TCREUR_Public/130916.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, September 16, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 183



NOKIA OYJ: Credit Protection Cost on Debt Now at 'BB+' Levels


DECO SERIES 2005: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. G Notes to 'BBsf'
SOLARWORLD AG: Investor Challenges Restructuring Plan


GLITNIR BANK: Winding-Up Committee Seeks Settlement Talks


HARVEST CLO VII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
HARVEST CLO VII: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
JUNO ECLIPSE 2007-2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'


RIVA GROUP: To Shut Down Companies After Asset Seizure


GOLDEN TRAVEL: Files for Bankruptcy; Calls for Dissolution


EUROCREDIT CDO III: Moody's Cuts 2 Note Classes Ratings to Caa3
HERBERT PARK: Fitch Rates EUR12-Mil. Class E Notes 'B-'
HERBERT PARK: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
SNS BANK: Moody's Hikes Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'D-'


AVERSA: Michael Topolinski Acquires Business
GALLI GALLO: Poultry Market Woes Prompt Insolvency


BREBORO HOLDINGS: S&P Assigns 'B-' CCR; Outlook Stable
* Moody's Notes Higher Credit Risks for Russia's Consumer Banks


* Slovenian Bank Clean-Up Still Uncertain Despite Progress


BANCO DE SABADELL: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings; Outlook Negative
CODERE SA: Decision to Delay Bond Coupon May Trigger CDS Payouts
PESCANOVA SA: Damm-Led Shareholder Group Ousts Former Chairman
* SPAIN: Falling Bank Lending Threatens Small Companies

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DIXONS RETAIL: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B1' CFR to Stable
FORDGATE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B Notes
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Payout to Unsecured Creditors Expected in Nov.


* High-Yield Bond Issuance for EMEA Surges Past US$100 Billion
* Moody's Says Better EUR Economy to Result in Fewer Downgrades
* Fitch Sees Improvement in Credit Quality of Eurozone Entities
* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 9 to September 13, 2013



NOKIA OYJ: Credit Protection Cost on Debt Now at 'BB+' Levels
The credit default swap (CDS) market seems to be reacting
favorably to Microsoft's plans to acquire Nokia Oyj, according to
the latest case study from Fitch Solutions.

Following the US$7.2 billion acquisition on announcement on
Sept.3, CDS spreads on Nokia have tightened 59%, while Microsoft
remains largely illiquid. Additionally, the cost of credit
protection on Nokia's debt is now at 'BB+' levels.

That said, CDS liquidity for Nokia remains high. Trading in the
third global percentile, 'Nokia is trading with more CDS
liquidity than 97 percent of Fitch's CDS pricing universe,
signaling still-high market uncertainty over future pricing,'
said Director Diana Allmendinger.

Fitch Solutions case studies build on data from its CDS Pricing
Service and proprietary quantitative models, including CDS
Implied Ratings. These credit risk indicators are designed to
provide real-time, market-based views of creditworthiness. As
such, they can and often do reflect more short term market views
on factors such as currencies, seasonal market effects and short-
term technical influences. This is in contrast to Fitch Ratings'
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs), which are based on forward-looking
fundamental credit analysis over an extended period of time.


DECO SERIES 2005: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. G Notes to 'BBsf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded DECO Series 2005 - Pan Europe 1
plc's class G commercial mortgage-backed notes and affirmed class
H as follows:

  EUR2.2 million class G due July 2014 (XS0227116950) downgraded
  to 'BBsf' from 'Asf'; Placed on Rating Watch Negative (RWN)

  EUR4.9 million class H due July 2014 (XS0227117503) affirmed at
  'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 95%

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade of the class G notes is driven by the failure to
complete the notarized sale of the last properties securing the
AWOBAG loan, particularly in light of the approaching July 2014
note maturity. With less than 11 months to go, the special
servicer's operational flexibility is narrowing, which could
weaken its bargaining position with potential purchasers.
Nevertheless, in Fitch's view investors in the class G notes are
well-protected from discounting; what explains the multi-category
downgrade of this class and its placement on RWN is the
illiquidity of the collateral, which threatens to impede the
required swift resolution.

The AWOBAG loan failed to repay at its maturity in July 2012.
Following a progressive sell down of the portfolio, the loan is
now secured by a portfolio of 26 residential clusters in Kiel,
Germany. In March 2013, the residual portfolio was revalued at
EUR19.9 million. This is only marginally down from the EUR20.6
million value reported in May 2005, despite the portfolio being
characterized by a poor state of repair and high vacancy rate

Since Fitch's previous rating action in December 2012, the
notarised sale of the Kiel properties failed to complete. The
servicer, Situs Asset Management, expected the sale to complete
first at the October 2012 interest payment date (IPD) and then at
the January 2013 IPD. At the January 2013 IPD, the servicer
reported that the sale was unable to complete due to further
negotiations with the purchaser arising from additional technical
due diligence and some of the conditions precedent in the SPA not
being met. In a special notice dated February 26, 2013, the
special servicer, Hatfield Philips International Ltd (HPI), also
confirmed the sales process had fallen through.

Given its advanced stage, a collapse in the sales process was not
expected by Fitch. The loan has since been accelerated and an
insolvency administrator appointed. Since the opening of the
insolvency proceedings, Fitch understands the insolvency
administrator has marketed the properties to more than 40
investors. HPI has indicated to Fitch that the insolvency
administrator expects indicative bids during September and
binding offers a few weeks later.

Due to the high level of expenditure needed to maintain the
properties in their current state, little cash is available to
service the debt. Indeed at the last IPD the issuer paid senior
expenses and note interest using only drawdowns of the liquidity
facility. This was not sufficient to cover class H note interest,
with the excess above the loan interest rate not paid. Pursuant
to an available funds cap, this class of notes continues to
perform, with the distressed rating reflecting rather the risk of
principal remaining outstanding at note maturity. Even if loan
proceeds are sufficient, the risk of a spike in final issuer
costs warrants a sub-100% RE for this class.

Rating Sensitivities

The RWN will be resolved within the next six months. If the class
G notes remain outstanding at this time, they will very likely be

SOLARWORLD AG: Investor Challenges Restructuring Plan
Alexander Kell at Bloomberg News, citing The Wall Street Journal,
reports that a spokeswoman of Solarworld AG doesn't know details
of a legal action filed by investor Karl Walter Freitag with
Higher Regional Court Cologne yet.

According to Bloomberg, the Journal said Mr. Freitag filed legal
action challenging the company's restructuring plan.  Bloomberg
notes that the Journal said the investor sees Solarworld
bondholders favored over shareholders.

                        Restructuring Plan

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 7,
2013, Bloomberg News related that Solarworld creditors backed
proposals to try to save Germany's biggest solar-panel maker.
According to Bloomberg, Solarworld said in a statement that a
total of 99.96% of noteholders representing 35.78% of the
company's EUR150 million (US$198.9 million) of bonds due
July 2016 backed the restructuring plan.  A group representing at
least 25% of the notes was required, Bloomberg disclosed.
Solarworld reported net debt of EUR806.4 million in the first
quarter, up from EUR757.6 million the year before, Bloomberg
said, citing a company filing.  The company has a EUR250 million
revolving credit facility maturing in 2016, according to data
compiled by Bloomberg.

SolarWorld AG is Germany's biggest solar-panel maker.  The
company is based in Bonn.


GLITNIR BANK: Winding-Up Committee Seeks Settlement Talks
According to Bloomberg News' Omar R. Valdimarsson, Kjarninn,
citing a letter, said that the winding-up committee of failed
lender Glitnir Bank asked Iceland's Prime Minister, Finance
Minister and Central Bank Governor for talks about creditor

Premier Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson, as cited by Kjarninn, said
in August he hoped for an offer from lenders creditors "soon",
Bloomberg notes.

Glitnir requested that the central bank grants an exemption to
the island's capital controls so it can complete creditor
settlements, Bloomberg discloses.  Sedlabanki has yet to respond
to the request, Bloomberg says.

Mr. Gunnlaugsson has signaled he'll ask for writedowns on US$3.6
billion of krona-denominated claims held by creditors of Glitnir
Bank, Bloomberg states.

                      About Glitnir Banki

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Iceland, Glitnir banki hf -- offers an array of financial services
to corporation, financial institutions, investors and

Judge Stuart Bernstein of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District Court of New York granted Glitnir
permission to enter into a proceeding under Chapter 15 of the
U.S. bankruptcy code on January 6, 2008.


HARVEST CLO VII: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings to
Harvest CLO VII Ltd.'s class A, B, C, D, and E senior secured
floating-rate notes.  At closing, Harvest CLO VII also issued
unrated subordinated notes.

S&P's ratings address timely interest and principal on the class
A and B notes, and ultimate interest and principal on the class
C, D, and E notes.


Class        (mil. EUR)  Interest   Deferrable  OC (%)  Rating
A               177.0    6mE+1.35%      No      41.00   AAA(sf)
B                34.0    6mE+1.75%      No      29.67   AA+(sf)
C                20.0    6mE+2.80%     Yes      23.00   A(sf)
D                13.6    6mE+3.70%     Yes      18.47   BBB(sf)
E                23.0    6mE+5.50%     Yes      10.80   BB(sf)
Subordinated     42.0       N/A        N/A       0.00     NR

6mE - Six-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR).
N/A - Not applicable.
OC - Overcollateralization = [portfolio target par amount -
     tranche notional (including notional of all senior
     tranches)]/portfolio target par amount.
NR - Not rated.

At the end of the ramp-up period, S&P understands that the
portfolio would represent a well-diversified pool of corporate
credits, with a fairly uniform exposure to all of the credits.
Therefore, S&P has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by
applying its 2009 corporate cash flow collateralized debt
obligation criteria.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used a portfolio target par
amount of EUR300.0, assuming that 10% of the portfolio comprises
fixed-rate assets, using the covenanted weighted-average spread
and weighted-average coupon (4.35% and 5.0% respectively), and
the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates at each rating

The portfolio's replenishment period will end 4.1 years after
closing, and the portfolio's average maturity date will, at all
zimes, fall before 2021.

Elavon Financial Services Ltd. is the bank account provider and
custodian.  The issuer will enter into asset swaps with either
Credit Suisse International, or JP Morgan Securities PLC to hedge
the foreign exchange risk arising from non-euro-denominated
assets.  The participants' downgrade remedies are in line with
S&P's current counterparty criteria.

The issuer is in line with S&P's bankruptcy-remoteness criteria
under its European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S& considers that its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

Harvest CLO VII is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior
secured loans made to speculative-grade European corporates. 3i
Debt Management Investments Ltd. manages the transaction.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:


Ratings Assigned

Harvest CLO VII Ltd.
EUR309.6 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate
and Subordinated Notes

Class               Rating             Amount
                                     (mil. EUR)
A                   AAA (sf)            177.0
B                   AA+ (sf)             34.0
C                   A (sf)               20.0
D                   BBB (sf)             13.6
E                   BB (sf)              23.0
Subordinated        NR                   42.0

NR-Not rated.

HARVEST CLO VII: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class E Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Harvest CLO VII Ltd's notes final
ratings, as follows:

  EUR177.0 million Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR34.0 million Class B: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR20.0 million Class C: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR13.6 million Class D: 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR23.0 million Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR42.0 million subordinated notes: not rated

Key Rating Drivers

Sufficient Credit Enhancement

Credit enhancement (CE) for the rated notes, in addition to
excess spread, is sufficient to protect against portfolio default
and recovery rate projections in the applicable rating scenario.
CE for the rated notes is higher than the average for Fitch-rated
legacy CLOs.

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B'/'B-' range.

Above-Average Recoveries

At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured loans and
senior secured bonds. Recovery prospects for these assets are
typically more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and
mezzanine assets.

Limited Basis/Reset Risk

Basis and reset risk is naturally hedged for most of the
portfolio through the floating rate, semi-annually paying
liabilities. Fixed rate assets can account for no more than 10%
of the portfolio and no more than 5% of the assets can pay
interest less frequently than semi-annually.

Limited FX Risk

Asset swaps are used to mitigate any currency risk on non-euro-
denominated assets. All non-euro assets have to be hedged using
suitable asset swaps. Non-euro assets are limited to 30% of the

Transaction Summary

Harvest CLO VII Ltd (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flow CLO.
Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes will be used to
purchase a EUR300 million portfolio of European leveraged loans
and bonds. The portfolio is managed by 3i Debt Management
Investments Limited. The reinvestment period is scheduled to end
in 2017.

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or note holder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a comment if the change would not
have a negative impact on the then current ratings. Such
amendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long as
Fitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal at
the legal final maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from the
perspective of the rating Fitch may decline to comment.
Noteholders should be aware that the structure considers the
confirmation to be given in the case where Fitch declines to

Rating Sensitivities

A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of one to three notches for the rated notes.

A 25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of one to four notches for the rated notes.

JUNO ECLIPSE 2007-2: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Juno (Eclipse 2007-2) Limited class
C due 2022 as follows:

-- EUR60.6 million Class C (XS0299976836): downgraded to 'Dsf'
    from 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 50%

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade follows a EUR11.4 million principal write-down of
the class C notes. This reflects a loss of EUR24.1 million being
realised on the EUR25 million Senior Den Tir reference loan,
which also led to the 'Dsf' rated class D notes being fully
written off.

As this outcome is in line with Fitch's expectations, there is no
impact on the ratings of the other classes of notes of this

Rating Sensitivities

At 'Dsf', the rating of the class C notes is no longer sensitive
to transaction performance.

Fitch will continue to monitor the performance of the


RIVA GROUP: To Shut Down Companies After Asset Seizure
Giulia Segreti at The Financial Times reports that Italy's Riva
Group, owner of one of Europe's largest steel plants, has
announced it will shut down almost all the companies it controls
in the country after a court seized assets and wealth worth about
EUR900 million from the family-owned company.

Steel making and logistics operations in 13 companies owned by
the Riva family, which employ almost 1,500 workers, will be
halted from Thursday, Sept. 12, the FT discloses.

The Riva family been at the center of a long-running court case
opened by prosecutors alleging corruption and violations of
environmental standards leading to deaths around its Ilva iron
and steel plant in the southern port city of Taranto, the FT
notes.  The group has denied all the allegations, the FT states.

Ilva, which produces about 30% of Italy's steel output and
employs 12,000 directly, will continue its activities under
government supervision, the FT says.

The decision to freeze all of the Riva family's Italian assets,
including blocking current accounts, was taken by a judge based
in Taranto on Sept. 9, the FT relates.  Assets confiscated
include the family's shares in Alitalia, the Italian airline,
worth about EUR70 million, the FT notes.

Halting production at the companies was necessary as the seizures
"impeded the normal cycle of company payments and do not allow
(normal) operative and economic conditions", Riva, as cited by
the FT, said in a statement on Thursday.

According to the FT, a company representative said Riva would
appeal against the court order "unexpectedly extended" to the
whole group.


GOLDEN TRAVEL: Files for Bankruptcy; Calls for Dissolution
Matthew Xuereb at Times of Malta reports that Golden Travel Club
Limited, the company which runs Fantasy Tours, has filed for
bankruptcy and called for the troubled firm to be dissolved.

The request was filed by company shareholders Karl and Audrey
Azzopardi, Times of Malta discloses.  They asked the court to
dissolve the company, which operated from its registered address
in Psaila Street, Birkirkara, since it could not repay its debts,
Times of Malta notes.

According to court documents seen by Times of Malta, they filed
the request on August 8, the same day Fantasy Tours sent text
messages to clients informing them that due to financial problems
it was unable to provide the holidays they had paid for.

In the application filed through company lawyer Kris Borg, they
claimed that although the firm had tried to maximize its business
during the summer months, not many people chose its services,
Times of Malta relates.

As a result, the company began operating at a loss and the more
it carried on trading, the larger the losses became, Times of
Malta states.

They therefore called on the court to dissolve the company in
terms of a specific article of the Companies Act relating to
being unable to pay debts, Times of Malta says.

As with similar cases, they also called on the court to appoint a
provisional administrator to run the company on an interim basis,
Times of Malta notes.

Golden Travel Club Ltd was hit with class action week when 138
clients filed a judicial letter in court, giving the travel agent
three days to refund the money they had paid for the holidays
that never happened, Times of Malta recounts.

The company axed its tours via SMS on August 8, just hours after
urging those who had booked holidays to pay in advance for their
excursions, Times of Malta discloses.

The police say more than 250 official complaints against the
travel agency have been received and the losses amount to
EUR374,058, according to Times of Malta.

Times of Malta previously reported how an insolvency fund that
could have been used to pay those who had their holidays
cancelled by Fantasy Tours was enacted in 1999 but never brought
into force.  The fund, which tourism operators were meant to
contribute towards, would have compensated any traveller,
licensed tourism operation or tourist for any debt arising from
the insolvency of any licensed tourism operator, Times of Malta
says.  The setting up of the fund came through the Malta Travel
and Tourism Service Act, which was enacted in 1999, Times of
Malta recounts.


EUROCREDIT CDO III: Moody's Cuts 2 Note Classes Ratings to Caa3
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Eurocredit CDO III B.V.:

  EUR20.5M Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aa2
  (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Eurocredit CDO III B.V.:

  EUR12.5M Class D-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011
  Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  EUR1.5M Class D-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011
  Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  EUR2.3M Class E-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011
  Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  EUR1.5M Class E-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate
  Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011
  Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service also affirmed the following notes:

  EUR161M (current amount outstanding EUR62M) Class A-1 Senior
  Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11,
  2003 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR10M (current amount outstanding EUR3.8M) Class A-2 Senior
  Accreting Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2003
  Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR10M Class C-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded
  to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR12M Class C-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate
  Notes, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded
  to Ba1 (sf)

Eurocredit CDO III B.V., issued in September 2003, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Intermediate Capital Managers Limited. This
transaction ended its reinvestment period in October 2008. It is
predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the upgrades of the Class B notes are
primarily a result of continued deleveraging of the A1 and A2
notes and subsequent increase in the Class A/B
overcollateralization ratio. Moody's notes that the Class A1 and
A2 notes have paid down by approximately 47% over the last year
and approximately 60% since the last rating action in September
2011. The downgrades of the Class D1, D2, E1 and E2 notes are
driven by the decrease of their overcollateralization ratios,
increased in defaults, increased in long dated assets and
exposure to assets rated B3 and below.

As a result of the deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios
for the senior notes have increased. As of the latest trustee
report dated August 2013, the Class A/B, C, D and E
overcollateralization ratios are 151.38%, 120.64%, 106.84% and
103.62%, respectively versus August 2011 levels of 130.16%,
116.11%, 108.64% and 106.78%, respectively. The Trustee reported
WARF has increased to 3,053 from 2,860 between August 2011 and
August 2013. During the same period total amount of securities
treated as defaulted by Moody's have increased to EUR 10.4
million from EUR 1.7 million.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR
113.23 million, defaulted par of EUR10.4 million, a weighted
average default probability of 20.02% over 2.3 years (consistent
with a WARF ("Weighted Average Rating Factor") of 3,851), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.41% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 19 and a weighted
average spread of 3.10%.

The default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 89.7% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default and 10.3%
non-first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%. In each
case, historical and market performance trends and collateral
manager latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant
factors. These default and recovery properties of the collateral
pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are
subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each
CLO liability being reviewed.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes:

1) The portfolio is exposed 12.66% to obligors located in Spain
and Ireland, both of which have a country ceiling of A3. On
August 14, 2013, Moody's released a report, which describes how
it proposes to incorporate the additional credit risk of
exposures domiciled in countries with country ceilings that are
single A or lower when rating CLO tranches that carry ratings
higher than those ceilings. In its analysis, Moody's incorporated
sensitivities applying the par value haircuts suggested in the
report, reflecting country risks in CLOs. The Aaa and Aa par
value haircut scenarios generated model outputs that were
consistent to these rating actions.

2) Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing
together with the sovereign risks -- Approximately 36.79% of the
portfolio is rated B3 and below with maturities between 2014 and
2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. The
portfolio is also exposed 12.66% to obligors located in Spain and
Ireland. Moody's considered the scenario where the WARF of the
portfolio was increased to 4,745 by forcing to Ca the credit
quality of 25% of such exposures subject to refinancing or
sovereign risks. This scenario generated model outputs that were
up to one notch lower than the base case results.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of lowly rated debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subject
to market conditions and this may have a significant impact on
the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerate
as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan market
or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed by
rising loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization
would usually benefit the ratings of the senior notes but may
negatively impact the mezzanine and junior notes.

2) Moody's also notes that around 65% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction
maturity such an asset has a liquidation value dependent on the
nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities. Realization of higher than
expected liquidation values would positively impact the ratings
of the notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in May 2013.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction is Moody's EMEA CLO
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

HERBERT PARK: Fitch Rates EUR12-Mil. Class E Notes 'B-'
Fitch Ratings has assigned Herbert Park B.V.'s notes final
ratings, as follows:

  EUR235.0m Class A-1: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR40.0m Class A-2: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR37.0m Class B: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR21.0m Class C: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR23.5m Class D: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR12.0m Class E: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR44.68m Subordinated Notes: not rated

Transaction Summary

Herbert Park B.V. (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the
issuance of the notes will be used to purchase a EUR400m
portfolio of European leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio is
managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management Europe Limited.
The reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2017.

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or note holder approval. Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a comment if the change would not
have a negative impact on the then current ratings. Such
amendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long as
Fitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal at
the legal final maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from the
perspective of the rating Fitch may decline to comment.
Noteholders should be aware that the structure considers the
confirmation to be given in the case where Fitch declines to

Key Rating Drivers
Four-Year Reinvestment Period
The reinvestment period is longer than recent similar
transactions. The maximum weighted average life of the
transaction is eight years from closing, reducing to four years
at the end of the reinvestment period.

Portfolio Credit Quality
The covenanted minimum weighted average (WA) Fitch rating factor
is 34. Fitch therefore expects the average credit quality of
obligors to be in the 'B'/'B-' range. Fitch has credit opinions
on all the obligors in the indicative portfolio.

Above-Average Recoveries
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations. Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured, and mezzanine
assets. The covenanted minimum WA Fitch recovery rate is 69.5%.
Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 95% of the indicative

Limited Basis/Reset Risk
Basis and reset risk is naturally hedged for most of the
portfolio through the floating rate, semi-annually paying
liabilities. Fixed rate assets can account for no more than 10%
of the portfolio and no more than 5% of the assets can pay
interest less frequently than semi-annually.

Limited FX Risk
Asset swaps are used to mitigate any currency risk on assets not
denominated in euro. The transaction is allowed to invest up to
10% of the portfolio in non-euro-denominated assets, provided
that suitable asset swaps can be entered into.

Lower Obligor Concentration
Unlike many recent CLO's, there are no exceptions to the maximum
obligor concentration limit of 2.5% and a limit of 1.5% is
included for non-senior obligors. This will lead to a lower
portfolio correlation in our asset analysis.

Rating Sensitivities
A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a one to two notch downgrade for each class of notes. A
25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a one
notch downgrade for all rated notes.

Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivities are further described
in the accompanying new issue report.

HERBERT PARK: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Class D Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings to
Herbert Park B.V.'s EUR368.5 million floating-rate class A-1, A-
2, B, C, D, and E notes.  At closing, Herbert Park also issued an
unrated subordinated class of notes.

S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the collateral's credit
quality.  The portfolio is diversified, primarily comprising
broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans
and senior secured bonds.

S&P's ratings also reflect the available credit enhancement for
the rated notes through the subordination of cash flows payable
to the subordinated notes.  S&P subjected the capital structure
to a cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate
for each rated class of notes.

In S&P's analysis, it used the target par amount, the covenanted
weighted-average spread, the covenanted weighted-average coupon,
and the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates.  S&P applied
various cash flow stress scenarios, using four different default
patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate stress
scenarios for each liability rating category.

The ratings assigned to the notes are commensurate with S&P's
assessment of available credit enhancement following its credit
and cash flow analysis.  S&P's analysis shows that the available
credit enhancement for each rated class of notes was sufficient
to withstand the defaults applicable under the supplemental tests
(not counting excess spread) outlined in our corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

In S&P's analysis, it considered that the transaction documents'
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate the
transaction's exposure to counterparty risk under S&P's current
counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's criteria for nonsovereign
ratings that exceed eurozone sovereign ratings, it considers the
transaction's exposure to country risk to be sufficiently
mitigated at the assigned rating levels as the concentration of
the pool comprising assets in countries rated lower than 'A-' is
limited to 10% of the aggregate collateral balance.

The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy remote, in
accordance with S&P's European legal criteria.

Herbert Park is a European cash flow corporate loan
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) securitization of a
revolving pool, comprising euro-denominated senior secured loans
and bonds issued by European borrowers.  Blackstone/GSO Debt
Funds Management Europe Ltd. is the collateral manager.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar

The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:


Herbert Park B.V.
EUR413.18 Million Floating-Rate And Subordinated Notes

Class             Rating           Amount
                                 (mil. EUR)

A-1               AAA (sf)         235.00
A-2               AA (sf)           40.00
B                 A (sf)            37.00
C                 BBB (sf)          21.00
D                 BB (sf)           23.50
E                 B (sf)            12.00
Sub               NR                44.68

NR-Not rated.

SNS BANK: Moody's Hikes Bank Financial Strength Rating to 'D-'
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed SNS Bank N.V.'s Baa3
long-term and Prime-3 short-term debt and deposit ratings. At the
same time, Moody's upgraded the bank's standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) to D-, equivalent to a baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ba3 (from E/ca). Concurrently, Moody's has
upgraded the provisional (P) rating for SNS Bank's subordinated
MTN program to (P)B1 from (P)C.

The confirmation of debt and deposit ratings reflects the bank's
improved standalone credit profile and Moody's assumption of a
high likelihood that the Dutch government (Aaa, negative) would
provide support to SNS in case of need. The upgrade of the BFSR
reflects the material improvement in the bank's solvency position
and the drastic reduction of credit risk on its loan portfolio.
The outlook on the BFSR is positive and the outlooks on the long-
term debt and deposit ratings are stable.

Moody's has also confirmed the Baa2 (stable) insurance financial
strength ratings (IFSRs) of SRLEV N.V. and REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen N.V., and the B1(hyb) ratings, with a
developing outlook, of SRLEV's hybrid instruments. The rating
agency also confirmed the (P)Ba2 senior debt rating and upgraded
to (P)B2 from (P)C the subordinated debt rating of SNS REAAL
N.V., the holding company of the group.

Moody's also withdrew ratings on the dated subordinated debt and
hybrid instruments, previously rated C and C(hyb), respectively,
issued by SNS Bank and the holding company, SNS REAAL which have
ceased to exist following the expropriation as part of the rescue
and nationalization of the group.

These actions conclude the review of SNS REAAL entities' ratings
that Moody's initiated on November 21, 2012 and extended on April
30, 2013.

The backed Aaa ratings assigned to notes issued by SNS Bank under
the guarantee of the Kingdom of the Netherlands are unaffected by
this action.

Ratings Rationale:

Confirmation of Long- And Short-Term Debt And Deposit Ratings of
SNS Bank:

The confirmation of SNS Bank's senior unsecured debt and deposit
ratings at Baa3/Prime-3 was driven by (1) the achieved
improvement in the institution's standalone financial strength
with further recovery potential over the medium-term; and (2)
Moody's assessment of the Dutch state's high willingness and
ability to provide public support to SNS in case of need.

Moody's bases its view on (1) the bank's state ownership --
albeit provisional -- implying the Dutch government would
actively protect its own investment and see the bank through the
process of regaining its standalone independence; (2) Moody's
sovereign rating for the Netherlands of Aaa (negative),
reflecting the government's financial flexibility to do so; and
(3) the bank's systemic importance for the domestic banking
sector as the fourth largest bank in the country, which the
government intended to preserve through the rescue measures and
nationalization of the group earlier this year.

The Baa3 rating currently incorporates three notches of systemic
support uplift, which also factors the current temporary
extraordinary support until SNS Bank has recovered more fully and
prospects for a re-privatization become more likely.

Upgrade of SNS Bank's BFSR to D-:

The upgrade of SNS Bank's standalone BFSR to D-/ba3 is primarily
driven by (1) the material improvement in the bank's solvency
position following the measures announced at the time of the
institution's nationalization; and (2) the drastic reduction of
credit risk on its loan portfolio following the recognition of a
EUR2 billion provision on its legacy Commercial Real Estate (CRE)

At end-June 2013, SNS Bank reported a core Tier 1 ratio of 12.2%,
significantly above the level reported at year-end 2012 (6.1%).
The material improvement of SNS Bank's nominal capital base was
due to (1) the expropriation of capital (as decreed); (2) the
losses imposed on hybrid instruments; and (3) subsequent EUR1.9
billion capital injection by the Dutch state. Against this
background, the risks on the legacy CRE portfolio, which SNS Bank
still holds until its transfer to the state-owned Real Estate
Management Company (REMC), have also materially abated following
the recognition of the aforementioned EUR2 billion provision.
Although Moody's expects further deterioration in the domestic
CRE sector, the rating agency does not anticipate that SNS Bank
would incur additional losses on this portfolio until its
transfer to the REMC, as the EUR2 billion provision and existing
loan loss provisions provide a substantial cushion against
further impairments (total provisions represent around 45% of
outstanding legacy exposures according to data disclosed in SNS
Bank's June 2013 interim report).

The upgrade of SNS Bank's BFSR also reflects Moody's view that
(1) SNS Bank's risk profile will be considerably lower as the
bank will focus solely on its core domestic retail banking
activities; (2) profitability will materially improve, as the
bank no longer incurs credit losses on its legacy portfolio and
the core activities generate sound recurring earnings; and (3)
the bank's liquidity profile will remain a credit strength. The
bank has quickly compensated for the deposit outflows that
preceded nationalization and its structural reliance on wholesale
funding will decline after the transfer of the legacy CRE

Rating Outlooks on SNS Bank's Long-Term Ratings and BFSR:

The outlook on SNS Bank's BFSR is positive, reflecting Moody's
expectation that the bank's standalone financial strength is
likely to improve further if (1) the final restructuring plan is
approved by the EC; (2) tail risks within the legacy CRE
portfolio are addressed; and (3) the bank successfully restores
its domestic retail franchise.

The outlook is stable on SNS Bank's long-term debt and deposit
ratings. The outlook reflects Moody's view that an improvement of
the bank's standalone financial profile would not automatically
result in an improvement of its long-term creditworthiness. This
stance is consistent with Moody's assessment that, if SNS Bank
required a third state-support package (1) the European
Commission (EC) would likely seek to impose burden sharing, in
line with its restructuring plan guidelines; and (2) burden
sharing could impact senior instruments, given the current state
ownership and in the absence of junior instruments in the
liability structure.

Confirmation of the Ratings of SNS REAAL'S Insurance Operations:

Following the group's announcement that it will separate its
banking and insurance operations, Moody's believes that the
contagion risks between SNS REAAL's insurance operations and SNS
Bank have abated. Therefore, SRLEV and REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen's IFSRs now reflect the standalone financial
profile of SNS REAAL's insurance operations.

The Baa2 IFSRs and the stable outlook assigned to SRLEV and REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen take into account Moody's expectation of
continuous pressures on the profitability, solvency and financial
flexibility of SNS REAAL's insurance operations because of (1)
the low interest-rate environment; (2) the challenging Dutch
insurance market; and (3) the weak economic environment in the

Moody's says that the insurance operations' leverage has
increased to 45% at year-end 2012, notably as a result of a
decline in shareholders' equity. Total shareholders' equity
decreased by 34% between year-end 2011 and year-end 2012,
following significant impairment of intangible assets. Earnings
coverage (0.7x on a five-year average basis) is also pressurized
by weakening profitability.

The Baa2 IFSRs also reflect the uncertainties on the franchise of
the insurance group. In Moody's opinion, the period preceding the
nationalization had a negative impact on SNS REAAL's insurance
operations franchise. The rating agency notes the continued
uncertainty regarding SNS REAAL's ability to maintain its
historically strong market positions, especially in the rapidly
evolving Dutch life insurance market, where insurance savings are
falling and competition in the pensions segment is growing. These
uncertainties are reinforced by potential remedies that the EC
could impose on SNS REAAL's insurance operations, as part of the
approval of the Group's restructuring plan.

Confirmation of SRLEV'S Hybrid Ratings:

The B1(hyb) ratings on the hybrid securities issued by SRLEV are
five notches below its IFSR, which is wider than Moody's standard
notching practices for debt issued by operating insurance
companies. This wider notching reflects the deferral of coupons
on these securities imposed by the EC under the authority granted
by its temporary approval on February 22, 2013, following the
state aid granted to SNS REAAL.

At the same time, Moody's says that the B1(hyb) ratings and the
developing outlook attached to these ratings incorporate a
variety of positive and negative credit scenarios.

In particular, Moody's notes that the EC's approval of the state
aid was only temporary and the EC will shortly give its final
decision on the basis of the restructuring plan submitted by SNS
REAAL. At this stage, it remains uncertain whether the EC's final
approval will lift or prolong the coupon ban on SRLEV's hybrid

Moody's says that the B1(hyb) ratings could be downgraded if the
coupon ban persists, thereby deferring coupons for a prolonged
period of time. On the contrary, the B1(hyb) ratings may be
upgraded if the coupon ban is lifted rapidly, and if the risks of
a liability exchange exercise, undertaken by SNS REAAL,

Confirmation of the Holding Company's Senior Debt Rating:

The confirmation of SNS REAAL's senior debt rating at (P)Ba2
follows the confirmation of SNS Bank's deposit rating and of
SRLEV and REAAL Schadeverzekeringen's IFSRs. The (P)Ba2 rating
reflects the combination of (1) the relative credit strengths of
the banking and insurance operations of SNS REAAL; (2) the
structural subordination of the revenues that the Group receives
in the form of dividends from operating companies; and (3)
Moody's current assessment of systemic support for the banking
unit, and the resulting benefits attributable to creditors at the
holding operations.

SNS REAAL's (P)B2 subordinated debt rating reflects the
subordinated position of these creditors at the holding company,
and, consistent with Moody's approach for rating subordinated
debts issued by a bank's holding company, is anchored by the
standalone financial profiles of the bank and the insurance

Moody's does not factor diversification benefits into SNS REAAL's
ratings given the group's intention to separate its banking and
insurance operations.

Withdrawal of Tier 1 And Dated Subordinated Debt Ratings:

Moody's withdrew the C(hyb) ratings on all Tier 1 instruments and
the C ratings on all dated subordinated debt instruments issued
by SNS REAAL and SNS Bank. These instruments were expropriated on
February 1, 2013 by the Dutch government as part of the
nationalization of the SNS REAAL group and have therefore ceased
to exist.

Upgrade of SNS Bank's Subordinated Debt Program Rating:

The upgrade to (P)B1 from (P)C of SNS Bank's provisional
subordinated MTN program rating is driven by the improvement in
the institution's standalone credit profile and the resulting
lower risks for subordinated bondholders. The provisional program
rating is one notch below SNS Bank's BCA of ba3, reflecting the
subordinated claim in liquidation of the instruments that the
bank could issue in the future under this program.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

- SNS Bank

SNS Bank's BFSR may be upgraded following a combination of the
following: (1) a successful restoring of the bank's franchise
with no material restriction from the EC on its business
activities; (2) the approval of the final restructuring plan and
a complete removal of tail risk on the legacy CRE portfolio; and
(3) the bank maintaining a sound financial position against the
current domestic economic backdrop.

The outlook is stable on SNS Bank's long-term senior unsecured
and deposit ratings, consistent with Moody's view that the bank's
long-term creditworthiness would not automatically strengthen as
a result of an improvement of the bank's standalone financial

The positive outlook on SNS Bank's BFSR indicates that Moody's
does not anticipate a downgrade in the foreseeable future.
However, the BFSR could be downgraded in the event of any further
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment that affects the
bank's financial position beyond Moody's expectations, notably as
a result of higher-than-anticipated risks on domestic mortgage
loans. The bank's BFSR may also be downgraded if the bank fails
to restore its franchise or if the EC were to attach material
conditions to (or materially alter) its restructuring plan. More
generally, any deterioration in the bank's solvency or liquidity
profile or in its recurring earnings generation capacity, may
lead to a downgrade of its BFSR.

SNS Bank's long-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings could
be downgraded as a result of a similar action on its BFSR, or if
Moody's lowers its probability of systemic support assumptions
for SNS Bank's senior creditors or depositors. This reassessment
may result notably from lower systemic importance for the
institution, or from developments on the willingness to support
senior creditors in the Netherlands.

- SRLEV and REAAL Schadeverzekeringen

According to Moody's, the IFSRs of the insurance companies could
be downgraded if their franchises were to deteriorate, with a
negative impact on the profitability of these operations, or if
their solvency continued to deteriorate significantly.
Conversely, the IFSRs could be upgraded if SRLEV and REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen were able to maintain strong market
positions, while restoring good levels of profitability and

Moody's adds that SRLEV's B1(hyb) debt ratings could be
downgraded if the rating agency believes that the probability of
a prolonged coupon deferral has increased for those instruments,
for example if the EC maintained a coupon ban for these
instruments. On the contrary, the B1(hyb) ratings could be
upgraded if the EC lifted its coupon ban and if Moody's
considered that the risks of a liability exchange exercise on
these instruments -- implying losses for bondholders -- were


The rating agency says that as long as SNS REAAL remains the
holding company of both the banking and the insurance operations,
a change in the bank's long-term ratings or of the insurance
entities' IFSRs could result in a change of the holding company's
ratings. Furthermore, the provisional senior debt rating of SNS
REAAL could be downgraded if Moody's lowers its assessment of the
probability of systemic support available to SNS REAAL's

The following ratings were upgraded:

- SNS Bank's bank financial strength rating upgraded to D-/ba3
   from E/ca, and outlook revised to positive

- SNS Bank's provisional subordinated program rating upgraded to
   (P)B1 from (P)C

- SNS REAAL N.V.'s provisional subordinated program rating
   upgraded to (P)B2 from (P)C

The following ratings were confirmed:

- SNS Bank's long-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings
   confirmed at Baa3, and outlook revised to stable

- SNS Bank's provisional MTN program rating confirmed at (P)Baa3

- SNS Bank's short-term senior unsecured and deposit ratings
   confirmed at Prime-3

- SNS Bank's provisional short-term program rating confirmed at

- SRLEV N.V.'s insurance financial strength rating confirmed at
   Baa2, and outlook revised to stable;

- REAAL Schadeverzekeringen N.V.'s insurance financial strength
   rating confirmed at Baa2, and outlook revised to stable;

- SRLEV N.V.'s dated subordinated debt rating confirmed at
   B1(hyb), and outlook revised to developing;

- SRLEV N.V.'s perpetual junior subordinated debt rating
   confirmed at B1(hyb), and outlook revised to developing;

- SNS REAAL N.V.'s provisional senior unsecured program rating
   confirmed at (P)Ba2

The following ratings were affirmed:

- SNS REAAL N.V. commercial paper affirmed at Not Prime

- SNS REAAL N.V. provisional short-term program rating affirmed
   at (P)Not Prime

The following ratings were withdrawn:

- SNS Bank's and SNS REAAL's subordinate notes previously rated
   C, no outlook

- SNS Bank's and SNS REAAL's pref stock non-cumulative
   instruments, previously rated C(hyb), no outlook

The principal methodology used in rating SNS Bank N.V. was Global
Banks published in May 2013.

The methodologies used in rating REAAL Schadeverzekeringen N.V.
and SRLEV N.V. were Moody's Global Rating Methodology for
Property and Casualty Insurers Published in May 2010, Moody's
Global Rating Methodology for Life Insurers published in May
2010, and Moody's Guidelines for Rating Insurance Hybrid
Securities and Subordinated Debt Published in January 2010.

The methodologies used in rating SNS REAAL NV were Global Banks
published in May 2013, Moody's Global Rating Methodology for
Property and Casualty Insurers Published in May 2010, and Moody's
Global Rating Methodology for Life Insurers published in May

List of affected Issuers by Releasing Office France:

Releasing Office:

  Moody's France SAS
  96 Boulevard Haussmann
  75008 Paris

Issuer : SNS Reaal N.V.

Issuer : SRLEV NV

Issuer : REAAL Schadeverzekeringen NV


AVERSA: Michael Topolinski Acquires Business
Cristi Moga at Ziarul Financiar reports that Michael Topolinski
has acquired bankrupt pump maker Aversa in Bucharest.

Mr. Topolinski was assisted in the transaction by law firm Biris
Goran, Ziarul Financiar discloses.

Aversa is based in Romania.

GALLI GALLO: Poultry Market Woes Prompt Insolvency
Gabriel Razi at Ziarul Financiar reports that Galli Gallo went
insolvent at its own request amid difficulties on the poultry
market and weighed down by debts.

Galli Gallo is the largest turkey farmer and turkey meat
processor in Romania.


BREBORO HOLDINGS: S&P Assigns 'B-' CCR; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'B-' long-term corporate credit rating and 'ruBBB-' Russia
national scale rating to Cyprus-registered holding company
Breboro Holdings Co. and its fully owned subsidiary LLC MC
Kvartstroy, which develop residential real estate in Russia.  The
outlook is stable.

S&P has also assigned its 'B-' long-term and 'ruBBB-' issue
ratings to the proposed RUB1.5 billion senior unsecured notes to
be issued by Kvartstroy.  The recovery rating on these proposed
notes is '4', reflecting S&P's expectation of average recovery
(30%-50%) for bondholders in the event of a payment default.

The rating reflects S&P's assessment of Breboro's business risk
profile as "vulnerable," based primarily on the generally high
cyclicality and capital intensity of the real estate development
business in Russia.  It also factors in the risks associated with
the relatively small size of the company, and a high
concentration of income derived from projects in one area, Nizhny
Novgorod.  S&P believes that Breboro has weak long-term equity
support, which constrains the scope of future development
projects and, consequently, the company's ability to improve
operating margins and free cash flow from operations.  S&P views
equity support as weak because just over 30% of the company's
equity capital may be called back by its holders in 2015, unless
a new agreement is drawn up or new equity investors are found.
This consideration drives S&P's assessment of Breboro's
management and governance score as "weak," which contributes to
the overall business risk profile assessment.

S&P believes that Breboro has well-established market positions
in some of Russia's larger industrial cities, such as Nizhny
Novgorod and Volgograd.  S&P acknowledges the company's track
record in developing and marketing quality smaller-size
apartments that address the needs of mid-income consumers.  S&P
believes that demand for residential housing in Russia has
received a boost from a range of government initiatives -- such
as residential mortgage lending expansion by state-owned or -
supported banking organizations -- which seek to address
shortages of quality housing in Russia.

However, cyclicality of demand and prices is high in the house-
building industry.  Furthermore, S&P views Breboro's exposure to
house price volatility as above average because of the modest
size of its development portfolio -- 261,500 square meters under
construction -- and high concentration of income derived from
only four projects in 2013 -- three in Nizhny Novgorod and one in
Volgograd.  S&P believes that the geographical focus on Nizhny
Novgorod is likely to increase over the next three years as 80%
of the 1,303,000 square meters currently in the predevelopment
phase relates to projects in the city.  S&P also factors in the
unpredictability of local regulatory decisions in Russia and
growth prospects in Nizhny Novgorod and Volgograd, which are, in
S&P's view, lower than in Moscow or St. Petersburg.  Although
there is structural demand for new homes in Russia, it remains
highly correlated to GDP growth.  S&P projects Russia's GDP will
slow in 2013 to 2.5% compared with 3.4% in 2012.  The supply of
housing developments also relies greatly on the current low
interest rates.

"We view Breboro's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged."
In our view, Breboro has high short- to medium-term liabilities,
stemming from the put options that the 30.5% shareholder, Conlu
Ltd., can exercise over the next three years, namely at
completion of two major projects in 2014 and 2015 and at
termination of the shareholders' agreement in March 2015.  We
view the latter put option as a potential risk affecting the
long-term continuity of Breboro's equity.  However, we
acknowledge Conlu's strong commitment to find a third-party
investor without hampering Breboro's self-funding capacity,
should the 69.5% shareholder Kvartstroy Investment Ltd. be unable
to redeem its shares," S&P said.

S&P believes the company's financial flexibility also remains
constrained by the high working capital needs of its residential
development projects, which are likely to require additional
external liquidity before there is a material step-up in free
cash flow generation from its development operations.  As a
result, S&P forecasts the ratio of debt to debt and equity,
including its adjustments, to remain close to 60%, which S&P
views as consistent with a highly leveraged financial risk

The stable outlook on Breboro reflects S&P's opinion that its
operating performance over the next 6-12 months should benefit
from stable demand for smaller apartments in its main local
markets, as well as from stable prices in the broader residential
property segment.  S&P believes that Breboro's established
operations will allow it to seek alternative sources of debt and
equity funding to stabilize its capital structure before 2015.
That said, S&P's credit rating highlights the long-term business
and financial constraints that are placed on the company by its
current capital structure.

S&P could lower the ratings if an unexpected fall in demand
affected the company's cash flow generation and operating margin.
S&P could also take a negative rating action if it saw evidence
of Breboro's shareholder support weakening further over the next
12 months.

Rating upside is limited at this stage, as it would be contingent
on Breboro being able to significantly increase its equity base.

* Moody's Notes Higher Credit Risks for Russia's Consumer Banks
Russia's consumer finance banks face increasing credit risks in
the unsecured retail lending market, says Moody's Investors
Service in a new Special Comment entitled "Russian Consumer
Finance Banks: Rising Credit Risks Accelerate Asset Quality
Weaknesses." Higher credit risks have accelerated the
deterioration in the banks' asset quality in 2013, leading to
lower profits and reduced capital buffers over the next 12-18

Moody's bases its view on three key drivers (1) Russian
consumers' growing debt burden; (2) the banks' rapid growth in
personal loans; and (3) the country's weak growth outlook. These
factors are exerting credit negative pressure on the rated
Russian consumer finance banks.

Banks that are likely to continue to be affected the most in
terms of a deterioration in asset quality, are those with higher
credit-risk appetites, as measured by (1) a track record of rapid
retail lending growth; (2) historical and current high credit
costs ; and (3) modest capital buffers and lower core earnings,
which imply weaker loss-absorption capacity. Banks that are
following more prudent risk strategies will likely continue to be
affected to a lesser extent.

Despite Moody's expectation of slower lending growth in H2 2013
following new bank regulations introduced, most consumer finance
banks are still growing very rapidly. The continued high lending
growth rate will likely lead to further deterioration in the
banks' asset quality due to households' weakening capacity to
repay debt. Indicative of this, credit costs for rated consumer
banks increased by 1.5 times in the first half of 2013 and
Moody's expects this trend to continue.

Moody's will continue to assess how the deteriorating trend in
Russia's consumer finance banks asset quality develops and any
resulting implications for the banks' credit profiles.


* Slovenian Bank Clean-Up Still Uncertain Despite Progress
The announcement of the resolution of two small Slovenian banks
underlines the authorities' determination to tackle weaknesses in
the banking sector without imposing losses on senior creditors,
Fitch Ratings says. But the banks involved are small and without
a timely transfer of problem assets to the state-owned "bad
bank", a much-needed clean-up of the system remains uncertain.

The overall clean-up costs could be underestimated by the
Slovenian government. The EUR1 billion guarantee issued by the
sovereign to support the liquidity of Probanka and Factor Banka
is large, particularly as these two banks make up just 4.5% of
banking sector assets. This indicates that the contingent risks
for the sovereign could rise.

"There is already significant divergence between official and
Fitch estimates of bank recapitalization costs. We estimate
Slovenian banks could need EUR2.8 billion (8% of GDP) of fresh
capital, more than 2x the official estimate, because we make
tougher assumptions on peak non-performing loan levels, their
coverage and target capital ratios. In addition, the sovereign
may also need to provide liquidity to support the transfer of
assets to the bad bank. However, our base case remains that the
sovereign can afford the bank restructuring costs," Fitch says.

Non-performing loans have continued to increase and we believe
they have yet to peak despite a recent slowing in the pace of
economic contraction. The uncertain market conditions mean that
agreeing an appropriate transfer value for the bad bank assets
among several parties, including the European Commission, is a
challenge. It is possible the asset transfer could be pushed back
again, having already been extended by four months to October.
The sub-investment grade Issuer Default Ratings of the three
largest banks -- NLB, NKBM and Abanka -- already reflect
significant uncertainty about timely provision of sufficient
support to the banks.

The delays with the timing of asset transfers to the bad bank
increase the risk that additional credit losses will arise as
portfolios continue to deteriorate. Further weakening of
capitalization from loan impairment losses could also lead to
further downgrades for the Viability Ratings of Slovenian banks
from already low levels.

The announced wind-down of the two small banks has had limited
impact on customer deposits within the system so far. However,
the Slovenian market is highly interconnected and a sharp
tightening of liquidity at those two banks could raise systemic

"We continue to believe that support will be forthcoming for the
largest banks, so the recapitalizations will not involve losses
for senior creditors. The treatment of bank depositors and senior
creditors in the resolution of the two small banks supports this
view. The resolution stipulates that hybrid and other
subordinated debt will be subject to burden sharing, consistent
with new EU state aid requirements introduced in August. But
there is significant uncertainty, particularly in light of
continued delays with recapitalizing the banks, which is why the
IDRs are low," Fitch says.

"We expect further consolidation in the banking sector in the
medium term, which combined with restructuring should help create
a smaller number of more efficient and viable institutions. This
could involve foreign investors."


BANCO DE SABADELL: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' Ratings; Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Spain-based Banco de
Sabadell S.A. (Sabadell).  The outlook is negative.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Sabadell's announced
capital increase will improve the bank's creditworthiness by
materially strengthening its relatively weak capitalization,
although S&P believes that the bank's capital position is still
exposed to potential risks, mainly relating to the challenging
operating environment in Spain.

On Sept. 9, 2013, Sabadell announced a plan to increase capital
by between EUR1.3 billion and EUR1.4 billion through the
combination of accelerated bookbuilding and a rights issue.  The
bookbuilding, which has already been completed, will cover EUR650
million and the bank will raise the rest through the rights
issue.  The operation is fully underwritten for the amount still
to be raised. S&P understands that Sabadell has undertaken this
capital increase to strengthen regulatory capital ratios, in
accordance with its capital management policy.

In S&P's opinion, the announced capital increase, together with
Sabadell's ongoing deleveraging and internal capital generation,
will meaningfully improve the bank's solvency from its currently
relatively weak position.  S&P now estimates that over the next
24 months its risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio for Sabadell will
reach just under 5%, a level that remains consistent with its
current assessment of Sabadell's capital.  S&P also acknowledges
Sabadell's financial flexibility, which it has demonstrated
through being able to raise capital even in difficult times.
Sabadell has raised EUR2.3 billion of fresh capital in total in
2012 and 2013.

However, S&P still sees potential risks to the bank's
profitability from the weak operating environment in Spain.
S&P's assessment is also constrained by Sabadell's relatively
modest quality of capital because of the level of deferred tax
assets, which is higher than peers'.  Deferred tax assets
represented 53% of total adjusted capital (pro forma, including
the effect of the capital increase currently underway) as of
year-end 2012.

S&P has maintained its assessments of Sabadell's "adequate"
business position, "moderate" risk position, "average" funding,
and "moderate" liquidity.  S&P continues to assess Sabadell's
stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'b+'.

S&P also continues to incorporate a one-notch uplift in its
ratings for short-term support to reflect its belief that the
European Central Bank's (ECB) long-term refinancing operations
should give Sabadell time to address its liquidity imbalances and
achieve adequate funding and liquidity.  S&P also maintains a
one-notch uplift over the SACP for potential extraordinary
government support, based on its view of Sabadell's high systemic
importance and Spain's supportive stance towards its banking

The negative outlook on Sabadell reflects the possibility that
S&P could lower the rating if the conditions in which Spanish
banks operate deteriorate further or S&P lowers the long-term
sovereign credit rating on Spain.  If the latter happened, all
else remaining equal, S&P would no longer include the one-notch
uplift for potential extraordinary government support into its
ratings on Sabadell, in accordance with its criteria.

S&P could also consider lowering the rating if it believes that
the bank's liquidity position is unlikely to improve in line with
its current expectations, and that it is likely to continue to
rely on short-term wholesale funding, including the ECB liquidity

"We could revise the outlook on Sabadell to stable if we also
revised the outlook on the long-term sovereign credit rating on
Spain to stable and we expected an easing in the negative trends
we see for the operating environment for banks in Spain.  We
could also revise Sabadell's outlook to stable, all else being
equal, if we anticipated a sustainable strengthening of
Sabadell's asset quality and solvency beyond our current
expectations. Specifically, we could revise the outlook to stable
if the bank smoothly manages the nonperforming assets of Banco
CAM and improves asset quality performance closer to the system
average (as it was before Sabadell acquired Banco CAM).  An
outlook revision to stable would also hinge on Sabadell meeting
our expectation that the bank will sustain a stronger level of
capital both in quantitative and qualitative terms, including a
RAC ratio comfortably above 5%," S&P noted.

CODERE SA: Decision to Delay Bond Coupon May Trigger CDS Payouts
Katie Linsell and Julie Miecamp at Bloomberg News report that
Codere SA's decision to delay payment of a bond coupon until two
days after the money is due may trigger payouts on credit-default
swaps insuring US$444 million of the Spanish gaming company's

Bloomberg relates that Codere said on Friday it paid a penalty to
change the terms of a EUR99 million (US$132 million) loan from
private-equity firms Canyon Partners LLC and Blackstone Group
LP's GSO Capital Partners requiring the facility to be repaid
should the coupon be paid.  According to Bloomberg, the statement
said that it will now miss a payment on its US$300 million of
9.25% bonds due Sept. 15 and pay the money two days later.

That delay will enable buyers of credit-default swap protection
to seek a ruling from the International Swaps & Derivatives
Association that there's been a failure-to-pay credit event and
that the contracts should be settled, Bloomberg states.
Stan Manoukian, founder of Independent Credit Research, which
supplies analysis to distressed debt investors, said that may
simplify a restructuring of Codere because the company could then
work with the remaining creditors to repair the business,
Bloomberg notes.

"Non-payment of the coupon would trigger the CDS and allow some
funds involved in the restructuring to cash out," Bloomberg
quotes Mr. Manoukian as saying.

According to Bloomberg, the statement said that some of Codere's
senior lenders agreed to increase the loan from Canyon and GSO
Capital by EUR35 million.  The facility matures on Jan. 5 and can
be drawn down as many as three times between Sept. 17 and Dec. 5,
Bloomberg notes.  The statement said that the commitment fee is
3.25% per year on the undrawn borrowing and the company has to
pay the greater of 7% over benchmark rates or 8%a year for any
money taken, Bloomberg relates.

Investor confidence in the company deteriorated as it negotiated
with lenders, with its 8.25% notes due June 2015 falling to 51
cents on the euro from 80 cents in May, according to Bloomberg

According to Bloomberg, the company said that the majority of
holders of Codere's 8.25% bonds agreed to amend the terms to
allow the loan to be increased.  Investors in both Codere's
dollar- and euro-denominated notes agree they won't force
repayment when the coupon is paid late, Bloomberg notes.

A total of 3,192 swaps contracts insuring Codere's debt were
outstanding as of Sept. 6, Bloomberg says, citing the Depository
Trust & Clearing Corp.

Five-year contracts signaled a 97% chance of the company
defaulting during that period and cost EUR5.2 million in advance
and EUR500,000 annually to insure EUR10 million of Codere's debt,
Bloomberg states.

Codere SA is a Spain-based company engaged, together with its
subsidiaries, in the operation of activities related to the
private gaming sector, principally in the operation of arcade and
slot machines, sports betting houses, bingo halls, casinos and
racetracks.  The Company has presence in Spain, Italy, Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Trobuled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 22,
2013, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had lowered to
'SD' from 'CC' its long-term corporate credit rating on Spain-
based gaming company Codere S.A.

PESCANOVA SA: Damm-Led Shareholder Group Ousts Former Chairman
Miles Johnson at The Financial Times reports that a group of
shareholders in Pescanova SA seized control of the scandal-hit
Spanish frozen fish company from its former chairman in a vote on
Thursday, as it seeks to renegotiate previously hidden debts of
EUR3.6 billion with its lenders.

Investors led by Damm, the Catalan brewing company, which is
Pescanova's second-biggest shareholder with a 5.84% stake, won a
sweeping victory in the vote to remove the fishing group's former
chairman from the board and install new directors, the FT

Juan Manuel Urgoiti, a veteran banker who ran the now
nationalized Banco Gallego and sits on the board of clothing
group Inditex, was installed as the company's new non-executive
chairman, at the Damm-led investors' suggestion, the FT

Damm's proposal for the board, which along with its own candidate
included three members who were present during the period when
Pescanova concealed its debts, won 70.8% of the votes of the
investors present, or 37% of the total outstanding shares, the FT

Cartesian Capital, a US-based fund that holds 5% of Pescanova,
had proposed Baldomero Falcones, former chief executive of the
construction company FCC, as its candidate for chairman, arguing
that an entirely new group of directors with no connection to the
company was required, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Manuel Fernandez de Sousa, former chairman
of Pescanova, who as the son of its founder remains its largest
single investor with a 7.5% stake, had also proposed at the
meeting that the current board, including himself, should remain
in place.  But this was voted down at the meeting in Vigo in the
north-western region of Galicia, the FT relays.

Mr. Fernandez de Sousa, who has denied any wrongdoing, is being
investigated in both Spanish criminal and civil courts for
allegedly presiding over accounting fraud at the company, and
having secretly sold half of his then 15% stake before the
business revealed its problems, the FT discloses.

Pescanova is a Galicia-based fishing company.  The company
catches, processes, and packages fish on factory ships.  It is
one of the world's largest fishing groups.

Pescanova filed for insolvency on April 15, 2013, on at least
EUR1.5 billion (US$2 billion) of debt run up to fuel expansion
before economic crisis hit its earnings.  The Pontevedra
mercantile court in northwestern Galicia accepted Pescanova's
insolvency petition on April 25.  The court ordered the board of
directors to step down and proposed Deloitte as the firm's

* SPAIN: Falling Bank Lending Threatens Small Companies
Angeline Benoit at Bloomberg News reports that while Spanish
manufacturing and services expanded in August for the first time
in more than two years, falling bank lending threatens small
companies in a country where only 2% of businesses employ more
than 20 people.  That is overshadowing the recovery Prime
Minister Mariano Rajoy forecasts after a two-year recession,
Bloomberg notes.

"Spanish companies are most often small family-run operations,"
Bloomberg quotes Nathalie Gianese, director of studies at Informa
D&B, the research arm of Spanish risk insurer CESCE S.A., as
saying.  "Between the slump in revenue and their limited means,
these small firms are disadvantaged at a time when banks are
seeking to reduce risk as much as possible."

The number of companies seeking protection from creditors
increased by 26% through August compared with the same period a
year earlier, Bloomberg says, citing a report published by
Informa D&B.  According to Bloomberg, Spain's national statistics
institute said last month that in the second quarter, 73% of
businesses in such a predicament employed fewer than 20 people.

Lending by banks to non-financial corporations fell 1.3% in July
from June in Spain, more than in Portugal, Ireland and Greece,
while it rose in Italy, Bloomberg says, citing data compiled by
the European Central Bank.  Since January, it has declined almost
10% in Spain, Bloomberg notes.

Bank of Spain Chief Economist Jose Luis Malo de Molina said in
July that deleveraging in the economy makes funding restrictions
far worse for smaller enterprises, which are paying interest
rates at least 2 or 3 percentage points higher than similar
businesses elsewhere, Bloomberg relates.

Asked about the option of developing so-called mezzanine credit
for such businesses, which would give lenders the rights to
convert debt into equity, European Central Bank President Mario
Draghi said that the ECB is working on measures with the European
Commission and the European Investment Bank, Bloomberg notes.  He
didn't specify a time frame, Bloomberg states.

According to Bloomberg, the reluctance of Spanish banks to lend
is forcing businesses to resort to other methods of finding cash.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DIXONS RETAIL: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B1' CFR to Stable
Moody's Investors Service changed to stable from negative the
outlook on the B1 corporate family rating and senior unsecured
rating of Dixons Retail plc. Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the
B1 corporate family rating, B1-PD probability of default rating
and B1 senior unsecured rating assigned to the company.

"The change in outlook to stable is prompted by our view that in
the past few quarters, Dixons has delivered a resilient
performance in its core UK market, where it now benefits from a
stronger competitive position," says Yasmina Serghini-Douvin a
Vice President-Senior Analyst at Moody's and lead analyst for
Dixons. "The outlook change also factors in the irrevocable offer
received by the company with respect to its loss-making online
retailer PIXmania, as well as Dixons' disposal of its Turkish
operations, which, in our opinion, will boost its profitability
going forward and will enable management to focus more on
strengthening the core businesses."

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects Moody's view that in the past few
quarters, Dixons' performance has been resilient in its core
market, the UK & Ireland. In its first quarter ended July 31,
2013, Dixons' total like-for-like sales growth was 2%, driven by
a positive performance in its main market, where the company's
like-for-like sales increased by 6%, in the Nordics (+5%), and
despite deeply negative sales in southern Europe (-12%) and at
PIXmania (-28%). Although Moody's believes that Dixons will
remain subject to tough trading conditions in the UK, it benefits
from an improved competitive position there as a result of the
collapse last year of one of its main competitors, Comet. This,
together with Dixons' sustained efforts in narrowing the pricing
differential with e-tailers and enhancing its store and service
offering, should support its operational performance going

The change in outlook to stable also incorporates Moody's view
that the company's decisive actions to sell its Turkish
operations and its pure-play e-tailer PIXmania will be beneficial
to Dixons' profitability and credit metrics. Dixons has received
an irrevocable offer from mutares A.G., a German industrial
holding company, to purchase PIXmania. As part of this
transaction, Dixons will provide approximately EUR69 million
(approximately GBP58 million) to mutares, before any adjustment
related to PIXmania's working capital, to support its plan for
PIXmania. Dixons has also entered into an agreement to sell its
ElectroWorld operations in Turkey to Bimeks, one of the leading
electrical specialist retailers in Turkey. The rating action
assumes that both transactions will close in the course of this
financial year: Dixons expects the sale of ElectroWorld Turkey to
close by the end of this calendar year and the transaction on
PIXmania to complete within the next few months, after a
consultation period with PIXmania's Works Councils.

In light of the considerable pressure on earnings of electrical
and electronic retailers in Continental Europe, Moody's believes
that these transactions will enhance Dixons' profitability
because PIXmania and the Turkish business were both loss-making
last year and a drag on the company's consolidated earnings: they
reported an underlying operating loss of, respectively, GBP31.3
million and GBP9 million in the financial year ended April 30,
2013, compared with an underlying operating profit of GBP178.1
million for the group as a whole (before central costs). From a
strategic standpoint, the sale of PIXmania -- which had been a
focus of Dixons management's attention in the recent past -- will
also enable Dixons to focus more on its core businesses,
especially in the UK & Ireland.

Whilst the sale of PIXmania will result in a material cash
outflow for Dixons, not offset by the cash consideration of GBP2
million to be received from Bimeks, Moody's believes that the
transaction will support Dixons' credit metrics going forward
because the company will deconsolidate the losses of its Turkish
operations and PIXmania, and any liabilities held by these
subsidiaries including leases. In Moody's view, these
transactions, and Dixons' positive sales momentum in the UK, are
likely to result in a reduction in the company's adjusted (gross)
debt/EBITDA towards 5.5x compared with 6.5x in the year to April
2013. This would position the company more adequately in the B1
rating category.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Positive pressure on the rating or outlook could occur if the
company's earnings were to sustainably improve, translating into
better credit metrics including a debt/EBITDA ratio comfortably
below 5.0x and an EBITA/interest expense ratio sustained at, or
higher than, 2.0x.

Conversely, negative pressure could occur if the company's
operating performance or liquidity profile were to deteriorate.
Quantitatively, this would translate into a debt/EBITDA ratio
increasing towards 6.0x and an EBITA/interest expense ratio below

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Retail Industry published in June 2011. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Hemel Hempstead, England, Dixons Retail plc. is
one of Europe's leading specialist consumer electrical retailers.
It posted revenues of GBP8.2 billion for the financial year
ending April 30, 2013.

FORDGATE COMMERCIAL: Fitch Affirms 'B' Rating on Class B Notes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Fordgate Commercial Securitisation
No.1 plc's notes, as follows:

  GBP238.1m class A (XS0027160018): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

  GBP23.8m class B (XS02716505148): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation reflects that a slight improvement in collateral
performance has not changed Fitch's view on a likely loan default
at maturity in October 2013. Although the whole loan-to-value
ratio (LTV) is reported at 87%, this is based on values as at the
October 2006 closing; Fitch's estimate of 130% is consistent with
an expectation not of refinancing (particularly as the sponsor is
unlikely to inject equity) but rather of a managed disposal
process. Fitch estimates a securitized LTV of between 85% and
90%, which together with excess cash flow should allow for note
repayment by maturity in October 2016.

Since the previous rating action in September 2012 gross rents
have risen to GBP24.8 million from GBP24.0 million, whilst the
securitized interest coverage ratio (ICR) has increased to 1.50x
from 1.44x. This improvement is largely down to the Friar Bridge
asset, located south of the River Thames on Blackfriars Road,
which experienced a rise in occupancy to approximately 90% from
75% 12 months ago. Although rent achieved is much lower than
levels seen prior to the market slow-down, the successful re-
letting of a few units (following the recent expansion of one
tenant's presence after the previous occupier vacated) suggests
there is continued interest in Aberdeen among oil majors.

The portfolio includes three Aberdeen offices, so this is a
welcome sign. Overall, the collateral comprises mainly large
secondary assets let to financially strong tenants, but on short
remaining lease terms. In assets such as these Fitch has assumed
high levels of structural vacancy.

Following the expected loan event of default at maturity, Fitch
understands that debt ranking subordinate to the securitized loan
will stop benefitting from cash sweep of excess funds. The
borrower's interest rate swap will also expire, allowing funding
costs to fall in line with market rates of interest. Both these
changes should establish a stream of excess cash flow capable of
contributing materially towards either note amortization
(sequentially) or (more likely) a capex program. In Fitch's view,
exploiting excess funds in this way will be vital for a
successful work-out and note repayment by October 2016.

Rating Sensitivities

If the work-out becomes protracted, and is not accompanied by a
substantial capex program and/or deleveraging, this will likely
result in a downgrade for both classes of notes.

LEHMAN BROTHERS: Payout to Unsecured Creditors Expected in Nov.
Terry Murden at The Scotsman reports that all creditors in the
collapse of Lehman Brothers five years ago are a step closer to
recovering the entirety of their claims, with the -- possibility
for additional -- interest payments.

According to The Scotsman, administrators at PwC said that
another significant payout to unsecured creditors is expected in
November.  In March this year, a top-end payout of 116.2p in the
pound was forecast, but this could be higher, The Scotsman

Since the start of the administration PwC has returned GBP21
billion to creditors through a 68.5p in the pound payout, The
Scotsman discloses.  The prospect of a 100% recovery for any
insolvent estate is unusual, The Scotsman states.  According to
The Scotsman, Tony Lomas, joint administrator and PwC partner,
described it as "one of the most complex insolvencies the
financial world has ever seen."

A total of 2,100 unsecured creditor claims totaling GBP9 billion
have now been admitted to the Lehman estate and -- another 1,300
claims worth GBP7.5 billion have been filed but -- remain to be
agreed, The Scotsman discloses.

                      About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- was
the fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For
more than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the
global financial markets by serving the financial needs of
corporations, governmental units, institutional clients and
individuals worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Case No. 08-13555) on Sept. 15, 2008.  Lehman's bankruptcy
petition disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in
debts, effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the
largest in U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed

Affiliates Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred Somerset
LLC sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serve
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee's
investment banker.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered an
order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens has been appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase of
Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capital
markets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75
billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house in
Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus the
retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought Lehman's
operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, more
than three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history.  The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other than
the broker was confirmed in December 2011.

Lehman made its first payment of $22.5 billion to creditors in
April 2012, a second payment of $10.2 billion on Oct. 1, 2012,
and a third distribution of $14.2 billion on April 4, 2013.  The
brokerage is yet to make a first distribution to non-customers,
although customers are being paid in full.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and other
insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its


* High-Yield Bond Issuance for EMEA Surges Past US$100 Billion
Speculative-grade rated non-financial corporates in EMEA issued
bonds totaling US$12 billion in July/August, taking the last 12
months issuance to US$104 billion says Moody's in the September
edition of its "High Yield Interest -- European Edition"
publication. Year-to-date issuance of US$75 billion already
exceeds the previous record full year issuance of US$70 billion
in 2012.

"The market has returned speedily from the problems experienced
in June, with new issuer yields adjusting to revised
expectations, particularly for B-rated companies," says
Chetan Modi, Managing Director in Moody's European leveraged
finance team. "We now anticipate that full year issuance will
exceed US$100 billion, in line with the last 12 months."

In addition, the September edition includes new charts and data
including on issuance activity in the euro area periphery that
will provide investors with greater clarity on high-yield trends.
The report also discusses Moody's new methodology for debt and
equity treatment of speculative-grade hybrid instruments, and the
rating agency's expectation that the slight improvement in macro
trends will result in fewer downgrades for non-financial EMEA

* Moody's Says Better EUR Economy to Result in Fewer Downgrades
The slightly improving macroeconomic trends in Europe could lead
to a narrowing of the gap between rating upgrades and downgrades
for EMEA corporates, says Moody's Investors Service in a Special
Comment report entitled "EMEA Non-Financial Corporates: Fewer
Downgrades Likely to Follow Improvement in Europe's Macroeconomic

"The percentage of ratings with negative outlooks or ratings on
review for downgrade has fallen slightly for the first time in
several quarters to around 26% due to slightly improving
macroeconomic trends in Europe, reflected by euro area GDP rising
by 0.3% on the quarter in Q2 2013," says Jean-Michel Carayon, a
Moody's Senior Vice President and author of the report. "We still
expect more rating downgrades than upgrades in the third quarter
but are likely to approach a balance between the two in Q4 unless
there is an unexpected, dramatic deterioration in cyclical
industries such as mining, steel or chemicals."

Moody's currently expects the fundamental business conditions for
the following nine sectors covering EMEA corporates to be stable
over the next 12-18 months, reflected by their stable outlooks:
airlines, automotive manufacturers, building materials,
integrated oil, oilfield services and drilling, refining and
marketing, exploration and production, pharmaceutical, and
tobacco. Seven other sectors are currently on a negative outlook:
automotive parts suppliers, base metals, chemicals, retail, steel
producers, shipping and telecommunications. Meanwhile, only four
sectors carry a positive outlook: beverages, cable operators,
consumer products, and paper and forest products. However, there
are unlikely to be any significant shifts before the end of the
year, especially as cyclical industries remain under pressure
from emerging market slowdowns.

Despite signs that Europe is exiting recession, the credit
quality of select non-financial corporates will still be affected
by the macroeconomic weakness in the euro area periphery.
Corporates in the periphery remain more exposed to downgrades
than corporates in other regions of Europe as their exposure to
the region is usually significant.

Overall, liquidity remains solid. Despite Moody's concerns that
liquidity might deteriorate, investor appetite for bonds remains
strong, which favors market access for all corporates, and has
been beneficial for liquidity.

* Fitch Sees Improvement in Credit Quality of Eurozone Entities
Fitch Ratings says in the latest edition of its Credit Market
Quarterly EMEA that the credit quality of eurozone entities is
beginning to turn a corner. Rating downgrades continue to
diminish as the region emerges from six quarters of economic
contraction. The rating stabilization is driven by financials but
the potential for further downgrades is highlighted by the still-
elevated level of Negative Outlooks and Rating Watches for the

On-going bank deleveraging caused the 28% fall in overall bond
issuance in the year to end August compared with the same period
last year - pre-funding by non-financials at 2.5 times maturities
was insufficient to alleviate a 44% decline in new bonds from
financials. Investor sentiment remains cautious, reflected in the
relatively high allocation to cash. Opportunities are seen in
financial-sector bonds and high-yield despite a concern that the
latter is overvalued.

Peripheral Europe is also showing signs of improving credit
trends, following a significant reduction in negative rating
actions on entities in GIIPS nations. However, this is not yet
reflected in higher issuance volumes, with both financials and
non-financials exhibiting declines -- although recent investor
reception to issuance from their associated sovereigns has been

* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 9 to September 13, 2013

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *