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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

              Monday, July 8, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 133

                            Headlines



A L B A N I A

PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B/B' Issuer Default Ratings


A U S T R I A

HYPO ALPE: Breakup Deadline Extension Hinges on Credible Plan



F I N L A N D

NOKIA OYJ: Moody's Says Siemens Share Purchase Credit Negative


F R A N C E

WRIGHTON YACHTS: Failure to Pay Bills Prompts Receivership


G E R M A N Y

CONERGY AG: Files for Insolvency in Hamburg District Court
GERMAN RESIDENTIAL: Sponsor's IPO Delay No Impact on Ratings


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: Major Shareholder Sues Ex-Managers Over Derivatives
* S&P Applies Revised Insurance Criteria to Italian Groups


N E T H E R L A N D S

JUBILEE CDO VI: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes


P O L A N D

BRE BANK: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba1' Deposit Ratings & E+ BFSR


P O R T U G A L

LUSITANO SME: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class C Notes
* Portugal Resignations Show Political Risk to Adjustment Program


R O M A N I A

BANCA TRANSILVANIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating
COMPANIA NATIONALA: OPSI Selects Liquidator
TERMOELECTRICA: OPSI Selects Liquidator


S P A I N

AVANZA SPAIN: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
BANCO POPULAR: Weak Financials Cue Moody's to Cut Ratings to Ba3
BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Mulls Possible Downgrade of Covered Bonds
BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Reviews Ba1 Ratings for Downgrade
BBVA-3 FTPYME: Fitch Raises Rating on Class C Notes From 'BB'

BBVA-4 PYME: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class C Notes
* Fitch Publishes July Edition of SME CLO Compare


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CANARY WHARF: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D2 Notes
CARE UK: Weak Performance Prompts Moody's to Downgrade CFR to B3
COVENTRY CITY: Sisu Cos. Agree to Write Off GBP32 Mil. of Debt
HEARTS OF MIDLOTHIAN: Administrator Does Not Rule Out Newco Route
INEOS GROUP: Bank Debt Trades at 2% Off

SCOTTISH COAL: Hargreaves Services Buys Assets for GBP8.4 Million
THOMAS COOK: S&P Raises Long-Term Corp. Credit Ratings to 'B'
* UK: Moody's Says WBS Outlook Still Constrained by Weak Economy


X X X X X X X X

* EMEA Renewables Remain Under Pressure, Fitch Reports
* Fitch Sees Stable Outlook for EMEA Transport Infrastructure
* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 1 to July 5, 2013


                            *********


==============
A L B A N I A
==============


PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B/B' Issuer Default Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ProCredit Holding AG & Co. KGaA's
(PCH) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'BBB-'with a Stable Outlook. At the same time, the agency has
affirmed the IDRs of PCH's subsidiary banks in Kosovo (PCBK),
Serbia (PCBS) and Bosnia (PCBiH).

KEY RATING DRIVERS - PCH's IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

PCH's IDRs and Support Rating reflect Fitch's view that there is
high probability that support would be provided to PCH by its
owners, and in particular by a group of international financial
institutions (IFIs) which are 'core' shareholders (end-2012:
combined stake of 61.8%). Fitch notes that while the change in
PCH's legal structure to a KGaA (a partnership limited by shares)
has increased the group's flexibility to raise capital
externally, it is structured in such a way so as to retain the
'core' shareholders' strategic control (and thereby preserve
PCH's developmental mission) as long as they together retain at
least a 20% stake.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - PCH's IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

A change in Fitch's view of the support available to PCH, for
example due to the exit of one or more 'core' shareholders, or a
change in their support stance, could be negative for PCH's IDRs.
However, the Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view that the
propensity and ability of PCH's owners to provide support are
unlikely to change in the near term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - PCH's VR

PCH's Viability Rating is driven by the group's exposure to
difficult markets and the credit risks inherent in the group's
operations, given its focus on lending to small businesses. As a
result, Fitch regards group capitalization as only moderate. A
high double leverage ratio at the holding company level is also a
rating negative.

However, this is balanced by solid liquidity, risk management and
reasonable corporate governance across the group, all of which
benefit from PCH's consolidated group supervision by the German
Banking Regulator (BaFin). Group performance also remains
satisfactory, notwithstanding increasing asset quality and margin
pressures and a challenging operating environment, reflecting
wide margins and strict cost control. A high level of
diversification by market, sector and borrower also underpin the
group's reasonable track record of asset quality through-the-
cycle. Fitch notes that subsidiary banks' asset quality typically
outperforms their banking sector peers.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - PCH's VR
Upward movement in PCH's VR could result from a significant
improvement in the double leverage ratio at the holding company
level, increased capital levels on a consolidated basis and an
improvement in the operating environments of group banks. A
marked deterioration in asset quality and capitalization would be
negative for the VR.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - TRUST PREFERRED
SECURITIES

PCH's TPS are notched from the IDR reflecting Fitch's opinion
that potential support from PCH's shareholders also helps reduce
the non-performance of these instruments. As such, their rating
is sensitive to any change in PCH's IDR. Fitch notes that the
holders of the TPS largely consist of PCH's shareholders or
creditors, who typically share PCH's developmental goals.

The three notch difference between PCH's IDR and the rating of
the TPS consists of two notches for loss severity, to reflect the
deeply subordinated status for this instrument, and one notch for
non-performance, reflecting the terms and conditions of the notes
(notably the triggers for non-payment of the coupon).

SUSBIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY - KEY RATING DRIVERS

The IDRs and Support Ratings of PCH's wholly-owned bank
subsidiaries in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia reflect the likelihood
of support from their parent, PCH. However, potential support for
those entities is constrained by Fitch's assessment of risks
relating to their respective countries. The one notch uplift of
the local currency IDR above the bank's foreign currency IDR, in
the case of PCBiH, and above the Country Ceiling, in the case of
PCBS, also reflect the strength of shareholder support. The
Negative Outlook on PCBS's IDRs reflects the Outlook on the
sovereign.

SUSBIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY - RATING SENSITIVITIES

Changes in Fitch's perception of risks relating to Kosovo or
Bosnia in either direction could affect PCBK's and PCBiH's IDRs
and Support Ratings. As PCBS's Long-term foreign currency IDR is
constrained by Serbia's Country Ceiling of 'BB-', any movement in
Serbia's sovereign rating is likely to affect the bank's IDRs.

Significant deterioration in PCBK's asset quality and/or
performance could put pressure on its VR, although this is not
currently Fitch's base case scenario. Upside potential is
limited, notwithstanding the bank's leading domestic franchise
and reasonable asset quality track record and performance to
date, in view of the still challenging operating environment.

Downward pressure on PCBiH's VR could result from a renewed sharp
deterioration in asset quality. Upside potential is limited in
light of the bank's small size, modest prospects and the still
difficult operating environment.

An upgrade of PCBS's VR would likely require a more favorable
macro backdrop. The high level of foreign-currency lending --
which is symptomatic of the Serbian banking sector -- constrains
upward movement in the VR. The high loan/deposit ratio is also a
rating negative. Downward pressure on the VR could result from a
marked deterioration in asset quality.

The rating actions are as follows:

PCH

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook
   Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
VR: affirmed at 'bb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Tier 1 trust preferred securities (TPS): affirmed at 'BB-'

PCBK

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
VR: affirmed at 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '4'

PCBS

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
   Negative
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Negative
Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: unaffected at 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

PCBiH

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '4'



=============
A U S T R I A
=============


HYPO ALPE: Breakup Deadline Extension Hinges on Credible Plan
-------------------------------------------------------------
Stephanie Bodoni and Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News report
that the European Union's top antitrust official indicated he may
extend a deadline for the breakup of Austria's Hypo Alpe-Adria-
Bank International AG so long as the nationalized lender sticks
to a credible plan.

Joaquin Almunia, the EU's competition chief, on July 3 said that
he may be able to approve a new roadmap the Austrian government
filed on June 29 "very, very soon" should it meet expectations.
Mr. Almunia, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the document, which
Austria said includes accelerated asset sales and curbs on new
business, must be "credible" and in line with what was agreed in
preparatory talks to justify more time for the sale of Hypo
Alpe's main unit.

Mr. Almunia told Austria in March its plans for Hypo Alpe weren't
good enough to justify the EUR2.2 billion (US$2.9 billion) in aid
the lender received since 2008, and he may order Hypo Alpe to
repay it, Bloomberg recounts.  That would lead to insolvency and
as much as 16 billion euros in losses, according to estimates by
the Austrian central bank, Bloomberg notes.

A task force led by former central bank governor Klaus Liebscher
was installed in May to draft the new arrangement, Bloomberg
discloses.  Hypo Alpe Chief Executive Officer Gottwald
Kranebitter stepped down on July 2 and Chairman Johannes Ditz
resigned last month citing disagreements over the plan, Bloomberg
relates.

Under Austria's new proposal, Hypo Alpe will complete the sale of
its Austrian unit this year, will stop accepting new business in
Italy immediately and will sell its biggest unit, a network of
banks in the former Yugoslavia, by mid-2015, bringing the
disposal forward by more than a year, Bloomberg discloses.
According to Bloomberg, Hypo said that the steps will require
writedowns of the bank's first-half earnings and new capital.

The bank may need as much as EUR2 billion in extra capital due to
the concessions this year, Bloomberg says, citing two people with
knowledge of the situation, who asked not to be identified
because talks with the EU are confidential.  Austrian Finance
Minister Maria Fekter said on July 2 that EUR700 million
earmarked in Austria's 2013 budget will suffice for any needs
arising in the first-half results, Bloomberg relates.

Hypo Alpe-Adria International AG is a subsidiary of BayernLB.  It
is active in banking and leasing.  In banking, HGAA serves both
corporate and retail customers and offers services ranging from
traditional lending through savings and deposits to complex
investment products and asset management services.



=============
F I N L A N D
=============


NOKIA OYJ: Moody's Says Siemens Share Purchase Credit Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service reports that it views as credit
negative for Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN; B2 positive) that Nokia
Oyj (Nokia; Ba3 on review for downgrade) is to acquire the 50%
stake in the company it does not yet own from Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft (Aa3 negative) for a consideration of EUR1.7
billion. The transaction is credit negative because it may affect
NSN's dividend policy to help finance the acquisition at a time
when NSN's financial profile needs to remain strong in order to
sustain its restructuring efforts.

Although Moody's views the acquisition, announced on Monday, as
credit negative, it does not on its own change the positive
outlook on NSN's B2 rating. While the rating is predominantly
driven by the competitiveness and volatility in the
telecommunications industry, it also take into account the
company's recent restructuring efforts, which have allowed it to
return to profitability over the past couple of quarters. If NSN
is able to sustain this turnaround, positive rating pressure
could develop over time; however, by the same token, negative
rating pressure could result if the company is unable to achieve
this. Despite potential changes in financial policy, Moody's
would expect NSN to maintain a liquidity cushion of above EUR2
billion (cash on the balance sheet and the undrawn portion of its
existing EUR750 million undrawn long-term revolving credit
facility), which is a condition to maintain the positive outlook
on the rating.

Moody's does not expect the transaction to adversely affect the
company's current B2 rating (positive outlook) as the rating (1)
already factors in a potential change in shareholders, and (2)
does not factor in any significant degree of financial support
from its shareholders.

Moody's expects Nokia to retain the existing management at NSN
and to continue to support its current business strategy and
ongoing restructuring plan. Moody's understands that, although
consolidated into Nokia's financial results, NSN will continue to
operate as an independent entity both operationally and
financially.

Moody's expects the acquisition to be funded through (1) a EUR500
million secured sellers loan from Siemens with a one year tenor
and (2) a EUR1.2 billion bridge loan facility with an undisclosed
maturity schedule. Both facilities will be raised at Nokia level.
Moody's expects Nokia to address its short-term debt maturities
in due course to restore a well-balanced debt maturity profile.

In the first quarter 2013, NSN delivered solid underlying
operating margins of 7.4%, compared with negative margins of -
4.4% in the same period of 2012, and positive margins of 15.0% in
the seasonally strong fourth quarter of 2012. First quarter 2013
was the company's fourth consecutive quarter of positive
underlying operating margins. Reported free cash flow was
positive, at EUR239 million, compared with EUR291 million in the
first quarter 2012 and EUR733 million in the fourth quarter 2012.
NSN ended the first quarter 2013 with gross cash of EUR2.8
billion and net cash of EUR1.5 billion. Moody's expects NSN's
gross as well as net cash position to remain significant, despite
payment of any possible dividend. In addition, as of December 31,
2012, NSN had sufficient covenant headroom under its a EUR750
million undrawn long-term revolving credit facility.

Moody's positive outlook on the ratings assumes that NSN will
maintain stable revenues excluding asset disposals and that its
margin will improve modestly (before restructuring costs) to well
above 5%. To consider an upgrade, Moody's would require evidence
that NSN will generate free cash flow/gross adjusted debt of 10%-
20% on a sustainable basis, including normalizing cash flow as a
result of decreasing restructuring costs. During this period of
restructuring, Moody's would expect the company to maintain a
liquidity cushion in the form of freely available cash and the
undrawn portion of the revolving credit facility -- with
comfortable covenant headroom -- amounting to at least EUR2.0
billion. Sustainable achievement of these metrics could lead to
an upgrade over the next couple of quarters. An upgrade would
also depend on Nokia's future policy related to NSN as it is
going to be a 100% owned subsidiary after the completion of the
transaction, as well as to some extent on the performance and
rating development of Nokia itself.

The rating could come under pressure if NSN was unable to execute
its restructuring plan as planned, which could lead to negative
free cash flow generation.



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F R A N C E
===========


WRIGHTON YACHTS: Failure to Pay Bills Prompts Receivership
----------------------------------------------------------
Yachting Monthly, citing IBI magazine, reports that Wrighton
Yachts SAS has been placed in receivership by the Commercial
Court of Arras after failing to pay its bills.

According to Yachting Monthly, French website Voilenews.fr said
that a mistake made by Wrighton's bridge mould supplier for the
new Bi-Loup 365 (which was 8cm out with the hull mould) resulted
in late deliveries and demands for reimbursements.

The receiver will now take stock of the company and judge whether
it is to be liquidated or able to continue its activities,
Yachting Monthly discloses.

Wrighton Yachts SAS is located in Bethune in northern France.
Founded 20 years ago, the company manufactures the Bi-Loup range
of twin-keel sailing yachts.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


CONERGY AG: Files for Insolvency in Hamburg District Court
----------------------------------------------------------
Deutsche Welle reports that Conergy AG filed for insolvency at
the Hamburg district court on Friday.

According to DW, the company had long been suffering from
Germany's solar industry crisis, but said they were "confident"
of finding an investor to continue the business.

Conergy was worth EUR2.2 billion (US$2.8 billion) on the market
just six years ago, DW notes.  At trading on July 5, the value of
its stock plummeted nearly 70% to around 11 cents a share, DW
states.

There had been hope last year when a Chinese firm was reportedly
interested in investing in the company, DW recounts.

Germany's solar industry has struggled with falling government
subsidies and oversupply, DW discloses.

Conergy AG is a Hamburg-based solar panel manufacturer.


GERMAN RESIDENTIAL: Sponsor's IPO Delay No Impact on Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has determined that the decision of the transaction's
sponsor, Deutsche Annington Immobilien SE (DA) to postpone the
planned initial public offering (IPO) does not change the credit
risk of the German Residential Asset Note Distributor plc.
(GRAND) transaction. If DA decides not to go ahead with an IPO in
the midterm, Moody's expects the transaction to pay down in line
with the amortization targets outlined in the 2012 transaction
restructuring. Hence, the IPO cancellation will delay the
repayment of the notes, but it is in line with the transaction
documentation and it meets Moody's expectations at the last
rating action.

The IPO was part of DA's financing strategy to repay all the
outstanding notes of the GRAND transaction in October 2013, as
outlined in the notice to noteholders dated June 10, 2013. The
financings that DA intended to use for the repayment of the notes
included a committed term loan facility, for which a certain
amount of gross proceeds from the IPO is a condition precedent.
On July 2, 2013, DA announced that its main shareholder decided
to postpone the IPO.

Moody's assumed in its previous analysis of the transaction
restructuring in 2012 that the transaction would only be repaid
over the extended loan term until 2018. It concluded in its
analysis that the restructuring effectively staggered refinancing
risk over the extended loan term due to the annual amortization
targets and the bullet repayment at the amended loan maturity
date.

Transaction Overview

The transaction follows the principles of a secured loan
structure. The Issuer used the issuance proceeds of each class of
Notes to purchase REF Notes (equivalent to loans) from 31 REF
Note Issuers (equivalent to borrowers) in a corresponding
aggregate amount. Despite the 31 individual REF Note Issuers and
the fact that the security structure does not provide for cross-
collateralization between the REF Note Issuers, the structure is
effectively a single borrower deal. In addition to the interest
payment obligations with respect to the REF Notes, each REF Note
Issuer has also entered into a global facility agreement, in
which global LTV targets are defined that have to be met by the
borrower group as a whole. Two holding companies, both
subsidiaries of DAIG that ultimately own each REF Note Issuer and
their general partners, guarantee the obligations under the
global facility agreement.

The transaction was restructured in 2012. The restructuring
included inter alia (1) a deleveraging by equity injections and
subordination of notes, (2) staggered amortization targets, (3) a
cash sweep mechanism and (4) an extension of the loan and note
maturity.

Rating Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio
Analysis (MoRE Portfolio) published in April 2006.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2013 Central Scenarios published in February 2013.

On December 21, 2012, Moody's downgraded the following classes of
CMBS Notes issued by German Residential:

EUR577M Class D Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep
22, 2011 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

EUR133M Class E Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep
22, 2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

EUR200M Class F Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Sep
22, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

EUR42M First Further Class D Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf);
previously on Sep 22, 2011 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

EUR15M First Further Class F Notes, Downgraded to C (sf);
previously on Sep 22, 2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Moody's withdrew the provisional rating of the Class C Treasury
Notes issued by German Residential Asset Note Distributor P.L.C.
on October 28, 2008.

Following the downgrade due to the distressed exchange
definition, Moody's will upgrade the ratings of these classes of
notes to the following levels, based on the new terms and
consitions of the Notes:

EUR577M Class D Notes, Ba1 (sf);

EUR133M Class E Notes, Ba2 (sf);

EUR200M Class F Notes, Ba3 (sf);

EUR42M First Further Class D Notes, Ba1 (sf);

EUR15M First Further Class F Notes, Ba3 (sf);



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA MONTE: Major Shareholder Sues Ex-Managers Over Derivatives
----------------------------------------------------------------
Lorenzo Totaro at Bloomberg News reports that Fondazione Monte
dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA's
largest shareholder, has decided to sue two of the Italian bank's
former managers including ex-chairman Giuseppe Mussari as well as
Nomura Holdings Inc. and Deutsche Bank AG over the alleged use of
derivatives to mask losses.

According to Bloomberg, Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena said
in an e-mailed statement that it took the decision at a meeting
of its council on Saturday.  The banking foundation will also
support Monte Paschi in its lawsuits, Bloomberg discloses.

Last month a judge approved the request by Siena prosecutors to
try Mussari and two other former managers on charges that they
helped hide a document that showed how the world's oldest bank
entered into a derivative deal, Bloomberg recounts.  The judge
scheduled a trial for Sept. 26 in an accelerated procedure,
Bloomberg says, citing three people with direct knowledge of the
case, who asked not to be identified because the decision hasn't
been made public.

                             State Aid

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 4,
2013, Bloomberg News said that Monte Paschi is seeking state aid
to bolster its balance sheet after the bank failed to meet the
capital requirements set by the European Banking Authority.  The
lender is also selling assets and reducing risk and costs in a
three-year plan to restore liquidity, Bloomberg disclosed.  Under
the government's rescue plan, Monte Paschi will sell securities,
dubbed "Monti bonds" after Prime Minister Mario Monti, to the
government with a 9% coupon that may rise to as much as 15%,
Bloomberg noted.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.

                          *     *     *


As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 19,
2013, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
long-term counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'B' from 'BB', and affirmed the
'B' short-term rating.  S&P also lowered its rating on MPS' Lower
Tier 2 subordinated notes to 'CCC-' from 'CCC+'.  S&P affirmed
the ratings on MPS' junior subordinated debt at 'CCC-' and on its
preferred stock at 'C'.  At the same time, S&P removed the
ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with negative
implications on Dec. 5, 2012.


* S&P Applies Revised Insurance Criteria to Italian Groups
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has reviewed its
ratings on Italian and Slovenian insurance groups and their
subsidiaries, by applying its new ratings criteria for insurers,
which were published on May 7, 2013.

S&P will publish individual analytical reports on the insurance
groups identified below, including a list of ratings on
affiliated entities, as well as the ratings by debt type --
senior, subordinated, junior subordinated, and preferred stock.
The research updates will be available at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/insurancecriteria. Ratings on
specific issues will be available on RatingsDirect and at
http://www.standardandpoors.com.

RATINGS LIST

(All ratings are affirmed, except where a "from" rating is
indicated.)

Societa Cattolica di Assicurazione
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Local Currency                BBB/Negative/--
Financial Strength Rating
  Local Currency                BBB/Negative/--

Unipol Assicurazioni SpA
Milano Assicurazioni SpA
Fondiaria-SAI SpA
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Local Currency                 BBB/Negative/--
Financial Strength Rating
  Local Currency                 BBB/Negative/--

Unipol Gruppo Finanziario SpA
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Local Currency                 BB+/Negative/--

                                 To                 From
SIAT - Societa Italiana Assicurazioni e Riassicurazioni SpA
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Local Currency                 BBB-/Stable/--  BBB-/Negative/--
Financial Strength Rating
  Local Currency                 BBB-/Stable/--  BBB-/Negative/--

                                 To                 From
Pozavarovalnica Sava d.d.
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Local Currency                 BBB+/Stable/-- BBB+/Watch Neg/--
Financial Strength Rating
  Local Currency                 BBB+/Stable/-- BBB+/Watch Neg/--

                                 To                 From
Triglav Insurance Co. Ltd.
Triglav Re, Reinsurance Co. Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
  Local Currency                 A-/Stable/--   BBB+/Positive/--
Financial Strength Rating
  Local Currency                 A-/Stable/--   BBB+/Positive/-



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


JUBILEE CDO VI: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'AA- (sf)' from 'A+
(sf)' its credit rating on Jubilee CDO VI B.V.'s class B notes.
At the same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A1-a,
A1-b, A2-a, A2-b, A3, C, D, and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance and the application of its current counterparty
criteria.

Since S&P's last review in June 2012, it has observed a positive
rating migration in the portfolio.  Defaulted assets have
decreased to zero from 2.57% and 'CCC' rated assets have
decreased to 3.07% from 11.74%.

At the same time, the available credit enhancement for the class
A, B, and C notes has increased, and the available credit
enhancement for the class D and E notes has slightly decreased.
Since S&P's last review, there have been two payment dates and
EUR24.362 million of senior notes have amortized.

Positive factors in S&P's analysis include the reduction of the
transaction's weighted-average life to 4.1 years from 4.7 years,
and the increase in the weighted-average spread to 4.12% from
3.85%.

"We have subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for
each rated class.  We used the portfolio balance that we consider
to be performing, the reported weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we consider to be
appropriate.  We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using our standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each
rating category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction
with different interest rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"Our cash flow analysis has shown that the BDR for the class B
notes now passes at a higher rating level, compared with our
previous review.  However, the cash flows for the other classes
in this transaction still pass at their respective rating levels.
We have therefore raised to 'AA- (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' our rating
on the class B notes and have affirmed our ratings on all other
rated classes of notes in this transaction," S&P added.

"Non-euro-denominated assets, denominated in U.S. dollars and
British pounds sterling, account for about 13% of the underlying
portfolio, and the resulting foreign currency risk is hedged via
asset swaps with Credit Suisse International (A/Stable/A-1) and
JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.(A+/Stable/A-1) as swap counterparties.
We have also stressed the transaction's sensitivity to and
reliance on the swap counterparties, for senior classes of notes
rated higher than the swap counterparties, by applying foreign
exchange stresses to the notional amount of non-euro-denominated
assets. Our analysis showed that the class A1-a, A1-b, A2-a, A2-
b, A-3, and B notes could still sustain their assigned ratings
under additional foreign exchange stresses," S&P noted.

Jubilee CDO VI is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction backed primarily by leveraged loans to
speculative-grade corporate firms.  Alcentra Ltd. is the
transaction's manager.  The reinvestment period ended on Sept.
20, 2012.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                Rating
            To                  From

Jubilee CDO VI B.V.
EUR424.15 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

B           AA- (sf)             A+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A1-a        AAA (sf)
A1-b        AA+ (sf)
A2-a        AAA (sf)
A2-b        AA+ (sf)
A3          AA+ (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)
E           B+ (sf)



===========
P O L A N D
===========


BRE BANK: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba1' Deposit Ratings & E+ BFSR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn BRE Bank Hipoteczny's Ba1
Long Term Local and Foreign Deposit ratings, Not Prime Short Term
Local and Foreign Deposit ratings, and E+ Bank Financial Strength
Rating (BFSR) (equivalent to a b3 baseline credit assessment).

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


LUSITANO SME: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Lusitano SME No. 1 plc's class A
notes, as follows:

  EUR61m class A notes upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook
  Negative

  EUR36m class B notes affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable

  EUR30m class C notes affirmed at 'CCCsf', revised Recovery
  Estimate (RE) to 10% from 50%

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade reflects the portfolio's stable performance and the
deleveraging of the transaction since the last review in July
2012. Since then, the class A notes have amortized to 8% of their
initial balance and credit enhancement has increased to 64% from
36%. The Negative Outlook on the class A notes is due to its
exposure to Portugal (BB+/Negative/B).

Credit enhancement for the class B notes has increased to 40%
from 23%. The tranche is guaranteed by the European Investment
Fund (EIF; AAA/Stable/F1+) and is therefore credit-linked.

Despite the increase in credit enhancement for the senior notes,
credit enhancement for the class C notes has reduced.
Additionally, the class C notes are exposed to concentration
risk. The top 10 obligors in the pool contribute over 20% of the
portfolio and retail is the largest industry (33% of all assets).
The reserve fund level has been volatile over the past three
years and remains underfunded by EUR1.8 million.

Defaults are currently equivalent to 49% of the outstanding
balance and have increased to EUR71.5 million from EUR67.5
million since 2012. The transaction benefits from gradual
provisioning for delinquent loans depending on the number of days
in arrears. 93% of the current defaulted balance (net of
recoveries) has been provisioned for, which leaves an amount of
EUR 5m are currently not provisioned.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch incorporated two stress tests to analyze the ratings'
sensitivity to a change in scenario. The first scenario addressed
an increase in default rates by 25%, whereas the second case
reduced the recovery rates of the underlying collateral by 25%.
Neither of the tests suggests that a negative rating migration
would be triggered. However, due to the rating cap applicable to
the class A notes, any potential change in Portugal's ratings
would be reflected in the notes' rating. Also, should the EIF's
rating change, it would trigger a rating action on the class B
notes.

The transaction is a revolving cash flow securitization of loans
granted to Portuguese small-and-medium enterprises granted by
Banco Espirito Santo. In accordance with the transaction
documents, the revolving period ended in February 2010.


* Portugal Resignations Show Political Risk to Adjustment Program
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The resignation of Portugal's finance minister and the tendered
resignation of the foreign minister this week highlight the
political and implementation risks to the country's adjustment
program, which Fitch Ratings cited as reasons for maintaining its
Negative Outlook on the 'BB+' sovereign rating when Fitch
affirmed it last November.

"Prolonged political uncertainty that hampered policy formation
and execution, or material underperformance of Portugal's fiscal
and external adjustment, would put pressure on the country's
sovereign ratings. Our base case remains that program
implementation will stay on track.

"The appointment of Maria Luis Albuquerque as the new finance
minister suggests a desire by Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho
for economic policy continuity. Albuquerque has been a strong
advocate of meeting program targets through the policies of her
predecessor, Vitor Gaspar, who resigned on Monday.

"More significant is the subsequent move by Paulo Portas, leader
of the CDS party, the junior coalition member, to offer his
resignation in response to Albuquerque's appointment. Prime
Minister Coelho refused to accept Portas's resignation, and
Bloomberg reported on Thursday that the two would meet to discuss
securing a "viable solution" for the coalition government. A CDS
spokesman was reported on Wednesday as saying that the two other
government ministers from the CDS party would not leave the
government. Opposition parties have called for early general
elections. The final political outcome remains uncertain.

"Since our affirmation in November, the Portuguese authorities
have kept the country's EU-IMF program on track even in the face
of significant institutional hurdles, such as April's
Constitutional Court ruling that elements of the government's
fiscal consolidation plans were unconstitutional. In May the
government attempted a further shift towards cutting expenditure
rather than relying on revenue-raising measures, with a four-year
package of spending cuts.

Implementing the program has helped reduce the current account
deficit and improve external competitiveness. However, the scale
of the adjustment needed to maintain primary surpluses and
restore fiscal sustainability meant that political disagreement
over fiscal and economic policy was always possible. This week's
developments increase the risk that program implementation goes
off track, although this is not currently our base case."

If the government survives, it will have to endure periods of
potential instability, for example around local elections due in
September.

If early elections were called, the resulting government of one
or more mainstream parties would be likely to remain engaged with
the Troika, although it might seek to renegotiate some elements
of the current program (as also advocated by CDS leader Portas).
Both the CDS and the main opposition party, the Socialists,
signed up to the original three-year support package in 2011.
However, the risk of deviation from program targets, which may
have implications for public finances and therefore potentially
for the ratings, would rise.

The political crisis has pushed Portuguese sovereign bond yields
higher, upsetting the sovereign's plan to fully re-enter the bond
markets. Our existing assumption that Portugal will need further
official support remains. The 'BB+' rating is underpinned by our
assumption that this support will be forthcoming.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


BANCA TRANSILVANIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three Romanian banks' Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) as follows:

UniCredit Tiriac Bank S.A. (UCTB) at 'BBB', Negative Outlook

Banca Transilvania S.A. (BT) at 'BB-', Stable Outlook

ProCredit Bank Romania (PCBR) at 'BB+', Stable Outlook

The contraction in Romania's economy in 2009 and 2010 followed by
a period of slow recovery has damaged the banking system's asset
quality. The system's regulatory non-performing loan (NPL) ratio
increased to 19.5% at end-April 2013 (2012: 18.2%, 2011: 14.3%,
2010: 11.9%), which, coupled with slow lending growth and a shift
to more expensive domestic funding, resulted in sector losses for
the three years to end-2012. In Fitch's view the NPL ratio is
likely to increase further despite early signs of a slowdown in
new NPL inflows and impairment charges. Due to the high level of
foreign-currency lending, exposure to unhedged borrowers and the
long maturities of retail loans, asset quality risks remain high.
Furthermore pressures on pre-impairment profitability are
expected to persist.

Fitch views the capitalization of Romanian banks as adequate, and
its aggregate liquidity position as sound, despite having reached
the bottom of the economic cycle. It takes into consideration the
difference between the National Bank of Romania's (NBR)
conservative provisioning rules and the accounting rules required
by IFRS, which have usually been lower. Since 2012 all banks in
Romania report their financials according to IFRS including asset
quality metrics and impairment charges.

UCTB
KEY RATING DRIVERS: VIABILITY RATING
UCTB's Viability Rating (VR) reflects the pressure on its
profitability from elevated loan impairment charges (LICs),
rising impaired loan ratios (20.7% at end-2012), lending
concentrations in troubled real estate and construction sectors
as well as relatively low coverage of impaired loans with
accounting provisions (38% at end-2012) and moderate coverage of
90 days overdue loans at 72% at end-2012. It also considers
relatively high, albeit decreasing (through customer deposit
growth and funds attracted from domestic institutional investors
and International Financial Institutions) reliance on its parent
for funding and its moderate capital levels (Fitch Core Capital
ratio of 14.3% at end-2012). The rating also takes into account
UCTB's efficiency, limited market risk and comfortable liquidity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS: IDR, SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
UCTB's IDRs and Support Rating reflects Fitch's opinion that UCTB
remains strategically important for its ultimate parent,
UniCredit S.p.A. (UC; 'BBB+'/Negative), although Romania is
currently not a market where UC is focusing its growth strategy.
This view takes into account the continued high strategic
importance of the Central and Eastern Europe region as a whole
for UC. Fitch notches down the UCTB's Long-term IDR once from
UC's Long-term IDR. Although support is likely to flow through
UC's fully owned subsidiary and UCTB's direct owner, UniCredit
Bank Austria AG (UCBA 'A'/Stable), at present UCTB's IDRs and
Support Ratings do not incorporate any potential support coming
directly from UCBA. Fitch believes that the Austrian authorities
would look to UC to provide support to the CEE subsidiaries
directly before allowing any Austrian sovereign support to flow
through to these entities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES; VR
Fitch views the recent deterioration in the bank's asset quality
and reduced impairment coverage of impaired loans as a negative
rating driver and should a continued deterioration take place,
this may result in a downgrade in the bank's VR. Fitch will focus
in particular on the impact the deterioration will have on the
bank's capital levels, taking into account particularly the
portion of equity exposed to the uncovered portion of impaired
loans. Given the recent deterioration in the bank's performance,
Fitch views the likelihood of an upgrade in the bank's VR as
being low in the short- to medium-term, unless the current trends
reverse significantly.

RATING SENSITIVITIES; IDRs, SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING
FLOOR
The Negative Outlook on UCTB's Long-term IDR reflects that on the
parent. Therefore, a downgrade of UC's Long-term IDR would be
likely to result in a downgrade of UCTB's Long-term IDR.

BT

KEY RATING DRIVERS: IDR, VR AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
BT's Long-Term IDR is driven by its individual strength,
reflected in its VR of 'bb-'. The VR reflects the bank's strong
deposit funding base, improving profitability, share of foreign-
currency lending lower than at peers and reasonable coverage of
impaired loans with accounting provisions (67.8% at end-2012) and
full coverage of 90 days past due loans. Given the bank's risk
profile and provisioning coverage, capitalization is adequate in
Fitch's view (Fitch Core Capital ratio of 14.4% at end-2012) and
internal capital generation is sound.

BT's Support Rating of '3' and Support Rating Floor of 'BB-'
reflect the bank's systemic importance as the largest private
bank with no majority shareholder and with a nationwide franchise
in Romania, as a result of which Fitch believes there to be a
moderate likelihood that the Romanian authorities would provide
support if necessary.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: IDR, VR AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
BT's VR and Long-term IDR could be upgraded if there were
sustained improvements in asset quality supported by a recovery
in the macroeconomic environment, and continued sound performance
supporting capitalization. Downside risk to the VR could come
primarily from a major deterioration in asset quality, leading to
a substantial worsening of capitalization, which is not likely,
in Fitch's view.

The Long-term IDR would come under downward pressure only if
there was both a downgrade of the VR and a downward revision of
Fitch's expectation of sovereign support for the bank, for
example should timely support not be made available if required.

PCBR

KEY RATING DRIVERS: LONG-TERM IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING
PCBR's Long-Term IDRs and Support Rating reflect Fitch's opinion
of potential support from its main shareholder, ProCredit Holding
AG & Co KGaA (PCH, 'BBB-'/Stable), given PCH's history of support
for its bank subsidiaries and PCBR's advanced integration into
the group.

KEY RATING DRIVERS: VR
PCBR's 'b' VR considers the bank's small market size in Romania
and increasing market competition, and only acceptable
capitalization (Fitch Core Capital of 11.3% at end-2012) given
the low internal capital generation. PCBR's weak profitability is
mainly attributable to its low operating efficiency stemming from
the labor intensive characteristics of its business model and
lack of the benefits of scale.

The bank's VR also reflects its solid asset quality in the local
context (with impaired loans ratio and 90 day overdue loans
equaling 7.3% and 4.9% of gross loans at end-2012 respectively)
and conservative provisioning of impaired loans which reflects
the group's risk management culture.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: LONG-TERM IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING
PCBR's ratings would be upgraded or downgraded in line with any
changes in PCH's ratings. They would be sensitive, therefore to
the same sensitivities as PCH'S ratings. Given the current Stable
Outlook of the Long-term IDR, Fitch does not expect for the
ratings to be upgraded or downgraded in the short- to medium-term

RATING SENSITIVITIES: VR

The VR could be downgraded if any negative performance was not
balanced by a material increase in capitalization. A significant
and sustainable improvement in core profitability and asset
quality in addition to improved franchise could lead to an
upgrade of the VR.

The rating actions are:

UniCredit Tiriac Bank S.A.:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
     Negative
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'

Banca Transilvania S.A.:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
    Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB-'

ProCredit Bank (Romania):

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook
    Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
  Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'


COMPANIA NATIONALA: OPSI Selects Liquidator
-------------------------------------------
Ecaterina Craciun at Ziarul Financiar reports that Romania's
state assets privatization office OPSPI has selected a liquidator
for bankrupt Compania Nationala a Huilei, which is controlled by
the state.

Compania Nationala a Huilei is a Romanian coal mining company.


TERMOELECTRICA: OPSI Selects Liquidator
-----------------------------------------
Ecaterina Craciun at Ziarul Financiar reports that Romania's
state assets privatization office OPSPI has selected a liquidator
for Termoelectrica, which is controlled by the state.

Termoelectrica is a Romanian power producer.



=========
S P A I N
=========


AVANZA SPAIN: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating to bus service provider Avanza Spain
S.A.U.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'B+' issue rating to the
EUR315 million senior secured notes (due 2018) issued by AG
Spring Finance Ltd., and a 'B-' issue rating to the EUR175
million senior unsecured notes (due in 2019) issued by AG Spring
Finance II Ltd.

"The proceeds of both notes will be onlent to Avanza by way of
separate back-to-back loans and will be used for refinancing
purposes.  We have assigned a 'B+' issue rating to the back-to-
back loan for the senior secured notes and a recovery rating of
'3', reflecting our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.  Additionally, we
assigned a 'B-' issue rating to the unsecured notes' back-to-back
loan and a recovery rating of '6', reflecting our expectation of
negligible (0%-10%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment
default," S&P said.

The rating reflects S&P's assessment of Avanza's business risk
profile as "satisfactory" and its financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged," under S&P's criteria.

Avanza's partial exposure to Spanish public authorities' payments
for revenue shortfalls is a ratings constraint.  While 35% of the
revenues are collected from public authorities, 65% of revenues
are collected from passengers, which mitigates this somewhat.
S&P believes that the local authorities' capacity to make timely
payments could dwindle if economic conditions deteriorate
further.

S&P's view of concession renewal risk is also a ratings weakness.
While S&P believes that this risk is currently low, the effect of
nonrenewal could be significant in the longer term.  Avanza's
exposure to passenger volume risk also limits the rating.  For
25% of its revenues, cost recovery is limited to a consumer price
index (CPI) adjustment to passenger fares.  The rating also
reflects S&P's view that Avanza is a relatively small company
with more concentration in Spain than international peers, some
of which are more diversified.

"Avanza's strong competitive position as Spain's leading private
provider of bus services is a rating strength.  We note its track
record of sustainable operating profit margins, supported by
long-term concession agreements and a business model focused on
forced mobility in urban and suburban markets (84% of revenues)
that deliver resilient and predictable EBITDA earnings.  About
75% of total revenues guarantees cost protection through tariffs;
35% of total revenues do not involve any passenger volume risk.
About 40% of revenue is exposed to passenger volume risk but
benefits from cost protection through tariffs.  Other supporting
factors include limited competition--the company operates
exclusive concession routes--and supportive regulation in its key
role as a provider of efficient urban and suburban transport,"
S&P said.

"Our base-case operating scenario for 2013 incorporates the fact
that Avanza successfully renewed its Zaragoza concession contract
earlier this month and reflects our assumption that Avanza will
formalize the Zaragoza concession renewal by mid-2013, as it was
the sole bidder.  We also anticipate a decline of 2%-4% in group
revenues on reduced kilometers in the Zaragoza urban bus network.
Under our base case, we estimate that the group's EBITDA margin
will remain at 19%-20% for 2013, but could face pressures from
price fluctuations and diesel availability; 25% of Avanza's
revenues are not protected against fuel costs increases through a
price-adjustment mechanism in its concession agreements," S&P
added.

S&P estimates that Avanza's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to
EBITDA will be about 6.2x-6.5x in 2013 (11x in 2012; although
this includes the shareholder loan, which was terminated as part
of the refinancing).  S&P considers adjusted debt to EBITDA of
less than 7x to be commensurate with the rating on Avanza.

The issue rating on the senior secured notes issued by AG Spring
Finance is 'B+'.  The issue rating on the senior unsecured notes
issued by AG Spring Finance II is 'B-'.

AG Spring Finance and AG Spring Finance II are independent,
stand-alone, special-purpose financing vehicles (SPV) based in
Ireland, which were formed to issue the notes.  The proceeds of
the notes were on-lent to Avanza via separate back-to-back loans.
The issued amount of the secured notes was EUR315 million and the
unsecured notes was EUR175 million.  In analyzing the risks
associated with the SPV, S&P was not given insight into legal or
tax opinions on the SPV.

The issue rating on the EUR315 million senior secured back-to-
back loan is 'B+'.  The recovery rating is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.  The issue rating on the EUR175 million senior
secured back-to-back loan is 'B-'.  The recovery rating is '6',
indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in
the event of a payment default.

The issue ratings on the notes reflect the issue rating on the
back-to-back loans.  Any change to the documentation related to
the pass-through features and other legal aspects of the
transaction could have a material effect on the issue rating on
either, or both, the senior secured and unsecured notes.

The issue rating on the senior secured notes is based on the
notes' first-ranking security interest over AG Spring Finance's
rights to, and benefit from, the senior secured back-to-back
loan.

The issue rating on the senior unsecured notes is based on the
notes' first-ranking security interest over AG Spring Finance
II's rights to, and benefit from, the senior unsecured back-to-
back loan.

The ratings are constrained by the significant priority debt
ranking ahead of the notes comprising finance leases obligations,
a super senior RCF, and other facilities.

S&P's hypothetical default scenario assumes lower revenues caused
by a weaker economy; further payment delays from public
administrations; and renewed concession contracts on less-
favorable terms.  S&P believes that Avanza's ability to service
finance leases and debt obligations would come under pressure as
a consequence.  S&P's hypothetical scenario assumes this would
lead to a payment default in 2017.

S&P values Avanza as a going concern given its strong market
position, its exposure to nondiscretionary customer demand, and
its diverse portfolio of concessionary routes.  At S&P's
hypothetical point of default in 2017, it values the company at
EUR457 million, with a stressed EBITDA of EUR76 million and a
stressed valuation multiple of 6.0x.

After deducting enforcement costs, assumed finance leases
obligations, and a fully used super senior RCF, S&P forecasts a
residual net enterprise value of EUR283 million.  S&P envisage
about EUR327 million of senior secured debt outstanding at
default (including prepetition interest).  Although nominal
recovery for senior secured lenders is higher than 70%, S&P caps
the recovery rating at '3' to reflect the company's exposure to
what it views as the relatively unfavorable insolvency regime for
secured creditors in Spain, and the limited security package
under the terms and conditions.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that cash flows will likely
remain stable due to the predictable, contractual cash flow of
its current concession portfolio, and that this, along with the
refinancing, should continue to support an "adequate" liquidity
position.  We also forecast that Avanza will continue to deliver
cash-flow-protection measures close to the higher end of the
"highly leveraged" descriptor for financial risk profiles.  The
typical outlook horizon for speculative-grade ratings is 12
months," S&P noted.

S&P could consider lowering the ratings if credit measures
deteriorate such that FFO to debt falls to less than 9% and debt
to EBITDA exceeds 7x as a result of higher debt levels.  Debt
could increase on acquisitions, or working capital loans to
bridge delays in payments from the public authorities.  If Avanza
fails to renew some of its concession contracts, this would also
reduce EBITDA and could put pressure on the rating.

S&P considers an upgrade unlikely at this stage because it
believes that the company's financial risk profile will remain
"highly leveraged."  S&P is unlikely to rate financial-sponsor-
owned companies, such as Avanza, that have business risk profiles
that S&P assess as "satisfactory," above 'B+'.


BANCO POPULAR: Weak Financials Cue Moody's to Cut Ratings to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the debt and deposit
ratings of Banco Popular Espanol S.A. to Ba3/Not Prime from
Ba1/Not Prime, following the lowering of the bank's baseline
credit assessment (BCA) to b1 from ba2, which is equivalent to a
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) at E+, down from
D. All of the bank's ratings now carry a negative outlook.

The downgrade of Banco Popular's ratings reflects the bank's
weakened financial profile and the deterioration of asset-quality
metrics in most asset classes. In particular, the downgrade
reflects the bank's significant exposure to the non-real estate-
related corporate sector, the bank's key strategic focus, for
which Moody's expects further significant deterioration.

In its rating action, Moody's considered the benefits of the
EUR2.5 billion capital increase on Banco Popular's solvency
levels and other capital-strengthening measures carried out in
2012 against a backdrop of a recessionary operating environment,
which it believes will continue to pressure the bank's
profitability and already poor asset-quality indicators.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated
on October 24, 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

Lowering Of Standalone Credit Assessment

The lowering of Banco Popular's standalone credit assessment by
two notches to E+/b1 from D/ba2, reflects the broad asset-quality
deterioration across the bank's asset classes as the economy has
continued contracting in the first half of 2013, with domestic
demand not showing any significant signs of recovery. Moody's
therefore anticipates a further decline in asset quality for the
remainder of 2013 and during 2014.

Banco Popular's asset-quality deterioration was initially
primarily driven by the group's exposure to the real-estate
development and construction sectors. However, since 2012 and
coinciding with the acquisition of Banco Pastor, the
deterioration has accelerated in other asset classes, namely
residential mortgages and corporate. At year-end 2012, gross non-
performing loans (NPLs) almost doubled numbers reported in 2011 -
- almost 30% of which relates to the acquisition of Banco Pastor
-- to 11.7% of gross loans (up from 7.2% at end of 2011),
compared to the system average of 10.44%. The 10.5% quarter-on-
quarter increase in NPLs in the first quarter of 2013 to 13% of
gross loans -- versus a system average of 10.47% -- highlights
the persistent asset-quality challenges faced by the bank.

In addition to NPLs, Banco Popular has other problematic
exposures related to real-estate assets the bank acquired over
the last few years. If included, the NPL ratio rises to a very
high 19.5%, which exceeds its domestic peers. Furthermore,
Moody's notes the high percentage of refinanced loans at the bank
(12% of gross loans). The aggregation of refinanced loans (that
are not already captured in the non-performing loan ratio) to the
overall problem loan ratio (rising to 26.5%) indicates the
magnitude of the existing balance-sheet pressures the bank faces
before considering any possible further deterioration of the loan
book.

Going forward, Moody's expects Popular's asset quality to
deteriorate further across asset classes, based on its view that
any signs of a modest economic recovery at this stage are only
being generated by the export sector, while still weak domestic
demand is likely to cause further contraction in domestic growth
into 2014 as unemployment remains at very high levels. Banco
Popular is particularly exposed to the non-real estate corporate
sector, which represented a high 46% of the bank's total loans
(defined as unconsolidated private sector domestic loans) at end-
December 2012 versus one-third for the system.

In lowering Banco Popular's standalone credit assessment, Moody's
has incorporated the benefits of the capital-strengthening
measures carried out in 2012 -- that resulted in an increase of
the coverage ratio (defined as loan loss reserves/NPLs) to 66% at
end of 2012 up from 35% in the previous year -- and that will
continue in the current year, albeit to a more limited extent, as
well as Banco Popular's sound recurring earnings power Banco
Popular displays a level of recurrent profitability (measured as
recurrent pre-provision income over risk-weighted assets) which
at 2.06% at end of 2012 is higher than the 1.67% average of rated
Spanish banks.

Popular's standalone BFSR has a negative outlook to reflect (1)
the bank's vulnerability to a further weakening of its credit
profile in light of the anticipated modest recovery of the
Spanish economy and its higher than average exposure to corporate
non-real estate, and (2) the significant downside risks to
Moody's macroeconomic forecasts, which could exert further
pressure on the ratings if they were to materialize.

Downgrade of the Senior Debt and Deposit Ratings

The two-notch downgrade of Banco Popular's senior debt and
deposit ratings reflects the two-notch lowering of the bank's
standalone credit assessment.

The negative outlook on the bank's debt and deposit ratings
reflects the currently negative outlook on the Spanish
government's Baa3 bond rating and the negative outlook on Banco
Popular's standalone BFSR.

Downgrade of Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Ratings

Moody's has downgraded the senior subordinated debt ratings of
Banco Popular to B2 from Ba3, the junior subordinated ratings to
B3(hyb) from B1(hyb) and the preferred shares ratings to Caa1
(hyb) from B3 (hyb), with a negative outlook, in line with the
lowering of the bank's BCA.

Banco Popular's preferred shares are now rated three-notches
below the bank's standalone BCA, down from the previous four
notches to reflect the changed conditions of these instruments
approved earlier this year. Under the new terms and conditions,
the trigger for dividend deferral has moved from a profit and
loss trigger to a balance sheet trigger which, in Moody's view,
reduces the probability of a trigger breach.

What Could Move the Rating Up/Down

An upgrade of Banco Popular's standalone BFSR is currently
unlikely, given the negative outlook. An improvement of its
standalone ratings could be driven by the work out of its asset-
quality challenges together with a sustainable recovery in its
recurring earnings.

Downward pressure would be exerted on the bank's standalone
credit strength if (1) operating conditions worsen beyond Moody's
current expectations, i.e., a broader economic recession beyond
its current GDP decline forecasts of -1.4% for 2013; (2) the
bank's liquidity position deteriorates significantly; and/or (3)
its franchise weakens.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in May 2013.


BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Mulls Possible Downgrade of Covered Bonds
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
A3 rating assigned to the mortgage and public-sector covered
bonds issued by Banco Sabadell, S.A. (deposits Ba1 on review for
downgrade, standalone bank financial strength rating D/baseline
credit assessment ba2, on review for downgrade). This rating
action follows Moody's decision to place on review for downgrade
the senior unsecured rating of the issuer, which supports these
covered bonds.

Ratings Rationale:

These rating actions are prompted by Moody's decision to place on
review for downgrade the Ba1 senior unsecured rating of Banco
Sabadell. The TPIs Moody's assigns to the issuer's covered bond
programs remain "Improbable".

Key Rating Assumptions/Factors

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

Expected Loss: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. .
COBOL determines expected loss as (1) a function of the issuer's
probability of default (measured by the issuer's rating); and (2)
the stressed losses on the cover pool assets following issuer
default.

For the two covered bond programs, cover pool losses are an
estimate of the losses Moody's currently models if the relevant
issuer defaults. Moody's splits cover pool between market risk
and collateral risk. Market risk measures losses stemming from
refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and currency
mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal risks).
Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly from the cover
pool assets' credit quality. Moody's derives collateral risk from
the collateral score.

(1) Banco Sabadell's Mortgage Covered Bonds

The cover pool losses are 51%, with market risk of 26% and
collateral risk of 24.9%. The collateral score for this program
is currently 37.2%. The over-collateralization (OC) in this cover
pool is 126.1% (137.1% as of end May 2013), of which Banco
Sabadell provides 25% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC
level that is consistent with the A3 rating target is 46.5%.
These numbers show that Moody's is relying on "uncommitted" OC in
its expected loss analysis.

(2) Banco Sabadell's Public-Sector Covered Bonds

The cover pool losses are 50%, with market risk of 35% and
collateral risk of 15%. The collateral score for this program is
currently 30%. The OC in this cover pool is 94.5%, of which Banco
Sabadell provides 42.9% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC
level that is consistent with the A3 rating target is 49%. These
numbers show that Moody's is relying on "uncommitted" OC in its
expected loss analysis.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which indicates the likelihood that the issuer will make
timely payments to covered bondholders if the issuer defaults.
The TPI framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain
number of notches above the issuer's rating.

The TPIs assigned to these programs are "Improbable".

Sensitivity Analysis

The issuer's credit strength is the main determinant of a covered
bond rating's robustness. The TPI Leeway measures the number of
notches by which Moody's might downgrade the issuer's rating
before the rating agency downgrades the covered bonds because of
TPI framework constraints.

Based on the current TPI of "Improbable", the TPI Leeway for both
Banco Sabadell's programs is 0 notches. This implies that Moody's
might downgrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap, if it
downgrades the issuer rating below Ba1, all other variables being
equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (1) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting both the issuer's senior unsecured rating
and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the issuer; or (3)
a material reduction of the value of the cover pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in July 2012.


BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Reviews Ba1 Ratings for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade
Banco Sabadell's long-term debt and deposits ratings of Ba1 and
its D standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR; equivalent
to a ba2 baseline credit assessment, or BCA). At the same time,
the rating agency has also placed on review for downgrade Banco
Sabadell's Ba3 senior subordinated debt ratings and B3(hyb)
preference shares. The bank's short-term rating remains at Not
Prime.

The review has been prompted by Moody's concern over the broader
asset quality deterioration at Banco Sabadell, particularly in
the non-real-estate corporate segment, which has been the bank's
traditional focus. Moody's is concerned about the continuing weak
outlook for the non-export-oriented corporate sector in view of
the ongoing contraction in the domestic, non-export oriented
economy. The review will also take into consideration any
potential negative impact of the very acquisitive expansion of
Banco Sabadell over recent months.

Ratings Rationale:

Review of Standalone Credit Assessment

Moody's says that primarily its concern over the broader asset
quality deterioration in the non-real estate segment and in
particular Banco Sabadell's exposure to this sector, triggered
the review for downgrade of the bank's standalone ratings.
Moody's expects the asset quality of the corporate sector -- as
well as other asset categories such as residential mortgages and
consumer loans -- to deteriorate further, based on its view that
any signs of a modest economic recovery at this stage are only
caused by the export sector, whereas weak domestic demand is
still set to contract domestic growth into 2014. Banco Sabadell
is particularly exposed to the non-real estate corporate sector,
which represented a high 43% of the bank's total loans at end-
December 2012. However, Moody's notes that the integration of
Banco CAM in June 2012 has broadened Banco Sabadell's asset base.

Furthermore, Moody's notes that the negative conditions in the
country's economy will continue to drive a deterioration in Banco
Sabadell's asset-quality indicators across all asset classes,
including the residential mortgage portfolio (around 34% of the
bank's loan book) and the real-estate segment (16% of total
loans). As a result of these conditions, the increase in Banco
Sabadell's non-performing loans (NPLs) has been particularly
acute since 2012, with a NPL ratio of 9.7% (excluding the
portfolio covered by the asset protection scheme) as of end-March
2013.

In concluding the review of Banco Sabadell's standalone ratings,
Moody's will take into account (1) the ability of the bank to
generate sufficient earnings to offset any increase in
provisioning requirements and to ensure a sufficiently resilient
capital base; (2) the impact on the bank's credit profile of the
acquisitions announced over the past recent months, which
individually are not relevant in size but combined increase Banco
Sabadell's exposure to the domestic market and therefore may
render the bank more vulnerable to the downside risks of Spain's
macro scenario. In particular, the rating agency will assess the
impact of (1) the acquisition of the retail network of former
Caixa Penedes to Banca Mare Nostrum (unrated) closed on 31 May
2013, (2) Banco Sabadell's acquisition of Banco Gallego
(unrated), announced on April 19, 2013 after the public auction
made by the Spanish Fund for the Orderly Resolution of the
Banking System (FROB); and (3) the acquisition of all Spanish
subsidiaries of Lloyds TSB Bank (A2 negative; C-/baa2 negative),
announced on April 29, 2013.

Review of the Senior Debt and Deposit Ratings

The review for downgrade of the senior debt and deposit ratings
was triggered by the review for downgrade of Banco Sabadell's
standalone BCA. According to Moody's methodology, the senior debt
and deposit ratings of a bank results from the combination of its
BCA and any external support it may benefit from. Accordingly,
any downgrade of a bank's BCA could trigger a downgrade of its
senior debt and deposit ratings.

Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Ratings

Moody's review for downgrade of Banco Sabadell's Ba3 senior
subordinated debt ratings and B3(hyb) preference share ratings is
in line with the review for downgrade of the bank's BCA.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

The ratings have been placed on review for downgrade, indicating
downward pressure. This pressure may intensify beyond what has
been described if the macroeconomic operating conditions in Spain
should deviate significantly from Moody's current GDP growth
projections for 2013 and 2014, a GDP decline of -1.4% for 2013
and a very weak growth of less than 1% in 2014; furthermore,
should asset quality deteriorate at a significantly faster rate
than the system average, this may exert further pressure on the
rating.

An upgrade of Banco Sabadell's standalone credit strength is
currently very unlikely, given the current review for downgrade.
However, upward pressure could be exerted on the bank's BCA as a
result of (1) Banco Sabadell successfully resolving its asset-
quality challenges; (2) a sustainable recovery of its
profitability indicators; and (3) the bank achieving sustainable
access to market funding and capital.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in May 2013.


BBVA-3 FTPYME: Fitch Raises Rating on Class C Notes From 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded BBVA-3 FTPYME FTA's class B and C
notes, and affirmed the class A2 notes as follows:

  Class A2 notes (ES0310110012): affirmed at 'AA-sf ', Outlook
  Negative

  Class B notes (ES0310110020): upgraded to 'AA-sf' from 'A+sf',
  Outlook Negative

  Class C notes (ES0310110038): upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf',
  Outlook Stable

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade of the class B and C notes reflects the increased
levels of available credit enhancement (CE) due to the
transaction's deleveraging, which has offset the deterioration of
the portfolio since the last annual review in July 2012, and
allows the notes to withstand higher stresses.

Although the transaction features an interest deferral mechanism
for classes B and C, Fitch believes that the deferral of interest
is unlikely to occur and therefore the rating of the class B
notes addresses the timely payment of interest on the notes.

The class A2 notes' rating and Outlook are limited by the rating
of the Kingdom of Spain (BBB/Negative/F2). The highest achievable
rating for Spanish structured finance transactions is 'AA-
sf'/Negative, which is five notches above the rating of Spain.

The class A2 notes stand at 4.4% of their initial balance and are
expected to be redeemed in full on the next payment dates. After
the payment in full of the senior class, the class B and C notes
will start amortizing sequentially as one of the triggers for the
pro-rata amortization is breached: the outstanding balance of the
pool is below 10% of the initial pool balance.

The transaction's portfolio has further deleveraged since the
last review and currently stands at 3.3% of the balance at
closing. One consequence of deleverage has been higher volatility
in the performance due to the concentration of the pool, with a
spike in delinquencies since March 2013. As of May 2013, 4.4% of
the pool was delinquent for more than 90 days compared with 1.7%
as of May 2012, and 1.7% was delinquent for more than 180 days
compared with 0.5% in 2012. Defaults currently represent 13.4% of
the outstanding portfolio or 0.5% of the maximum portfolio
balance as of closing. The largest borrower represents 4.4% and
45 borrowers accounted for more than 0.5% as of May 2013.

BBVA 3 FTPYME is a cash flow securitization of loans to small-
and medium-sized Spanish enterprises (SMEs) granted by Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria.

Rating Sensitivities

As part of its analysis, Fitch considered the sensitivity of the
notes' ratings to the stresses on defaults and recovery rates.
These stresses had no material negative impact on the ratings.

The impact of an increase of defaults of 25% was assessed, and no
negative impact on the rating of the notes resulted from the
analysis. The recovery rates were also stressed, applying a
haircut of 25% with no negative impact on the rating of the
notes.


BBVA-4 PYME: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed BBVA-4 PYME FTA's notes as follows:

Class A2 notes (ES0370458012): affirmed at 'AA-sf ', Outlook
Negative

Class B notes (ES0370458020): affirmed at 'AA-sf ', Outlook
Negative

Class C notes (ES0370458038): affirmed at 'CCCsf', assigned
Recover Estimate (RE) of 90%

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation of the ratings reflects the increased levels of
available credit enhancement (CE) due to the transaction's
further deleveraging that has offset the performance
deterioration observed over the past year. The class A2 notes are
likely to be redeemed in full at the next payment date as only
0.4% of their initial balance remains outstanding.

The class A2 and B notes' rating and Outlook are limited by the
rating of the Kingdom of Spain (BBB/Negative/F2). The highest
achievable rating for Spanish structured finance transactions is
'AA-sf' Negative Outlook, which is five notches above the rating
of Spain.

The portfolio has amortized to 4% of its original balance as of
May 2013, and the largest borrower represents 5.1%, while the 10
largest obligors are 31.3% of the balance. The transaction is
also exposed to a considerable industry exposure to the real
estate and building and material sectors, which stands at 28%.

Since the previous annual review, the transaction's performance
has deteriorated with an increase in the arrears over 90 days to
1.1% from 0.4%, and an increase in the arrears over 180 days to
0.7% from 0.2%. Defaulted assets represent 25.4% of the
outstanding pool or 1.1% of the portfolio at closing date.

79% of the portfolio is backed by mortgages, however the observed
weighted average recovery rate has been historically low over the
life of the transaction. Nevertheless over the past year more
recoveries have been observed and the weighted average recovery
rate has increased from 17% at the last annual review to 34%. The
increased recoveries are reflected in the RE of 90% assigned to
the class C notes.

BBVA-4 PYME is a cash flow securitization of loans to small- and
medium-sized Spanish enterprises (SMEs) granted by Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria.

Rating Sensitivities

As part of its analysis, the agency considered the sensitivity of
the notes' ratings to the stresses on defaults and recovery rates
but such stresses had no material negative impact on the ratings.

The impact of an increase of defaults of 25% was assessed, and no
negative impact on the notes' rating resulted from such analysis.
Also the recovery rates were stressed, applying a haircut of 25%
and no negative impact was derived on the notes' rating.


* Fitch Publishes July Edition of SME CLO Compare
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has published the July edition of its SME CLO
Compare. The report is updated on a monthly basis.

On June 17, 2013, the agency launched its new publication series
under the banner 'SME Market Overview'. The reports provide an
overview of the SME market in key European jurisdictions that are
active in the SME securitization sector allowing for cross-
jurisdiction comparisons in regards to SME demographics,
financing, business regulations, tax and insolvency regimes. The
first two reports for the UK and Spain are available at
www.fitchratings.com.

During June 2013, Fitch reviewed the ratings of 12 SME CLO
transactions, resulting in 31 tranches being affirmed, two being
upgraded and three being downgraded. Additionally three tranches
of TDA Sa Nostra Empresas 1&2 FTA were maintained on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN) as they are credit linked to Banco Mare Nostrum's
rating ('BB+'/RWN/'B') who acts as the transactions' originator
and servicer.

Fitch upgraded EuroConnect Issuer SME 2007's class B notes to
'BB+sf' from 'BB-sf' and class C notes to 'B+sf' from 'B-sf',
reflecting the stable pool performance and the increased credit
protection for the rated notes as a result of pool amortization.
The transaction is a partially-funded synthetic CDO
securitization with exposures to small-and medium-sized
enterprises, primarily in Germany and Austria.

The agency downgraded FTPYME Bancaja 2 FTA 's class C notes to
'Bsf' from 'BBsf' due to the increased level of delinquencies and
defaults since the previous review in July 2012. The transaction
is a cash-flow securitization of loans granted to Spanish small
and medium-sized enterprises (SME) by Caja de Ahorros de
Valencia, Castellon y Alicante.

Fitch downgraded S-Core 2007-1 GmbH's class B notes to 'CCsf'
from 'CCCsf' and class C notes to 'Csf' from 'CCsf', reflecting
the limited available credit enhancement compared to the single
obligor concentrations. The transaction is a cash securitisation
of certificates of indebtedness (Schuldscheindarlehen) of German
SMEs originated and serviced by Deutsche Bank AG
('A+'/Stable/'F1+').

Delinquencies and defaults in Spain and Italy remained at
substantial levels during the first half of 2013. Loans more than
90 days in arrears in Spain have decreased to 4.5% of the total
Spanish SME portfolio, from 6% as of February 2013. The drop is
mainly attributed to the inclusion of two new Spanish deals in
the portfolio which total EUR1.7 billion (IM Cajamar Empresas 5,
FTA and Foncaixa Leasings 2, FTA) and include no loans in arrears
at closing. Excluding these two transactions, 90+ arrears account
for 5.5% of the rest of the Spanish SME portfolio. Cumulative
defaults in Spain account for 3.5% as a percentage of the SME
portfolio excluding the two new deals.

In Italy, loans 90 days past due (dpd) account for 2.3% of the
total Italian portfolio balance; however defaults have increased
significantly during H113 and currently stand at 6.3% of the
outstanding balance of all Italian deals tracked in Fitch's SME
CLO portfolio. One driver for the high defaults is the Impresa
One srl. deal in which defaults account for 7.4% as of its
initial balance. The deal included no defaults at its closing in
October 2011. Fitch believes that the deteriorating performance
in Spain and Italy will be maintained reflecting the stressed
economic fundamentals in the eurozone periphery.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CANARY WHARF: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D2 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Canary Wharf Finance II plc, as
follows:

GBP1,012.5m class A1 due October 2037 (XS0112279616): affirmed at
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

GBP400m class A3 due October 2037 (XS0130681512): affirmed at
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

GBP222m class A7 due October 2037 (XS0295171341): affirmed at
'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

GBP179.7m class B due October 2037 (XS0112281190): affirmed at
'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

GBP104m class B3 due October 2037 (XS0295172075): affirmed at
'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

GBP275m class C2 due October 2037 (XS0295172406): affirmed at
'Asf'; Outlook Stable

GBP125m class D2 due October 2037 (XS0295172745): affirmed at
'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect the stable performance of the underlying
loan, which is secured by seven prime office buildings benefiting
from several high quality leases to institutions in the financial
and professional services sector headquartered on London's Canary
Wharf estate. The weighted average lease term to first break is
13.4 years, while vacancy stands at 5% of total floor area, which
Fitch considers largely structural in nature.

Although its market value remains 26% below the peak recorded in
June 2007, the collateral has recovered well since the outbreak
of the financial crisis, particularly given the now-defunct
Lehman Brothers was a significant tenant on the estate. Income
coverage has risen to 1.33x from 1.25x since the last rating
action in July 2012, while collateral value of GBP3.263 billion
was reported in December 2012, an increase of GBP58 million from
12 months earlier. Added to the effect of scheduled amortization
(and taking account of cash reserves), this has brought the loan-
to-value ratio down to 69.8%.

Rating Sensitivities

A resumption of the strains in global financial markets seen in
the depths of the financial crisis would likely have a harmful
effect on the performance of global financial institutions whose
health is instrumental to the continued deleveraging of the
transaction. Any downwards revision of the ratings Outlook for
global trading and universal banks from their broadly Stable
setting could therefore prompt negative rating action on the
notes.


CARE UK: Weak Performance Prompts Moody's to Downgrade CFR to B3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has downgraded Care UK Health & Social Care Investments
Ltd Corporate Family Rating, Probability of Default Rating to B3
and B3-PD respectively as well as Care UK Health & Social Care
plc.'s instrument ratings to Caa1. The outlook on all ratings has
been changed to stable from negative.

Downgrades:

Issuer: Care UK Health & Social Care Investments Ltd

  Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to B3-PD from B2-PD

  Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to B3 from B2

Issuer: Care UK Health & Social Care plc.

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Aug 1, 2017, Downgraded
  to Caa1 (LGD4, 63%) from B3 (LGD4, 59%)

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Care UK Health & Social Care Investments Ltd

  Outlook, Changed To Stable from Negative

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade was primarily driven by weak performance of Care UK
despite continuously increasing size of the group, coupled with
an increase in adjusted debt levels over the last year.

Given the debt funded expansion growth, Care UK's credit profile
continued to weaken. Reported by company and pro-forma for all
synergies net leverage levels increased by c. 1.0x since June
2012 to c. 5.0x (March 2013), a level, however, that does not
reflect the ongoing increase of operating leases which have been
increasingly used to finance Care UK's aggressive expansion.
Gross leverage levels, therefore, have also continued to increase
to reach 9.9x (including Moody's adjustment for the present value
(PV) of operating leases) and 8.9x (Company actual reported
level) by end of March 2013.

Prospects of a quick deleveraging over the next 12-18 months
below the 6.25x trigger level that was set for the downgrade are
limited as the company will enter into further lease agreements
and free cash flow is expected to remain negative over this and
next year. Moody's expects that its leasing obligations and rent
payments will continue to increase going forward, so that Moody's
adjusted leverage will remain significantly higher than reported
and even pro-forma for synergies levels over at least next couple
years.

As the company is using operating leases to finance its organic
growth, Moody's adjusted leverage already reflects the respective
debt adjustments. These new developments are not operational yet,
therefore leverage will be overstated. However, Moody's estimates
that even leverage using lower effective lease capitalization
factor of 6.0x on current lease payments will still be above
Moody's trigger level to maintain the B2 rating.

Over recent months, Care UK has continued its strategy to grow
via debt funded acquisitions (e.g. most recently via the
acquisitions of UK Specialist Hospitals Ltd. and Watson Group
Healthcare Ltd). This strategy resulted in sales growing
significantly from GBP182 million in 2010 to GBP548 million for
the last twelve months as of end of March 2013 while Moody's
adjusted debt increased substantially from GBP300 million to
GBP567 million in the same period. This position includes a
sizeable adjustment to reported debt for operating leases, which
Care UK largely used to fund its development program.

Although Care UK made progress made in improving occupancy rates
in recently acquired former Southern Cross properties, this was
more than offset by moderate declines in the rest of the
portfolio, the expiry of rent-free periods for operating leases
and material restructuring and one-off costs, so that the overall
contribution has fallen, as illustrated by Moody's adjusted
EBITDA margins of 10.4% ( for the last twelve months ending March
2013) as compared to 13.3% achieved in the financial year 2012.

Though still adequate, Care UK's liquidity profile continued to
deteriorate as reflected in year-over-year lower cash balance and
increased drawings under the RCF. Following a track record of
negative free cash generation, it is likely that existing cash
balances further decline and RCF facility drawings remain
outstanding over a longer period, more reflective of their use as
acquisition funding source.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the Company
will be able to gradually improve operating performance, so that
interest cover would not decline materially below 1.0x, and that
Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA would move towards 7.0x by end of
2014.

Rating Triggers:

An upgrade is currently unlikely, given the high leverage and
weak free cash flow generation, but would require leverage levels
trending sustainably toward 6.0x, EBITA/Interest improving above
1.2x and the generation of positive free cash flows on a
sustainable basis.

A downgrade would be considered if free cash flow generation
remains negative and Care UK's liquidity profile weakens further.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Healthcare Service Providers published in December 2011. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Care UK Health & Social Care Investments Ltd is a leading
independent provider of health and social care services in the
UK. The company generated revenues of GBP488 million in FY 2012
and following inclusion of several former Southern Cross
properties operates over 200 facilities and employs a workforce
of over 22,000 employees.


COVENTRY CITY: Sisu Cos. Agree to Write Off GBP32 Mil. of Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Coventry Telegraph reports that Sisu companies have agreed to
write off GBP32 million of debt as part of Coventry City
administrator Paul Appleton's sale to Otium for GBP1.5 million.

According to Coventry Telegraph, Arena Coventry Limited, as a
non-connected unsecured creditor, would get 25.95p in the pound
back on its debts if it agrees to the Company Voluntary
Arrangement (CVA) proposed by Mr. Appleton.  That would see
GBP553,261 returned to it, Coventry Telegraph notes.

That figure is made up of a percentage of the debt it is owed in
unpaid Sky Blues rent; and another year's rent effectively as
compensation for the lease agreement being broken between ACL and
the Sky Blues, which has around 40 years remaining on it,
Coventry Telegraph says.

If ACL does not agree to the CVA, Mr. Appleton states it would
get a paltry halfpence in the pound under the alternative of
Coventry City Football Club Limited being liquidated, Coventry
Telegraph states.

Mr. Appleton's proposal -- seen by the Telegraph -- states
Sisu-related creditor Coventry City Football Club (Holdings)
Limited has agreed to "waive amounts due to them of GBP24.7
million".

The corresponding write-off for Sisu company Sky Blue Sports and
Leisure Limited is GBP7.5 million, the report states -- amounting
to a total of GBP32.2 million in write offs, according to
Coventry Telegraph.  The report states that would leave total
liabilities to the two companies of GBP11.5 million and GBP7
million respectively -- leaving a total remaining debt of GBP18.4
million, Coventry Telegraph discloses.

If the CVA is accepted, the Sisu companies would write off this
GBP18.4 million, and another GBP10.25 million owed to another
Sisu company, Cayman Islands-based Arvo Master Fund, Coventry
Telegraph notes.

Mr. Appleton's proposal states Otium had offered GBP1.5 million
for the assets in Coventry City Football Club Limited -- the
company Arvo placed in administration in March after ACL's High
Court administration was dismissed by a judge, Coventry Telegraph
relates.

Holdings then continued to run the football club, while
Mr. Appleton as the administrator took ownership of CCFC Ltd,
which remains in administration, Coventry Telegraph says.

According to Coventry Telegraph, Mr. Appleton has said he has
completed the sale of the "rights and title" to assets in Ltd. to
Otium, minus the ACL lease.

Coventry City is an English association football club based in
Coventry, central England.


HEARTS OF MIDLOTHIAN: Administrator Does Not Rule Out Newco Route
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Courier reports that Hearts joint-administrator Trevor Birch
has warned that going down the newco route cannot be ruled out if
his Lithuanian counterparts play hardball over the transfer of
the club's shares.

Departed Hearts owner Vladimir Romanov's collapsed companies
UBIG, which is about to be placed in administration, and Ukio
Bankas, which has been declared bankrupt, own a combined 79.9% of
the club, The Courier discloses.

Rangers were forced to set up a new company last season after Her
Majesty's Revenue and Customs rejected a Company Voluntary
Arrangement, with the club ordered to start again in the bottom
tier of Scottish football as a result, The Courier recounts.

And Birch admits Hearts, who owe GBP15 and GBP10 million to UBIG
and Ukio respectively, might be left with no option but to go
down that road, The Courier notes.

Mr. Birch, as cited by The Courier, said: "They might say, 'well
we want GBP10 million for them' or something stupid; or there
might be difficulties with the [UBIG] administration;
administrators might not be appointed quickly and, therefore, you
won't be able to sell them (the shares) quickly that way.

"Whether someone is wanting an exorbitant figure or not, it's
whether you are physically able to deliver them.

"If we cannot get the shares then we have to start thinking 'is
there another way of doing it?' And that might mean of course the
Rangers way.  They set up a newco because they could not do a CVA
because of HMRC.

"But that took them out of the league so there was a precedent
there.

"You try and avoid that at all costs.  Whether the SPFL and the
SFA would treat us the same way, I don't know.

"A newco has not been discussed as an option but you have to look
at all situations and all alternatives, because if we were
hitting our head against a brick wall and we could not sell (the
club) then that might be the only alternative.

"And then it would be up to the authorities to see how they might
deal with that."

Meanwhile, Hearts supporters are closing in on the 3,000 mark of
extra season ticket sales, which they were challenged to reach in
a two-week period ending on Friday, The Courier relates.

Heart of Midlothian Football Club (more commonly known as Hearts)
is a Scottish professional football club based in Gorgie, in the
west of Edinburgh.


INEOS GROUP: Bank Debt Trades at 2% Off
---------------------------------------
Participations in a syndicated loan under which Ineos Group Plc
is a borrower traded in the secondary market at 98.23 cents-on-
the-dollar during the week ended Friday, July 5, 2013 according
to data compiled by LSTA/Thomson Reuters MTM Pricing and reported
in The Wall Street Journal.  This represents a drop of 0.61
percentage points from the previous week, The Journal relates.
Ineos Group Plc pays 300 basis points above LIBOR to borrow under
the facility.  The bank loan matures on April 23, 2018.  The bank
debt carries Moody's B1 rating and Standard & Poor's BB-rating.
The loan is one of the biggest gainers and losers among 255
widely quoted syndicated loans with five or more bids in
secondary trading for the week ended Friday.

Ineos Group Holdings plc is a diversified and integrated
chemicals
group headquartered in Southampton, the United Kingdom.  Ineos
reported 2007 Revenues of EUR 27.5 billion and EBIT of EUR1.2
billion.


SCOTTISH COAL: Hargreaves Services Buys Assets for GBP8.4 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Erikka Askeland at The Scotsman reports that Hargreaves Services
on Friday acquired the assets of Scottish Coal for GBP8.4
million, three years after its parent company embarked on a
GBP250 million plan to float on the stock market.

Hargreaves, the Scotsman says, will reinstate 300 jobs, rising to
500, after taking control of five former active mining sites,
including Broken Cross in South Lanarkshire and House of Water in
East Ayrshire.  While the company will not own the mines, it has
pledged to invest GBP25 million into them and expects to extract
1m tonnes of coal in its first year, the Scotsman notes.

Due to "complexities associated with the company's financial
affairs", ownership of the mines have been transferred to a new
Scottish Coal holding company, which Hargreaves has the option to
purchase at a later date, the Scotsman discloses.

According to the Scotsman, the subsidiaries will "continue to be
responsible for the resolution of outstanding restoration
liabilities at these sites".

The Durham-based industrial firm did acquire other assets owned
by the failed Scottish Resources Group (SRG) including around
30,000 acres of land, plant and equipment and potential wind farm
interests, the Scotsman states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, BBC News related that liquidators for Scottish Coal named
Hargreaves Services as preferred bidder for some of its assets.
KPMG, as cited by BBC, said it had chosen County Durham-based
Hargreaves Services as the best way of resuming operations and
bringing mining jobs back to the coal fields.  Scottish Coal,
which operated six open cast mines across Scotland, folded in
April with the loss of 600 jobs, BBC recounted.

Scottish Coal is an open cast mining firm.


THOMAS COOK: S&P Raises Long-Term Corp. Credit Ratings to 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit ratings on U.K.-based tour operator Thomas Cook Group PLC
to 'B' from 'B-', and removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
S&P placed them with positive implications on May 16, 2013.

At the same time, S&P raised to 'B' from 'B-' the issue rating on
the outstanding bonds, including the EUR525 million unsecured
notes due 2020, the GBP300 million unsecured notes due 2017, and
the EUR400 million unsecured notes due 2015, issued by Thomas
Cook.  S&P has removed the issue rating from CreditWatch where it
placed it with positive implications on May 16, 2013.

The recovery rating on the unsecured notes is unchanged at '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.

The upgrade reflects S&P's view of Thomas Cook's improved
financial flexibility following the completion of its capital
refinancing plan.  As part of the plan, Thomas Cook raised almost
GBP430 million in new equity, issued EUR525 million in unsecured
notes, and signed a new GBP500 million revolving and bonding
facility and EUR224 million additional forward start facility.
Thomas Cook has used some of the proceeds to repay and fully
cancel its existing credit facilities.

"In our view, the comprehensive plan has improved Thomas Cook's
financial flexibility both in terms of liquidity headroom and
credit metrics.  Specifically, we anticipate that proceeds from
the new equity issuance have reduced outstanding debt by about
GBP355 million.  This, along with a projected improvement in
profitability, is likely to materially reduce leverage from the
high level that Thomas Cook reported in 2012.  We estimate that
Standard & Poor's-adjusted gross debt to EBITDA will remain at
slightly less than 7.0x at both financial year-end Sept. 30, 2013
and at the seasonal low point in December.  This ratio was 8.9x
at the end of financial year 2012," S&P said.

"In financial 2013, adjusted interest coverage by EBITDA ratio
should reach, under our projections, about 2.0x compared with
1.3x at the end of financial 2012.  We expect leverage to reduce
further in financial 2014, when we estimate that adjusted gross
debt to EBITDA will be less than 6.0x and adjusted interest
coverage will be more than 2.0x.  This is mainly based on our
assumptions of a material reduction in operating restructuring
costs -- which the company considers exceptional--some margin
improvement as a result of the cost cutting exercise implemented
by management, and better yield management.  We also estimate
that funds from operations (FFO) to total debt will improve to
about 15% by financial 2014 from 9% in 2012," S&P said.

The refinancing plan, in S&P's opinion, has materially improved
Thomas Cook's debt maturity profile.  Based on the current
capital structure, there are now no material debt maturities
before 2017 (the EUR400 million notes due 2015 will mainly be
refinanced through the committed EUR224 million forward start
facility).

"We assess Thomas Cook's business risk profile at the low end of
the "weak" category.  Our assessment mainly reflects our view of
the cyclicality and seasonality of the tourism industry, which
creates ongoing margin pressure; deepening threats to
discretionary consumer spending in some markets; and a high level
of event risk.  We consider that the group has marginal ability
to generate discretionary cash flow and therefore limited
capacity for debt reduction.  That said, Thomas Cook has critical
mass, a well-established market position in various European
markets (the group is one of the top three players in its key
markets), and geographically diverse sales," S&P added.

S&P's base-case operating scenario for the next 12-18 months
assumes the following:

   -- A continued weak global economy, which will affect
      operating trends.  That said, under S&P's base-case credit
      scenario it assumes some moderate improvement in
      discretionary spending in the group's main countries of
      operation--the U.K., Germany, and the Nordic region
      countries.

   -- A predicted decline in revenues by 3% in 2013 as a result
      of capacity reduction.  In S&P's view, new management
      initiatives are likely to support low-single-digit sales
      growth from 2014.

   -- Still-sizable restructuring costs (over GBP110 million
      under S&P's base-case scenario), which will weaken
      profitability and capacity to generate cash flow in 2013.
      From 2014, such operating restructuring costs are projected
      to significantly decline, allowing for margin improvement
      and better cash flow generation capacity.

   -- S&P's projection of an improvement in margins in 2013-2014
      --from about 1% to more than 3% and 4%, respectively--as
      growth in the average selling price in the group's main
      regions outpaces cost inflation, due to better yield
      management as well as cost-saving initiatives implemented
      by the new management.

   -- Capital investments of between GBP175 million and
      GBP185 million that S&P anticipates in both 2013 and 2014.
      No dividend payments are projected over the next 12-18
      months.

The issue rating on Thomas Cook's unsecured notes is 'B', in line
with the corporate credit rating.  The recovery rating on the
unsecured notes is '4', reflecting S&P's expectation of average
(30%-50%) recovery expectations in the case of a payment default.
S&P's estimated recovery prospects are at the low end of the 30%-
50% range, and reflect S&P's estimate of the company's valuation
in case of default, and its new capital structure, mainly
comprising unsecured debt instruments.

The EUR525 million notes are unsecured and rank pari passu with
the existing notes (GBP300 million due 2017 and EUR400 million
due 2015) and the new GBP691 million-equivalent credit
facilities.  The EUR525 million unsecured notes benefit from a
standard (high-yield) package of covenants, which includes a
basket for possible prior-ranking secured debt of GBP650 million
(a GBP450 million basket under the existing notes).  S&P
anticipates that, as long as the existing notes remain
outstanding, the most stringent of the two conditions will apply.
Under S&P's simulated default scenario, therefore, which assumes
a default in late 2016, the GBP300 million notes will still be
outstanding, and so the applicable basket will be GBP450 million.
S&P's recovery rating is based on the current capital structure
and does not assume further prior-ranking debt being raised on
the path to default.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Thomas Cook's
improving profitability over the next year will enable it to
sustain its enhanced financial metrics.  We base this view on the
group's new strategic plan to reduce costs by approximately
GBP250 million (on a risk-adjusted basis) over the next three
years, and improve its yield management.  As a result, we
estimate that reported EBITDA (after operating exceptional costs)
will be in the GBP300 million-GBP310 million range in September
2013, with further double-digit growth estimated for 2014,
enabling the group to achieve adjusted EBITDA interest coverage
of more than 2.0x in 2014 and an adjusted gross debt-to-EBITDA
ratio of less than 6.0x.  The stable outlook also reflects our
opinion that Thomas Cook will maintain what we consider to be
"adequate" liquidity," S&P said.

Adverse operating developments leading to significantly weaker-
than-anticipated EBITDA performance and credit ratios, and
significant tightening of covenant headroom to persistently less
than 15% could trigger a negative rating action.  Specifically,
pressure on the ratings could result from adjusted debt to EBITDA
exceeding 6.0x and adjusted EBITDA interest coverage declining to
less than 2.0x in financial 2014.  Furthermore, if S&P was to
reassess downward the group's liquidity to "less than adequate,"
it might consider lowering the rating.

"A positive rating action would depend on the group achieving a
sustained improvement in its profitability margins (an EBITDA
margin of more than 5%).  A successful implementation of the
strategic plan aimed at reducing fixed costs, optimizing cash
flow and working capital management, and adapting the business by
increasing the focus on online supply and premium products--such
as differentiated packages -- could lead to a marginal
improvement in our business risk profile assessment to the high
end of the "weak" category.  An improvement in Thomas Cook's
operating performance, if combined with a rigorous financial
policy, could lead to financial metrics consistent with an
"aggressive" financial risk profile.  Such a combination could
potentially drive a one-notch upgrade," S&P noted.


* UK: Moody's Says WBS Outlook Still Constrained by Weak Economy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says in a new report that the outlook for UK Whole
Business Securitisations (WBS) remains predominantly negative,
largely due to weak economic conditions and the consequent
pressures on consumer and government spending.

The main UK WBS sectors (pubs and care homes/hospitals) will
continue to struggle in the latter stages of 2013 due to both the
weak UK economy (with declining consumer discretionary spending)
and the effect of public austerity. Consequently, despite the
diversity of sectors within Fitch-rated WBS transactions, the
outlook remains negative.

The government's surprise move to lower the duty on beer by 1p
per pint at end-March and to eventually scrap the duty escalator
on beer was welcome news for the pub sector. However, the duty on
other alcoholic drinks was left in place. Furthermore, plans to
introduce minimum pricing for alcohol -- which could have helped
pubs to better compete with low price alcohol sold in
supermarkets -- seem less likely to materialize anytime soon.

The weak UK economy will continue to challenge the pub companies'
(pubcos) profitability, but margin compression is expected to
slow. Managed pubs (notably those selling food) still offer an
appealing value proposition driving footfall/revenues, and
recently invested pubs (e.g. Spirit) should continue to grow.

Fitch expects tenanted pubs' woes to continue with further
declines in rent and beer incomes. They are hampered by their
chronic underinvestment with both pubcos and tenants having
limited financing capacities. Some established players with
flexible leases, prudent rent setting and capex planning (e.g.
Greene King) and newly setup franchise agreements (Marston's)
should be relatively resilient.

The potential implementation of a statutory code to protect the
tenants of pubcos from perceived unfair treatment would be credit
negative for major tenanted pubcos in the short to medium term,
while over the longer term the code could reduce tenant failure
rates.

In the healthcare sector, continued pressure on NHS and local
authority budgets and negotiation by medical insurers mean that
care homes' and hospitals' EBITDAR margins are likely to decline
further, back to below the 30% level observed less than a decade
ago (from around 35% today). Fitch expects the ratings of
individual care home and pub transactions will be driven in the
near term by the terms of debt restructuring (pubs) and
refinancing (care homes and hospitals) exercises. Care homes with
longer tails between loan and bond maturity are expected to be
less affected in the short term, whilst the junior bonds in pubs
are likely to be more volatile.

An (unexpectedly) stronger UK economic output or an easing of
austerity measures would alleviate (at least temporarily) some of
the healthcare funding issues and improve consumer discretionary
spending power (benefiting pubs). Government plans to introduce a
surveillance body to monitor care homes' financial performance
(to prevent another Southern Cross scenario) could also be
positive.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EMEA Renewables Remain Under Pressure, Fitch Reports
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says in a new report that renewable energy
projects, particularly those located in Southern and Eastern
Europe, carry the highest downgrade risk within Fitch's portfolio
of EMEA energy project finance ratings due to the possibility of
negative regulatory intervention. Oil and gas projects and UK
offshore transmission operators continue to display stable credit
profiles.

The pressures on public and private budgets in a number of
Southern and Eastern European countries resulted in some
governments enacting measures to reduce, also retroactively, the
remuneration of renewable energy projects, with solar PV hardest
hit. Further negative regulatory intervention remains a
possibility due to the combination of large levels of price
subsidy and weak economic conditions. In addition, projects may
also be challenged by the introduction of more stringent
operational parameters. In Italy, for example, PV projects are
now required to provide day-ahead hourly generation forecasts and
have had to implement technical upgrades for grid safety and
stability.

The absence of similar precedents of negative regulatory
intervention in Northern Europe supports a generally stable
outlook for this region. Transaction-specific operational
performance issues (in particular, solar/wind resource
availability and operating costs escalation) are the main drivers
of the negative outlooks on some of the Fitch-rated renewable
energy projects in these jurisdictions.

Large Fitch-rated oil & gas projects, such as liquefied natural
gas producers, benefit from low break-even price levels and,
generally, a firm base of long-term take-or-pay contracts. These
features support the project's ability to weather the possible
toughening of hydrocarbon market conditions (low prices and/or
demand contraction). This downside risk is reflected in Fitch's
ratings through the use of stress analysis to accommodate both
mild and severe downside scenarios.

The still limited operating performance of the early UK offshore
transmission operators (OFTOs) has been sound. Fitch expects
OFTOs to show stable revenue and cost profiles. This reflects the
view that the projects employ proven technology with low failure
rates and that the regulatory regime is instrumental in smoothing
revenue and cost volatility. However, the regulatory provisions,
particularly in respect of major failure events, need to develop
a case history to allow for a better assessment of their
efficacy.

The main drivers of a stabilization of the outlooks on renewables
would be the lessening of regulatory risk and the projects
developing a stable operational track record.

The credit quality of the oil & gas projects rated by Fitch may
come under pressure in case of extreme events, such as crude oil
prices below Fitch's base case price deck (Brent USD70/bbl long
term) for more than a year or, for projects which rely on getting
product through the straits, a protracted closure of the Strait
of Hormuz.

In the case of OFTOs, the testing of the regulatory framework and
projects' operating history could change the outlook to positive
or negative in the coming years.


* Fitch Sees Stable Outlook for EMEA Transport Infrastructure
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says in a new report that although the prolonged
economic weakness in European economies continues to erode the
performance of the transport infrastructure sector, most ratings
and Outlooks were envisaging (and still envisage) a recession in
2012/13. This is why many ratings in the portfolio carry a Stable
Outlook.

Most public ratings in Fitch's portfolio apply to debt serviced
by cash flow from mature infrastructure assets with strong
operational profiles. These include large hub airports, mature
toll-road networks, diversified seaports and essential rail
links. These core (i.e. large and resilient) assets generally
carry a Stable Outlook despite the adverse economic environment.
Where exposed to particularly weakened economies (e.g. Portugal,
Spain, Italy), a Negative Outlook may apply, even to more
resilient assets.

Fitch's rating case (which allows for some downside to its base
case) is based on a prudent forecast of all the main credit
drivers, some of which may be sensitive to macro developments,
e.g. volume, price, opex, capex, cost of debt.

A Stable Outlook now applies to 68% of the portfolio (up from 51%
in December 2012). This mostly reflects the downgrade (with
Stable Outlook) of credits guaranteed by or credit-linked to the
UK (the sovereign was downgraded in April 2013) and the addition
of new ratings with Stable Outlooks. Most Negative Outlooks apply
to peripheral European projects, some of which have been
downgraded and maintain poor prospects.

Ratings also hinge on the ability of their sponsors to negotiate
or renew long-term off-take agreements, re-profile capex,
deleverage (i.e. reduce dividend distribution, add equity or sell
assets), refinance upcoming maturities and/or extend liquidity
lines. Yet some issuers (particularly in Spain or Portugal) have
likely hit the limits of such flexibility.

After a strong decline in traffic (far beyond the GDP decline
rate) in 2012, traffic on European large toll road networks
continues to fall in 2013. However, it is at a slower pace than
in the previous year. A return to some traffic growth in 2014 or
2015 will depend on unemployment and private consumption.
Evidence of depressed private consumption is clear for southern
European toll roads networks.

Fitch's base case believes passenger air travel will post very
timid growth in 2013. The rating case takes a more conservative
view and assumes traffic will remain flat or slightly negative in
Europe. Large northern European airports continue to have Stable
Outlooks.

Fitch's rating cases do not factor in a near-term economic
rebound. Ratings carrying Stable Outlooks should not therefore be
materially affected by the weaker economic climate - unless it
worsens considerably. In such a scenario, Fitch would adjust its
ratings accordingly. A return to sustained growth would, combined
with a stable economic and financing environment, justify a more
stable outlook for the transport infrastructure sector.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 1 to July 5, 2013
---------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


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