TCREUR_Public/130805.mbx          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, August 5, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 153

                            Headlines



C R O A T I A

* CROATIA: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB+' Rating


C Y P R U S

FINTEST TRADING: S&P Assigns 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating


F R A N C E

PEUGEOT SA: Moody's Changes Outlook to Negative on Sales Drop


G E R M A N Y

KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Puts 'BB' CCR on CreditWatch Positive


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: Special Liquidators Commence Loan Book Sale Process
BANK OF IRELAND: Close to Profit; Narrows 1H Losses to EUR455MM
DUNCANNON CRE CDO I: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Class X Notes
FERREXPO PLC: S&P Affirms 'B/B' CCRs; Outlook Negative
SVG DIAMOND: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on EUR83.5MM of CFO Notes

ULSTER BANK: Narrows Losses to GBP329-Mil. in First Half of 2013
WATERFORD CASTLE: Aiden Murphy Confirmed as Official Liquidator


I T A L Y

CLARIS FINANCE 2006: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB'
SAGRANTINO ITALY: Fitch Affirms, Then Withdraws CCC Notes Rating


K A Z A K H S T A N

SB ALFA BANK: Fitch Rates KZT4.5BB Senior Unsecured Bonds 'B+'
ZHAIKMUNAI LP: S&P Raises LT Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'


N E T H E R L A N D S

CONTEGO CLO I: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on Class E Notes
PDM CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
REFRESCO GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B+' CCR


N O R W A Y

NJORD GAS: S&P Cuts Rating on NOK3.798BB Sr. Sec. Bonds to 'BB'
NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Ratings to 'CCC/C'


P O R T U G A L

SAGRES SOCIEDADE: S&P Affirms 'B-' Ratings on Two Note Classes


R U S S I A

RUSSIAN EXPOBANK: Fitch Rates Series 3 Sr. Unsecured Bonds 'B'
ZENIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-term IDR; Outlook Stable
* CITY OF KAZAN: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Currency Ratings
* Dividend Payout Hike Won't Affect Russian State-Owned Entities


S P A I N

* Spanish Banks' Deferred Tax Move Largely Cosmetic, Fitch Says


U K R A I N E

NAFTOGAZ UKRAINY: Ukraine Faces Reserves Squeeze Over Subsidies


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Hedge Funds Threaten Rescue Plan


* UK: Scottish Business Failures Down Due to Creditor Support


X X X X X X X X

* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 29 to August 2, 2013


                            *********


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C R O A T I A
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* CROATIA: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB+' Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlook on the
Republic of Croatia to negative from stable.  At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term sovereign credit
ratings on Croatia.

The transfer and convertibility assessment remains at 'BBB+'.

                           RATIONALE

The outlook revision reflects S&P's estimate that there is a more
than one-in-three chance that prolonged weak economic
performance, coupled with limited reform impetus, will lead to
fiscal or external outcomes worse than S&P currently projects.
S&P sees Croatia's recent EU accession as an important
opportunity for addressing key growth, competitiveness, and
productivity challenges.  However, due to the co-financing
requirement, and in the absence of government expenditure-side
reforms, the EU funds now available to Croatia from the 2014-2020
EU budget (which amount to 3% of GDP annually) may not be used
fully.  Failure to draw on them would render Croatia a net
contributor to the EU budget.

In 2013, Croatia entered its fifth consecutive year of recession.
Since 2008, real GDP has contracted by a cumulative 12%, mainly
on the 12% decline in real consumption and 35% decline in real
investment.  For 2013, S&P projects a further contraction of 1%.
In 2014-2015, we believe that domestic demand will remain subdued
as a result of private sector deleveraging and high unemployment.
From 2014, S&P anticipates a modest recovery helped by the
absorption of the EU funds, but S&P sees increasing risks to this
projection.  Some of these relate to competitiveness and capacity
challenges in Croatia's historically successful tourism sector.
Overall, S&P consider real GDP per capita growth prospects--which
S&P estimates will average 0.4% over 2007-2016--to be weaker than
EU peers'.

S&P sees some positive signs regarding reforms.  The government
has made recent announcements about state privatizations,
proposed reforms of the business climate, labor law amendments,
and planned pension reforms.  In S&P's view, however, the
implementation of this agenda has so far been partial and
reactive.

S&P expects that when Eurostat publishes data related to the EU's
fiscal notification in October, Croatia will face the activation
of an excessive debt procedure (EDP).  For 2013, the Croatian
general government fiscal deficit will likely exceed 3% of GDP,
with general government debt approaching 60% of GDP (the 3%
deficit-to-GDP ratio and the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio are reference
values defined in the Protocol on the EDP annexed to the
Maastricht Treaty).  If the debt of the Croatian Road Authority--
which amounts to 7.5% of GDP--is assumed by the government as
part of a concession arrangement, this would push the general
government debt ratio up even higher: by the difference between
the concession revenues and the debt assumed by the government.

S&P believes that pressure from the European Commission could
potentially steer the Croatian government to focus more on fiscal
consolidation on the expenditure side.  The government has so far
focused almost exclusively on the revenue side, including planned
privatizations, and its efforts are now stalling as a result of
low growth and growing interest payments as a reflection of
rising government indebtedness.

Croatia's current account is close to balance, with the past
decade's prevailing deficits driven down primarily by declining
imports.  Exports of goods and services, which took a hit from
the restructuring of the shipbuilding industry, remain below pre-
2008 levels in real terms.  As in much of emerging Europe, net
FDI has declined from 6%-8% of GDP in the pre-crisis years to 2%-
3% more recently, while bank financing from abroad fell sharply
in 2012. Croatia's overall net external liability position
remains high at around 200% of current account receipts (100% of
GDP), leaving the economy dependent on external financing to
service its high external debt.  This debt amounts to about 60%
of all external liabilities.

The Croatian central bank is committed to an informal kuna-euro
peg, which limits monetary policy flexibility, as does the highly
euroized economy (more than 70% of loans and more than 60% of
deposits are denominated in or linked to a foreign currency).
The predominantly foreign-owned Croatian banking system will
continue to report low profitability given weak economic
prospects, constrained by depressed domestic demand and moderate
credit growth.

Credit risk in the economy is elevated, in S&P's view.  S&P
expects nonperforming loans to continue to increase, driven by
the weak performance of the real estate and construction sectors,
and reach 18% of total loans by end-2013 while credit costs
remain substantive.  That said, S&P believes the local banking
sector's capitalization is adequate to absorb further
deterioration in asset quality.  However, S&P understands that
this capacity could be challenged by the legal risks stemming
from a recent claim related to mortgage lending in Swiss francs
and associated compensation required for borrowers.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that it could lower the
ratings on Croatia in the next year if the economy deteriorates
beyond S&P's current expectations, should deficits widen, or if
external financing becomes more challenging.

The negative outlook also reflects S&P's view of a possible
deterioration in the government's balance sheet should contingent
liabilities crystallize.  These contingent liabilities include
state guarantees on debt worth an estimated 12% of GDP.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed;
CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                        To                 From
Croatia (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating                BB+/Negative/B
BB+/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BBB+
Senior Unsecured                       BB+
Short-Term Debt                        B



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C Y P R U S
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FINTEST TRADING: S&P Assigns 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had assigned its
'B-' long-term corporate credit rating to Cyprus-registered
Fintest Trading Co. Ltd., a holding company for Ukraine-based
Donetsk Steel Group.  The outlook is stable.

The rating reflects S&P's view of Fintest Trading's "weak"
business risk profile and "highly leveraged" financial risk
profile, as our criteria define these terms.

Fintest Trading mines coking coal, which accounts for the bulk of
its profits, and is vertically integrated in coke and pig iron
production.

The stable outlook reflects the company's limited maturities in
the next 12 months and S&P's expectation that Fintest Trading
will proactively address its maturities in the second half of
2014 and in 2015.  It also factors in S&P's forecast that the
debt-to-EBITDA ratio will not exceed 4.5x and that the company
will avoid substantially negative free operating cash flow.

S&P could lower the rating if it reassessed the company's
liquidity to "weak", which could happen if the Fintest Trading
does not proactively addresses maturities in the second half of
2014, or if the covenants under the PXF are breached and not
waived in advance.  A further weakening of the market
environment, leading to negative free cash flow or higher
leverage than S&P currently anticipates, could also lead to a
downgrade.  A downgrade of the sovereign to 'B-' would not
automatically result in a downgrade of Fintest Trading, but
rating pressure would increase if it resulted in country risks or
liquidity pressures.

"We could ultimately raise the rating if coal prices improved and
we reassessed the company's liquidity to "adequate" on the back
of a strengthened maturity profile.  An upgrade would also
require a track record of at least neutral cash flow generation
and a prudent financial policy, but would be contingent on a more
stable operating environment in Ukraine," S&P said.



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F R A N C E
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PEUGEOT SA: Moody's Changes Outlook to Negative on Sales Drop
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the B1 ratings of Peugeot S.A. and its rated
subsidiary GIE PSA Tresorerie. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed
these ratings.

"We have changed the outlook on PSA's B1 ratings to negative
because despite containing its cash absorption to EUR51 million
in H1 2013, it could become increasingly challenging for the
company to meet its target of break-even operational free cash
flow (without restructuring and exceptional) at the end of 2014
which was stated in February this year," says Falk Frey, a
Moody's Senior Vice President and lead analyst for PSA. "We
anticipate that PSA's cash burn will be significantly higher in
H2 2013 and note that if its market shares across Europe continue
to decline, improvements in 2014 might not be sufficient to
achieve the planned break-even level," adds Mr. Frey.

Ratings Rationale:

The outlook change reflects Moody's view that the continued
decline in PSA's unit sales volumes and market shares in its
European stronghold could prevent the company from achieving some
of the targets set in its turnaround plan.

While PSA has executed its restructuring largely as planned to
date, Moody's believes that the company might be challenged in
successfully turning around the operating performance of its
automotive operations in a European market environment that
continues to worsen and is characterized by historically high
discount levels, especially in the small and medium-sized
passenger car segments. Unless Western European market demand
recovers strongly in 2014 from anticipated 2013 levels, PSA may
be unable to achieve its target of break-even operational free
cash flow by year-end 2014 and be forced to undertake further
cost-saving measures beyond the announced restructuring plan.

Despite the introduction of the new model 208 and other new cars,
PSA has been unable to limit a further decline in its passenger
car market share in Western Europe (EU15+EFTA countries), with
its share dropping to 11.3% in H1 2013 from 12.3% in H1 2012
(11.9% in fiscal2012 (to December 31) and 12.6% in fiscal 2011).
That being said, half of the decline was attributable to
manufacturing disruption of the Citroen C3 and some of the
reduction is due to PSA's unfavorable exposure to Southern
European markets.

The French auto market weakness has been more severe than
anticipated in Moody's base scenario. New passenger car
registrations in the first six months of 2013 are 11.2% lower
than in the H1 2012 and thus materially below the rating agency's
base-case scenario of a 2.9% decline in car registrations in
France for the full year 2013. In the first six months PSA has
sold approximately 40% of its Western European passenger car
units in France.

While Moody's estimates that PSA could record a recurring
operating loss in the automotive division of up to EUR1.2 billion
for the year, it nevertheless anticipates some improvement in the
operating performance of the automotive division in 2013.
However, this forecast carries some downside risk, i.e., if
market demand in Western Europe declines by more than the
currently anticipated 5% or pricing pressure increases further.
Although PSA's negative operational FCF in 2013 should be half of
2012's figure of nearly EUR3.0 billion, restructuring costs
during the year will result in additional cash outflows.

More positively, Moody's notes that PSA's H1 2013 results,
published on July 31, 2013, show a negative free cash flow (FCF)
of EUR51 million only, helped by (1) significantly lower capital
expenditure (capex) and capitalized research and development, or
R&D, costs (EUR764 million less than compared with H1 2012); (2)
a positive working capital contribution (EUR253 million); (3)
dividends received from Banque PSA (EUR281 million) and from
PSA's Chinese joint venture; and (4) PSA successfully containing
price concessions. However, Moody's does not expect all of these
effects to reoccur in H2 2013.

Also supporting PSA's performance is a new product pipeline,
which shows promise for halt the erosion of the company's market
share by the beginning of 2014 in combination with the aging of
the automotive fleet in Europe, which should eventually support a
rebound in unit sales. The refresh of the C4 Picasso and 308, and
a new cross-over derivative from the new 208 (2008), are expected
to represent approximately 20% of its global volume sales in
2014. Moreover, the company is likely to increase its emphasis on
brand differentiation across the various Peugeot and Citroen
platforms.

Rationale for Negative Outlook

The negative rating outlook reflects the heightened risk that PSA
might not be able to achieve performance targets for 2014 given
the weaker-than-anticipated market environment, especially in its
domestic market of France, as well as the continued erosion of
its market share in Western Europe. Moody's would expect PSA to
stabilize its Western European passenger car market shares in H2
2013 on the back of its strong new model launch program, and be
able to regain some share next year, when its new models will be
fully available. Such developments should translate into revenue
growth and a positive recurring operating income in the
automotive division approaching EUR200 million in 2014.

What Could Change the Ratings Down/Up?

The following factors could cause the rating to be downgraded:
(1) cash outflow (including restructuring) exceeding EUR2 billion
in 2013 and a failure to achieve break-even operating FCF by
year-end 2014; (2) a failure to maintain its market shares,
despite a high number of important new model launches over the
course of 2013; (3) evidence that liquidity would weaken
materially beyond current expectations; and/or (4) signs that the
turnaround expected to begin in early 2014 will be delayed or
weaker than expected.

A rating upgrade is unlikely in the foreseeable future given
Moody's expectation that PSA will report poor results for full
year 2013 and that weaknesses in the company's core European
automobile market will continue. However, the ratings could come
under upward pressure in the event of a faster-than-anticipated
and sustained recovery in the operating performance and cash
generation of PSA's automotive business. This recovery would be
reflected by positive operating profits in the industrial
business in 2013, with profitability improving to a positive EBIT
margin by 2014 and beyond.

Liquidity

Moody's notes that PSA currently maintains an adequate liquidity
position, which provides the company with a sufficient period of
time to reverse negative performance trends. As of June 30, 2013,
PSA's principal liquidity sources for its industrial business
consisted of (1) cash and cash equivalents on the balance sheet
amounting to EUR8.1 billion; (2) availability under undrawn
committed credit lines of EUR2.225 billion maturing July 2015 and
EUR175 million maturing July 2014 (excluding additional headroom
of EUR800 million under Faurecia's facility); (3) financial
assets of EUR500 million less some haircuts; and (4) potential
cash flow generation from operations over the next 12 months.
These cash sources provide adequate coverage for PSA's major
liquidity requirements during the next 12 months. These
requirements consist of short-term debt maturities, capital
expenditures, working capital funding and day-to-day operating
needs.

Moody's also positively notes that PSA's captive finance
subsidiary, Banque PSA Finance, has received the final European
Commission authorization to use the French state's guarantee of
EUR7.0 billion to secure debt issued by Banque PSA Finance in the
period from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2016. This is an
important element in supporting the captive's refinancing for the
next three years.

Structural Considerations

Peugeot's funding policy is based on borrowing at the holding
company level (PSA), and on-lending to its operating subsidiaries
via GIE PSA Tresorerie. Based on a cash-pooling agreement between
PSA and GIE, all operating subsidiaries' payment obligations to
GIE rank pari-passu with trade payables at the subsidiaries'
level. In addition, PSA has put in place a guarantee by GIE that
will benefit PSA bondholders.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating PSA was the "Global
Automobile Manufacture Industry" rating methodology, published in
June 2011. Other methodologies used include "Loss Given Default
for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada
and EMEA", published in June 2009.

Peugeot S.A., headquartered in Paris, is Europe's second-largest
maker of light vehicles, with its two main brands being Peugeot
and Citroen. The group's other industrial operations include
Faurecia, one of Europe's leading automotive suppliers, in which
PSA holds a 57% interest. The group also provides financing to
dealers and end-customers through its wholly owned finance
subsidiary, Banque PSA Finance. In 2012, PSA generated revenues
of EUR54 billion.



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G E R M A N Y
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KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Puts 'BB' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had placed its 'BB'
long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based cable operator
Kabel Deutschland Holding AG (KDH), and all issue ratings on the
group's debt, on CreditWatch with positive implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows the launch of Vodafone Group
PLC's voluntary public offer to acquire KDH, as announced on
July 30, 2013.  It reflects the high likelihood that S&P could
raise the long-term corporate credit rating on KDH by several
notches, in line with the rating on Vodafone at a maximum, if the
transaction closes successfully.  The acceptance period for
Vodafone's offer ends on Sept. 11, 2013, but can be extended.

S&P believes KDH's credit quality after the acquisition will
benefit from potentially closer operational and legal integration
of KDH into the Vodafone group.  In addition, S&P expects
Vodafone to refinance KDH's debt following the acquisition, in
view of Vodafone's track record of not maintaining debt at the
subsidiary level and existing change of control provisions in the
loans' and notes' documentation.

"Furthermore, we understand that on successful completion of the
takeover--subject to a minimum acceptance rate of 75% and
regulatory approval--the bidding entity, Vodafone Vierte
Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH, intends to initiate and execute a
domination and profit and loss transfer agreement, effectively
exercising control over KDH's management through the issuance of
binding instructions to its management board.  We believe that
such a level of control over KDH's operations, if exercised, will
indicate closer operational integration with the higher-rated
Vodafone than we previously expected," S&P said.

The current ratings on KDH reflect S&P's assessment of the
group's business risk profile as "satisfactory" and financial
risk profile as "aggressive."

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch if the transaction closes
successfully, which S&P currently believes could happen during
the fourth quarter of 2013.  This means the CreditWatch
resolution could extend beyond S&P's usual three-month horizon,
depending on the regulatory approval process.

S&P will likely raise the long-term corporate credit rating on
KDH by several notches if the transaction closes successfully.
However, S&P's final rating decision will depend on:

   -- S&P's assessment of Vodafone's and KDH's parent-subsidiary
      relationship, which could lead to, at a maximum, rating
      equalization; and

   -- The long-term rating on Vodafone after the acquisition,
      which S&P sees as 'A-' or, at the lowest 'BBB+'.



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I R E L A N D
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ANGLO IRISH: Special Liquidators Commence Loan Book Sale Process
----------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Flanagan at Independent.ie reports that the special
liquidators of the former Anglo Irish Bank have begun the process
for the possible sale of the bank's remaining loan book.

In a statement, KPMG's Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson, who
are the liquidators for Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC),
said they had started "preliminary market soundings" on the sale
of the bank's EUR22 billion worth of remaining loans,
Independent.ie relates.

According to Independent.ie, the move is aimed at assessing the
"market interest" and identifying "potential purchasers and
funders of the loans or other obligations owed to IBRC, such as
guarantees and other forms of security".  It also covers any
"related hedging or other arrangements".

The "preliminary" part of the process will involve the loanbook
being valued by an independent person, while the liquidators will
also seek professional advice on its sales strategy,
Independent.ie says.

According to Independent.ie, there will also be something akin to
a consultation process with IBRC borrowers while potential buyers
will be furnished with a "confidential investment overview".
Potential buyers will be asked to give an indicative offer, a
binding bid, and then go through the closing phases of the
process, Independent.ie discloses.  Any deal is some way off for
now, with the process scheduled to kick off next month,
Independent.ie notes.

The liquidators have yet to decide who will qualify to make a
bid, or how the loans will be sold, Independent.ie states.  That
will all be hashed out as part of the process, Independent.ie
says.  Any loans that aren't sold by the liquidators will be
transferred to the National Asset Management Agency, according to
Independent.ie.

                        About Anglo Irish

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IBRC) to 'D/D' from 'B-/C'.   S&P also
lowered the senior unsecured ratings to 'D' from 'B-'.  S&P then
withdrew the counterparty credit ratings, the senior unsecured
ratings, and the preferred stock ratings on IBRC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB+' issue rating on three government-
guaranteed debt issues.

The rating actions follow the Feb. 6, 2013, announcement that the
Irish government has liquidated IBRC.


BANK OF IRELAND: Close to Profit; Narrows 1H Losses to EUR455MM
---------------------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Independent.ie reports that Bank of Ireland
said it is moving closer to profit but still faces challenges,
including repaying a state rescue loan before a punitive
"step-up" that would increase the bank's debts next April.

The bank reported on Friday that losses at the bank narrowed to
EUR455 million for the first half of this year, down from
EUR1.1 billion in the same period in 2012, Independent.ie
relates.

Meanwhile, Bank of Ireland chief executive Richie Boucher said
the country's biggest bank is not concerned about so-called
"stress tests" due to take place to test the bank's financial
strength, Independent.ie notes.

"We are close to profit," Independent.ie quotes Mr. Boucher as
saying in a call with analysts.  Mr. Boucher, as cited by
Independent.ie, said that the bank had protected its core
franchises in Ireland through the crisis.

According to Independent.ie, Mr. Boucher said Bank of Ireland can
continue to grow its lending business even if the overall economy
fails to grow because it is winning business from rivals.  He
said that historic loan losses were becoming less of a problem,
Independent.ie relates.

Mr. Boucher said the bank is going through a process of
"normalization" after the shock of the crash, Independent.ie
notes.

Mr. Boucher said the bank is "reviewing all options" on how to
redeem a EUR1.8 billion chunk of so-called preferred shares -- in
effect a loan from the State to the bank before an April 1
deadline, Independent.ie recounts.

According to Independent.ie, under the terms of the bank's
rescue, the debt will increase or "step up" by 25% if it's not
paid off by that date.

Analysts believe that tapping shareholders for cash is likely to
be one of the ways cash is raised to finance the redemption,
Independent.ie states.

Headquartered in Dublin, Bank of Ireland --
http://www.bankofireland.com/-- provides a range of banking and
other financial services.  These include checking and deposit
services, overdrafts, term loans, mortgages, business and
corporate lending, international asset financing, leasing,
installment credit, debt factoring, foreign exchange facilities,
interest and exchange rate hedging instruments, executor,
trustee, life assurance and pension and investment fund
management, fund administration and custodial services and
financial advisory services, including mergers and acquisitions
and underwriting.  The Company organizes its businesses into
Retail Republic of Ireland, Bank of Ireland Life, Capital
Markets, UK Financial Services and Group Centre.  It has
operations throughout Ireland, the United Kingdom, Europe and the
United States.


DUNCANNON CRE CDO I: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Class X Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB (sf)' credit
rating on Duncannon CRE CDO I PLC's class X notes, following
their redemption.  S&P's ratings on the class A, B, C1 Def, C2
Def, D1 Def, D2 Def, D3 Def, E1 Def, and E2 Def notes are
unaffected by rating action.

The withdrawal follows the cash manager's report confirming that
the class X notes were fully redeemed on the June 2013 interest
payment date.

Duncannon CRE CDO I is a European commercial real estate
collateralized debt obligation transaction, which closed in 2007.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class               Rating
            To                From

Duncannon CRE CDO I PLC
EUR810 Million Senior And Mezzanine Deferrable-Interest Floating-
Rate Notes

Rating Withdrawn
X           NR                BB (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

A           BB (sf)
B           BB- (sf)
C1 Def      B (sf)
C2 Def      B (sf)
D1 Def      B- (sf)
D2 Def      B- (sf)
D3 Def      B- (sf)
E1 Def      B- (sf)
E2 Def      B- (sf)

NR-Not rated.


FERREXPO PLC: S&P Affirms 'B/B' CCRs; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'B/B'
long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on Ukraine-based
iron ore pellet producer Ferrexpo PLC.  The outlook is negative.

S&P also affirmed its ratings on Ferrexpo's US$500 million senior
unsecured notes at 'B'.  At the same time, S&P revised its
recovery rating on these notes to '3' from '4', indicating its
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view of Ferrexpo's moderate debt-
to-EBITDA ratio and adequate liquidity, supported by sizable cash
balances.  It also reflects S&P's anticipation that Ferrexpo will
adjust its investment program to the market environment, and its
ability to attract long-term funding for the construction of a
concentrator that could increase its pellet production by
10 million tons (mt) per year.  In addition, it reflects S&P's
opinion that Ferrexpo's exposure to significant country risks in
Ukraine, and volatile iron ore prices, is partly balanced by
improved operational diversification after the commissioning of
the Yeristovo mine and S&P's expectation of associated economies
of scale.

The long-term rating on Ferrexpo continues to reflect S&P's view
of its business risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk
profile as "aggressive."

S&P's revision of the recovery rating on the unsecured notes to
'3' from '4' factors in that Ferrexpo did not proceed with its
planned $500 million bond issue in 2013, thereby supporting a
higher recovery rate on the existing notes.

S&P's base-case scenario for Ferrexpo assumes an increase in
pellet production to 12 mt per year by 2014 from 9.7 mt in 2012,
because of the ramp up of the Yeristovo mine, which was
commissioned in early 2013.  Under S&P's current pricing
assumption for iron ore of US$120 per ton in 2013 and US$110 in
2014, it expects Ferrexpo to generate about US$400 million-US$450
million in EBITDA in 2013, compared with US$404 million achieved
last year.  S&P expects the inflation of cash costs in Ukraine to
be partly offset by economies of scale stemming from higher
production volumes.  In addition, S&P notes that significant
Ukrainian hryvnia depreciation would be beneficial for Ferrexpo.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, adjusted financial leverage
remains below 2.0x-2.5x in 2013-2014, reflecting Ferrexpo's
continued commitment to prudent funding of its capital
expenditure (capex).  If the company decides to build the
concentrator, S&P expects it to obtain adequate long-term funding
amid supportive iron ore prices.

The negative outlook on Ferrexpo reflects S&P's view that the
company is exposed to significant country risks in Ukraine, which
continue to weigh on the ratings.

S&P could lower the ratings on the company in the event of a
further downgrade of Ukraine and a downward revision of the
transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment on Ukraine.  S&P
might also lower the ratings if the company's liquidity weakened
due to high negative free operating cash flow (FOCF), followed by
a reduction in available liquidity.

S&P could revise the outlook on Ferrexpo to stable if it revised
the outlook on Ukraine to stable.  To assign a stable outlook,
S&P would also expect the company to avoid significant negative
FOCF and maintain adequate liquidity.

Because the long-term rating is currently largely constrained by
high country risks and S&P's T&C assessment, it would likely
raise the long-term rating on Ferrexpo only if S&P raised the
sovereign rating and revised its T&C assessment upward.


SVG DIAMOND: Moody's Upgrades Ratings on EUR83.5MM of CFO Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by SVG Diamond Private Equity Plc.:

Issuer: SVG Diamond Private Equity plc.

EUR58.5M B-1 (currently EUR50.7M rated balance outstanding)
Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

$26.3M B-2 (currently USD22.8M rated balance outstanding) Notes,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013 Upgraded to
Baa2 (sf)

EUR15M C-1 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jan 28,
2013 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by SVG Diamond Private Equity Plc.

EUR40M M-1 Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

$49M M-2 Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

SVG Diamond Private Equity plc. (SVG I), issued on September 28,
2004 is a private equity collateralized fund obligation ("CFO")
backed by private equity funds. The portfolio is managed by SVG
Advisers Limited. This transaction is predominantly composed of
buyout funds.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily from an improvement in the overcollateralization ratios
of the rated notes pursuant to the amortization of the portfolio.
Moody's notes that the Class A-1 and A-2 notes have been fully
repaid and that the Class B-1 and B-2 notes have amortized by
approximately EUR10.5 million (or 13.21%) since the rating action
in January 28, 2013.

Moody's notes that in this type of transaction, private-equity
investors commit capital that will be drawn in the future. The
liquidity available is constituted of the cash outstanding and
the future distributions. This funds expense payments and draw-
downs to private-equity investors. Based on March 2013 unaudited
financial statements, the Value of Investment Portfolio is
EUR340.7 million and the level of Other Assets is EUR60.7 million
rendering the risk of a default on an interest payment remote.
The current modeling assumes that the Uncalled Commitments of
EUR68.9 million will be fully drawn.

In its rating analysis, Moody's considered the aggregated cash
flow projection based on random Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
draws from the student-t distribution in combination with a J-
curve assumption on cash flow distributions. For each simulation,
the aggregated cash-flows resulting from the asset modeling is
flushed into a simplified waterfall based on the transaction's
documentation. In each simulation scenario, the corresponding
loss for each class of notes is calculated given the incoming
cash flows from the assets and the outgoing payments to third
parties and noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for
each tranche is the sum product of (i) the probability of
occurrence of each simulation scenario and (ii) the loss derived
from the cash flow model in each simulation scenario for each
tranche. As such, Moody's encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

Moody's updated surveillance approach:

In its updated surveillance approach, Moody's relies on the
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of each underlying fund as a
primary performance indicator. Moody's believes that the shape of
the distribution that best fits the historical data is a student-
t distribution with three degrees of freedom. The base case
assumes the equivalent volatility for primary funds to be 52% for
Venture Capital (VC) funds and 26% for Buyout Funds. The mean is
assumed at 10% for both types of funds.

The timing of the cash-flows is an additional required input in
Moody's surveillance approach. Based on historical analysis,
Moody's chose a set of deterministic cash-flows shapes for
distributions and drawn-downs, which can be characterized as "J-
curve assumptions". Under these assumptions, draw-downs are
expected to be mostly concentrated in the first three to four
years following the initial commitment while the cash-flow
distributions are spread over a ten-year period and mostly
concentrated between years six and ten.

In its approach, Moody's used a Gaussian copula model for the
dependency structure of the final IRRs of the funds. The
correlation between VC funds and buyout funds is assumed at 40%
in the base case. The intra-correlation is assumed at 50%.

In addition, Moody's assumptions of the final returns of primary
funds were adjusted given the seasoning of the underlying funds
already invested in this transaction. The correlation between the
funded portion and the unfunded portion is set to 20%, a lower
level than the correlation considered for the funded portion.

Moody's assessed expected cash flows on the rated tranches based
on the updated surveillance approach. The agency also considered
various scenarios related to the IRR distribution, the dependency
structure and the timing of distributions and drawdowns via the
J-curve. Sensitivity to interest rate and foreign exchange
fluctuations was also analyzed. The observed model outputs
volatility in these sensitivity runs was deemed consistent with
the current rating levels and available notes coverage.
Therefore, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stress
scenarios.


ULSTER BANK: Narrows Losses to GBP329-Mil. in First Half of 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah McCabe at Independent.ie reports that losses at Ulster Bank
narrowed in the first six months of the year as new cases of
mortgage arrears slowed.

Newly released quarterly and half-year results show the bank lost
GBP329 million (EUR377 million) in the six months to the end of
June, down from GBP555 million (EUR636 million) the same time
last year, Independent.ie relates.

Impairment charges at the Irish subsidiary of Royal Bank of
Scotland noticeably improved, falling by 20% or GBP214 million
(EUR245 million) between January and June compared to first six
months of 2012, Independent.ie discloses.

Much of this was attributed to a reduction in losses on its
mortgage portfolio, Independent.ie notes.

The April to June period was the first quarter since 2008 where
the bank saw its number of mortgages in arrears for more than 90
days decline, Independent.ie discloses.  According to
Independent.ie, impairments are expected "to continue to gently
decline as the economy continues to recover in Ireland".

                             Bailout

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 11,
2013, The Irish Times, citing The London Times, related that
Ulster Bank accounted for one in four pounds of losses at state-
owned Royal Bank of Scotland.  Ireland was given a "back-door
bailout" worth around GBP10 billion (EUR11.5 billion) by Britain
in "an arrangement that was never explicitly approved by
parliament", the Irish Times said, citing a report on June 10.
According to the Irish Times, The London Times claimed Ulster
Bank accounted for about a quarter of losses since 2008 at the
state-owned Royal Bank of Scotland, which is 81% owned by British
taxpayers after a GBP45 billion state bailout five years ago.
Quarterly reports after the Irish property market collapsed in
2010 show losses at Ulster Bank amounted to GBP10 billion,
exceeding those in the rest of the RBS group combined, the Irish
Times disclosed.  The money pumped into Ulster Bank is more than
three times the GBP3.25 billion direct loan offered by the
British government to Ireland in 2010, which was approved by
parliament after a heated debate and vote, the Irish Times noted.

                       About Ulster Bank

Ulster Bank Group -- http://www.ulsterbank.ie/-- is a wholly
owned subsidiary of the enlarged RBS group.  First Active, a
leading mortgage provider, was acquired by Ulster Bank Group in
January 2004 in a EUR887 million transaction.  Serving personal
and small business customers, Ulster Bank Retail Markets provides
Branch Banking and Direct Banking throughout the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland.  Ulster Bank Corporate Markets
caters for the banking needs of business and corporate customers,
treasury and money market activities, asset financing, wealth
management, ebanking and international services, with a continued
focus on providing customer choice and value.


WATERFORD CASTLE: Aiden Murphy Confirmed as Official Liquidator
---------------------------------------------------------------
BreakingNews.ie reports that Aiden Murphy of Crowe Horwath has
recently been confirmed as official liquidator to Newgold Ltd.
and Cendant Ltd., the trading companies of the Waterford Castle
Hotel & Golf Resort.

Despite the official liquidator appointment, the well-known
island resort remains open for "business as usual",
BreakingNews.ie notes.

The Hotel and Golf resort operations will be overseen by the
statutory receiver, Eoin Ryan of McKeogh Gallagher Ryan, who was
appointed by the National Asset Management Agency,
BreakingNews.ie discloses.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


CLARIS FINANCE 2006: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB (sf)' from
'BB+ (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit
rating on Claris Finance 2006 S.r.l.'s class B notes.

On July 18, 2013, S&P placed its 'BB+ (sf)' rating on Claris
Finance 2006's class B notes on CreditWatch negative.

On July 24, 2013, S&P lowered to 'BB' from 'BB+' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on
Veneto Banca.

As in S&P's previous review, its current counterparty criteria
links its ratings in this transaction to its long-term ICR on
Veneto Banca.  Therefore, following its recent downgrade of
Veneto Banca, S&P has lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on Claris Finance
2006's class B notes.

Claris Finance 2006 is a securitization of a pool of Italian
residential and commercial mortgages.  The transaction closed in
July 2006 and its revolving period elapsed in March 2010.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


SAGRANTINO ITALY: Fitch Affirms, Then Withdraws CCC Notes Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and withdrawn Sagrantino Italy s.r.l's
class B to E floating-rate notes due 2025, as follows:

EUR16.4m class B (IT0004294838) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
Stable; withdrawn

EUR48m class C (IT0004294846) affirmed at 'BBBsf ; Outlook
Stable; withdrawn

EUR24.5m class D (IT0004294853) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
Negative; withdrawn

EUR32.7m class E (IT0004295025) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%; withdrawn

The affirmation reflects that the performance since the previous
rating action in September 2012 has been consistent with Fitch's
base case.

The withdrawal reflects the lack of market interest in the
rating: the sole ultimate investor in the bonds has instructed
the issuer to waive or cancel the ratings of the class B to E
notes. Fitch believes that maintaining an on-going surveillance
of a seasoned non-performing loan deal would not lead to any
material enhancement in its rating criteria and has therefore
agreed to withdraw its ratings.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


SB ALFA BANK: Fitch Rates KZT4.5BB Senior Unsecured Bonds 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned JSC SB Alfa Bank Kazakhstan's (ABK)
KZT4.5 billion Series 2 senior unsecured bonds an expected Long-
term local currency rating of 'B+(EXP)' and expected National
Long-term rating of 'BBB(kaz)(EXP)'. Recovery Rating is 'RR4'.
The final ratings are contingent on the receipt of final
documentation conforming to information already received.

The issue of Series 2 bonds in the framework of the second
KZT12bn bond program is anticipated in Q313. The bonds would
carry a fixed semi-annual coupon of 7% with no step-up and would
have a maturity date in five years from the issuance date. No put
option is envisaged.

According to Kazakhstan's legislation, the bonds would rank pari
passu with other senior unsecured obligations of the bank except
for the individuals' deposits (KZT24bn or 19% of total IFRS
liabilities at end-H113).

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATING and SENIOR UNSECURED
DEBT

The Long-term IDRs, National Rating and senior unsecured debt
ratings are based on the Viability Rating (VR) of 'b+'. The VR
reflects the bank's small franchise, high single-name
concentrations, significant growth in a relatively high risk
environment and some uncertainty due to potential new bank
acquisitions in Kazakhstan by ABK's shareholders.

The ratings positively consider the solid performance helped by
low average funding costs, reasonably strong reported asset
quality metrics, the currently sound liquidity and funding
position, and solid capitalization.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATING and SENIOR UNSECURED
DEBT

The ratings could be downgraded following a material
deterioration in asset quality, capitalization or the funding
profile. An upgrade would require an improvement of the operating
environment, a longer track record of sustainable performance,
and a more extensive franchise.


ZHAIKMUNAI LP: S&P Raises LT Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Kazakhstan-based oil and gas exploration and
production company Zhaikmunai L.P. to 'B+' from 'B'.  The outlook
is stable.

S&P also raised the issue ratings on Zhaikmunai's senior secured
notes to 'B+' from 'B'.

The upgrade reflects S&P's assumption that Zhaikmunai will
continue to achieve robust credit metrics in 2013-2014, including
funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 40% or higher (2012:
48.6%) and debt to EBITDA below 2x in 2013-2014 (2012: 1.3x).
This is based on S&P's base-case scenario that the company will
produce about 45,000 boepd (barrels of oil equivalent per day),
which is close to full production capacity, and a realized price
of no less than US$95 per barrel in 2013 and US$90 per barrel in
2014.  S&P believes that adjusted EBITDA will be about US$500
million in 2013 and between US$400 million and US$450 million in
2014.  S&P also anticipates that oil prices will remain
supportive.

"Our "weak" business risk assessment reflects our view of the
company's concentrated asset base, its dependence on one pipeline
for crude oil and stabilized condensate and one pipeline for dry
gas, as well as risks relating to the oil industry and operating
in Kazakhstan.  These are somewhat mitigated by good
profitability, low cash lifting costs, a supportive tax regime,
and the part-ownership of its local partner, Kazakhstan-based
engineering company KazStroyService.  Zhaikmunai acquired three
new oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan in the third quarter of
2012, but these will not be producing before 2016," S&P said.

Zhaikmunai is able to self-fund sizable capital expenditure
(capex), which sets it apart from its peers, in S&P's view.
Planned capex is at least US$300 million in 2013 and US$200
million in 2014, including spending on phase two of investment in
the new gas treatment facility (GTF).  This is likely to lead to
neutral or slightly negative free operating cash flows in 2013-
2014.

S&P expects Zhaikmunai to adhere to its financial policies of
maintaining debt to EBITDA at or below 1.5x and paying dividends
of about 20% of net income.  In November 2012, Zhaikmunai was
able to reduce its interest burden, extend debt maturities, and
diversify funding sources when it successfully issued
US$560 million of new senior notes.

Key supporting factors for the rating are the company's good cash
flow generation (unrestricted cash on balance sheet was
US$280 million on June 30, 2013) and its long-dated debt maturity
profile.  S&P understands that management aims to maintains a
comfortable cash balance during the second GTF investment phase.

The stable outlook on Zhaikmunai reflects S&P's expectation of
robust credit metrics for the ratings on the back of near full
capacity production in 2013 and 2014 of about 45,000 boepd.  S&P
anticipates that the company will adhere to its financial targets
and we assume neutral or slightly negative FOCF and continued
adequate liquidity.

All else being equal, S&P would consider raising the ratings if
Zhaikmunai builds a track record of meeting its financial targets
and S&P receives more information on the shareholders' investment
strategy.  In addition, greater cushion for liquidity could
support the likelihood of an upgrade.

S&P could consider lowering the ratings if Zhaikmunai's
production levels become considerably lower than it currently
envisage or if S&P considers that the company's liquidity
management or financial policies have become less prudent.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CONTEGO CLO I: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Contego CLO I B.V.:

Issuer: Contego CLO I B.V.

EUR21.75M Class B Deferrable Secured Floating rate Notes due
2026, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2011 Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf)

EUR18.15M Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2011 Upgraded to
A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Contego CLO I B.V.:

EUR75M Multicurrency Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable
Funding Notes due 2026, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 24,
2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

EUR120M Class A-1-a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)

EUR20.55M Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)

EUR11.75M Class E Deferrable Secured Floating rate Notes due
2026, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 24, 2011 Upgraded to B2
(sf)

Contego CLO I B.V., issued in August 2007, is a multi-currency
Collateralized Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European senior secured loans. The portfolio is
managed by N M Rothschild & Sons Limited. This transaction passed
its reinvestment period in April 2013.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes is
primarily a result of the transaction entering into amortization
period at the last payment date in April 2013. In consideration
of the reinvestment restrictions applicable during the
amortization period, and therefore, the limited ability to effect
significant changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's
analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from a shorter
amortization profile and higher spread levels compared to the
levels previously assumed prior to April 2013.

Over the last year and prior to the end of the reinvestment
period, the trustee reported weighted average rating factor (the
"WARF") has decreased from 2737 (June 2012) to 2605 (June 2013).
In the same period, the trustee reported overcollateralization
(the "OC") ratios have remained relatively stable and the
weighted average spread has increased slightly from 3.56% to
3.76%. The Moody's calculated portfolio exposure to assets rated
in the Caa category has decreased to 5.66%.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR257.2 million, defaulted par of EUR3.2 million, a WARF of 2794
(corresponding to a default probability of 5.8%% over 4.25
years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 54% for
a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 30 and a
weighted average spread of 3.76%. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and
Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool.
The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is
based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral
pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 93%
of the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non-first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 15%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes:
Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing and
sovereign risks -- Approximately 13% of the portfolio are
European corporate rated B3 and below and maturing between 2014
and 2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
Approximately 4.67% of the portfolio are exposed to obligors
located in Italy and Ireland. Moody's considered a model run
where the base case WARF was increased to 3066 by forcing ratings
on 25% of such exposure to Ca. This run generated model outputs
that were within one notch from the base case results.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Portfolio Amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Delevering may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the liquidation agent, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Typically, fast
amortization will benefit the ratings of the senior notes but may
negatively impact the ratings of the mezzanine and junior notes.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.

3) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct
impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the
transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in May 2013.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. Therefore,
Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

On March 11, 2013, Moody's released a report, which describes how
sovereign credit deterioration impacts structured finance
transactions and the rationale for introducing two new parameters
into its general analysis of such transactions. In the coming
months, Moody's will update its methodologies relating to multi-
country portfolios including the one for Collateralized Loan
Obligations (CLOs) as well as for other types of collateralized
debt obligations (CDO), asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). Once those
methodologies are updated and implemented, the rating of the
notes affected by these rating actions may be negatively
affected.


PDM CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
PDM CLO I B.V.'s class A, B, and D notes.  At the same time, S&P
has affirmed its ratings on the class C and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance, using data from the June 20, 2013 trustee report and
our credit and cash flow analysis.  S&P has taken into account
recent developments in the transaction and has applied its 2009
criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs).  S&P has also applied its current counterparty criteria.

Since S&P's previous review on Jan. 20, 2012, its analysis
indicates that the portfolio has become more diversified and its
credit quality has improved.  On average, the ratings on assets
in the underlying portfolio are higher compared with S&P's
previous review, the assets are less correlated due to better
diversification, and their weighted-average maturity is shorter.
The collateral pool's weighted-average spread has increased to
3.85% from 3.00% and its weighted-average life has reduced to
4.45 years from 5.84 years.

S&P has subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) at each rating
level for each rated class.  In S&P's analysis, it has used the
performing portfolio balance--EUR275.707 million, the principal
cash balance--EUR5.128 million, the current weighted-average
spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P
considers to be appropriate.  S&P has incorporated various cash
flow stress scenarios using various default patterns for each
liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios.

Taking into account S&P's credit and cash flow analysis, as well
as the application of its relevant criteria, S&P has concluded
that the collateral pool's increased credit quality,
diversification, weighted-average spread, and lower weighted-
average life are commensurate with higher ratings on the class
A and B notes.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on these
classes of notes.

"Our ratings on the class C, D, and E notes are constrained by
the application of the largest obligor test, a supplemental
stress test that we introduced in our 2009 corporate cash flow
CDO criteria.  This test addresses event and model risk that
might be present in the transaction.  Although the BDRs generated
by our cash flow model indicated higher ratings, the largest
obligor test results effectively constrained our ratings on the
class C, D, and E notes.  For the class D notes, the results of
the largest obligor test have improved since our previous review.
We have therefore raised to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' our rating
on the class D notes.  We have affirmed our ratings on the class
C and E notes as a result of the application of the largest
obligor test," S&P said.

Non-euro-denominated assets account for nearly 11.4% of the
underlying portfolio.  The resulting foreign currency exchange
risk is mostly hedged via asset swaps with JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. and Credit Suisse International.  The documentation for
these counterparties is not fully in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria.  S&P has therefore applied additional
foreign exchange stresses for its 'AAA', 'AA+', 'AA', and 'AA-'
stress scenarios.

PDM CLO I is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms.  The transaction closed in December 2007 and is
managed by Permira Debt Managers Group Holdings Ltd.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class               Rating
              To              From

PDM CLO I B.V.
EUR300 Million Secured Floating-Rate And Subordinated Notes

Ratings Raised

A             AA+ (sf)        AA- (sf)
B             AA- (sf)        A+ (sf)
D             BB+ (sf)        B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C             BBB+ (sf)
E             CCC+ (sf)


REFRESCO GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B+' CCR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook on
Netherlands-based private-label soft-drinks producer Refresco
Group B.V. to stable from negative and affirmed its 'B+' long-
term corporate credit rating.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on
Refresco's EUR660 million senior secured notes due 2018.  The
recovery rating on the instruments remains unchanged at '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery.

The affirmation reflects Refresco's maintenance of credit metrics
S&P views as commensurate with its 'B+' ratings at year-end 2012.
Refresco's adjusted debt to EBITDA improved to 5.2x, free cash
flow was back in positive territory, and liquidity remained
adequate.  Also, the group's EBITDA margin started improving in
the third quarter of 2012, and this trend continued through the
first quarter of 2013, showing Refresco's ability to manage its
decreasing volumes through cost control, restructuring actions,
and the negotiation of more favorable manufacturing contracts.

Consumer demand in Western Europe remains fragile and S&P
anticipates the group will continue to show decreasing volumes in
2013.  Moreover, with 80% of revenue achieved with retailers and
an absence of brand, the group's pricing power remains low and
prevents it from increasing prices beyond raw material inflation.
S&P expects the recently announced merger with European drinks
manufacturer Gerber Emig to improve Refresco's bargaining power,
notably on the procurement side.  S&P continues to assess
Refresco's business risk profile as "fair" according to S&P's
criteria, although still at the lower end of the category.  S&P
believes the merger will significantly increase the group's scale
and geographic diversification, notably through a greater
presence in the U.K. market, but S&P also believes it will
initially dilute margins.

While Refresco's liquidity will weaken if the merger draws on
EUR100 million under the extended revolving credit facility (RCF)
and uses a portion of the cash on hand, S&P views the
EUR50 million undrawn portion and the positive cash flow
generation as sufficient to fund working capital swings.  S&P
also expects headroom above 15% on the RCF's covenant, and
acknowledge the absence of significant repayment before 2018 when
the notes mature.  That said, S&P views positive free cash flow
generation as key in coming years, considering 2018's EUR660
million in maturities.

"For 2013, our base-case scenario assumes revenue of about
EUR2.3 billion but a 70 basis-point decrease in Refresco's
adjusted EBITDA margin, including the dilutive merger.  We
forecast slightly higher capital expenditure in 2013 and a
substantial increase in 2014 for the integration of Gerber Emig.
Still, our projections show positive free cash flow generation.
We also anticipate that Refresco will maintain adjusted debt to
EBITDA and interest coverage of around 5.0x and 3.0x,
respectively.  We continue to view Refresco's financial risk
profile as "highly leveraged."  Due to a need for further
economies of scale and additional bargaining power, we estimate
Refresco will continue playing a role in the sector's
consolidation once the merger with Gerber Emig is completed.
That said, our base case incorporates only modest bolt-on
acquisitions and does not factor in any shareholder returns," S&P
said.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, despite pressure on
volumes, Refresco will keep free cash flow in positive territory,
maintain adequate liquidity, and post adjusted debt to EBITDA and
EBITDA to interest ratios of about 5.0x and 3.0x, respectively.
It also factors in S&P's anticipation of a stabilization of
operating margins after the synergies of the dilutive merger
are delivered.

S&P could lower the ratings if Refresco's liquidity deteriorated
to the point that its undrawn committed credit facilities and
cash position did not cover working capital swings.  S&P could
also lower the ratings if Refresco did not keep its adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio and interest coverage at around 5.0x and
3.0x, respectively, which could occur if it undertook a
significant debt-funded acquisition or shareholder-friendly
measures.  S&P would also views negatively further significant
deterioration in the group's profitability, as this could lead
S&P to revise the business risk profile to "weak."

S&P would consider raising the ratings if the group sustainably
improved its operating performance and showed a steady adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 5.0x.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NJORD GAS: S&P Cuts Rating on NOK3.798BB Sr. Sec. Bonds to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'BB'
from 'BBB+' its long-term issue ratings on the Norwegian krone
(NOK)-equivalent 3.798 billion senior secured index-linked bonds
due September 2027, issued by Norway-based asset company Njord
Gas Infrastructure AS (NGI).  At the same time, S&P removed the
issue ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
negative implications on May 2, 2013.  The outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P assigned a recovery rating of '1' to the bonds,
indicating its expectation of a very high (90%-100%) recovery for
debtholders in the event of a payment default.

The downgrade of the bonds reflects S&P's view of the significant
weakening in NGI's forecast financial profile as a result of
tariff revisions announced by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum
& Energy on June 27, 2013.  The revised tariffs reduce the 'K'
capital tariff element by 90% for the majority of new bookings
for the Gassled network from October 2016.

S&P's updated base case for NGI now predicts minimum and average
annual debt service coverage ratios (ADSCRs) over the remaining
life of the debt of 0.84x and 1.23x, respectively, compared with
1.23x and 1.46x at financial close.  In effect, S&P views NGI as
being reliant on cash retentions ahead of the periods of low debt
service coverage to fulfill scheduled debt service.  S&P believes
this can only occur with shareholder support through the receipt
of lower distributions.

That said, NGI's policy to date has been to maintain a minimum
cash balance--separate from the required debt service reserve
account (DSRA)--at all times, equivalent to approximately one
month of the anticipated annual level of cash calls.  Cash calls
are the process by which Gassco, the operator of the Gassled
network, funds its operations, including capital expenditure
(capex).  In S&P's base case, such a level of cash reserve is
sufficient to offset any projected debt service shortfall for all
but one payment over the remaining life of the debt.  This also
assumes that the DSRA remains fully funded throughout.

NGI used the proceeds of the bonds to acquire from ExxonMobil
Corp. its approximate 8% interest in the Gassled partnership.
Gassled comprises the bulk of the natural gas pipeline
infrastructure on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, which enables
96% of the gas extracted on the shelf to be processed,
transported, and exported to mainland Europe and the U.K. Gassled
provides about 20% of the EU's gas consumption.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view of the steady operating
environment for the Gassled network and NGI's reduced volume risk
following the significant reduction in tariffs for future
bookings.

S&P could take a negative rating action if NGI's financial
profile were to weaken further.  This could occur if, for
example, future cash calls were materially higher than we
currently forecast, resulting from increased capital investment
or operating requirements.

S&P could take a positive rating action if NGI's financial
profile were to prove stronger than it forecasts.  This could
result, for example, from substantially lower future cash calls
or from bond repurchase activities funded by shareholders.  S&P
currently views the likelihood of such events as relatively
remote, however.


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Ratings to 'CCC/C'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its
long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on Norway-based
forest products group Norske Skogsindustrier ASA (Norske Skog) to
'CCC/C' from 'CCC+/C'.  The outlook is negative.

S&P also lowered its issue ratings on Norske Skog's senior
unsecured debt to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view of continued weakening of
Norske Skog's liquidity, which S&P now considers as "weak" as
opposed to "less than adequate" previously.  S&P do not think
Norske Skog can cover its expected liquidity outflows over the
next 12 months with the current cash on its balance sheet and
internally generated ash flows.  The group faces tough operating
conditions, with falling demand and low prices for newsprint and
magazine paper across its main markets, Europe, Australia, and
New Zealand.  In addition, Norske Skog's near-term debt
maturities are now significant, partly due to the drawdown of
EUR70 million from a revolving credit facility due to be paid
back during the third quarter of 2013.  Apart from this, Norske
Skog also faces Norwegian krone 724 million (about EUR92 million)
of debt maturities in June 2014, which in S&P's view will be
difficult to cover with cash on hand and operating cash flows.

The negative outlook reflects the risk that S&P could lower the
ratings within the next six to nine months if it sees no tangible
improvement in Norske Skog's liquidity and operating performance.

Specifically, S&P could lower the long-term rating to 'CCC-' if
it thinks that a default, distressed exchange, or redemption
appears to be inevitable within six months, absent unanticipated
significant favorable improvements in Norske Skog's liquidity.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the group's operating
performance improves above its expectations or if the group
secures liquidity sources of a magnitude that would remove
uncertainties regarding debt maturities and interest payments in
2014.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


SAGRES SOCIEDADE: S&P Affirms 'B-' Ratings on Two Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BBB- (sf)' from
'A- (sf)' its credit rating on the class A notes in SAGRES
Sociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A. (Douro Mortgages
No. 3).  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the
class A, B, C, and D notes in SAGRES Sociedade de Titurizacao de
Creditos, S.A. (Douro Mortgages No. 1) and on the class B, C, and
D notes in Douro Mortgages No. 3.

The rating actions follows S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information available to S&P and the
application of its relevant criteria.

                            COUNTRY RISK

"Our nonsovereign ratings criteria cap at 'A- (sf)' our ratings
in Portuguese residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions, which is five notches above our long-term sovereign
rating on Portugal.  Douro Mortgages No. 1 and No. 3 are exposed
to country risk because of the 100% concentration of the
securitized assets in Portugal," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the recession and rising unemployment associated
with increased country risk may affect obligors' ability to pay
the originator and servicer the amounts due under the mortgages.
To account for this increased country risk, following our revised
assessment of Portuguese country risk on March 7, 2012, we have
incorporated a 30% adjustment to the portfolio's weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) in our analysis," S&P added.

                         COUNTERPARTY RISK

Both transactions features the same counterparty risk.  S&P has
reviewed counterparty risk by applying its current counterparty
criteria.  These two transactions are exposed to counterparty
risk in respect of the transaction account provider, Citibank
N.A., London branch (A/Stable/A-1), and the swap provider, Banco
BPI, S.A. Cayman Islands branch (BB-/Negative/B).  The
counterparty risk relating to the transaction account provider is
mitigated in accordance with S&P's current counterparty criteria.
Under the transaction documents, the swap provider is not
eligible to support ratings on these notes that are higher than
S&P's long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on the swap provider.
Therefore, S&P' did not give benefit to the swap provider in its
credit and cash flow analysis at rating levels that are above
S&P's long-term ICR on the swap provider.

                       Douro Mortgages No. 3

Arrears of more than 90 days increased to 0.70% in May 2013 from
0.47% in May 2011, despite continuing to outperform S&P's
Portuguese RMBS index.  Net cumulative defaults increased to
0.82% in May 2013 from 0.61% in August 2012, but still remains
below the interest deferral trigger of 15%.

The current portfolio has a weighted-average loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, of 55.78% compared with 49.29% for Douro Mortgages No. 1.
The pool benefits from highly seasoned loans, with 98.40% of the
pool comprising loans that are more than 18 months seasoned
(similar to Douro Mortgages No. 1).

The reserve fund continues to amortize, while remaining at the
required level under the transaction documents.  The transaction
has been able to generate excess spread to clear the principal
deficiency ledger and pay interest on the class F notes.
Available credit enhancement, which S&P measured by excluding
defaulted loans from the portfolio balance and available cash in
the transaction, has decreased since S&P's September 2011 review
because the notes have paid down on a pro rata basis and the
reserve fund has amortized.  The decreasing credit enhancement is
due to the transaction's structural features.

The weighted-average spread paid by loans that are less than 90
days in arrears is 0.74%, compared with 0.98% in Douro Mortgages
No. 1.  The class A notes also benefit from an interest deferral
trigger mechanism, which diverts interest from the mezzanine and
junior classes of notes until the class A notes have been fully
repaid.  While positive, the impact of the trigger is limited as,
under the transaction documents, it is set at 15% and is unlikely
to be triggered at this stage in the transaction's life.

S&P's portfolio weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF)
assumption has increased since May 2011 due to the observed and
forecasted increase in 90+ days arrears.  S&P expects long-term
delinquencies to continue to increase in the underlying portfolio
on the back of challenging Portuguese macroeconomic conditions
and a depressed housing market.  In the meantime, S&P's weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) assumption has also increased due
to, among other factors, the ongoing Portuguese house price
declines.

Taking into account the decreased available credit enhancement
since S&P's last review, the ineligibility of the swap support in
our analysis, and the lower weighted-average pool margin than
Douro Mortgages No. 1, S&P's rating on the class A notes did not
pass its credit and cash flow stresses at a higher rating than
'BBB- (sf)'.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BBB- (sf)' from
'A- (sf)' its rating on the class A notes.

In S&P's view, the available credit enhancement for the class B,
C, and D notes is commensurate with their current ratings.  S&P
had therefore affirmed its ratings on these classes of notes.

Douro Mortgages No. 3 is a Portuguese RMBS transaction that
closed in July 2007.  At closing, the portfolio comprised self-
employed borrowers (4.39%), second-home mortgages (3.89%), and
subsidized mortgages (17%).

                       Douro Mortgages No. 1

Net cumulative defaults experienced by the securitized portfolio
have increased to 75 basis points (bps) in June 2013 from 70 bps
in December 2012, while remaining below the interest deferral
trigger of 12.5%.  Despite this increase, 90+ days arrears have
decreased to 0.58% in June 2013 from 0.74% in June 2011,
outperforming S&P's Portuguese RMBS index.

Most of the performing balance of the pool (98.17%) is highly
seasoned at more than 18 months.  In S&P's view, this benefits
the loans' performance as borrowers are historically more likely
to default in the first 12 to 18 months since origination.

The reserve fund is at its target level as specified in the
transaction documents.  The transaction has been able to generate
excess spread to clear the principal deficiency ledger and pay
principal and interest to the class E notes.  The class A notes
benefit from an interest deferral trigger mechanism, which
diverts interest from the class B, C, D, and E notes until the
class A notes have been fully repaid.

To derive S&P's WAFF assumptions, it took into account the
transaction's performance, and has incorporated its view of
increased country risk in its credit analysis.  Following the
application of S&P's Portuguese RMBS criteria, its WAFF
surveillance assumptions have increased at all rating levels.
S&P has increased its WALS surveillance assumptions at all rating
levels to reflect ongoing Portuguese house price declines
observed since April 2011.

In S&P's view, the available credit enhancement for all of the
rated classes of notes is commensurate with their current rating
levels, as, in S&P's cash flow analysis, all classes of notes
passed its cash flow stresses at these levels.  S&P has therefore
affirmed its ratings on the class A, B, C, and D notes.

Douro Mortgages No. 1 is a Portuguese RMBS transaction that
closed in November 2005.  At closing, the portfolio comprised
self-employed borrowers (12.38%), second-home mortgages (3.21%),
and subsidized mortgages (28.26%).

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an residential mortgage-backed security
as defined in the Rule, to include a description of the
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms available
to investors and a description of how they differ from the
representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms in
issuances of similar securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope
securities initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or
after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
           To                 From

SAGRES Sociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A.
EUR1.515 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Securitisation
Notes And Floating-Rate Securitisation Notes
(Douro Mortgages No. 3)

Rating Lowered

A         BBB- (sf)           A- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B         B (sf)
C         B- (sf)
D         B- (sf)

SAGRES Sociedade de Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A.
EUR1.509 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Securitisation
Notes (Douro Mortgages No. 1)

Ratings Affirmed

A         A- (sf)
B         BBB- (sf)
C         BB- (sf)
D         B (sf)



===========
R U S S I A
===========


RUSSIAN EXPOBANK: Fitch Rates Series 3 Sr. Unsecured Bonds 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russian Expobank LLC's (EB,
'B'/Stable) Series 3 senior unsecured bonds a Long-term local
currency rating of 'B', a National Long-term Rating of 'BBB-
(rus)' and Recovery Rating 'RR4'. The bonds mature in July 2016,
are putable in July 2014 and have an 11.5% annual coupon payable
quarterly.

The bank's obligations under the bonds rank equally with the
claims on existing senior unsecured liabilities, save the claims
of retail depositors, which under Russian law rank above those of
other senior unsecured creditors. Retail deposits accounted for
43% of the bank's liabilities at end-H113, according to local
GAAP accounts'

EB has Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDRs) of 'B' with Stable Outlooks, a National Long-term Rating
of 'BBB-(rus)' with a Stable Outlook, a Short-term foreign
currency IDR of 'B', a Viability Rating of 'b', a Support Rating
of '5' and a Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The bond's Long-term rating is driven by EB's Long-term local-
currency IDR, which reflects the bank's reasonable capitalization
(17.8% regulatory capital ratio at end-H113) and comfortable
liquidity position, but at the same time limited franchise,
concentrated balance sheet, weak operating profitability (based
on 2012 IFRS financials) and expansion through M&A activities.

The issue's Recovery Rating of 'RR4' reflects average recovery
prospects for bondholders in case of default.

For the most recent update on EB see "Fitch Rates Expobank LLC at
'B'; Outlook Stable" dated 19 Dec 2012, and full rating report,
dated 15 Mar 2013 available at www.fitchratings.com.

Rating Sensitivities

Downward pressure on EB's ratings could arise if there was a
marked deterioration in asset quality and/or substantial losses
resulting from bank acquisitions, causing a significant weakening
of the bank's capital position, or if deposit outflows and/or
acquisitions caused a marked tightening of liquidity.

Strengthening and diversification of the bank's franchise,
improvements in performance and a demonstrated track record of
successfully managing bank acquisitions, would be positive for
the credit profile.


ZENIT BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-term IDR; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based Zenit Bank's Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+' with a Stable Outlook. At the
same time, the agency has upgraded the bank's National Rating to
'A(rus)' from 'A-(rus)' with Stable Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS: IDRS, NATIONAL RATING, VIABILITY RATING,
SENIOR DEBT RATING

Zenit's ratings continue to reflect the heightened risk profile
of its loan book, and in particular its focus on long-term
lending to construction and real estate projects, associated with
high completion risks. The ratings are further constrained by the
bank's only moderate profitability and capital, although the
latter is currently sufficient to absorb a mild deterioration in
the weaker asset exposures. The bank's close connections with its
minority shareholder, oil company Tatneft (BB+/Stable), remain
beneficial for Zenit's funding, capital, earnings and customer
acquisition. However, Fitch does not believe that support from
Tatneft can be relied upon in all circumstances due to the
latter's only minority stake in Zenit and the non-strategic
nature of this investment.

The upgrade of the National Rating reflects Fitch's revised
assessment that Zenit is a relatively strong credit within the
'B+' category. This follows improved disclosure on, and further
analysis of, the bank's higher risk asset exposures. It also
reflects some of Zenit's credit strengths relative to 'B+'
Russian peers, particularly its broader franchise and lesser
appetite for rapid growth.

Concentration by borrower has always been significant in Zenit's
loan book, with the aggregate exposures to the largest 20
borrowers consistently maintained at about 2x the bank's equity.
The largest exposures are predominantly long-term in nature. The
most prominent were loans to the real estate/construction sector
(accounting for 16% of the consolidated loan book or 110% of
Fitch core capital (FCC) at end-2012), although total exposures
classified as project finance comprised 33% of the portfolio,
equivalent to 2.3x FCC. Considering the high completion risks
associated with these projects, in Fitch's view some may
ultimately require additional impairment charges, although loan-
to-value ratios and collateral valuations were for the most part
reasonable. Non-core assets, mostly comprising foreclosed real
estate and construction projects were also significant,
equivalent to 0.3 FCC.

Non-performing loans (90+ overdue, NPLs) remained a moderate 4.3%
of the portfolio at end-2012, and were more than 100% covered by
impairment reserves. The moderate NPL level is partly supported
by grace periods enjoyed by many of the largest borrowers in
respect of interest and principal payments. However, the flipside
of this is Zenit's thin net interest margin (3.8%, the lowest
level among its peer group) and low liquidity of the loan book.
Restructured loans were a moderate 6.8% at end-2012.

Zenit's capitalization is sufficient to absorb only a mild
deterioration in the weaker part of the bank's asset exposures.
At end-2012, the FCC ratio based on Zenit's consolidated accounts
was a moderate 10.7%, while the standalone regulatory capital
ratio stood at 13.7% at end-H113 (core Tier 1 7.8%), impacted in
part by deductions of investments in subsidiary banks and into
the non-banking affiliates. Fitch estimates that this would have
been sufficient to increase impairment reserves to 8.9% of the
loan book from the actual level of 4.3% without breaching minimum
capital requirements, which Fitch regards as a moderate level
given some of the bank's high-risk exposures.

Potential internal capital generation resulting from the bank's
quite stable pre-impairment profit is likely to be broadly in
line with the pace of risk-weighted assets growth in the near-
term (about 15% targeted for FY13).

The liquidity buffer was adequate at end-H113, with cash and
interbank placements, unpledged securities eligible for Central
Bank refinancing and other potential liquidity sources on Zenit's
standalone balance sheet equal to 39% of customer deposits.
However, RUB20 billion of domestic bonds maturing or with put
options by end-H114 were equal to 37% of the end-H113 liquidity
cushion, and non-core deposits from federal and local government
and the central bank equaled a further 26%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: IDRS, NATIONAL RATING, VIABILITY RATING,
SENIOR DEBT RATING

Upward pressure on the ratings would be possible if Zenit reduces
its project finance exposures and achieves improvements in the
quality of its restructured/high risk loans. Profitability
improvements would be also credit positive. Downward pressure
could result if there were greater signs of impairment in the
loan book, increased leverage and risk concentrations, or a
marked deterioration in the operating environment.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOORS

The '5' Support Rating and 'No Floor' Support Rating Floor
reflect Zenit's limited franchise, making government support
uncertain. An upgrade of these ratings is unlikely in the
foreseeable future, although acquisition by a stronger owner
could lead to an upgrade of the Support Rating.

The rating actions are:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+', Outlook Stable

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+', Outlook Stable

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

National Long-term rating: upgraded to 'A(rus)' from 'A-(rus)',
Outlook Stable

Senior unsecured local currency debt: affirmed at 'B+'; Recovery
Rating 'RR4'

Senior unsecured local currency debt (on the National scale):
upgraded to 'A(rus)' from 'A-(rus)'


* CITY OF KAZAN: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Currency Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the City of Kazan's Outlooks to
Positive from Negative and affirmed its Long-term foreign and
local currency ratings at 'B+', National Long-term Rating at
'A(rus)'. The agency has also affirmed City of Kazan's Short-term
foreign currency rating at 'B'.

The rating action also affects City of Kazan's outstanding senior
unsecured domestic bonds of RUB0.9 billion.

Key Rating Drivers

The Outlook revision reflects the following rating drivers and
their relative weights:

High

-- High refinancing pressure stemming from budget loans was
   unexpectedly eased. According to regulations adopted by the
   federal government and then by the Tatarstan Republic, the
   repayment of budget loans earmarked for preparation to
   Universiade 2013 was prolonged until 2032. The initial
   schedule had RUB25.4 billion budget loans representing 84% of
   the city's direct risk with maturities from 2012 to 2015 and
   interest rates ranging from 0.01% to 4.125%. This imposed a
   high refinancing risk on Kazan's modest budget as debt
   servicing repayment would exceed Kazan's operating balance by
   2x in 2012. The new terms set interest rates on serving the
   loans at 0.5% annually from 2013 to 2032 and grace period in
   the repayment of the principal which will be amortized in ten
   annual installments from 2023 to 2032.

-- Fitch expects the city's direct risk will stabilize at
   RUB30 billion in the medium-term. In relative terms it will
   account for a still high 160% of current revenue expected for
   2013. The city does not plan to incur new budget loans nor
   increase its market debt in 2013-2015. Kazan's direct debt
   composed of issued debt and loans from commercial banks is
   modest and decreased to 28% of current revenue in 2012 (2011:
   34%). Kazan has to repay RUB4.3 billion by the end-2013, out
   of which almost RUB4 billion is short-term bank loans. The
   city plans to refinance this amount with new bank loans.

Medium

-- Fitch expects the city's operating performance will remain
   sound in 2013 with an operating balance close to 14% of
   operating revenue. In 2012 the city's budgetary performance
   had been improving for the second year running. The operating
   margin rose to 14.1% in 2012 from 12% in 2011 as a result of
   increased current transfers from Tatarstan Republic.

-- Fitch believes the city will continue to post positive budget
   balances in the medium-term, after it recorded surplus before
   debt variation at 2.8% of total revenue in 2012. Kazan fully
   completed its investment program linked to Universiade 2013
   preparation. The level of capex will be reduced by half (or
   more) starting from 2013 after an average 42% of total
   spending in 2009-2012.

Kazan's rating also reflects the following key rating drivers

-- The city's economy is well-diversified and has a developed
   industrial sector. The latter is dominated by petrochemicals,
   machine-building and food processing. In 2012 the city's
   economy grew by 5% exceeding the national growth rate of 3.4%.
   The administration expects average growth will account for 5%
   annually in 2013-2015.

-- The city is the capital of Tatarstan, one of the most
   developed Russian regions. It received large capital transfers
   from the republic in the mid-2000s to finance its capital
   expenditure. The latter also remained high during the past
   five years and Fitch expects the republic to be supportive in
   the future if needed.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive rating action is subject to successful refinancing
and/or extension of maturities of the bank loans maturing by the
end-2013, accompanied by the maintenance of sound budgetary
performance.


* Dividend Payout Hike Won't Affect Russian State-Owned Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------
A potential increase in dividends paid by state-controlled
companies and banks in Russia is unlikely to result in negative
ratings pressure for Moody's rated entities, says Moody's
Investors Service in a Special Comment entitled "Russian State-
Controlled Entities: Possible Increase in Russian Dividend
Payouts Would Have Low or Moderate Credit Impact."

The Russian government is considering attracting higher dividends
from state-controlled companies and banks in order to shore up
its finances. In its report, Moody's has tested the impact of two
possible scenarios -- dividend payouts of 25% and 35% of net
income under international financial reporting standards (IFRS)
-- on the financial metrics of 22 rated state-controlled
entities. Moody's has selected these payout ratios because they
reflect public statements made by Russia's Finance Ministry.

The most profitable Russian companies and banks would be affected
to the greatest extent, although only moderately in both
scenarios. Six issuers fall into this category: OAO AK Transneft
(Baa1 stable), Russian Railways JSC (Baa1 stable), Alrosa OJSC
(Ba3 positive), OJSC Gazprom (Baa1 stable), Sberbank (Baa1
stable, D+/ba1 stable) and Bank VTB, JSC (Baa2 stable, D-/ba3
stable). Moody's thinks these entities would have the flexibility
to increase dividend payments without damaging their debt metrics
(for corporates) and capital adequacy (for banks). The credit
impact on the remaining 16 issuers in Moody's sample would be
low.

"No decision has been made by the government so it is still
unclear which dividends policy will come into play, however it is
likely that many state-controlled corporates and banks could
eventually have to pay out more of their profits," says Denis
Perevezentsev, a Moody's Vice President - Senior analyst in
Moody's Corporate Finance Group and co-author of the report.
"Nonetheless, we see the credit impact on Moody's rated state-
controlled companies and banks in Russia as either low or
moderate, and therefore unlikely to result in negative rating
pressure."

Moody's has calculated the new levels of dividends based on
either the projections it uses for an issuer's future net profits
in its current rating assumptions or by using the IFRS net profit
figure for the most recent reporting period. The rating agency
has also assumed that companies would fund any higher dividends
by increasing their borrowings, while the banks would have to
reduce their lending. Moody's recognizes the limitations of this
analysis because it assumes that any such policy would be applied
uniformly and it also excludes the possibility that entities may
be required to make special dividend payouts; factors that could
change the outcome.

While Moody's analysis assumes that the dividend policy would be
applied across the board, the rating agency cannot rule out the
possibility that the government might reserve the right to grant
exemptions/flexibility to entities under certain circumstances
along similar lines to the provisions in the existing
legislation.



=========
S P A I N
=========


* Spanish Banks' Deferred Tax Move Largely Cosmetic, Fitch Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
A potential change in Spain's tax regime to allow banks to
convert part of their deferred tax assets (DTA) into a
transferable tax credit to boost Basel III capital ratios is
largely cosmetic and likely to be ratings neutral for Spanish
banks and the sovereign, Fitch Ratings says. "The DTAs were
already included in our capital shortfall stress estimate for the
banking sector, and so are already factored into our bank and
sovereign ratings," Fitch says.

The Spanish banks are looking to convert up to EUR30 billion of
their EUR50 billion DTAs into tax credits, according to media
reports. This move would boost their Basel III capital ratios as
the tax credits would no longer have to be deducted from common
equity Tier 1. This would be particularly helpful because capital
and profitability remain under pressure from the challenging
operating environment.

The impact of the potential change varies across banks and may be
very pronounced, for example, for Banco de Sabadell, which
estimated a fully loaded Basel III core capital ratio of 4.9% for
end-2013 compared with an end-Q113 Tier 1 capital ratio of 10.6%.
A substantial part of the difference is attributable to DTAs.

"We would view this boost to regulatory capital as largely
cosmetic and broadly neutral to the solvency of Spanish banks
because the potential change would not benefit our primary
measure of bank capitalization -- Fitch core capital (FCC),"
Fitch says.  "We already incorporate DTAs arising from temporary
differences in provisions into FCC because they would bring a
real tax benefit if the loan impairment they stem from
crystallizes into genuine loan losses. When the available capital
amount is being reduced by anticipated loan losses, we consider
it appropriate to recognize the connected anticipated tax credit
as well. To the extent disclosure allows, we only deduct DTAs
relating to losses carried forward from reported equity as they
would have no tangible value if a bank continues to makes losses
or undergoes resolution."

Nevertheless, Fitch's ratings take into account the benefit
derived from higher regulatory capital ratios in boosting
investor confidence in banks' solvency, which can ultimately
improve banks' access to funding and their liquidity profiles.

"Our EUR50 billion-EUR60 billion capital shortfall stress
estimate in June 2012 was based on banks' post-tax earnings and
would be unaffected if the DTAs were converted. The existing DTAs
already represented an effective narrowing of the sovereign's
future corporate tax base. Were these to be turned into more
fungible tax credits the long-term fiscal picture would not
materially alter. This would probably not lead to an upfront
increase in public debt, as the tax credits are likely to be
treated as a contingent liability. We project a peak debt/GDP
ratio of 99%.

"The Spanish banks' DTAs mainly arose from losses and loan
impairment charges, which were particularly pronounced in 2012.
The tax credit would be recognized by allocating collective
impairment to specific loans. Under Basel III's stricter common
equity definitions being phased in from 2014, deductions are
required for all DTAs that rely on future profitability to be
realized. We therefore expect the potential changes to target
DTAs arising from loan impairment charges, similar to the reform
Italy made in 2011.

"This would allow the banks to avoid partial DTA deductions
arising from timing differences between collective impairment
charges in financial reporting and tax recognition of the
provision required under Basel's limited recognition approach. In
regimes where such DTAs are transformed automatically into a
claim on the government when an institution makes a loss, is
liquidated or placed under insolvency proceedings, banks will not
need to deduct these DTAs."



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


NAFTOGAZ UKRAINY: Ukraine Faces Reserves Squeeze Over Subsidies
---------------------------------------------------------------
Daryna Krasnolutska and Kateryna Choursina at Bloomberg News
report that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych sees state-run
NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy delivering energy independence.

According to Bloomberg, international lenders see the company as
a money pit that posted losses for six of the past eight years.

Naftogaz, Ukraine's biggest employer with 175,000 workers,
received more than US$6 billion of subsidies in domestic bonds
from 2009 to 2012 as regulated gas prices and expensive Russian
energy imports led to losses, Bloomberg discloses.  Handouts to
the company, whose pipelines carry about 25% of Europe's gas
imports, prevented Ukraine from balancing its budget over the
past decade in a nation whose graft ranking is on par with Syria,
Bloomberg says, citing data compiled by Berlin-based Transparency
International.

The International Monetary Fund said July 25 it hasn't discussed
loan policies with Ukraine since April when negotiations over a
US$15 billion aid package were abandoned, Bloomberg notes.

Bloomberg relates that analysts at Moscow-based VTB Capital said
on July 30 the country is facing a reserves squeeze this month as
the central bank has to repay US$950 million to the IMF and
US$253 million to domestic bondholders.

Ukraine's biggest opposition party, led by jailed former Prime
Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, alleges that Naftogaz is being driven
toward bankruptcy as management uses purchases of equipment and
gas to embezzle cash, Bloomberg discloses.

The government has denied wrongdoing, Bloomberg notes.

For investors, Naftogaz offers a window into how the nation of 45
million runs its finances, Bloomberg states.  According to
Bloomberg, the government won't cut the gas subsidies that are
impeding a potential bailout from the IMF, while a failure to
boost corporate transparency is blocking funds from the European
Union to help repair the nation's aging pipelines.

                  About NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine

Headquartered in Kiev, Ukraine, NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine --
http://www.naftogaz.com/-- is a vertically integrated oil and
gas company engaged in full cycle of operations in gas and oil
field exploration and development, production and exploratory
drilling, gas and oil transport and storage, supply of natural
gas and LPG to consumers.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Hedge Funds Threaten Rescue Plan
---------------------------------------------------
Philip Aldrick at The Telegraph reports that hedge funds are
threatening to undermine the Co-operative Group's last-ditch plan
to rescue its stricken banking arm after amassing major positions
in GBP300 million of the lender's bonds.

According to the Telegraph, a group of vulture funds led by
Aurelius Capital and Silver Point Capital from the U.S. are
believed to have built up blocking stakes in two tranches of the
Co-operative Bank's GBP1.3 billion of subordinated debt.

Bondholders are key to the Co-op's rescue plan because the group
does not have sufficient funds to fill a GBP1.5 billion capital
shortfall at the bank identified by the regulator, the Telegraph
says.

Instead, the group will inject GBP1 billion and bondholders will
be asked to make up the remaining GBP500 million by taking losses
on the GBP1.3 billion of debt, the Telegraph discloses.

However, the hedge fund consortium is thought to have taken a
large enough position to block the deal on two tranches of the
debt worth a total of GBP300 million, the Telegraph states.  As a
result, the Co-op Group might have to find another GBP100 million
to get the rescue through, the Telegraph notes.

The hedge funds are playing a high-risk game because the Co-op
claims it cannot put any more money into the bank without running
into problems with its own lending syndicate, according to the
Telegraph.  If it fails to raise the full GBP1.5 billion, the
bank may be put into "resolution" and wound down, which would see
bondholders lose significantly more than GBP500 million, the
Telegraph says.

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1.  The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.


* UK: Scottish Business Failures Down Due to Creditor Support
-------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Ranscombe at The Scotsman reports that an insolvency expert
said banks and other creditors are being more supportive of
struggling businesses, leading to a fall in the number of
companies that have failed.

Figures released on Friday by the UK government's insolvency
service showed the number of Scottish firms that failed between
April and June dropped by 58% year-on-year, the Scotsman relates.

Just under 200 businesses went into administration, liquidation
or receivership, or signed voluntary agreements with their
creditors during the second quarter, compared with 468 in the
same period last year, the Scotsman discloses.

Matt Henderson, head of business recovery an insolvency services
at accountancy firm Johnston Carmichael, as cited by the
Scotsman, said: "Without the support of creditors, particularly
the banks, many more struggling companies would be failing and
these statistics would be much worse than they are.

"Creditors of companies are clearly keen to receive something
back against a debt rather than the expectation of a potentially
smaller return through a formal insolvency procedure and are
looking at extended repayment terms as a way of achieving this."

Melanie Giles, an insolvency practitioner at PJG Recovery agreed,
the Scotsman notes.

"Both the banks and private creditors are still nervous about
pulling the plug and are concerned that calling in their debts
will see them lose everything," the Scotsman quotes Ms. Giles as
saying.  "The resurgence of the economy is also making creditors
more likely to wait, as they hope the companies they are owed
money by somehow rebound. But in many cases this is overly
optimistic."

The number of Scottish business failures edged up by 7% quarter-
on-quarter after a rise in the number of construction firms,
hotels, restaurants and retailers hitting trouble, the Scotsman
discloses.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 29 to August 2, 2013
------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


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