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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, September 9, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 178

                            Headlines

B E L G I U M

ESMEE MASTER: Moody's Upgrades Rating on EUR240MM Notes to 'Ba1'


F I N L A N D

NOKIA OYJ: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B1' CFR to Positive


F R A N C E

ALTICE B2B: S&P Assigns BB- CCR & Rates EUR460MM Facilities BB-
YPSO HOLDING: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive


H U N G A R Y

E-STAR ALTERNATIV: Bankruptcy Procedure Halted After Settlement
PAPA-SER: Extends Debt Moratorium Until January 2014
PAPAI HUS: Rejects Owners' Offer to Repay 5% of Debts


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: Obtains EU Approval for EUR4.1-Bil. Bailout
EUROHOME MORTGAGES: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CCC
VENETO BANCA: S&P Lowers Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'B-'


L U X E M B O U R G

DUCHESS III CDO: S&P Raises Rating on Two Notes Classes to CCC+


N E T H E R L A N D S

CHAPEL 2003-I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'B'


P O L A N D

ALIOR BANK: Fitch Assigns 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating


S L O V E N I A

PROBANKA DD: Faces Liquidation; Slovenia to Issue Guarantees
VARIO 2000: CoBe Capital Launches Liquidation Procedure


S P A I N

SNIACE SA: Seeks Court Protection From Creditors


S W E D E N

NORTHLAND RESOURCES: Moody's Upgrades PDR to 'Caa3-PD'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CSDM FUNDRAISING: In Administration, Owes GBP400,000 to Printers
DIXONS RETAIL: Fitch Puts 'B' Long-Term IDR on Watch Positive
EMPIRE MEATS: In Administration; 40 Jobs Affected
HMV: Returns to Irish High Street, Open 4 Outlets
MORTGAGE FUNDING: Fitch Puts 'CC' Class A Notes Rating on RWP

WEST BROMWICH: Avoids Yo-Yo Bankruptcy Curse With Solid Finances


X X X X X X X X

* European Banking Union Essential Step for Long-Term Confidence
* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 2 to September 6, 2013


                            *********



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B E L G I U M
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ESMEE MASTER: Moody's Upgrades Rating on EUR240MM Notes to 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Aa3 (sf) , A3 (sf) and
Ba1 (sf), respectively, the Class B , C and D notes issued by
ESMEE Master Issuer N.V. -- S.A. Series 0-2009-1 (ESMEE),
following the mitigation of set-off risk in the transaction on
the back of the passing of the Belgian Mobilization Act in August
2012 and the better-than-expected collateral performance.

ESMEE is a revolving cash securitization backed by loans granted
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) originated by Fortis
Bank S.A. / N.V. (now BNP Paribas Fortis, A2/P-1) in 2009.

Ratings Rationale:

Belgian Mobilization Act Mitigates Set-Off Risk

The rating action primarily reflects the abatement of set-off
risk in the transaction, following the enactment of the Belgian
Mobilization Act by the Belgian government on August 3, 2012.
This act has largely removed set-off risk for most structured
finance transactions, including transactions backed by loans to
SMEs. As such, Moody's no longer accounts for such risk in its
rating analysis of Belgian SME ABS.

When initially rating the notes issued by ESMEE, Moody's modeled
a set-off exposure to an A2/P-1 counterparty (Fortis, now BNP
Paribas Fortis) of 18.75% of the initial pool balance. The set-
off free analysis produced better modeling results for the
Classes B, C and D notes.

Solid Collateral Performance

This rating action also reflects the better-than-expected
performance of the transaction, evidenced by the low delinquency
and loss levels observed since the closing date in December 2009.
As of July 2013, loans 90+ days in arrears represented 0.34% of
current balance, whilst cumulative defaults represented 0.55% and
cumulative losses 0.03% of total securitized assets.

Moody's also notes that the composition and quality of the
underlying portfolio has not materially changed since closing,
with 71.48% of the borrowers being micro-sized enterprises
according to Moody's classification. Moreover, the top 20
borrowers account for 3.69% of the pool, and the Construction and
Building sector represents 27.20% of the pool.

As a result, Moody's reviewed some its key modeling assumptions
for the transaction, reducing the expected mean default rate of
the pool to 10% of the current balance (Ba3 equivalent) from 14%
and increasing the coefficient of variation (CoV) to 45% from 40%
while keeping the average recovery rate unchanged at 70%.

Other Developments That May Affect The Notes

BNP Paribas Fortis acts as swap counterparty in this transaction,
providing strong support to the notes, guaranteeing timely
interest payments and an excess spread of 0.75%. Moody's has
taken into account the exposure to BNP Paribas Fortis into the
notes rating.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions",
published in July 2013.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns, as well as the
weakening credit profile of the global banking sector, could
further negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the inverse normal distribution assumed for the portfolio default
rate. In each default scenario, Moody's calculates the
corresponding loss for each class of notes given the incoming
cash flows from the assets and the outgoing payments to third
parties and noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss for each
tranche is the sum product of the 1) probability of occurrence of
each default scenario and 2) loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitisations," published in
May 2013 and "Moody's Approach to Quantifying Set-off Risk for
Belgian Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Transactions,"
published in March 2013.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Esmee Master Issuer N.V. - S.A. Series 0-2009-I

EUR1400M B Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2013
A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR320M C Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2013
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR240M D Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 8, 2013
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade



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F I N L A N D
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NOKIA OYJ: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B1' CFR to Positive
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the B1
corporate family rating (CFR) and B1-PD probability of default
rating (PDR) of Nokia Oyj (Nokia) to developing from negative.
Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed these ratings.

Moody's has also affirmed the B1 and provisional (P)B1 ratings on
Nokia's senior unsecured notes and medium-term note (MTN)
program, respectively, as well as the short-term senior unsecured
ratings of Not Prime (NP)/(P)NP of Nokia Oyj and Nokia Finance
International B.V.. The actions follow the announcement on
Tuesday that the company has agreed to sell its core Devices &
Services business to Microsoft Corporation for EUR5.44 billion.

"We have changed the outlook on Nokia's ratings to developing
from negative as we view the proposed sale as a positive step for
the company, as it will eliminate a loss-making business as well
as improve its business profile," says Roberto Pozzi, Moody's
Vice President and lead analyst on Nokia. "However, the
developing outlook also reflects the significant uncertainties
with regard to the company's long-term business strategy and
capital structure."

Ratings Rationale:

The change of outlook on Nokia's rating to developing from
negative was driven by Moody's view that the company's business
profile will be improved given that the disposal will eliminate a
loss-making business that was facing major challenges in
returning to positive free cash flow generation.

Nokia's ratings are unchanged following the announced deal
because the company is currently conducting a strategic review of
its three remaining businesses in order to decide its future
business strategy and capital structure. Nokia announced that it
will be evaluating its strategic options, including how to use
the sale proceeds, until the transaction closes. Nokia expects
the transaction to close in the first quarter of 2014, subject to
approval by the company's shareholders, regulatory approvals, and
other customary closing conditions.

Under the agreed EUR5.44 billion sale of Nokia's Devices &
Services business, Microsoft will pay EUR3.79 billion to purchase
substantially all of Nokia's Devices & Services business, and
EUR1.65 billion to license the group's patents. Nokia will retain
its patent portfolio and will grant Microsoft a 10-year non-
exclusive license to its patents with an option to extend this
mutual patent agreement in perpetuity. Microsoft will acquire
Nokia's Smart Devices and Mobile Phones business units, including
the Lumia and the Asha brands. Nokia will continue to own and
manage the Nokia brand, which Microsoft will license for use with
current Nokia mobile phone products. Overall, the operations that
are planned to be transferred to Microsoft generated an estimated
EUR14.9 billion, or almost 50% of Nokia's net sales, for the full
year 2012.

The transaction is expected to close in the first quarter of
2014, subject to approval by Nokia's shareholders, regulatory
approvals, and other customary closing conditions. Moody's notes
that the deal is subject to a US$750 million termination fee
payable by Microsoft to Nokia, in the event that the transaction
fails to receive necessary regulatory clearances. Additionally,
Nokia has secured EUR1.5 billion of financing -- in the form of
convertible bonds to be issued by Nokia -- from Microsoft at
attractive terms and which are not conditional on the transaction
closing. Effectively, this financing agreement allows Nokia to
largely fund the ongoing purchase of the 50% stake in Nokia
Solutions and Networks B.V. (NSN) from Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft. If the transaction closes, these bonds will
be netted against the deal proceeds at principal and accrued
interest.

Assuming the transaction is successfully completed, Nokia's
future operations will comprise NSN, its telecoms equipment
business, which it recently took control of from Siemens, its
Here mapping business, and a new unit named Advanced
Technologies, which has been set up to develop and monetize
technology. Nokia intends to evaluate its strategic options
before the closing of the transaction, in order to identify
possible synergies between its three remaining businesses, the
future capital structure for the group and distributions to
shareholders.

If the transaction closes, the majority of Nokia's operations
will consist of those of NSN, its 100%-owned subsidiary. The
credit profile and rating of NSN are themselves in transition
phase, reflecting that the business has a strongly improving
underlying operating performance but a limited track record of
sustained profitability and free cash flow generation. Moody's
considers that the announced deal with Microsoft could positively
affect NSN's financial flexibility because it would reduce the
pressure on the company to support the free cash flow negative
mobile phone and smartphone operations of its parent company,
Nokia.

Rationale For Developing Outlook

The outlook on Nokia's rating is developing because of the
uncertainties with regard to the group's future business focus
and capital structure. Moody's expects Nokia to complete its
strategic review before the closing of the deal in the first
quarter of 2014. Although the ratings of Nokia and NSN appear
increasingly intertwined, they could potentially diverge
depending on the outcome of Nokia's ongoing strategic review.
Also, there is the risk that Nokia's outstanding bonds could be
structurally subordinated to the remaining group debt, depending
on the final capital and legal structure of the group.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Moody's could upgrade Nokia's rating if the final strategic
direction of the group becomes clearer. Specifically, an upgrade
could result if Nokia's strategic review leads to a stable
business profile, and the group extends its track record of
positive operating performance whilst managing a conservative
capital structure.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the rating if Nokia paid a
significant dividend to shareholders. Such an action could result
in a downgrade of Nokia's rating as it would compromise the
currently excellent liquidity position of Nokia and NSN and
result in the currently positive performance of the remaining
businesses being unsustainable.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Communications Equipment Industry published in June 2008. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Espoo, Finland, Nokia Oyj is a large
manufacturer of mobile communication devices and a leading
supplier of telecommunication network systems. Its net sales in
2012 amounted to approximately EUR30.2 billion.



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F R A N C E
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ALTICE B2B: S&P Assigns BB- CCR & Rates EUR460MM Facilities BB-
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating to French alternative telecommunications
services provider Altice B2B Sarl (also known as Completel).

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to Altice
B2B's EUR460 million senior secured facilities.

The recovery rating on these notes is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful recovery prospects at the high end of
the 50%-70% range in the event of a payment default.

S&P has placed the ratings on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The CreditWatch placement on Altice B2B follows Ypso Holding
Sarl's (Ypso; B/Watch Pos/--) recent request to its lenders for
various amendments to its debt documentation.  These include
changes to allow Ypso to merge with its sister company Altice
B2B, and plans for a potential IPO for the combined business.
The placement reflects S&P's expectation that a merger of this
kind would result in increased leverage at Altice B2B.

As the two companies are owned by the same shareholders, the
transaction would be a cashless merger.  Such a transaction would
result in Altice B2B being hit by Ypso's substantial leverage and
would push Altice B2B's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA
ratio, pro forma the merger, up to a level well above the 4.0x
that is commensurate with a lower rating.

"Our assessment of Altice B2B's business risk profile is
supported by our view of the good quality of Altice B2B's assets
and internet protocol-based network.  It has relatively wide
fiber network penetration that provides cost efficiencies and
allows the company to be competitive on pricing.  We consider the
French business-to-business (B2B) telecoms market to have a
relatively low degree of competition, with only three main
players.  We therefore believe that Altice B2B can gain market
share thanks to its solid position as the No. 1 alternative B2B
fixed-line provider in France.  Finally, we anticipate that
Altice B2B's profitability--which we already consider to be
good--will continue to improve in the medium term on account of a
better mix of products, and an increase in higher-margin data
products offsetting a decline in lower-margin voice products.
Our business risk profile assessment incorporates our view of
Altice B2B's management and governance as "fair", S&P said."

"However, we assess Altice B2B's business risk profile as "weak"
because we consider Altice B2B to be a small player, with
approximately 7.5% of the French B2B telecoms market.
Furthermore, Altice B2B lacks operating diversity, as it is
reliant on a single market in a single country.  In addition, the
company has to compete with two larger and stronger local
telecoms incumbents--France Telecom and SFR--which benefit from
significantly greater financial resources than Altice B2B, and
can therefore be more aggressively competitive if they need to
be.  We also consider the telecoms industry to be highly
competitive, which puts pressure on some of Altice B2B's telecoms
services, mainly within its voice business.  The voice business
is still an important revenue generator, contributing more than
40% to revenues in 2012.  We anticipate that this contribution
will decrease over the coming years, but we consider that Altice
B2B's significant exposure to voice, which is higher than its
peers' exposure, will remain a constraint on the future growth of
the overall business," S&P added.

S&P's financial risk profile assessment of "significant" is
supported by Altice B2B's relatively low leverage, translating
into Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage of 2.5x in 2013,
relatively strong free operating cash flow generation, long-term
capital structure, and limited debt repayment in the short term.
The financial risk profile is constrained by the fact that Altice
B2B is owned by private equity companies.  At the same time,
however, S&P assumes that the current private equity owners are
aiming to reduce their exposure to Altice B2B in the short term,
perhaps via an IPO; a sale of the company to an industrial seems
unlikely if it merges with Ypso.  In S&P's view, this mitigates
the constraint on the ratings from the private equity ownership.

The issue rating on Altice B2B's senior secured bank facilities--
comprising an approximate EUR8 million term loan B, an
approximate EUR427 million term loan B3, and a EUR24 million
RCF--is 'BB-', in line with the corporate credit rating.  The
recovery rating on these instruments is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful recovery prospects at the high end of
the 50%-70% range.

S&P's issue and recovery ratings on the senior secured bank
facilities reflect S&P's valuation of Altice B2B as a going
concern and its relatively low leverage for a private equity-
owned company.  However, the ratings are constrained by what S&P
considers to be a weak security package comprising only shares
and bank account pledges, and the relatively unfriendly creditor
jurisdiction in France.

S&P's hypothetical default scenario for Altice B2B envisages,
among other things, increased competition from more-powerful
telecoms incumbents, resulting in falling prices and lower
margins.  S&P also envisage a loss of key contracts and increased
customer churn, combined with higher expenses for customer
acquisition and retention.  S&P assumes in its hypothetical
scenario that this would lead to a default in 2017, triggered by
the company's inability to refinance its RCF and term loan B3,
both of which mature that year.

S&P values Altice B2B as a going concern on account of its strong
position as the No. 1 alternative B2B provider of telecoms
services in France, as well as its good and relatively wide fiber
network.  At S&P's hypothetical point of default in 2017, it
values the company at EUR400 million, with stressed EBITDA of
about EUR100 million and a stressed multiple of 4x.

S&P deducts from the enterprise value about EUR50 million of
priority liabilities, mainly enforcement costs and debt at
subsidiaries.  S&P envisage about EUR470 million of senior
secured bank facilities outstanding at default, including six
months' prepetition interest, equivalent to recovery prospects of
50%-70%. Although nominal recovery prospects are greater than
70%, S&P caps the recovery rating on these debt instruments at
'3' in line with its criteria to reflect its perception that the
creditor jurisdiction in France is relatively unfriendly.

S&P will update its recovery assumptions if the transaction takes
place, and, depending on any changes to the company's capital
structure, may raise or lower the recovery rating.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch if and when the transaction
closes successfully, which it currently believes could happen
during the fourth quarter of 2013.

This means the CreditWatch resolution could extend beyond S&P's
usual three-month horizon, depending on the regulatory approval
process.

Should S&P believes that, after the transaction, credit measures
could weaken to levels that it considers as no longer
commensurate with a 'BB-' rating (that is, an adjusted leverage
ratio of more than 4.0x), it could lower the long-term rating on
Altice B2B by one notch.  A two-notch downgrade seems unlikely at
this point, considering S&P's leverage expectation for the
combined group. However, this could occur if the two companies
merged and S&P affirmed its rating on Ypso at 'B', for example
because of weaker-than-expected deleveraging prospects.

A lack of progress in merger or IPO plans by the end of October
2013 could lead S&P to affirm the ratings and remove them from
CreditWatch pending further progress.


YPSO HOLDING: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on France-based cable operator, Ypso
Holding Sarl on CreditWatch with positive implications.

At the same time, S&P placed its 'B' issue rating on Ypso's
various senior secured notes on CreditWatch with positive
implications.

The recovery rating on these notes remains unchanged at '3',
reflecting S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
prospects in case of default.

The CreditWatch placement follows Ypso's recent request to its
lenders for various amendments to its debt documentation,
including for a potential merger with its sister company Altice
B2B (BB-/Watch Neg/--) and an initial public offering (IPO) for
the combined businesses.  The CreditWatch reflects S&P's
expectations of lower leverage after the merger.

As the two companies are owned by the same shareholders, S&P
assumes that a merger would be cashless.  Given Altice B2B's
significantly lower leverage, S&P calculates that Ypso's Standard
& Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio could decline, pro forma
the acquisition, to a level slightly below our expectations for a
potential upgrade (5x excluding shareholder loans and 7x
including shareholder loans).

S&P believes the merger would slightly enhance Ypso's business
risk profile, which it would likely continue to view as "fair"
under its criteria.  The addition of Altice B2B's enterprise and
carrier customer base would render Ypso's customer base more
diverse, and its fiber network denser.  S&P would not expect
additional material synergies between the two companies to
emerge, as they already share some resources such as management.

S&P notes that Altice B2B has weaker margins than Ypso, which
would lead to a dilution of the overall group's EBITDA margin.
S&P also considers the French B2B market to be highly
competitive, with several financially stronger and more-
integrated players.  The market as a whole, and particularly
Altice B2B, is also exposed to declining legacy products such as
voice.  However, S&P could see some potential margin improvement
in the medium term for Altice B2B if it improves its product mix;
this could happen as high-margin data products increase as a
proportion of the company's revenues and low-margin voice
products diminish.

The ratings on Ypso continue to reflect S&P's assessment of
Ypso's "fair" business risk profile and "highly leveraged"
financial risk profile.  Underpinning S&P's business risk profile
assessment is Ypso's high-quality network infrastructure, which
offers fast and advanced broadband and content services, and its
steady growth in bundled products that offer triple- and
quadruple-play services (telephone/TV/broadband/mobile).
However, S&P also sees fierce competition coming from the
integrated French pay-TV, broadband, and telephony markets
(exacerbated by Altice B2B's exposure to those markets).  S&P
continues to view Ypso's network as narrower than national
competitors, but S&P believes the merger would see this widen.

Ypso's "highly leveraged" financial risk profile reflects S&P's
view of the group's fairly high debt burden (which should
proportionally decrease after the merger with Altice B2B), as
well as its ongoing relatively substantial capital expenditure
(capex) needs, which constrain free cash flow generation.  S&P
expects the group's adjusted net leverage to decrease to 6.7x
including shareholder loans (4.9x excluding shareholder loans)
from 8.7x including shareholder loans (6.0x excluding shareholder
loans) to reach a level slightly below our minimum guidelines for
a 'B+' rating.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch after meeting with management
and assessing its plans and prospects for a merger and an IPO.
Given the number of steps necessary for a merger or an IPO, S&P
expects that the CreditWatch could extend beyond its usual three-
month horizon.

A merger could lead S&P to raise the ratings by one notch if it
believes that the new group's credit measures had strengthened to
levels adequate for a 'B+' rating.  This would include an
adjusted leverage ratio below 5x excluding shareholder loans (7x
including shareholder loans), with continued relatively strong
cash generation.

Further significant benefits from debt reduction in an IPO
scenario could also support a 'B+' rating.

If S&P saw a lack of progress with the merger or IPO by the end
of October 2013, it could take the ratings off CreditWatch and
affirm them at the current level pending further progress.  S&P
could also affirm its 'B' ratings if it foresaw weaker-than-
expected deleveraging prospects.



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H U N G A R Y
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E-STAR ALTERNATIV: Bankruptcy Procedure Halted After Settlement
---------------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that E-Star Alternativ on Friday said the
Budapest Metropolitan Court approved a settlement reached between
the company and its creditors and cancelled a bankruptcy
procedure.

E-Star filed for bankruptcy protection in December 2012,
MTI-Econews recounts.

E-Star Alternativ Nyrt. is a Hungarian energy company.


PAPA-SER: Extends Debt Moratorium Until January 2014
----------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that creditors of Papa-Ser extended the
moratorium on payment for the company, which is under
liquidation, until January 31 at a meeting on Thursday.

The creditors extended the deadline until January 31, 2014 from
November 11, MTI-Econews relates.

Papa-Ser earlier took out a HUF900 million loan from the
Hungarian Development Bank (MFB) that is guaranteed by its
parent, troubled meat company Papa Hus 1913, MTI-Econews
recounts.  It owes suppliers and other creditors a further
HUF465 million, MTI-Econews discloses.

Papa-Ser is Hungary-based hog farming company.


PAPAI HUS: Rejects Owners' Offer to Repay 5% of Debts
-----------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that creditors of Papai Hus 1913 rejected the
owners' offer to repay 5% of its debts at a meeting on Friday.

Papai Hus 1913 managing director Andras Uzsoky told MTI-Econews
that the creditors asked the owners to come up with a new offer.

The next meeting with the creditors will take place by
October 15, MTI-Econews discloses.  The company's moratorium on
payments runs out on November 10, MTI-Econews notes.

According to MTI-Econews, Hungary's Rural Development Ministry is
paying HUF280 million in support to suppliers of Papai Hus 1913
with unpaid invoices.

Papai Hus 1913 is a Hungary-based meat company.



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I T A L Y
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BANCA MONTE: Obtains EU Approval for EUR4.1-Bil. Bailout
--------------------------------------------------------
Elisa Martinuzzi and Andrew Frye at Bloomberg News report that
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, engulfed by investigations
into alleged misconduct of former managers, won the backing of
the top European antitrust regulator for a EUR4.1 billion
(US$5.4 billion) bailout after saying it would raise more capital
than previously planned.

The deal may take two months to complete, European Union
Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia told reporters at the
Ambrosetti Workshop in Cernobbio, Italy, Bloomberg says.
Mr. Almunia, who met on Saturday with Italian Prime Minister
Enrico Letta and Finance Minister Fabrizio Saccomanni, said his
office reached "a political agreement" with Italy that must be
formally ratified, Bloomberg relates.

Final approval from the EU will enable Chief Executive Officer
Fabrizio Viola to dispose of assets and branches in an effort to
return the lender to profit amid Italy's longest recession in 20
years, Bloomberg notes.  The bank is also seeking to raise funds
from private investors to repay state aid after it abolished a
cap on voting rights in July to lure new backers, Bloomberg
discloses.

Mr. Almunia, as cited by Bloomberg, said the deal will require
Monte Paschi, the world's oldest bank, to raise more than the
previous plan of EUR1 billion in capital.  He declined to specify
the amount, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, if the bank fails to raise the targeted
amount, Monte Paschi debt owned by the Italian government will be
converted into equity.  So-called Monti bonds are those bought by
former Prime Minister Mario Monti's government in a bailout,
Bloomberg discloses.

Italian regulators must now write a formal plan based on the
agreement announced on Saturday and submit it to the EU,
Bloomberg states.  Mr. Almunia said that the plan will include
cost cutting measures and changes to the business model,
Bloomberg relates.  Monte Paschi's holdings of Italian debt are a
concern for EU regulator, Bloomberg says.

Monte Paschi, controlled by Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena,
posted a loss of EUR279.3 million in the second quarter after net
interest income dropped, Bloomberg recounts.  The lender pays 9%
interest on the bonds it sold to the government in the bailout
and must pay with its own stock if it's unprofitable, Bloomberg
says.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 19,
2013, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
long-term counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'B' from 'BB', and affirmed the
'B' short-term rating.  S&P also lowered its rating on MPS' Lower
Tier 2 subordinated notes to 'CCC-' from 'CCC+'.  S&P affirmed
the ratings on MPS' junior subordinated debt at 'CCC-' and on its
preferred stock at 'C'.  At the same time, S&P removed the
ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with negative
implications on Dec. 5, 2012.


EUROHOME MORTGAGES: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to CCC
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC(sf)' from
'B-(sf)' its credit rating on Eurohome (Italy) Mortgages S.r.l.'s
class B notes.  S&P's ratings on all other outstanding classes of
notes are unaffected by the rating action.

The rating action follows S&P's review of the transaction, which
shows that at the August 2013 interest payment date (IPD), the
underlying collateral's performance had deteriorated since the
May 2013 IPD.

On June 28, 2013, S&P lowered and removed from CreditWatch
negative its ratings on the class A and B notes.

The transaction has an interest-deferral mechanism trigger for
the class B, C, D, and E notes, based on the cumulative default
level. This mechanism provides additional protection to the class
A notes.  If an interest-deferral trigger is breached, the
interest on that class of notes is deferred after the principal
deficiency ledger is cleared and the principal borrowed under the
principal priority of payments is repaid.  The class C, D, and E
notes have already breached this trigger and are not paying any
interest.

Cumulative defaults in the pool increased to 22.82% at the August
2013 IPD, from 21.66% at the May 2013 IPD, reflecting the
transaction's deteriorating performance.

S&P considers it increasingly likely that cumulative defaults
could reach or exceed the 23.75% interest-deferral trigger for
the class B notes.  Since S&P's June 2013 review, cumulative
defaults have increased further and, in its view, the interest-
deferral trigger will be breached even more quickly than S&P
predicted in its last analysis.  S&P has therefore lowered to
'CCC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

Eurohome (Italy) Mortgages is an Italian residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction, with loans originated by
Deutsche Bank Mutui SpA.  The transaction closed in December
2007.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class     Rating          Rating
          To              From

Eurohome (Italy) Mortgage S.r.l.
EUR260.85 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

B         CCC (sf)        B- (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

A         A (sf)
C         D (sf)
D         D (sf)


VENETO BANCA: S&P Lowers Rating on Subordinated Debt to 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Italian-based Veneto
Banca SCPA.  At the same time, S&P lowered the issue ratings on
the bank's non-deferrable subordinated debt and preference shares
to 'B-' from 'B', and to 'CCC' from 'CCC+', respectively.  The
outlook is negative.

The rating action reflects S&P's expectation that given the
amount of problematic loans at Veneto Banca, and the pace of
accumulation of these loans during the economic downturn the bank
is likely to incur higher credit losses than S&P had previously
expected.  In S&P's view, this will likely put pressure on the
bank's capitalization.  Although S&P understands that the bank
plans to take several capital actions to enhance its solvency, it
now believes that these are unlikely to be sufficient to fully
offset the effect of the likely increased credit losses on S&P's
view of the bank's overall capital position.

Veneto Banca reported total first-half 2013 net operating losses
of almost EUR40 million, mainly owing to increased credit
provisions.  As of June 30, 2013, gross nonperforming loans
accounted for 16% of the bank's year-end 2012 gross credit
portfolio, up from 13.2% as of end 2012.  This is the result of
accelerated asset quality deterioration in the first half of
2013, when net inflows of nonperforming loans (NPLs) accounted
for about 2.8% of the bank's loan book, a level significantly
higher than S&P's previous expectations.  S&P notes that asset
quality trends reported by Veneto Banca in the first half 2013
are to some extent outcomes of an inspection by the Bank of
Italy.  S&P believes that Veneto Banca is likely to accumulate a
large amount of NPLs throughout the economic downturn.

At the same time, S&P notes that, despite sizable loan loss
provisions booked by Veneto Banca in the first half of 2013
(EUR209 million, or about a 150 basis point annualized cost of
risk), the total coverage ratio of the bank's NPLs has declined
to 31.5% as of June 30, 2013, from 33.0% at the end of 2012.

Consequently, S&P anticipates that Veneto Banca will likely incur
higher credit losses than it had previously anticipated.  S&P
also believes that the bank's organic capital generation may not
be sufficient to enhance its solvency to the levels it had
previously forecast.

Veneto Banca has stated that it plans to take measures to improve
its capital position, including the capital increase that it
announced will be completed within the next eight months.
However, S&P considers that its risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio
for Veneto Banca is unlikely to remain sustainably above 5% over
the next 18 months.  In addition, in S&P's view Veneto Banca's
quality of capital is weakened by the large amount of deferred
tax assets related to provisions and goodwill that it has
accumulated; this accounts for about 27% of the bank's total
adjusted capital as of end-2012.  S&P has therefore revised its
assessment of Veneto Banca's capital and earnings to "weak" from
"moderate."

As a result of the lowering of S&P's capital and earnings
assessment, it has lowered its SACP on Veneto Banca to 'b+' from
'bb-'.  Consistent with S&P's criteria, because it has revised
downward its assessment of the bank's SACP, S&P has lowered the
ratings on Veneto Banca's nondeferrable subordinated debt to 'B-'
from 'B' and its preference shares to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'.

However, the impact of the one notch lowering of the SACP on the
ratings on Veneto Banca is mitigated by the one notch of uplift
S&P incorporates into the ratings to reflect its view of the
potential for extraordinary government support.  This notch of
uplift reflects S&P's view that Veneto Banca would likely receive
extraordinary financial support from the Italian government if
needed.  S&P bases this view on its assessment of Veneto Banca's
"moderate" systemic importance and Italy's "supportive" stance
toward its banking system.

The negative outlook on Veneto Banca reflects the possibility
that S&P could lower the rating if it lowers the long-term
sovereign credit rating on Italy.  If this happened, all else
remaining equal, S&P would no longer include the one notch uplift
for potential extraordinary government support into its ratings
on Veneto Banca, in accordance with its criteria.  A negative
rating action would also be possible if S&P believes that at
least one of the following conditions is likely to occur:

   -- The economic and operating conditions in which Italian
      banks operate deteriorate further;

   -- Veneto Banca's asset quality performance deteriorates
      further, with total NPLs exceeding 20% of the bank's loan
      book, or provisions coverage declines below current levels;
      or

   -- The bank's liquidity position is unlikely to improve in
      line with S&P's expectations, and that it is likely to
      continue to rely on short-term wholesale funding, including
      European Central Bank liquidity facilities.

S&P do not currently expect to revise upward the outlook on
Veneto Banca to stable.  However, S&P could do so if it revises
the outlook on Italy to stable and it believes that downside
risks to the economic and operating environment in Italy, and to
S&P's assessment of Veneto Banca's risk position and liquidity,
are easing.

RATINGS SCORE SNAPSHOT
                         To                From
Issuer Credit Rating     BB/Negative/B     BB/Negative/B

SACP                     b+                bb-
Anchor                   bbb-              bbb-

Business Position        Adequate (0)      Adequate (0)
Capital and Earnings     Weak (-2)         Moderate (-1)
Risk Position            Moderate (-1)     Moderate (-1)
Funding and Liquidity    Average           Average
                         Moderate (-1)     Moderate (-1)

Support                  +2                +1
GRE Support             0                 0
Short-Term Government
   Support               +1                +1
Sovereign Extraordinary
   Support               1+                0
Additional factors       0                 0



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


DUCHESS III CDO: S&P Raises Rating on Two Notes Classes to CCC+
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Duchess III CDO S.A.'s class B, C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2 notes.

The rating actions follows S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance, and the application of its relevant criteria for
transactions of this type.

For S&P's review of the transaction's performance, it used data
from the latest available trustee report (July 2013), in addition
to its cash flow analysis.  S&P has taken into account recent
developments in the transaction, and has applied its current
counterparty criteria, as well as its 2009 corporate cash flow
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) criteria.

"From our analysis, we have observed a small increase in the
proportion of assets that we consider to be rated in the 'CCC'
category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-'), to 8.66% from 5.44% since
our previous review on March 14, 2012.  However, the proportion
of defaulted assets (rated 'CC', 'SD' [selective default], and
'D') have decreased in the collateral pool since we last reviewed
the transaction.  The class A notes have fully paid down. As a
result, the available credit enhancement has increased for all
outstanding rated classes of notes," S&P said.

S&P subjected the capital structure to its cash flow analysis in
order to determine the break-even default rate.  In S&P's
analysis, it used the reported portfolio balance that it
considers to be performing, the principal cash balance, the
current weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average
recovery rates that S&P considered to be appropriate.  S&P
incorporated various
cash flow stress scenarios using various default patterns and
levels for each liability rating category, in conjunction with
different interest rate stress scenarios.

Taking into account S&P's credit and cash flow analysis and its
current counterparty criteria, it considers the available credit
enhancement for the class B, C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2 notes to be
commensurate with higher ratings than previously assigned.  S&P
has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its rating on
the class B notes and to 'CCC+ (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its ratings
on the class D-1 and D-2 notes.

S&P's ratings on the class C-1 and C-2 notes were constrained by
the application of the largest obligor default test, a
supplemental stress test S&P introduced in its 2009 corporate
cash flow CDO criteria.

Although the results of S&P's cash flow analysis suggest higher
ratings for the class C-1 and C-2 notes, the largest obligor
default test constrains its ratings on these classes of notes.
S&P has therefore raised to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)' its
ratings on the class C-1 and C-2 notes.

Duchess III CDO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The reinvestment period for
this transaction ended in July 2007.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class            Rating
          To                From

Duchess III CDO S.A.
EUR450 Million Secured Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B         AAA (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
C-1       BB+ (sf)          CCC+ (sf)
C-2       BB+ (sf)          CCC+ (sf)
D-1       CCC+ (sf)         CCC- (sf)
D-2       CCC+ (sf)         CCC- (sf)



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CHAPEL 2003-I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard and Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Chapel 2003-I B.V. and Chapel 2007 B.V.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- lowered its ratings on Chapel 2003-I's class A and B notes
      and Chapel 2007's class A2 notes;

   -- Affirmed its ratings on Chapel 2003-I's class C notes and
      Chapel 2007's class B, C, D, E, and F notes.

The rating actions reflect what S&P considers to be the
transactions' deteriorating credit performance, and its analysis
of set-off risk as a result of duty of care claims, based on the
most recent available information from September 2013.

Chapel 2003-I closed in December 2003 and Chapel 2007 closed in
April 2007.  The transactions securitize residential property
secured second ranking mortgage loans and unsecured consumer
loans originated by the now insolvent DSB Bank N.V. in the
Netherlands. Both Chapel 2003-I's and Chapel 2007's asset pools
have amortized since closing, resulting in collateral pool
factors (outstanding principal balances) of 29.5% and 52.2%,
respectively.

                            CREDIT RISK

Since February 2011, Chapel 2003-I's accrued losses (from
defaults and set-off risk) first caused the depletion of its cash
reserve and subsequently led to a cumulative uncleared principal
deficiency ledger of EUR40.89 million for the class D notes.  Due
to accrued losses, Chapel 2007's cash reserve fund has been
depleted since April 2013, and as of the July 2013 payment date,
the class E cumulative uncleared principal deficiency ledger was
EUR3.75 million.

                   POTENTIAL DUTY OF CARE CLAIMS

On Dec. 21, 2011, S&P lowered its ratings on all classes of notes
in both transactions as a result of deteriorating credit
performance and its assessment of potential set-off risk from
duty of care claims, as well as its opinion of counterparty risk.
Since then, S&P has received further information about the extent
of duty of care claims from the issuer and prepared by DSB Bank
employees.  As a result, S&P is taking further rating actions on
Chapel 2003-I's and Chapel 2007's classes of notes.

The asset pools in both transactions contain a significant
proportion of loans whose borrowers are alleging due care
failures with respect to the selling of accompanying insurance
products and over extension of credit.  S&P understands that as
of July 2013, DSB Bank had about 30,296 duty of care claims filed
against it.

In September 2011, DSB's insolvency administrator and consumer
organizations entered a framework agreement to clarify the extent
and potential set-off amount of these claims.  The agreement is
to allow borrowers to offset compensation amounts against their
outstanding loan balance in accordance with the Netherlands law.
Pursuant to the agreement, borrowers will first set off the
compensation amount against any arrears, and subsequently against
the principal amount outstanding of any loan at their discretion,
most likely to be the highest interest bearing loans.

Under the agreement, consumer organizations and legal insurers
cannot accept the framework agreement on behalf of borrowers, and
each borrower who has filed a duty of care claim will need to
individually reach a written agreement with DSB Bank on the
settlement of their claim.  In April 2013, DSB Bank bankruptcy
trustees (R.J. Schimmelpenninck and B.F.M. Knuppe) filed a
request at the appeal court to ratify the framework agreement,
which is expected to be completed at the end of 2013.  Once
ratified, the agreement will require borrowers to actively "opt-
out" in writing within three months, in which case, the framework
agreement would not automatically by law be applicable to any
compensation if the borrowers' claims prove to be valid.  Under
the agreement, any borrower which has not opted out should file
any alleged duty of care claim within 12 months of "opting in"
(end-2014), which would then be automatically subjected to the
framework agreement.  S&P understands that no further claims can
be filed against DSB Bank due to duty of care claims after the
end of 2014.

S&P understands that the consumer organizations have advised
borrowers of this obligation.  As S&P understands the status of
the framework agreement, it expects those consumers who are
affected, to continue to exercise their rights of set-off and to
continue to receive compensations for set-off.

Based on S&P's understanding of the framework agreement and on
updated information received from the issuer, it maintains its
worse-case assumption for set-off risk.  S&P assumes in the case
of Chapel 2003-I and Chapel 2007 that EUR48.86 million and
EUR59.18 million, respectively, of their current pool balances
will be further lost due to set-off risk from the duty of care
claims.

                 SERVICING AND COUNTERPARTY RISKS

Since June 2013, the servicer of both transactions, DSB Bank, has
sub-delegated its servicing functions to Quion Services B.V.  In
June 2013, the interest rate swap counterparty for Chapel 2007
(The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC) has been replaced by the
bankruptcy trustees with a guarantee from Cooperative Centrale
Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (Rabobank Nederland).  For Chapel
2003, the bankruptcy trustees replaced Barclays Bank PLC as the
interest swap counterparty, a change that also included a swap
guaranty from Rabobank Nederland.

"In our analysis, we assumed that both transactions will
experience further credit defaults.  We also gave some credit to
available excess spread before losses are applied to the
principal deficiency ledger.  In addition, we also considered
that the asset pool balances will be reduced by further losses
arising from the duty of care claims, which have not yet
materialized.  Taking into account the results of our analysis of
the abovementioned key factors, we have lowered our ratings on
Chapel 2003-I's class A and B notes and Chapel 2007's class A2
notes.  At the same time, we have affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)'
ratings on Chapel 2003-I's class C notes and Chapel 2007's class
B to F notes," S&P said.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class               Rating
            To               From

Chapel 2003-I B.V.
EUR1 Billion Floating-Rate Asset-Backed Notes

Ratings Lowered

A           B (sf)           BB (sf)
B           CCC- (sf)        CCC (sf)

Rating Affirmed

C           CCC- (sf)

Chapel 2007 B.V.
EUR710.7 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

A2          B (sf)           B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B           CCC- (sf)
C           CCC- (sf)
D           CCC- (sf)
E           CCC- (sf)
F           CCC- (sf)



===========
P O L A N D
===========


ALIOR BANK: Fitch Assigns 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Poland-based Alior Bank SA a Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB' with a Stable Outlook,
Viability Rating (VR) of 'bb' and National Long-term rating of
'BBB+(pol)' with a Stable Outlook.

Key Rating Drivers - IDRs, National Ratings, Viability Rating
Alior's ratings reflect its limited franchise, rapid credit
expansion and ambitious growth plans to 2016 (including in
somewhat higher risk segments), relatively short track record and
moderate internal capital generation. They also take into account
significant impaired loan origination and material key management
risk as departures of certain individuals could hamper successful
execution of Alior's strategy, in Fitch's view.

These factors are balanced by Alior's conservative funding
strategy (based almost solely on customer deposits), experienced
management team, good cost efficiency (despite very fast
expansion of the branch network) and advanced systems, which
support effective management of the bank.

Alior employs a largely urban-based banking strategy and plans to
double its market share by 2016 in SME and retail segments. In
particular, the bank plans to strengthen its position in cash and
consumer finance loans. At end-H113, Alior's market share in
total sector assets reached 1.6% after rapid growth since its
foundation in late 2008 (2009-2012 CAGR: 51%). At end-H113, the
gross loan book (up 22% ytd) was split 16% mortgages, 37% other
retail (mostly unsecured) and 47% companies.

Origination of impaired loans has been substantial and Fitch
believes that this will continue due to the economic slowdown,
further fast credit expansion and the seasoning of the loan book.
At end-H113, the impaired loans ratio was 6.4% (market average
7.6%). However, the ratio with a 12-month lag, calculated as
impaired loans at end-H113 divided by end-H112 gross loans was
9.3%. Alior's impaired loans ratio reflects however a small share
(about half the market average) of relatively low risk
residential mortgages in the loan book. The coverage of impaired
loans by specific reserves was moderate at 57%. In Q213, the bank
raised its recovery estimates for impaired unsecured retail
loans, and reduced their coverage to 61% (down 7pp qoq).

Alior's capitalization is only adequate in light of its
considerable growth appetite and moderate internal capital
generation. In December 2012, the bank raised fresh equity
externally through an initial public offering on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange (PLN626 million net equity increase). However, this
increase has already been partly absorbed in H113 by fast credit
growth (mostly in the higher capital absorbing non-retail
segment) and the higher capital requirement for operational risk
(the calculation of which is related to performance).
Consequently, the Fitch core capital ratio shrank to 12.4% at
end-H113 from 14.6% at end-2012. Management views an 11% Tier 1
ratio as a minimum comfortable level for running the bank (end-
H113: 12.5%).

The bank's operating profit has been supported by fast revenue
growth and good cost efficiency. Alior's non-interest income
equals about half of total revenues (notably higher than peers)
and is mainly sourced from bancassurance activity. However, this
income is sensitive to the volume of disbursed loans, the fast
growth of which may not be sustainable in the future. In H113,
Alior's net interest margin was broadly flat at a solid 418bp
(2012: 433bp), supported by a lending mix skewed towards higher-
yield products and a healthy funding structure.

In H113, loan impairment charges were a sizable 200bp
(annualised) of average gross loans (2012: 214bp) and are likely
to remain high. Alior's recoveries of NPLs have been reasonable
so far, but could come under pressure in case of economic stress,
as the bank's tailored pricing of credit risk (using complex
credit models) has not yet been fully tested through the economic
cycle.

Alior's funding structure is a rating strength as it is based
mainly on customer deposits (90% of total funding at end-H113),
which are mainly sourced from retail savings. Alior wants to keep
its loans (net of reserves) to deposits below 100% (end H113:
99%), but this could be challenging in light of the planned fast
growth to end-2016, especially if deposits become more expensive.
At end-H113, Alior's short-term wholesale refinancing needs were
manageable at about PLN1.4bn. The bank maintains a minimum 10%
coverage of customer deposits by liquid assets (comprising mainly
Polish sovereign and central bank debt securities).

Market risk is relatively low as Alior is not involved in
proprietary trading, but offers trading transactions to own
customers within reasonable limits. The bank fully funds its
foreign currency loans (about 12% of the loan book at end-H113)
through foreign currency deposits.

Key Rating Drivers - Support Rating and Support Rating Floor
The Support Rating of '5' reflects Fitch's view that potential
support from the bank's largest shareholders cannot be relied
upon. In December 2012, Carlo Tassara (an Italian holding
company) reduced its majority stake in the bank to 36% (from
97.2%) and plans to exit the bank by end-2013. Other significant
shareholders are European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(8.8%) and Genesis Asset Managers (6.1%, a specialist investment
management company which focuses on emerging market equities).
The remaining shares are widely held.

The Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor' reflects Fitch's opinion
that potential sovereign support cannot be relied upon in light
of Alior's small systemic importance.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch does not expect changes to the bank's IDRs, National
Ratings and VR in the short term, as indicated by the Stable
Outlook. However, downward pressure on Alior's ratings could
arise from further material deterioration in asset quality or
considerably weaker internal capital generation. An upgrade of
Alior's VR and IDRs would likely require a moderation of growth
rates and a longer track record of solid performance and stable
asset quality trends; further deepening of the bank's franchise
would also be credit positive.

Fitch has assigned Alior the following ratings:

Long-Term foreign currency IDR: 'BB', Stable Outlook
Short-Term foreign currency IDR: 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: 'BBB+(pol)', Stable Outlook
National Short-Term rating: 'F2(pol)'
Viability Rating: 'bb'
Support Rating: '5'
Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor'



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


PROBANKA DD: Faces Liquidation; Slovenia to Issue Guarantees
------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Cerni at Bloomberg News reports that Slovenia liquidated
two of its smaller banks, Probanka d.d. and Factor Banka d.d., in
a move described by Central Bank Governor Bostjan Jazbec as a
preemptive action to avoid the fate of Cyprus.

"Th[ese] measures have been taken to stop a possible deposit
withdrawal from other banks," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Jazbec as
saying on Friday.  "The central bank and the government are
trying to avoid the Cyprus scenario."

Burdened by non-performing loans equaling about a fifth of the
Slovenian economy, the Adriatic nation's mostly state-owned banks
pushed it to the brink of a bailout in March after Cyprus's
rescue triggered a sell-off in weaker euro-region assets,
Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Jazbec, as cited by Bloomberg, said that Factor Banka and
Probanka with combined total assets of about EUR2 billion
(US$2.6 billion), will face supervised liquidation.

According to Bloomberg, Slovenian Finance Minister Uros Cufer
said at the joint press conference with Jazbec on Friday that the
cost of liquidation of Probanka and Factor Banka will be borne
first by owners, followed by holders of subordinated debt.

Even so, Slovenia will issue state guarantees of EUR490 million
for Probanka and EUR540 million for Factor Banka "that will
ensure an unhindered liquidity and normal fulfillment of
obligations of both banks to ordinary creditors," Banka
Slovenije, as cited by Bloomberg, said in an e-mailed statement.
The European Union said the guarantees were given temporary
approval, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Andraz Grahek, managing partner at
Capital Genetics in Ljubljana, called the state support
"shocking" and questioned why "the failure of two privately owned
banks that are neither material or systemic has prompted the
government to issue guarantees of round EUR1 billion to provide
liquidity and cover losses that should have been taken by
creditors and deposit holders."

"This is against the concept of the banking union and transfers
unnecessary burden to public finances," Bloomberg quotes
Mr. Grahek as saying.  "I believe this is a mistake that can
backfire and shows there is a state of panic."

Prime Minister Alenka Bratusek's government has delayed a fix of
the bank industry originally planned for the end of June due to a
dispute with the European Union over banks' capital needs and the
value of their bad assets, Bloomberg discloses.

Factor Banka reported a loss of EUR5.3 million in the first half,
compared with a EUR2.9 million profit a year earlier, Bloomberg
relates.  Assets declined 11% to EUR913 million at the end of
June from the end of 2012, Bloomberg discloses.

Probanka's first-half loss narrowed to EUR6.8 million from
EUR12.5 million euros a year earlier, Bloomberg notes.  Assets
declined 5% to EUR981 million, Bloomberg states.

Probanka is based in the north-eastern city of Maribor.

Factor Banka is based in Ljubljana.


VARIO 2000: CoBe Capital Launches Liquidation Procedure
-------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that local media said on Thursday the US
investment firm CoBe Capital has decided to launch a liquidation
procedure for Vario 2000.

CoBe acquired Vario 2000 from local household appliance maker
Gorenje in February, SeeNews recounts.

Vario 2000 is a Slovenian furniture maker.



=========
S P A I N
=========


SNIACE SA: Seeks Court Protection From Creditors
------------------------------------------------
Esteban Duarte at Bloomberg News reports that Sniace SA's board
agreed to submit request to court in Madrid to seek court
protection from creditors after the company failed to obtain
financing.

According to Bloomberg, Sniace units Viscocel, Celltech will also
seek court protection from creditors.

Sniace SA -- http://www.sniace.com/-- is a Spain-based company
primarily active in the chemical sector.  The Company's main
activities are structured into five divisions: Cellulose,
Viscose, Electricity Generation, Biofuels and Forestry.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


NORTHLAND RESOURCES: Moody's Upgrades PDR to 'Caa3-PD'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the probability of default
rating of Northland Resources AB to Caa3-PD and has removed the
'limited default' ('/LD') indicator on the company's PDR, to
reflect the recent termination of the reorganization process
overseen by the Swedish District Court of Lulea, after the
company was able to complete all the milestones of its
restructuring, due to the full support received from its trade
creditors and its existing as well as new bondholders. The
outlook remains negative.

Ratings Rationale:

The one-notch upgrade of the probability of default rating (PDR)
to Caa3-PD and removal of the 'limited default' factor reflect
the completion of the reorganization process as well as the
support that Northland has recently received from all its major
creditors, as well as the money provided by both new and, to a
lesser extent, by previous bondholders. Part of this bondholder
support was made immediately available to the company in early
June, so that its operations and planned development activities
on its Kaunisvaara project could be resumed without any further
delay after they were halted for 10 days in late May owing to the
company's lack of liquidity.

On May 31, 2013, Northland received consents from its bondholders
on the proposed consensual restructuring of the company's capital
structure. Moody's believes that the broad terms achieved with
the completed restructuring are favorable to Northland, as they
allow the company to direct available cash resources on the
project execution, by postponing the servicing of the various
debt instruments now in the capital structure.

Key terms agreed in the restructuring include: (1) amendments to
some of the terms of Northland's US$370 million of notes (the
'Old Notes'), to enable their transformation into Payment in Kind
(PIK) second lien notes mandatorily convertible into equity at
the earlier of (a) the company having produced and sold 4 million
dry metric tonnes of iron ore concentrate on a rolling 12-month
basis, and (b) July 14, 2016; (2) the full release of cash left
on the old bondholders' pledged escrow account -- US$30 million,
with US$16 million having already been used during the initial
phase of the reorganization and US$24 million used for the
payment of the last semi-annual cash interest on the Old Notes;
and (3) the acceptance of the terms of the new PIK-only (until
2016, and then pay as you can (PAYC)) US$335 million of senior
secured notes (the 'New Notes'), which were subscribed in full on
May 30, 2013 by a combination of new and old bondholders. As
disciplined in the inter-creditor agreement approved by both
bondholders and by Northland's shareholders, the New Notes rank
ahead of the Old Notes and carry warrants convertible into
Northland shares representing in aggregate 50% of the company's
share capital on a fully diluted basis. Furthermore, the key
trade creditors agreed in early June to transform part of their
overdue trade payables into a long-term US$143 million supplier
credit facility, with staged repayments starting from July 2015
and accrued only interest. Northland Resources AB remains liable
of an intercompany loan of US$370 million to the top holding
company Northland Resources SA, the new borrower under the Old
notes, and our Caa3 corporate family rating (CFR) reflects that
this loan is considered as debt by Moody's.

Moody's notes that the near term liquidity needs have been
addressed, as Northland has already funded its most urgent
requirements with (1) the first two draw-downs of US$100 million
each, on the 10th of June and 5th of August respectively, from
the new bond escrow account, where the net proceeds of the New
Notes have been placed; and (2) US$30 million released from the
Old Notes' pledged escrow account.

The Caa3 CFR reflects (1) still high execution risks related to
the next operational milestones of the Kaunisvaara project,
namely the full commissioning of process line 1, the switch from
temporary to permanent logistics arrangements to transport and
ship the iron ore, and the receipt of still outstanding permits;
and (2) the materially increased leverage -- as additional debt
was required and obtained from existing and new bondholders in
order to provide funding to address the liquidity shortfall
announced by the company earlier this year -- which might not be
sustainable over time without new equity injections at some point
in the future.

Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Northland's still tight liquidity
profile, in spite of the new funding obtained during the
restructuring recently completed. In particular, Moody's notes
that the funding requirements for the completion of phase 1 of
the Kaunisvaara project relies also on the ability of the company
to start generating positive operating cash flows in the coming
quarters, and to become free cash flow positive already from Q4
2014. In this context, Moody's highlights that Northland could
find it challenging to improve its cash flow generation in the
event of iron ore prices remaining weak or falling materially
below current levels and/or in a scenario of higher-than-
anticipated project-related ramp-up costs. It also reflects
Moody's concerns about the negative implications on the financial
and liquidity profile of project delays recently highlighted by
management in its last quarterly report. In particular,
management noted that, due to the temporary suspension of all
operations for 10 days in May while the project was temporarily
on-hold, pending agreements to be finalized with all bondholders,
the key milestones of the project have been shifted by one
quarter. Moody's believes that this development leaves little or
no headroom for further delays or possible cost-overruns, and
actually, if not properly and timely addressed by management,
could lead to a new liquidity shortfall within the next 18
months.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Although unlikely in the near term, positive rating pressure
could develop over time if Northland (1) can address the
accumulated delay in project's execution and demonstrate a
proactive management of its liquidity, by accessing further
sources of funding and/or delivering higher and earlier than
expected positive operational cash flows, thereby enabling to
transition the liquidity profile of the company to an 'adequate'
assessment; (2) can successfully complete the execution of its
next two key project milestones scheduled for Q4 2013, namely the
full commissioning of process line 1 and the switch from
temporary to permanent logistics arrangements, without any
further delay; and (3) can obtain the still outstanding permits
required for its logistic arrangements and to expand its
operations (namely the Sahavaara environmental permit). Moreover,
further positive pressure might develop over time as the phase 1
of the project is complete, with no further overruns or
meaningful delays, and demonstrates its ability to generate
positive free cash flows.

Conversely, negative rating pressure would result if Northland's
liquidity proves to be insufficient to entirely fund the
company's project development until completion of its phase 1,
targeted by Q4 2014. Insufficient liquidity would most likely be
a result of diminished support from bondholders and/or major
suppliers, or higher-than-anticipated negative free cash flows
resulting from material overrun in costs and/or capex or further
delays to the completion of the project.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Mining Industry published in May 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Northland Resources AB, a subsidiary of publicly listed Northland
Resources SA, is a special purpose vehicle created to manage the
construction and development of the Kaunisvaara iron ore project
in northern Sweden. The Kaunisvaara project comprises the Tapuli
mine, the nearby Sahavaara mine, a dual-line processing plant and
a fully integrated logistics solution for the delivery of iron
ore concentrate to the Port of Narvik in Norway. The Kaunisvaara
project is expected to produce 4.4 million dry metric tonnes of
high-grade iron ore concentrate per annum, once completed.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CSDM FUNDRAISING: In Administration, Owes GBP400,000 to Printers
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hannah Jordan Wednesday at PrintWeek reports that fundraising
agency CSDM Fundraising, which fell into administration on
June 28, owed around GBP400,000 to printers and direct marketing
firms, according to the administrator's report.

Herefordshire-based CSDM Fundraising (CSDMF), a charity direct
marketing agency, emerged in June 2010 under the directorship of
Chris Stoddard, on the same day his previous company CSDM
collapsed owing GBP1.4 million, according to PrintWeek.  It is
the third company, associated to Stoddard, to collapse in as many
years, the report relates.

According to the administrator's report produced by MB
Insolvency, CSDMF owed unsecured creditors GBP739,172, at the
time of its collapse this summer, with the largest creditors
being SPI Direct Entry and Affinion International, which were
owed GBP173,699 and GBP126,800 respectively, PrintWeek notes.

Other unsecured print and mailing operators included Apex Direct
Mail, TFW Printers, The Envelope Works, The Colourhouse, Impact
Mail and Print & Mail Solutions UK, PrintWeek says.

The report discloses that it is not anticipated that there will
be any available funds for unsecured creditors, the report
states.

According to the document, Mr. Stoddard claims his company was
forced to enter administration because a subcontracted postal
supplier failed to deliver its post, costing CSDMF around
GBP300,000, the report relays.

In a statement, Mr. Stoddard said despite the amount owed to
unsecured creditors being documented by the administrator as
GBP739,172, the amount that would ultimately be due to third
parties would be "comparatively small," the report relays.

Mr. Stoddard said: "[The figure] actually includes inter-company
claims amounting to some GBP160,000 and GBP204,000 of creditor
claims that are totally disputed but excludes the GBP600,000 of
claims that CSDM Fundraising has against two creditors for breach
of contract. . . . Relatively few creditors remain on the CSDM
Fundraising's purchase ledger. . . . Our principal aim has been
to ensure that clients of the firm, all small charities, do not
suffer as a result of the company's closure. . . . None of the
company's clients has suffered any financial loss as a result of
the administration. . . . No members of staff have lost their
jobs and we continue to have the support of our clients - who
value our approach and the resources and expertise we bring.
Neither have we - nor do we intend to - put other companies into
administration," the report quoted Mr. Stoddard as saying.

Meanwhile, the report says that another firm, CS Fundraising,
also owned by Stoddard, has acquired the assets of CSDMF,
including clients, contracts and obligations.

However, the report relays that according to the administrator's
report "there was uncertainty regarding the extent of assets
included in the sale", resulting in ongoing investigations by MB
Insolvency.

Mr. Stoddard confirmed that all staff had transferred to CS
Fundraising, the report notes.   The business continues to
operate from CSDMFs Ross-on-Wye base, the report adds.


DIXONS RETAIL: Fitch Puts 'B' Long-Term IDR on Watch Positive
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Dixons Retail plc (Dixons) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B' and senior unsecured ratings
of 'B+' on Rating Watch Positive (RWP) applicable to Dixons'
guaranteed bonds due in 2015 and 2017. The Short-term IDR has
been affirmed at 'B'. These rating actions follow the
announcement of the disposal of Dixons' online unit PIXmania and
Electroworld operations in Turkey.

The RWP takes into account the improvement envisaged by Fitch in
Dixons' operating and financial profile following the closure of
the proposed deal. Fitch expects Dixons' group EBIT margin to
trend towards 2% by FY15 (FY13:1.6% pre-disposal) and that the
disposal of its loss making business, PIXmania will reduce the
uncertainty and improve visibility of Dixons' credit profile.
Management will now have fewer distractions and will be able to
focus more on its UK and Nordics businesses which are currently
performing well. Fitch expects the group to continue to maintain
a prudent financial policy.

Key Rating Drivers

Ratings Upside
Fitch expects that the completion of the disposal has the
potential to result in one-notch upgrade. Post disposal, Dixons'
credit profile will be driven predominantly by its core UK and
Nordics business. It will be important for Dixons to prove the
improvement of its current profit margin in its core operations,
leverage profile amid a competitive industry in order to achieve
its longer-term objectives.

Continued Improvement in Operating Trend
Dixons continues to benefit from its "Renewal and Transformation"
program. The group has got its service proposition and product
range on track and refurbished and streamlined its store
portfolio. Like-for-like (LFL) sales have been positive since
April 2012, despite a difficult trading environment in the UK and
Ireland and competitive environment in the Nordics. UK and
Ireland's LFL sales were up 6% for Q114 (quarter ended July 31,
2013) and 5% in northern Europe. Group EBIT margin was 1.6% in
FY13 and Fitch expects this to trend above 2% following the
disposals by FY15.

Strengthened Market Position
The consolidation in the industry in the UK over the past two
years, including the closure of 11 Best Buy Co., Inc. (BB-
/Negative) stores and the disposal of Comet (owned by Darty,
formerly known as Kesa, unrated), has helped to create a more
favourable competitive environment for Dixons. In the Nordics,
there have been a number of significant exits from the
independent sector and heavy price competition. Overall, Dixons
is in a much stronger position than a few years ago.

Strengthened Credit Metrics
Group lease-adjusted net debt/EBITDAR improved to 4.7x in FY13
(FY12:5.1x) and FFO net leverage was 5x in FY13 (FY12: 5.9x).
Total adjusted debt was GBP3.3 billion, reflecting that most of
Dixons' adjusted debt is linked to the capitalization of the
group's operating leases. Therefore, in the context of total
adjusted debt, the EUR69 million of investment required to
dispose of PIXmania is relatively small even though the
elimination of losses from PIXmania should be a big driver of
Dixon's profit improvement expected by FY15 (ending April 2015).
FFO fixed charge coverage remained stable at 1.3x in FY13
(FY12:1.3x) and is expected to improve mildly to 1.5x by FY15.

Improving Liquidity Profile
The liquidity problems that affected Dixons in 2008-2009 have
abated. The company has managed an equity injection, restructured
its capital structure through refinancing and extending the
maturity of its revolving credit facility (GBP225 million due
June 2015) and issued two bonds due in 2015 (GBP100 million) and
2017 (GBP150 million).

Rating Sensitivities
Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a positive rating action include:

-- Completion of the sale of PIXmania and its Turkish operations
    on the announced terms.

-- Group EBIT margin improving to 2.5%.

-- A sustainable positive LFL sales growth in core areas (the UK
    and Ireland and the Nordic region).

-- Lease-adjusted net debt to EBITDAR below 5x or lease-adjusted
    net debt/FFO decreasing to below 5.5x and/or ability to
    maintain positive free cash flow generation.

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a stabilization of the rating at the
current level include:

-- Deterioration in its operating performance such that EBIT
    margin falls below 1.5%

-- Lease adjusted net debt/EBITDAR above 5x or lease adjusted
    net debt/FFO higher than 5.5x.

-- Inability to complete the announced disposals and material
    deterioration in its southern European businesses and
    PIXmania depleting group cash flows and eroding the group's
    liquidity buffer.


EMPIRE MEATS: In Administration; 40 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------
Margaret Canning at Belfast Telegraph reports that forty jobs
have been lost in a border area of Co Fermanagh after
Empire Meats went into administration on Wednesday.

Belfast Telegraph relates that in a statement, administrators
Gregg Sterritt -- gregg.sterritt@rsmmcw.com -- and
Stephen Armstrong -- stephen.armstrong@rsmmcw.com -- of RSM
McClure Watters said: "Unfortunately the company experienced
deterioration in trading over the past number of months which
resulted in significant cashflow pressures.

"These pressures ultimately led to the company ceasing to trade
prior to the appointment of the administrators.

"There was no alternative but to make the company's 40 employees
redundant on September 5."

Empire Meats, which traded as Flynn's Fine Foods, is a family-run
food company based in Roslea.  The firm processed and sold meat
products to shops and wholesalers.  It was set up in 2005.


HMV: Returns to Irish High Street, Open 4 Outlets
-------------------------------------------------
Irish Independent reports that HMV returns to the Irish high
street with the official opening of its flagship store on
Dublin's Henry Street on Friday and a live performance by Irish
band the Strypes.

Owner Hilco Capital said yesterday that HMV would redeem gift
cards which were not honored during the receivership of the old
HMV business, according to Irish Independent.  It said details of
how to do so would be set out later, the report relates.

Irish Independent notes that new documents show HMV Ireland's
receiver earned more than EUR300,000 in fees and expenses since
it went out of business eight months ago.

The report notes that the payments to appointed receiver David
Carson of Deloitte & Touche work out at more than EUR2,300 per
working day in the six-month period under review.

Documents just filed with the Companies Office show Mr. Carson
received EUR300,495 (ex VAT) in fees and expenses in the period
from when HMV Ireland went into receivership on January 16 last
to July 15, the report relates.

Irish Independent discloses that turnaround specialists Hilco are
in the process of reopening four of the shut HMV stores with
three at Henry Street, Liffey Valley Shopping Centre in Dublin
and the Crescent Shopping Centre in Limerick opening and the
fourth at HMV in Dundrum scheduled to open later this month.

The receiver's extract lodged by Mr. Carson shows a list of
payments that includes EUR26,528 to the Sunni Mae Trust, the
report relays.

The money was owed to the trust from the money raised by the
charity single 'Tiny Dancer' to fund health expenses for four-
year-old Co Galway girl Lily Mae Morrison, who is fighting a rare
and aggressive form of cancer, the report discloses.

The document shows that EUR1.2 million has been paid out in
payments in the six-month period with EUR487,574 paid to former
staff of the retailer, the report adds.


MORTGAGE FUNDING: Fitch Puts 'CC' Class A Notes Rating on RWP
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Mortgage Funding 2008-1's class A notes'
(ISIN XS0350039912) 'CCsf' rating on Rating Watch Positive (RWP)
following the restructuring of the transaction on Aug. 23, 2013.

Key Rating Drivers
On Aug. 22, 2013, the issuer received US$51.5 million from the
auction of its remaining claims against the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy estate. These recoveries, combined with receipts from
prior claims, have been converted to a GBP equivalent amount of
GBP76.8 million. Subsequently, these amounts have been applied
towards the redenomination of the euro-denominated class A notes
into GBP, with a portion to be applied towards the partial
redemption of the class A and B notes on the upcoming September
payment date.

Rating Sensitivities

The agency is currently analyzing the transaction and expects the
class A notes' rating to be upgraded to investment grade.


WEST BROMWICH: Avoids Yo-Yo Bankruptcy Curse With Solid Finances
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ravi Ubha, writing for Daily Bankruptcy Review, reported that
West Bromwich Albion used to be a yo-yo club, a team that bounced
up and down between the top two tiers of English soccer. It would
fight for promotion glory one season and then for its Premier
League life the next.

But after sinking from the top-flight three times in the last
decade, the club is beginning to forget what relegation worries
are like, the report said.  Last season, the modest club from the
Birmingham area in central England recorded its best season in
the top flight in more than 30 years, finishing eighth with its
highest ever Premier League points tally.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* European Banking Union Essential Step for Long-Term Confidence
----------------------------------------------------------------
Progress on European banking union is essential to achieving
long-term confidence in the eurozone banking sector, Fitch
Ratings says in a new report. The report also details which
banking groups Fitch expects to be included and a country-by
country analysis.

"Banking union is a building block for the long-term stability of
the eurozone but it will take time," says Bridget Gandy, co-head
of EMEA Financial Institutions at Fitch. "It should help level
the playing field to create a sustainable platform for growth for
divergent national economies. Ties between banks and their
sovereigns will remain, but banking union should loosen them
somewhat."

France is likely to be the largest banking system by assets under
direct ECB supervision. French regional banks in the Credit
Agricole, Groupe BPCE and Credit Mutuel groups are likely to be
included because of their strong mutual support structures. Fitch
expects Germany to have the largest number of banking groups
regulated directly by the ECB, however this will comprise only
65-70% of German banking assets. Some 40% of Germany's retail
sector is likely to remain under national supervision, comprising
a multitude of local savings and cooperative banks.

Fitch does not anticipate any short-term impact on European
banks' ratings from the introduction of banking union, but for
the vast majority of European banks, progress towards banking
union should eventually be positive for Viability Ratings
(ratings excluding extraordinary support). If the ECB establishes
itself as an authoritative supervisor, the comparability of
banks' risk reporting should improve. Together with transparency
around how and when a bank would be resolved, this should improve
investor confidence, resulting in better access to the capital
markets for banks and better pricing.

More efficient allocation of capital is broadly positive.
However, Fitch sees longer term negative potential for some banks
and their domestic borrowers in the stronger eurozone countries.
A single supervisor may lead to the creation of more pan-eurozone
banking networks, collecting deposits in one country and lending
in another. This would be an important shift from locally funded
operations and would mean that banks operating in deposit-rich
countries would have to pay more to compete for funding, and
would pass this cost on through their lending rates.

The report "Impact of European Banking Union on Banks - More to
Gain than to Lose" is available at www.fitchratings.com or by
clicking on the link above.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 2 to September 6, 2013
-------------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *