TCREUR_Public/130930.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Monday, September 30, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 193


B O S N I A   &   H E R Z E G O V I N A

* BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating; Outlook Stable


FCC ZEBRE: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Part M2 Loan
* Fitch: US Money Fund Exposure to French Banks Hits 2-Year High


* GREECE: Bailout Fund Head Casts Doubt on Debt Sustainability


* ICELAND: C.B. Urges Failed Banks' Creditors to Cut Demands


ALLIED IRISH: Completes Non-Core Loan Deleveraging Plan
EURO ATLANTIS CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
IRISH BANK: Liquidation May Lead to "Substantial Savings"
QUIRINUS PLC: Moody's Reviews Ba3-Rated X2 Notes for Downgrade

* IRELAND: Company Insolvencies Down 25% in Third Quarter 2013
* IRELAND: 716 SME Jobs Secured Through Examinership This Year


ALITALIA SPA: Plans to Seek More Funding to Avoid Bankruptcy
MARCHE MUTUI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes From 'Ba3'


NIELSEN COMPANY: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Issuer Default Rating


FAXTOR ABS 2005-1: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Two Note Classes
LEVERAGED FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class IV Notes to 'CCC-'
STORM 2013-IV: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Ratings on Two Note Classes


CITADELLA TITAN: To Be Put Up for Sale for EUR6.85 Million


CREATIVE GROUP: Fitch Withdraws 'B-(EXP)' Sr. Unsecured Rating
NOVIKOMBANK JSC: Moody's Affirms B2 Issuer Rating; Outlook Stable
NOVIKOMBANK JSC: Moody's Interfax Affirms National Deposit Rating
RUSSIAN UTILITIES: Fitch Assigns 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings


* SLOVENIA: Says Will Fix Financial Sector Without Outside Help


CODERE SA: Moody's Affirms Ca-PD Rating; Removes LD Indicator


OCTAPHARMA NORDIC: S&P Affirms & Withdraws 'BB+' Long-Term CCR


ORION HOLDING: Applies for Suspension of Bankruptcy Proceedings
* TURKEY: Fitch Says BoP May Slow Growth But Won't Spark Crisis

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DUNFERMLINE ATHLETIC: Pars United Expects to Take Over This Week
SPEARPOINT RISK: In Liquidation; Owes GBP154,000 to CBG
SDI FUNDING: Moody's Lowers Rating on GBP300MM of Notes to 'B2'


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 23 to September 27, 2013


B O S N I A   &   H E R Z E G O V I N A

* BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B/B' long-
and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The outlook is stable.


The ratings on Bosnia and Herzegovina are constrained by its
fragile, overlapping government institutions, its weak fiscal
management framework, and external vulnerabilities arising from
persistent current account deficits and funding challenges.  The
ratings are supported by S&P's expectation of continued and
significant international support.

S&P believes that the domestic political environment will likely
remain divided along ethnic lines and entity boundaries.  Under
the 1995 Dayton Agreement that concluded the 1992-95 Bosnian war,
Bosnia is divided along ethnic lines into three political
entities--the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with a
predominantly Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) and Croat population),
Republika Srpska (Serbian Orthodox Christian and Bosniak) and the
Brcko District (Bosniak and Croat).  Under the Agreement, both
the Federation and the Republika Srpska have their own
parliament, which has executive legislative powers over the
respective entity. Among other responsibilities, foreign policy,
judicial powers and monetary policy are with the State and
exercised through state-level institutions.

Tensions exist between the entities and the state-level
institutions and, increasingly, between the combined authorities
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community.  In
S&P's view, periodic events--such as the government reshuffle
earlier this year within the entities--undermine confidence that
political cohesion is developing.

Such events detract from important issues.  For instance,
progress on a key constitutional amendment to allow members of
other communities to be elected to higher government positions, a
prerequisite for EU candidacy, has been pending since a 2009
ruling by the European Court for Human Rights.  Bosnia's current
constitution only allows Bosniaks, Serbs, or Croats to be elected
to the Presidency of the State.

A stalemate between the entity governments regarding meeting the
EU's sanitation standards has prevented Bosnia's agricultural
sector from preparing for Croatia's accession to the EU; at the
end of 2012, Croatia was Bosnia's second-largest export market.
More recently, the European Commission (EC) canceled two
agricultural projects worth EUR5 million (0.02% of GDP) after the
entity governments failed to reach a decision on the
implementation of the projects.  While EUR5 million isn't of
itself a large amount, Bosnia risks losing funds for other
EC-backed projects if the entity governments fail to set up a
coordination mechanism to deal with EU funds.

S&P views the IMF Stand-By Arrangement (the Program) secured by
Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 2012 as an important policy
anchor.  S&P believes that disbursement conditionality will
continue to help stabilize fragile public finances at the entity
level, while also boosting the government's ability to meet its
increasing external debt repayments.  To date, Bosnia and
Herzegovina has successfully completed three reviews and received
three disbursements (totaling EUR155 million; 0.6% of GDP) so far
under the Program; the fourth review is now underway.

To be eligible for each successive disbursement, the IMF requires
the entity governments to meet structural benchmarks by certain
deadlines: the adoption of laws on privileged pensions for war
veterans is one example.  Other ongoing stipulated reforms
involve the pension and healthcare sectors, improvements to the
business environment, and greater control and monitoring of the
finances of lower levels of government.

S&P notes that the strained finances of both the Federation and
the Republika Srpska, coinciding with economic stagnation since
the global financial crisis, have increased Bosnia and
Herzegovina's reliance on the IMF for budgetary and external
financing.  Broadly speaking, S&P believes risks to IMF program
implementation and delays to reforms may persist given the
complex institutional set-up and potential political disruptions.
General elections next year could also potentially, and
protractedly, shift political focus away from the reform agenda.

S&P expects the general government deficit to narrow to 1% of GDP
and the net general government debt stock to reduce to 36% of GDP
by 2016, after peaking at an estimated 39% in 2013.  In addition
to the risks already mentioned, lower-than-anticipated economic
growth, pre-election spending, or spending overruns from the
lower levels of government could derail planned fiscal targets.
That said, S&P believes that the need to secure ongoing financing
from the IMF will sufficiently motivate the entities to keep
consolidation on track.

S&P expects economic growth to remain subdued, which will further
challenge reform implementation.  S&P anticipates that, after
contracting by an estimated 0.7% in 2012, real GDP will increase
by 0.5% this year.  S&P forecasts real GDP to grow at an average
of 1.9% over 2013-2016, well below the average 5.0% of 2004-2008.
Assuming a slow recovery in the eurozone, S&P expects investment
to remain below its 2008 peak of 28% of GDP over the next few
years.  Bosnia and Herzegovina's 2013 GDP per capita is modest at
an estimated $4,700.

In S&P's opinion, the banking system represents a limited
contingent liability for the government.  It is largely owned by
foreign parent banks and has a moderate degree of financial
intermediation (claims on the resident non-government sector are
estimated at 55% of 2013 GDP).

Though the banking system appears well-capitalized -- with
reported Tier 1 capital equal to 15.3% of risk-weighted assets at
June 2013 -- non-performing loans (NPLs) have continued to
increase steadily since early 2012.  NPLs reached 14.3% of total
loans at the end of June 2013, from 5.9% at the end of 2009, and
may rise further.  As a result, S&P expects that banks (mostly
owned by Austrian and Italian parents) will continue to be
cautious in extending credit even when the demand for loans
starts to pick up.

External vulnerabilities have arisen from persistent current
account deficits (estimated at 8.5% of GDP in 2013), though
financing from the IMF and other multilateral lending
institutions has somewhat reduced external funding challenges.
While the large trade deficit (estimated at 32% of 2013 GDP) is
offset partially by net remittances (we estimate net transfers
flow of nearly 14% of 2013 GDP), S&P expects the current account
deficit to remain above 5% of GDP over 2013-2016.  S&P
anticipates that direct investment inflows will continue to
amount to about one third of the current account deficit, and
therefore expect an increase in external indebtedness over the
forecast horizon.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's large current account deficit, along
with its external repayments, will keep its gross external
financing needs high at an average of 150% of current account
receipts and usable reserves from 2013-2016.

Bosnia has a currency board regime and the convertible marka is
pegged to the euro.  While the currency board provides stability,
it limits monetary flexibility.  Bosnia, like other regional
peers, has a high level of euroization; nearly two-thirds of all
loans are in or indexed to a foreign currency, mostly euros.


The stable outlook balances S&P's view of the risks to Program
implementation posed by the complex institutional set-up, the
general elections in 2014, and the weak external environment
against the Program's role in guiding policy direction and
providing financing.

S&P could lower the ratings if it sees a significant
deterioration in Bosnia's external position or if the government
fails to meet IMF conditions and thereby jeopardizes

If S&P sees delays in payments to official creditors -- as
happened in January 2012 amid ambiguity over the extension of
temporary financing -- it could lower the ratings by more than
one notch.

In S&P's opinion, if tensions between the two entities abate, and
if their relations with state institutions improve, this would
gradually enable autonomous reform implementation that does not
rely on international pressure and policy conditionality.  S&P
believes this would strengthen the business environment and pave
the way for more sustainable growth and better external
performance.  This could lead us to consider raising the ratings.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.


Ratings Affirmed

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sovereign Credit Rating                B/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   BB-


FCC ZEBRE: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Part M2 Loan
Fitch Ratings has affirmed FCC Partimmo 05/03, FCC Partimmo
11/03, FCC Zebre One, FCC Zebre Two and FCC Zebre 2006-1, as

FCC Partimmo 05/03
CDE11 part P affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

FCC Partimmo 11/03
CDE11 part P affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

FCC Zebre One
Class A affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

FCC Zebre Two
Part P affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

FCC Zebre 2006-1
Part P affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Part M1 affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Part M2 affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

These prime French RMBS transactions comprise loans originated
and serviced by Credit Foncier de France (CFF; A/Stable/F1).

Key Rating Drivers

Solid Asset Performance

The affirmations reflect the solid performance of the underlying
assets in all transactions, which is in line with Fitch's initial
expectations. As of July 2013, three-month plus arrears ranged
from 0.36% (Zebre One) to 1.59% (Partimmo 11/03) of the current
pool balance.

Full Provisioning of Defaulted Loans

The transactions' structures allow for the full provisioning of
defaulted loans, which are defined as loans with arrears of more
than six months. As of July 2013, the cumulative gross defaults
varied between 1.59% (Zebre 2006-1) to 2.82% (Zebre Two) of the
initial asset balance. To date, gross excess spread levels
together with period recoveries have remained adequate to fully
provision for defaulted loans and to ensure that the reserve
funds remain fully funded.

Junior Tranches of Zebre 2006-1 Capped
In late 2008, some of the securitized loans in Zebre 2006-1 were
subject to modifications. In order to limit the level of risk
exposure on M1 and M2 junior notes, CFF committed to paying the
issuer any capital loss incurred as a result of the loan
modification. Hence the notes are deemed to be dependent on the
credit-worthiness of CFF and these tranches are subject to a
rating cap linked to CFF's Long-term rating.

Rating Sensitivities
Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors, in particular the increasing effect of unemployment. A
corresponding increase in new defaults and associated pressure on
excess spread levels and reserve funds could result in negative
rating action.

* Fitch: US Money Fund Exposure to French Banks Hits 2-Year High
U.S. prime money market fund (MMF) exposure to eurozone banks
increased for the second consecutive month, driven by rising
allocations towards French banks, according to Fitch Ratings.

As of end-August 2013, exposure to eurozone banks represented
15.8% of assets under management within Fitch's sample of the
top-10 U.S. prime MMFs. MMF allocations to French banks stood at
9.1% of assets, an 18% increase over the prior month. This
allocation represents the highest level since end-August 2011, a
period during which MMFs sharply reduced their exposure to
eurozone banks amid intensifying concerns in the region.

While the increase in eurozone allocations signals more positive
investor sentiment towards the region, Fitch notes that MMF
exposure to eurozone banks continues to be less than half of its
May-2011 allocations.

The proportion of eurozone and European exposure in the form of
repos fell to levels last observed in 2011. At end-August, about
13% of MMF exposure to eurozone banks was in repo, well below the
levels of about 40% of exposure observed in the latter half of
2012. Fitch believes this reduced presence of repo indicates that
MMFs are more willing to take unsecured exposure to banks in the

The full report is 'U.S. Money Fund Exposure and European Banks:
France at Two-Year Low' issued by Fitch.


* GREECE: Bailout Fund Head Casts Doubt on Debt Sustainability
Matina Stevis and Gabriele Steinhauser at The Wall Street Journal
report that the head of the euro zone's bailout fund has cast
doubt on official assessments of how much Greece's debt is really
weighing on its economy, in the latest signal that the currency
bloc is stepping away from commitments to reduce the country's
debt mountain.

In an interview with the Journal, Klaus Regling, managing
director of the European Stability Mechanism, said that the
targets for lowering Greece's debt that were central to its
latest rescue deal were "meaningless."

He said that to accurately evaluate the sustainability of
Greece's debt, more heed had to be paid to the exceptionally low
interest rates Athens was paying and to the long repayment
schedules -- conditions that set it apart from other high-debt
countries, the Journal relates.

According to the Journal, Mr. Regling's comments provide backing
for Germany and other euro-zone countries that have conceded
Athens, the Journal says, will likely require a third bailout but
have resisted demands from the International Monetary Fund and
elsewhere that they forgo repayment on some of the money already

Last November, the currency union's finance ministers sealed a
new bailout deal for Greece that was meant to bring the country's
debt down to 124% of its gross domestic product by 2020, from
around 170% currently, the Journal recounts.  Crucially, the
ministers also promised that Greece's debt would be
"substantially lower than 110%" of GDP by 2022, the Journal

That commitment, made after months of harrowing back-and-forth
that pushed Greece to the brink of leaving the euro zone, was
central for the IMF, the Journal states.

The Journal relates that fund officials said at the time that the
IMF wouldn't be able to lend any more money to Greece unless
there was a realistic chance the loans would be repaid.

They also raised expectations that euro-zone governments would
forgive Greece part of its debt, despite denials from rich
countries like Germany, the Journal discloses.

But now, senior European officials are attacking the calculations
on Greece's debt that formed the basis of the November deal as
well as the targets, the Journal relates.

"It's not sufficient to have a target of a certain debt ratio,"
Mr. Regling, as cited by the Journal, said.  "It's meaningless."

According to the Journal, Mr. Regling said that the calculations
-- known as a debt-sustainability analysis -- didn't take
sufficient account of the exceptionally good terms of Greece's
bailout.  He said that the euro zone's loans come at very low
interest rates and, on average, won't have to be repaid for 30
years, the Journal notes.

The German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble has said that
Athens may need new loans but has ruled out debt forgiveness, the
Journal relates.

Mr. Regling added that bailout-fund rules prevent it from taking
losses on loans, the Journal notes.

According to the Journal, Simon O'Connor, a spokesman for the
European Commission, which represents the euro zone in bailout
negotiations, said it is "working constructively with our
partners, the ECB and IMF, on analyzing the debt sustainability
of Greece" in line with the November statement from euro-zone
finance ministers.


* ICELAND: C.B. Urges Failed Banks' Creditors to Cut Demands
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Iceland's
central bank is urging creditors in the nation's failed banks to
scale back their demands, which policy makers say risk
destabilizing the current account balance.

According to Bloomberg, central bank Governor Mar Gudmundsson
said that Kaupthing Bank hf and Glitnir Bank hf won't be able to
complete a creditor accord unless they come up with a solution to
deal with US$3.8 billion in krona-denominated claims that doesn't
hurt Iceland's economy.

"In order to go into composition they need an exemption from the
central bank of Iceland," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Gudmundsson as
saying in an interview from Reykjavik.  "For the central bank of
Iceland to make that exemption or give that exemption, there has
to be a solution regarding the krona assets of these banks that's
compatible with the balance of payments equilibrium in Iceland
and financial stability."

Offshore creditors hold about US$8 billion trapped by krona
restrictions as policy makers struggle to scale back the measures
without triggering a currency selloff, Bloomberg discloses.
Prime Minister Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson has said he wants
writedowns on ISK461 billion (US$3.8 billion) in claims held by
the creditors of Kaupthing, Glitnir and Landsbanki Islands hf to
help the government ease the currency controls, Bloomberg
relates.  Creditors have asked to circumvent the controls to help
recoup their investments, Bloomberg notes.

"It's very clear that the condition for giving that exemption is
not fulfilled," Mr. Gudmundsson, as cited by Bloomberg, said.
According to Bloomberg, he said that the creditors and their
representatives at the failed banks "know that, and if they want
the exemption they have to take measures to fulfill that

The caretaker of Kaupthing said it won't ask creditors to accept
kronur claims to be written off in full, Bloomberg relates.

"The winding up committee is obliged by law to preserve the value
of Kaupthing's assets," Bloomberg quotes Johannes Runar
Johannsson, a member of the winding-up committee, as saying in an
interview.  "It's therefore difficult, or even impossible, to see
how the winding-up committee could make such a recommendation,
given its legal duties."

Kaupthing, Glitnir and Landsbanki all failed in October 2008
after running out of cash to sustain their debt-funded
expansions, Bloomberg recounts.  The banking meltdown plunged the
economy into its worst recession in six decades, forcing the
government to impose restrictions on the krona and to seek an
international bailout, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Gudmundsson said that the central bank is probing ideas from
both Kaupthing and Glitnir on how to move forward with creditor
settlements, Bloomberg relates.  According to Bloomberg, he said
that conditions for granting exemptions to the lenders have yet
to be fulfilled.


ALLIED IRISH: Completes Non-Core Loan Deleveraging Plan
Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c., confirms completion of its
Deleveraging Plan, a significant milestone in the bank's overall
restructuring as part of its strategy to return to sustainable

Under the terms of the March 2011 Prudential Liquidity Adequacy
Review contained in the Financial Measures Programme, AIB was
required to deleverage EUR20.5 billion of non-core loans by
December 2013.  Despite challenging market conditions in recent
years the Plan has been achieved ahead of schedule and with a
positive capital variance versus the Financial Measures Programme

Completion of the Plan coupled with a growth in customer accounts
has seen the bank's loan to deposit ratio decrease from 165% at
December 2010 to 106% at June 2013, significantly below the
original end 2013 PLAR threshold of 122.5%.

                      About Allied Irish Banks

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary
shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at
shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-
voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On
April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount
of CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby
increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

The Company reported a loss of EUR2.29 billion in 2011, a loss of
EUR10.16 billion in 2010, and a loss of EUR2.33 billion in 2009.

Allied Irish's consolidated statement of financial position for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2011, showed EUR136.65 billion in total
assets, EUR122.18 billion in total liabilities and EUR14.46
billion in shareholders' equity.

Allied Irish's balance sheet at June 30, 2012, showed EUR129.85
billion in total assets, EUR116.59 billion in total liabilities
and EUR13.26 billion in total shareholders' equity.

EURO ATLANTIS CLO: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating actions
on notes issued by Euro Atlantis CLO Limited:

EUR171.125M Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1

EUR11.4M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2020, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2011
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR7.325M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2011
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

EUR9.25M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Aug 12, 2011
Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Euro Atlantis CLO Limited, issued in June 2008, is a single
currency Collateralized Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
static portfolio of mostly high yield European and US loans. The
collateral servicer, Pramerica Investment Management, may act on
behalf of the Issuer to dispose of credit impaired and defaulted
obligations, subject to certain conditions set out in the
collateral servicer agreement.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result primarily from an improvement in the overcollateralization
ratios of the rated notes pursuant to amortization of the

Moody's notes that the Class A notes amortized by approximately
EUR28.5 million (or 34%) on the latest payment date in May 2013,
and in total, by approximately EUR116.9 million (or 68.29%) of
the original amount. There is currently EUR 21.5 million in the
principal account which should be used to pay down the Class A
notes on the next payment date in November 2013. As of the latest
trustee report dated August 30, 2013, the Class A/B, Class C and
Class D overcollateralization ratios are reported at 158.92%,
142.97%, and 126.98% respectively, versus April 2013 levels of
143.57%, 133.21% and 122.09% respectively.

Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its
analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity
score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its
published methodology and may be different from the trustee's
reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the
underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal
proceeds balance of EUR104.3 million, defaulted par of EUR2.4
million, a weighted average default probability of 25.03%
(consistent with a WARF of 4404) over a weighted average life of
2.72, a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.61% for
a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 16 and a
weighted average spread of 3.71%. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and
Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool.
The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is
based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral
pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that
78.89% of the portfolio exposed to first lien senior secured
corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while the
remainder non-first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%.
In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes:
Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing and
sovereign risks -- approximately 16.49% of the portfolio are
European corporate rated B3 and below and maturing between 2014
and 2016, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance.
Approximately 5.34% of the portfolio are exposed to obligors
located in Italy and Spain. In those sensitivity model runs the
base case WARF was increased to 4933 and 5514 by forcing ratings
on 25% and 50% of such exposure to Ca. These runs generated model
outputs that were within two notches from the base case results.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Portfolio Amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Delevering may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the liquidation agent, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings. Typically, high
prepayments, especially to obligors with the better credit
quality, will benefit the ratings of the senior notes but may
negatively impact the ratings of the mezzanine and junior notes.

2) Moody's also notes that around 58% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Realization of higher
than expected recoveries would positively impact the ratings of
the notes.

4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction
maturity such an asset has a liquidation value dependent on the
nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's
maturity lags that of the liabilities. Realization of higher than
expected liquidation values would positively impact the ratings
of the notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in May 2013.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. Therefore,
Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

IRISH BANK: Liquidation May Lead to "Substantial Savings"
Ciara O'Brien at The Irish Times reports that the Fiscal Advisory
Council has claimed the decision to liquidate Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. could lead to "substantial savings" for the
Government, but it warned that the level of savings would depend
on the market view of the country's creditworthiness.

The Government decided in February to liquidate State-owned IBRC
to reduce the annual cost of toxic lenders, The Irish Times
recounts.  Estimates at the time placed the annual savings at
around EUR1 billion, The Irish Times notes.  However, the
advisory committee, as cited by The Irish Times, said the gains
from the move relative to the size of Government debt would be

"The gains could increase substantially if the risk spread on
Irish government debt were to narrow before the new bonds are
sold to the market; conversely a deterioration in risk spreads
could eliminate any gains," The Irish Times quotes the advisory
committee as saying.

According to The Irish Times, by the end of 2012, Government
liabilities exceeded assets by EUR135 billion, representing 82%
of gross domestic product.  That compares to being broadly equal
prior to the crisis in 2007, The Irish Times states.

The advisory council is placing the blame for the deterioration
on a combination of large budgetary deficits and exceptional
payments to the banking sector, The Irish Times says.

                         About Irish Bank

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.

Irish Bank Resolution is seeking assistance from the U.S. court
in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and Irish Nationwide
Building Society.  The two banks failed and were merged into IBRC
in July 2011.  IBRC was tasked with winding them down and
liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish lawmakers
adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was placed into a
special liquidation in the Irish High Court to complete
liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some 25 billion euros ($33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about 50 billion euros, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

The IRBC liquidators want the U.S. bankruptcy judge to rule that
Ireland is home to the so-called foreign main bankruptcy
proceeding.  If the judge agrees and determines that IBRC
otherwise qualifies, creditor actions in the U.S. will halt

QUIRINUS PLC: Moody's Reviews Ba3-Rated X2 Notes for Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade the Class A and Class X2 Notes issued by Quirinus
(European Loan Conduit No. 23) plc (amounts reflecting the
initial outstanding amount):

EUR560M A Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Oct 3, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

X2 Notes, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade;
previously on Aug 22, 2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E or
Class F Notes of the Issuer and has withdrawn the rating on the
Class X1 Notes on August 21, 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

The review action is driven by concerns that the Class A could
incur losses in certain scenarios when the sequential payment
trigger would not be breached as expected. Moody's is concerned
that the sequential payment trigger following the workout of
defaulted loans could be even weaker than previously anticipated.
In addition, Moody's expects further capital value declines of
the underlying collateral compared to the last review, which
results in an increased loss expectation for the notes.

In contrast to Moody's expectation, recovery proceeds from the
Fairacre loan were recently allocated to the notes on a modified
pro-rata basis. At the payment date when the recovery proceeds of
the Fairacre loan were allocated, the loan was excluded from the
calculation of the portion of specially serviced loans in the
pool. Thus, only the H&B loan was considered as specially
serviced loan and the sequential payment trigger threshold was
not reached.

Similar treatment of the Eurocastle loan, which is maturing last
in the pool, could lead to losses even on the most senior class
of notes. Losses could occur in a scenario of further property
value declines. Recovery proceeds would be insufficient to repay
the securitized loan in full; however, they would still be
allocated on a modified pro-rata basis. This scenario is relevant
if the whole portfolio is sold at once. If assets were sold
individually over time, Moody's would expect the proceeds to be
allocated sequentially.

Furthermore, the sequential payment trigger was not breached even
though a loss of EUR0.34 million was incurred on the Fairacre
loan. The sequential payment trigger refers to losses while in
this transaction losses on loans are not immediately allocated to
the notes but reflected by NAI amounts. Only at the note maturity
date, these NAI amounts will be allocated to the notes as a loss.
Moody's expects that potential future loan level losses would be
treated in the same manner.

The review action for the Class X2 Notes is driven by the
increased loss expectation for the pool.

Moody's will conclude its review once it has determined whether
the expected loss for the Class A1 is still commensurate with an
investment grade rating. It will seek more clarity on the
potential allocation of recovery proceeds from the Eurocastle
loan on a modified pro-rata basis. Moody's will discuss with the
transaction parties including the cash manager and perform
further legal analysis of the transaction documentation. In
addition, it will re-assess its property value estimate for the
underlying collateral.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) lending
will remain constrained over the next years, while subject to
strict underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the
underlying property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between
prime and secondary properties, with further value declines
expected for non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets
will remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
for the world's largest economies is for only a gradual
strengthening in growth over the coming two years. Fiscal
consolidation and volatility in financial markets will continue
to weigh on business and consumer confidence, while heightened
uncertainty hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. In
2013, Moody's expects no growth in the Euro area and only slow
growth in the UK.

Quirinus (European Loan Conduit No. 23) plc is a securitization
of initially 10 loans that closed in July 2006. The remaining two
loans in the pool are secured on portfolios of in total 36 retail
properties, for the most part supermarkets, spread across

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio
Analysis (MoRE Portfolio) published in April 2006. The
methodology used in rating Class X2 was Moody's Approach to
Rating Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities published in
February 2012.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2013 Central Scenarios published in February 2013.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated 3 October 2012. The last Performance Overview for
this transaction was published on August 29, 2013.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
ABSROM to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for each
tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in ABSROM, where for each loss
scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated taking into account the structural features
of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.

* IRELAND: Company Insolvencies Down 25% in Third Quarter 2013
Irish Examiner reports that there has been a 25% drop in the
number of insolvencies in the third quarter of the year compared
to the same period last year.

According to Irish Examiner, the latest figures Vision-net show
that Dublin accounted for most insolvencies at 37%, followed by
Cork with 15% and Kildare with 7%.

Kilkenny, Laois, Mayo, Carlow, Leitrim, Monaghan, Roscommon and
Longford all recorded company insolvency rates of less than 1%,
Irish Examiner notes.

Of the 359 insolvent companies, 207 were liquidated, 145 entered
receivership, and an examiner was appointed to 7, Irish Examiner

The construction industry represents a fifth of all insolvencies
recorded, followed by real estate, professional services,
manufacturing and wholesale and retail, Irish Examiner says.

* IRELAND: 716 SME Jobs Secured Through Examinership This Year
Irish Examiner reports that 716 jobs in small and medium
enterprises have been saved through examinership so far this

Among the companies which benefited from the recovery mechanism
are Trifik Forklifts in Kildare and the Gazette Group in Dublin,
Irish Examiner discloses.

According to Irish Examiner, The Hughes Blake SME Examinership
Index, published on Friday, says an additional 270 non-SME jobs
were saved in the west, when Barna Waste emerged from
examinership in the third quarter.


ALITALIA SPA: Plans to Seek More Funding to Avoid Bankruptcy
Gilles Castonguay, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reported
that Italy's Alitalia plans to seek at least EUR455 million
(US$615 million) in extra funding from shareholders and creditors
as it fights to stave off bankruptcy and return to profitability
under a new industrial plan.

However, the request immediately met resistance from French-Dutch
peer Air France-KLM, which owns 25% of Alitalia and will decide
by year's end whether to take a larger stake in the beleaguered
airline, according to the report.

Alitalia hasn't made a profit since it was rescued by a group of
Italian financiers and industrialists five years ago, the report
related.  Despite a major restructuring, it still faces enormous
challenges in a weak domestic market where it competes with
discount airlines and high-speed trains along lucrative routes.
Alitalia has had three chief executives in as many years, with
Gabriele Del Torchio currently at the helm.

Indeed, it said on Sept. 26 that it posted a first-half net loss
of EUR294 million, wider than a net loss of EUR201 million for
the same period in 2012, the report added.  Total revenue was
EUR1.62 billion for the first half of this year, down from
EUR1.69 billion during the first six months of last year.

Board members on Sept. 26 voted in favor of asking shareholders
and creditors for more help, the report further related.
Shareholders will examine proposals to launch a capital rise of
at least EUR100 million on Oct. 14. They will also examine a
request for an additional EUR55 million to complete a convertible
loan that was only partially completed.

                          About Alitalia

Alitalia - Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.

MARCHE MUTUI: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class C Notes From 'Ba3'
Moody's has placed under review for downgrade the class A2 and B
notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. and
the class B and C notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l.. At the same
time, Moody's has upgraded the class C notes in Marche Mutui
Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. The downgrade and
placement under review of Banca delle Marche S.p.A. (Caa1/under
review for downgrade) prompted Moody's to place the notes under
review for downgrade. According to the rating agency, the
potential credit enhancement available to the affected notes in
Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l. might be insufficient to mitigate increased
counterparty risk. Note holders of the senior notes in Marche
Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. might be exposed to
additional payment disruption risk from the lack of back-up
servicing arrangements. Furthermore, the reassessment and
revision of the available credit enhancement prompted the upgrade
of the junior notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la
Cartolarizzazione S.r.l.

Issuer: Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l.

  EUR281.8M A2 Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  EUR16.2M B Notes, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

  EUR11.4M C Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
  2013 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l.

  EUR12M B Notes, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  EUR15.8M C Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Downgrade; previously on Jul 2, 2013 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The placement under review for downgrade of the class A2 and B
notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. and
the class B and C notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l. follows the
downgrade and placement under review for downgrade of Banca delle
Marche S.p.A. (Caa1/under review for downgrade) acting as
servicer and originator in these transactions. The upgrade of the
class C notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la Cartolarizzazione
S.r.l. follows the revision and reassessment of the transaction's
available credit enhancement to support the notes.

Counterparty exposure

In Moody's view the recent rating action on the servicer,
together with the lack of any back-up servicing arrangements,
heightens the payment disruption risk on senior notes in the
event of the servicer's default in Marche Mutui Societa per la
Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. Moody's also notes that the recent
rating action on the servicer does not have any rating impact on
the senior notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l. and Marche Mutui 4
S.r.l. as a result of the appointment of Italfondiario as back-up

Furthermore Banca delle Marche S.p.A.'s downgrade and placement
under review for downgrade increases the set-off and commingling
exposure for the classes B and C notes in Marche Mutui 2 S.r.l.
as their available credit enhancement might be insufficient to
compensate for these risks should the bank be downgraded further.
Moody's expects to close these rating reviews once the rating
review on Banca delle Marche S.p.A. has been concluded.

As part of the review of Marche Mutui Societa per la
Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. Moody's corrected its set-off modeling
giving benefit to the Italian deposit guarantee scheme, which, in
itself, did not have any impact on the ratings of the outstanding

Revision of credit enhancement in Marche Mutui Societa per la
Cartolarizzazione S.r.l.

The upgrade of class C notes in Marche Mutui Societa per la
Cartolarizzazione S.r.l. follows Moody's revision and
reassessment of available credit enhancement. The transaction
traps all cash released from the amortization of the reserve fund
in the structure, thus creating over-collateralization. In its
previous analysis Moody's did not consider this over-
collateralization as part of the available credit enhancement,
having a negative impact on the class C notes. The rating action
rectifies this by considering the full credit enhancement
available. As a result Moody's calculated the available credit
enhancement for the class C notes at 16.2%, compared with 5.3%
previously. Moody's also notes that the upgrade considered the
increased set-off and commingling exposure to Banca delle Marche
S.p.A. after the recent downgrade. The revised ratings should not
be further negatively affected as long as a potential downgrade
of Banca delle Marche S.p.A. was within two notches.

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in May 2013,
"The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines" published in March 2013,
and "Moody's Approach to Set-Off Risk in Italian Structured
Finance and Covered Bonds Transactions" published in June 2012.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (1)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (2)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.


NIELSEN COMPANY: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has assigned a 'BB' Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
The Nielsen Company (Luxembourg) and assigned a 'BB'
rating on its US$625 million 5.5% senior unsecured noted due
2021. The Nielsen Company (Luxembourg) is an indirect
subsidiary of each of Nielsen Holdings N.V (Nielsen) and The
Nielsen Company B.V. (TNCBV). The new offering will be guaranteed
by TNCBV and certain subsidiaries. The notes will rank pari passu
with the senior unsecured notes issued by Nielsen Finance LLC and
Nielsen Finance Co. (collectively, Nielsen Finance). Fitch has
also affirmed the IDRs of Nielsen and Nielsen Finance. The Rating
Outlook is Positive.

Proceeds of the notes are expected to be used to redeem in full
the 11.625% senior unsecured note due 2014 (US$215 million
outstanding) issued by Nielsen Finance and for general corporate
purposes (including capital expenditures, working capital and, if
applicable, to fund a portion of the purchase price of the
Arbitron acquisition). Nielsen received regulatory approval to
complete the acquisition of Arbitron, which is expected to close
at the end of September.

Key Rating Drivers

   -- Nielsen was much more resilient during the downturn than
  other media companies, given the contractual and diversified n
  nature of its revenue stream and the benign competitive
  environment. The company exhibited revenue and EBITDA growth,
  as well as positive free cash flow (FCF), through the trough of
  the downturn.

   -- Nielsen's Watch and Buy businesses are well positioned in
their respective markets. The ratings reflect the risk that
competitive threats may emerge over time. Increased competition
could result in revenue pressure (lost share), incremental costs
(talent/sales/services), and some FCF pressure (investments in
offerings). However, the complexity and significant investments
associated with attempting to replicate Nielsen's offerings
create meaningful barriers to entry.

Fitch believes Nielsen's liquidity is sufficient. At June 30,
2013, liquidity was composed of US$1.16 billion of cash on hand
and US$622 million available under the US$635 million senior
secured revolver due in 2016. In the 12 months ended June 30,
2013, Fitch calculates (after dividends) the company generated
US$440 million of FCF.

Total debt at June 30, 2013 was approximately US$6.3 billion,
consisting primarily of $4.04 billion in secured term loans;
US$215 million of senior unsecured notes due 2014; $1.1 billion
of senior unsecured notes due 2018; and US$800 million of senior
unsecured notes due 2020. The company has been active in managing
its near-term maturities, and they are manageable over the next
several years. Fitch calculates unadjusted gross leverage as of
June 30, 2013 at approximately 3.9x.

The notching on Nielsen Finance's senior secured debt reflects
the security provided to the lenders.

Rating Sensitivities

What Could Trigger a Rating Action

Positive: Continued improvement in operating trends with gross
leverage less than 4x (pro forma for the sale of Exposition and
acquisition of Arbitron) over the next 12-24 months could result
in a one-notch upgrade.

Negative: Additional debt-funded acquisitions that materially
increased leverage, or shareholder-friendly policies that
increased debt in the near term, and kept pro forma unadjusted
gross leverage above 4.5x, would pressure the ratings. In
addition, ratings may be pressured if competitive threats emerge
and take a meaningful share of Nielsen's market position.

Fitch has affirmed the following ratings:


  -- IDR at 'BB'.

Nielsen Finance

  -- IDR at 'BB';
  -- Senior secured bank facility at 'BB+';
  -- Senior unsecured notes at 'BB'.

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

The Nielsen Company (Luxembourg)

  -- IDR at 'BB';
  -- Senior unsecured notes at 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Positive.


FAXTOR ABS 2005-1: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Two Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Faxtor ABS 2005-1 B.V.'s notes, as

  Class A-1 floating-rate notes due 2070 (XS0235143970): upgraded
  to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

  Class A-2E floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235144358):
  upgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

  Class A-2F fixed-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235144945): upgraded
  to 'BB+sf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

  Class A-3 fixed-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235146056): affirmed at
  'Bsf' from 'Bsf', Outlook revised to Stable from Negative

  Class A4 floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235146569): affirmed
  at 'CCsf'

  Class B floating-rate notes due 2094 (XS0235147617): affirmed
  at 'CCsf'

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade reflects the notes' levels of credit enhancement due
to the deleveraging of the underlying portfolio.

The structure is deleveraging and the class A-1 notes have been
repaid by approximately EUR41.4 million since the last review and
now represent 33% of their original balance. The deleveraging is
a result of natural portfolio amortization, as well as interest
diversion mechanisms due to the breaching of some over-
collateralization tests. As a result, credit enhancement for the
rated notes has increased. For instance, credit enhancement for
the class A-1 notes has increased by 10.34% since the last

The class A-3 over-collateralization test has improved since the
last review and is now in compliance. As a consequence, deferred
interest due on the class A-4 notes has been paid back to the
noteholders. The class B and C over-collateralization tests are
still failing and the notes have been accumulating deferred
interest since January 2010. The interest coverage remains in

Fitch analyzed the exposure to interest rate risk. The structure
is currently over-hedged and benefits from an interest rate swap
where the counterparty pays a fixed rate whereas Faxtor ABS 2005-
1 pays three-month EURIBOR. As a result, additional excess spread
is being used to repay the class A-1 notes.. After the maturity
of the swap, the structure will be under-hedged and exposed to
interest rate risk as the class A2-F and A3 notes pay a fixed
interest rate whereas all the asset in the pool pay a floating
interest rate.

The affirmation of the class A-3, A-4 and B notes reflect the
extension risk of the portfolio assets. A material risk for these
tranches is that the portfolio assets' maturity may extend beyond
their reported weighted-average expected life and prolong the
risk horizon of the portfolio.

Faxtor ABS 2005-1 is a securitization of European structured
finance assets of mainly mezzanine quality. The two largest
industry sectors in the portfolio are RMBS with 53% of the
portfolio and CMBS with 18%. The portfolio is concentrated in the
UK with almost 43% of the portfolio. Peripheral eurozone exposure
accounts for 21.4% of the portfolio and is concentrated in
Italian and Spanish RMBS. The asset performance has remained
stable and cumulative defaults have increased by EUR1.82 million.

Rating Sensitivities

Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of one to two rating
category for the rated notes from the current rating levels.
Applying a 0.75x recovery rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would not result in a downgrade for the rated notes
from the current rating levels.

LEVERAGED FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class IV Notes to 'CCC-'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
Leveraged Finance Europe Capital II B.V.'s class I-A, I-B, and II
notes.  At the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on the
class III and IV notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Aug. 23,
2013.  S&P has considered recent developments in the transaction
and reviewed it under its 2009 corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) and its current counterparty criteria.

All par value tests are currently failing.  The senior par value
tests were passing at S&P's previous review on April 19, 2012.
The class III and IV par value tests continue to fail and the
margin by which they are failing has increased since S&P's
previous review.

S&P has also observed that the weighted-average spread earned on
the collateral pool has increased to 3.89% from 3.37% since its
previous review.  Over that period, the aggregate collateral
balance has declined, mainly due to increasing defaults observed
in the current collateral pool.  The increasing defaults have
also resulted in reduced available credit enhancement for all
classes of notes.

Even though the portfolio's credit quality (excluding the
defaulted assets) has been broadly stable, the shorter time to
maturity has resulted in reduced scenario default rates across
all rating levels when compared with S&P's previous review.

S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each
rated class at each rating level.  S&P incorporated various cash
flow stress scenarios using its standard default patterns,
levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each
class of notes, in conjunction with different interest rate

Approximately 0.77% of the portfolio's performing assets are
non-euro-denominated and are unhedged.  In S&P's analysis, it has
applied a foreign exchange stress to these unhedged assets as
they are exposed to currency risk.

Based on S&P's analysis, it considers that the available credit
enhancement for the class I-A, I-B, and II notes is commensurate
with the currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed
its 'AA+ (sf)' ratings on the class I-A and I-B notes and
'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class II notes.

S&P has lowered its ratings on the class III and IV notes based
on the supplemental tests, which S&P introduced in its 2009
corporate CDO criteria.  These classes of notes now pass at lower
ratings than previously assigned.  S&P has therefore lowered to
'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on the class III notes and
to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class IV notes.

Leveraged Finance Europe Capital II is a cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
September 2003 and is managed by BNP Paribas.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class              Rating
            To                From

Leveraged Finance Europe Capital II B.V.
EUR187.2 Million Floating-Rate Secured Notes

Ratings Affirmed

I-A         AA+ (sf)
I-B         AA+ (sf)
II          BBB+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered

III         CCC+ (sf)         B+ (sf)
IV          CCC- (sf)         B- (sf)

STORM 2013-IV: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Ratings on Two Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Storm 2013-IV B.V.'s EUR752.2 million
notes final ratings, as follows:

  EUR150m Class A1 floating-rate notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR550m Class A2 floating-rate notes: 'AAAsf; Outlook Stable
  EUR17.1m Class B floating-rate notes: 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR13.1m Class C floating-rate notes: 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR14.5m Class D floating-rate notes: 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable
  EUR7.5m Class E floating-rate notes: 'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable

Credit enhancement for the class A notes is 7%, provided by
subordination (6%) and a non-amortizing reserve fund (1%), which
is fully funded at closing.

Key Rating Drivers

Concentrated Counterparty Exposure

This transaction relies strongly on the creditworthiness of
Rabobank Group (AA/Negative/F1+), which fulfills a number of
roles, including collection account provider, issuer account
provider, cash advance facility provider and commingling
guarantor. In addition, it acts as back-up swap counterparty.

NHG Loans

The portfolio includes 33% of loans that benefit from the
national mortgage guarantee scheme (Nationale Hypotheek Garantie
or NHG). No reduction in foreclosure frequency for the NHG loans
was applied since the historical data provided did not show a
clear pattern of lower defaults for NHG loans. Fitch was also
provided with data on historical claims, which enabled the agency
to determine a compliance ratio assumption. The ratings on the
notes would be one notch lower without giving any credit to the
NHG guarantee.

Market Average Portfolio

The 46-month seasoned portfolio consists of prime residential
mortgage loans, with a weighted average (WA) original loan-to-
market-value of 88.5% and a WA debt-to-income ratio of 30.8%,
both of which are typical for Fitch-rated Dutch RMBS
transactions. The purchase of further advances into the pool is
allowed after closing, subject to certain conditions.

Robust Performance

The past performance of transactions in the STORM series, as well
as data received on Obvion's loan book, indicate solid historical
performance in terms of low arrears and losses. Since September
2011, loans 90+ days in arrears on Obvion's mortgage book have
increased to 0.7% at June 2013 from 0.3%. While relatively high
compared with historical levels, in absolute terms the arrears
levels remain low.

Rating Sensitivities

Material increases in the frequency of defaults and loss severity
on defaulted receivables could produce loss levels higher than
Fitch's expectations, which in turn may result in potential
rating actions on the notes. If the agency stressed its 'AAA'
assumptions by 30% for both weighted average foreclosure
frequency and recovery rate, it would possibly result in a
downgrade of the class A notes to 'A-sf(EXP)'.

Fitch reviewed the results of an agreed-upon procedures report
(AUP) conducted on the portfolio. The AUP contained no material
errors which would affect Fitch's ratings analysis.

To analyze the CE levels, Fitch evaluated the collateral using
its default model, details of which can be found in the report
titled 'EMEA Residential Mortgage Loss Criteria', dated June
2013, and 'EMEA RMBS Criteria Addendum - Netherlands', dated June
2013, at The agency assessed the
transaction cash flows using default and loss severity
assumptions under various structural stresses including
prepayment speeds and interest rate scenarios. The cash flow
tests showed that each class of notes could withstand loan losses
at a level corresponding to the related stress scenario without
incurring any principal loss or interest shortfall and can retire
principal by the legal final maturity.


CITADELLA TITAN: To Be Put Up for Sale for EUR6.85 Million
Oana Gavrila at Ziarul Financiar reports that Citadella Titan
could be put up for sale for EUR6.85 million under a
reorganization plan approved by creditors.

Citadella Titan is an insolvent residential project in Bucharest.


CREATIVE GROUP: Fitch Withdraws 'B-(EXP)' Sr. Unsecured Rating
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn OJSC Creative Group Public Limited's
expected senior unsecured rating of 'B-(EXP)'/'RR4' on Rating
Watch Negative (RWN) applicable to a planned Eurobond issue. The
RWN reflected the sensitivity in the expected recoveries for
bondholders subject to the amount of the bond issued and the
corresponding senior secured leverage remaining in the capital

Since the bond issuance is no longer going ahead in the near term
as Creative has managed to extend its debt maturities, the
expected bond rating is no longer applicable.

Fitch currently rates Creative's Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B-' with a Positive

Key Rating Drivers

Rating Dependent on Deleveraging

The Positive Outlook on the IDR factors in the expected
deleveraging path prompted by improving funds from operations and
a reduction in combined capex and working capital investments by
2015 as the latest investments in sunflower crushing capacity
mature. It also reflects the rising share of export revenues and
hence foreign currency receipts that support Creative's financial
flexibility in the event of a domestic currency depreciation
minimizing any material currency mismatch between sales/profits
and debt.

Credit Metrics

Despite its relatively strong business profile for the rating,
credit metrics are weak compared to the peer group. We expect FFO
adjusted leverage to improve substantially in 2013 to 4.0x (2012:
5.0x) and FFO fixed charge cover to 2.4x (2012: 2.2x) driven by
the expected profit contribution from the recently commenced

Adequate Liquidity

Creative extended the maturity of a large portion of its debt in
June 2013 with local banks. Excluding any drawn amounts under its
working-capital facilities (PXF lines), Fitch estimates debt
repayments until the end of 2014 will be approximately US$60
million. Despite the expectation of still negative FCF this year,
cash balances of US$120 million by end-2012, access to liquid
inventories and scalable capex plans should support near-term

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

   - FFO of at least US$200 million
   - Evidence of stabilising free cash flow and maintaining
     conservatively funded expansion plan
   - FFO adjusted leverage below 4.5x by FYE13
   - FFO fixed charge cover comfortably positioned in the 2x-
     2.5x range

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action (including a revision of the Outlook to Stable) include:

   - Consistent drop of EBITDA margin below 15% in the next two
     years combined with a deterioration of liquidity (measured
     as available cash plus next year's CFO less maintenance
     capex totaling less than 80% of short-term maturities
     excluding the PXF line)
   - FFO adjusted leverage remaining in the 5x - 5.5x range
   - FFO fixed charge coverage below 2.0x

NOVIKOMBANK JSC: Moody's Affirms B2 Issuer Rating; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B2 deposit ratings and
senior debt rating of Novikombank JSC bank (Russia). The rating
agency has also affirmed the bank's standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) of E+, which is equivalent to a baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of b2. The bank's Not Prime short-term
deposit ratings were also affirmed. All of the bank's long-term
ratings carry a stable outlook.

The affirmation of Novikombank's ratings reflects Moody's
expectations of a planned capital increase and the bank's good
asset quality. The affirmation also takes into account
constraints associated with modest profitability and the rapid
growth of a highly concentrated loan portfolio.

Moody's affirmation of Novikombank's ratings is primarily based
on the bank's audited financial statements for 2012 prepared
under IFRS.

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of Novikombank's ratings reflects Moody's
expectations of a significant capital increase in the next three
months and the bank's good asset quality. The rating agency adds
that Novikombank's ratings remain constrained by (1) rapid loan
growth, which is expected to continue to exert pressure on
capital; (2) modest profitability; and (3) high single-name
concentration in the bank's loan portfolio and deposit base.

Moody's expects Novikombank's low capital levels (Basel I Tier 1
ratio of 6.4% and total capital adequacy ratio of 10.0% at
December 31, 2012) to be significantly strengthened in the next
three months, as a result of the planned capital increase.
Novikombank's shareholders have a recent track record of
supporting the bank's capital (e.g., RUB4.6 billion subordinated
loan provided in 2012). However, sustaining adequate capital
levels remains a challenge for Novikombank, as its pace of asset
growth remains aggressive relative to its modest internal capital
generation capacity. In 2012, the bank grew its loan book by 51%
(2011: 65%), while its return on average equity (ROAE) was about
8.3%, and Moody's expects this mismatch to persist.

Moody's further observes that high concentration of Novikombank's
loan book renders the bank's credit risk profile susceptible to
the performance of a few of the largest borrowers. Novikombank's
deposit base is also highly concentrated (top-10 depositors
accounted for 66% of total customer funds in 2012), which renders
the bank's liquidity profile potentially vulnerable -- a risk
mitigated by the bank's track record of deposit stability and
steady growth over the past five years.

At the same time, Moody's notes positively that Novikombank has a
growing niche franchise in servicing the Russian military-
industrial complex and machine-building sector: in 2012, the bank
held a 12% market share in loans to these sectors, and such loans
accounted for 46% of its loan book. Novikombank's strong
positions in this niche are supported by its close ties with the
Russian state corporation Rostech, which owns a 17.6% stake in
the bank. The fact that most of its large loans are backed by
government contracts is supportive for Novikombank's asset
quality profile: as of year-end 2012, loans overdue more than 90
days amounted to just 0.9% of gross loans and were fully covered
with reserves.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Any possible upgrade of Novikombank's ratings will be contingent
on the bank's ability to materially increase its capital and
sustain it at a level comparable with that of higher-rated peers.
A prerequisite for this improved capitalization would be a
significant increase in the bank's profitability.

Downward pressure could be exerted on Novikombank's ratings by
(1) any failure to improve its capital adequacy in the next three
months; and (2) any material adverse changes in the bank's risk
profile, particularly a weakening of its asset quality or
liquidity profile.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, Novikombank reported -- as of 1H
2013 -- total assets of RUB144 billion (US$4.4 billion), equity
of RUB8.7 billion (US$267 million), total regulatory capital of
RUB16.2 billion (US$523 million) and net income of RUB648 million
(US$21 million) under unaudited Russian GAAP.

NOVIKOMBANK JSC: Moody's Interfax Affirms National Deposit Rating
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has affirmed the national
scale deposit rating (NSR) of Novikombank JSC Bank (Russia). The
NSRs carry no specific outlooks.

The affirmation of Novikombank's ratings reflects Moody's
expectations of a planned capital increase and the bank's good
asset quality. The affirmation also takes into account
constraints associated with modest profitability and the rapid
growth of a highly concentrated loan portfolio.

Moody's affirmation of Novikombank's ratings is primarily based
on the bank's audited financial statements for 2012 prepared
under IFRS.

Ratings Rationale:

The affirmation of Novikombank's ratings reflects Moody's
expectations of a significant capital increase in the next three
months and the bank's good asset quality. The rating agency adds
that Novikombank's ratings remain constrained by (1) rapid loan
growth, which is expected to continue to exert pressure on
capital; (2) modest profitability; and (3) high single-name
concentration in the bank's loan portfolio and deposit base.

Moody's expects Novikombank's low capital levels (Basel I Tier 1
ratio of 6.4% and total capital adequacy ratio of 10.0% at
December 31, 2012) to be significantly strengthened in the next
three months, as a result of the planned capital increase.
Novikombank's shareholders have a recent track record of
supporting the bank's capital (e.g., RUB4.6 billion subordinated
loan provided in 2012). However, sustaining adequate capital
levels remains a challenge for Novikombank, as its pace of asset
growth remains aggressive relative to its modest internal capital
generation capacity. In 2012, the bank grew its loan book by 51%
(2011: 65%), while its return on average equity (ROAE) was about
8.3%, and Moody's expects this mismatch to persist.

Moody's further observes that high concentration of Novikombank's
loan book renders the bank's credit risk profile susceptible to
the performance of a few of the largest borrowers. Novikombank's
deposit base is also highly concentrated (top-10 depositors
accounted for 66% of total customer funds in 2012), which renders
the bank's liquidity profile potentially vulnerable -- a risk
mitigated by the bank's track record of deposit stability and
steady growth over the past five years.

At the same time, Moody's notes positively that Novikombank has a
growing niche franchise in servicing the Russian military-
industrial complex and machine-building sector: in 2012, the bank
held a 12% market share in loans to these sectors, and such loans
accounted for 46% of its loan book. Novikombank's strong
positions in this niche are supported by its close ties with the
Russian state corporation Rostech, which owns a 17.6% stake in
the bank. The fact that most of its large loans are backed by
government contracts is supportive for Novikombank's asset
quality profile: as of year-end 2012, loans overdue more than 90
days amounted to just 0.9% of gross loans and were fully covered
with reserves.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Any possible upgrade of Novikombank's ratings will be contingent
on the bank's ability to materially increase its capital and
sustain it at a level comparable with that of higher-rated peers.
A prerequisite for this improved capitalization would be a
significant increase in the bank's profitability.

Downward pressure could be exerted on Novikombank's ratings by
(1) any failure to improve its capital adequacy in the next three
months; and (2) any material adverse changes in the bank's risk
profile, particularly a weakening of its asset quality or
liquidity profile.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, Novikombank reported -- as of 1H
2013 -- total assets of RUB144 billion (Us$4.4 billion), equity
of RUB8.7 billion (US$267 million), total regulatory capital of
RUB16.2 billion (US$523 million) and net income of RUB 648
million (US$21 million) under unaudited Russian GAAP.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia.

               About Moody's and Moody's Interfax

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).

On September 26, 2013, Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the
B2 deposit ratings and senior debt rating of Novikombank JSC bank
(Russia). The rating agency has also affirmed the bank's
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of E+, which is
equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b2. The
bank's Not Prime short-term deposit ratings were also affirmed.
All of the bank's long-term ratings carry a stable outlook.

RUSSIAN UTILITIES: Fitch Assigns 'B+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has assigned OAO Russian Utilities Systems (RUS)
Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR)
of 'B+', a Short-term foreign and local currency IDR of 'B' and a
National Long-term Rating of 'A(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-
term IDRs and National Rating are Stable.

The ratings are based on RUS's standalone profile reflecting
operations independent of its ultimate parent, Renova Group, and
without the Novogor-Prikamye business, which remains outside the
consolidation perimeter.

RUS benefits from diversification of its operational portfolio by
both business segment and region of operations, supported by
long-term lease and concession agreements with good revenue
visibility. The ratings are constrained by the low predictability
of the regulatory environment in Russia towards utilities,
evolving group structure, and its financial profile with
significant short term debt.

Key Rating Drivers

Diversified Private Utilities Provider

The company's diversification into four different businesses --
heat, water and power supply as well as power distribution --
supports its business profile. However, we view heat and power
supply as more prone to margin pressure and political
interference compared with water, despite the latter's higher
reliance on less predictable connection fee revenues. As such, we
believe that RUS's business profile is somewhat riskier than its
peer, Ventrelt Holdings Ltd (BB-/Stable), which is focused on the
water business. RUS operates in 11 Russian regions and provides
utility services to over 7.5m households, supporting its customer
diversification and collection rates. Although the company has a
good track record of improving collection rates in its
businesses, this could reverse during an economic downturn.

Long-term Leases and Concessions

The company leases infrastructure assets from local
municipalities in order to improve them and provide reliable
services to the public. The rent or concession agreements are
long-term (up to 49 years with average remaining life of around
21 years), which underpins its operational and revenue
visibility. The agreements do not include any cancellation fees,
with rent or concession payments coterminous with the contracts.
Rent and concession payment are reflected in agreed end-user
tariffs charged by RUS. Although concessions tend to include more
explicit capex requirements, we believe that these contracts
provide RUS with a better contractual framework compared with
rent agreements. However, RUS only benefits from two concessions
to date (excluding Novogor-Prikamye).

Optimization of Operational Portfolio

The company has recently sold two loss-making heat supply
businesses in Tver and Bryansk, which we view positively, despite
the marginal level of disposal proceeds. RUS also plans to
consolidate an operating company in Novogor-Prikamye, which is
currently owned by Renova Group (but is operated by RUS). We
believe that contribution in kind would improve RUS's business
profile and hence support its ratings despite only modest change
in projected financial profile (due to debt at Novogor-Prikamye)
as a result. We assume that any future M&A would be funded by the
ultimate parent and that all earnings will be retained by RUS.

Challenging Regulatory Environment

Predictability of the regulatory environment in Russia remains
low with frequent changes in policies and subsequently tariff
determinations. In 2012 tariffs for power distribution and power
supply were changed, which resulted in a major contraction of
EBITDA in the latter sector for RUS. However, the company's total
EBITDA remained similar to the previous year thanks to the
performance of other segments and demonstrating the benefit of
the diversification of the business.

The Russian government's recent discussion of freezing natural
monopoly tariffs in 2014 may not directly affect RUS since its
tariffs are mostly set at the local level. In addition, a large
part of the fuel cost bill would also have tariffs frozen,
offsetting the impact. Fuel costs represent 12% of opex but other
cost inputs could also be frozen. Nevertheless, there remains a
significant risk of a fundamental mismatch of utility tariff
growth compared with fuel and other cost inflation for the
company. This could quickly impact RUS's cash flows, considering
its relatively thin supply margin. In addition, investments with
a long-term payback period without long-term tariff visibility
expose the company to financial risk.

Manageable Financial Profile

The company's leverage is commensurate with the ratings and
comparable with its closest peer. Funds from operations (FFO)
adjusted net leverage was 2.9x at YE12 compared with 2.7x at
YE11. To better capture operational performance, Fitch also
calculates leverage using FFO after deducting connection fees
that we consider less predictable and essentially an item
offsetting capex. This connection fee adjusted FFO net leverage
was 4.0x at YE12 and we expect it to weaken to around 4.2x at
YE13, due to partial debt funding of capex. Thereafter,
considering our assumption for slight margin improvement
reflecting the capex and assuming no adverse changes in
regulation, we expect to reduce to below 4.0x. FFO interest cover
was 3.3x in 2012 (down from 5.8x in 2011) or 2.3x and 4.5x when
adjusted for connection fees. Fitch expects that interest cover
(even unadjusted for connection fees) will remain in the low
single-digit territory, and hence without much headroom for the

Complex Structure with Structural Subordination

Debt is primarily raised by operating companies with a parent
company guarantee, but there are cash pooling agreements between
operating companies for accounts of two of the lending banks. In
addition, there are no restrictions on cash flows within the
group and all key functions are managed centrally. The ratings
therefore reflect the company's consolidated profile, rather than
focusing on RUS as a holding with recourse only to dividends from
its operating subsidiaries. We would expect any debt to be issued
directly by RUS to benefit from upstream guarantees to mitigate
structural subordination of creditors lending directly to RUS. In
the absence of such guarantees, ratings of RUS and/or its debt
would be notched down from the consolidated profile.

Liquidity & Debt Structure

At end-2012, total debt was RUB4.3 billion, of which short-term
loan maturities were RUB4.2 billion. As of September 1, 2013,
total outstanding debt had increased to RUB4.8 billion. The
company managed to refinance part of its short-term debt with
longer-term loans and plans to further increase the share of
long-term loans by year-end. As of 1 September 2013, short-term
debt was RUB2.3 billion (47% of total debt), which should further
decrease to RUB1.8 billion (37% of the total debt) before YE13,
according to RUS's management. Although this compared well with
unused credit lines of RUB3.4 billion and cash and cash
equivalents balance of RUB232 million, we note that RUS does not
pay commitment fees on the lines (as is common in Russia). We
expect RUS to report negative free cash flow in 2013-2015 and we
therefore view the company's liquidity and debt maturity profile
as a limiting factor for the ratings. The company has limited
foreign exchange exposure, but most of its debt is short term and
variable rate, exposing it to interest rate increases.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action, include:

   - Stronger business profile with less exposure to riskier
     segments of heat and power supply.

   - Improved debt maturity profile and liquidity.

   - More predictable regulatory environment.

   - Strong operational performance with sustained improvement of
     financial metrics including FFO net leverage adjusted for
     connection fees below 3.5x and FFO interest coverage over

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action, include:

   - Adverse regulatory changes and tariff determinations (not
     reflective of fuel or other cost inflation).

   - Weaker operational performance or capital spending with
     significant deterioration of the credit metrics on a
     sustained basis including FFO net leverage adjusted for
     connection fees above 4.5x and FFO interest coverage below

   - A sustained reduction in cash generation and margins through
     worsening cash collection rates.


* SLOVENIA: Says Will Fix Financial Sector Without Outside Help
Leos Rousek at The Wall Street Journal reports that despite
continuing stress in its banks and a protracted recession,
Slovenia is determined not to become the sixth euro-zone nation
in need of an international bailout and will fix its financial
sector without outside help.

Slovenia, which adopted the euro in 2007, has stoked concerns
that it may become another member of the European Union's single-
currency bloc to request an international bailout because of its
debt-saddled state-owned banks, the Journal notes.

The three lenders -- Nova Ljubljanska Banka D.D., Nova Kreditna
Banka Maribor D.D. and Abanka Vipa D.D. -- control most of the
country's financial sector but are burdened with about
EUR7.5 billion (US$10.11 billion) of bad loans worth about a
fifth of the national economic output, the Journal discloses.
This has aggravated the country's economic woes by making new
credit scarcely available to Slovenian companies, the Journal

"The flow of money into new projects or for normal business
activity of [local] companies basically stopped already five
years ago," the Journal quotes Finance Minister Uros Cufer as
saying in an interview at his office in the Slovenian capital.
"The key thing to do to get back to growth is to clean up balance
sheets of banks on the one hand and restructure corporate debts
on the other since they are both interconnected."

Even though Slovenia is a country of just under two million, its
banking-sector problems highlight the euro area's struggle to
contain its debt crisis and have caused much concern across the
Continent, the Journal notes.

According to the Journal, asked whether Slovenia expects to seek
outside help from the European Central Bank and the EU, Mr. Cufer
said: "I don't see a need for that," adding that the country has
sufficient funding through April when its five-year EUR1.5
billion bond matures.

The Journal notes that data from the central bank showed
provisions against nonperforming loans, those unpaid for 90 days
or longer, held by all Slovenian banks stood at EUR4.47 billion
at the end of June, with the three state-held banks accounting
for most of the provisions.

Mr. Cufer, as cited by the Journal, said that the government has
already created reserves in its budget of up to EUR1.2 billion to
be available for fresh capital injections in its troubled banks.
Banking sector problems are "very manageable on our side," the
Journal quotes Mr. Cufer as saying.  He said that government
institutions have around EUR3 billion in accounts at the state-
owned banks, allowing the finance ministry to use at least some
of these deposits for capital injections, the Journal notes.

He said that the government will consider tapping markets when it
knows how much money it will need for its banking-sector cleanup,
the Journal relays.

According to the Journal, the finance minister and Slovenian
central bank Gov. Bostjan Jazbec remain confident that their
country won't need to go cap in hand asking for a bailout.

"If you single out those bad loans, if you take into account
provisions and if you add that additional capital to those banks,
then you figure out that those numbers aren't that big,"
Mr. Jazbec, as cited by the Journal, said.

The government and the central bank expect to have a final
estimate of funds needed to shore up its banks by the end of
November, the Journal relates.  After that the three troubled
state lenders -- NLB, NKBM and Abanka -- could transfer their bad
loans to the state-run Bank Asset Management Co., also referred
to as a bad bank, and seek fresh capital injections through
equity sales, the Journal states.

According to the Journal, outside auditors are carrying out
appraisals of loan portfolios of the three main local banks and
stress-testing their balance sheets to gauge capital adequacy of
the banks.


CODERE SA: Moody's Affirms Ca-PD Rating; Removes LD Indicator
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Codere S.A.'s Ca-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) and removed the limited
default (/LD) indicator following the payment on September 17,
after the end of the 30-day grace period, of the coupon on the
USD notes issued by Codere Finance (Luxembourg) S.A.

Codere's Caa3 corporate family rating (CFR) and the Ca ratings on
Codere Finance (Luxembourg) S.A.'s euro and US dollar denominated
notes remain unchanged. The outlook on all ratings remains

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's has removed the /LD indicator from Codere's Ca-PD PDR
following the payment on September 17 of the coupon on the US$300
million notes. The coupon was due on August 15, and the payment
was made after the end of the 30-day grace period.

Codere's Caa3 rating reflects the company's weak liquidity, its
uncertain operating and financial prospects in light of its
weakening operating performance, the limitations in accessing
cash-flows from Argentina, and its high adjusted leverage, which
stood at around 6.1x as of June 2013. The rating also reflects
its position as one of the leading gaming operators in Latin
America, Italy and Spain, and its diversification in terms of
business lines, gaming assets and geographies.

The negative outlook reflects that further downward pressure
could be exerted on the ratings if the company fails to reach a
consensual agreement with its bondholders or if another form of
debt restructuring takes place resulting in a greater than
currently expected loss for bondholders.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down?

Downward pressure on the rating could develop if Codere were to
start a bankruptcy procedure, possibly resulting in higher losses
for bondholders than currently captured in Moody's ratings.

Upward pressure is currently unlikely but subsequent to any
future restructuring, Moody's might upgrade the ratings of Codere
to reflect the company's reduced debt burden. However, Moody's
believes that the turnaround of Codere's business and financial
performance will be very challenging, particularly given the
deterioration in operating performance across its main markets
reported YTD in 2013.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Gaming published in December 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Codere is a multinational gaming operator that manages gaming
machines, machine halls, bingo halls, horse racing tracks,
casinos and sports betting locations in Latin America, Italy and
Spain. As of December 2012, Codere managed 56,474 gaming machine
seats, 186 gaming halls (including machine halls, bingo halls
with machines, machine halls at racetracks and casinos), 1,379
betting locations and three horse racing tracks. In 2012, Codere
generated operating revenue of EUR1.664 billion and EBITDA of
EUR305 million.


OCTAPHARMA NORDIC: S&P Affirms & Withdraws 'BB+' Long-Term CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB+' long-term corporate credit rating on Switzerland-
headquartered plasma derivatives manufacturer and distributor
Octapharma Nordic AB.  S&P subsequently withdrew the rating at
the company's request.  The outlook at the time of the withdrawal
was stable.

The affirmation prior to withdrawal reflected S&P's continued
assessment of Octapharma's business risk profile as "fair" and
its financial risk profile as "modest."

The "fair" business risk profile mainly reflected Octapharma's
relatively small size and low product diversification as a
consequence of its sole focus on plasma fractionation.  The
"modest" financial risk profile reflected S&P's view of
Octapharma's high conversion of profits into cash flow and
historically strong cash flow generation.


ORION HOLDING: Applies for Suspension of Bankruptcy Proceedings
Taylan Bilgic at Bloomberg News relates that Yalcin Karaman, head
of Orion Holding, which applied for suspension of bankruptcy
proceedings against it, spoke to Hurriyet newspaper in an

According to Bloomberg, Hurriyet said the company got EUR12.5
million from Darby, an arm of Mark Mobius's Franklin Templeton,
and US$20 million from Gulf Capital.

Bloomberg relates that Mr. Karaman, as cited by Hurriyet, said he
owes US$48 million to two funds, TRY40 million (US$20 million) in
taxes and social security payments, TRY15 million to market and
TRY7 million to banks.

Orion Holding gave catering, security, janitorial services to
Turkey's biggest companies.  It employed more than 22,000 people.

* TURKEY: Fitch Says BoP May Slow Growth But Won't Spark Crisis
A slowdown in Turkey's net capital inflows is likely to temper
economic growth, but should not trigger a crisis because of the
country's strong fundamentals, according to Fitch Ratings.
Nevertheless, dependence on net capital inflows is one of the key
risks to the Turkish economy, and a prolonged funding shortfall
would create the risk of a hard economic landing.

"In the short term, the combination of the wide current account
deficit (CAD), high inflation and weak international liquidity
limit Turkey's room for maneuver, and we believe it may have to
adjust its growth expectations in line with a lower and more
easily funded CAD," Fitch says.

"Despite this risk to growth, we believe the country's strong
public finances will help to protect it from a balance of
payments crisis. Turkey's public-debt ratio is moderate at 38% of
GDP, while its budget deficit is low, and it has successfully
lengthened its average debt maturity. Additional buffers include
a strong banking system, modest household debt, and a dynamic
corporate sector accustomed to adjusting to shocks.

"There are also structural benefits to the Turkish market that we
believe will keep investors engaged and reduce the risk of a
sharper decline in net capital inflows. These include favorable
demographics that point to strong medium-term growth potential,
deep local capital markets with a good debt service record, and a
favorable business climate with well-proven export market

"Net capital inflows are essential for economic growth in Turkey,
where a CAD of 6%-7% of GDP mirrors a comparable imbalance
between savings and investment. The current account deficit has
widened again in 2013 after improving last year, while capital
inflows have fallen abruptly since May, and net portfolio flows
have turned mildly negative. Banks and corporates, however, have
encountered little difficulty rolling over existing exposures.
Nonetheless, future funding is likely to prove more expensive."

Turkey has a Long-Term IDR of 'BBB-' with a Stable Outlook.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DUNFERMLINE ATHLETIC: Pars United Expects to Take Over This Week
Herald Scotland reports that Pars United, the Dunfermline
Athletic supporters' group, are expected to take full control of
the Fife club this week and bring an end to six months of

According to Herald Scotland, insolvency experts BDO ran the club
during that time but are prepared to hand control over to fans
when the final contractual formalities are completed, Herald

Pars United -- an organization which has united various fans'
groups -- were successful in attaining a Company Voluntary
Arrangement in July after raising enough capital to be named
preferred bidders, Herald Scotland discloses.

"With new owners, it will just give us more of an ability to plan
ahead, although the football debt will need sorted out,"
Herald Scotland quotes Jim Jefferies, the Dunfermline manager, as

Dunfermline Athletic Football Club is a Scottish football team
based in Dunfermline, Fife, commonly known as just Dunfermline.

SPEARPOINT RISK: In Liquidation; Owes GBP154,000 to CBG
Richard Curran at reports that Spearpoint Risk
Management has gone into liquidation, owing money to a private
security and counter surveillance firm.

According to, the company had assets of just
GBP22,000 (EUR26,214) but liabilities of GBP244,000 when a
liquidator was appointed.

The biggest creditor was a property development company called
Concept Business Group, which is owned by London-based Greek
developer Nicholas Trimmatis, discloses.  CBG was
owed GBP154,000 by the company, notes.

Spearpoint Risk Management is a London company owned by Michael
Fingleton junior, the son of the former Irish Nationwide chief
executive.  With an address at 41 Whitehall, the company was
itself described in Companies Office filings as involved in
security systems activities.

SDI FUNDING: Moody's Lowers Rating on GBP300MM of Notes to 'B2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the
following notes issued by SDI Funding PLC:

  GBP300,000,000 Series 1 iTraxx SDITM-75 Credit-Linked Secured
  Notes due 2016, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 17,
  2010 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

This transaction represents the repackaging of three bank
deposits with a synthetic link to the iTraxx SDI(TM)-75 index.
The Index currently consists of 72 equally weighted issuers of
debt, at closing 75 issuers.

The issuer enters into deposit agreements with the Royal Bank of
Scotland plc, Barclays Bank PLC , HSBC Bank plc and four credit
default swaps ("the CDS's") with each of the banks and also
Deutsche Bank AG . Under the CDS's the SPV sells protection to
each bank in relation to the Index in return for a premium
payment from the banks. The SPV also enters into an interest rate
swap with Royal Bank of Scotland plc.

Under the interest rate swap, the SPV pays to Royal Bank of
Scotland plc interest received under the deposits and the premium
received under the CDS's and Royal Bank of Scotland plc pays the
fixed amount due under the Notes. At maturity, Noteholders will
receive the principal amount of the Notes subject to reductions
as specified in the transaction documents such as partial
redemption or credit events.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's explained that the rating action incorporates losses
associated with all credit events suffered since closing. This is
a change from Moody's earlier rating actions, wherein Moody's
monitored this transaction assessing the expected loss on the
prevailing outstanding notional of the index without reflecting
the losses from reference entities that have been removed from
the Index as a result of credit events. In particular the
reference portfolio has already suffered losses of slightly more
than 3% which have reduced the notional outstanding of the notes.
The downgrade to B2 (sf) is consistent with the methodology
outlined in Moody's publication "Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Securities in Default" dated November 2009.
Moody's notes that in terms of the transaction documentation, the
notes have not experienced an event of default.

Moody's also notes that the average credit quality of the
remaining 72 names in the index is roughly equivalent to Ba1.

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Rating Repackaged Securities published in April 2010 and Moody's
Approach to Rating Structured Finance Securities in Default
published in November 2009.

Moody's quantitative analysis of repacks is designed to estimate
the expected loss "EL" borne by the repack investor, given the
transaction structure, the Collateral and any other credit risks
arising under the transaction. To this end, Moody's relies on an
EL analysis in which it identifies and attaches probabilities to
events that might give rise to losses to repack noteholders.

Moody's EL calculation assesses the probability and severity of
each possible loss-inducing event happening at discrete
(typically one-year) intervals through the life of the
transaction. The EL for each of these time points can then be
aggregated to provide a weighted-average EL for the rated notes.

No additional cash flow, sensitivity analysis or stress scenarios
have been conducted as the rating was directly derived utilizing
a weighted average expected loss calculation including
consideration of write downs that have already occurred.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 23 to September 27, 2013

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *