TCREUR_Public/130923.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, September 23, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 188

                            Headlines

B E L G I U M

DEXIA SA: In Exclusive Talks to Sell Asset Management Unit


C Y P R U S

IG SEISMIC: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Positive


G E R M A N Y

HAPAG-LLOYD: S&P Rates EUR200MM Senior Unsecured Notes 'B-'
SCHAEFFLER AG: Moody's Lifts CFR to Ba3 Following Shares Offer


I R E L A N D

ANGLO IRISH: Creditors Blast Bank's Bid For Emergency Stay
DUBLIN GAZETTE: High Court Approves Examiner's Rescue Plan
HOUSE OF EUROPE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class A1 Notes to 'BB'
IRISH BANK: Judge Criticizes Lack of Witnesses in Bankruptcy Bid


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: Set to Approve Revised Restructuring Plan Tomorrow
FINMECCANICA SPA: Moody's Lowers Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba1


N E T H E R L A N D S

FORNAX ECLIPSE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on Class F & G Notes


P O L A N D

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Withdraws 'Ca' Corporate Family Rating


P O R T U G A L

METROPOLITANO DE LISBOA: S&P Puts 'B' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
PARPUBLICA: S&P Puts 'B' Rating on CreditWatch Developing


R O M A N I A

* ROMANIA: Lowest Number of Insolvencies in August This Year


R U S S I A

BORETS INT'L: Moody's Views EBRD Acquisition as Credit Positive


S L O V E N I A

* Moody's Maintains Negative Outlook on Slovenia's Banking System


S P A I N

LA SEDA: Seeks Court OK to Sell Two Production Sites in Spain


S W E D E N

JB EDUCATION: Economic Crime Authority Begins Bankruptcy Probe


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CLIVE CAPITAL: To Close This Month Following Two Years of Losses
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Sets Up Panel to Review Alternative Proposals
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Parent Can Refuse to Inject Capital
LLOYDS BANKING: Fitch Affirms Tier 1 Sub. Debt Rating to 'BB-'
MEREPARK CONSTRUCTION: Fined GBP30,000 Over Gas Leak Incident

REDTREE INT'L: Rugby Club Sponsor Goes Into Liquidation


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Expects Deleveraging Trend to Continue for EU Insurers
* Fitch Sees Shifting Growth Trends in Advanced, Emerging Markets
* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 16 to September 20, 2013


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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DEXIA SA: In Exclusive Talks to Sell Asset Management Unit
----------------------------------------------------------
Robert-Jan Bartunek at Reuters reports that Dexia SA said late on
Thursday it has entered into exclusive talks with New York Life
Investments to sell its asset management unit, which had
EUR72.7 billion of assets under management at the end of
June 2013.

According to Reuters, the group, which has to sell Dexia Asset
Management as part of a deal with European regulators in exchange
for state aid it received in recent years, did not say how much
New York Life Investments planned to offer.

Dexia had initially agreed to sell the asset management arm to
Hong Kong-based GCS Capital for EUR380 million (US$507 million),
but that deal fell through in July, Reuters recounts.

The group said it was confident that New York Life Investments
would see the deal through if the two sides decided to put pen to
paper, Reuters relates.

On Wednesday, FinEx Capital, part of the investment management
firm FinEx Group, said it had made an offer to buy the unit,
Reuters notes.

Dexia was once the world's biggest lender to local authorities,
but it had to be bailed out by France and Belgium when its access
to funds dried up in the credit crunch, Reuters recounts.

Dexia SA is a Belgium-based banking group with activities
principally in Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Turkey in the
fields of retail and commercial banking, public and wholesale
banking, asset management and investor services.  In France,
Dexia Bank focuses on funding public sector bodies and providing
financial services to local government.  In Luxembourg, Dexia
operates in two main areas: commercial banking (for personal and
professional customers) and private banking (for international
investors).  In Turkey, Dexia is involved in retail and
commercial banking and offers services to ordinary account
holders, business and local public sector customers and
institutional clients. The Company operates through its
subsidiaries, such as Dexia Credit Local, DenizBank, Dexia
Credicop, Dexia Sabadell, Dexia Kommunalbank Deutschland, Dexia
Asset Management, among others.



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C Y P R U S
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IG SEISMIC: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'B' long-
term corporate credit rating to Cyprus-headquartered seismic
company IG Seismic Services and to its Russia-domiciled core
subsidiary GEOTECH Seismic Services.  The outlook is positive.
S&P also assigned its 'ruA' Russian national scale rating to
GEOTECH Seismic Services.

The rating on IGSS reflects S&P's assessment of the company's
business risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged."  IGSS generated US$138 million of Standard &
Poor's adjusted EBITDA for 12 months until June 30, 2013 and
achieved positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) of US$7.3
million, compared with negative FOCF in 2011.  S&P views this as
supportive of the rating.

The rating on GEOTECH reflects S&P's view of this entity as a
core subsidiary of IGSS that is integral to IGSS' business.  It
controls key operating assets and generates approximately one
half of the group's EBITDA.  GEOTECH is strongly linked to IGSS's
reputation and the group has a strong incentive to support
GEOTECH if needed.

S&P views the company's financial risk profile as the key
constraint on the rating owing to high volatility and seasonality
of IGSS business, which puts pressure on liquidity requirements
and financial metrics, in S&P's view.  The company also has a
short track record in the current consolidation perimeter.  It
emerged at the end of 2011 when the key local industry players at
the time, GEOTECH, Integra, and Schlumberger, decided to combine
their seismic assets in Russia to withstand severe competitive
pressures and low prices.

"In our base-case scenario for 2013-2014, we expect IGSS to
strengthen its cash flow generation with funds from operations
(FFO) to debt of 20%-25% and neutral to positive FOCF, which will
allow the company to gradually reduce leverage.  We expect that
the company's adjusted debt to EBITDA will be less than 3.0x in
2014.  The actual ratio was 2.3x as of June 30, 2013, but the
company's debt typically rises in the second half of the year.
We assume that IGSS will refrain from large dividend payments and
material acquisitions in the near term, at least before debt
obligations reduce greatly," S&P said.

The company's business risk assessment includes S&P's view of the
Russian seismic industry as a niche market with high seasonality
and volatility.  Unlike the case for some of its international
peers, the majority of IGSS revenues comes from short-term
contracts, and seismic works in IGSS' core markets can only be
performed during the winter months.  The company's pricing power,
in S&P's view, may face limitations due to IGSS' small size
compared with its customers.

The company's relatively small scale is partially offset by IGSS'
leading position in the Russian seismic market, thanks to its
advanced technology, compared with local competitors.  Its
leading position also benefits from technological support from
its shareholder Schlumberger.  Market entry barriers are high due
to difficult logistics and market regulation, which further
supports the company's leading position. We expect that the
Russian seismic market, particularly the volume and complexity of
its services, will grow from its current low level as Russia's
key oil provinces mature and oil companies use more advanced
technologies, such as high-density seismic services, to save on
drilling costs.  This will support company revenue growth and
profitability.  IGSS actively works on increasing long-term
contracts in its portfolio, which should help make future
revenues more predictable.  For example, the company signed a
three-year contract with Gazprom Neft JSC in early 2013.

The positive outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the Russian
sesimic market will improve gradually.

S&P could raise the rating if IGSS shows consistently improving
performance, satisfying an "aggressive" financial risk profile,
as defined by S&P's criteria.  This should be supported by
stronger cash flow generation, so that higher profits and neutral
to positive free cash flow helps the company to gradually reduce
leverage.  That said, S&P assumes that the company should
maintain its "adequate" liquidity position.  In S&P's base case,
it do not expect any large acquisitions or dividend payments in
the near term.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the company's liquidity
weakens.  S&P could also revise the outlook to stable in the
event of slower than expected market growth or a decrease in
demand for the more expensive and complex services IGSS offers.
Negative pressure may also arise from large acquisitions or
sizable dividend payments.



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G E R M A N Y
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HAPAG-LLOYD: S&P Rates EUR200MM Senior Unsecured Notes 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'B-' issue rating to the proposed EUR200 million senior unsecured
and unguaranteed notes due 2018 to be issued by Hapag-Lloyd AG
(B+/Stable/--).  The recovery rating on the proposed notes is
'6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery
in the event of a payment default.

The recovery rating of '6' on the proposed EUR200 million senior
unsecured notes, as well as on the existing senior unsecured
notes (US$250 million due 2017 and EUR480 million due 2015), is
constrained by:

   -- The notes' unsecured and unguaranteed status and slight
      documentary protection against the raising of new debt;

   -- The strong security provided to virtually all the group's
      bank loans over the company's best assets; and

   -- The risk of multijurisdictional insolvency proceedings.

S&P believes that the three categories of notes are equally
deeply subordinated vis a vis Hapag-Lloyd's enterprise value,
given the significant amount of secured debt at Hapag-Lloyd.

S&P's hypothetical default scenario contemplates a default in
2015 when the EUR480 million senior unsecured notes fall due.  It
assumes that lenders become unwilling to refinance these notes,
following a weakening in economic conditions, and thus transport
volumes, as well as freight rates, which would lead to rapidly
falling vessel values.

S&P has valued the company's assets at EUR2.6 billion, using a
stressed asset valuation in a going concern scenario, which,
among others, included distressed values for vessels, containers,
and properties.

After deducting enforcement costs of EUR236 million, priority
liabilities of about EUR287 million, and secured loans (including
six months of prepetition interest) of EUR2 billion, the net
value available to unsecured creditors would be negligible (0%-
10%).

RATINGS LIST

New Rating
Hapag-Lloyd AG

Proposed EUR200 mil senior unsecured notes   B-
Recovery rating                            6


SCHAEFFLER AG: Moody's Lifts CFR to Ba3 Following Shares Offer
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the
corporate family rating and to Ba3-PD from B1-PD the probability
of default rating of Schaeffler AG. Concurrently, Moody's has
upgraded Schaeffler AG's and Schaeffler Finance B.V.'s loans and
senior secured notes to Ba2 with a loss given default assessment
(LGD) of LGD3-37% from Ba3 and the senior secured notes issued by
Schaeffler Holding Finance B.V. to B1 LGD5-75% from B2. The
outlook on all ratings is stable.

The following ratings have been assigned:

Upgrades:

Issuer: Schaeffler AG

  Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Ba3-PD from B1-PD

  Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Ba3 from B1

  Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility Jan 27, 2017, Upgraded to
  Ba2 from Ba3

Issuer: Schaeffler Finance B.V.

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Feb 15, 2017, Upgraded to
  Ba2 from Ba3

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Feb 15, 2019, Upgraded to
  Ba2 from Ba3

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture May 15, 2021, Upgraded to
  Ba2 from Ba3

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Feb 15, 2017, Upgraded to
  Ba2 from Ba3

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Jul 1, 2017, Upgraded to
  Ba2 from Ba3

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Feb 15, 2019, Upgraded to
  Ba2 from Ba3

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture May 15, 2018, Upgraded to
  Ba2 from Ba3

Issuer: Schaeffler Holding Finance B.V.

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Aug 15, 2018, Upgraded to
  B1 from B2

  Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Aug 15, 2018, Upgraded to
  B1 from B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Schaeffler AG

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Issuer: Schaeffler Finance B.V.

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Issuer: Schaeffler Holding Finance B.V.

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

Ratings Rationale:

"The upgrade to Ba3 was triggered by Schaeffler's successful
placement of 3.9% of its shares held in Continental AG and to
apply the proceeds of approximately EUR950 million as well as
additional EUR325 million from excess free cash flow to reduce
its indebtedness", says Falk Frey, a Moody's Senior Vice
President and lead analyst for Schaeffler. "As a result of the
transaction, Schaeffler's credit metrics will improve to levels
which position the company solidly in the Ba3 rating category in
our opinion", adds Mr. Frey.

The rating action reflects Schaeffler's lower total debt after
the transaction, resulting in improved leverage metrics such as a
reduced adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio of 3.6x in the 12 months ended
March 2013 pro-forma the transaction from 4.0x previously.
Moreover, Moody's views Schaeffler's reduced stake in Continental
to 46% (34.2% of which is held by Schaeffler AG and 11.8% by
Schaeffler Verwaltungs GmbH) from 49.9% as positive as the
potential risk of a future combination of Schaeffler and
Continental has decreased further. However, Schaeffler's current
Ba3 rating continues to incorporate the company's complex group
structure, the uncertainty as to Schaeffler's long term strategy
of its participation in Continental as well as its still high
total indebtedness.

The Ba3 corporate family rating is supported by Schaeffler's
solid business profile evidenced by (i) leading market positions
in the bearings and automotive component and systems market with
number one to three positions across the wide ranging product
portfolio in a relatively consolidated industry; (ii) its leading
mechanical engineering technology platform supporting a
competitive cost structure and the development of innovative
products; (iii) a well-diversified customer base, especially in
the Industrial division, but also to the extent possible in the
consolidated automotive industry and a sizable aftermarket
business which accounts for more than 20% of group revenues.

The rating also benefits from (iv) Schaeffler's proven business
model with a good track record of operating performance and
margin levels well above the automotive supplier industry
average; (v) an experienced management team as well as (vi) a
good innovative power evidenced by a high number of patents,
founded on a notable amount of R&D expenses of above 5% of
revenues per year.

However, the rating is constrained by (i) the combined high
indebtedness and leverage of the operating level ("Schaeffler
Group" or "Schaeffler AG") and the holding level, the latter of
which also includes the junior debt incurred by parent companies
of Schaeffler AG; (ii) the organizational and legal complexity
and evolving structure of Schaeffler in its current state as well
as (iii) Moody's expectation that debt levels will not be
materially reduced over the short to medium term as (iv) free
cash flow generation will be challenged by high interest expense,
increasing capital expenditure and dividend payments to the
holding level - despite strong operating performance.

The stable outlook incorporates Moody's expectation that
Schaeffler will (i) be able to maintain its solid operating
performance with further improvements of the absolute amount of
EBITDA over the next two to three years even though Moody's
believe that margins might have reached their peak in 2011; (ii)
be able to generate at least slightly positive free cash flows
over the next two to three years and (iii) apply these to debt
reduction.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

The ratings could be upgraded should Schaeffler be able to (i)
generate sustainably positive free cash flows which would be
applied to a further debt reduction that would also contribute to
(ii) a sustainable reduction of its high leverage (Debt/EBITDA)
to below 3.5x. These performance achievements should go along
with unchanged or improved market positions and technological
leadership positions.

The ratings could come under pressure in case of (i) a
significant weakening in Schaeffler's operating performance and
cash flow generation evidenced by adjusted EBIT margins below 15%
and material negative free cash flow; (ii) inability to sustain
its current leverage of below 4.25x over the coming years as well
as (iii) weakening of its liquidity profile including the
possible failure to perform within the currently comfortable
headroom under its financial covenants.

As of June 30, 2013 Moody's considers Schaeffler Group's short
term liquidity over the next 12 months to be adequate. Based on
Moody's calculation the company has access to cash sources of
around EUR2.3 billion comprising a cash balance of EUR562 million
(thereof a minor portion of restricted cash), expected FFO, and a
revolving credit facility of EUR1.0 billion currently mostly
undrawn. Cash uses consisting of working capital requirements,
capex, working cash for day to day needs as well as cash needs
upstreamed to the holding level for payment of taxes, interest
payment and operating / advisory costs should be fully covered.
Given the expected limited free cash flow generation in the next
couple of years, the ability to refinance existing debt when it
comes due will be a key challenge for Schaeffler Group. At the
same time Moody's notes that Schaeffler has no near-term debt
maturities.

Structural Considerations

When assessing the structure of Schaeffler's liabilities Moody's
includes the junior debt located at the level of Schaeffler
Verwaltungs GmbH and Schaeffler Holding Finance B.V. This debt is
secured by pledges over Continental shares held by Schaeffler
Verwaltungs GmbH as well as shares in Schaeffler AG. This
assessment is consistent with Moody's approach when assessing the
corporate family rating of Schaeffler AG, given the absence of a
complete ring-fencing between Schaeffler AG and its subsidiaries
from the holding level.

Moody's views the junior debt as legally and structurally
subordinated to the senior debt at Schaeffler AG level as well as
to trade claims, pension obligations and lease rejection claims
at operating entities.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Automotive Supplier Industry published in May 2013. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Herzogenaurach, Germany, Schaeffler is a leading
manufacturer of rolling bearings and linear products worldwide as
well as a renowned supplier to the automotive industry. The
company develops and manufactures precision products for
everything that moves -- in machines, equipment and vehicles as
well as in aviation and aerospace applications. The group
operates under three main brands -- INA, FAG and LuK. In the 12
months period ended June 30, 2013, Schaeffler AG generated
revenues of approximately EUR11.1 billion.



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I R E L A N D
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ANGLO IRISH: Creditors Blast Bank's Bid For Emergency Stay
----------------------------------------------------------
Law360 reported that U.S. creditors of Irish Bank Resolution
Corp. Ltd., formerly known as Anglo Irish Bank, urged a Delaware
bankruptcy judge on Sept. 18 to deny an emergency bid to invoke
the court's automatic stay, saying the bank lacks any
justification for the expedited timetable.

According to the report, already in liquidation in its home
country, Dublin-based IBRC filed motions asking the court
postpone consideration of its Chapter 15 petition and instead use
the Sept. 20 scheduled hearing to grant the bank provisional
relief, a move creditors claim would deprive them of their
rights.

                       About Anglo Irish

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IBRC) to 'D/D' from 'B-/C'.   S&P also
lowered the senior unsecured ratings to 'D' from 'B-'.  S&P then
withdrew the counterparty credit ratings, the senior unsecured
ratings, and the preferred stock ratings on IBRC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB+' issue rating on three government-
guaranteed debt issues.

The rating actions follow the Feb. 6, 2013, announcement that the
Irish government has liquidated IBRC.

The former Irish bank sought protection from creditors under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on Aug. 26, 2013 (Bankr.
D. Del., Case No. 13-12159).  The former bank's Foreign
Representatives are Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson.  Its
U.S. bankruptcy counsel are Mark D. Collins, Esq., and Jason M.
Madron, Esq., at RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., in Wilmington,
Delaware.


DUBLIN GAZETTE: High Court Approves Examiner's Rescue Plan
----------------------------------------------------------
Dublin Gazette at Marketing.ie reports that the High Court has
approved the examiner's recommendation that Dublin Gazette
Newspapers continues to operate.

According to Marketing.ie, the High Court decision follows
confirmation that as part of a rescue plan The Irish Times is no
longer a shareholder in DGN.  The Times previously owned nearly
two-thirds of Gazette and invested EUR3.5 million, Marketing.ie
discloses.  When the group went into examinership in June, the
Times was owed EUR92,000 for printing, Marketing.ie notes.  The
three remaining shareholders will now invest EUR200,000 in the
business and take full control of the company, Marketing.ie says.

The three shareholders are chartered accountant Mary Leane, Texas
oil and gas businessman Tom Kelley and Michael McGovern, who
worked with O'Kennedy Brindley (later Saatchi & Saatchi) and
Doherty Advertising, Marketing.ie states.  McGovern thanked the
group's staff, suppliers and customers for their support during
the examinership, Marketing.ie relates.

DGN publishes eight free newspapers in the greater Dublin area,
stretching from Malahide on the northside to Dun Laoghaire on the
southside, with other group titles covering local news and events
in the Swords, Blanchardstown, Dundrum, Castleknock, Lucan and
Clondalkin areas.


HOUSE OF EUROPE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class A1 Notes to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded House of Europe Funding IV plc's
class A1 notes and affirmed the remaining notes, as follows:

  EUR288m Class A1 notes (ISIN XS0228470588): downgraded to
  'BBsf' from 'BBBsf', Outlook Stable

  EUR130m Class A2 notes (ISIN XS0228472873): affirmed at 'CCsf'

  EUR62.5m Class B notes (ISIN XS0228474572): affirmed at 'Csf'

  EUR5m Class C notes (ISIN XS022847572): affirmed at 'Csf'

  EUR49m Class D notes (ISIN XS0228476197): affirmed at 'Csf'

  EUR8.5m Class E notes (ISIN XS0228477161): affirmed at 'Csf'

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade of class A1 notes reflects the possibility of an
event of default on the transaction occurring, should a timely
rated note be unable to fulfill its interest payments. The
concern mainly addresses the potential of class C becoming unable
to pay its interest in a timely manner as a result of a possible
diminishment of excess spread over the remaining life of the
transaction. The transaction may become more reliant on principal
to keep the timely pay notes current should this occur. In
addition, the transaction includes current defaults worth EUR70
million, as well as EUR5 million of replacement assets. The
portfolio concentration has increased as a result of natural
amortization. Since the previous review in September 2012, class
A1 notes have been paid down by EUR74 million and currently
represent 35% of their initial note balance. Whilst the available
credit enhancement decreased for notes A2 to E, it increased for
class A1, which benefits from 35%% of asset-based credit
enhancement.

A shift in reported expected maturity dates for the underlying
assets was also noted. European peripheral exposure adds up to
over 15% of the current performing balance.

The current ratings of the remaining notes already factor in the
above mentioned risks and have therefore been affirmed. It is to
be noted that the ratings of classes D and E only addresses
ultimate payment and that the current rated balance is EUR44
million and EUR6.7 million, respectively. Class E notes are
additionally protected by a par balance of EUR6.4 million through
a zero coupon French government bond.

House of Europe Funding IV plc is a managed cash arbitrage
securitization of structured finance assets, primarily RMBS and
CMBS. The portfolio is managed by Collineo Asset Management GmbH.
The reinvestment period ended in December 2010.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch analyzed the impact of further extensions on the expected
maturity dates on the ratings of the transaction. The stress
considered all underlying assets at their legal maturity date and
did not indicate any potential rating action.


IRISH BANK: Judge Criticizes Lack of Witnesses in Bankruptcy Bid
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ronald Quinlan at Independent.ie reports that a U.S. judge
criticized the Irish Bank Resolution Corp. for failing to produce
witnesses in court to support an application for protection from
its creditors.

The IBRC's special liquidators Kieran Wallace and Eamon
Richardson applied for US Chapter 15 bankruptcy protection on
August 26, in an effort to protect the broken bank's estimated
US$1 billion (EUR0.73 billion) in US assets from seizure by
creditors during the current liquidation process, Independent.ie
relates.  In the absence of such protection, those assets could
be vulnerable to claims from creditors, the report notes.

According to Independent.ie, a report carried in the New York-
based legal journal Law 360 said that while the bank's
application had been due to be heard Friday evening, Sept. 20,
Delaware Judge Christopher Sontchi reluctantly agreed to impose a
two-week stay on the proceedings after hearing that IBRC needed
to delay the matter following objections from a number of IBRC's
public debt holders and borrowers.

The IBRC's US attorney Van Durrer told the court that while an
agreement had been reached with the majority of those objectors
on a form of provisional relief, a number of the bank's
borrowers, led by the developer John Flynn, remained opposed to
it being granted, Independent.ie states.

Mr. Flynn, who developed large parts of Dublin's Smithfield, is
among a number of clients of the former Anglo Irish Bank bringing
a legal action in New York in which they have alleged that the
bank engaged in "systematic, organized, and comprehensive fraud"
against borrowers, Independent.ie notes.

Independent.ie relates that in opposing the IBRC's petition,
Mr. Flynn said in an affidavit that he and his fellow plaintiffs
believed the special liquidators were seeking "to frustrate the
prosecution of the federal action against IBRC in New York".

Addressing the court in Delaware last Friday, Mr. Flynn's
attorney, Dan O'Neill, said the proposed stay on the Chapter 15
petition hearing would be an "unnecessary" and debilitating
impediment to the New York case, Independent.ie discloses.

Mr. Durrer countered that delaying the bank's liquidation would
be more harmful as it would give rise to additional costs,
Independent.ie recounts.

Judge Sontchi, Independent.ie says, imposed a temporary stay on
the objecting creditors until Oct. 8, when he would hold a full
hearing on the provisional relief being sought by IBRC.

                        About Irish Bank

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.

Irish Bank Resolution is seeking assistance from the U.S. court
in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and Irish Nationwide
Building Society.  The two banks failed and were merged into IBRC
in July 2011.  IBRC was tasked with winding them down and
liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish lawmakers
adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was placed into a
special liquidation in the Irish High Court to complete
liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some 25 billion euros (US$33.5 billion). About 70
percent of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of
the portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.
Total liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion,
according to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

The IRBC liquidators want the U.S. bankruptcy judge to rule that
Ireland is home to the so-called foreign main bankruptcy
proceeding.  If the judge agrees and determines that IBRC
otherwise qualifies, creditor actions in the U.S. will halt
automatically.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA MONTE: Set to Approve Revised Restructuring Plan Tomorrow
---------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Sanderson at The Financial Times reports that Italy's
Monte dei Paschi, which calls itself the world's oldest bank,
will this week approve a restructuring plan aimed at dispelling
the specter of nationalization.

According to the FT, people familiar with the matter said that
under pressure from Brussels, the board of Italy's third-largest
bank by assets will tomorrow, Sept. 24, give the go-ahead to a
revised restructuring plan that sees it undertaking a
EUR2.5 billion capital increase, closing extra branches, shedding
and outsourcing jobs and cutting the salaries of its top
managers.

Brussels, which rejected an earlier plan, saying it was not tough
enough, has also insisted the bank gradually wind down its
EUR29 billion portfolio of Italian government bonds to be allowed
to take EUR4.1 billion in bailout bonds from the state, the FT
discloses.  Without the bailout, the bank would not be viable,
the FT notes.

Under the new plan, the city of Siena -- which has sought for
decades to stay as the main shareholder in the bank -- faces the
prospect of significant dilution or full nationalization if it
fails to find enough backers for the capital increase demanded by
Brussels, the FT says.  Siena has been the bank's largest
shareholder with a 37.5% stake, the FT states.

Joaquin Almunia, the European Commissioner who polices bank
bailouts, said this month that if the capital increase failed,
the state would have to step in, the FT recounts.

Monte dei Paschi's core capital would be only 6.5% without the
aid package from the government, the FT says, citing analysts'
estimates.  Given the timing of the board meeting and allowing
for a final sign-off from Brussels of the plan, Monte dei Paschi
could launch its capital increase as early as the first weeks of
next year, according to the FT.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 18,
2013, Fitch downgraded MPS's Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc' from
'b' and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 19,
2013, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
long-term counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'B' from 'BB', and affirmed the
'B' short-term rating.  S&P also lowered its rating on MPS' Lower
Tier 2 subordinated notes to 'CCC-' from 'CCC+'.  S&P affirmed
the ratings on MPS' junior subordinated debt at 'CCC-' and on its
preferred stock at 'C'.  At the same time, S&P removed the
ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with negative
implications on Dec. 5, 2012.


FINMECCANICA SPA: Moody's Lowers Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to Ba1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 the senior
unsecured long-term debt ratings of Finmeccanica SpA and its
guaranteed subsidiaries (Finmeccanica Finance SA and Meccanica
Holdings USA, Inc.; taken together, "Finmeccanica" or the
company). In conjunction with this rating action, Moody's
assigned to Finmeccanica a Corporate Family Rating of Ba1 and a
Probability of Default Rating of Ba1-PD. The rating outlook
remains negative. This concludes Moody's review for possible
downgrade of Finmeccanica's ratings which began April 23, 2013.

"The downgrade incorporates our expectation of a slower pace of
improvement in Finmeccanica's overall operating performance and
credit profile, particularly given some outsized constraints in
certain areas, and even in consideration of pending asset sales
and ensuing debt repayments with the net proceeds generated
therefrom," according to Russell Solomon, Moody's Senior Vice
President and lead analyst for the company.

Almost two years ago Finmeccanica undertook a comprehensive
series of restructuring activities aimed at improving long-term
profitability and cash flow generating ability. Over this same
period, management has also been attempting to meet its market
commitment to monetize EUR1 billion or more of non-core assets
and thereby ease its heavy debt burden with a corresponding pay-
down in loan outstandings. Although some progress has been made,
Moody's believes that most of the targeted operational gains are
now likely to take several more years to fully manifest. And for
various reasons the targeted asset sales have also been
extensively delayed. While the latter "one-time" credit
enhancements related to asset dispositions were deemed important,
the former, more fundamental and sustainable long-term operating
improvements had been noted by Moody's as being more germane to
Finmeccanica's ability to maintain an investment-grade rating
profile.

Difficult market conditions characterized by increasing pressure
on defense budgets, heightened competition and macroeconomic
weakness in the company's core markets are expected to persist.
This environment exacerbates the disruptive potential of ongoing
challenges related to operating inefficiencies, contract
disputes, and reputational and governance issues. These factors
have been evidenced to at least some degree by the noteworthy
recent slow-down in order rates.

"We now see the prospect of the company's ability to sufficiently
strengthen and restore its credit profile such that key credit
metrics evidence investment grade-rated characteristics on a
fundamental stand-alone basis as much less likely over the next
several years, and have subsequently revised Finmeccanica's
ratings to reflect a credit profile that is more appropriately
positioned in the Ba-rated range of credit risk on a comparative
basis" noted Solomon.

Ratings Rationale:

Finmeccanica's key credit metrics remain weak, with profitability
measures continuing to be adversely affected by significant
restructuring-related charges that may still be pressured
further. While the Helicopter division remains a strong performer
and Aeronautics is broadly perceived to have considerable
opportunity for improvement, revenues have been declining in the
company's other core Defense Electronics and Security division.
This reflects the challenging operating environment for defense
contractors, broadly, and especially in the US and for
Finmeccanica in particular given its above-average exposure to
the Army and rapidly declining overseas contingency operations.
Moreover, the planned asset dispositions that were to have
effectuated an accelerated liquidity enhancement and balance
sheet deleveraging have been very slow in coming.

While governance issues have been at least partially addressed,
the controlling shareholder influence of the Italian state
continues to pose an apparent impediment to progress in this
particular area. Additionally, it has become increasingly clear
that the planned disposition of the Transportation segment as a
whole is unlikely, even though this would have addressed one of
the company's biggest problems by stopping the heavy cash burn of
Ansaldo Breda and, in particular, off-loading the unprofitable
legacy contracts. Further cash drain and disruption is expected
given higher working capital consumption as new contracts are
satisfied and in light of prospective incremental charge-offs
following certain contractual disputes.

Macroeconomic headwinds -- particularly in the company's core US,
UK and Italian markets -- and the impact of fiscal constraints on
defense budgets are expected to persist and could weigh further
on Finmeccanica's business and financial results. While
Finmeccanica's firm-wide restructuring programs should continue
to yield gradual improvements in operating performance, earnings
and cash flows are likely to remain comparatively weak, with free
cash flows in particular anticipated to be below levels
previously expected.

Even so, these high-level risks continue to be somewhat mitigated
by the large size and scope of the company's business operations,
with more than EUR17 billion of revenue on a proportionally
consolidated basis including various joint ownership
arrangements. Finmeccanica remains a critical Tier 1 contractor
on several important aerospace and defense platforms and a
leading manufacturer of helicopters with a broad global installed
base. The company continues to enjoy a diversity of revenue
streams in both commercial and military applications, and
reasonably high-level revenue predictability associated with its
multi-year (albeit declining) backlog.

Finmeccanica also continues to benefit from a good liquidity
profile, albeit one that is likely to be somewhat more strained
over the forward period given significant normal-course working
capital volatility that Moody's expects will be compounded by
ramping production rates on several key programs. The company
pre-financed most of its upcoming December 2013 bond maturity
(EUR750 million remaining) late last year when EUR600 million of
new debt was issued, and maintains a sizeable EUR2.4 billion
revolving credit facility that remains available to support its
volatile working capital needs.

Ongoing implicit support from the Italian sovereign state also
notably lends support to Finmeccanica's ratings. Moody's
continues to classify Finmeccanica as a Government Related
Issuer. The Government of Italy (Baa2) controls Finmeccanica's
Board of Directors and holds an approximate 30% economic interest
in the company. Finmeccanica's current baseline credit assessment
(BCA) of ba2 indicates Moody's view of stand-alone credit
strength without extraordinary support from the sovereign.
Moody's continues to view the level of default dependence between
Finmeccanica and Italy as being moderate and to assume moderate
potential for extraordinary support from the sovereign. The Ba1
CFR and senior unsecured debt ratings incorporate one-notch of
upward lift from the ba2 BCA due to extraordinary support from
the Government of Italy.

The negative outlook reflects heightened challenges in delivering
needed operational improvements and executing asset disposals in
view of the company's ongoing exposure to cuts in defense budgets
across many European nations and in the US. Nonetheless, the
ratings incorporate Moody's expectation that tangible
improvements in the company's credit profile will in fact be
realized, with improved profitability, cash flow and return
measures in particular increasingly evidenced over the longer
term.

What Could Cause the Ratings and/or Outlook to Change?

Finmeccanica's ratings could be lowered further if meaningful
asset dispositions and follow-on debt repayments in accordance
with expectations fail to be realized, and/or if prospects for
achieving requisite improvements in financial performance
diminish. Of particular note, the revised ratings do not reflect
the company's status quo credit risk; rather, they continue to
incorporate expectations of ongoing improvements in operating
performance and related balance sheet strengthening over the
forward rating horizon. Implicit in the revised ratings is an
expectation that a strong liquidity profile will be maintained,
operating margins will trend toward the high single-digit
percentage range, free cash flow will grow from modestly positive
levels towards several hundred million Euro, and financial
leverage (Debt-to-EBITDA) will fall and remain below 4 times, all
as measured on a Moody's-adjusted basis.

Although not expected over the immediate rating horizon, ratings
could warrant consideration for potential upgrade (or more
likely, stabilization of the rating outlook) upon evidence of
more meaningful progress in the company's restructuring program
at a pace that exceeds expectations, or possibly in conjunction
with a stabilization of the Italian sovereign rating outlook.
Ratings and/or the rating outlook could be favorably predisposed
to a broad strengthening of underlying key credit metrics, as
evidenced for example by consolidated operating margins sustained
in the high single-digit range and Retained Cash Flow-to-Debt in
the high-teen percentage range or better. These results would be
indicative only and would have to be both sustainable and
accompany the company's maintenance of a strong liquidity profile
and a minimum two-year backlog of firm orders.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Aerospace and Defense Industry Methodology published in June
2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009 and the Government-Related Issuers
methodology published in July 2010.

Headquartered in Rome, Italy, Finmeccanica is one of Italy's
largest industrial conglomerates and receives approximately half
of the country's annual defense outlays. With reported revenue of
just over EUR17 billion for the last twelve-month period ended
June 2013, Finmeccanica operates primarily in the defense
electronics and aerospace (helicopters, aircraft) markets with
interests also in the transportation (rolling stock, train
signaling systems) and energy sectors.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


FORNAX ECLIPSE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Ratings on Class F & G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Fornax (Eclipse 2006-2) B.V.'s notes
due 2019, and revised the Outlook on the class C to E notes as
follows:

EUR24.3m class B (XS0267554334) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable

EUR31.9m class C (XS0267554508) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

EUR19.9m class D (XS0267554920) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

EUR24.8m class E (XS0267555570) affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

EUR16.8m class F (XS0267555737) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate (RE) of RE50%

EUR8.0m class G (XS0267556032) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE0

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation and Outlook revision reflect the progress made in
stabilizing refinancing risk across a number of loans in the
portfolio since Fitch's previous rating action as well as the
switch to sequential principal pay. While three loans matured
this year without repaying, this was expected for some time, and
a cash sweep is providing for some amortization. Tenant
concentration continues to pose a risk for several loans,
particularly those secured on secondary quality property, and
this combination is acting as a drag on ratings despite some
improvement.

One improvement was the substantial pay-down of what was the
largest loan in the pool, Century Centre, following the sale of
much of its collateral. The loan balance has fallen to only
EUR3.8 million from EUR39.9 million, and with a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 58%, Fitch no longer anticipates losses.

The largest loan left, at 32% of the pool, is the EUR39.9m
Cassina Plaza. It is secured by four relatively modern office
properties on the outskirts of Milan, whose dominant tenant,
Nokia, contributes 52% of rent until first break in 2018.
Occupancy has fallen to 67% from 85% over the past 12 months,
leaving income on a weighted-average term to break of 4.5 years.
Although Fitch's estimate of LTV is higher than the reported 72%,
no loss is expected: besides its net debt yield of 8.4%, any
failure to repay at maturity in November will instigate a full
cash sweep of excess income, and with rates so low, this will
help to deleverage the loan. Bond maturity is in 2019.

The Bielefeld/Berlin loan (EUR24.5 million, 20%) is secured on a
portfolio comprising residential assets located in north-eastern
Germany (Bielefeld, representing 51% by market value) as well as
a mixed-use property (80% office/20% retail) located in a prime
retail district of Berlin. Occupancy has remained above 90% since
closing in 2006, with current vacancy (3%) only present in the
residential portion. Net operating income has been on an upward
trajectory, supporting the 17% increase in value recorded in a
July 2012 valuation versus closing. The net debt yield of 7% is
in excess of current yields for these property types, quoted
between 5% and 6% and Fitch does not expect a loss. Loan maturity
is in 2016.

The Netto (EUR18.4 million, 14.6%) and Kingbu (EUR17.9 million,
11.3%) loans are both secured by out-of-town retail units --
retail warehouses for Netto and predominantly roadside
restaurants for Kingbu. Both loans have large tenant exposures
(to Netto and Burger King) and failed to repay at maturity dates
falling in 2012. Since then, with rates low, both have managed to
amortize via cash sweep, compensating for declines in lease terms
(which average six and eight years, respectively). Both
portfolios are currently being marketed for sale, with the one
KingBu property that has been sold reaching its release price.
Losses for these loans, if any, are expected to be minimal,
although collateral illiquidity poses downside risk in higher
rating stresses.

ATU, a German car workshop chain, is the sole tenant for two
loans, ATU Germany and ATU Austria (each 10%), both of which
failed to repay at maturity in January. Meanwhile, ATU Germany
was extended to July 2014 (subject to a number of conditions
including cash sweep). The loan balance has reduced to EUR12.7
million from EUR29.0 million over the past 12 months, through the
sale of four assets (all meeting the release price), an equity
injection and a cash sweep. For its part, the tenant managed to
negotiate a temporary rent reduction for the German assets last
year in exchange for a 10-year lease extension to 2030. Similar
discussions with the tenant are now being held for the Austrian
portfolio, although this loan is formally in default. For both
loans, the cash sweep will help to reduce the risk profile, but
collateral illiquidity again presents a concern.

Rating Sensitivities

Any dampening in market confidence for secondary out-of-town
property, particularly in Germany, could depress sale proceeds on
several of the loans, and potentially lead to negative rating
action. Conversely, continued progress in deleveraging loans,
particularly from disposals, can mitigate these risks and could
allow for positive rating action.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Withdraws 'Ca' Corporate Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the Ca corporate family
rating and Ca-PD probability of default rating of Central
European Distribution Corporation (CEDC). Concurrently, Moody's
has also withdrawn the senior secured rating of Ca, with a loss
given default assessment of LGD3, 43%, on the notes issued by
CEDC's subsidiary CEDC Finance Corporation International.

The withdrawal of CEDC's ratings follows the company's announced
debt restructuring, which was completed in June 2013.

Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, CEDC is one of the largest vodka
producers in the world, with annual sales of around 34.5 million
nine-liter cases, mainly in Russia and Poland. CEDC generated net
revenues of around $815.7 million during financial year-end
December 2012.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


METROPOLITANO DE LISBOA: S&P Puts 'B' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'B' long-
term issuer credit rating on Portuguese subway company
Metropolitano de Lisboa E.P. (Metro) on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

The rating action follows a similar action on the Republic of
Portugal.  The rating on 100% government-owned Metro is supported
by S&P's assessment that there is an "extremely high" likelihood
that the sovereign would provide extraordinary and timely support
in case of need.  This reflects S&P's view of Metro's:

   -- "Integral" link with the government.  S&P continues to see
      Metro as an extension of Portugal's central government, in
      charge of managing and enlarging the subway network in the
      Lisbon area in strict accordance with government's plans.

   -- The central government decides Metro's strategy, makes its
      main budgetary decisions, and exercises very tight control
      over the company.  Ongoing support in the form of
      government guarantees has been strong.  Most of the
      company's debt, excluding central government loans, is
      currently guaranteed by the central government, and the
      guaranteed debt bears cross-default clauses with all of
      Metro's financial obligations.  The Portuguese government
      also has a policy of providing extraordinary support
      through budget loans so Metro can service its debt on time.

   -- The central government manages Metro's derivatives
      directly, which fortifies the integral link between the
      company and the central government, under S&P's criteria;
      and

   -- Metro's "very important" role, as Lisbon's subway operator,
      in charge of developing the city's subway infrastructure.
      S&P believes Metro has a key role in implementing the
      government's policy of building and managing the subway
      network, a main feature in Lisbon's urban mobility.
      However, S&P do not consider Metro's role as critical to
      the government, in part owing to the abrupt deterioration
      in Metro's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) after its
      funding difficulties in 2011, which the government did not
      prevent.

"Our assessment of Metro's SACP at 'cc' reflects our view that
Metro remains unable to fund its large negative cash flow without
government support.  In our opinion, Metro is highly leveraged,
generates negative cash flow, and has only limited access to
large sources of funding other than the government.  We
understand that the government has not yet created a formal
financial framework that would provide Metro stable financial
support.  As a result, since June 2011, the company has relied on
ad hoc extraordinary support when needed from its government
owner.  However, we do not factor in extraordinary government
support when assessing the SACP of a government-related entity
(GRE) such as Metro, according to our criteria," S&P said.

"In accordance with our criteria, we consider the 'CC' rating
category to be applicable to an issuer that we consider is at
substantial risk of default, generally within six months,
especially when a default date can be determined.  While we
generally anticipate that issuers in the 'CC' category will
default in the near term, some may find resources to continue
operations and honor their financial obligations for a longer
period.  In the case of Metro, however, only its SACP--and not
the issuer credit rating--is in the 'cc' category, as we believe
that there is an extremely high likelihood that the company will
receive additional resources from the central government to repay
debt in the next 12 months," S&P added.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch within the next few months,
after the resolution of the CreditWatch on Portugal.  S&P could
downgrade Metro if it downgraded Portugal.  S&P could affirm its
long-term rating on Metro if it affirmed the long-term rating on
Portugal.


PARPUBLICA: S&P Puts 'B' Rating on CreditWatch Developing
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B' corporate
issuer rating on Portugal-based Participacoes Publicas (SGPS)
S.A. (PARPUBLICA) on CreditWatch with developing implications.

The CreditWatch placement on Portugal reflects S&P's view that it
could lower the ratings on Portugal within the next few months,
which would in turn affect the ratings on PARPUBLICA, all else
remaining equal.

That said, S&P considers it likely that PARPUBLICA could be
included in the general government accounts in the near term.  If
this were to lead to PARPUBLICA gaining access to funding from
the government's debt agency, and the company's refinancing needs
being included in the state budget for 2014, S&P's assessment of
PARPUBLICA's link with the government could strengthen.

PARPUBLICA is a 100% sovereign-owned holding company, with
investments in operating subsidiaries and a portfolio of real
estate assets.  It has executed several successful
privatizations, and the majority of its privatization receipts
are usually used to allow the state to reduce its debt burden.
The rating on PARPUBLICA is based on the company's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP), which S&P assess at 'ccc', and its opinion
that there is a "very high" likelihood that the Portuguese
government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to PARPUBLICA in the event of financial distress.

Under S&P's criteria for government-related entities (GREs), its
view of a "very high" likelihood of extraordinary government
support is based on its assessment of PARPUBLICA's:

   -- "Very important" role, as Portugal's entity for holding,
      managing, and privatizing key participations on behalf of
      the government.

   -- "Very strong" link with the Portuguese state as its 100%
      owner, and S&P's view of the close operational link between
      the two in the absence of an explicit and timely guarantee
      for PARPUBLICA's debt.

The government influences PARPUBLICA's strategic and operational
activities by approving its budgets and financial plans;
appointing its main managerial bodies; and deciding which assets
should be transferred to PARPUBLICA or privatized.  While the
government does not provide an explicit and timely guarantee for
PARPUBLICA's debt, it is subject to article 501 of the Portuguese
Companies Code, which indicates that a parent is legally
responsible for the liabilities of its fully-owned subsidiaries.
S&P understands that the statute may provide a means for
creditors of the subsidiary to make claims against the parent
from 30 days after the subsidiary defaults, which likely supports
recovery prospects.

S&P believes the scope of PARPUBLICA's role could diminish, as
the number of remaining state assets to privatize declines over
time. This is offset by the current government's stated
commitment to PARPUBLICA's obligation, and the possibility that
PARPUBLICA could be included in the general government account in
the next few months.  If PARPUBLICA were included in the general
government account, it could benefit from a budget allowance and
centralized state financing, which could lead S&P to review its
assessment of the likelihood of extraordinary government support.

The SACP is constrained by S&P's view of PARPUBLICA's weak
portfolio characteristics, including geographic concentration of
assets in Portugal, as well as limited financial flexibility and
a weak liquidity position.  The company remains highly leveraged
with a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of above 55% at year-end 2012.
It had about EUR4.9 billion of debt at the holding level at the
end of 2012, down about 3% from a year earlier.  It signed a
30-year bank loan of approximately EUR600 million in the first
quarter of 2013.  This amount was initially allocated to a high-
speed rail project, which was cancelled.  S&P estimates total
debt at June 30, 2013, to be around EUR4.9 billion.  In July 2013
the company repaid EUR800 million in euro medium term notes
(EMTNs).

PARPUBLICA's portfolio of equity stakes in Portuguese companies
remains adequately diversified in terms of sectors despite the
privatizations and divestment of significant shareholdings in
recent years.  The group is present in sectors such as air
transportation, postal services, water and waste, real estate
management and development, and to a lesser extent in
agriculture, forestry, services, production of currency, and
mining.

However, overall portfolio diversification is weak, in S&P's
view, given that government receivables constitute a large share
of the global portfolio.  PARPUBLICA had approximately EUR4
billion in government receivables at year-end 2012, and S&P
estimates that the company held about EUR3 billion in receivables
as a claim on the government after the transfers of assets to
PARPUBLICA in January 2013.  S&P expects this figure to decrease
further as the state continues to transfer additional state
assets to PARPUBLICA to offset some of these receivables.  The
company's SACP is also constrained by the weak portfolio quality,
which stems from poor financial performance of a majority of its
subsidiaries (including TAP).

S&P assess the company's management and governance as "weak", as
our criteria defines the term, partly owing to the lack of
independence from the state, as PARPUBLICA's funding decisions
and general strategy depend largely on the Portuguese government.

S&P views PARPUBLICA's liquidity on a stand-alone basis as
"weak", under its criteria.  S&P acknowledges that the liquidity
position has somewhat improved with the repayment of the EUR1
billion exchangeable bonds in December 2012 and the EUR800
million EMTNs repaid in July 2013.  However, committed liquidity
sources remain insufficient to cover the funding needs in the
next 12 months.

In order to address the mismatch between estimated available
liquid sources and uses, S&P anticipates that PARPUBLICA will
contract additional debt with Portuguese banks or draw on its
commercial paper line with Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. (CGD).
S&P also believes the state will transfer additional assets to
offset PARPUBLICA's claims on the state, so these claims are not
counted as government debt under Eurostat's accounting rules.
PARPUBLICA could also use these assets as collateral to secure
funding from banks.

As a last resort, S&P expects direct, extraordinary support would
come from the Portuguese state treasury.

Principal Liquidity Sources:

   -- Cash position of around EUR200 million at year-end 2012.

   -- Proceeds from the sale of EDP - Energias de Portugal shares
      of around EUR356 million.

   -- Expected proceeds from the sale of ANA of around
      EUR1.1 billion in the third quarter of 2013, the majority
      of which S&P assumes will be upstreamed to the government.

   -- Around EUR125 million in dividends received from
      subsidiaries.

Principal Liquidity Uses:

   -- EUR800 million bonds repaid in July 2013 and EUR650 million
      bonds maturing in 2014.

   -- Around EUR130 million of commercial paper currently drawn
      under a total program of around EUR1 billion with CGD,
      expected to be rolled over.

   -- Around EUR125 million in commercial paper currently fully
      drawn under the program with Banco Santander Totta,
      expected to be rolled over.

The CreditWatch developing placement on PARPUBLICA reflects the
risk that S&P could downgrade Portugal, which in turn would imply
that the sovereign's capacity to support PARPUBLICA had reduced.
The CreditWatch placement also reflects the potential of a
stronger link with the government.  S&P expects to resolve the
CreditWatch within the next few months.

S&P could lower the rating on PARPUBLICA if it was to lower the
ratings on Portugal, and if S&P did not change its assessment of
the likelihood of extraordinary government support for
PARPUBLICA.

"We could upgrade PARPUBLICA, if we affirm our ratings on
Portugal and revised upward our assessment of PARPUBLICA's link
with the government.  Such a revision could result from
PARPUBLICA gaining access to funding through the government's
debt agency and its refinancing needs being included in the state
budget for 2014.  In this case, the likelihood of extraordinary
support could be revised from "very high" to "extremely high",
S&P said.

S&P would affirm the rating at the current level if it lowers the
sovereign ratings but S&P revises the likelihood of extraordinary
support from "very high" to "extremely high", or if the ratings
on Portugal and its assessment of the likelihood of extraordinary
support remain unchanged.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


* ROMANIA: Lowest Number of Insolvencies in August This Year
------------------------------------------------------------
actmedia.eu reports that 658 companies became insolvent in
August, representing the lowest number of insolvencies this year.
The National Trade Register Office (ONRC) said 10,313 insolvency
files, 7% less than in 2012, were registered in the first 8
months of the year, actmedia.eu relates.  In the same period of
2012 there were 11,068 companies in insolvency in the whole
country, ONRC shows.

The average number of insolvencies over January-July 2013 was of
1,400 companies, the report relays.

According to the report, Brasov and Dolj are in the top with
1,090 insolvencies (on the rise by 48% against 2012) and 935
(+27%), followed by Bucharest with 764 (-8%).  The fewest
insolvencies were in Calarasi county -23 cases and Harghita - 35
cases this year, the report notes.

actmedia.eu relates that the highest number of companies with
financial difficulties were in commerce with over 3,210 firms in
insolvency, in the processing industry with 1,363 and
constructions -- 1,363.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BORETS INT'L: Moody's Views EBRD Acquisition as Credit Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service views as credit positive for Borets
International Ltd. (Borets, B1 stable) EBRD's final decision to
acquire an equity stake in the company and subscribe to up to $80
million in its proposed Eurobond.

Borets recently announced that on September 17, 2013, EBRD's
board of directors approved the financing package, comprising the
acquisition of a 5% stake in Borets for US$30 million and a
subscription of up to US$80 million in its upcoming Eurobond
issue of a maximum of US$420 million. Moody's understands that as
a result, EBRD will have one seat on the company's board of
directors as well as a set of minority protection rights
including veto right for certain transactions.

EBRD's final approval of the 5% equity participation is in line
with Moody's expectation, incorporated in Borets' B1 corporate
family rating. Moody's would expect the presence of EBRD in
Borets' shareholding structure to mitigate corporate governance
risks such as excessive shareholder distributions, related-party
transactions and opportunistic financial policy. In addition,
EBRD's decision to both acquire an equity stake in Borets and
participate in the company's Eurobond issuance should result in
better control and protection of noteholders' interests and
reduce placement risks.

Overall, Moody's positively acknowledges EBRD's decision to
become a minority shareholder in Borets. The rating agency
expects the new shareholding structure to have a positive impact
on Borets' financial and operating strategy and corporate
governance standards.

Borets International Limited is a leading vertically integrated
manufacturer of artificial lift products for the oil sector,
specializing in the design and manufacture of electric
submersible pumps (ESP) and provision of related services. The
company predominantly operates in Russia. Following the
acquisition of the ESP business of Weatherford International Ltd
(Weatherford, Baa2 negative) in 2008, which was primarily active
in non-Russian markets, the company has also been actively
developing its international operations. In 2012, Borets
generated US$743 million in sales and US$144 million of adjusted
EBITDA, and reported US$808 million in assets.



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


* Moody's Maintains Negative Outlook on Slovenia's Banking System
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook on Slovenia's banking system remains negative,
unchanged since 2008, says Moody's Investors Service in a new
report entitled "Banking System Outlook: Slovenia."

The negative outlook primarily reflects the lack of adequate
capitalization of the leading Slovenian banks and of on-going
losses due to chronic asset-quality problems in the context of a
persistently adverse operating environment.

Over the 12-18 month outlook period, the key issue of ensuring
sufficient capital resources in the rated Slovenian banks remains
acute in the context of the challenging operating environment.
Moody's believes that a spiraling decline in asset quality has
undermined banks' risk-absorption capacity, leaving the banking
system requiring further external support in order to restore
normal operations. Without an additional and sufficiently large-
scale capital injection the banks' ability to attract funding
would be inhibited, leading to further deleveraging and
heightened instability in funding base.

Asset-quality problems are likely to persist for Slovenian banks,
as Moody's expects that the ongoing recession will continue,
weighing on fragile business confidence, limiting demand for
credit and restricting profitable lending opportunities. As noted
in July 2013, the rating agency forecasts that real GDP will
contract by 1.9% in 2013 and by 0.1% in 2014, following a
decrease of 2.3% in 2012. High indebtedness in the corporate
sector, which constitutes around two thirds of the loan book, is
unlikely to improve dramatically during the outlook period.

In this context Moody's notes that the government-led "bad bank
project" to clean up the asset quality of leading banks has been
postponed until end-2013 and its full impact and details remain
unclear at this stage and subject to approval by the European
Commission (EC). Meanwhile, Moody's says that the planned
liquidation of two small banks, announced in September 2013,
further reinforce its view of the unstable position of the
Slovenian banking environment.

After several years of continuing losses, Moody's believes that
the leading banks will remain loss-making because of on-going
deleveraging, declining margins and weak core profitability. The
high likelihood of further provisioning requirements caused by
ongoing deterioration in asset quality, which has weighed on the
system for the past three years will also, according to Moody's,
exacerbate the banks' losses.

The banking system outlook is in line with the outlooks on the
individual banks' ratings, and with the negative outlook on
Slovenia's sovereign Ba1 rating.



=========
S P A I N
=========


LA SEDA: Seeks Court OK to Sell Two Production Sites in Spain
-------------------------------------------------------------
Plasteurope.com reports that La Seda de Barcelona has asked the
Commercial Court of Barcelona for permission to sell its Artenius
Espana production site at El Prat de Llobregat, near
Barcelona/Spain and the Industrias Quimicas Asociadas (IQA) site
at Tarragona/Spain. At the first location, the company produces
170,000 t/y of PET, according to Plasteurope.com database
Polyglobe (www.polyglobe.net).  The second has capability for
140,000 t/y EO and 60,000 t/y of feedstock MEG.

According to Plasteurope.com, selling off non-core businesses
that have low profitability and high volatility is expected to
facilitate finding a buyer for the more viable units. Spanish
reports said the bidding process for the two businesses has begun
and La Seda also has asked the court for permission to start the
process for its Turkish unit, Artenius TurkPet, Plasteurope.com
relates.

Insolvency administrator Forest Partners Estrada y asociados is
said to have approved the sale plans for the three production
sites.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 19,
2013, Plasteurope said the commercial court in Barcelona
overseeing the bankruptcy proceedings of La Seda and its 12
subsidiaries has appointed auditing and consulting firm Mazars
Financial Advisory as insolvency administrator.

The company filed a voluntary insolvency petition on June 17
after its restructuring and refinancing plans failed to reach
approval of 75% of shareholders, Plasteurope related.

La Seda de Barcelona is a Spanish plastics bottle maker.  The
Catalonia-based company makes bottles in Europe, Turkey and North
Africa.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


JB EDUCATION: Economic Crime Authority Begins Bankruptcy Probe
--------------------------------------------------------------
Radio Sweden reports that the Swedish Economic Crime Authority
has begun an investigation into the bankruptcy of JB Education,
an education group that operated more than 30 free schools before
filing for bankruptcy in June.

According to Radio Sweden, the Economic Crime Authority said in a
statement that there is reason to believe that an offense,
subject to public prosecution, has been committed "not to a
specific person, but to one event".

The company managed 36 schools and was one of the nation's
largest education groups before going under, Radio Sweden
discloses.  More than 11,000 students and over 1,600 employees
were affected, Radio Sweden says.

Most schools have been taken over by new owners and a few have
been phased out, Radio Sweden notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 13,
2013, The Local related that at the end of May, JB Education sent
shockwaves through Sweden's free school establishment when it
announced it would be quitting its primary and secondary school
operations in Sweden due to a drop in the number of students.

JB Education is one of Sweden's largest operators of publicly
funded, privately managed free schools.  JB Education, previously
known as John Bauer Gymnasiet, opened its first school in Sweden
in Jonkoping, central Sweden, in 2000.  It currently operates
schools in 20 locations around the country.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CLIVE CAPITAL: To Close This Month Following Two Years of Losses
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jesse Westbrook and Chris Larson at Bloomberg News, citing a
letter to clients, report that Clive Capital LLP, the US$1
billion commodity hedge-fund firm founded by Chris Levett, plans
to close after posting more than two years of investment losses.

The letter obtained by Bloomberg said Clive told investors on
Friday that the London-based hedge fund will shut down at the end
of the month.  The Clive Fund's Class A shares fell 9.1% this
year through Sept. 18 after declining 8.8% in 2012 and about 10%
in 2011, Bloomberg discloses.

Clive is among money managers who have been hurt since the start
of 2011 after price swings in markets from oil to wheat whipsawed
traders, prompting losses and clients to pull investments,
Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Clive wrote in the letter, "We perceive
there to be limited, suitable opportunities at this point in the
economic-demand and the commodity-supply cycles."

"It is also unclear as to when a heightened opportunity
environment will return in commodities."

The commodity hedge fund ended 2012 with US$1.95 billion under
management, a 46% drop from the year earlier, Bloomberg states.

The letter said Clive told investors that 98% their capital will
be returned next month and the remainder once a final audit has
been conducted, Bloomberg relates.


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Sets Up Panel to Review Alternative Proposals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Bounds at The Financial Times reports that The
Co-operative Bank has bowed to pressure from its bondholders and
agreed to listen to alternative proposals for rescue funding.

On Friday, Sept. 20, the bank said it was setting up an
independent committee to examine ideas to fill its GBP1.5 billion
capital hole -- after months of insisting that there was no
alternative to its own plan, which imposed losses of up to 60% on
its lenders, the FT relates.

The Co-operative Group -- the mutual organization that owns the
bank -- had proposed a flotation that forces bondholders to
convert their debt to shares as it provides up to GBP1 billion of
extra capital and retains a majority stake, the FT notes.

However, many have protested and a group representing
institutional holders of 42% of the debt last week proposed a
plan that would see them take over the bank, the FT discloses.

According to the FT, the Co-op said that the independent
committee would "consider third-party approaches in relation to
the Group's recapitalization plan, ahead of the planned launch of
the exchange offer", in a move that has been hailed as a victory
by campaigners.

A new plan is expected to be published in October, the FT says.

The independent committee will consist of Richard Pym, Co-op
Bank's non-executive chairman, Niall Booker, its chief executive,
and the independent non-executive directors of the bank, the FT
states.  It is expected to appoint Greenhill as its financial
adviser, the FT notes.

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people, and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1.  The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Parent Can Refuse to Inject Capital
------------------------------------------------------
John Glover and Howard Mustoe at Bloomberg News report that
bondholders said the parent of Co-operative Bank Plc, which is
seeking capital after losses, may avoid being forced to rescue
the lender thanks to an accord it struck with regulators last
year.

Co-Op Group Chief Executive Officer Euan Sutherland said in a
letter to an unidentified bondholder and seen by Bloomberg that
the Financial Services Authority agreed not to classify the firm
as a "mixed financial holding company."  Mark Taber, the
organizer of a group of bondholders, as cited by Bloomberg, said
in a separate letter dated Sept. 19 to the Prudential Regulation
Authority, that would mean Co-Op can't be forced to inject
capital into the lender.  The PRA along with the Bank of England
replaced the FSA as the banking industry's regulators this year,
Bloomberg recounts.

Co-Op Bank must raise GBP1.5 billion (US$2.4 billion) to plug a
capital hole after losses incurred following its acquisition of
Britannia Building Society in 2009, Bloomberg notes.  According
to Bloomberg, Mr. Sutherland wrote in the letter that the FSA
granted the waiver to the parent before the completion of a
planned purchase to acquire 632 branches owned by Lloyds Banking
Group Plc last year.

As a mixed financial company, regulators would have powers
including the authority to direct it to raise new capital, to
reorganize the financial unit and to fire executives, Bloomberg
states.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Sutherland wrote, "The FSA granted a
three-year waiver from CGL being considered a mixed financial
holding company and put the matter beyond doubt."

"That waiver remains in force."

The lender plans to raise GBP500 million by exchanging
subordinated debt for equity and another GBP500 million from the
sale of senior debt issued by the parent company, Bloomberg says,
citing a company filing on June 17.

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people, and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1.  The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.


LLOYDS BANKING: Fitch Affirms Tier 1 Sub. Debt Rating to 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDR) of Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBSG), Lloyds Banking
Group (LBG) and Santander UK (San UK) at 'A', with Stable
Outlooks. Fitch has downgraded Nationwide Building Society's
(Nationwide) Long-term IDR to 'A' from 'A+'. The Outlooks on all
of the Long-term IDRs are Stable. All of the banks' Support
Rating Floors (SRF) and Support Ratings have been affirmed at 'A'
and '1', respectively.

Fitch has also upgraded the Viability Ratings (VR) of LBG and of
Lloyds TSB Bank Plc (LTSB) to 'bbb+' from 'bbb' and has
downgraded the VR of Nationwide to 'a' from 'a+'. The VRs of
RBSG, RBS and San UK have been affirmed at 'bbb', 'bbb' and 'a',
respectively.

The financial institutions discussed in this comment are leading
players in the UK retail and commercial banking market. Retail
banking, heavily weighted towards mortgage lending, is the core
business of Nationwide, LBG and San UK. Retail is also a sizeable
business line for RBSG, although it is somewhat more diversified,
both across product lines and geographically.

All financial institutions discussed in this comments are
benefiting from the gradual improvement in the UK's operating
environment. Performance in 2012/13 is improving, albeit
gradually. Performance indicators vary widely across the
institutions, reflecting different business focus and the ability
to address legacy problems, notably in commercial real estate
(CRE) lending, Irish exposure, certain books of low yielding
residual mortgages and many others. Liquidity at all the
financial institutions is expected to reduce, albeit faster at
some than others, from a strong level across the board. Capital
ratios are improving.

Key Rating Drivers: IDRS, Senior Debt, Support Rating and Support
Rating Floor

The Support Ratings and SRFs of RBSG, RBS, LBG, LTSB, Bank of
Scotland Plc (BoS), Nationwide and San UK reflect Fitch's view
that, as systemically important banks in the UK, support for the
banks from the UK authorities (AA+/Stable), in case of need, is
still highly likely.

The IDRs and senior debt ratings of RBSG, RBS, LBG, LTSB, BoS and
San UK are driven by their SRFs. Nationwide's IDRs and senior
debt ratings are driven by its VR, underpinned by its SRF.
Nationwide's SRF is at the same level as its Long-term IDR.

Rating Sensitivities: IDRS, Senior Debt, Support Rating and
Support Rating Floor

The SRs and SRFs of all these institutions are sensitive to a
change in Fitch's assumptions about the ongoing availability of
extraordinary sovereign support to them. Changes in assumptions
could be driven by a reduction either in the sovereign's ability
(for example, triggered by a downgrade of the UK's sovereign
rating) or propensity to provide such support. In either case,
this would result in a downward revision of the banks' SRFs.

In Fitch's view, there is a clear intention ultimately to reduce
implicit state support for systemically important banks in the UK
(and more broadly in the EU), as demonstrated by a series of
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives at UK and EU
levels. On 11 Sept. 2013, Fitch outlined its approach to
incorporating support in its bank ratings in light of evolving
support dynamics for banks worldwide.

The SRFs and SRs of all the banks listed in this rating action
commentary would be revised down if Fitch concluded that
potential sovereign support had either weakened relative to its
previous assessment or that it could no longer be relied upon.

A downward revision of the SRF would lead to a downgrade of the
Long-term IDRs, and possibly also of the Short-term IDRs, and
senior debt ratings of RBSG and of LBG and their subsidiaries
given their current VR levels. It would also lead to a Negative
Outlook on the Long-term IDR and senior debt ratings of San UK,
as its ratings would at that point be driven by its VR. The VR
is, in turn, constrained by the Long-term IDR of its parent,
Banco Santander SA (BBB+/Negative/bbb+). The potential Negative
Outlook on San UK's Long-term IDR would reflect Fitch's view that
some degree of correlation between the IDRs of San UK and Banco
Santander SA exists, thus justifying harmonization of Outlooks. A
downward revision of Nationwide's SRF would currently have no
impact on its IDRs or senior debt ratings as they are currently
driven by its VRs.

Royal Bank of Scotland

Key Rating Drivers - VR

RBS's VR reflects the significant progress made in improving its
overall risk profile and in meeting strategic targets. It also
considers certain significant risk areas that remain. These
include credit risks associated with its still sizeable Irish
loans and CRE portfolio; political risks and uncertainties,
including in relation to the outcome of the UK government's
ongoing investigation into the cost/benefit of spinning off
certain activities; and substantial potential conduct and
litigation risks. Lastly, strategic guidelines remain uncertain
as the newly appointed CEO due to take office from 1 Oct. 2013,
has yet to clarify the overall direction to be pursued by the
bank.

Nonetheless, Fitch believes that RBSG is well positioned to
continue to de-risk and strengthen its balance sheet, given its
strong core retail and commercial franchises, and improving
governance structures. While the potential sale of some of its
businesses in the medium-term, and restructuring of its trading
division is likely to result in lower earnings, the overall
volatility of earnings is expected to reduce which Fitch would
consider positive.

Regulatory capital ratios continue to improve thanks to de-
leveraging and despite increased risk weightings applied to CRE
investment portfolio assets. However, capitalization needs to be
considered in the context of residual concentration risks
(geographic, industrial and single name exposures) and a
relatively high level of unreserved non-performing loans relative
to Fitch core capital (FCC; 46%), which exposes the bank to
further falls in collateral values.

Rating Sensitivities - VR

On balance, Fitch considers that RBSG's VR is capable of gradual
improvement over the short to medium term. However, there is
uncertainty regarding the extent and pace of a potential future
upgrade. Positive drivers would include further reductions in
risk concentrations and strengthening of capital and greater
visibility regarding strategic direction and the outcome of
overhanging political, litigation and conduct risk, including the
outcome of the government's "bad" bank review, In the longer-
term, and reflecting its strong core franchise across many
segments and assuming further strengthening in profitability and
maintenance of sound key metrics, Fitch sees potential for the
VRs of both the group and the bank to rise to the 'a' category.

Downside risk to RBSG's VR is likely to be driven by external
factors, rather than by any change in risk appetite. A
particularly disruptive or expensive and extended reputational or
litigation event could also create downside risks.

RBS's and RBSG's VRs and VR sensitivities are all driven by the
same considerations; for RBSG, the continued absence of any
double leverage is also a consideration.

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - Subsidiaries' IDRs,
Support Ratings and VRS

Royal Bank of Scotland NV (RBS NV)

RBS NV is a former ABN Amro Bank legal entity, which is in the
process of being wound down and much of whose business acquired
by RBS was transferred to RBS plc's balance sheet. It is
essentially a booking center for the group and its IDRs are
aligned with those of RBS because of its high operational
integration and the extremely high likelihood it would be
supported by RBS if needed. Fitch believes it cannot be
meaningfully analyzed on a standalone basis (it has no VR) and
its IDRs are sensitive to the same considerations that could
affect RBS.

National Westminster Bank PLC

National Westminster Bank is a core subsidiary of RBS and, while
a separate legal entity, its operations are highly integrated
with those of its parent. Fitch believes that it cannot be
meaningfully analyzed on a standalone basis (it has no VR), that
its overall risk profile is indistinguishable from that of RBS
and that it is difficult to countenance a default of one bank and
not the other. Its IDRs are thus driven by the same rating
drivers and sensitivities as those of RBS.

Royal Bank of Scotland International Limited (RBSI)

RBSI provides core offshore banking operations. RBSI's IDRs are
the same as those of its parent RBS, reflecting its ownership,
the alignment of risk management procedures and operating
platforms with RBS, and the close alignment of RBSI's activities
with those of the RBS Group's core UK bank. In Fitch's opinion,
there is an extremely strong likelihood of support being provided
by RBS to RBSI should it ever be required. Its IDRs are thus
driven by the same rating drivers and sensitivities as those of
RBS.

Ulster Bank Limited

Ulster Bank's VR reflects Fitch's view that its capacity for
continued unsupported operation is highly vulnerable to
deterioration in the business and economic environment. The bank
is reliant on its parent for funding, liquidity and capital. Its
Long-term IDR is notched once from its parent's, reflecting
Fitch's view that this Irish subsidiary is still strategically
important and that support will continue to flow through from the
parent. Ulster Bank's Short-term IDR is equalized with its
parent's because Fitch believes that the likelihood of the bank
continuing to receive support in the short term is highly likely.
The Long-term IDR is driven by the same drivers and sensitivities
as those of RBS but could also be impacted should questions about
the importance of maintaining a presence in Ireland or potential
ownership changes surface. The VR is sensitive to an improvement
in the entity's standalone performance.

Ulster Bank Ireland Limited

Ulster Bank Ireland's Long-term and Short-term IDRs are equalized
with those of Ulster Bank. Like Ulster Bank, its Long-term IDR is
notched once from the IDR of RBS and its Short-term IDR is
equalized. It has no VR as Fitch believes its operations cannot
be meaningfully analyzed on a standalone basis. However, while
its IDRs are also driven by the same rating drivers and
sensitivities as those of RBS but could also be impacted should
questions about the importance of maintaining a presence in the
Republic of Ireland or potential ownership changes surface. They
are also subject to additional Irish country risk, meaning its
ratings are expected to be capped one notch above that of the
Irish sovereign's Long-term IDR (BBB+/Stable).

RBS Holding USA Inc

The rating assigned to RBS Holdings USA Inc's commercial paper
program is equalized with the Short-term IDR of RBSG reflecting
the unconditional guarantee provided by the ultimate parent.

RBS Securities Inc

RBSSI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of RBSG and its ratings are
notched once off RBSG's Long-term IDR, reflecting Fitch's view
that this is a strategically important subsidiary of the group's
markets business. RBSSI relies on the parent for contingent
funding, capital and liquidity needs. Without such support, its
ratings would be materially lower on a standalone basis. As it
operates as an integral part of RBS's market business, no VR is
assigned. The ratings incorporate RBS's continuing demonstrated
support in the form of capital infusions and credit lines.

RBSSI's Long-term IDR is notched down from RBS's IDR because the
entity is based outside the UK and support may diminish over
time. Fitch believes that the UK government will continue to
allow support to flow through to RBSSI, if required. However,
retail bank subsidiaries may have priority for support in an
extreme stress scenario. Furthermore, over time, the UK
government may opt to segregate investment banking and core
banking activities. This could reduce support for RBSSI and cause
Fitch to review these ratings. Changes to RBSSI's ratings would
move in tandem with RBS's Long- and Short-term IDRs because
RBSSI's ratings are driven by that of its parent. If RBSSI were
no longer deemed strategically important to RBS, RBSSI's ratings
would be downgraded, potentially by multiple notches.

Lloyds Banking Group

Key Rating Drivers - VR

LBG's and LTSB's VRs are underpinned by the group's strong UK
retail and commercial banking franchises, a reduced risk profile
as a result of deleveraging and healthy liquidity. The VR also
takes into account risks, especially those linked to CRE
exposures and potential conduct charges. For LBG, the VR also
reflects relatively low holding company double leverage.

The upgrade of LBG and LTSB's VRs acknowledges significant
improvement in the group's FCC/weighted risks ratio to 9.6% at
end-H113 (end-2012: 8.1%), a trend which Fitch expects will
continue. The improvement in LBG's FCC/weighted risks ratio
results from improved retained earnings, deleveraging and the
upstreaming of a GBP1.6 billion dividend from its insurance
subsidiary. Despite the improving trend, capitalization is still
weaker than peers' in the 'a' range and Fitch considers that
LBG's capitalization is still at risk from falls in the value of
collateral, given a relatively high proportion of unreserved
impaired loans to FCC (71%).

Non-core loans reduced to GBP83 billion at end-H113 (end-2012:
GBP98 billion); further reductions to less than GBP70 billion are
expected by end-2013. De-leveraging has been capital accretive
throughout 2012 and H113 and was a key driver to LBG's improving
FCC/weighted risks ratio.

Key Rating Sensitivities - VR

Further positive rating action on the VRs would need to be
supported by an improving UK operating environment helping to
sustain profitability and further strengthen capitalization.

Continued improvement in LBG's and LTSB's asset quality
indicators and capital ratios could support the positive momentum
of the banks' VRs to align with the 'a' range of other large UK
institutions.

A downgrade would likely be the result of external factors, for
example a particularly sharp deterioration in the UK economy and
property market that resulted in a material weakening of asset
quality.

Nationwide Building Society

Key Rating Drivers - VR

The downgrade of Nationwide's VR is driven by the continued
pressure on post-impairment earnings and thus capital generation
arising from the society's poorly performing commercial property
finance portfolio (the total property finance portfolio accounted
for 7% of lending assets, the equivalent of 183% of the society's
FCC). A deterioration of the portfolio during 2012/2013 resulted
in additional impairment charges. Furthermore, the classification
of around GBP3 billion of loans as 'default' under the Prudential
Regulatory Authority's (PRA) new 'slotting' regime resulted in
additional capital needed to be set aside against regulatory
expected losses.

While acknowledging that profit maximization is not Nationwide's
goal, Fitch considers this negative impact is exacerbated by the
building society's very low (albeit rising) underlying
profitability. A relatively high proportion of net impaired loans
(calculated as impaired loans less reserves) to Nationwide's FCC
(52%), leaves the society vulnerable to further falls in the
value of collateral.

Fitch notes that Nationwide's franchise and brand recognition in
the UK mortgage and savings markets is strong. Further, its
large, well performing prime residential mortgage loans (69% of
total loans) and its stable deposit base are major strengths,
underpinning the VR. Internal capital generation is expected to
improve given the general widening of margins noted in the UK
since mid-2013 and strong volume growth noted at Nationwide
(gross loans were up 4% on a net basis in the year to April 4,
2013). While profitability is expected to rise notably as early
as FY14, it is from a very low base and is not expected to rise
to its full potential until the property portfolio is fully
restructured, most likely 2015/2016.

On-balance sheet liquidity reserves are reducing in line with
lower regulatory requirements and, as a result, liquidity metrics
are now weaker than certain of its peers' but still very solid.
In common with other UK banks, the society's overall liquidity
position is supported by off-balance sheet Treasury Bills and
access to central bank liquidity through the positioning of some
of its loans with the Bank of England.

Rating Sensitivities - VR

Given Nationwide's geographic and business concentrations, Fitch
views its natural VR range to be within the 'a' category. An
improvement in the VR to 'a+' in the short term is not Fitch's
base case given weak profitability and some pressure on capital.
Further negative rating pressure on the VR could arise from the
society's inability to meet its targeted leverage ratio in a
timely manner, or from a faster deterioration in the loan book
than originally envisaged.

SAN UK

Key Rating Drivers - VR

San UK's VR is underpinned by the bank's good asset quality,
supported by the high proportion of lending, secured by prime
residential mortgages. Although there was a slight uptick in
impaired mortgages in 2012-H113, the overall book remains well
performing. The bank's strategy is to increase corporate and SME
loans, potentially to around 20% of total loans over the medium-
term. The bank's performance weakened as a result of the extended
low base rate environment but spreads are beginning to widen.
Although loan impairment charges reached a very high GBP1 billion
in 2012 (57% of pre-operating income), these were largely the
result of a portfolio review and have fallen to more moderate
levels in year to date 2013.

Liquidity and capital are comfortable, although Fitch expects
some limited reduction of excess liquidity following changes in
regulatory requirements. This is the case for most UK banks.

Deposits are the bank's main funding source. San UK also makes
use of secured issuance and asset encumbrance is relatively high
(albeit reducing) compared with its UK peers. The capital
position is strong, with a core Tier 1 ratio of 12.4% at H113,
although this is likely to weaken gradually as the bank expands
its SME lending.

San UK is regulated by the UK PRA on a standalone basis and it is
managed and funded separately from its parent. Fitch believes the
bank is well ring-fenced against the potential for its parent to
upstream excessive liquidity and/or capital. However, in Fitch's
view, San UK's reputation and business flows are to some extent
still correlated with its parent's overall creditworthiness and
the linkage between parent and subsidiary ratings means that
Fitch has maintained San UK's VR two notches above Banco
Santander SA's Long-term IDR.

Although Banco Santander SA may provide capital and liquidity
support to San UK, if necessary, the extent of this support is
limited given the size of the UK subsidiary, which represents
c.30% of total group assets. Fitch does not factor institutional
support into San UK's ratings.

Rating Sensitivities - VR

Negative pressure on San UK's VR would arise if Banco Santander
SA was downgraded or if San UK's standalone position weakened for
example due to a material weakening of asset quality arising from
a very sharp correction in the UK economy and property market.
This is not Fitch's base case. Upward potential on the VR is
limited given the parent's rating.

SAN UK'S Subsidiaries' Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities
Abbey National Treasury Services (ANTS)

The ratings of ANTS, the main debt issuing vehicle of San UK, are
equalized with those of San UK. It is a fully integrated
subsidiary and all its obligations incurred prior to 30 June 2015
are guaranteed by San UK. ANTS' ratings are sensitive to changes
in San UK's IDRs.

Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Ratings (All Banks) - Rating Drivers
and Sensitivities

The ratings of all banks' subordinated debt and hybrid securities
are notched down from their or from their parents' VRs reflecting
a combination of Fitch's assessment of their incremental non-
performance risk relative to their VRs (up to three notches) and
assumptions around loss severity (one or two notches). These
features vary considerably by instrument. The ratings are
primarily sensitive to changes in the VRs of the banks or their
parents.

GOVERNMENT GUARANTEED DEBT - RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES

Where rated, the ratings of these securities are driven by the
rating of the UK government and are sensitive to changes in that
rating.

The full list of rating actions is as follows:

LBG

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Stable Outlook

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb+' from 'bbb'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured EMTN Long-term: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured EMTN Short-term: affirmed at 'F1'

Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A'

Lower tier 2 (XS0145620281): upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'

All other lower Tier 2 subordinated Enhanced Capital Notes:
upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+'

Upper Tier 2 subordinated Enhanced Capital Notes (XS0471770817,
XS473103348, XS0471767276, XS0473106283): upgraded to 'BB+' from
'BB'

All other Upper Tier 2 subordinated bonds: upgraded to 'BB+'
from 'BB'

Subordinated non-innovative Tier 1 discretionary debt: upgraded
to 'BB-' from 'B+'

LTSB

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A' '; Stable Outlook

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb+' from 'bbb'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured Long-term debt: affirmed at 'A'

Commercial paper and senior unsecured Short-term debt: affirmed
at 'F1'

Guaranteed senior EMTN Long-term: affirmed at 'AA+'

Guaranteed senior EMTN Short-term: affirmed at 'F1+'

Guaranteed senior notes Long-term: affirmed at 'AA+'

Market linked securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'

Lower Tier 2: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'

Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BB+' from 'BB'

Innovative Tier 1 subordinated non-discretionary debt
(XS0156923913, US539473AE82, XS0474660676): upgraded to 'BB'
from 'BB-'

Non-innovative Tier 1 debt (XS 0156372343): upgraded to 'BB'
from 'BB-'

Other Innovative Tier 1 subordinated discretionary debt:
upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'

HBOS

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Stable Outlook

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A'

Innovative Tier 1 subordinated discretionary debt: upgraded to
'BB-' from 'B+'

Innovative Tier 1 subordinated non-discretionary debt: upgraded
to 'BB' from 'BB-'

Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BB+' from 'BB'

Lower Tier 2 debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'

BOS

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Stable Outlook

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A'

Commercial paper and senior unsecured Short-term debt: affirmed
at 'F1'

Lower Tier 2: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'

Upper Tier 2: upgraded to 'BB+' from 'BB'

Preference stock: upgraded to 'BB' from 'BB-'

RBSG

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured market linked securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'

Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB+'

Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'

Innovative Tier 1 and Preferred stock: affirmed at 'B+'

USD1.2bn, US780097AH44; GBP200m XS0121856859; USD1bn
US780097AE13 and USD300m US7800978790: affirmed at 'BB-'

RBS

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured market linked securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'

Subordinated Lower Tier 2 debt affirmed at 'BBB-'

Subordinated Upper Tier 2 debt affirmed at 'BB'

EUR1bn Dated Subordinated Debt, XS0201065496 affirmed at 'BB+'

National Westminster Bank plc

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Long-term and Short-term senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A'/
'F1'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A'

Subordinated Lower Tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'

Subordinated Upper Tier 2 debt: affirmed at 'BB'

RBS NV

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured market linked securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'

RBS International Ltd

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

RBS Holding USA Inc

CP programme: affirmed at 'F1'

Ulster Bank Limited

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable

Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'

Viability Rating affirmed at 'ccc'

Support Rating affirmed at'1'

Ulster Bank Ireland Limited

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable

Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'.

Senior unsecured Long-term and Short-term debt, including CPs,
affirmed at 'A-/F1'

Support Rating affirmed at '1'

Subordinated debt affirmed at 'BBB-'

RBS Securities Inc

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable

Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'.

Nationwide

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'; Stable Outlook

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

VR: downgraded to 'a' from 'a+'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

SRF: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured long-term debt, including programme ratings and
member deposits: downgraded to 'A' from 'A+'

Commercial paper and short-term debt, including programme
ratings: affirmed at 'F1'

Lower Tier 2: downgraded to 'A-' from 'A'

Permanent interest bearing securities: downgraded to 'BBB-' from
'BBB'

San UK:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

VR: affirmed at 'a'

Support Rating: affirmed at '1'

SRF: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured debt long-term rating, including programme
rating: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured debt short-term rating, including programme
rating and commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1'

Market-linked senior unsecured securities: affirmed at 'Aemr'

Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'A-'

Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB'

GBP300m Non-cumulative, callable preference shares,
XS0502105454: affirmed at 'BB+'

Other Preferred stock: affirmed at 'BBB-'

Abbey National Treasury Services plc

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A'; Stable Outlook

Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'

Senior unsecured debt long-term rating, including programme
ratings: affirmed at 'A'

Senior unsecured debt short-term rating: affirmed at 'F1'

Government guaranteed Debt Programme: affirmed at 'AA+'/'F1+'

Abbey National Capital Trust 1

USD1bn Trust Preferred Securities (ISIN: US002927AA95)
(guaranteed by San UK): affirmed at 'BBB-'


MEREPARK CONSTRUCTION: Fined GBP30,000 Over Gas Leak Incident
-------------------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that a contractor previously working on a
GBP160 million mixed-use development project in central Liverpool
has appeared in court over a major gas leak which sparked fears
of an explosion in the area.

Merepark Construction Ltd, which has since entered voluntary
liquidation, was working on the refurbishment of the former
Lewis's building as part of the wider Central Village scheme when
the incident occurred, the report recalls.

But on Jan. 19, 2012, a gas supply pipe was damaged during
demolition work inside the building. Liverpool Magistrates' Court
heard Merepark Construction, as principal contractor, has failed
to warn the demolition company about the live gas supply.

According to the report, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE),
which brought the prosecution, said a gas supply pipe, which was
clearly visible entering the building's service duct from street
level, was damaged by falling debris during demolition work
causing a two-inch hole in the pipe.

Insider Media relates that the court was told Merepark
Construction had arranged for the pipes, which led from the gas
meter into the building, to be disconnected but had failed to
take any action to either disconnect the gas supply to the meter
or to protect the four-inch supply pipe from demolition work.

Merepark Construction, of Garden Lane in Altrincham, was found
guilty of two breaches of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act
1974 by failing to ensure the safety of workers or the public
following a trial at Liverpool Magistrates' Court, the report
says.

The company, which is currently in voluntary liquidation, was
fined GBP30,000 and ordered to pay GBP8,490 in prosecution costs,
adds Insider Media.


REDTREE INT'L: Rugby Club Sponsor Goes Into Liquidation
-------------------------------------------------------
Amy Westlake at Rochdale Online reports that Rochdale Rugby Union
Football Club is holding a fundraising event to raise money to
cover costs incurred by the Minis and Juniors section of the
club.

Rochdale relates that Redtree International Limited, a company
involved with sponsorship of the club has recently gone into
liquidation. As a result of Redtrees difficulties, the Minis and
Juniors section of the club finds itself needing to make up a
shortfall in its budget for items including kit, according to the
report.

Rochdale says this has come at a difficult time of year for the
club given that it is only the start of the season.

This situation is something that the club's officers are
extremely disappointed about but could not have foreseen.

According to the report, following confirmation from Insolvency
Practitioners that Redtree is going into liquidation there is
little that can be reasonably done about recovering monies, or,
to pursue the promised sponsorship and monies due from Redtree.

Rochdale notes that to help solve issues, the club are hosting a
Sportsman's Dinner on Oct. 24, 2013, at 7:00 p.m. for 7:30 p.m.
1986 European Winning Goal Keeper Alex Stepeny and comedian Brian
Sharpe will be guests at the dinner, along with club chairman
Iain Coates.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Expects Deleveraging Trend to Continue for EU Insurers
----------------------------------------------------------------
The majority of the largest Moody's-rated European insurers have
reduced their financial leverage over the last five years and
adopted a more conservative attitude towards capital management,
says Moody's Investors Service in a new Special Comment entitled
"Large European Insurers: Deleveraging Trend Will Continue."

This deleveraging trend for the industry is set to continue in
the coming quarters with many insurers willing to use part of
their excess cash to reduce their outstanding debt rather than
returning it to shareholders.

Moody's notes that this trend reflects the insurers' more
conservative attitude towards capital management as a result of
ongoing economic uncertainty, particularly in continental Europe.
It is also the result of the lower profitability of the industry
compared to pre-crisis levels which, in turn, has pressured
fixed-charge coverage. "In fact, despite the reduction in
financial leverage, fixed-charge coverage is generally well below
2007 levels and, for many insurers, sits below our expectations
for their ratings" says Antonello Aquino, a Moody's Senior Vice
President and author of the report.

In its report, Moody's also analyses the quality of capital and
the debt structure of the large European insurers. On average,
more than 20% of solvency capital for the large European insurers
is represented by subordinated debt and other capital securities.
However, under the rating agency's hybrid methodology, these
securities only receive equity credit equal to one third of their
value, reflecting the limited loss absorbing characteristics of
these instruments.

Following its peer comparison, Moody's concludes that, among its
peers, Aegon showed the largest reduction in its financial
leverage over the last five years, driven by a strong recovery in
the value of shareholders' equity. Conversely, Aviva recorded the
highest deterioration given the sharp reduction in shareholders'
equity as a result of losses from disposals in 2012.

Moreover, Aviva and Generali rely on a higher proportion of
subordinated debt and other capital securities in their capital
structure than peers. As a result, Moody's views their quality of
capital as lower than their peers.

Moody's notes that most insurance debt has a long-term maturity
profile with little short-term refinancing risk. Close to 50% of
the total financial debt outstanding matures after five years,
assuming the first call date as, de facto, maturity date. On the
same basis, the total amount maturing in the next 1 to 5 years is
close to EUR30 billion and, among the rating agency's selected
peer group, Zurich and Generali present the largest amount of
debt maturing in this period.


* Fitch Sees Shifting Growth Trends in Advanced, Emerging Markets
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says in its newly published Global Economic Outlook
(GEO) that world economic growth will strengthen in H213 and
2014, driven by a cyclical pick up in major advanced economies
(MAE), while growth stutters in emerging markets (EM). Its latest
forecasts for world GDP growth are revised down to 2.3% in 2013
(from 2.4% in the June GEO), 2.9% in 2014% (from 3.1%) and 3.2%
in 2015 (unchanged), weighted at market exchange rates.

"Forward guidance of major central banks reinforces Fitch's view
that the short-term policy rates of the US Fed, ECB, Bank of
England and BoJ will remain low into 2015," says Gergely Kiss,
Director in Fitch's Sovereign team. "However, the marked rise in
long-term yields and risk premiums on some asset classes since
May 2013 indicates that the exit from exceptionally loose
monetary conditions is likely to generate bouts of volatility,
despite enhanced central bank communication and an improving
economic outlook. In particular, tighter global funding
conditions will add to headwinds facing EMs, particularly those
dependent on capital inflows," he adds.

The end of the 18-month eurozone recession in Q213 supports
Fitch's longstanding view that growth will recover gradually in
the second half of this year. Fitch forecasts MAE GDP growth to
increase to 1.8% in 2014 and 2.0% in 2015 from 0.9% in 2013
(practically unchanged from the June GEO).

Although growth in EM will continue to comfortably outstrip that
in MAEs, we expect the growth differential to narrow between the
two over the forecast horizon. Fitch has again cut its growth
forecasts for all four of the BRICs. It expects growth in China
to slow to 7.0% in 2014 (7.5% previously), from 7.5% in 2013;
while growth in India is forecast at just 4.8% this year and 5.8%
in 2014. Higher interest rates and less buoyant capital inflows
will complicate policy trade-offs in many EMs, adding to growth
strains from domestic structural bottlenecks, declining returns
on investment and China's rebalancing.

The US economy is expanding at a moderate pace. We forecast real
GDP growth of 1.6% in 2013 (down from 1.9% in June), due to data
revisions and mixed Q313 indicators. We expect growth to
strengthen to 2.6% in 2014 and 3.0% in 2015, underpinned by the
housing market recovery, improved household balance sheets,
rising employment and strong corporate profitability. However, a
renewed fiscal squeeze or political stand-off over the debt
ceiling and rising interest rates represent downside risks.

The eurozone delivered a positive surprise with GDP growth of
0.3% qoq in Q213, with the improvement broadly based across
member states. A subdued recovery will follow as gains in
competitiveness and rebalancing bear fruit, fiscal consolidation
eases and financing conditions normalize. Fitch forecasts GDP
growth of negative 0.4% in 2013 (negative 0.6% in June), positive
0.9% in 2014 and positive 1.3% in 2015 (both unchanged).
Unemployment will remain above 12% until 2015.

In the UK, Fitch has revised up GDP growth to 1.4% in 2013 (from
0.8% in June) and 2.2% in 2014 and 2015 (1.8% and 2% in June,
respectively), to reflect stronger-than-expected H113 data and
vibrant recent surveys, which indicate broadly based acceleration
of growth. Nevertheless, growth is likely to remain modest by
historical standards over the medium term due to fiscal
consolidation, stretched private sector balance sheets and the
still fragile outlook in the eurozone, the UK's main trading
partner.

Fitch maintains its expectations that 'Abenomics', the
reflationary economic policy strategy in Japan, will buoy growth
in the short term, though its medium-term success is less
certain. Growth could reach 1.8% in 2013 as fiscal and monetary
stimulus provides an initial boost to confidence, before
moderating to 1.5% in 2014 and 1.2% in 2015 as the impetus fades.

In this GEO's alternative scenario, we explore the global growth
impact of an additional 100bps rise (relative to mid-September
level) in long-term interest rates in MAEs, excluding Japan, and
200bp in most EMs reflecting a jump in the risk premium. The
simulation results indicate world GDP growth could be 0.3pp
weaker in 2014 and 2015, a cumulated impact of 60 bps. The US and
UK are the most exposed among MAE due to the large role played by
capital markets, with a cumulated impact of 140 and 80 bps,
respectively. In EMs, the risk premium component would be the
most relevant, presenting a monetary policy dilemma for those
with liberalized capital markets including Brazil and Russia,
while the impact would be more subdued in China and India.

The full report, entitled "Global Economic Outlook", is available
at www.fitchratings.com. To complement the release of the GEO,
Fitch has also published a datasheet containing the agency's
latest macroeconomic forecasts by country and region.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 16 to September 20, 2013
---------------------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *