/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130930.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Monday, September 30, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 193 Headlines B O S N I A & H E R Z E G O V I N A * BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating; Outlook Stable F R A N C E FCC ZEBRE: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Part M2 Loan * Fitch: US Money Fund Exposure to French Banks Hits 2-Year High G R E E C E * GREECE: Bailout Fund Head Casts Doubt on Debt Sustainability I C E L A N D * ICELAND: C.B. Urges Failed Banks' Creditors to Cut Demands I R E L A N D ALLIED IRISH: Completes Non-Core Loan Deleveraging Plan EURO ATLANTIS CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2' IRISH BANK: Liquidation May Lead to "Substantial Savings" QUIRINUS PLC: Moody's Reviews Ba3-Rated X2 Notes for Downgrade * IRELAND: Company Insolvencies Down 25% in Third Quarter 2013 * IRELAND: 716 SME Jobs Secured Through Examinership This Year I T A L Y ALITALIA SPA: Plans to Seek More Funding to Avoid Bankruptcy MARCHE MUTUI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes From 'Ba3' L U X E M B O U R G NIELSEN COMPANY: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Issuer Default Rating N E T H E R L A N D S FAXTOR ABS 2005-1: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Two Note Classes LEVERAGED FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class IV Notes to 'CCC-' STORM 2013-IV: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Ratings on Two Note Classes R O M A N I A CITADELLA TITAN: To Be Put Up for Sale for EUR6.85 Million R U S S I A CREATIVE GROUP: Fitch Withdraws 'B-(EXP)' Sr. Unsecured Rating NOVIKOMBANK JSC: Moody's Affirms B2 Issuer Rating; Outlook Stable NOVIKOMBANK JSC: Moody's Interfax Affirms National Deposit Rating RUSSIAN UTILITIES: Fitch Assigns 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings S L O V E N I A * SLOVENIA: Says Will Fix Financial Sector Without Outside Help S P A I N CODERE SA: Moody's Affirms Ca-PD Rating; Removes LD Indicator S W I T Z E R L A N D OCTAPHARMA NORDIC: S&P Affirms & Withdraws 'BB+' Long-Term CCR T U R K E Y ORION HOLDING: Applies for Suspension of Bankruptcy Proceedings * TURKEY: Fitch Says BoP May Slow Growth But Won't Spark Crisis U N I T E D K I N G D O M DUNFERMLINE ATHLETIC: Pars United Expects to Take Over This Week SPEARPOINT RISK: In Liquidation; Owes GBP154,000 to CBG SDI FUNDING: Moody's Lowers Rating on GBP300MM of Notes to 'B2' X X X X X X X X * BOND PRICING: For the Week September 23 to September 27, 2013 ********* ======================================= B O S N I A & H E R Z E G O V I N A ======================================= * BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating; Outlook Stable ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B/B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The outlook is stable. Rationale The ratings on Bosnia and Herzegovina are constrained by its fragile, overlapping government institutions, its weak fiscal management framework, and external vulnerabilities arising from persistent current account deficits and funding challenges. The ratings are supported by S&P's expectation of continued and significant international support. S&P believes that the domestic political environment will likely remain divided along ethnic lines and entity boundaries. Under the 1995 Dayton Agreement that concluded the 1992-95 Bosnian war, Bosnia is divided along ethnic lines into three political entities--the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with a predominantly Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) and Croat population), Republika Srpska (Serbian Orthodox Christian and Bosniak) and the Brcko District (Bosniak and Croat). Under the Agreement, both the Federation and the Republika Srpska have their own parliament, which has executive legislative powers over the respective entity. Among other responsibilities, foreign policy, judicial powers and monetary policy are with the State and exercised through state-level institutions. Tensions exist between the entities and the state-level institutions and, increasingly, between the combined authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community. In S&P's view, periodic events--such as the government reshuffle earlier this year within the entities--undermine confidence that political cohesion is developing. Such events detract from important issues. For instance, progress on a key constitutional amendment to allow members of other communities to be elected to higher government positions, a prerequisite for EU candidacy, has been pending since a 2009 ruling by the European Court for Human Rights. Bosnia's current constitution only allows Bosniaks, Serbs, or Croats to be elected to the Presidency of the State. A stalemate between the entity governments regarding meeting the EU's sanitation standards has prevented Bosnia's agricultural sector from preparing for Croatia's accession to the EU; at the end of 2012, Croatia was Bosnia's second-largest export market. More recently, the European Commission (EC) canceled two agricultural projects worth EUR5 million (0.02% of GDP) after the entity governments failed to reach a decision on the implementation of the projects. While EUR5 million isn't of itself a large amount, Bosnia risks losing funds for other EC-backed projects if the entity governments fail to set up a coordination mechanism to deal with EU funds. S&P views the IMF Stand-By Arrangement (the Program) secured by Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 2012 as an important policy anchor. S&P believes that disbursement conditionality will continue to help stabilize fragile public finances at the entity level, while also boosting the government's ability to meet its increasing external debt repayments. To date, Bosnia and Herzegovina has successfully completed three reviews and received three disbursements (totaling EUR155 million; 0.6% of GDP) so far under the Program; the fourth review is now underway. To be eligible for each successive disbursement, the IMF requires the entity governments to meet structural benchmarks by certain deadlines: the adoption of laws on privileged pensions for war veterans is one example. Other ongoing stipulated reforms involve the pension and healthcare sectors, improvements to the business environment, and greater control and monitoring of the finances of lower levels of government. S&P notes that the strained finances of both the Federation and the Republika Srpska, coinciding with economic stagnation since the global financial crisis, have increased Bosnia and Herzegovina's reliance on the IMF for budgetary and external financing. Broadly speaking, S&P believes risks to IMF program implementation and delays to reforms may persist given the complex institutional set-up and potential political disruptions. General elections next year could also potentially, and protractedly, shift political focus away from the reform agenda. S&P expects the general government deficit to narrow to 1% of GDP and the net general government debt stock to reduce to 36% of GDP by 2016, after peaking at an estimated 39% in 2013. In addition to the risks already mentioned, lower-than-anticipated economic growth, pre-election spending, or spending overruns from the lower levels of government could derail planned fiscal targets. That said, S&P believes that the need to secure ongoing financing from the IMF will sufficiently motivate the entities to keep consolidation on track. S&P expects economic growth to remain subdued, which will further challenge reform implementation. S&P anticipates that, after contracting by an estimated 0.7% in 2012, real GDP will increase by 0.5% this year. S&P forecasts real GDP to grow at an average of 1.9% over 2013-2016, well below the average 5.0% of 2004-2008. Assuming a slow recovery in the eurozone, S&P expects investment to remain below its 2008 peak of 28% of GDP over the next few years. Bosnia and Herzegovina's 2013 GDP per capita is modest at an estimated $4,700. In S&P's opinion, the banking system represents a limited contingent liability for the government. It is largely owned by foreign parent banks and has a moderate degree of financial intermediation (claims on the resident non-government sector are estimated at 55% of 2013 GDP). Though the banking system appears well-capitalized -- with reported Tier 1 capital equal to 15.3% of risk-weighted assets at June 2013 -- non-performing loans (NPLs) have continued to increase steadily since early 2012. NPLs reached 14.3% of total loans at the end of June 2013, from 5.9% at the end of 2009, and may rise further. As a result, S&P expects that banks (mostly owned by Austrian and Italian parents) will continue to be cautious in extending credit even when the demand for loans starts to pick up. External vulnerabilities have arisen from persistent current account deficits (estimated at 8.5% of GDP in 2013), though financing from the IMF and other multilateral lending institutions has somewhat reduced external funding challenges. While the large trade deficit (estimated at 32% of 2013 GDP) is offset partially by net remittances (we estimate net transfers flow of nearly 14% of 2013 GDP), S&P expects the current account deficit to remain above 5% of GDP over 2013-2016. S&P anticipates that direct investment inflows will continue to amount to about one third of the current account deficit, and therefore expect an increase in external indebtedness over the forecast horizon. Bosnia and Herzegovina's large current account deficit, along with its external repayments, will keep its gross external financing needs high at an average of 150% of current account receipts and usable reserves from 2013-2016. Bosnia has a currency board regime and the convertible marka is pegged to the euro. While the currency board provides stability, it limits monetary flexibility. Bosnia, like other regional peers, has a high level of euroization; nearly two-thirds of all loans are in or indexed to a foreign currency, mostly euros. OUTLOOK The stable outlook balances S&P's view of the risks to Program implementation posed by the complex institutional set-up, the general elections in 2014, and the weak external environment against the Program's role in guiding policy direction and providing financing. S&P could lower the ratings if it sees a significant deterioration in Bosnia's external position or if the government fails to meet IMF conditions and thereby jeopardizes disbursements. If S&P sees delays in payments to official creditors -- as happened in January 2012 amid ambiguity over the extension of temporary financing -- it could lower the ratings by more than one notch. In S&P's opinion, if tensions between the two entities abate, and if their relations with state institutions improve, this would gradually enable autonomous reform implementation that does not rely on international pressure and policy conditionality. S&P believes this would strengthen the business environment and pave the way for more sustainable growth and better external performance. This could lead us to consider raising the ratings. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed Bosnia and Herzegovina Sovereign Credit Rating B/Stable/B Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB- =========== F R A N C E =========== FCC ZEBRE: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Part M2 Loan ------------------------------------------------------ Fitch Ratings has affirmed FCC Partimmo 05/03, FCC Partimmo 11/03, FCC Zebre One, FCC Zebre Two and FCC Zebre 2006-1, as follows: FCC Partimmo 05/03 CDE11 part P affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable FCC Partimmo 11/03 CDE11 part P affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable FCC Zebre One Class A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable FCC Zebre Two Part P affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable FCC Zebre 2006-1 Part P affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable Part M1 affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable Part M2 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable These prime French RMBS transactions comprise loans originated and serviced by Credit Foncier de France (CFF; A/Stable/F1). Key Rating Drivers Solid Asset Performance The affirmations reflect the solid performance of the underlying assets in all transactions, which is in line with Fitch's initial expectations. As of July 2013, three-month plus arrears ranged from 0.36% (Zebre One) to 1.59% (Partimmo 11/03) of the current pool balance. Full Provisioning of Defaulted Loans The transactions' structures allow for the full provisioning of defaulted loans, which are defined as loans with arrears of more than six months. As of July 2013, the cumulative gross defaults varied between 1.59% (Zebre 2006-1) to 2.82% (Zebre Two) of the initial asset balance. To date, gross excess spread levels together with period recoveries have remained adequate to fully provision for defaulted loans and to ensure that the reserve funds remain fully funded. Junior Tranches of Zebre 2006-1 Capped In late 2008, some of the securitized loans in Zebre 2006-1 were subject to modifications. In order to limit the level of risk exposure on M1 and M2 junior notes, CFF committed to paying the issuer any capital loss incurred as a result of the loan modification. Hence the notes are deemed to be dependent on the credit-worthiness of CFF and these tranches are subject to a rating cap linked to CFF's Long-term rating. Rating Sensitivities Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic factors, in particular the increasing effect of unemployment. A corresponding increase in new defaults and associated pressure on excess spread levels and reserve funds could result in negative rating action. * Fitch: US Money Fund Exposure to French Banks Hits 2-Year High ---------------------------------------------------------------- U.S. prime money market fund (MMF) exposure to eurozone banks increased for the second consecutive month, driven by rising allocations towards French banks, according to Fitch Ratings. As of end-August 2013, exposure to eurozone banks represented 15.8% of assets under management within Fitch's sample of the top-10 U.S. prime MMFs. MMF allocations to French banks stood at 9.1% of assets, an 18% increase over the prior month. This allocation represents the highest level since end-August 2011, a period during which MMFs sharply reduced their exposure to eurozone banks amid intensifying concerns in the region. While the increase in eurozone allocations signals more positive investor sentiment towards the region, Fitch notes that MMF exposure to eurozone banks continues to be less than half of its May-2011 allocations. The proportion of eurozone and European exposure in the form of repos fell to levels last observed in 2011. At end-August, about 13% of MMF exposure to eurozone banks was in repo, well below the levels of about 40% of exposure observed in the latter half of 2012. Fitch believes this reduced presence of repo indicates that MMFs are more willing to take unsecured exposure to banks in the region. The full report is 'U.S. Money Fund Exposure and European Banks: France at Two-Year Low' issued by Fitch. =========== G R E E C E =========== * GREECE: Bailout Fund Head Casts Doubt on Debt Sustainability -------------------------------------------------------------- Matina Stevis and Gabriele Steinhauser at The Wall Street Journal report that the head of the euro zone's bailout fund has cast doubt on official assessments of how much Greece's debt is really weighing on its economy, in the latest signal that the currency bloc is stepping away from commitments to reduce the country's debt mountain. In an interview with the Journal, Klaus Regling, managing director of the European Stability Mechanism, said that the targets for lowering Greece's debt that were central to its latest rescue deal were "meaningless." He said that to accurately evaluate the sustainability of Greece's debt, more heed had to be paid to the exceptionally low interest rates Athens was paying and to the long repayment schedules -- conditions that set it apart from other high-debt countries, the Journal relates. According to the Journal, Mr. Regling's comments provide backing for Germany and other euro-zone countries that have conceded Athens, the Journal says, will likely require a third bailout but have resisted demands from the International Monetary Fund and elsewhere that they forgo repayment on some of the money already lent. Last November, the currency union's finance ministers sealed a new bailout deal for Greece that was meant to bring the country's debt down to 124% of its gross domestic product by 2020, from around 170% currently, the Journal recounts. Crucially, the ministers also promised that Greece's debt would be "substantially lower than 110%" of GDP by 2022, the Journal notes. That commitment, made after months of harrowing back-and-forth that pushed Greece to the brink of leaving the euro zone, was central for the IMF, the Journal states. The Journal relates that fund officials said at the time that the IMF wouldn't be able to lend any more money to Greece unless there was a realistic chance the loans would be repaid. They also raised expectations that euro-zone governments would forgive Greece part of its debt, despite denials from rich countries like Germany, the Journal discloses. But now, senior European officials are attacking the calculations on Greece's debt that formed the basis of the November deal as well as the targets, the Journal relates. "It's not sufficient to have a target of a certain debt ratio," Mr. Regling, as cited by the Journal, said. "It's meaningless." According to the Journal, Mr. Regling said that the calculations -- known as a debt-sustainability analysis -- didn't take sufficient account of the exceptionally good terms of Greece's bailout. He said that the euro zone's loans come at very low interest rates and, on average, won't have to be repaid for 30 years, the Journal notes. The German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble has said that Athens may need new loans but has ruled out debt forgiveness, the Journal relates. Mr. Regling added that bailout-fund rules prevent it from taking losses on loans, the Journal notes. According to the Journal, Simon O'Connor, a spokesman for the European Commission, which represents the euro zone in bailout negotiations, said it is "working constructively with our partners, the ECB and IMF, on analyzing the debt sustainability of Greece" in line with the November statement from euro-zone finance ministers. ============= I C E L A N D ============= * ICELAND: C.B. Urges Failed Banks' Creditors to Cut Demands ------------------------------------------------------------ Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland's central bank is urging creditors in the nation's failed banks to scale back their demands, which policy makers say risk destabilizing the current account balance. According to Bloomberg, central bank Governor Mar Gudmundsson said that Kaupthing Bank hf and Glitnir Bank hf won't be able to complete a creditor accord unless they come up with a solution to deal with US$3.8 billion in krona-denominated claims that doesn't hurt Iceland's economy. "In order to go into composition they need an exemption from the central bank of Iceland," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Gudmundsson as saying in an interview from Reykjavik. "For the central bank of Iceland to make that exemption or give that exemption, there has to be a solution regarding the krona assets of these banks that's compatible with the balance of payments equilibrium in Iceland and financial stability." Offshore creditors hold about US$8 billion trapped by krona restrictions as policy makers struggle to scale back the measures without triggering a currency selloff, Bloomberg discloses. Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson has said he wants writedowns on ISK461 billion (US$3.8 billion) in claims held by the creditors of Kaupthing, Glitnir and Landsbanki Islands hf to help the government ease the currency controls, Bloomberg relates. Creditors have asked to circumvent the controls to help recoup their investments, Bloomberg notes. "It's very clear that the condition for giving that exemption is not fulfilled," Mr. Gudmundsson, as cited by Bloomberg, said. According to Bloomberg, he said that the creditors and their representatives at the failed banks "know that, and if they want the exemption they have to take measures to fulfill that condition". The caretaker of Kaupthing said it won't ask creditors to accept kronur claims to be written off in full, Bloomberg relates. "The winding up committee is obliged by law to preserve the value of Kaupthing's assets," Bloomberg quotes Johannes Runar Johannsson, a member of the winding-up committee, as saying in an interview. "It's therefore difficult, or even impossible, to see how the winding-up committee could make such a recommendation, given its legal duties." Kaupthing, Glitnir and Landsbanki all failed in October 2008 after running out of cash to sustain their debt-funded expansions, Bloomberg recounts. The banking meltdown plunged the economy into its worst recession in six decades, forcing the government to impose restrictions on the krona and to seek an international bailout, Bloomberg notes. Mr. Gudmundsson said that the central bank is probing ideas from both Kaupthing and Glitnir on how to move forward with creditor settlements, Bloomberg relates. According to Bloomberg, he said that conditions for granting exemptions to the lenders have yet to be fulfilled. ============= I R E L A N D ============= ALLIED IRISH: Completes Non-Core Loan Deleveraging Plan ------------------------------------------------------- Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., confirms completion of its Deleveraging Plan, a significant milestone in the bank's overall restructuring as part of its strategy to return to sustainable profitability. Under the terms of the March 2011 Prudential Liquidity Adequacy Review contained in the Financial Measures Programme, AIB was required to deleverage EUR20.5 billion of non-core loans by December 2013. Despite challenging market conditions in recent years the Plan has been achieved ahead of schedule and with a positive capital variance versus the Financial Measures Programme assumptions. Completion of the Plan coupled with a growth in customer accounts has seen the bank's loan to deposit ratio decrease from 165% at December 2010 to 106% at June 2013, significantly below the original end 2013 PLAR threshold of 122.5%. About Allied Irish Banks Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- http://www.aibgroup.com/-- is a major commercial bank based in Ireland. It has an extensive branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a capital markets operation based in the International Financial Services Centre in Dublin. AIB also has retail and corporate businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands). Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly. As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non- voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares. On April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount of CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital. In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors (three non-executive directors are Government nominees), participation in NAMA, and otherwise. The Company reported a loss of EUR2.29 billion in 2011, a loss of EUR10.16 billion in 2010, and a loss of EUR2.33 billion in 2009. Allied Irish's consolidated statement of financial position for the year ended Dec. 31, 2011, showed EUR136.65 billion in total assets, EUR122.18 billion in total liabilities and EUR14.46 billion in shareholders' equity. Allied Irish's balance sheet at June 30, 2012, showed EUR129.85 billion in total assets, EUR116.59 billion in total liabilities and EUR13.26 billion in total shareholders' equity. EURO ATLANTIS CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2' ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating actions on notes issued by Euro Atlantis CLO Limited: EUR171.125M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) EUR11.4M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf) EUR7.325M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf) EUR9.25M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf) Euro Atlantis CLO Limited, issued in June 2008, is a single currency Collateralized Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a static portfolio of mostly high yield European and US loans. The collateral servicer, Pramerica Investment Management, may act on behalf of the Issuer to dispose of credit impaired and defaulted obligations, subject to certain conditions set out in the collateral servicer agreement. Ratings Rationale: According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes result primarily from an improvement in the overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes pursuant to amortization of the portfolio. Moody's notes that the Class A notes amortized by approximately EUR28.5 million (or 34%) on the latest payment date in May 2013, and in total, by approximately EUR116.9 million (or 68.29%) of the original amount. There is currently EUR 21.5 million in the principal account which should be used to pay down the Class A notes on the next payment date in November 2013. As of the latest trustee report dated August 30, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 158.92%, 142.97%, and 126.98% respectively, versus April 2013 levels of 143.57%, 133.21% and 122.09% respectively. Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR104.3 million, defaulted par of EUR2.4 million, a weighted average default probability of 25.03% (consistent with a WARF of 4404) over a weighted average life of 2.72, a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.61% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 16 and a weighted average spread of 3.71%. The default probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 78.89% of the portfolio exposed to first lien senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non-first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%. In each case, historical and market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes: Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing and sovereign risks -- approximately 16.49% of the portfolio are European corporate rated B3 and below and maturing between 2014 and 2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. Approximately 5.34% of the portfolio are exposed to obligors located in Italy and Spain. In those sensitivity model runs the base case WARF was increased to 4933 and 5514 by forcing ratings on 25% and 50% of such exposure to Ca. These runs generated model outputs that were within two notches from the base case results. Sources of additional performance uncertainties: 1) Portfolio Amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal proceeds will continue and at what pace. Delevering may accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market and/or collateral sales by the liquidation agent, which may have significant impact on the notes' ratings. Typically, high prepayments, especially to obligors with the better credit quality, will benefit the ratings of the senior notes but may negatively impact the ratings of the mezzanine and junior notes. 2) Moody's also notes that around 58% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009. 3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Realization of higher than expected recoveries would positively impact the ratings of the notes. 4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction maturity such an asset has a liquidation value dependent on the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Realization of higher than expected liquidation values would positively impact the ratings of the notes. The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in May 2013. Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in May 2013. Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. The cash flow model used for this transaction is Moody's EMEA Cash-Flow model. This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for each tranche. Therefore, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios. In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the final rating decision. IRISH BANK: Liquidation May Lead to "Substantial Savings" --------------------------------------------------------- Ciara O'Brien at The Irish Times reports that the Fiscal Advisory Council has claimed the decision to liquidate Irish Bank Resolution Corp. could lead to "substantial savings" for the Government, but it warned that the level of savings would depend on the market view of the country's creditworthiness. The Government decided in February to liquidate State-owned IBRC to reduce the annual cost of toxic lenders, The Irish Times recounts. Estimates at the time placed the annual savings at around EUR1 billion, The Irish Times notes. However, the advisory committee, as cited by The Irish Times, said the gains from the move relative to the size of Government debt would be small. "The gains could increase substantially if the risk spread on Irish government debt were to narrow before the new bonds are sold to the market; conversely a deterioration in risk spreads could eliminate any gains," The Irish Times quotes the advisory committee as saying. According to The Irish Times, by the end of 2012, Government liabilities exceeded assets by EUR135 billion, representing 82% of gross domestic product. That compares to being broadly equal prior to the crisis in 2007, The Irish Times states. The advisory council is placing the blame for the deterioration on a combination of large budgetary deficits and exceptional payments to the banking sector, The Irish Times says. About Irish Bank Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being seized by creditors. Irish Bank Resolution is seeking assistance from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and Irish Nationwide Building Society. The two banks failed and were merged into IBRC in July 2011. IBRC was tasked with winding them down and liquidating their assets. In February, when Irish lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets. IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio valued at some 25 billion euros ($33.5 billion). About 70 percent of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing. Total liabilities in June 2012 were about 50 billion euros, according to a court filing. Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already. IBRC is involved in lawsuits in the U.S. The IRBC liquidators want the U.S. bankruptcy judge to rule that Ireland is home to the so-called foreign main bankruptcy proceeding. If the judge agrees and determines that IBRC otherwise qualifies, creditor actions in the U.S. will halt automatically. QUIRINUS PLC: Moody's Reviews Ba3-Rated X2 Notes for Downgrade -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible downgrade the Class A and Class X2 Notes issued by Quirinus (European Loan Conduit No. 23) plc (amounts reflecting the initial outstanding amount): EUR560M A Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) X2 Notes, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on Aug 22, 2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) Moody's does not rate the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E or Class F Notes of the Issuer and has withdrawn the rating on the Class X1 Notes on August 21, 2012. Ratings Rationale: The review action is driven by concerns that the Class A could incur losses in certain scenarios when the sequential payment trigger would not be breached as expected. Moody's is concerned that the sequential payment trigger following the workout of defaulted loans could be even weaker than previously anticipated. In addition, Moody's expects further capital value declines of the underlying collateral compared to the last review, which results in an increased loss expectation for the notes. In contrast to Moody's expectation, recovery proceeds from the Fairacre loan were recently allocated to the notes on a modified pro-rata basis. At the payment date when the recovery proceeds of the Fairacre loan were allocated, the loan was excluded from the calculation of the portion of specially serviced loans in the pool. Thus, only the H&B loan was considered as specially serviced loan and the sequential payment trigger threshold was not reached. Similar treatment of the Eurocastle loan, which is maturing last in the pool, could lead to losses even on the most senior class of notes. Losses could occur in a scenario of further property value declines. Recovery proceeds would be insufficient to repay the securitized loan in full; however, they would still be allocated on a modified pro-rata basis. This scenario is relevant if the whole portfolio is sold at once. If assets were sold individually over time, Moody's would expect the proceeds to be allocated sequentially. Furthermore, the sequential payment trigger was not breached even though a loss of EUR0.34 million was incurred on the Fairacre loan. The sequential payment trigger refers to losses while in this transaction losses on loans are not immediately allocated to the notes but reflected by NAI amounts. Only at the note maturity date, these NAI amounts will be allocated to the notes as a loss. Moody's expects that potential future loan level losses would be treated in the same manner. The review action for the Class X2 Notes is driven by the increased loss expectation for the pool. Moody's will conclude its review once it has determined whether the expected loss for the Class A1 is still commensurate with an investment grade rating. It will seek more clarity on the potential allocation of recovery proceeds from the Eurocastle loan on a modified pro-rata basis. Moody's will discuss with the transaction parties including the cash manager and perform further legal analysis of the transaction documentation. In addition, it will re-assess its property value estimate for the underlying collateral. The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a loss expectation for the securitized pool. In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in subordination due to realized losses. Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) lending will remain constrained over the next years, while subject to strict underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the underlying property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between prime and secondary properties, with further value declines expected for non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets will remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly recover in the medium term in line with anticipated economic recovery. Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario for the world's largest economies is for only a gradual strengthening in growth over the coming two years. Fiscal consolidation and volatility in financial markets will continue to weigh on business and consumer confidence, while heightened uncertainty hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. In 2013, Moody's expects no growth in the Euro area and only slow growth in the UK. Quirinus (European Loan Conduit No. 23) plc is a securitization of initially 10 loans that closed in July 2006. The remaining two loans in the pool are secured on portfolios of in total 36 retail properties, for the most part supermarkets, spread across Germany. The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach to Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE Portfolio) published in April 2006. The methodology used in rating Class X2 was Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities published in February 2012. Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS: 2013 Central Scenarios published in February 2013. The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press release dated 3 October 2012. The last Performance Overview for this transaction was published on August 29, 2013. In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and ABSROM to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated in MoRE Portfolio is then used in ABSROM, where for each loss scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated taking into account the structural features of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios. Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore, the rating outcome may differ from the model output. * IRELAND: Company Insolvencies Down 25% in Third Quarter 2013 -------------------------------------------------------------- Irish Examiner reports that there has been a 25% drop in the number of insolvencies in the third quarter of the year compared to the same period last year. According to Irish Examiner, the latest figures Vision-net show that Dublin accounted for most insolvencies at 37%, followed by Cork with 15% and Kildare with 7%. Kilkenny, Laois, Mayo, Carlow, Leitrim, Monaghan, Roscommon and Longford all recorded company insolvency rates of less than 1%, Irish Examiner notes. Of the 359 insolvent companies, 207 were liquidated, 145 entered receivership, and an examiner was appointed to 7, Irish Examiner discloses. The construction industry represents a fifth of all insolvencies recorded, followed by real estate, professional services, manufacturing and wholesale and retail, Irish Examiner says. * IRELAND: 716 SME Jobs Secured Through Examinership This Year -------------------------------------------------------------- Irish Examiner reports that 716 jobs in small and medium enterprises have been saved through examinership so far this year. Among the companies which benefited from the recovery mechanism are Trifik Forklifts in Kildare and the Gazette Group in Dublin, Irish Examiner discloses. According to Irish Examiner, The Hughes Blake SME Examinership Index, published on Friday, says an additional 270 non-SME jobs were saved in the west, when Barna Waste emerged from examinership in the third quarter. ========= I T A L Y ========= ALITALIA SPA: Plans to Seek More Funding to Avoid Bankruptcy ------------------------------------------------------------ Gilles Castonguay, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reported that Italy's Alitalia plans to seek at least EUR455 million (US$615 million) in extra funding from shareholders and creditors as it fights to stave off bankruptcy and return to profitability under a new industrial plan. However, the request immediately met resistance from French-Dutch peer Air France-KLM, which owns 25% of Alitalia and will decide by year's end whether to take a larger stake in the beleaguered airline, according to the report. Alitalia hasn't made a profit since it was rescued by a group of Italian financiers and industrialists five years ago, the report related. Despite a major restructuring, it still faces enormous challenges in a weak domestic market where it competes with discount airlines and high-speed trains along lucrative routes. Alitalia has had three chief executives in as many years, with Gabriele Del Torchio currently at the helm. Indeed, it said on Sept. 26 that it posted a first-half net loss of EUR294 million, wider than a net loss of EUR201 million for the same period in 2012, the report added. Total revenue was EUR1.62 billion for the first half of this year, down from EUR1.69 billion during the first six months of last year. Board members on Sept. 26 voted in favor of asking shareholders and creditors for more help, the report further related. Shareholders will examine proposals to launch a capital rise of at least EUR100 million on Oct. 14. They will also examine a request for an additional EUR55 million to complete a convertible loan that was only partially completed. About Alitalia Alitalia - Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through a successful restructuring. After filing for bankruptcy protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline in early 2009. Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the airline now serves more than 75 national and international destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice, Naples, and Catania. Alitalia extends its network as a member of the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM. An Italian investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France- KLM owns 25%. MARCHE MUTUI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes From 'Ba3' -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's has placed under review for downgrade the class A2 and B notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. and the class B and C notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l.. At the same time, Moody's has upgraded the class C notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. The downgrade and placement under review of Banca delle Marche S.p.A. (Caa1/under review for downgrade) prompted Moody's to place the notes under review for downgrade. According to the rating agency, the potential credit enhancement available to the affected notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l. might be insufficient to mitigate increased counterparty risk. Note holders of the senior notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. might be exposed to additional payment disruption risk from the lack of back-up servicing arrangements. Furthermore, the reassessment and revision of the available credit enhancement prompted the upgrade of the junior notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. Issuer: Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. EUR281.8M A2 Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to A3 (sf) EUR16.2M B Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to A3 (sf) EUR11.4M C Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf) Issuer: Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l. EUR12M B Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) EUR15.8M C Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) Ratings Rationale: The placement under review for downgrade of the class A2 and B notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. and the class B and C notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l. follows the downgrade and placement under review for downgrade of Banca delle Marche S.p.A. (Caa1/under review for downgrade) acting as servicer and originator in these transactions. The upgrade of the class C notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. follows the revision and reassessment of the transaction's available credit enhancement to support the notes. Counterparty exposure In Moody's view the recent rating action on the servicer, together with the lack of any back-up servicing arrangements, heightens the payment disruption risk on senior notes in the event of the servicer's default in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. Moody's also notes that the recent rating action on the servicer does not have any rating impact on the senior notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l. and Marche Mutui 4 S.r.l. as a result of the appointment of Italfondiario as back-up servicer. Furthermore Banca delle Marche S.p.A.'s downgrade and placement under review for downgrade increases the set-off and commingling exposure for the classes B and C notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l. as their available credit enhancement might be insufficient to compensate for these risks should the bank be downgraded further. Moody's expects to close these rating reviews once the rating review on Banca delle Marche S.p.A. has been concluded. As part of the review of Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. Moody's corrected its set-off modeling giving benefit to the Italian deposit guarantee scheme, which, in itself, did not have any impact on the ratings of the outstanding notes. Revision of credit enhancement in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. The upgrade of class C notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. follows Moody's revision and reassessment of available credit enhancement. The transaction traps all cash released from the amortization of the reserve fund in the structure, thus creating over-collateralization. In its previous analysis Moody's did not consider this over- collateralization as part of the available credit enhancement, having a negative impact on the class C notes. The rating action rectifies this by considering the full credit enhancement available. As a result Moody's calculated the available credit enhancement for the class C notes at 16.2%, compared with 5.3% previously. Moody's also notes that the upgrade considered the increased set-off and commingling exposure to Banca delle Marche S.p.A. after the recent downgrade. The revised ratings should not be further negatively affected as long as a potential downgrade of Banca delle Marche S.p.A. was within two notches. The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in May 2013, "The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines" published in March 2013, and "Moody's Approach to Set-Off Risk in Italian Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Transactions" published in June 2012. In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (2) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for each tranche. =================== L U X E M B O U R G =================== NIELSEN COMPANY: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Issuer Default Rating --------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB' Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to The Nielsen Company (Luxembourg) S.ar.l. and assigned a 'BB' rating on its US$625 million 5.5% senior unsecured noted due 2021. The Nielsen Company (Luxembourg) S.ar.l. is an indirect subsidiary of each of Nielsen Holdings N.V (Nielsen) and The Nielsen Company B.V. (TNCBV). The new offering will be guaranteed by TNCBV and certain subsidiaries. The notes will rank pari passu with the senior unsecured notes issued by Nielsen Finance LLC and Nielsen Finance Co. (collectively, Nielsen Finance). Fitch has also affirmed the IDRs of Nielsen and Nielsen Finance. The Rating Outlook is Positive. Proceeds of the notes are expected to be used to redeem in full the 11.625% senior unsecured note due 2014 (US$215 million outstanding) issued by Nielsen Finance and for general corporate purposes (including capital expenditures, working capital and, if applicable, to fund a portion of the purchase price of the Arbitron acquisition). Nielsen received regulatory approval to complete the acquisition of Arbitron, which is expected to close at the end of September. Key Rating Drivers -- Nielsen was much more resilient during the downturn than other media companies, given the contractual and diversified n nature of its revenue stream and the benign competitive environment. The company exhibited revenue and EBITDA growth, as well as positive free cash flow (FCF), through the trough of the downturn. -- Nielsen's Watch and Buy businesses are well positioned in their respective markets. The ratings reflect the risk that competitive threats may emerge over time. Increased competition could result in revenue pressure (lost share), incremental costs (talent/sales/services), and some FCF pressure (investments in offerings). However, the complexity and significant investments associated with attempting to replicate Nielsen's offerings create meaningful barriers to entry. Fitch believes Nielsen's liquidity is sufficient. At June 30, 2013, liquidity was composed of US$1.16 billion of cash on hand and US$622 million available under the US$635 million senior secured revolver due in 2016. In the 12 months ended June 30, 2013, Fitch calculates (after dividends) the company generated US$440 million of FCF. Total debt at June 30, 2013 was approximately US$6.3 billion, consisting primarily of $4.04 billion in secured term loans; US$215 million of senior unsecured notes due 2014; $1.1 billion of senior unsecured notes due 2018; and US$800 million of senior unsecured notes due 2020. The company has been active in managing its near-term maturities, and they are manageable over the next several years. Fitch calculates unadjusted gross leverage as of June 30, 2013 at approximately 3.9x. The notching on Nielsen Finance's senior secured debt reflects the security provided to the lenders. Rating Sensitivities What Could Trigger a Rating Action Positive: Continued improvement in operating trends with gross leverage less than 4x (pro forma for the sale of Exposition and acquisition of Arbitron) over the next 12-24 months could result in a one-notch upgrade. Negative: Additional debt-funded acquisitions that materially increased leverage, or shareholder-friendly policies that increased debt in the near term, and kept pro forma unadjusted gross leverage above 4.5x, would pressure the ratings. In addition, ratings may be pressured if competitive threats emerge and take a meaningful share of Nielsen's market position. Fitch has affirmed the following ratings: Nielsen -- IDR at 'BB'. Nielsen Finance -- IDR at 'BB'; -- Senior secured bank facility at 'BB+'; -- Senior unsecured notes at 'BB'. Fitch has assigned the following ratings: The Nielsen Company (Luxembourg) S.ar.l. -- IDR at 'BB'; -- Senior unsecured notes at 'BB'. The Rating Outlook is Positive. ===================== N E T H E R L A N D S ===================== FAXTOR ABS 2005-1: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Two Note Classes ----------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has upgraded Faxtor ABS 2005-1 B.V.'s notes, as follows: Class A-1 floating-rate notes due 2070 (XS0235143970): upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable Class A-2E floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235144358): upgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable Class A-2F fixed-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235144945): upgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable Class A-3 fixed-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235146056): affirmed at 'Bsf' from 'Bsf', Outlook revised to Stable from Negative Class A4 floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235146569): affirmed at 'CCsf' Class B floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235147617): affirmed at 'CCsf' Key Rating Drivers The upgrade reflects the notes' levels of credit enhancement due to the deleveraging of the underlying portfolio. The structure is deleveraging and the class A-1 notes have been repaid by approximately EUR41.4 million since the last review and now represent 33% of their original balance. The deleveraging is a result of natural portfolio amortization, as well as interest diversion mechanisms due to the breaching of some over- collateralization tests. As a result, credit enhancement for the rated notes has increased. For instance, credit enhancement for the class A-1 notes has increased by 10.34% since the last review. The class A-3 over-collateralization test has improved since the last review and is now in compliance. As a consequence, deferred interest due on the class A-4 notes has been paid back to the noteholders. The class B and C over-collateralization tests are still failing and the notes have been accumulating deferred interest since January 2010. The interest coverage remains in compliance. Fitch analyzed the exposure to interest rate risk. The structure is currently over-hedged and benefits from an interest rate swap where the counterparty pays a fixed rate whereas Faxtor ABS 2005- 1 pays three-month EURIBOR. As a result, additional excess spread is being used to repay the class A-1 notes.. After the maturity of the swap, the structure will be under-hedged and exposed to interest rate risk as the class A2-F and A3 notes pay a fixed interest rate whereas all the asset in the pool pay a floating interest rate. The affirmation of the class A-3, A-4 and B notes reflect the extension risk of the portfolio assets. A material risk for these tranches is that the portfolio assets' maturity may extend beyond their reported weighted-average expected life and prolong the risk horizon of the portfolio. Faxtor ABS 2005-1 is a securitization of European structured finance assets of mainly mezzanine quality. The two largest industry sectors in the portfolio are RMBS with 53% of the portfolio and CMBS with 18%. The portfolio is concentrated in the UK with almost 43% of the portfolio. Peripheral eurozone exposure accounts for 21.4% of the portfolio and is concentrated in Italian and Spanish RMBS. The asset performance has remained stable and cumulative defaults have increased by EUR1.82 million. Rating Sensitivities Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier to all assets in the portfolio would result in a downgrade of one to two rating category for the rated notes from the current rating levels. Applying a 0.75x recovery rate multiplier to all assets in the portfolio would not result in a downgrade for the rated notes from the current rating levels. LEVERAGED FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class IV Notes to 'CCC-' ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on Leveraged Finance Europe Capital II B.V.'s class I-A, I-B, and II notes. At the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on the class III and IV notes. The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Aug. 23, 2013. S&P has considered recent developments in the transaction and reviewed it under its 2009 corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) and its current counterparty criteria. All par value tests are currently failing. The senior par value tests were passing at S&P's previous review on April 19, 2012. The class III and IV par value tests continue to fail and the margin by which they are failing has increased since S&P's previous review. S&P has also observed that the weighted-average spread earned on the collateral pool has increased to 3.89% from 3.37% since its previous review. Over that period, the aggregate collateral balance has declined, mainly due to increasing defaults observed in the current collateral pool. The increasing defaults have also resulted in reduced available credit enhancement for all classes of notes. Even though the portfolio's credit quality (excluding the defaulted assets) has been broadly stable, the shorter time to maturity has resulted in reduced scenario default rates across all rating levels when compared with S&P's previous review. S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each rated class at each rating level. S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using its standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction with different interest rate scenarios. Approximately 0.77% of the portfolio's performing assets are non-euro-denominated and are unhedged. In S&P's analysis, it has applied a foreign exchange stress to these unhedged assets as they are exposed to currency risk. Based on S&P's analysis, it considers that the available credit enhancement for the class I-A, I-B, and II notes is commensurate with the currently assigned ratings. S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AA+ (sf)' ratings on the class I-A and I-B notes and 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class II notes. S&P has lowered its ratings on the class III and IV notes based on the supplemental tests, which S&P introduced in its 2009 corporate CDO criteria. These classes of notes now pass at lower ratings than previously assigned. S&P has therefore lowered to 'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on the class III notes and to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class IV notes. Leveraged Finance Europe Capital II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to speculative-grade corporate firms. The transaction closed in September 2003 and is managed by BNP Paribas. STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in the Rule, to include a description of the representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and a description of how they differ from the representations, warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011. If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this credit rating report is available at: http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com RATINGS LIST Class Rating To From Leveraged Finance Europe Capital II B.V. EUR187.2 Million Floating-Rate Secured Notes Ratings Affirmed I-A AA+ (sf) I-B AA+ (sf) II BBB+ (sf) Ratings Lowered III CCC+ (sf) B+ (sf) IV CCC- (sf) B- (sf) STORM 2013-IV: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Ratings on Two Note Classes ---------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned Storm 2013-IV B.V.'s EUR752.2 million notes final ratings, as follows: EUR150m Class A1 floating-rate notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR550m Class A2 floating-rate notes: 'AAAsf; Outlook Stable EUR17.1m Class B floating-rate notes: 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable EUR13.1m Class C floating-rate notes: 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable EUR14.5m Class D floating-rate notes: 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable EUR7.5m Class E floating-rate notes: 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable Credit enhancement for the class A notes is 7%, provided by subordination (6%) and a non-amortizing reserve fund (1%), which is fully funded at closing. Key Rating Drivers Concentrated Counterparty Exposure This transaction relies strongly on the creditworthiness of Rabobank Group (AA/Negative/F1+), which fulfills a number of roles, including collection account provider, issuer account provider, cash advance facility provider and commingling guarantor. In addition, it acts as back-up swap counterparty. NHG Loans The portfolio includes 33% of loans that benefit from the national mortgage guarantee scheme (Nationale Hypotheek Garantie or NHG). No reduction in foreclosure frequency for the NHG loans was applied since the historical data provided did not show a clear pattern of lower defaults for NHG loans. Fitch was also provided with data on historical claims, which enabled the agency to determine a compliance ratio assumption. The ratings on the notes would be one notch lower without giving any credit to the NHG guarantee. Market Average Portfolio The 46-month seasoned portfolio consists of prime residential mortgage loans, with a weighted average (WA) original loan-to- market-value of 88.5% and a WA debt-to-income ratio of 30.8%, both of which are typical for Fitch-rated Dutch RMBS transactions. The purchase of further advances into the pool is allowed after closing, subject to certain conditions. Robust Performance The past performance of transactions in the STORM series, as well as data received on Obvion's loan book, indicate solid historical performance in terms of low arrears and losses. Since September 2011, loans 90+ days in arrears on Obvion's mortgage book have increased to 0.7% at June 2013 from 0.3%. While relatively high compared with historical levels, in absolute terms the arrears levels remain low. Rating Sensitivities Material increases in the frequency of defaults and loss severity on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher than Fitch's expectations, which in turn may result in potential rating actions on the notes. If the agency stressed its 'AAA' assumptions by 30% for both weighted average foreclosure frequency and recovery rate, it would possibly result in a downgrade of the class A notes to 'A-sf(EXP)'. Fitch reviewed the results of an agreed-upon procedures report (AUP) conducted on the portfolio. The AUP contained no material errors which would affect Fitch's ratings analysis. To analyze the CE levels, Fitch evaluated the collateral using its default model, details of which can be found in the report titled 'EMEA Residential Mortgage Loss Criteria', dated June 2013, and 'EMEA RMBS Criteria Addendum - Netherlands', dated June 2013, at www.fitchratings.com. The agency assessed the transaction cash flows using default and loss severity assumptions under various structural stresses including prepayment speeds and interest rate scenarios. The cash flow tests showed that each class of notes could withstand loan losses at a level corresponding to the related stress scenario without incurring any principal loss or interest shortfall and can retire principal by the legal final maturity. ============= R O M A N I A ============= CITADELLA TITAN: To Be Put Up for Sale for EUR6.85 Million ---------------------------------------------------------- Oana Gavrila at Ziarul Financiar reports that Citadella Titan could be put up for sale for EUR6.85 million under a reorganization plan approved by creditors. Citadella Titan is an insolvent residential project in Bucharest. =========== R U S S I A =========== CREATIVE GROUP: Fitch Withdraws 'B-(EXP)' Sr. Unsecured Rating -------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has withdrawn OJSC Creative Group Public Limited's expected senior unsecured rating of 'B-(EXP)'/'RR4' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) applicable to a planned Eurobond issue. The RWN reflected the sensitivity in the expected recoveries for bondholders subject to the amount of the bond issued and the corresponding senior secured leverage remaining in the capital structure. Since the bond issuance is no longer going ahead in the near term as Creative has managed to extend its debt maturities, the expected bond rating is no longer applicable. Fitch currently rates Creative's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B-' with a Positive Outlook. Key Rating Drivers Rating Dependent on Deleveraging The Positive Outlook on the IDR factors in the expected deleveraging path prompted by improving funds from operations and a reduction in combined capex and working capital investments by 2015 as the latest investments in sunflower crushing capacity mature. It also reflects the rising share of export revenues and hence foreign currency receipts that support Creative's financial flexibility in the event of a domestic currency depreciation minimizing any material currency mismatch between sales/profits and debt. Credit Metrics Despite its relatively strong business profile for the rating, credit metrics are weak compared to the peer group. We expect FFO adjusted leverage to improve substantially in 2013 to 4.0x (2012: 5.0x) and FFO fixed charge cover to 2.4x (2012: 2.2x) driven by the expected profit contribution from the recently commenced facilities. Adequate Liquidity Creative extended the maturity of a large portion of its debt in June 2013 with local banks. Excluding any drawn amounts under its working-capital facilities (PXF lines), Fitch estimates debt repayments until the end of 2014 will be approximately US$60 million. Despite the expectation of still negative FCF this year, cash balances of US$120 million by end-2012, access to liquid inventories and scalable capex plans should support near-term liquidity. Rating Sensitivities Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating actions include: - FFO of at least US$200 million - Evidence of stabilising free cash flow and maintaining conservatively funded expansion plan - FFO adjusted leverage below 4.5x by FYE13 - FFO fixed charge cover comfortably positioned in the 2x- 2.5x range Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating action (including a revision of the Outlook to Stable) include: - Consistent drop of EBITDA margin below 15% in the next two years combined with a deterioration of liquidity (measured as available cash plus next year's CFO less maintenance capex totaling less than 80% of short-term maturities excluding the PXF line) - FFO adjusted leverage remaining in the 5x - 5.5x range - FFO fixed charge coverage below 2.0x NOVIKOMBANK JSC: Moody's Affirms B2 Issuer Rating; Outlook Stable ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B2 deposit ratings and senior debt rating of Novikombank JSC bank (Russia). The rating agency has also affirmed the bank's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of E+, which is equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b2. The bank's Not Prime short-term deposit ratings were also affirmed. All of the bank's long-term ratings carry a stable outlook. The affirmation of Novikombank's ratings reflects Moody's expectations of a planned capital increase and the bank's good asset quality. The affirmation also takes into account constraints associated with modest profitability and the rapid growth of a highly concentrated loan portfolio. Moody's affirmation of Novikombank's ratings is primarily based on the bank's audited financial statements for 2012 prepared under IFRS. Ratings Rationale: The affirmation of Novikombank's ratings reflects Moody's expectations of a significant capital increase in the next three months and the bank's good asset quality. The rating agency adds that Novikombank's ratings remain constrained by (1) rapid loan growth, which is expected to continue to exert pressure on capital; (2) modest profitability; and (3) high single-name concentration in the bank's loan portfolio and deposit base. Moody's expects Novikombank's low capital levels (Basel I Tier 1 ratio of 6.4% and total capital adequacy ratio of 10.0% at December 31, 2012) to be significantly strengthened in the next three months, as a result of the planned capital increase. Novikombank's shareholders have a recent track record of supporting the bank's capital (e.g., RUB4.6 billion subordinated loan provided in 2012). However, sustaining adequate capital levels remains a challenge for Novikombank, as its pace of asset growth remains aggressive relative to its modest internal capital generation capacity. In 2012, the bank grew its loan book by 51% (2011: 65%), while its return on average equity (ROAE) was about 8.3%, and Moody's expects this mismatch to persist. Moody's further observes that high concentration of Novikombank's loan book renders the bank's credit risk profile susceptible to the performance of a few of the largest borrowers. Novikombank's deposit base is also highly concentrated (top-10 depositors accounted for 66% of total customer funds in 2012), which renders the bank's liquidity profile potentially vulnerable -- a risk mitigated by the bank's track record of deposit stability and steady growth over the past five years. At the same time, Moody's notes positively that Novikombank has a growing niche franchise in servicing the Russian military- industrial complex and machine-building sector: in 2012, the bank held a 12% market share in loans to these sectors, and such loans accounted for 46% of its loan book. Novikombank's strong positions in this niche are supported by its close ties with the Russian state corporation Rostech, which owns a 17.6% stake in the bank. The fact that most of its large loans are backed by government contracts is supportive for Novikombank's asset quality profile: as of year-end 2012, loans overdue more than 90 days amounted to just 0.9% of gross loans and were fully covered with reserves. What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down Any possible upgrade of Novikombank's ratings will be contingent on the bank's ability to materially increase its capital and sustain it at a level comparable with that of higher-rated peers. A prerequisite for this improved capitalization would be a significant increase in the bank's profitability. Downward pressure could be exerted on Novikombank's ratings by (1) any failure to improve its capital adequacy in the next three months; and (2) any material adverse changes in the bank's risk profile, particularly a weakening of its asset quality or liquidity profile. The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks published in May 2013. Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, Novikombank reported -- as of 1H 2013 -- total assets of RUB144 billion (US$4.4 billion), equity of RUB8.7 billion (US$267 million), total regulatory capital of RUB16.2 billion (US$523 million) and net income of RUB648 million (US$21 million) under unaudited Russian GAAP. NOVIKOMBANK JSC: Moody's Interfax Affirms National Deposit Rating ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has affirmed the Baa1.ru national scale deposit rating (NSR) of Novikombank JSC Bank (Russia). The NSRs carry no specific outlooks. The affirmation of Novikombank's ratings reflects Moody's expectations of a planned capital increase and the bank's good asset quality. The affirmation also takes into account constraints associated with modest profitability and the rapid growth of a highly concentrated loan portfolio. Moody's affirmation of Novikombank's ratings is primarily based on the bank's audited financial statements for 2012 prepared under IFRS. Ratings Rationale: The affirmation of Novikombank's ratings reflects Moody's expectations of a significant capital increase in the next three months and the bank's good asset quality. The rating agency adds that Novikombank's ratings remain constrained by (1) rapid loan growth, which is expected to continue to exert pressure on capital; (2) modest profitability; and (3) high single-name concentration in the bank's loan portfolio and deposit base. Moody's expects Novikombank's low capital levels (Basel I Tier 1 ratio of 6.4% and total capital adequacy ratio of 10.0% at December 31, 2012) to be significantly strengthened in the next three months, as a result of the planned capital increase. Novikombank's shareholders have a recent track record of supporting the bank's capital (e.g., RUB4.6 billion subordinated loan provided in 2012). However, sustaining adequate capital levels remains a challenge for Novikombank, as its pace of asset growth remains aggressive relative to its modest internal capital generation capacity. In 2012, the bank grew its loan book by 51% (2011: 65%), while its return on average equity (ROAE) was about 8.3%, and Moody's expects this mismatch to persist. Moody's further observes that high concentration of Novikombank's loan book renders the bank's credit risk profile susceptible to the performance of a few of the largest borrowers. Novikombank's deposit base is also highly concentrated (top-10 depositors accounted for 66% of total customer funds in 2012), which renders the bank's liquidity profile potentially vulnerable -- a risk mitigated by the bank's track record of deposit stability and steady growth over the past five years. At the same time, Moody's notes positively that Novikombank has a growing niche franchise in servicing the Russian military- industrial complex and machine-building sector: in 2012, the bank held a 12% market share in loans to these sectors, and such loans accounted for 46% of its loan book. Novikombank's strong positions in this niche are supported by its close ties with the Russian state corporation Rostech, which owns a 17.6% stake in the bank. The fact that most of its large loans are backed by government contracts is supportive for Novikombank's asset quality profile: as of year-end 2012, loans overdue more than 90 days amounted to just 0.9% of gross loans and were fully covered with reserves. What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down Any possible upgrade of Novikombank's ratings will be contingent on the bank's ability to materially increase its capital and sustain it at a level comparable with that of higher-rated peers. A prerequisite for this improved capitalization would be a significant increase in the bank's profitability. Downward pressure could be exerted on Novikombank's ratings by (1) any failure to improve its capital adequacy in the next three months; and (2) any material adverse changes in the bank's risk profile, particularly a weakening of its asset quality or liquidity profile. The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks published in May 2013. Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, Novikombank reported -- as of 1H 2013 -- total assets of RUB144 billion (Us$4.4 billion), equity of RUB8.7 billion (US$267 million), total regulatory capital of RUB16.2 billion (US$523 million) and net income of RUB 648 million (US$21 million) under unaudited Russian GAAP. Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. About Moody's and Moody's Interfax Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's Corporation (NYSE: MCO). On September 26, 2013, Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B2 deposit ratings and senior debt rating of Novikombank JSC bank (Russia). The rating agency has also affirmed the bank's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of E+, which is equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b2. The bank's Not Prime short-term deposit ratings were also affirmed. All of the bank's long-term ratings carry a stable outlook. RUSSIAN UTILITIES: Fitch Assigns 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings --------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned OAO Russian Utilities Systems (RUS) Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of 'B+', a Short-term foreign and local currency IDR of 'B' and a National Long-term Rating of 'A(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long- term IDRs and National Rating are Stable. The ratings are based on RUS's standalone profile reflecting operations independent of its ultimate parent, Renova Group, and without the Novogor-Prikamye business, which remains outside the consolidation perimeter. RUS benefits from diversification of its operational portfolio by both business segment and region of operations, supported by long-term lease and concession agreements with good revenue visibility. The ratings are constrained by the low predictability of the regulatory environment in Russia towards utilities, evolving group structure, and its financial profile with significant short term debt. Key Rating Drivers Diversified Private Utilities Provider The company's diversification into four different businesses -- heat, water and power supply as well as power distribution -- supports its business profile. However, we view heat and power supply as more prone to margin pressure and political interference compared with water, despite the latter's higher reliance on less predictable connection fee revenues. As such, we believe that RUS's business profile is somewhat riskier than its peer, Ventrelt Holdings Ltd (BB-/Stable), which is focused on the water business. RUS operates in 11 Russian regions and provides utility services to over 7.5m households, supporting its customer diversification and collection rates. Although the company has a good track record of improving collection rates in its businesses, this could reverse during an economic downturn. Long-term Leases and Concessions The company leases infrastructure assets from local municipalities in order to improve them and provide reliable services to the public. The rent or concession agreements are long-term (up to 49 years with average remaining life of around 21 years), which underpins its operational and revenue visibility. The agreements do not include any cancellation fees, with rent or concession payments coterminous with the contracts. Rent and concession payment are reflected in agreed end-user tariffs charged by RUS. Although concessions tend to include more explicit capex requirements, we believe that these contracts provide RUS with a better contractual framework compared with rent agreements. However, RUS only benefits from two concessions to date (excluding Novogor-Prikamye). Optimization of Operational Portfolio The company has recently sold two loss-making heat supply businesses in Tver and Bryansk, which we view positively, despite the marginal level of disposal proceeds. RUS also plans to consolidate an operating company in Novogor-Prikamye, which is currently owned by Renova Group (but is operated by RUS). We believe that contribution in kind would improve RUS's business profile and hence support its ratings despite only modest change in projected financial profile (due to debt at Novogor-Prikamye) as a result. We assume that any future M&A would be funded by the ultimate parent and that all earnings will be retained by RUS. Challenging Regulatory Environment Predictability of the regulatory environment in Russia remains low with frequent changes in policies and subsequently tariff determinations. In 2012 tariffs for power distribution and power supply were changed, which resulted in a major contraction of EBITDA in the latter sector for RUS. However, the company's total EBITDA remained similar to the previous year thanks to the performance of other segments and demonstrating the benefit of the diversification of the business. The Russian government's recent discussion of freezing natural monopoly tariffs in 2014 may not directly affect RUS since its tariffs are mostly set at the local level. In addition, a large part of the fuel cost bill would also have tariffs frozen, offsetting the impact. Fuel costs represent 12% of opex but other cost inputs could also be frozen. Nevertheless, there remains a significant risk of a fundamental mismatch of utility tariff growth compared with fuel and other cost inflation for the company. This could quickly impact RUS's cash flows, considering its relatively thin supply margin. In addition, investments with a long-term payback period without long-term tariff visibility expose the company to financial risk. Manageable Financial Profile The company's leverage is commensurate with the ratings and comparable with its closest peer. Funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage was 2.9x at YE12 compared with 2.7x at YE11. To better capture operational performance, Fitch also calculates leverage using FFO after deducting connection fees that we consider less predictable and essentially an item offsetting capex. This connection fee adjusted FFO net leverage was 4.0x at YE12 and we expect it to weaken to around 4.2x at YE13, due to partial debt funding of capex. Thereafter, considering our assumption for slight margin improvement reflecting the capex and assuming no adverse changes in regulation, we expect to reduce to below 4.0x. FFO interest cover was 3.3x in 2012 (down from 5.8x in 2011) or 2.3x and 4.5x when adjusted for connection fees. Fitch expects that interest cover (even unadjusted for connection fees) will remain in the low single-digit territory, and hence without much headroom for the rating. Complex Structure with Structural Subordination Debt is primarily raised by operating companies with a parent company guarantee, but there are cash pooling agreements between operating companies for accounts of two of the lending banks. In addition, there are no restrictions on cash flows within the group and all key functions are managed centrally. The ratings therefore reflect the company's consolidated profile, rather than focusing on RUS as a holding with recourse only to dividends from its operating subsidiaries. We would expect any debt to be issued directly by RUS to benefit from upstream guarantees to mitigate structural subordination of creditors lending directly to RUS. In the absence of such guarantees, ratings of RUS and/or its debt would be notched down from the consolidated profile. Liquidity & Debt Structure At end-2012, total debt was RUB4.3 billion, of which short-term loan maturities were RUB4.2 billion. As of September 1, 2013, total outstanding debt had increased to RUB4.8 billion. The company managed to refinance part of its short-term debt with longer-term loans and plans to further increase the share of long-term loans by year-end. As of 1 September 2013, short-term debt was RUB2.3 billion (47% of total debt), which should further decrease to RUB1.8 billion (37% of the total debt) before YE13, according to RUS's management. Although this compared well with unused credit lines of RUB3.4 billion and cash and cash equivalents balance of RUB232 million, we note that RUS does not pay commitment fees on the lines (as is common in Russia). We expect RUS to report negative free cash flow in 2013-2015 and we therefore view the company's liquidity and debt maturity profile as a limiting factor for the ratings. The company has limited foreign exchange exposure, but most of its debt is short term and variable rate, exposing it to interest rate increases. Rating Sensitivities Positive: Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to positive rating action, include: - Stronger business profile with less exposure to riskier segments of heat and power supply. - Improved debt maturity profile and liquidity. - More predictable regulatory environment. - Strong operational performance with sustained improvement of financial metrics including FFO net leverage adjusted for connection fees below 3.5x and FFO interest coverage over 5x. Negative: Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to negative rating action, include: - Adverse regulatory changes and tariff determinations (not reflective of fuel or other cost inflation). - Weaker operational performance or capital spending with significant deterioration of the credit metrics on a sustained basis including FFO net leverage adjusted for connection fees above 4.5x and FFO interest coverage below 3.5x. - A sustained reduction in cash generation and margins through worsening cash collection rates. =============== S L O V E N I A =============== * SLOVENIA: Says Will Fix Financial Sector Without Outside Help --------------------------------------------------------------- Leos Rousek at The Wall Street Journal reports that despite continuing stress in its banks and a protracted recession, Slovenia is determined not to become the sixth euro-zone nation in need of an international bailout and will fix its financial sector without outside help. Slovenia, which adopted the euro in 2007, has stoked concerns that it may become another member of the European Union's single- currency bloc to request an international bailout because of its debt-saddled state-owned banks, the Journal notes. The three lenders -- Nova Ljubljanska Banka D.D., Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor D.D. and Abanka Vipa D.D. -- control most of the country's financial sector but are burdened with about EUR7.5 billion (US$10.11 billion) of bad loans worth about a fifth of the national economic output, the Journal discloses. This has aggravated the country's economic woes by making new credit scarcely available to Slovenian companies, the Journal notes. "The flow of money into new projects or for normal business activity of [local] companies basically stopped already five years ago," the Journal quotes Finance Minister Uros Cufer as saying in an interview at his office in the Slovenian capital. "The key thing to do to get back to growth is to clean up balance sheets of banks on the one hand and restructure corporate debts on the other since they are both interconnected." Even though Slovenia is a country of just under two million, its banking-sector problems highlight the euro area's struggle to contain its debt crisis and have caused much concern across the Continent, the Journal notes. According to the Journal, asked whether Slovenia expects to seek outside help from the European Central Bank and the EU, Mr. Cufer said: "I don't see a need for that," adding that the country has sufficient funding through April when its five-year EUR1.5 billion bond matures. The Journal notes that data from the central bank showed provisions against nonperforming loans, those unpaid for 90 days or longer, held by all Slovenian banks stood at EUR4.47 billion at the end of June, with the three state-held banks accounting for most of the provisions. Mr. Cufer, as cited by the Journal, said that the government has already created reserves in its budget of up to EUR1.2 billion to be available for fresh capital injections in its troubled banks. Banking sector problems are "very manageable on our side," the Journal quotes Mr. Cufer as saying. He said that government institutions have around EUR3 billion in accounts at the state- owned banks, allowing the finance ministry to use at least some of these deposits for capital injections, the Journal notes. He said that the government will consider tapping markets when it knows how much money it will need for its banking-sector cleanup, the Journal relays. According to the Journal, the finance minister and Slovenian central bank Gov. Bostjan Jazbec remain confident that their country won't need to go cap in hand asking for a bailout. "If you single out those bad loans, if you take into account provisions and if you add that additional capital to those banks, then you figure out that those numbers aren't that big," Mr. Jazbec, as cited by the Journal, said. The government and the central bank expect to have a final estimate of funds needed to shore up its banks by the end of November, the Journal relates. After that the three troubled state lenders -- NLB, NKBM and Abanka -- could transfer their bad loans to the state-run Bank Asset Management Co., also referred to as a bad bank, and seek fresh capital injections through equity sales, the Journal states. According to the Journal, outside auditors are carrying out appraisals of loan portfolios of the three main local banks and stress-testing their balance sheets to gauge capital adequacy of the banks. ========= S P A I N ========= CODERE SA: Moody's Affirms Ca-PD Rating; Removes LD Indicator ------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Codere S.A.'s Ca-PD probability of default rating (PDR) and removed the limited default (/LD) indicator following the payment on September 17, after the end of the 30-day grace period, of the coupon on the USD notes issued by Codere Finance (Luxembourg) S.A. Codere's Caa3 corporate family rating (CFR) and the Ca ratings on Codere Finance (Luxembourg) S.A.'s euro and US dollar denominated notes remain unchanged. The outlook on all ratings remains negative. Ratings Rationale: Moody's has removed the /LD indicator from Codere's Ca-PD PDR following the payment on September 17 of the coupon on the US$300 million notes. The coupon was due on August 15, and the payment was made after the end of the 30-day grace period. Codere's Caa3 rating reflects the company's weak liquidity, its uncertain operating and financial prospects in light of its weakening operating performance, the limitations in accessing cash-flows from Argentina, and its high adjusted leverage, which stood at around 6.1x as of June 2013. The rating also reflects its position as one of the leading gaming operators in Latin America, Italy and Spain, and its diversification in terms of business lines, gaming assets and geographies. The negative outlook reflects that further downward pressure could be exerted on the ratings if the company fails to reach a consensual agreement with its bondholders or if another form of debt restructuring takes place resulting in a greater than currently expected loss for bondholders. What Could Change the Rating Up/Down? Downward pressure on the rating could develop if Codere were to start a bankruptcy procedure, possibly resulting in higher losses for bondholders than currently captured in Moody's ratings. Upward pressure is currently unlikely but subsequent to any future restructuring, Moody's might upgrade the ratings of Codere to reflect the company's reduced debt burden. However, Moody's believes that the turnaround of Codere's business and financial performance will be very challenging, particularly given the deterioration in operating performance across its main markets reported YTD in 2013. Principal Methodology The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global Gaming published in December 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. Codere is a multinational gaming operator that manages gaming machines, machine halls, bingo halls, horse racing tracks, casinos and sports betting locations in Latin America, Italy and Spain. As of December 2012, Codere managed 56,474 gaming machine seats, 186 gaming halls (including machine halls, bingo halls with machines, machine halls at racetracks and casinos), 1,379 betting locations and three horse racing tracks. In 2012, Codere generated operating revenue of EUR1.664 billion and EBITDA of EUR305 million. ===================== S W I T Z E R L A N D ===================== OCTAPHARMA NORDIC: S&P Affirms & Withdraws 'BB+' Long-Term CCR -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'BB+' long-term corporate credit rating on Switzerland- headquartered plasma derivatives manufacturer and distributor Octapharma Nordic AB. S&P subsequently withdrew the rating at the company's request. The outlook at the time of the withdrawal was stable. The affirmation prior to withdrawal reflected S&P's continued assessment of Octapharma's business risk profile as "fair" and its financial risk profile as "modest." The "fair" business risk profile mainly reflected Octapharma's relatively small size and low product diversification as a consequence of its sole focus on plasma fractionation. The "modest" financial risk profile reflected S&P's view of Octapharma's high conversion of profits into cash flow and historically strong cash flow generation. =========== T U R K E Y =========== ORION HOLDING: Applies for Suspension of Bankruptcy Proceedings --------------------------------------------------------------- Taylan Bilgic at Bloomberg News relates that Yalcin Karaman, head of Orion Holding, which applied for suspension of bankruptcy proceedings against it, spoke to Hurriyet newspaper in an interview. According to Bloomberg, Hurriyet said the company got EUR12.5 million from Darby, an arm of Mark Mobius's Franklin Templeton, and US$20 million from Gulf Capital. Bloomberg relates that Mr. Karaman, as cited by Hurriyet, said he owes US$48 million to two funds, TRY40 million (US$20 million) in taxes and social security payments, TRY15 million to market and TRY7 million to banks. Orion Holding gave catering, security, janitorial services to Turkey's biggest companies. It employed more than 22,000 people. * TURKEY: Fitch Says BoP May Slow Growth But Won't Spark Crisis --------------------------------------------------------------- A slowdown in Turkey's net capital inflows is likely to temper economic growth, but should not trigger a crisis because of the country's strong fundamentals, according to Fitch Ratings. Nevertheless, dependence on net capital inflows is one of the key risks to the Turkish economy, and a prolonged funding shortfall would create the risk of a hard economic landing. "In the short term, the combination of the wide current account deficit (CAD), high inflation and weak international liquidity limit Turkey's room for maneuver, and we believe it may have to adjust its growth expectations in line with a lower and more easily funded CAD," Fitch says. "Despite this risk to growth, we believe the country's strong public finances will help to protect it from a balance of payments crisis. Turkey's public-debt ratio is moderate at 38% of GDP, while its budget deficit is low, and it has successfully lengthened its average debt maturity. Additional buffers include a strong banking system, modest household debt, and a dynamic corporate sector accustomed to adjusting to shocks. "There are also structural benefits to the Turkish market that we believe will keep investors engaged and reduce the risk of a sharper decline in net capital inflows. These include favorable demographics that point to strong medium-term growth potential, deep local capital markets with a good debt service record, and a favorable business climate with well-proven export market flexibility. "Net capital inflows are essential for economic growth in Turkey, where a CAD of 6%-7% of GDP mirrors a comparable imbalance between savings and investment. The current account deficit has widened again in 2013 after improving last year, while capital inflows have fallen abruptly since May, and net portfolio flows have turned mildly negative. Banks and corporates, however, have encountered little difficulty rolling over existing exposures. Nonetheless, future funding is likely to prove more expensive." Turkey has a Long-Term IDR of 'BBB-' with a Stable Outlook. =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== DUNFERMLINE ATHLETIC: Pars United Expects to Take Over This Week ---------------------------------------------------------------- Herald Scotland reports that Pars United, the Dunfermline Athletic supporters' group, are expected to take full control of the Fife club this week and bring an end to six months of administration. According to Herald Scotland, insolvency experts BDO ran the club during that time but are prepared to hand control over to fans when the final contractual formalities are completed, Herald Scotland. Pars United -- an organization which has united various fans' groups -- were successful in attaining a Company Voluntary Arrangement in July after raising enough capital to be named preferred bidders, Herald Scotland discloses. "With new owners, it will just give us more of an ability to plan ahead, although the football debt will need sorted out," Herald Scotland quotes Jim Jefferies, the Dunfermline manager, as saying. Dunfermline Athletic Football Club is a Scottish football team based in Dunfermline, Fife, commonly known as just Dunfermline. SPEARPOINT RISK: In Liquidation; Owes GBP154,000 to CBG ------------------------------------------------------- Richard Curran at Independent.ie reports that Spearpoint Risk Management has gone into liquidation, owing money to a private security and counter surveillance firm. According to Independent.ie, the company had assets of just GBP22,000 (EUR26,214) but liabilities of GBP244,000 when a liquidator was appointed. The biggest creditor was a property development company called Concept Business Group, which is owned by London-based Greek developer Nicholas Trimmatis, Independent.ie discloses. CBG was owed GBP154,000 by the company, Independent.ie notes. Spearpoint Risk Management is a London company owned by Michael Fingleton junior, the son of the former Irish Nationwide chief executive. With an address at 41 Whitehall, the company was itself described in Companies Office filings as involved in security systems activities. SDI FUNDING: Moody's Lowers Rating on GBP300MM of Notes to 'B2' --------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the following notes issued by SDI Funding PLC: GBP300,000,000 Series 1 iTraxx SDITM-75 Credit-Linked Secured Notes due 2016, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17, 2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) This transaction represents the repackaging of three bank deposits with a synthetic link to the iTraxx SDI(TM)-75 index. The Index currently consists of 72 equally weighted issuers of debt, at closing 75 issuers. The issuer enters into deposit agreements with the Royal Bank of Scotland plc, Barclays Bank PLC , HSBC Bank plc and four credit default swaps ("the CDS's") with each of the banks and also Deutsche Bank AG . Under the CDS's the SPV sells protection to each bank in relation to the Index in return for a premium payment from the banks. The SPV also enters into an interest rate swap with Royal Bank of Scotland plc. Under the interest rate swap, the SPV pays to Royal Bank of Scotland plc interest received under the deposits and the premium received under the CDS's and Royal Bank of Scotland plc pays the fixed amount due under the Notes. At maturity, Noteholders will receive the principal amount of the Notes subject to reductions as specified in the transaction documents such as partial redemption or credit events. Ratings Rationale: Moody's explained that the rating action incorporates losses associated with all credit events suffered since closing. This is a change from Moody's earlier rating actions, wherein Moody's monitored this transaction assessing the expected loss on the prevailing outstanding notional of the index without reflecting the losses from reference entities that have been removed from the Index as a result of credit events. In particular the reference portfolio has already suffered losses of slightly more than 3% which have reduced the notional outstanding of the notes. The downgrade to B2 (sf) is consistent with the methodology outlined in Moody's publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default" dated November 2009. Moody's notes that in terms of the transaction documentation, the notes have not experienced an event of default. Moody's also notes that the average credit quality of the remaining 72 names in the index is roughly equivalent to Ba1. The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities published in April 2010 and Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default published in November 2009. Moody's quantitative analysis of repacks is designed to estimate the expected loss "EL" borne by the repack investor, given the transaction structure, the Collateral and any other credit risks arising under the transaction. To this end, Moody's relies on an EL analysis in which it identifies and attaches probabilities to events that might give rise to losses to repack noteholders. Moody's EL calculation assesses the probability and severity of each possible loss-inducing event happening at discrete (typically one-year) intervals through the life of the transaction. The EL for each of these time points can then be aggregated to provide a weighted-average EL for the rated notes. No additional cash flow, sensitivity analysis or stress scenarios have been conducted as the rating was directly derived utilizing a weighted average expected loss calculation including consideration of write downs that have already occurred. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * BOND PRICING: For the Week September 23 to September 27, 2013 --------------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price ------ ------ -------- -------- ----- AUSTRIA ------- A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75 A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13 IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29 RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30 RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37 RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53 RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96 RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43 RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24 RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62 RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49 RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13 RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71 RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19 RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11 RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69 RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62 BELGIUM ------- ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94 TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61 FRANCE ------ AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38 ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62 ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62 ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27 ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17 CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69 CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64 CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80 EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33 FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91 FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45 INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14 MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13 MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15 NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69 NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09 ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89 PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56 PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63 PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06 SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24 SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25 TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36 GERMANY ------- BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32 BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62 BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67 BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92 COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49 COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71 COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48 COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77 COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74 COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50 DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50 DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05 DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86 DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21 DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00 DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50 DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36 DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28 DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43 DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14 DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07 DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83 DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11 DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42 DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63 DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33 DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77 DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81 DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74 DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16 DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95 DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97 DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07 DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29 DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17 DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66 DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63 DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25 DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10 DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38 DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24 DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09 DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94 DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46 DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34 DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68 DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05 DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23 DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10 DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09 DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65 DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00 DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04 DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41 DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70 GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70 HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61 HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90 HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63 HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76 HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06 HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07 HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52 HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94 HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74 HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07 HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08 HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53 HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21 HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40 HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88 HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58 HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46 HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58 HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33 HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78 HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74 HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43 HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19 HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33 HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00 HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68 HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08 HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24 HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96 HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46 HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10 HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24 HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26 HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48 HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16 HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24 HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22 HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20 HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27 HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11 HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20 HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23 HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33 HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67 HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50 HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06 HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82 HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77 HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72 HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46 HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75 HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14 HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67 HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65 HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87 HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56 HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02 HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02 HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88 LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60 LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42 LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18 LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91 LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83 LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38 LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33 LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25 LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55 LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18 LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06 LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52 LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17 LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03 LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16 LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23 LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79 LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20 LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83 MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09 MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38 Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08 QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50 SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58 TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73 TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40 VONTOBEL FIN PRO 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AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28 UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53 UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67 UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02 UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27 UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09 UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07 UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39 UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51 UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87 UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64 UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71 UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85 UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41 UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18 UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29 UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44 UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53 UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58 UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59 UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81 UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88 UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41 UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51 UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10 UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18 UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09 UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30 UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69 UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84 UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83 UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52 UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33 UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40 UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63 UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95 UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36 UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82 UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39 UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32 UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98 UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69 UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58 UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54 UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23 UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99 UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92 UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21 UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94 UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05 UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65 UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55 UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05 UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34 UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22 UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54 UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04 UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86 UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90 UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35 UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96 UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23 UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02 UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24 UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00 UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30 UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20 UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16 UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75 UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16 UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45 UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44 UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63 UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05 UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98 UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88 UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19 UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43 UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24 UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24 UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21 UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17 UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77 UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39 UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84 UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50 UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06 UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75 UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07 UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90 UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12 UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60 UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70 UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00 UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17 UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43 UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83 UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98 UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05 UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59 UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54 UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28 UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82 UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91 UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62 UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86 UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83 UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15 UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72 UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94 UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97 UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96 UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07 UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87 UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62 UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50 UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82 UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26 UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53 UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76 UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64 UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72 UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23 BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13 BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83 BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06 BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44 BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37 BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66 ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62 MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36 ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200. * * * End of Transmission * * *