BB+ (sf) BB- (sf)
Ratings Affirmed
D B (sf)
E CCC+ (sf)
F D (sf)
G D (sf)
H D (sf)
J D (sf)
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I T A L Y
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SEAT PAGINE: Board Approves Debt Restructuring Proposal
-------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the board of Seat Pagine Gialle approved on
Thursday a debt restructuring proposal and new strategic
guidelines to relaunch the company.
In February, the heavily indebted company said it would ask
creditors for a debt restructuring after conceding its interest
burden and the recession had made its targets to 2015
unachievable, Reuters relates.
According to Reuters, in a statement, Seat said the debt
proposal, which will be presented for review to a court in Turin,
envisages that a portion of its debt will be converted into
equity and part of it reimbursed with cash.
The company said that the restructuring would reduce consolidated
debt by about EUR1 billion (US$1.30 billion), Reuters notes.
Under the new plan, Seat Pagine, as cited by Reuters, said it
will focus on the Italian market where it would reshape its
product offering, seek possible acquisitions and streamline
operations in order to cut costs.
At the end of December, Seat had a gross debt of about EUR1.5
billion, Reuters discloses. Its net loss in 2012 was EUR1.06
billion due to impairments, while free operating cash flow was
EUR318 million, Reuters says.
Like other directories firms, including France's PagesJaunes and
Yell in Britain, Seat Pagine has been struggling to reduce debts
and fight competition from Internet search giants such as Google,
Reuters states.
About SEAT Pagine
SEAT Pagine Gialle SpA (PG IM) -- http://www.seat.it/-- is an
Italy-based company that operates multimedia platform for
assisting in the development of business contacts between users
and advertisers. It is active in the sector of multimedia
profiled advertising, offering print-voice-online directories,
products for the Internet and for satellite and ortophotometric
navigation, and communication services such as one-to-one
marketing. Its products include EuroPages, PgineBianche,
Tuttocitta and EuroCompass, among others. Its activity is
divided into four divisions: Directories Italia, operating
through, Seat Pagine Gialle; Directories UK, through TDL
Infomedia Ltd. and its subsidiary Thomson Directories Ltd.;
Directory Assistance, through Telegate AG, Telegate Italia Srl,
11881 Nueva Informacion Telefonica SAU, Telegate 118 000 Sarl,
Telegate Media AG and Prontoseat Srl, and Other Activitites
division, through Consodata SpA, Cipi SpA, Europages SA, Wer
liefert was GmbH and Katalog Yayin ve Tanitim Hizmetleri AS.
* * *
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 11,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the corporate family
rating of Seat Pagine Gialle SpA to Ca, and the probability of
default rating to Ca-PD/LD. Concurrently, Moody's downgraded
Seat's EUR750 million senior secured bonds due 2017 and EUR65
million senior secured stub bonds due 2017 to Ca. Moody's said
the outlook on the ratings is negative.
===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================
CASPIAN ENERGY: Fails to Pay 9.34-Mil. Debt to Meridian
-------------------------------------------------------
Caspian Energy Inc. on June 26 disclosed that it has received
notices of a failure to make a payment from Meridian Capital
International Fund under Caspian's Amended and Restated
Convertible Debentures dated July 8, 2011 for failure to pay the
principal amount on maturity. The aggregate principal amount of
the Convertible Debentures held by Meridian Capital is
US$9,343,731 and the maturity date of the Convertible Debentures
was June 2, 2013. An additional US$3,117,226 aggregate principal
amount of Convertible Debentures held by another party remain
outstanding as well. The terms of the Convertible Debentures
provide that a default occurs if there is a failure to pay
principal on maturity and such breach is not remedied within 30
days after receipt of written notice from the holder. Caspian
has 30 days to repay the amounts owing to Meridian Capital.
Caspian intends to contact Meridian Capital to discuss repayment
terms.
Caspian Energy Inc. is an oil and gas exploration company,
operating in Kazakhstan where it has a number of targets in the
highly prospective Aktobe Oblast of Western Kazakhstan.
===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================
ION TRADING: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive ratings to the
instruments issued by ION Trading Technologies S.a.r.l, a
Luxembourg-based private limited liability company fully-owned by
ION Trading Technologies Limited. These ratings confirm the
provisional ratings assigned on May 15, as the final terms are in
line with the drafts reviewed for the assignments of the
provisional ratings. The corporate family rating and probability
of default rating assigned to IONTT are B3 and B3-PD
respectively.
The definitive ratings assigned are: a B2 rating (LGD3, 35%) to
the US$50 million Revolving Credit Line maturing in 2018, a B2
rating (LGD3, 35%) to the US$750 million First Lien Term Loan
maturing in 2020, and a Caa2 rating (LGD5, 88%) to the US$375
million Second Lien Term Loan maturing in 2021.
Ratings Rationale:
The ratings negatively reflect IONTT's high leverage, its
relatively small size, its dependence on a narrow range of
software and services for fixed income electronic trading
activities, and high customer concentration. Moody's view also
reflects the risk of technology shifts and the fragmented nature
of the industry in which the company operates and the need of all
players to continue growing through acquisitions to gain new
customers. The rating also factors in Moody's expectation that
debt to EBITDA (including Moody's adjustments, mainly $38 million
of additional debt for operating leases) will stay high at around
7.0x.
The ratings positively reflect the very high profitability of the
company, its strong operating cash flow generation, good medium-
term visibility of revenues due to long-term contracts, and its
high customer retention rates
The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that IONTT will
maintain its solid market position and customer relationships
whilst further growing organically in new markets, and will keep
EBITDA margins (including Moody's adjustments) in the 40-50%
range.
The loan proceeds along with US$70 million of IONTT's cash
holdings have been used to repay around US$230 million of
existing debt and pay a dividend of US$948 million to ION
Investment Group.
The debt is located at ION Trading Technologies S.a.r.l, a
Luxembourg-based private limited liability company fully-owned by
ION Trading Technologies Limited. The debt is unconditionally
guaranteed by IONTT and secured by all assets of IONTT and its
subsidiaries. The First Lien Term Loan and Revolving Credit Line
are rated B2, one-notch above the CFR. The Second Lien Term Loan
is rated Caa2, two-notches below the CFR. The three-notch
difference between the two secured loans reflects Moody's
assessment of the priority of claims of the First-Lien Term Loan
on the security package, which are mainly made of the shares of
the operating entities ION Trading Ireland Limited and Pattington
Limited.
What Could Change the Rating Up/Down
The ratings could be upgraded if there is clear evidence that the
trading platform software industry in which the company operates
is stabilizing, and if the debt sustainably approaches 6.0x
EBITDA. The rating could be lowered if IONTT's customer retention
or EBITDA margin were to decline from current levels, thus
suggesting a weakening of the company's competitive position. The
rating could also be downgraded if IONTT consistently generates
negative free cash flow or if debt goes above 8.0x EBITDA.
The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Software Industry published in October 2012. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.
Privately owned by ION Investment Group, a TA Associates company,
ION Trading Technologies Ltd. is a global provider of sell-side
trading software and service to banks and other financial
institutions operating in fixed income markets. Incorporated in
Dublin (Ireland), IONTT has offices in London and other major
financial centers worldwide. IONTT offers, in particular, trading
solutions for electronic fixed income markets, including support
for cash, futures, repos, money markets, interest rate swaps and
credit default swaps. IONTT serves more than 160 customers from
15 locations globally with a staff of over 800 people. In 2012,
the company generated revenues of US$245 million and EBITDA of
US$142 million.
SODRUGESTVO GROUP: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Luxembourg-based Sodrugestvo Group
S.A.'s Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'B' and revised the Outlook to Stable from Negative.
The revision of the Outlook reflects Sodru's strong financial
performance in FY12 for both sales and profits moderated in its
effects on cash flow by further investments in working capital
and dividend payments. Although Fitch expects the operating
environment to be challenging in FY13 and that the consolidation
of recent expansion projects will result in increased debt, we
believe its third soybean crushing plant and other investments
will meet increasing long-term demand for oilseeds meal and oil,
therefore resulting in sustainable profits and steady de-
leveraging after FY14. The collaboration agreement with Mitsui
and equity injection in October 2012 further underpins the Stable
Outlook with the assumption that Sodru will now pursue more
conservative expansion and adhere to a de-leveraging path.
Key Rating Drivers
Vertically Integrated Business Model
Sodru benefits from a vertically-integrated business model
covering most soybean meal and oil production stages, from
origination and beans storage to processing and product delivery.
This model leads to lower business risks due to the high degree
of control over the production cycle. This is offset by limited
diversification beyond its core business lines.
Ambitious Investment Program
Sodru is close to completing multiple expansion projects, related
to enhancing its business profile as well as moving along the
value chain, estimated by Fitch at US$400 million by 2014. If
effectively managed, we expect significant growth in FY14 albeit
with a mild improvement in operating margins until the new assets
are fully ramped up. Focus on leveraging its existing strengths
and sequential execution of the expansion projects and new market
entries could mitigate these risks.
Strong Industry Demand Drivers
Russia's soybean meal and oil production has recently been
increasing and is forecast to meet increasing demand from
industrialized meat processors as the sector is prioritized in
the government's agriculture policy to ensure food self-
sufficiency. The increasing global population and protein
consumption should ensure growth of global soybean consumption,
while increasing usage of biodiesel and stable demand for
vegetable oil should secure demand for soybean oil. Fitch
acknowledges Sodru's enhanced capabilities to produce in future
other oils and meals such as rapeseed, which have high demand
potential.
Weak Cash Flow Generation
Funds from operations (FFO) generation is weak due to a low
operating margin and high interest burden. In FY13 (ending June
2013) and FY14, we do not expect Sodru will cover working capital
investments and the last part of its capex program with
internally generated cash flows. However, we acknowledge Sodru's
ability to fund these projects with multiple sources of financing
and consequently we are comfortable that these investments will
be fully funded. We estimate that Sodru will not start generating
positive FCF until FY15. The Stable Outlook is premised on the
assumption that Sodru will adopt a more conservatively funded
expansion plan that retains earnings.
Strategic Alliance with Mitsui
Fitch considers the equity injection made by Mitsui & Co. Ltd of
US$84 million in October 2012 as a positive factor. Collaboration
in origination and distribution of soft commodities will be
beneficial for Sodru's operational profile. This mitigates
Sodru's high FFO gross adjusted leverage -adjusted for readily
marketable inventories (RMI) which is expected to peak at 4.7x in
FY13 before reducing towards 4x expected for FY14. If Sodru
receives additional equity injections, and proceeds are mainly
used to achieve a permanent deleveraging, this would be deemed
positive for the ratings.
Rating Sensitivities
Future developments that could lead to a negative rating action
include:
- Net lease-adjusted leverage above 6x (>4x RMI-adjusted)
equivalent to FFO adjusted gross leverage (RMI-adjusted)
above 5x
- Negative FCF in the mid to high single digits (% of sales)
eroding internal liquidity
- Further decrease in operating EBITDAR margin below 6.5%
in FY14
Future developments that could lead to a positive rating action
include:
- Net lease-adjusted leverage below 4x (<3x RMI-adjusted)
equivalent to FFO adjusted gross leverage (RMI-adjusted)
below 3.5x
- FFO fixed charge cover (RMI-adjusted) above 5x
- Operating EBITDAR margin above 8% on a consistent basis
- Evidence of positive FCF, conservative business expansion
funded by cash flows or equity rather than debt
Liquidity and Debt Structure
Adequate Liquidity
Sodru's liquidity is considered adequate in line with its current
rating, comprising cash, liquid inventories (RMI) and available
undrawn bank lines. We believe these sources of funds are
sufficient to cover Sodru's short-term debt maturities, including
its rollover of working capital lines. Although negative FCF in
FY13 will stretch liquidity, we note that Sodru's latest business
expansion is fully funded while other smaller projects are either
scalable or financing is being arranged.
=========
S P A I N
=========
AUTOVIA DEL CAMINO: S&P Cuts SPUR Rating to BB+ on Weak Traffic
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'BB+'
from 'BBB-' its long-term Standard & Poor's underlying rating
(SPUR) and insured debt ratings on the EUR175 million senior
secured European Investment Bank loan due 2029 and EUR145 million
senior secured commercial bank loan due 2030 issued by Spanish
shadow-toll road project Autovia del Camino S.A. (Camino). The
outlook is stable.
The loans have an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee of
payment of scheduled interest and principal from Syncora
Guarantee U.K. Ltd. (not rated). Under Standard & Poor's
criteria, a rating on monoline-insured debt reflects the higher
of the rating on the monoline and the SPUR. Therefore, the long-
term debt rating on Camino's loans reflects the SPUR.
The rating actions reflect S&P's view that Camino's financial
profile has weakened because of continued low traffic volume
relative to its forecasts on the project's road. In addition,
the Spanish government has not yet set a completion date for the
construction of new feeder roads on which Camino relies for
traffic volume growth -- mainly the extension of the A-12 to
connect Burgos and Logrono. S&P now assumes that these will not
be completed by 2016, as it originally anticipated.
S&P has forecast later construction completion dates mainly
because of the Spanish government's budgetary constraints. S&P
understands that the government has only budgeted for the design
of the A-12 connection in 2015, and has avoided stating any
intended completion date. In addition, although the connections
with the AP-68 and N-232 roads remain under construction, the
pace of investment has slowed down, and the government has
postponed the new official opening date to late 2014. S&P's
revised base-case scenario assumes that the A-12 connection will
not be open to traffic until 2022 and that the connections to the
AP-68 and N-232 will not materially increase traffic on the
project road.
Furthermore, traffic levels have contracted materially since mid-
2011. Traffic in the 12 months to April 2013 decreased by 5% for
light vehicles (LV) and 4.1% for heavy goods vehicles (HV)
compared with the previous year. During the first four months of
2013, the decreases were 4.6% and 0.7%, respectively.
In S&P's view, the continued weakness in the Spanish economy
constrains Camino's ability to sustain healthy traffic growth in
the near term, despite the project's strong economic basis, its
large proportion of commuters, and the region of Navarre's
relatively healthy economic situation compared with the rest of
Spain.
S&P's updated base-case assumptions for traffic are for a
decrease of 4% in LVs and 6% in HVs for 2013, and flat growth for
2014. From 2015, S&P forecasts long-term traffic growth of 1.5%.
This results in a forecast minimum annual debt service coverage
ratio (ADSCR) of 1.02x in 2021 and an average ADSCR of 1.28x.
S&P notes that the project is particularly vulnerable between
2017 and 2022 due to the delay in the completion of the A-12
connection and the scheduled major maintenance during these
years.
In 2012, the Spanish government enacted new legislation modifying
the Spanish corporate income tax regime. The new law, which
Navarre has mostly mirrored in its corporate income tax, limits
the tax deductions of financial expenses to 30% of annual
operating profit. This will not affect Camino's financials until
2017. S&P anticipates only a minimal effect thereafter.
Camino holds a 30-year concession to design, build, finance, and
operate under a shadow toll regime a 70-kilometer road linking
the cities of Pamplona and Logrono in northern Spain.
The 'BB+' long-term SPUR continues to take into account what S&P
sees as the following project risks:
-- Full exposure to traffic volume risk. Risk is heightened by
the decrease in traffic that we have observed since mid-
2011 and Camino's reliance on new traffic from feeder roads
that S&P now expects to be completed later than it
previously anticipated.
-- Continuing weak economic conditions in Spain, including
rising unemployment, which reduces Camino's traffic volumes
because the majority of road users are commuters.
-- Exposure to operations and maintenance and lifecycle
expenditure risk, together with a fairly high exposure to
interest-rate fluctuations (although 75% of the project's
debt is hedged).
-- An aggressive financing structure, reflected in Camino's
high leverage, a back-loaded debt profile (about 44% of the
debt amortizes in the last five years of the project) and
weak forecast ADSCRs between 2017 and 2022.
These risks are partly offset, in S&P's view, by the following
credit strengths:
-- The project's sound rationale, with a supportive concession
framework and strong support from the highly rated
government of Navarre (BBB+/Negative/--), which granted the
concession.
-- The shadow nature of the project's toll payments (meaning
that the project receives per-driver fees directly from the
government rather than collecting them from road users).
This eliminates the risk associated with the price
elasticity inherent to real toll road traffic.
-- An inflation swap that protects the project against
deviations in tariff adjustments from original forecasts.
-- Liquidity retention above the peer average, thanks to a
dividend lock-up (under which Camino cannot distribute
dividends without an ADSCR of at least 1.2x) and a major
maintenance reserve account that S&P assess as stronger
than that of most comparable projects. The reserve account
is funded with the greater of the typical three-year
forward-looking coverage (100%, 66%, and 33% of the
lifecycle costs anticipated in the next, second, and third
years ahead, respectively) and 200% of the average
lifecycle budget over the next 10 years.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that although traffic
volume growth over the remainder of the concession will be weaker
than it originally anticipated, it will not deteriorate
significantly further.
S&P could take a negative rating action if traffic levels fall
materially further in the near term, or there is a further
significant delay in the construction of the feeder roads.
S&P could take a positive rating action if it observes a material
increase in traffic volumes, or if S&P's forecast of future
growth changes materially as a result of an improvement in the
forecast macroeconomic conditions in Spain. S&P could also take
a positive rating action if it assess Camino's lifecycle as
having sufficient flexibility to protect ADSCRs when needed.
BANCO MARE: Fitch Bases CH Rating on 'BB+' Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained Banco Mare Nostrum's (BMN,
'BB+'/RWN/'B') Cedulas Hipotecarias' (CH; mortgage covered bonds)
'BBB+' rating on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).
The rating action follows a full review of the program, which
acknowledges the transfer of EUR7.35 billion troubled assets to
the SAREB in February 2013 and the sale of EUR7.6 billion assets
to Banco de Sabadell in May 2013. As of end-May 2013, the
outstanding amount of mortgage cover assets was c. EUR21.53
billion, while the outstanding CH amount was c. EUR12.68bn,
resulting in nominal overcollateralization (OC) of 70%.
Key Rating Drivers
The CH rating is based on BMN's Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) of 'BB+'/RWN, a Discontinuity Cap (D-Cap) assessment of 1
(very high risk) which enables the CH to be rated 'BBB-' on a
probability of default (PD) basis, and the relied upon level of
OC of 66.6% that is judged by Fitch to provide recoveries in
excess of 91% on CH assumed to be in default in a 'BBB+'
scenario, justifying a two-notch uplift from the 'BBB-' rating on
a PD basis. The RWN on the CH reflects the RWN on BMN's IDR.
Fitch's 'BBB+' break-even OC has decreased slightly to 64.5%,
mainly driven by the increased quality of the cover pool
composition, but also reduced available excess spread. In a
'BBB+' rating scenario, Fitch has calculated a stressed credit
loss rate of 16.1% for the entire cover pool associated with a
cumulative weighted average (WA) default rate of 26.8% and WA
recovery rate of 39.9%. Similarly, under a base case stress
scenario, Fitch derives a WA loss rate of 8.1% associated with a
WA default rate of 16.1% and WA recovery rate of 50.0%.
The weight of developer loans in the cover pool has significantly
decreased to c. 5% from c. 25% following the transfer of troubled
assets to the SAREB. Consequently, the current cover pool is
highly concentrated on residential mortgage loans (c.70%), which
Fitch views as less risky, and commercial mortgage loans (25%).
Fitch considers BMN's CH program as dormant, since the entity
does not expect further issuances in the short to medium term.
This is because the issuer's overall liquidity position has
improved significantly resulting from the EUR5.82 billion bonds
received from the SAREB as a payment for the trouble assets
transferred by BMN. As a consequence, we have modified the
alternative management cover pool score within our discontinuity
assessment to moderate high from moderate, as we perceive the
issuer's efforts to maintain the asset pool credit quality as
lower than for active programs.
Rating Sensitivities
The 'BBB+' rating would be vulnerable to a downgrade if any of
the following occurred (i) BMN's IDR was downgraded by two
notches or more; or (ii) the level of relied upon OC that Fitch
takes into account in its analysis (currently 66.6%) fell below
the 'BBB+' breakeven OC of 64.5%.
Fitch has given credit to BMN's public minimum OC commitment of
66.6%. In the absence of such commitment or in the event of a
breach that would undermine its credibility in the future, Fitch
would then apply a 30% haircut to the lowest level of OC observed
over the previous 12 months, which all else equal would trigger a
downgrade to the CH.
The Fitch breakeven OC for a given covered bond rating will be
affected, among others, by the profile of the cover assets
relative to outstanding covered bonds, which can change over
time, even in the absence of new issuances. Therefore it cannot
be assumed to remain stable.
CAJAS RURALES: Fitch Bases Cedulas Territoriales Rating on BB IDR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Cajas Rurales Unidas (CRU:
BB/Stable/B) EUR545 million Cedulas Territoriales (public sector
covered bonds or CT) a 'BBB' rating. The Outlook is Negative.
Key Rating Drivers
The 'BBB' rating is based on CRU's Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) of 'BB', a Discontinuity Cap (D-Cap) of 0 (full
discontinuity) and the 42.8% minimum legal overcollateralization
(OC) of CT, which is in line with the breakeven OC for the
rating. The Negative Outlook on the CT reflects the Negative
Outlook on Spain (BBB/Negative/F2), to which 34.5% of the cover
pool is exposed.
Nominal OC between the CRU public sector cover pool and the
outstanding CT was 51.2% as of March 2013. However, given the
issuer's Short-term rating of 'B', Fitch does not give full
credit to the OC in place, and relies instead on the mandatory
minimum OC of 42.8%, resulting from the legal requirement which
limits total outstanding CT to 70% of the public sector cover
pool. In a 'BBB' scenario, this level provides 100% recoveries on
outstanding CT, which allows for a three-notch uplift from CRU's
IDR on a recovery basis. For CT, Fitch models recoveries given
default by allocating cover assets proceeds in chronological
order of covered bonds maturities, unlike Cedulas Hipotecarias
(Spanish mortgages covered bonds or CH), where legal provisions
ensure equal treatment of all covered bonds irrespective of their
maturity upon insolvency of the bank (see 'Cedulas Hipotecarias
Legal Framework Review', dated 5 April 2013 at
www.fitchratings.com).
As of March 2013, the cover pool, totaling EUR827 million,
comprised exposures to the Spanish sovereign (34.5% of the pool),
Spanish autonomous regions (20.5%) and local authorities (44.5%).
Fitch analyzed the cover pool using its Portfolio Credit Model
(PCM), resulting in a rating default rate at 'BBB' of 40.2% and a
rating recovery rate of 54.5%. In this rating scenario, the
Spanish sovereign is not assumed to default, hence the CT's
rating is credit linked to Spain's.
The cover pool has a residual weighted average life of 5.9 years,
compared with 3.3 years for the CT. 43% of the assets have a
variable rate of interest, whereas all of the outstanding CT have
a fixed rate. All assets and liabilities are euro-denominated.
In terms of discontinuity risk analysis, Fitch assesses the risk
of asset segregation as moderate high, based on the lack of a
public registry for the public sector cover pool and the lack of
clarity in the legislation regarding the inclusion of bonds as
part of the collateral.
Fitch attributes a full discontinuity liquidity gap and systemic
risk assessment to CRU's CT program considering the CT's hard
bullet profile and the lack of specific protection against
liquidity shortfalls post assumed issuer insolvency. In the
agency's opinion, only intervention by the Spanish authorities
would avoid a default on the CT in this scenario. Fitch believes
that intervention is less likely for CT than it is for CH, given
that CTs are not deemed as important for the Spanish financial
sector.
The systemic alternative management risk is considered moderate
high, mainly because the Spanish law does not provide for a
separate mortgage pool administrator to organize the transition
process in the event of the bank defaulting.
Fitch considers the cover pool-specific alternative management
risk assessment moderate. This reflects the small size and
limited complexity of the portfolio, and therefore the limited
burden to manage the portfolio in the event of a transfer of
operational duties.
The risk assessment for privileged derivatives is categorized as
very low since the program does not have privileged derivative
contracts linked to the public sector book or to the covered
bonds. The absence of any privileged hedging arrangements also
means there is no potential termination payment to impact the
liquidity risk or credit risk assessment.
Rating Sensitivities
The 'BBB' rating would be vulnerable to a downgrade, all else
being equal, if one of the following occurred: CRU was downgraded
to 'BB-' or below; the portfolio composition shifted from
sovereign and regional exposures to local entities; or if the
Spanish sovereign or autonomous communities in the cover pool
were downgraded.
FTA PYMES: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on EUR34MM Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed FTA PYMES Banesto 2's notes, as
follows:
EUR154.2m Class A2 (ISIN ES0372260010): affirmed at 'BBB-sf';
Outlook Stable
EUR24.3m Class B (ISIN ES0372260028): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
Negative
EUR34.0m Class C (ISIN ES0372260036): affirmed at 'CCsf';
assigned Recovery Estimate RE0%
Key Rating Drivers
The affirmation of the class A and B notes reflects their credit
enhancement, which allows them to withstand Fitch's stress
scenarios under their current ratings.
The transaction's performance has worsened since the last review
in July 2012 with loans more than 90 days in arrears increasing
to 5.7% of outstanding balance, compared with 4.2% as of the last
review. Current defaults account for 9.5% of outstanding
portfolio balance up from 8.5% as of the last review. The reserve
fund (RF) remains depleted, while the principal deficiency ledger
(PDL) stands at EUR654,584, down from EUR3.3 million as of the
last review.
The Negative Outlook on the class B notes reflects their
sensitivity to a further deterioration of the portfolio credit
quality. The class C notes were not able to withstand Fitch's
base case stress scenario. The agency considers the full
repayment of the notes unlikely due to the mismatch between the
balance of performing assets and the outstanding balance of the
notes reflected in the PDL, and also the fully depleted RF.
The current portfolio information provided to Fitch by Santander
de Titulizacion, SGFT, SA (SdT, the management company or
Gestora) for the analysis was missing essential fields. Fitch has
not received any information on the loan collaterals, obligor IDs
and amortization profiles. The agency has overcome these data
issues by cross-linking the complete original portfolio data and
information provided by SdT in the closing collateral data tape.
Rating Sensitivities
Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier or applying a 0.75x
recovery rate multiplier to all assets in the portfolio could
result in a one-notch downgrade for the class A2 notes and a two-
notch downgrade for the class B notes.
FTA PYMES Banesto (the issuer) is a static cash flow SME CLO
originated by Banco Espanol de Credito S.A, now part of Banco
Santander S.A. (Banco Santander; BBB+/Negative/F2). At closing,
the issuer used the note proceeds to purchase a EUR1.0bn
portfolio of secured and unsecured loans granted to Spanish small
and medium enterprises and self-employed individuals. The
transaction is managed by SdT.
PESCANOVA SA: Obtains EUR56-Mil. Syndicated Loan From Banks
-----------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Pescanova, which filed for insolvency in
April, said on Friday it had obtained a EUR56 million (US$73
million) syndicated loan to cover its urgent financing needs.
According to Reuters, the company said in a regulatory filing
that Spain's largest banks were all involved in the syndicate.
Pescanova's insolvency filing mentioned debts of EUR1.5 billion
but financial sources have said that total debt is probably more
than double that amount, Reuters notes.
Pescanova is a Galicia-based fishing company. The company
catches, processes, and packages fish on factory ships. It is
one of the world's largest fishing groups.
Pescanova filed for insolvency on April 15 on at least EUR1.5
billion (US$2 billion) of debt run up to fuel expansion before
economic crisis hit its earnings. The Pontevedra mercantile
court in northwestern Galicia accepted Pescanova's insolvency
petition on April 25. The court ordered the board of directors
to step down and proposed Deloitte as the firm's administrator.
===========
T U R K E Y
===========
CALIK HOLDING: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on Turkey-based €alik Holding A.S.
(Calik) to 'B-' from 'B', and affirmed the 'B' short-term
corporate credit rating. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P lowered the long-term Turkish national
scale rating on Calik to 'trBB+' from 'trBBB-', and the short-
term Turkish national scale rating to 'trB' from 'trA-3'.
The downgrade reflects the company's modest operating performance
and credit measures compared with our expectations for the 'B'
rating. As of Dec. 31, 2012, Calik's funds from operations (FFO)
were fairly low. A rating-commensurate ratio of FFO to debt of
about 10% would have required FFO to be close to $200 million,
given that the year-end adjusted debt figure was substantially
higher than S&P had anticipated. S&P therefore believes that
Calik will not be able to post adjusted FFO to debt and debt to
EBITDA commensurate with S&P's 'B' and 'trBBB-' ratings in 2013.
In addition, S&P has revised its assessment of Calik's liquidity
downward to "weak" from "less than adequate," which caps the
long-term rating at 'B-' according to S&P's criteria. The change
reflects the company's still sizable short-term debt. That said,
S&P acknowledges the company's track record of arranging short-
term finance in the local bank market, where banks do not
typically grant multiyear revolving credit facilities according
to Turkish market practice.
In S&P's base-case operating scenario, it anticipates organic
revenue growth (excluding banks) for Calik in the mid to high
single digits in 2013, potentially accelerating in 2014. This
will likely be supported by ongoing construction projects in
Turkmenistan and real estate developments in Istanbul, and
engineering procurement and construction activity in the energy
segment. S&P remains mindful that most of Calik's activities
show some volatility, with the exception of its energy
distribution business. In addition, S&P forecasts positive
EBITDA for all businesses, with a consolidated margin in excess
of 10%. S&P expects inter alia a turnaround of the media
business, after a difficult 2012, and resilient energy activity.
On the financial front, S&P anticipates substantial working
capital releases in 2013 and 2014, depending on the timing and
size of real estate sales. S&P also expects increasing capital
expenditures in construction (for existing real estate projects),
and in energy generation as Calik is developing several
greenfield projects. Bolt-on acquisitions, not necessarily
consolidated, are also likely as S&P understands Calik is keen to
have joint control of new projects with business partners.
The ratings on Calik reflect S&P's assessment of its business
risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged".
The ratings are constrained by S&P's perception of high risks
associated with operating in Turkey and some of its neighboring
countries, where Calik has the majority of its investments and
generates most of its revenues. In addition, Calik has a
substantial amount of debt because previous growth was largely
debt-funded. S&P also views Calik's liquidity as one of the main
constraints to the ratings. S&P now considers Calik's liquidity
to be "weak," because the debt maturity schedule has not improved
and the company remains exposed to large near-term refinancing
requirements. S&P expects Calik's sources of funding to cover
uses by about 0.2x over the next 12 months.
These negative factors are partly offset by Calik's generally
satisfactory track record of developing its businesses over the
past few years, with sustained revenue growth, both organic and
through acquisitions.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Calik's subsidiaries'
performance should improve in 2013, and that the group's
financial risk profile will remain highly leveraged. In
particular, S&P would regard a ratio of FFO to debt in the high
single digits and debt to EBITDA below 6x as commensurate with
the ratings.
Since some of Calik's activities are still in the development
phase, it believes a positive revision of the company's business
risk profile to "fair" from "weak" is unlikely in the next 12
months. S&P might consider a positive rating action if it saw a
marked improvement in the company's credit metrics and liquidity
profile. This, for example, could be illustrated by a track
record of FFO to debt exceeding 10%.
Any further deterioration of Calik's financial risk profile could
trigger a negative rating action. S&P would view negatively
increased leverage, resulting, for instance, from higher
industrial outlays or weaker working capital performance than S&P
currently anticipates under its base-case scenario or from
sizable debt-financed acquisitions.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
ARK: Bought Out of Administration by JD Sports
----------------------------------------------
Duncan Robinson at The Financial Times reports that JD Sports has
bought northern fashion retailer Ark out of administration saving
the Leeds-based fashion outlet from becoming the latest victim of
the high street downturn.
Rumors on Ark's fate had circled the chain since the start of
last week, when the retail sector's quarterly rent bill
traditionally falls due and rival fashion chain Internacionale
fell into administration, the FT relates.
According to the FT, Ark's deal with JD Sports means that 160 of
200 jobs have been saved, but the group has closed four stores in
Norwich, Cambridge, Merry Hill and Manchester.
"It is no secret that many retail businesses are facing a hugely
challenging environment at the moment, and this deal is a welcome
piece of good news for the sector," the FT quotes David Acland,
partner at Begbies Traynor, as saying.
ARQIVA PP: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on GBP600MM Senior Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Arqiva PP Financing plc's notes (whole
business securitisation (WBS) senior debt) final ratings and
affirmed Arqiva Financing plc and Arqiva Broadcast Finance plc's
notes as follows:
Arqiva PP Financing plc (WBS issuer - US Private Placement
(USPP)):
US$358 million (GBP235.5 million equivalent) Series 1 guaranteed
secured senior notes (WBS) due 2025: assigned 'BBB'; Stable
Outlook
GBP163 million Series 2 guaranteed secured senior notes (WBS)
due
2025: assigned 'BBB'; Stable Outlook
Arqiva Financing plc (WBS issuer):
GBP350 million 4.040% Series 2013-1a notes (WBS) due 2035:
affirmed 'BBB'; Stable Outlook
GBP400 million 4.882% Series 2013-1b notes (WBS) due 2032:
affirmed 'BBB'; Stable Outlook
Arqiva Broadcast Finance plc (High Yield (HY) issuer):
GBP600 million 9.500% senior notes (HY) due 2020: affirmed 'B-';
Stable Outlook
The GBP398.5 million (equivalent) USPP issuance of fully
amortizing WBS senior notes (which rank pari-passu with existing
WBS notes) through a newly setup SPV follows the previous initial
issuances of GBP750 million and GBP600 million of WBS and HY
notes, respectively, at end-February 2013.
Key Rating Drivers
The ratings reflect Arqiva's strong operating performance to
date, with EBITDA over the past three years growing at a
compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 9.5% and FY12 (financial
year ending June 2012) EBITDA reaching GBP402.6 million. The
ratings also reflect relatively stable revenues, secured by long-
term contracts with many customers backed by strong credit
profiles, and high barriers to entry, with monopolistic positions
in key communications infrastructure segments notably in UK
digital terrestrial television (DTT) and radio broadcasting, all
under the regulation of UK-based Ofcom, and a dominant position
in the wireless towers sector with 24% market share.
The transaction also benefits from strong structural features,
especially for the senior debt, namely a solid security package,
a full suite of performance-related cash lock-up triggers, and
untypical cash sweep mechanisms (notably for the FinCo term loans
and the Series 2013-1a notes, which are features not usually seen
in UK WBS transactions with the exception of CPUK Finance Ltd
which closed a year ago). The transaction's structure also
differs from typical WBS transactions in that the debt-issuing
vehicles are not orphan SPVs. However, given structural
protections in the transaction's legal documentation, the
potential conflicts of interest (due to the non-orphan status of
the SPVs in combination with their directors also being directors
of other group companies) are deemed remote and consistent with
the notes' rating.
Fitch's analysis included assessing how quickly the transaction's
debt levels reduce to compensate for mid-to-long term revenues
risks. For example, these risks could arise from potential
funding issues (e.g. with cuts from both public and private
customers of DTT or radio broadcasting networks) or threats from
alternative technology (such as IPTV), for instance, lowering the
demand for DTT viewing, with key stress points culminating at the
contracts' renewals. Fitch's base case factors in these risks and
assumes some stresses in satellite and radio revenues in the
medium term with low single digit growth, and below inflation
increases in revenues for both the digital platform and wireless
towers divisions (with nominal stresses at renewal of key
contracts).
The leverage and prepayment speeds continue to bring some comfort
and are almost identical to the patterns before the new issuance
of WBS notes. From a day-one unaudited trailing-12-month (TTM)
December 2012 EBITDA senior leverage of 5.7x (with EBITDA at
GBP414.3 million), the senior debt is expected to deleverage
linearly from 2015 and to be paid back in full under Fitch's base
case (assuming no refinancing) by 2025 (with the exception of the
Series 2013-1b notes which have a fixed scheduled amortization to
2032). This rapid deleveraging is mainly driven by cash sweep
amortization and the heavy amortization schedule of the new
Series 1 and 2 notes (albeit back-ended). The junior debt's
leverage is assumed to reduce under Fitch's base case (assuming a
generic refinancing scenario) from 7.1x to below 6.0x in 2020 (at
maturity of the HY notes), mitigating its refinancing risk.
However, the junior debt remains highly speculative as it is
deeply subordinated and exposed to dividends pay-out disruptions
from the WBS group (which could trigger their default).
Fitch's synthetic base case debt service coverage ratios for the
senior bonds are slightly higher than previously (for the
expected ratings) at 1.61x (for the next 15 years) and 1.68x
(until legal final maturity of the amortizing Series 2013-1b
notes). Given the expected deleveraging and comfort in the short-
to medium-term cash flow generation, these levels are deemed
adequate. However, any lower ratios could be a point of concern
given the higher (long-term) obsolescence risk of Arqiva's
underlying technology compared with other WBS transactions at the
same rating level.
Rating Sensitivities
An unforeseen change in regulation (by Ofcom) notably with regard
to any changes in its pricing formulas (for DTT or radio
broadcasting), licensing costs (e.g. administrative incentive
pricing) or even spectrum allocations could hit Arqiva's future
cash flow and impact the ratings. In addition, the risk of
alternative and emerging technologies (such as IPTV) could
threaten Arqiva's revenues either through technology obsolescence
risk or lower ad-pool available to linear TV content providers.
This risk is currently mitigated by the potential fast
deleveraging of the transaction (assuming cash sweep
amortization) and the long-term contracts securing significant
revenues.
Summary of Credit
The transactions are the refinancing of senior and junior bank
debt of Arqiva Financing No.1 and No. 2 Limited through the
issuances of GBP1,149 million of WBS notes, plus GBP1.19 billion
of FinCo term loans (the underlying secured FinCo/senior borrower
loans ranking pari-passu with the underlying WBS issuer/senior
borrower loans), and GBP600 million of structurally subordinated
HY notes. The remaining FinCo term loans are expected to be
refinanced under the WBS program at a later stage. Arqiva's
operations consist of its ownership of UK's terrestrial TV &
radio broadcasting infrastructure, wireless towers and satellite
transmission services.
BAR ROMA: Faces Closure After No Buyer Found
--------------------------------------------
Terry Murden at The Scotsman reports that Bar Roma is closing at
the end of August after failing to find a buyer.
According to the Scotsman, Bar Roma in Queensferry Street had
been approached by pub chain Wetherspoon's, but it is understood
those talks have stalled.
Owner Mario Cugini said he and his wife Bibi wanted to retire and
had no-one to take on the business, which has been in the city's
West End since 1981, the Scotsman relates.
It appears that potential buyers have not met the asking price,
the Scotsman says. An agent has been appointed but there are not
thought to be any other interested parties, the Scotsman notes.
Some staff have already left and the remaining 25 still without
other jobs will be made redundant when the restaurant shuts, the
Scotsman discloses.
Rumors of its closure have been circulating since February and
the news will disappoint thousands of regulars and visitors, the
Scotsman relates.
Bar Roma is one of Edinburgh's best-known restaurants.
EXPRO HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised to stable
from negative its outlook on oilfield services company Expro
Holdings U.K. 3 Ltd. (Expro). S&P also affirmed its 'B-' long-
term corporate credit rating on Expro.
At the same time, S&P affirmed:
-- Its 'BB-' issue rating on the US$160 million super senior
revolving credit facility (RCF) at Expro Holdings U.K. 4
Ltd. (not rated). The recovery rating on the RCF is
unchanged at '1+', reflecting S&P's expectation of full
(100%) recovery for creditors in the event of a payment
default.
-- S&P's 'B' issue rating on Expro's US$991 million senior
secured term loan D.
-- The recovery rating on the loan is unchanged at '2',
reflecting its expectation of substantial (70%-90%)
recovery in an event of default.
-- S&P's 'B' issue rating on the US$991 million senior secured
notes due 2016, issued by Expro Finance Luxembourg S.C.A.
There is no recovery rating on the notes because the issuer
is an orphan special-purpose entity.
-- S&P's 'CCC+' issue rating on the US$975 million mezzanine
loan issued by Expro Holdings U.K. 4. The recovery rating
on the loan is unchanged at '5', reflecting S&P's
expectation of modest (10%-30%) recovery in an event of
default.
The outlook revision reflects the improvement S&P sees in Expro's
operational trajectory and its potential for steady deleveraging
over coming years. S&P anticipates that Expro will continue to
report double-digit revenue and EBITDA growth, supported by the
increasing development of deepwater oil and gas fields globally.
The revenue and EBITDA growth should allow Expro increased
flexibility to take on additional contracts and associated
investments. S&P projects that Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt
to EBITDA will strengthen to 5x alongside funds from operations
(FFO) to debt of about 10% by March 31, 2015.
The ratings on Expro continue to reflect S&P's assessment of the
company's business risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk
profile as "highly leveraged." Expro's "weak" business profile
reflects S&P's view of its relatively small size, its
participation in the highly competitive and fragmented oilfield
services industry, and its reliance on the exploration spending
of the oil and gas majors. These weaknesses are counterbalanced
by S&P's confidence in Expro's leading market position, providing
critical well testing and commissioning and subsea safety
services, particularly in more challenging, higher-risk offshore
deepwater regions. Expro's good track record on safety and its
blue chip and diversified customer base also serve as ratings
strengths.
S&P assess Expro's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged"
due to its view of its sizable debt, weak free cash flow
generation, and aggressive and complex capital structure, which
includes a mezzanine loan accreting interest at 6.5% per year.
These weaknesses are partly mitigated by S&P's assessment of
Expro's "adequate" liquidity over the next two years and the
company's demonstrably supportive shareholders, although S&P do
not factor their support into the rating.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Expro is well placed
to achieve revenue growth, mostly from its existing clients, and
to modestly expand its margins. S&P forecasts steady
deleveraging such that adjusted gross leverage measures move to
the upper part of the "highly leveraged" financial risk profile
category in the year to March 31, 2015. This corresponds to
adjusted debt to EBITDA approaching 5x and FFO to debt of about
10% by March 31, 2015.
S&P could consider raising the ratings if Expro demonstrates
sufficient EBITDA growth to cover its capital investment
requirements and S&P believes that leverage will remain stronger
than gross debt to EBITDA of 4.5x and FFO to debt of more than
15%.
S&P could consider lowering the ratings if it anticipates that
covenant headroom will become restrictive or if Expro increases
its level of investment materially, putting pressure on
management and operational resources, as well as free cash flow
generation.
NORD ANGLIA: Moody's Cuts Sr. Secured Notes Rating to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the US$325
million Senior Secured Notes due 2017 issued by Nord Anglia
Education (UK) Holdings plc. to B3 from B2. Moody's has
concurrently affirmed Nord Anglia Education, Inc.'s B3 corporate
family rating, B3-PD probability of default rating and the Caa2
rating on the US$150 million PIK Toggle Notes due 2018. Moody's
has also assigned a B3 rating to the US$165 million add-on notes
due 2017. The ratings outlook remains stable.
The proceeds of the proposed US$165 million senior notes will be
used (1) to repay the 125 million bridge loan put in place in
May 2013 for the acquisition of World Class Learning Group Ltd
and for the repayment of the US$11 million HSBC facility; (2) for
corporate general purposes including acquisitions and (3) for
related fees and expenses.
Ratings Rationale:
The affirmation of Nord Anglia Education, Inc.'s B3 CFR reflects
Moody's beliefs that the company's premium schools segment will
continue to deliver positive organic sales growth through new
enrolments and annual tuition fee increases. Moody's expects that
NAE will continue to offset the negative trends in the number of
visits and enquiries by an improved conversion rate as seen in
the year to date performance through June 9, 2013.
NAE's B3 CFR remains constrained by the company's high leverage
estimated at around 7.2x/7.3x at the end of August 2013 pro-forma
for the acquisition of World Class Learning Ltd (WCL). Given the
material shareholder contribution (US$133 million) to the
financing of WCL, the acquisition is almost leverage neutral.
On May 22, 2013, NAE completed the acquisition of WCL, which
operates eleven international schools out of which six schools
are located in the US and one school in Spain where NAE is not
present. The acquisition of WCL will therefore improve NAE's
business profile through greater geographic diversification.
However, EBITDA contribution from the company's schools in China
will remain above 50%. This leaves NAE exposed to expatriate
flows coming out of China.
Moody's expects that NAE will use part of the proceeds from the
US$165 million additional notes to fund additional acquisitions.
However, the B3 CFR assumes that Nord Anglia will adopt a prudent
approach towards debt-financed acquisitions; leading to a Moody's
adjusted leverage ratio trending towards 6.5x by August 2014.
Structural Considerations
The uplift that was provided by the US$150 million PIK Toggle
Notes to the Senior Secured Notes has been diluted as a result of
the proposed issuance of the US$165 million additional notes
because it will increase the quantum of Senior Secured notes
within the capital structure. As a result, the rating of the
Senior Secured Notes is being aligned with the CFR at B3.
The B3 rating assigned to the US$165 million additional notes is
at the same level as the rating of the existing US$325 million
Senior Secured Notes. This reflects the fact that the additional
notes will be issued under the same indenture of the US$325
million Senior Secured Notes and will be governed by the same
terms and conditions.
Outlook
The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that NAE will
continue to generate positive free cash flow and will not engage
in any material debt-funded M&A activity.
What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down
Negative pressure on the ratings could arise if the company's
leverage materially rises above 7.0x by August 2013 and if it
does not trend towards 6.5x by August 2014. Furthermore, any
material deterioration in the company's liquidity position could
contribute towards a rating downgrade. Conversely, positive
pressure on the ratings could develop if (1) the company's
utilization rate and revenue per student were to improve leading
to the adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio falling below 6.0x on a
sustainable basis; (2) the company sustains positive free cash
flow generation and (3) the company reports ample headroom under
its financial covenants.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Headquartered in Hong Kong, China, Nord Anglia Education, Inc.
operates 25 international premium schools, with more than 14,500
students ranging in level from pre-school through to secondary
school. NAE also provides a range of outsourced education and
training contracts with governments in the UK, the Middle East,
and Asia through its Learning Services division. For the fiscal
year ended August 31, 2012, NAE generated revenues of $264.6
million.
UNITED BISCUITS: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' preliminary
long-term corporate credit rating to U.K.-based biscuit
manufacturer United Biscuits Holdco Ltd. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' preliminary issue rating
to United Biscuits' senior secured bank facilities. S&P also
assigned a recovery rating of '3' to these facilities, reflecting
its expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery prospects for
the lenders in the event of a payment default.
The rating on United Biscuits reflects S&P's view that the group
will continue to maintain resilient operating performance. This
is despite its focus on Western European markets (primarily the
U.K.), where economic conditions remain tough and budget-
stretched consumers can only absorb limited price increases. S&P
also factors in its anticipation that the group's balance sheet
will remain highly leveraged, based on S&P's opinion of the
aggressive financial policy of the group's owners, which
primarily consist of two financial sponsors.
"We assess United Biscuits' business risk profile as fair,
reflecting our view of the group's fairly limited geographic
diversification and narrow product offering, compared with its
much larger international peers including Mondelez, Kellogg's,
and Nestle. We understand that the group's strategy is to expand
further into faster-growing emerging economies, but we do not
anticipate a significant change in its geographic sales breakdown
over the coming years. United Biscuits' sales outside Western
Europe represented only 11% of total sales in 2012, with the U.K.
representing the lion's share of sales in Europe. However, our
assessment of the group's business risk also factors in our
anticipation that United Biscuits will continue to defend its
entrenched and leading market position in the profitable U.K.
biscuit market thanks to its strong portfolio of well-known
brands and its ability to innovate," S&P said.
S&P's assessment of the group's financial risk profile as highly
leveraged primarily reflects its high level of indebtedness
(including shareholder loans), resulting from two leveraged buy-
outs (LBOs) since 2000. S&P also factors in the group's solid
and resilient cash generation, with its projections of GBP50
million-GBP70 million free operating cash flow a year.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that United Biscuits will
continue to perform resiliently, posting positive revenue growth
and maintaining adjusted EBITDA margin of close to 16%. S&P
forecasts that United Biscuits will maintain a ratio of adjusted
EBITDA to interest (excluding PIK interest on the shareholder
loans) in excess of 3x over the coming years.
S&P could take a negative rating action if adjusted EBITDA to
interest (excluding PIK interest on the shareholder loans)
slipped below 3x on a sustainable basis. In S&P's opinion, this
would most likely come from releveraging of the group's balance
sheet, which could result from the group's sale to new financial
sponsors, leading to a third LBO of United Biscuits.
S&P could raise the rating if adjusted debt to EBITDA (including
PIK shareholder loans) fell below 5x on a sustainable basis. If
this occurred, S&P could revise its view of the group's financial
risk profile to aggressive, from highly leveraged currently.
However, this change in S&P's assessment would also hinge on its
view of United Biscuits' shareholders having a long-term reduced
appetite for leverage than in the past.
* UK: May-April Company Administrations Up 20% in England & Wales
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Garry White at The Telegraph, citing research from restructuring
firm FRP Advisory, reports that the number of companies going
into administration in England and Wales soared 20% over April
and May.
Company administrations in April and May hit 378, up by a fifth
compared with the first two months of the year, the Telegraph
discloses.
The current monthly run rate indicates that the whole of the
second quarter is likely to show a similarly sharp rise in
administrations, upwards of at least 10%, the Telegraph notes.
"Current indications are that many business occupiers undergoing
financial stress, led by the retail sector, will once again see
an uptick in administrations in June, coinciding with the
quarterly in rent payments," the Telegraph quotes FRP as saying.
"March's uptick was largely down to timing of the last quarterly
property rent date, which hit many struggling high street
retailers after a poor Christmas period."
Ripples from the collapse of retailers are significant, with
supply-chain partners of some of the biggest retail failures in
recent years, including HMV, Comet and Blockbuster, losing
GBP1.86 billion in monies owed, the Telegraph states. Unsecured
creditors, such as small businesses, landlords and HMRC, received
well under 1% of what they were owed, the Telegraph says, citing
research conducted by retail veteran Bill Grimsey.
The study, which looked at the 19 biggest retail failures since
the beginning of 2012, found that GBP499 million was recovered
from these high-profile failures, which initially threatened to
close 4,500 stores and put 58,000 jobs at risk, the Telegraph
states. The bulk of assets recovered were paid out mainly to
banks and administrators, according to the Telegraph.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* Weak Economy Strains Eastern European Businesses' Cash Flow
-------------------------------------------------------------
Cash flow levels of Eastern European businesses are heavily
influenced by the weak economic conditions in the Eurozone.
Overall, this has the effect of slowing trade and triggering
insolvencies. According to the June 2013 Atradius Payment
Practices Barometer, on average, B2B payment defaults in Eastern
Europe rose to 3% of total invoice value over the past year.
Businesses in the region are therefore concerned about
maintaining adequate cash flow levels. Along with falling demand
for products and services, this could weaken Eastern European
businesses prospects for growth and profitability this year.
The Atradius survey interviewed 820 companies across 4 countries
in Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia).
These countries have been negatively impacted by the economic
problems of neighboring Eurozone countries. This has resulted in
a marked increase in the average value of long overdue
receivables, particularly on exports, which rose to 4.7% from
3.6% last year.
The growth in late payments has also contributed to the increase
in the value of receivables write offs. The average total value
of foreign B2B receivables written off as uncollectable by survey
respondents increased 44.4% to 2.6%, and that of domestic write
offs grew 38.5% to 3.6%.
As observed in the 2012 survey, the buyer's financial limitations
remain the primary reason for payment delays. This was most
evident in Hungary in respect of domestic payments (88.2% of
respondents) and in Slovakia in respect of foreign payments
(68.3%).
The rise in the value of invoices extending more than 90 days
past due and in payment defaults is also limiting the ability of
businesses to pursue opportunities. For the majority of Eastern
European respondents, falling demand for products and services
and maintaining adequate cash flow are the biggest challenges to
business growth and sustainable profitability. Slovakian
respondents (48.5%) appear to be the most concerned about
maintaining adequate cash flow this year. Polish respondents
(39.0%) are most concerned about the impact of falling demand of
products and services on the business.
Chris van Lint, Chief Risk Officer of Atradius, commented, "Slow
moving Eurozone economies are causing increased payment delays
and payment defaults for businesses in Eastern Europe,
particularly for those that rely heavily on exports to countries
with weak economies. We expect the positive impact of an
anticipated economic recovery later this year to be limited.
Sustained improvement in payment behavior is not expected until
the 2nd half of 2014 or 2015. In either case, diligent
management of trade credit risk and protecting your business from
payment defaults are essential to maintaining the financial
health of your company."
The complete June 2013 edition of the Atradius Payment Practices
Barometer focussing on Eastern Europe can be found in the
Publications section of the Atradius.com website.
About Atradius
The Atradius Group -- http://www.atradius.com-- provides trade
credit insurance, surety and collections services worldwide.
With a presence through 160 offices in 45 countries, it has a
market share of approximately 31% of the global trade credit
insurance market. Atradius has access to credit information on
100 million companies worldwide. Its products help protect
companies throughout the world from payment risks associated with
selling products and services on credit.
* BOND PRICING: For the Week June 24 to June 28, 2013
-----------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
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ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
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BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *