TCREUR_Public/130826.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, August 26, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 168

                            Headlines



F I N L A N D

NOKIA OYJ: Market Challenges Prompt Moody's to Lower CFR to B1


F R A N C E

SOCIETE GENERALE: Fitch Rates Deeply Subordinated Notes 'BB(EXP)'
SOCIETE GENERALE: Moody's Rates Subordinated Notes 'Ba3'
SOCIETE GENERALE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Tier 1 Sub. Notes


G E R M A N Y

REUTAX AG: Files Chapter 15 Petition to Recover U.S. Assets
WINDERMERE VII: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR50.8MM D Notes to Ca


I R E L A N D

AQUILAE CLO I: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes
AUTHENTIC IRELAND: Goes Out of Business; Owes Creditors EUR1.1MM
AVOCA CLO III: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC-'
DECO 10-PAN: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'


K A Z A K H S T A N

ALLIANCE OIL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR


N E T H E R L A N D S

HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Class E Notes
MARLIES DEKKERS: Declared Bankrupt by Rotterdam Court


R U S S I A

AK BARS: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Local Currency IDR
ROSSIYA INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' IFS rating; Outlook Neg.
* KIROV REGION: Fitch Affirms ST Foreign Currency Rating at 'B'


S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O

KOMBINAT ALUMINIJUMA: Court Denies Director Fled Montenegro


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BUCKIE SHIPYARD: In Administration; 68 Jobs Affected
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: To Write Off Up to GBP500 Million of Bad Loans
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Motor Market Probe Stalls Insurance Arm Sale
DWELL: Customers Seek to Recoup GBP5 Million From Collapse
EDWARDS GROUP: S&P Puts 'B+' CCR on CreditWatch Positive

EQUINOX ECLIPSE 2006-1: S&P Cuts Class D Notes Rating to 'D'
GALA CORAL: Sees Modest Growth but Challenges Remain
INMARSAT PLC: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Long-Term CCR; Outlook Stable
LEE DEMOLITION: Begbies Traynor Draws Up CVA Proposal
RSM TENON: Ashcourt Rowan Eyes Asset Management Businesses


X X X X X X X X

* US, EMEA Bank Issuance Hit Post-Crisis High & Low, Fitch Says
* Reinsurers' Underwriting Gains Offset By Unrealized Losses
* BOND PRICING: For the Week August 19 to August 23, 2013


                            *********


=============
F I N L A N D
=============


NOKIA OYJ: Market Challenges Prompt Moody's to Lower CFR to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Nokia Oyj's corporate
family rating and probability of default rating to B1 and B1-PD
from Ba3 and Ba3-PD, respectively. Moody's have also lowered the
senior unsecured notes and MTN program ratings to B1 and (P)B1,
from Ba3 and (P)Ba3, respectively. The short-term senior
unsecured ratings of NP/(P)NP were affirmed. The action concludes
a review for downgrade that was announced on 3 July 2013 and
incorporates the company's recent results and the financing
arranged for the EUR1.7 billion acquisition of a 50% stake in
Nokia Solutions and Networks B.V. (formerly, Nokia Siemens
Networks). The outlook on all ratings is negative.

Ratings Rationale:

"We have downgraded Nokia's CFR mainly because we believe that
the company continues to face challenges returning to sustainable
profitability in its core smartphone and mobile phone operations
and because we believe that it is unlikely to reach break-even on
a cash flow basis before well into 2014, at the earliest", says
Roberto Pozzi, Moody's Vice President and lead analyst on Nokia.

Nokia's challenges are reflected in the ongoing negative
operating margins and free cash flows in the first half of 2013.
This is despite some evidence that the company and the Windows
Phone are finding traction in their efforts to establish
themselves as a third mobile operating system behind Apple's iOS
and Google's Android. Nokia is currently experiencing strong
double digit volume growth rates -- it shipped 13.5 million smart
devices in the first half of 2013 -- but from a very low base and
therefore it has yet to see a sustainable ramp that could allow
it to achieve break-even.

In the second quarter of 2013, the smartphone business was still
losing 14 euros for every 100 euros of sales. Excluding the full
consolidation of NSN, Nokia reported an non-IFRS (i.e., before
restructuring expenses) operating loss of EUR25 million in the
first half of 2013. Revenues in traditional mobile phones
stabilized in 2012 but sharply declined again in Q1 and most of
Q2, 2013. The Mobile Phones business segment was barely breaking
even in Q2 2013, with a contribution margin of just 0.2%, down
from 4.3% in Q2 2012.

Moody's believes that Nokia's traditional stronghold in mobile
phones, particularly in emerging markets, will continue to reduce
over time, despite the company's efforts to stem the decline with
the launch of brand new products, and that the company will be
even more reliant on the success of its smartphone business. In
addition, Nokia's third business segment, HERE (including digital
map data and related location-based content and services) is
currently only marginally breaking even, however with improved
results trajectory and strong sequential growth from Q1/13 to
Q2/13.

On August 7, Nokia announced that it had completed the
acquisition of Siemens' 50% stake in Nokia Siemens Networks
(which has since been renamed Nokia Solutions and Networks B.V.)
for a consideration of EUR1.7 billion. NSN has also gone through
a period of heavy restructuring measures that are proving
successful, as evidenced by non-IFRS operating margins as high as
9.4% in the six months to 30 June 2013 and a strong cash flow
performance. Funding the transaction will only moderately reduce
Nokia's liquidity given the existing financing arrangements in
place. In Moody's opinion, the fairly low purchase price -- at
least based on NSN's recent financial performance -- the presence
of a vendor note and possibility to optimize the group's
liquidity after the acquisition closes, mitigate the effects on
Nokia's financial and liquidity profile. If the current
turnaround at NSN continues, Nokia's credit profile could
actually benefit from retaining a less volatile and potentially
more profitable business such as mobile networks. The outlook on
NSN's B2 rating is positive.

The negative outlook on Nokia's B1 reflects Moody's view that it
may take longer than 18-24 months for the company to return to
sustainable profitability and cash flow generation. The consumer
mobile communication sector remains highly competitive and
volatile, with significant challenges for manufacturers to manage
short product cycles, volatile consumer preferences and
disruptive technological innovation. However, Moody's notes that
Nokia has currently adequate liquidity to meet its significant
debt maturities in 2014-15 and that it has still a significant
positive net cash position also excluding NSN.

What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down

The ratings could face downward pressure if there is evidence
that the company is unable to return to meaningful profitability
and positive free cash flows, or if its liquidity deteriorates
significantly due to its inability to sell assets or refinance.
Failure to maintain a positive net cash position (excluding NSN)
could also trigger a downgrade.

A rating upgrade is currently unlikely but positive rating
pressure could develop if Nokia (standalone) gained further
traction in establishing its smartphone platform and if prospects
for reaching cash flow breakeven improved.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Communications Equipment Industry published in June 2008. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Espoo, Finland, Nokia Oyj is a large
manufacturer of mobile communication devices and a leading
supplier of telecommunication network systems. Its net sales in
2012 amounted to approximately EUR30.2 billion.



===========
F R A N C E
===========


SOCIETE GENERALE: Fitch Rates Deeply Subordinated Notes 'BB(EXP)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Societe Generale's ('A'/'F1'/'a-
'/Stable) potential issue of undated deeply subordinated
securities (UDSS) with a potential call feature beyond year five
an expected rating of 'BB(EXP).'

Key Rating Drivers

The UDSS are Tier 1 instruments with fully discretionary coupon
payments and are subject to write-down on breach of a
consolidated 5.125% common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio.

The securities are rated five notches below Societe Generale's
'a-' Viability Rating (VR), in accordance with Fitch's criteria
for "Assessing and Rating Bank Subordinated and Hybrid
Securities". The UDSS are notched twice for loss severity to
reflect the write-down on breach of the trigger, and three times
for non-performance risk.

The notching for non-performance risk reflects the instruments'
fully discretionary coupons, which Fitch considers the most
easily activated form of loss absorption. Under the terms of the
securities, the issuer will be subject to restrictions on
interest payments if it has insufficient distributable profits,
if it is insolvent or if it fails to meet the buffer capital
requirements that will be introduced with CRD IV.

Fitch has assigned 50% equity credit to the securities. This
reflects their full coupon flexibility, the permanent nature and
the subordination to all senior creditors, and the fact that the
securities would be written down not long before the bank would
become non-viable.

Rating Sensitivities

As the securities are notched from Societe Generale's VR, their
rating is primarily sensitive to any change in this rating.


SOCIETE GENERALE: Moody's Rates Subordinated Notes 'Ba3'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba3 (hyb) rating with a
stable outlook to the undated, deeply subordinated notes of
Societe Generale (deposits A2 stable, standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) C-/baseline credit assessment (BCA) baa2
stable).

The Ba3 (hyb) rating assigned to the notes is based on Societe
Generale's creditworthiness and is rated four- notches below the
bank's baa2 adjusted BCA, in line with Moody's Guidelines for
Rating Junior Debt Obligations.

Ratings Rationale:

The undated deeply subordinated notes are contractual, non-
viability preferred securities. The notes are perpetual and
deeply subordinated and have a non-cumulative optional coupon-
suspension mechanism. The principal of the notes will be written
down if the European Banking Authority's (EBA) Core Tier 1
capital ratio (before CRD 4 implementation) or Common Equity
Tier 1 capital ratio (after CRD4 implementation) drops below
5.125%, which Moody's views as close to the point of non-
viability in either case. The principal write-down upon a trigger
breach is either partial or full (limited to US$0.01) depending
on the capital shortfall, and the issuer has the option to write
the notes back up if its consolidated net income is positive (on
a pro-rata basis with other Tier 1 instruments with similar
write-up features). There is a substitution and variation
provision that is consistent with Moody's guidelines on
obligations with variable promises.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Global
Banks published in May 2013. Other Factors used in this rating
are described in Rating Obligations With Variable Promises
published in May 2013.

Societe Generale is one of the largest French banks,
headquartered in Paris with total assets of EUR 1,254 billion at
end-June 2013.


SOCIETE GENERALE: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Tier 1 Sub. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'BB+' long-term issue rating to the proposed Tier 1 undated
deeply subordinated resettable notes to be issued by France-based
Societe Generale (A/Negative/A-1).  The rating is subject to
S&P's review of the notes' final documentation.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for hybrid capital instruments,
the 'BB+' rating reflects its analysis of the proposed
instruments, and its assessment of Societe Generale's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) of 'a-'.

The 'BB+' issue rating stands four notches below the bank's SACP,
incorporating:

   -- The deduction of two notches, which is the minimum downward
      notching from the SACP under its criteria for a bank hybrid
      capital instrument.

   -- The deduction of an additional notch to reflect S&P's view
      that reporting a loss in a particular accounting period or
      breaching Basel III equity buffers may prevent coupon
      payments independently of the bank's collapse or non-
      viability.  This risk may not otherwise be reflected in the
      SACP.

   -- Payments can be limited under Condition 5.9 in the notes'
      documentation, which refers to the "Maximum Distributable
      Amount," subject to respect of the "combined buffer" (as
      the Capital Requirements Directive defines these terms).
      Given that this limit is defined in reference to the
      "combined buffer," S&P understands that this trigger level
      will increase over time, along with the expected regulatory
      phase-in.  S&P also factors in that if this earnings clause
      and trigger were to be activated, then Societe Generale
      would not have flexibility to use otherwise distributable
      reserves to make coupon payments.

   -- The deduction of a fourth notch to reflect that the notes
      feature a contingency clause leading to principal write-
      down.  This clause would become effective if Societe
      Generale's consolidated Common Equity Tier 1 ratio was to
      fall below a 5.125% trigger, which S&P sees as a "non-
      viability contingency clause."

"We understand that the decision to grant Tier 1 status and
regulatory capital credit to the instrument has not yet been
formally confirmed by regulators.  If this happens, we expect to
assign "intermediate" equity content to the notes, reflecting our
view that they would allow the absorption of losses on a "going-
concern" basis, through coupon cancellation at the option of the
issuer.  Our assessment also reflects that the instrument is
perpetual and has no step-up clause," S&P said.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


REUTAX AG: Files Chapter 15 Petition to Recover U.S. Assets
-----------------------------------------------------------
The administrator of Reutax AG is seeking U.S. recognition of
insolvency proceedings for Reutax in Germany and to protect
assets of the Debtor currently in the U.S.

Reutax provided information technology services to clients in
Germany, using free-lance information technology experts. The
Debtor was 60% owned by Contreg AG, an entity owned by the
Debtor's founder, Soheyl Ghaemian.  Hans-Peter Wild, through an
entity called Casun Invest AG, held a 40% equity stake in
exchange for a US$40 million investment.

Faced with a liquidity squeeze, as well as EUR10 million in
liabilities to its IT consultants, the Debtor halted operations
and on March 20, 2013, filed a petition to open insolvency
proceedings over its assets.

Tobias Wahl was appointed the insolvency administrator in June
2013.  He filed a Chapter 15 petition for Reutax (Bankr. D. Del.
Case No. 13-12135) on Aug. 21, 2013.  The Debtor is estimated to
have assets and debt of US$10 million to US$50 million.

Mr. Wahl believes that Mr. Ghaemian used certain funds from the
Debtor to purchase a US$9.1 million mansion located at 1278
Angelo Drive in Beverly Hills, California and four luxury
automobiles.

Mr. Ghaemian was subsequently arrested by German authorities in
early June 2013, in connection with the transactions involving
the Debtor's funds.

Mr. Wahl believes the loan for the Beverly Hills Mansion from
East West Bank is currently in default or will be so shortly, and
the bank will act promptly to enforce its rights under a US$4.4
million mortgage.  He believes that three of the luxury cars (a
Rolls Royce, Porsche and a Ferrari) remain in possession of
Mr. Ghaemian's sister.

Michael Joseph Custer, Esq., at Pepper Hamilton LLP, in
Wilmington, Delaware, serves as counsel to the foreign
representative and insolvency administrator for Reutax.

Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath presides over the case.
Mr. Wahl has filed a motion for a Rule 2004 examination.


WINDERMERE VII: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR50.8MM D Notes to Ca
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating action on the
following classes of Notes issued by Windermere VII CMBS plc.
(amounts reflect initial outstanding):

EUR466M A2 Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 4, 2011
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

EUR50M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 23,
2009 Confirmed at A2 (sf)

EUR27.4M C Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

EUR50.8M D Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2012 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

EUR0.05M X Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Aug 22,
2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class E and Class F Notes.

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade action reflects Moody's increased loss expectation
for the pool since its last review. This is primarily due to a
lower recovery expectation for both the largest loan in the pool,
Adductor (32% of pool balance) following significant performance
deterioration since last review as well as the single-let
property securing the Mulheim loan (13% of pool balance).
Additionally, since last review the deal has transformed into a
non-performing loan pool with all remaining loans in default and
in special servicing.

IO ratings are sensitive to changes in expected loss of the loan
pools that they reference. The rating on the Class X Notes is
downgraded because the future expected losses have increased
compared to when the Class X Notes were downgraded in August
2012.

The rating on the Class A2 Notes is affirmed because the current
credit enhancement level of 76.6%, is sufficient to maintain the
rating despite the high loss expectation for the remaining pool
and a 27% exposure to loans backed by properties located in Spain
(local currency country risk ceiling of A3). This Class is
subject to an operational risk rating cap. The transaction has
also entered its tail period i.e. the period between the maturity
date of the latest maturing loan and the final maturity date of
the Notes. This places an additional rating cap on the Class A
Notes.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.

Moody's current weighted average A loan and whole loan LTV for
the pool is 147% and 158% respectively. In comparison the
Underwritten (UW) A loan LTV is 122% and the whole loan is 130%.
Moody's value for the whole securitized portfolio is 26% lower at
EUR118 million versus the reported EUR159.5million UW value.

All the loans have passed their maturity dates and all have
defaulted at or before their maturity dates. Based on Moody's
revised assessment of underlying property values, the loss
expectation for the remaining pool is very large (40%).

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) lending
will remain constrained over the next years, while subject to
strict underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the
underlying property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between
prime and secondary properties, with further value declines
expected for non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets
will remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
for the world's largest economies is for only a gradual
strengthening in growth over the coming two years. Fiscal
consolidation and volatility in financial markets will continue
to weigh on business and consumer confidence, while heightened
uncertainty hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. In
2013, Moody's expects no growth in the Euro area and only slow
growth in the UK.

Moody's Portfolio Analysis:

Windermere VII CMBS plc. closed in May 2006 and represents the
securitization of initially twelve mortgage loans originated by
Lehman Commercial Paper Inc. and secured by first-ranking legal
mortgages over initially 72 commercial properties. Currently,
five loans remain in the pool which are secured by 21 properties.
The pool exhibits above average diversity in terms of geographic
location. By UW value, 44.7% of the properties are in France,
32.6% are in Germany, 22.7% are in Spain. The property types are
77.3% office and 22.7% retail. Moody's uses a variation of Herf
to measure diversity of loan size, where a higher number
represents greater diversity. Large multi-borrower transactions
typically have a Herf of less than 10 with an average of around
5. This pool has a Herf of 4.2 compared to a Herf of 8.7 at
closing. Since Moody's last rating action in September 2012, the
Nitsba, Corpus, Firefly and Phoenix loans have repaid and all
principal proceeds have been allocated to the Notes sequentially,
benefiting the Class A2 Notes.

The Adductor loan (31.9%) is the largest loan in the pool and is
secured by the 13 office properties in South-Western France. The
property portfolio's performance deteriorated significantly since
last year with vacancy increasing from 11% to 21% and rental
income declining by 13% to EUR5.85 million from EUR6.73 million.
The WA lease term is also very short at 2.3 years, therefore the
portfolio will require active management to maintain current
occupancy levels. The loan defaulted on its maturity date in
July 2012 and there is no clear work-out strategy as yet for the
loan. There is an EUR1 million interest shortfall on the loan as
default interest is not being paid by the borrower. Moody's value
at EUR50.4 million is 29% below the UW value as of June 2012.
This haircut is mainly because Moody's takes into account 20%
non-recoverable costs (actual cost ratio for the year 2012) for
maintenance, utilities and management cost and also takes into
account re-letting costs and rent free periods that are likely to
be incurred by the borrower in re-letting current and future
vacant space. In comparison, the valuer's total cost assumption
to derive net rent is 2%. Moody's loss expectation is in the 0%-
25% range.

The Nordostpark (28.2%) and the Mulheim (13.1%) loans are each
secured by a single office property in Germany and both are
single let with short weighted average remaining lease terms. The
Nordostpark property is let to Alcatel-Lucent until December 2014
and the Mulheim loan property is let to GMG
Generalmietgesellschaft (a company affiliated to Deutsche
Telekom) until June 2015. In both cases there is a high
probability that the tenants will vacate at maturity and as a
result both properties have suffered a substantial value decline
since closing, 47% for Nordostpark and 69% for Mulheim. Moody's
value is 20% below the EUR43.4 UW value for the Nordostpark loan
and is the same as the UW value for the Mulheim loan. Moody's
loss expectation for the Nordostpark loan is between 25%-50% and
for the Mulheim loan between 50%-75%.

Redleaf I (16.0%) and Redleaf II (10.8%) loans which share the
same sponsor, are secured by secondary retail properties in Spain
and Spanish territories. For the Redleaf I loan a potential buyer
has been found and according to the servicer the sale could be
closed by September/October 2013. For the Redleaf II loan which
is secured by a single shopping center in Ceuta (in Northern
Africa), the sale process will be re-launched in August 2013.
Moody's' value is EUR10 million for the Redleaf I loan and
EUR14.4 million for Redleaf II loan. The loss expectation for the
Redleaf I & II loans respectively is between 50%-75% and 25%-50%.

Portfolio Loss Exposure: Moody's expects a very large amount of
losses on the remaining securitized portfolio as a whole and
expects that that losses will eventually reach the Class C notes.
Given anticipated work-out strategy for the loans, Moody's
expects that losses will be realized and allocated to the junior
Notes within the next one to two interest payment date.

Rating Methodologies:

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE
Portfolio) published in April 2006, Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities published in February
2012 and Rating Caps for CMBS in the Tail Period published in
October 2011.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2013 Central Scenarios published in February 2013.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated 12 September 2012. The last Performance Overview
for this transaction was published on May 21, 2013.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
ABSROM to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for each
tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in ABSROM, where for each loss
scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated taking into account the structural features
of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AQUILAE CLO I: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'AAA (sf)' from
'AA+ (sf)' its credit rating on Aquilae CLO I PLC's class B
notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the
class C, D, and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 10, 2013 trustee report.
According to the report, the class A notes were fully paid on the
last payment date in June 2013.  Accordingly, the aggregate
collateral balance has decreased to EUR61 million from
EUR93 million.  The full amortization of the class A notes has
increased the available credit enhancement for all classes of
notes.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class of
notes at each rating level.  In S&P's analysis, it used the
reported portfolio balance that it considers to be performing
(EUR61.47 million), the weighted-average spread (2.68%), and the
weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered appropriate.
S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using
alternative default patterns and levels, in conjunction with
different interest stress scenarios.

Since S&P's Aug. 24, 2012 review, the results of the class B, C,
D, and E par value tests, which measure overcollateralization,
have improved.  In addition, none of the junior classes of notes
has deferred interest.  S&P has observed that the portfolio's
weighted-average spread has increased to 2.68% from 2.54%, which
is just above the documented level of 2.65%.

Although the transaction's weighted-average life has decreased to
1.96 years from 2.50 years, S&P's scenario default rates have
increased.  In S&P's view, this is a result of fewer higher rated
assets in the portfolio.  In addition, the transaction's
weighted-average recovery rates have decreased as assets with
lower seniorities remain in the portfolio.

"We have also continued to monitor the proportion of long-dated
assets, those assets that mature after June 18, 2015, the rated
notes' final maturity date.  In our view, this exposes the
transaction to the loss of par market value risk, because these
assets need to be sold ahead of their maturity date for the
issuer to repay the rated notes on time.  Since our 2012 review,
we have noted a nominal increase in long-dated assets to EUR19.5
million from EUR15.9 million.  Long-dated assets represent 38.5%
of total assets in the portfolio.  We therefore treat and stress
these assets separately in our cash flow analysis by reducing the
par credit given to them.  According to our analysis, all classes
of notes can withstand these stresses at higher ratings than
previously assigned," S&P said.

The results of S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicates that
available credit enhancement for the class B notes is
commensurate with a higher rating than previously assigned.  S&P
has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' its rating on
this class of notes.

The increased available credit enhancement for the class C notes
is commensurate with a higher rating.  However, S&P's rating on
these notes is constrained by the application of the largest
obligor test, which is a supplemental stress test in its 2009
corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.  This
test assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient credit
enhancement (excluding excess spread) to withstand specified
combinations of underlying asset defaults, with a flat recovery
rate of 5%.  S&P has therefore affirmed our 'A+ (sf)' rating on
the class C notes.

Although the results of S&P's credit and cash flow analysis
indicates increased available credit enhancement for the class D
and E notes, as a result of the transaction's relatively short
time to maturity, it has also considered the weighted-average
spread.  As this is less than the weighted-average debt cost, and
the class E notes' interest coverage test has been failing since
January 2013, S&P believes it is increasingly likely that the
junior classes of notes could suffer interest shortfalls.  In
addition, there could be a risk of an interest default when the
junior notes become the most senior in the structure.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its ratings on the class D and E notes.

Aquilae CLO I is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily European
speculative-grade corporate borrowers.  The transaction closed in
December 2003 and is managed by Henderson Global Investors Ltd.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating          Rating
             To              From

Aquilae CLO I PLC
EUR300 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

B            AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C            A+ (sf)
D            BB+ (sf)
E            CCC+ (sf)


AUTHENTIC IRELAND: Goes Out of Business; Owes Creditors EUR1.1MM
----------------------------------------------------------------
Gordon Deegan at Irish Examiner reports that Authentic Ireland
Travel Ltd. has gone out of business and a statement of affairs
circulated to the online firm's creditors shows that it had a
deficit of EUR1.1 million, owing unsecured creditors EUR1.1
million.

The firm operated the authenticireland.com Web site that was sold
to Irish Welcome Tours Ltd. prior to AITL ceasing to trade
earlier this month, Irish Examiner relates.

The Web site, which mainly sells holidays in Ireland to overseas
visitors, continues to operate as normal under its new owners,
Irish Examiner notes.

However, the statement of affairs circulated by AITL director,
Mark Lynch, to creditors shows that customer deposits totaling
EUR640,000 are listed as unsecured creditors, Irish Examiner
discloses.  It is understood, however, credit card companies will
be forced to incur the loss as deposits were all paid by credit
card, Irish Examiner states.

The list of unsecured creditors includes five-star hotels
including Dromoland Castle (EUR12,510) in Co Clare and Ashford
Castle (EUR12,681) in Co Mayo, according to Irish Examiner.

The Shelbourne Hotel (EUR6,102) is also listed along with the
K Club (EUR2,407) and Sheen Falls Lodge (EUR2,155) in Co Kerry,
Irish Examiner says.  Old Ground Hotel in Ennis is owed EUR9,594
by AITL, Irish Examiner discloses.

Creditors expressed concern that the business's most valuable
asset, its website, turned out not to be the property of AITL
prior to it being sold before the firm went out of business,
Irish Examiner relates.

The firm's only assets are listed as debtors totalling EUR11,300
and office equipment valued at EUR5,000, Irish Examiner notes.

Authentic Ireland Travel Ltd. is a Co Clare-based online tour
operator.


AVOCA CLO III: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on all classes of Avoca CLO III PLC's notes.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its rating on the class A notes;

   -- Affirmed its ratings on the class B Def and C Def notes;
      and

   -- Lowered its ratings on the class D-1 Def, D-2 Def, E, and R
      combination notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance, using data from the June 28, 2013 trustee report,
and by applying its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's previous 2012 review, it has observed an increase in
the weighted-average spread earned on the collateral pool to
3.80% from 3.24%.  The transaction's weighted-average life has
increased to 4.99 years from 4.71 years, over the same period.

"We have also observed an increase in the available credit
enhancement for the class A, B Def, and C Def notes, which
benefited from the principal paydown of the senior class A notes.
While, the available credit enhancement for the remaining classes
decreased.  In our view, this is a result of the reduced
aggregate collateral balance that we consider to be performing.
Principal and interest proceeds were used to partially amortize
the class A notes after the par value tests of the most
subordinated classes were breached on previous payment dates.
The outstanding balance of the class A notes is 71.06% of its
original balance and has decreased by EUR69.63 million since our
2012 review.  In addition, the aggregate collateral balance that
we consider to be performing has reduced to EUR299.43 million
from EUR378.05 million," S&P said.

Currently, the par value tests for the class E notes do not
comply with the required trigger under the transaction documents.
For all other classes of notes, however, the par value tests
comply with the required triggers.  As of S&P's 2012 review, all
par value tests complied with the levels required under the
transaction documents

Obligor concentration in the pool has increased since S&P's
previous review.  The proportion of assets that S&P considers to
be rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') has
decreased in notional and percentage terms.  Assets that S&P
considers to be defaulted (assets rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD', and 'D')
has increased in notional and percentage terms.

S&P has also considered that Avoca CLO III is in its post-
reinvestment period, which ended in February 2011.

S&P have subjected the capital structure to our cash flow
analysis, based on its 2009 corporate cash flow collateralized
debt obligation (CDO) criteria, to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) at each rating level.  S&P used the reported
portfolio balance that it considered to be performing, the
principal cash balance, the weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered to be
appropriate.

S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios, using
various default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability
rating category, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios.  To help assess the collateral pool's credit
risk, S&P used CDO Evaluator 6.0.1 to generate scenario default
rates (SDRs) at each rating level.  S&P then compared these SDRs
with their respective BDRs.

Taking into account S&P's observations outlined above, it
considers the available credit enhancement for the class R
combination notes to be commensurate with a lower rating level.
S&P has therefore lowered to 'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its
rating on this class of notes.

S&P's ratings on the class C Def, D-1 Def, D-2 Def, and E notes
are constrained by the application of the largest obligor test, a
supplemental stress test that it introduced in its 2009 corporate
cash flow CDO criteria.  This test addresses event and model risk
that might be present in the transaction and assesses whether a
CDO tranche has sufficient credit enhancement (not including
excess spread) to withstand specified combinations of underlying
asset defaults based on the ratings on the underlying assets,
with a flat recovery of 5%.

Although the results of S&P's cash flow analysis suggest higher
ratings for these classes of notes, the largest obligor test
results constrain its ratings on the notes.  S&P has therefore
affirmed its 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class C Def notes.  In
addition, S&P has lowered its ratings on the class D-1 Def and D-
2 Def notes to 'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)'.  S&P has also lowered
its rating on the class E notes to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)'.

"Based on our counterparty analysis, we have concluded that the
transaction documents for the derivative counterparties--Citibank
N.A.  (A/Stable/A-1) and JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. (A+/Stable/A-
1)--do not fully comply with our current counterparty criteria.
As a result, our current counterparty criteria constrain our
maximum potential ratings in this transaction to one notch above
our long-term issuer credit rating on the derivative
counterparties.  However, this does not apply if the available
credit enhancement for the class of notes in question is
sufficient to support higher ratings, after adjusting the pool
balance in accordance with our current counterparty criteria,"
S&P said.

"Our ratings on the class A and B Def notes reflect our opinion
of the available credit enhancement for these classes of notes
after we adjusted the aggregate pool balance in accordance with
our current counterparty criteria, and conducted our credit and
cash flow analysis.  In our opinion, the available credit
enhancement for the class A notes now supports a higher rating
than previously assigned.  We have therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)'
from 'AA+ (sf)' our rating on the class A notes.  Additionally,
in our opinion, the available credit enhancement for the class B
Def notes is commensurate with the currently assigned rating.
Therefore we have affirmed our 'AA- (sf)' rating on this class of
notes," S&P added.

Avoca CLO III is a cash flow corporate loan collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
August 2005.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

Avoca CLO III PLC
EUR408 Million Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A           AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered

D-1 Def     CCC+ (sf)         B+ (sf)
D-2 Def     CCC+ (sf)         B+ (sf)
E           CCC- (sf)         CCC+ (sf)
R Combo     CCC+ (sf)         B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B Def       AA- (sf)
C Def       BBB+ (sf)

Combo--Combination.


DECO 10-PAN: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC-(sf)' its credit rating on DECO 10-Pan Europe 4 PLC's class
C notes.  All other outstanding classes of notes are unaffected
by the rating action.

For the first time, the class C notes experienced an interest
shortfall on the July 2013 interest payment date.  This interest
shortfall primarily stems from increases in issuer level expenses
and lower revenue receipts due to prepayments.

S&P understands that the transaction's excess spread, which is
distributed to the unrated class X notes, cannot mitigate
interest shortfalls for the other classes of notes.

S&P's rating on DECO 10-Pan Europe 4's class C notes addresses
the timely payment of interest quarterly in arrears, and the
payment of principal no later than the legal final maturity date
in October 2019.  S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)'
its rating on the class C notes because it believes that they are
highly vulnerable to principal losses under its base-case
scenario, and because they have experienced interest shortfalls.

DECO 10-Pan Europe 4 is a European commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in 2006 and is backed
by 10 loans secured on properties in Germany, Switzerland, and
the Netherlands.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
           To             From

DECO 10-Pan Europe 4 PLC
EUR1.039 Billion Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

C          D (sf)         CCC- (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

A1         AA (sf)
A2         BB-(sf)
B          B (sf)
D          D (sf)
E          CCC- (sf)



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ALLIANCE OIL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Alliance Oil Company Ltd.'s (AOIL)
Long-Term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B'.
The Outlook is Stable.

AOIL's ratings reflect the company's limited scale, concentrated
business model skewed towards downstream operations, and
potential increase in capital intensity and leverage to pursue
its growth strategy. "We recognize the company's progress in
upgrading its Khabarovsk refinery and launch of the gas business
in Q113, but note that its growth strategy may be challenged by
the recent production decline at the Kolvinskoye field in Timano-
Pechora. AOIL is one of Russia's second-tier integrated oil
companies, accounting for 0.5% of crude production and for 1.5%
of oil refining in the country," Fitch says.

Key Rating Drivers

Upstream Scale Limits Upgrade
"We expect that AOIL will achieve a moderate increase in total
hydrocarbon production in 2013, due to stable or slightly lower
crude output and the launch of natural gas production in Q113.
AOIL aims for double-digit growth of oil and gas production in
2013-2015, but even if this growth strategy is successful, its
ratings are likely to be limited to the 'B' category, given its
limited scale and concentration on Russia. AOIL's upstream
production in H113 averaged 58.7 thousand barrels of oil
equivalent per day (mbbl/d), up 9% compared with the 2012
average, including natural gas and condensate production of
5.3mbbl/d," Fitch says.

Corporate Governance, Country Risk
"AOIL's ratings include a one-notch discount for weaker corporate
governance typical for Russian corporates and for higher country
risks inherent to Russia -- including the risks of evolving legal
and tax environment. The tax regime has a direct influence on the
sector's profitability through industry-specific taxes and
although it is not our base case scenario, we cannot exclude that
the regime might be revised at some stage. This unpredictability
is incorporated in AOIL's ratings via the discount," Fitch
states.

Timano-Pechora is Key
AOIL's ability to implement its upstream growth strategy in the
Timano-Pechora region is still important for maintaining and
increasing its production, although its significance has declined
since AOIL launched its gas business in the Tomsk region. At end-
2012, Timano-Pechora accounted for 42% of the company's proved
oil and gas reserves. The lower-than-expected production
potential of Kolvinskoye, AOIL's largest field, launched in
September 2011, resulted in upstream production falling to 52.3
thousand barrels per day (mbbl/d) in Q412 from 62.4mbbl/d in
Q411.

More Reliance On Downstream
Progress on the Khabarovsk refinery upgrade, increasing AOIL's
primary refining capacity to 90mbbl/d, supports the current
ratings. Average daily refining volumes at the Khabarovsk
refinery totaled 85.9mbbl/d in H113, 12% yoy. The company intends
to further increase its refining capacity to 100mbbl/d by end-
2013, and to connect the refinery to Transneft's ESPO oil
pipeline in 2014, significantly reducing the company's transport
costs. "We expect that lower transport costs will offset the
negative effect from the expiration of most AOIL's oil production
tax breaks in 2015, leading to greater reliance on downstream in
generation of operating cash flows from 2016," Fitch says.

Material Contribution to JV
In 2012 AOIL contributed its Volga-Urals upstream assets operated
by Tatnefteotdacha and Saneco to its joint venture (JV) with
Repsol, S.A. (BBB-/Stable), which was set up in 2011. The assets
accounted for 35% of AOIL's proved reserves at end-2012, and for
38% of its upstream production in 2012. "We expect AOIL to retain
significant control over these assets, but estimate that the cash
flows effectively available to service AOIL's debt in the medium
term will reduce as a result of the transaction, because 49% of
Saneco and Tatnefteotdacha's potential dividends will be
allocated to Repsol, and a part of the JV's operating cash flows
may be used to finance JV capex," Fitch says.

No Deleveraging Expected
"At end-2012 AOIL's funds from operations (FFO) Fitch-adjusted
gross leverage was 3.2x, and we expect it to average 3x-4x in
2013-2017. In 2012, the company's FFO interest coverage was 4.2x,
including capitalized interest, and this could be around 3x-4x
over 2013-2017. We consider these figures adequate for the
current rating level. AOIL might be able to deleverage moderately
if crude prices were higher than in Fitch's conservative Brent
price deck: US$103/bbl in 2013, US$96/bbl in 2014, US$88.5/bbl in
2015 and US$80/bbl in the long term," Fitch says.

The Amur River Flooding:
The management says that the Amur river flooding in the east of
Russia does not affect the operations of AOIL's Khabarovsk
refinery at the moment. "We do not expect that the flooding will
materially affect the company's operating cash flow and
modernization of the refinery. However, we will continue to
monitor the situation and might take a negative rating action in
case of potential serious disruption or material capex overruns
caused by the flooding," Fitch states.

Rating Sensitivities

Stronger Upstream, Stabilized Debt
Positive rating action could follow if the company increases the
scale of upstream and downstream operations, including
hydrocarbon production expanding to 80-100 thousand barrels of
oil equivalent per day, consistently achieves positive free cash
flow (FCF), and maintains mid-cycle funds from operations FFO
adjusted leverage at or less than 4x and interest cover above 4x.

Lower Production, Rising Leverage
Declining hydrocarbon production (eg stemming from an inability
to stabilize the production at Timano-Pechora), and higher capex
or non-zero dividends to ordinary shareholders resulting in mid-
cycle FFO adjusted leverage rising above 5x and interest cover
falling below 3x could lead to negative rating action.

Liquidity and Debt Structure

Adequate Liquidity
"We view AOIL's liquidity position as adequate for the current
ratings but challenged overall. Organic sources of liquidity are
the most constrained due to high capex resulting in negative FCF
generation. At end-H113, AOIL had US$398 million of cash compared
with short-term debt of US$384 million. In H113, AOIL improved
its debt maturity profile by issuing a US$500 million Eurobond
due 2020 and preferred stock for the equivalent of US$100
million," Fitch says.

Balanced Debt Portfolio
AOIL's consolidated debt portfolio is well balanced by maturities
and instruments. During 2008-H113 it issued Eurobonds,
convertible bonds, Russian rouble domestic bonds and preferred
stock totaling around US$2 billion. In addition, in 2010
Vnesheconombank (BBB/Stable) opened a long-term credit line of
more than US$750 million with AOIL aimed at the Khabarovsk
refinery upgrade due 2022. Around 25% of the company's
consolidated debt is secured, including the Vnesheconombank loan.

Approach to Preferred Stock
"Under Fitch's 'Treatment and Notching of Hybrids in Nonfinancial
Corporate and REIT Credit Analysis', we allocate AOIL's
cumulative preferred shares 50-50 between debt and equity; they
therefore affect the company's leverage ratios. We also include
100% of the projected preferred dividends in our forecasts for
interest coverage. AOIL has issued preference shares equivalent
to around US$300 million so far," Fitch says.

Full List of Rating Actions

Alliance Oil Company Ltd.

Long-Term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Long-Term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Short-Term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Foreign currency senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'B'/'RR4'
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'BBB(rus)'; Outlook
  Stable

OJSC Alliance Oil Company

Local currency senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'B' /RR4
National senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BBB(rus)'



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


HALCYON STRUCTURED: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating action
on the notes issued by Halcyon Structured Asset Management
European CLO 2006-I B.V.:

  EUR40M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
  Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2011 Upgraded to Aa2
  (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes issued by
Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2006-I B.V.:

  EUR207M Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2006 Definitive Rating
  Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR40M A-1R Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate Notes due
  2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2006 Definitive
  Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR30M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2021, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2011 Upgraded
  to A3 (sf)

  EUR15M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2021, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2011
  Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  EUR20M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2021, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 2, 2011 Upgraded
  to Ba2 (sf)

Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2006-I B.V.,
issued in June 2006, is a multi-currency Collateralized Loan
Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
European loans. The portfolio is managed by Halcyon Structured
Asset Management L.P. The reinvestment period ended on 21 July
2011.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the upgrade of Class B notes is primarily a
result of continued deleveraging of the Class A notes and
subsequent increase in the Class A/B overcollateralization (the
"OC") ratio. The Class A-1 and Class A-1R notes amortized by
approximately EUR69 million since July 2012, or 43.7% of the
original rated balance since the last rating action in August
2011.

As a result of the deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios
(or "OC ratios") of the senior notes have increased since the
rating action in August 2011. As of the latest trustee report
dated July 2013, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E OC
ratios are 144.9%, 124.9%, 116.8% and 107% respectively versus
April 2012 levels of 136%, 122%, 116% and 109%, respectively.
These OC ratios are based on the July 2013 report and do not
reflect the latest payment date on the 27 July 2013.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR268.7 million, defaulted par of EUR3.8 million, a weighted
average default probability of 22.38% over 3.92 years (consistent
with a WARF of 3,306), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 46.02% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity
score of 24 and a weighted average spread of 3.87%. The default
probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral
pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the
collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 88.63% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default and
11.37% non-first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%. In
each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes:

1) The portfolio is exposed 18.05% to obligors located in Spain,
Ireland and Italy with respective country ceilings of A3, A3 and
A2. On August 14, 2013, Moody's released a report, which
describes how it proposes to incorporate the additional credit
risk of exposures domiciled in countries with country ceilings
that are single A or lower when rating CLO tranches that carry
ratings higher than those ceilings. In Moody's analysis it
incorporated sensitivities applying the par value haircuts
suggested in the report, reflecting country risks in CLOs. The
Aaa and Aa par value haircut scenarios generated model outputs
that were consistent to these rating actions.

2) Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing
together with the sovereign risks -- Approximately 18.54% of the
portfolio is rated B3 and below with maturities between 2014 and
2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. The
portfolio is also exposed 18.05% to obligors located in Spain,
Ireland and Italy. Moody's considered the scenario where the WARF
of the portfolio was increased to 3,976 by forcing to Ca the
credit quality of 25% of such exposures subject to refinancing or
sovereign risks. This scenario generated model outputs that were
up to one notch lower than the base case results.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subject
to market conditions and this may have a significant impact on
the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerate
as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan market
or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed by
rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast amortization
would usually benefit the ratings of the notes.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in May 2013.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction is Moody's EMEA
Cash Flow Model. This model was used to represent the cash flows
and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow model
evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the binomial distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche. Therefore, Moody's analysis
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MARLIES DEKKERS: Declared Bankrupt by Rotterdam Court
-----------------------------------------------------
Radjin Persad at NL Times reports that the court in Rotterdam
declared Marlies Dekkers bankrupt on Aug. 21.

The curator has negotiated with investment company Karmijn
Kapitaal and they entered into an agreement to make a restart
with the healthy parts of Marlies Dekkers, NL Times relates.

According to NL Times, Marlies Dekkers reported in a press
release about a restart.   The restart is a transformation into
e-commerce: some stores will be closed and the sale will take
place mainly through their own webshop and online stores. This
restart saves 35 of about 100 jobs, NL Times discloses.

In the new situation, six stores in Amsterdam (Berenstraat),
Rotterdam, Maasmechelen, Breda, Utrecht and Antwerp remain open,
NL Times notes.

Marlies Dekkers is a lingerie company based in the Netherlands.
The company became world famous, especially by producing bras
with straps above the cups.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


AK BARS: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Local Currency IDR
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned AK BARS Bank (ABB) a Long-term local
currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB-' with Stable
Outlook.

Fitch has also assigned ABB's RUB5 billion issue of senior
unsecured bonds (series BO-3) with a coupon rate of 8.85% and the
final maturity in August 2016, a Long-term local currency IDR of
'BB-' and a final National Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)'. ABB's
other ratings remained unaffected.

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities

The issue's rating corresponds to ABB's Long-term local currency
IDR of 'BB-' and National Long-term Rating of 'A+(rus)', which in
turn reflect the moderate probability of support from the
Republic of Tatarstan (RT; 'BBB'/Stable).

Downward pressure on ABB's Long-term local currency IDR of 'BB-'
and National Rating and hence the issue's rating, could arise if
there was any major weakening in the relationship between RT and
the bank, for example, as a result of changes in any key senior
regional officials or pressure from the federal authorities for
RT to divest its stake in the bank (although neither of these are
currently expected by Fitch).

Upside potential for ABB's Long-term local currency IDR of 'BB-'
and National Rating and hence the issue's rating may emerge if
(i) its shareholding structure is streamlined, resulting in a
majority stake being held by the RT or an RT-controlled entity;
and/or (ii) ABB's related party business decreases and corporate
governance improves, thereby reducing the risk of support for the
bank being less politically acceptable or too costly.


ROSSIYA INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' IFS rating; Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based Rossiya Insurance
Company's (Rossiya) Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating at
'CCC' and National IFS rating at 'B(rus)' with Negative Outlooks.
At the same time Fitch has withdrawn the ratings as Rossiya has
chosen to stop participating in the rating process. Therefore,
Fitch will no longer have sufficient information to maintain the
ratings. Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or
analytical coverage for Rossiya.

Key Rating Drivers

Fitch sees Rossiya's current business model as unviable given the
significant deterioration of the operating environment in the
local compulsory motor third party liability (MTPL) insurance
segment. For Rossiya, the impact is exacerbated by company's lack
of success from its efforts to achieve a healthier portfolio
structure with less weighting to the MTPL business. In Fitch's
opinion, there might be a heightened risk of regulatory
preventive actions as a result. Fitch also believes that the
insurer's limited success in strengthening its profile since its
acquisition in 2009 reduces the value of the company to its
owner.


* KIROV REGION: Fitch Affirms ST Foreign Currency Rating at 'B'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kirov Region's Long-term foreign and
local currency ratings at 'BB-', National Long-term rating at
'A+(rus)' and Short-term foreign currency rating at 'B'. The
Outlooks for the Long-term ratings are Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The ratings reflect the region's moderate indebtedness, low
contingent liabilities and a diversified economy. However, the
ratings also factor in growing debt, high refinancing risks and
the modest size of the local economy, with wealth indicators
below the national average.

Fitch expects the region's direct risk to increase in 2013-2015,
but to remain below 50% of current revenue (2011: 26%). Direct
risk is moderate in an international context, but is relatively
high for an emerging market economy with lack of access to long-
term financing and high volatility of capital markets. However
these risks are reflected in the region's ratings.

The region relies on short-term bank loans and needs to refinance
all of its direct debt within a year. Fitch does not expect Kirov
Region to have problems with refinancing or rolling over bank
loans in 2013-2104 as the region is a reliable borrower for local
subsidiaries of state-owned banks. However the region's reliance
on short-term bank loans could cause severe refinancing risk if
the financial markets become less favorable.

The region has experienced a reduction of operating margin to
1.6% in 2012 (2011: 4.1%) primarily due to the low growth of tax
revenue and a drop in current transfers. Fitch expects the
restoration of operating margin to about 4% in 2013-2015 driven
by the restoration of tax growth and higher transfers.

Kirov Region's debt coverage (debt to current balance) ratio
deteriorated in 2012. Although the region managed to sustain a
positive operating margin, the debt coverage weakened to 73.3 in
2012 (2011: 5.6). Fitch expects debt coverage to improve over
2013-2015, but the ratio will remain significantly above the
maturity profile of the region's debt.

Gross regional product (GRP) per capita was 69% of the national
median in 2011. However, the economy is fairly diversified and
major taxpayers are spread across various sectors of the economy.
The administration forecasts annual economic growth to average
3.1% in 2012-2014.

The region's contingent liabilities totaled RUB1.8 billion in
2012 (2011: RUB2.1 billion). The region has abandoned issuing
guarantees that resulted in a sharp decrease of guarantees to
RUB0.8 billion at end-2012 (2010: RUB2.6 billion). Public sector
entities' debt amounted to RUB1.3 billion of which RUB0.2 billion
was guaranteed by the region at end-2012.

Kirov Region is located in the eastern part of European Russia.
The region contributed 0.4% of the Russian Federation's GDP in
2011 and accounted for 0.9% of the country's population.

Rating Sensitivities

-- A reduction of refinancing risk would be positive

-- An improvement of budgetary performance with the operating
    margin at about 10% and a reduction of refinancing risk would
    lead to an upgrade.

-- Weak performance and sharp debt growth would be negative

-- Continued weak performance with the operating margin
    languishing at about 2% and sharp debt growth would be
    negative.

Key Assumptions

   -- Russia has an evolving institutional framework with the
      system of intergovernmental relations between federal,
      regional and local governments still under development

   -- Russia's economy will continue to demonstrate moderate
      economic growth. Fitch does not expect dramatic external
      macroeconomic shocks

   -- The federal government's budgetary performance will remain
      sound and will serve as a supporting factor for Russian
      LRGs

   -- Kirov Region will continue to have fair access to the
      domestic financial markets sufficient for refinancing of
      maturing debt

   -- Increasing pressure on operating expenditure and capital
      spending will result in an increase of debt and weaker debt
      coverage ratios



=====================================
S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O
=====================================


KOMBINAT ALUMINIJUMA: Court Denies Director Fled Montenegro
-----------------------------------------------------------
Itar-Tass reports that a Montenegrin court on Thursday refuted
local media reports that a Russian national, Dmitriy Potrubach,
the financial director of the Podgorica aluminum plant (KAP), had
fled Montenegro.

According to Itar-Tass, a court in Podgorica said "Potrubach,
accompanied by three lawyers, attended a court hearing".
Mr. Potrubach is accused of stealing EUR9.6 million, Itar-Tass
discloses.

Itar-Tass relates Prosecutor Nina Ivanovic told journalists that
she had issued an order to audit the activities of the KAP
enterprise with an aim to establish the fact of illegal use of
electric energy.  The prosecutor's office employees are checking
the plant's financial records, Itar-Tass notes.

Mr. Potrubach was arrested in Montenegro on July 11 but was
released on bail six days later, Itar-Tass recounts.

The Russian En+Group Company linked the arrest to KAP's
bankruptcy initiated by the Montenegrin government in order to
exert pressure on the En+Group as the plant's creditor and
shareholder, Itar-Tass discloses.

The En+Group is a major creditor of the Podgorica aluminum plant,
which owes it over EUR91 million, Itar-Tass states.

                     Bankruptcy Proceedings

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 19,
2013, PRIME related that bankruptcy proceedings were initiated by
Montenegro's finance ministry on June 14 due to KAP's EUR24.4
million debt to the ministry, which occurred after the repayment
of KAP's EUR24.4 million debt to Deutsche Bank from Montenegro's
budget under state guarantees.  KAP's total debt amounts to
EUR380 million, including EUR102 million owed to Russia's VTB and
Hungary's OTP Bank, as well as EUR61 million to a local electric
power company and EUR91.6 million to En+, PRIME disclosed.

Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica is an aluminium plant.  The
company is Montenegro's single biggest industrial employer.  It
is jointly owned by the state and the Central European Aluminium
Company of Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BUCKIE SHIPYARD: In Administration; 68 Jobs Affected
----------------------------------------------------
Daily Record reports that Buckie Shipyard Limited has gone into
administration, with the loss of almost 70 jobs.

According to Daily Record, the company was said to have suffered
severe cashflow problems as a result of unsustainable costs, a
marked decline in demand and intense competition in the industry.

Joint administrators Iain Fraser and Tom MacLennan --
tom.maclennan@tenongroup.com -- will first wind down the
Moray-based business before closing it, while selling off the
company's assets, Daily Record discloses.

Mr. Fraser, as cited by Daily Record, said Buckie Shipyard's
staff and directors had "worked long and hard to secure a future
for the company," but added that "[t]he financial pressures meant
that administration was the only option.

"It is therefore with great regret that 68 jobs have been made
redundant with immediate effect, with the balance of six being
retained in the short-term to assist with the winding-down
process," Mr. Fraser continued.

"We will liaise with relevant organizations to provide staff with
as much support as possible with the redundancy process.  We will
also now market the assets of the business for sale," according
to Mr. Fraser.

Buckie Shipyard Limited is one of Scotland's oldest specialist
shipbuilders.  The company employs a total of 74 people and the
latest figures showed it had a turnover of GBP3 million,
according to Daily Record.  The company designed and built ships,
as well as carrying out refurbishment and maintenance work, with
recent clients includes the Ministry of Defence, the Royal
National Lifeboat Institution and others.


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: To Write Off Up to GBP500 Million of Bad Loans
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sharlene Goff at The Financial Times reports that the
Co-operative Bank will this week attempt to draw a line under its
ill-timed merger with Britannia building society by writing off
at least GBP500 million of bad commercial property and mortgage
loans it inherited four years ago.

Analysts are braced for loan writedowns of up to GBP1 billion
this year at the Manchester-based lender, the bulk of which they
expect to be taken in the first-half results, due to be published
on Thursday, Aug. 29, the FT discloses.

The charges, which analysts say will drag the Co-op into a loss
for the first six months of the year, come as the mutual prepares
for a sweeping restructuring of its banking business in the
coming months, the FT notes.

The Co-op Group is battling to fill a GBP1.5 billion capital hole
at its banking arm, which was identified by the financial
regulator earlier this year, the FT discloses.  It is planning a
debt exchange, which is expected to raise GBP1 billion of fresh
capital for the bank this year, the FT says.  According to the
FT, a further GBP500 million should be generated next year,
largely from the sale of the group's insurance businesses.

Announcing the restructuring in June, the Co-op, as cited by the
FT, said that the measures took into account "significant
additional impairment charges" in 2013.

These will relate to poor quality commercial real-estate loans
and subprime residential mortgages that the Co-op took over when
it merged with the Britannia building society in 2009, the FT
states.

The loans have been hived off into a non-core division, which the
Co-op is gradually running down, the FT notes.  Last year, it
took an impairment charge of GBP351.1 million against the loans,
the FT discloses.

The Co-op is not planning to provide any more details on the debt
exchange with its results, the FT says.  It will publish a
prospectus setting out the structure -- including the proposed
"haircuts" for bondholders -- towards the end of this year, the
FT discloses.

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1.  The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Motor Market Probe Stalls Insurance Arm Sale
---------------------------------------------------------------
Gareth Mackie and Martin Flanagan at The Scotsman report that
attempts to sell the Co-operative Bank's general insurance arm to
help plug a GBP1.5 billion hole in its finances could be hampered
by an ongoing probe into the "dysfunctional" motor cover market.

According to The Scotsman, analysts said that progress over the
sale of the division, announced in March after the lender plunged
to a full-year loss of GBP673.7 million, appears to have stalled.

Meanwhile, Royal Bank of Scotland will make a decision on who is
the preferred bidder for its 300-plus branches within two to
three weeks, as two suitors hit back at their rival's claim that
there "is only one real bid on the table", The Scotsman
discloses.

Co-op has already sold its fund management and life insurance
arms to Scottish Life-owner Royal London for GBP219 million and
declined to comment on developments with its general insurance
business, The Scotsman notes.

But Gary Greenwood, an analyst at Shore Capital, as cited by The
Scotsman, said: "With a Competition Commission inquiry hanging
over the motor market, getting a good price may be challenging."

The regulator launched its probe a year ago after the Office of
Fair Trading (OFT) found that the market, worth an estimated
GBP9.4 billion, was not working effectively, The Scotsman states.

The OFT said motorists' premiums were being inflated by GBP225
million a year because insurers had little control over the bills
they pay for "at fault" drivers, The Scotsman relates.

However, it is believed that the bank -- which has received
"significant" interest in the business -- is more relaxed about
its prospects than some observers in the City and will not rush
into a quick sale at a knock-down price, The Scotsman notes.

Mr. Greenwood said the Co-op's reputation had "taken a hit" after
the Prudential Regulation Authority ruled it must raise GBP1.5
billion to protect it against any future financial crises, The
Scotsman relates.

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1.  The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.


DWELL: Customers Seek to Recoup GBP5 Million From Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------
Graham Ruddick and Ben Martin at The Daily Telegraph report that
Dwell's customers are battling to recoup GBP5 million after the
company collapsed in June with a string of unfulfilled orders.

Dwell collapsed with debts of GBP16.3 million to unsecured
creditors, including GBP4.9 million in customer deposits and
GBP800,000 to HM Revenue & Customs, The Daily Telegraph says,
citing a newly published report by its administrator Duff &
Phelps.

According to The Daily Telegraph, the report lays bare the
turmoil at Dwell before it collapsed and warns these creditors
are unlikely to get any payout from the administration.

Angry customers inundated Dwell's Facebook page after the
retailer collapsed, complaining that orders made months ago had
still not been delivered, The Daily Telegraph recounts.

The administrator's report says that Dwell suffered stock-
shortage issues because its main suppliers in China froze
shipments of sofas and other furniture at ports and factories
after the retailer failed to make payments in early 2013, The
Daily Telegraph notes.

The Dwell brand and a collection of stores were bought out of
administration by Aamir Ahmad, its founder, Mr. Ahmad, who set up
the business in 2003 but left last November, bought five shops
including two at the Westfield shopping centers in London for
GBP925,000, The Daily Telegraph relates.

Dwell is now controlled by a new company called Coin Furniture
Ltd., which has no legal obligation to repay the customers, The
Daily Telegraph discloses.

According to The Daily Telegraph, the new Dwell said last month
that it was "working with customers to try to help resolve their
issues, which is being done on an individual basis".

The company, as cited by The Daily Telegraph, said it was
"limited" in what it could do for customers who paid by cash, but
those who paid by debit or credit card can try to reclaim
payments through their bank.

Although unsecured creditors will lose out, Barclays, as one of
the group's secured creditors, has received the GBP322,996 it was
owed by Dwell, The Daily Telegraph states.  The retailer's owner,
Key Capital Partners, is also expected to be repaid the GBP10,000
it is due from Dwell, as well as costs, The Daily Telegraph says.

According to The Daily Telegraph, the administrator states that
Dwell, which had 23 stores primarily in the south east of England
when it collapsed, was hurt by "generally poor trading levels".

Dwell's mounting cash difficulties had a knock-on effect on stock
availability, The Daily Telegraph says.  Key Capital Partners had
"no appetite" to put further funding into the business to release
the stock held by suppliers, and in May hired Argyll Advisory to
try to sell the retailer, which failed, The Daily Telegraph
notes.

Dwell is an upmarket furniture retailer.


EDWARDS GROUP: S&P Puts 'B+' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'B+' long-
term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based Edwards Group Ltd., a
worldwide supplier of vacuum technology, on CreditWatch with
positive implications.

At the same time, S&P put its 'B+' issue rating on the group's
US$560 million senior secured term loan and its 'BB' issue rating
on the US$90 million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF)
issued by subsidiary Edwards (Cayman Islands II) Ltd. on
CreditWatch positive.

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement that Sweden-
based industrial machinery manufacturer Atlas Copco AB
A/Stable/A-1) and Edwards entered into a definitive agreement to
merge in a transaction valued at as much as US$1.6 billion,
including US$0.4 billion of assumed net debt.  The CreditWatch
placement reflects the high likelihood that S&P could raise the
long-term rating on Edwards by multiple notches, putting it in
line with the rating on Atlas Copco at a maximum, if the deal is
successful.  S&P also factors in the likely repayment of Edwards'
financial debt on the transaction's close through Atlas Copco's
existing funds and its understanding that Edwards will be run as
a debt-free business thereafter.

According to Atlas Copco, Edwards will be part of Atlas Copco's
new Vacuum Solutions division within the Compressor Technique
business area.

The transaction will be completed by way of a merger and is
subject to customary closing conditions, including approval by
Edwards' shareholders and antitrust clearance in several
countries.  Under the agreement, Atlas Copco will acquire Edwards
at a price of up to US$10.50 per share.

The transaction has been unanimously approved by the Boards of
Directors of both companies.  Furthermore, Edwards' private-
equity sponsors, who own about 84% of the currently outstanding
shares, have entered into voting agreements with Atlas Copco to
vote in favor of the merger, subject to conditions set out in the
voting agreements.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch once the transaction closes,
which it understands is likely in the first quarter of 2014.
This means the CreditWatch resolution could extend beyond S&P's
usual three-month horizon.

S&P will likely raise the long-term rating on Edwards by multiple
notches if the deal is completed.  S&P's rating decision will
depend on its assessment of Atlas Copco's and Edwards' parent-
subsidiary relationship, which could lead to, at a maximum,
rating equalization.


EQUINOX ECLIPSE 2006-1: S&P Cuts Class D Notes Rating to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
EQUINOX (ECLIPSE 2006-1) PLC's class C and D notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class E and F
notes.

Six of the 13 original loans remain outstanding, as seven loans
have repaid.  The note balance has reduced to GBP180.34 million
from GBP401.34 million at closing.  The transaction's legal final
maturity date is in January 2018.

In April 2013, the special servicer confirmed that the sale of
the two remaining properties securing the MacAllan portfolio loan
had been completed (Beneficial Building in Birmingham and Bede
House and Cuthbert House in Washington, Tyne and Wear).  The July
2013 cash manager's report confirmed the final loss determination
and a write-down of principal losses of GBP17,917,695.63.  The
cash manager allocated these losses to the class D and E notes.

As a result of this loss allocation, the class E notes have been
fully written off and the class D notes' principal balance
reduced by 49% to GBP10,666,277.81.  Because S&P's ratings in
this transaction addresses timely interest payments and principal
repayments no later than the January 2018 legal final maturity
date, it has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on
the class D notes in accordance with its criteria.

In S&P's view, the class C notes' creditworthiness has
deteriorated as a result of the applied principal losses to the
class D and E notes.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'CCC (sf)'
from 'B- (sf)' its rating on this class of notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class E and F notes
given that both classes are exposed to principal losses.

EQUINOX (ECLIPSE 2006-1) is a true sale transaction that closed
in July 2006, which was initially backed by a pool of 13 loans
secured on 136 predominantly commercial U.K. properties.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
              To            From

EQUINOX (ECLIPSE 2006-1) PLC
GBP401.34 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

C             CCC (sf)      B- (sf)
D             D (sf)        CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

E             D (sf)
F             D (sf)


GALA CORAL: Sees Modest Growth but Challenges Remain
----------------------------------------------------
Ayesha Javed, writing for DBR Small Cap, reported that Gala Coral
Group Ltd., the U.K. betting and gambling operator seized by its
mezzanine lenders in 2010, has achieved modest growth in earnings
and debt reduction in its third quarter, ending July 6, according
to company accounts filed this week.  But the group's bingo and
casino businesses continue to suffer from fewer customers, the
report said.

Gala Coral Group Ltd. -- http://www.galacoral.co.uk/-- is a
gaming company in the UK, with operations encompassing bingo,
casinos, and sports betting.  It runs more than 150 bingo halls
throughout the country, as well as some 30 casinos.  The company
is also a bookmarker with nearly 1,600 betting shops and online
betting sites.  Gala Coral Group was formed in 2005 when Gala
Group acquired Coral Eurobet.  The company is jointly owned by
private equity firms Cinven Group, Candover Investments, and
Permira.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 23,
2010, the FT said that Gala finalized a restructuring of its
GBP2.5 billion (US$3.7 billion) debt.  The FT disclosed as a
result, Gala is freed from GBP588 million of mezzanine debt that
is being written off in exchange for giving creditors control of
the business.  The FT said the new shareholder group will be led
by Apollo Management, Cerberus, Park Square Capital and York
Capital, which are providing GBP200 million to repay debt.


INMARSAT PLC: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Long-Term CCR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'BB+' long-term corporate credit rating to U.K.-based satellite
services operator Inmarsat PLC.  The outlook is stable.

Inmarsat is the listed top holding company of Inmarsat group, and
the parent of Inmarsat Holdings Ltd., which S&P already rates at
'BB+'.  The rating on Inmarsat Holdings will now be directly
linked to that on Inmarsat.

S&P's assignment of a rating to Inmarsat does not change its
credit assessment of the overall Inmarsat group.  However, S&P
will publish its future reports on the group under Inmarsat.

The ratings on the Inmarsat group continue to reflect S&P's
assessment of the group's "satisfactory" business risk profile
and "significant" financial risk profile.  Underpinning S&P's
business risk profile assessment is Inmarsat's leading position
in the global mobile satellite services (MSS) industry, and its
strong in-orbit and ground infrastructure and vertical
integration. However, S&P's assessment also reflects some revenue
volatility due to much shorter contracts in the MSS industry than
in the fixed satellite services industry, as well as some high
operational risks characteristic of the launch and operation of
satellites.

Inmarsat's "significant" financial risk profile reflects S&P's
view of the group's negative free and discretionary cash flow
generation; its substantial capital expenditure (capex)
requirements (that will decrease substantially in 2014); and the
continued increase, in value terms, of its dividends.  S&P
continue to forecast that the group's Standard & Poor's-adjusted
gross debt to EBITDA will be about 3.3x in the coming two years.

In S&P's view, the group's free operating cash flow generation
will turn gradually positive after bottoming out in 2013.  In
addition, S&P forecasts that Inmarsat's adjusted gross debt to
EBITDA will remain less than 3.5x and adjusted FFO to gross debt
more than 20% in 2013.

S&P could downgrade Inmarsat if it foresees the group generating
significantly negative free operating cash flow over a prolonged
period.  This, combined with shareholder returns above the level
S&P assumes, would result in credit measures below its indicative
limits for the current ratings.

S&P views the possibility of an upgrade as remote, in light of
its forecast of negative discretionary cash flow until the end of
2014.


LEE DEMOLITION: Begbies Traynor Draws Up CVA Proposal
-----------------------------------------------------
Chloe Stothart at Construction News reports that accountants
Begbies Trayor have drawn up a proposal for a Company Voluntary
Arrangement to be put to the creditors of Lee Demolition.

According to the document, one creditor supported by two others
had proposed the firm be wound up and about 30 others had issued
county court judgments against it, Construction News notes.

Under the proposed CVA, which is an alternative to liquidation,
the firm would continue to trade and creditors would be paid a
dividend of at least 23.6p in the pound for five years,
Construction News discloses.

According to Construction News, the document, first revealed by
Demolition News, says the company's trade creditors are owed a
total of GBP3.1 million.  HM Revenue and Customs is owed
GBP715,000 and the directors are owed GBP123,000, Construction
News says.

Some debts are excluded from the arrangement and will be paid in
full in order to allow Lee Demolition to continue to trade,
Construction News states.  These debts include GBP20,287.23 owed
to Ashstead Plant Hire and GBP7,500 of the GBP13,982.47 owed to
Deborah Services, Construction News says.

The directors will not get a dividend under the proposed CVA to
allow a higher dividend for other creditors, Construction News
notes.

Construction News relates that the document said the firm's
turnover rose from GBP11 million to GBP19 million between 2011
and 2012 but profits after tax plummeted from GBP1 million to
just over GBP300,000.

According to Construction News, the report said that the firm's
problems were caused by large losses on contracts including
GBP220,000 on one at Farm Lane, GBP181,000 on its Able & Cleland
contract and GBP240,000 on its Turnmill deal.

The report, as cited by Construction News, said that the recent
losses "are believed to be unusual and have been incurred by
inaccurate costing and poor project management".

Construction News notes the report added that the firm's
directors "understand that the company is insolvent as it is
unable to pay its debts as and when they fall due . . . the
proposal for a CVA is being presented to creditors as an
alternative to the company being put into liquidation".

The report said the CVA will mean that creditors get repaid more
of their money than they would if the firm went into liquidation,
according to Construction News.

Lee Demolition is based in Kent.


RSM TENON: Ashcourt Rowan Eyes Asset Management Businesses
----------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Cave at The Daily Telegraph reports that Ashcourt Rowan,
the Aim-listed wealth management group, has emerged as a
potential suitor for the asset management businesses of
beleaguered accountancy group RSM Tenon.

RSM Tenon is being dismembered after failing to recover from
accountancy errors that led to the re-stating of its accounts,
The Daily Telegraph discloses.

The company has GBP80 million of debt and its main trading
entities were acquired last week by rival accountancy group Baker
Tilly in a pre-pack administration handled by Deloitte that wiped
out shareholders, The Daily Telegraph relates.

Its asset management businesses, which are believed to have
assets under management of about GBP3 billion, may now be up for
sale, The Daily Telegraph notes.

According to The Daily Telegraph, Ashcourt is said to be one of a
number of rivals eyeing the businesses.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 23,
2013, The Telegraph related that debt-laden accountant RSM Tenon
has wiped out its shareholders and left Lloyds Banking Group
facing chunky losses on its GBP80.4 million debt after being
rescued by rival accountancy Baker Tilly via a pre-pack
administration.  Tilly had made an "unsolicited" bid approach to
the troubled RSM last month, The Telegraph recounted.  But in a
piece of brinkmanship, Tilly hastened the collapse of RSM by
pulling out of the bid talks and forcing its target into
administration, The Telegraph noted.  According to The Telegraph,
in a pre-pack deal, overseen by administrators Deloitte, Tilly
than snapped up RSM's main "trading entities", ensuring that
about 2,300 of RSM's staff retained their jobs at the
accountant's 35 offices.  The Telegraph related that on Aug. 21
it said the pre-pack sale would "realize no value for the
ordinary shares of the company", while the terms of the agreement
meant that "Lloyds will not recover its secured debt in full".
Lloyds, which is 39% owned by the taxpayer, had earlier refused
to grant a "covenant waiver" to RSM over its GBP80.4 million
debts after Tilly pulled out of the takeover talks for the group,
The Telegraph disclosed.

RSM Tenon is an accountancy and advisory firm.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* US, EMEA Bank Issuance Hit Post-Crisis High & Low, Fitch Says
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bank issuance trends diverged either side of the Atlantic in
H113, according to Fitch Ratings' research. US volumes rose to
their highest first-half level since 2008, while EMEA bank
issuance was the lowest in a first half since before the start of
the global financial crisis.

Issuance from US financial institutions reached US$150.8 billion
in the first half of the year, compared with US$126.9 billion in
H112, according to data compiled for Fitch's latest quarterly
rating and issuance reports. July volumes also remained strong at
US$34.6 billion. Separately, the Federal Reserve's recent Senior
Loan Officer Survey showed stronger demand for lending from both
industry and consumers, and a greater willingness among banks to
lend. Taken together, we believe these results suggest US
financial issuance is beginning to rebound.

But H113 issuance by the EMEA financial sector fell 39% from a
year earlier to EUR265.6 billion as banks continued to reduce
their balance sheets. The fall was mainly driven by a 62% decline
in covered bond issuance, particularly in Italy and Spain. This
trend highlights the deleveraging at banks in both those
countries. But it also points to healing market conditions as the
proportion of covered bonds in the new-issuance mix fell back to
around a third from over a half a year earlier.

Although still a small part of the funding mix, EMEA financial
sector subordinated debt issuance jumped 74% in H113. This
increase is partly due to banks looking to boost the capital
buffer for senior debt holders against a backdrop of progress on
EU bank recovery and resolution plans.

These figures, as well as data on corporate issuance volumes and
ratings trends across the US and EMEA, are highlighted in two
recent reports; "EMEA Corporate Bonds: Rating and Issuance
Trends," and "US Corporate Bond Market: Second-Quarter 2013
Rating and Issuance Activity," available from
www.fitchratings.com.


* Reinsurers' Underwriting Gains Offset By Unrealized Losses
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says reinsurers' solid underwriting gains in the
first half of 2013 were offset by increased unrealized investment
losses, according to a newly-published report.

The global reinsurers that Fitch rates improved their
underwriting combined ratio to 85.9% in H113, compared with 87.7%
in H112, as catastrophe-related losses were manageable and loss
reserve development remained favorable.

The global reinsurance industry experienced below-average natural
catastrophe losses of US$13 billion in H113, below the 10-year
average of US$22 billion. The majority of losses were from
flooding in Europe, Canada and Australia, and severe
thunderstorms in the US.

Solid underwriting profitability was offset by increased
unrealized investment losses on fixed maturities, resulting in
shareholders' equity growth of only 1.3% for non-life reinsurers
during H113. Underwriting opportunities remained somewhat
limited, resulting in only marginal growth in premiums written.

Several individual reinsurance product lines continued to
experience unfavorable reserve development during H113, primarily
longer-tail casualty and liability lines.  However, earnings
continue to be supported by surpluses from prior-year reserves.
Reserve releases were equivalent to 6.4% of earned premiums in
H112, against 6.6% at end-2012.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week August 19 to August 23, 2013
---------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

  AUSTRIA
  -------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *