TCREUR_Public/131007.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Monday, October 7, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 198



* CYPRUS: Banking System Outlook Remains Negative, Says Moody's


WINDERMERE X: Fitch Cuts Rating on EUR104.6MM Cl. D Notes to 'CC'
* FRANCE: About 62,000 Companies Declared Bankrupt


LOEWE AG: Gains Approval for Self-Administered Insolvency
OPERA GERMANY: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC+'
SIEMENS AG: Aiming for 15,000 Jobs Cuts
TALISMAN-5 FINANCE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Dsf'


SEANERGY MARITIME: Incurs US$14.8 Million Net Loss in 2nd Quarter
* GREECE: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' Credit Ratings; Outlook Stable


IRISH BANK: Solvent at Time of Liquidation, Ex-Directors Say
M&J WALLACE: Costs Hit EUR420,000 for Takeover of Assets
MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Withdraws Rating on EUR50MM Cl. 1 Secs.


ALITALIA SPA: Etihad, Aeroflot Rule Out Potential Investment
FIAT INDUSTRIAL: S&P Affirms, Withdraws 'BB+/B' Credit Ratings


CREDIT EUROPE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Deposit & Sr. Debt Ratings
HERMES SERIES: Moody's Lowers 15 Notes in Six Dutch RMBS


POLIMEX-MOTOSTAL: Creditors Extend Restructuring Deal Deadline


PORTUGAL TELECOM: Moody's Places 'Ba2' CFR on Review for Upgrade
PORTUGAL TELECOM: S&P Puts 'BB' CCR on CreditWatch Developing


ALLIANCE OIL: S&P Lowers ICR to 'B'; Outlook Stable
BANK SAINT PETERSBURG: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' IDRs; Outlook Stable
GAZPROMBANK: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to US$750MM Notes
MOSCOW INTEGRATED: Fitch Keeps BB+ IDRs on Rating Watch Negative
RASPADSKAYA OAO: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Rating

TRANSCONTAINER JSC: Moody's Alters Ba3 CFR Outlook to Positive
* TOMSK OBLAST: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable


IM TERRASSA: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'
* Moody's: Spanish RMBS Market Shows Signs of Stabilization


FERREXPO PLC: Fitch Affirms 'B' Issue Default Ratings

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BEATBOX BARS: Buffalo Bought Out of Administration by 8 Bar Blue
CLARIS LIMITED: Moody's Lowers $10MM CDO Notes Rating to 'Caa2'
EMPIRE MEATS: In Administration, Cuts 40 Jobs
HAWKE INDUSTRIES: In Administration, 69 Jobs at Risk
KILMARNOCK FC: Fans Fear Administration

LCP PROUDREED: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
LLOYD'S SYNDICATE 0260: Moody's B- Rating on Review for Downgrade
LLOYD'S SYNDICATE 0382: Moody's Puts 'B(Ave)' Rating on Review
PIHL: Over-Aggressive Expansion, Costs Overruns Prompt Collapse
SEEKER PHOTOGRAPHY: In Administration, With GBP40,000 Debts

TIUTA PLC: To Be Liquidated After Administration

* UK: Over A Quarter of Firms Entering Administration Survives
* Matt Dunham Joins Smith & Williamson


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 30 to October 4, 2013



Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on Hrvatska
Elektroprivreda d.d. (HEP), the 100% state-owned, vertically
integrated Croatian electricity utility.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P revised its assessment of HEP's SACP to
'b+' from 'b'.

The affirmation mainly reflects the revision of HEP's SACP to
'b+' from 'b', which in turn is based on S&P's view that the
company's credit metrics have strengthened.  This can be
attributed to a more favorable operating environment and HEP's
improved liquidity, as a result of the company's active
management.  In 2013, HEP's hydro generation portfolio benefited
from extremely favorable hydrological conditions, which, combined
with lower electricity import prices and recent tariff hikes,
contributed to higher profitability.  S&P now anticipates that
the company will be able to repay its Croatian kuna (HRK) 500
million domestic bond due in November 2013 from excess
discretionary cash flows generated since the start of 2013.
This, coupled with HEP's debut five-year Eurobond issue in
November 2012, reduces refinancing risk over the
near to medium term, in S&P's view.  Furthermore, S&P understands
that the previously significant planned investment program has
now been scaled down, which S&P thinks should alleviate ongoing
funding needs.  Management has also extended the availability
period of three back-up liquidity facilities from one to three
years, which S&P believes signals a more prudent approach to
liquidity management than it has been in the past.

"We have revised our view of HEP's financial risk profile to
"aggressive" from "highly leveraged."  Nevertheless, and although
liquidity needs are less pressing, we continue to view the
company's liquidity position as "less than adequate."  Despite
the reduction in capital investments and our assumption that HEP
will not pay any dividends to the government as in the past, we
continue to forecast negative discretionary cash flows after
2013. At the same time, we forecast that cash flow generation
will improve due to continued low electricity import prices and
lower procurement costs for natural gas, as HEP renegotiates its
gas supply contracts.  In our base-case scenario, HEP's adjusted
funds from operations (FFO) to debt will increase to more than
30% from 22.5% at its low point for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012.
We note, however, that HEP's credit metrics are highly sensitive
to hydrology conditions because hydro power plants account for
one-half of HEP's installed capacity.  Furthermore, in our view,
HEP has significant exposure to foreign currency risk because
more than 70% of total debt is denominated in, or swapped to,
euros. Our forecasts do not incorporate the large thermal
generation project that HEP is planning with a strategic partner,
as it is only in its nascent stages," S&P said.

"We continue to view HEP's business risk profile as "fair",
constrained by high regulatory reset risk in the context of
unpredictable, regulated tariffs.  We believe the Croatian
government's track record of adjusting tariffs has been
inconsistent in the past.  Nevertheless, we believe the new
Energy Act, which has granted full tariff-setting powers to
Croatia's independent energy regulator, could reduce the risk of
political interference over the medium term, although the
regulator is yet to establish a track record.  HEP's
profitability is exposed to the inherent volatility of its
hydrological output, fluctuating commodity prices, and the need
to procure electricity abroad to bridge the generation gap.
These constraints are offset to a degree by HEP's de facto
monopoly position in Croatia's electricity market along the value
chain.  Furthermore, HEP has an important role as a public
provider to tariff customers who have not exercised their right
to switch supplier," S&P added.

"The 'BB-' rating on HEP is based on the company's 'b+' SACP, as
well as on our opinion that there is a "high" likelihood that the
Croatian government would provide timely and sufficient
extraordinary support to HEP in the event of financial distress.
In accordance with our criteria for government-related entities
(GREs), our view of a "high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support is based on our assessment of HEP's "very
important" role for the energy sector and the broader economy in
Croatia; and on its "strong" link with the Croatian government,
which is HEP's sole shareholder and is actively involved in
defining the company's strategy," S&P noted.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that the company's
financial standing will remain in line with its rating
expectations for the time being, and that its liquidity has
stabilized.  S&P also anticipates that HEP will proactively and
more conservatively manage its liquidity position to avoid any
further liquidity pressures.

According to S&P's GRE criteria, a lowering of the sovereign
rating on Croatia by one notch is unlikely to affect the rating
on HEP, assuming no change in HEP's SACP.  That said, should S&P
lowers the sovereign rating, it will likely review HEP's SACP for
any potential implications arising from the factors behind the
sovereign downgrade.

S&P anticipates that the state's implicit support of HEP will
continue for the foreseeable future.  If S&P sees any evidence of
weaker government support for HEP, this could lead S&P to revise
downward its assessment of the likelihood of extraordinary state
support, which S&P factors into the corporate credit rating.

An upward revision of HEP's SACP would depend on a continued,
sustainable improvement in the company's liquidity profile to a
level that S&P considers "adequate."  S&P would take a positive
view of:

   -- Timely prefunding of any committed investment projects;

   -- Extension and diversification of debt maturities; and

   -- Maintenance of sufficient headroom under committed back-up
      liquidity facilities to cover unexpected cost overruns.

According to S&P's GRE criteria, if it was to revise upward HEP's
SACP by one notch, it would also raise the rating on HEP by one
notch, all else being equal.

"We could consider revising downward the SACP if HEP's financial
risk profile deteriorates due to its liquidity deteriorating--for
example, if the cash flow deficit rises due to more ambitious
investment levels or worse market conditions than we currently
anticipate.  Equally, the SACP could come under pressure if the
government resumes dividend payments, which we do not consider
likely in the context of the company's large investment needs.
The SACP might also suffer if HEP's business risk profile weakens
resulting, for example, from a loss of retail market share due to
competition or delayed or insufficient tariff increases.  We
would also consider covenant breaches as adverse for HEP's credit
quality, although we view these as unlikely at present.  Under
our GRE criteria, a lowering of the SACP by one notch is unlikely
to affect the rating on HEP, all else being equal," S&P said.

* CYPRUS: Banking System Outlook Remains Negative, Says Moody's
The outlook for Cyprus's banking system remains negative,
unchanged since May 2009, says Moody's Investors Service in a new
report published.  The financial crisis in Cyprus triggered a
deep and prolonged economic recession that will further strain
the already highly stressed operating environment.  In this
context, the outlook reflects the formidable challenges facing
the banks, namely acute asset-quality deterioration, continued
concerns over their solvency, and intense funding and liquidity

The new report is entitled "Banking System Outlook: Cyprus".

The banks will continue to operate in a highly-stressed
environment, with Moody's expecting a 12% contraction of GDP in
2013 and 6.4% in 2014. The stressed conditions will be
characterized by (1) a sharp drop in domestic consumption,
reflecting the erosion of household incomes and wealth,
compounded by surging unemployment (up to 17.3% in June 2013 from
13.8% as of end 2012); (2) further contraction of the real-estate
sector; and (3) reduced business volumes in financial services
(which historically accounted for a large part of the economy),
given the impairment of the banking system's offshore business

The severe economic contraction will intensify already acute
asset quality pressures, leading to exceptionally high loan-loss
provisions. While there is limited publicly available data,
Moody's estimates that problem loans increased to around 26% of
gross loans as of December 2012, six months before the bail-in,
and will increase to over 35% by year-end 2013. As a result of
asset quality deterioration, the banks will likely require
additional capital, above recent recapitalizations, to withstand
potential credit losses from their loan books and/or their high
exposure to Cypriot government bonds (Caa3 negative). Under
Moody's central scenario, the Cypriot banks and cooperatives
could face capital needs that exceed by some EUR1.5 billion the
EUR2.5 billion of EU support funds earmarked for the banking

As a consequence of depositor losses, confidence in the banking
system has been largely eroded, accelerating deposit outflows.
While current constraints on deposit withdrawals are preventing a
full-blown capital flight, Moody's expects that deposits will
continue to decline. Moody's does not expect the constraints on
cash withdrawals to be fully lifted unless confidence in the Bank
of Cyprus's restructuring, and in the wider banking system, is
restored. The rating agency estimates that banks' reliance on
central bank funding, which totaled EUR11.3 billion as of August
2013 (equal to approximately 22% of domestically owned rated bank
assets and 70% of economic output), will rise further.


WINDERMERE X: Fitch Cuts Rating on EUR104.6MM Cl. D Notes to 'CC'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Windermere X CMBS Ltd's class D
notes due 2019 and affirmed classes A, B, C and E as follows:

EUR580.4m Class A (XS0293895271) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook

EUR51.9m Class B (XS0293896915) affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook

EUR59.3m Class C (XS0293897137) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

EUR104.6m Class D (XS0293898457) downgraded to 'CCsf from CCCsf';
Recovery Estimate (RE) RE 30%

EUR31.8m Class E (XS0293898887) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE 0%

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade of class D notes reflects an increased risk of
losses across a number of loans exceeding the subordination
represented by the defaulted class E notes. While now at severe
risk of default itself, the class D tranche is thick enough to
contain expected losses, which currently serve to protect the
ratings of the senior notes from downgrade. Nevertheless, in
spite of the pool seeing little change in credit quality over
2013, the Outlooks remain Negative. This is to reflect the risk
that credit quality could deteriorate should fragile investor
confidence in most of the property collateral wane between now
and bond maturity in 2019.

The EUR372.1 million Bridge loan accounted for 41% of the
portfolio at the July 2013 interest payment date (IPD). The
collateral, six office properties in secondary German locations,
has not been revalued since closing in 2007 and as the loan is
interest-only, the reported loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is
unchanged at 69%. Despite low vacancy at 2.7%, Fitch estimates
LTV around 120%, making full repayment in January 2014 doubtful.
The appeal of the properties once some dominant institutional
leases roll off is largely unknown, with considerable downside
risk to rental income after 2017 likely to be reflected in higher
required yields.

Like Bridge, the EUR103.5 million Fortezza loan (12.5%) is
sponsored by Fortress; secured on six office properties (in this
case in Italy) last valued at closing; benefits from leases to a
small number of institutional tenants (in this case all
investment-grade); reports low vacancy (6%) and LTV (69%); faces
major income rollover risk commencing in 2017; and matures in
January. Fitch estimates LTV around 120%, making repayment in
January 2014 unlikely. Fitch expects losses on these two large
loans, with further downside risk not consistent with ratings
above the 'BBBsf' category for any notes in this transaction.

The second-largest loan, EUR257 million Tour Esplanade (31%), is
secured on a single office property located in Paris's La Defense
district. The sole tenant, SFR, announced that it will vacate the
premises at lease maturity in December 2013. The borrower has
secured a new 13.5 -year lease (with the French government,
AA+/Stable) due to commence in July 2014 subject to completion of
a capital expenditure program (funded by sponsor equity) that
will start after SFR's departure. Meanwhile, surplus cash is
trapped (EUR3.8 million last quarter). Notwithstanding completion
risk, this notable letting improves the prospects for this loan,
which Fitch expects to repay in full at maturity in January 2016.

Both Dutch loans, EUR35 million Tresforte and EUR15.5 million
Lightning Dutch, are in special servicing. The former is secured
on 11 office properties currently in a portfolio auction process.
With an LTV of around 200% (including unpaid interest and
penalties), there will be significant losses. Following the sale
of four of its original properties, Lightning Dutch is secured on
a single sports business centre, an orderly sale of which is
plausible. At worst Fitch expects only minor losses from this

The Thunderbird loan was restructured in 2012 following non-
payment at maturity. Since then, the balance has reduced by
EUR41 million via sales and new equity, leaving EUR67.7 million
outstanding as of July 2013. The borrower intends to reduce the
balance further by selling part of the multifamily collateral,
before refinancing the remaining facility. The servicer reports
that it has been provided with evidence of progress with sales
and discussions with a lender, supporting Fitch's expectation of
full repayment at or shortly after the new maturity date this

The EUR4 million Built (0.5%) loan has been in special servicing
since October 2011 as the result of a maturity default. Two of
the original five assets remain (both retail warehouses located
in Germany). A 2013 revaluation led to the LTV increasing to
114%, consistent with Fitch's expectation of a moderate loss.

Rating Sensitivities

A delay in the capex program for Tour Esplanade could cause the
pre-letting to fall through and therefore undermine the chance of
a full repayment. Other possible causes of future downgrade
include any softening in market sentiment; new valuations for
Bridge and Fortezza may be forthcoming should either loan fail to
repay in January. The uncertainty of outcome is reflected in the
Negative Outlooks, and should either Bridge or Fortezza repay in
full in January, there may be scope for a revision of the
Outlooks to Stable or even an upgrade of the senior bonds.

* FRANCE: About 62,000 Companies Declared Bankrupt
Prensa Latina, citing a Euler Hermes study, reports that about
62,000 companies in a range of industries in France declared
bankruptcy this year.  According to Prensa Latina, the Euler
Hermes study said this situation affects virtually the entire
country's economy and is a direct result of the crisis.

Prensa Latina notes that the study said the problem will continue
next year with similar figures, despite a slight 0.5% rise in the
gross national product in the second quarter of 2013.

The sectors most affected by bankruptcy were accommodations and
restaurants, with a 16.4% increase, services to companies (11.5);
auto sales (10.2); retail trade (8); and services to private
businesses (7.4), Prensa Latina discloses.

The most well-known recent cases include Petroplus refinery,
Florange steel blast furnace; and Virgin Megastores chain, but
thousands of other micro and small companies are being affected
by the domestic economic problems, Prensa Latina states.


LOEWE AG: Gains Approval for Self-Administered Insolvency
Christine Benders-Rueger, writing for DBR Small Cap, reported
that a German insolvency court in Coburg on Oct. 1 granted Loewe
AG permission to carry out insolvency proceedings under the
company's own administration, and the television and
entertainment console maker has already received several offers
from interested investors in recent days, Loewe said.

OPERA GERMANY: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC+'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Opera Germany (No. 2) PLC's class A, B, C, D, and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the underlying loan's
credit quality in light of the transaction's October 2014 legal
final maturity date.

                             THE LOAN

The securitized loan balance reduced to EUR500.4 million from
EUR560.0 million following the sale of one of the properties
securing the loan in January 2013.  There is additional
subordinated debt outside the securitization.  The whole loan is
now secured on three shopping centers.

In S&P's opinion, all of the shopping centers are well-
established within their respective markets.  The portfolio
tenancy mix is diversified, including national and international
retailers.  The top 10 portfolio tenants by rent account for
28.5% of the overall portfolio's rental income as of the July
2013 interest payment date.

In July 2013, the servicer reported a securitized loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 86.5% and a securitized interest coverage ratio of
1.44x.  According to the most recent valuations available (from
March 2011 and March 2012), the portfolio value is
EUR578.1 million.

The whole loan was restructured in December 2009, following a
breach of the LTV covenant.  The updated whole loan maturity date
is Oct. 15, 2013, one year before the legal final maturity date
in October 2014.  S&P understands that the borrowers recently
made a request for an additional six-month standstill to sell
some properties and refinance others.  S&P understands that the
servicer is currently considering this proposal and other

"Despite our opinion of the properties' good quality, absent a
repayment or refinance by the borrower, the servicer may not be
able to complete a sale of the properties in time to allow the
issuer to repay the notes by their legal final maturity date.  In
addition, with less than one year remaining, we view this
timeframe as inadequate to maximize the level of recoveries in a
default scenario.  We therefore considered scenarios where the
servicer would have to sell the properties at a discount to meet
payment by the legal final maturity date.  In these scenarios,
the class D and E notes would likely experience losses, whereas
the class A notes would be fully repaid if the two largest
shopping centers were sold or refinanced before the legal final
maturity date," S&P said.

                          RATING ACTIONS

S&P's ratings in this transaction address the timely payment of
interest, payable quarterly in arrears, and the payment of
principal not later than the legal final maturity date (in
October 2014).

Given the approaching legal final maturity date, S&P considers
that there is a risk that payment of principal may not occur
before the legal final maturity date.

Although S&P's analysis indicates that the credit characteristics
of the class A to E notes could support higher rating stresses,
it has constrained all of its ratings because of the potential
risk of a payment default at the legal final maturity date.

Taking the above factors into account and in accordance with
S&P's criteria, it has lowered all of its ratings in this

S&P has lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on the
class A notes.  In S&P's view, this class of notes would be fully
repaid if the two largest shopping centers are sold or refinanced
before the legal final maturity date.

S&P has lowered to 'B (sf)' and 'B- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its
ratings on the class B and C notes, respectively.

S&P has also lowered to 'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its ratings on
the class D and E notes.  These two classes of notes have become
more vulnerable to principal losses in distressed sale scenarios,
in our view.  In S&P's opinion, the class E notes do not provide
a sufficient credit enhancement to the class D notes to
differentiate between the two classes of notes.

In accordance with S&P's rating definition and its criteria, a
payment default at the legal final maturity date would likely
result in its lowering of its ratings in this transaction to 'D

Opera Germany (No. 2) is a 2006-vintage single-loan commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction originally backed
by four German shopping centers.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class         Rating               Rating
              To                   From

Opera Germany (No. 2) PLC
EUR560 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A             B+ (sf)              BB+ (sf)
B             B (sf)               BB (sf)
C             B- (sf)              BB- (sf)
D             CCC+ (sf)            B- (sf)
E             CCC+ (sf)            B- (sf)

SIEMENS AG: Aiming for 15,000 Jobs Cuts
William Boston, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reported
that Siemens AG, the German industrial giant, said on Sept. 29
that it will have cut a total of about 15,000 jobs worldwide by
the end of the next business year, defining for the first time
the scope of the reductions it plans under a two-year
restructuring program aimed at boosting profits.

According to the WSJ report, jobs eliminated during the business
year that ends on Sept. 30 account for about half the total.
Another roughly 7,500 jobs will be cut in the new business year,
which begins on Oct. 1, a company spokesman said.

The Sept. 29 disclosure marked the first major cost-cutting
announcement by Siemens's freshly minted chief executive, Joe
Kaeser, the report said.  Mr. Kaeser's predecessor, Peter
Loscher, lost his job in July after failing to meet the company's
profit targets.

When Mr. Kaeser took the helm in August he ordered a full review
of Siemens's sprawling businesses and said he was determined to
get Europe's largest engineering company back on track to meet an
ambitious profit goal of 12% of sales, the report added.
Siemens's profit margin was 9.5% in the 2012 business year.

While Siemens is putting a number on the job cuts for the first
time, the figure includes redundancies that were part of the cost
cuts launched last October during Mr. Loscher's tenure under a
program called Siemens 2014, the report said.

Headquartered in Munich, Germany, Siemens AG is engaged in
electronics and electrical engineering.  The Company is an
integrated technology company with activities in the fields of
industry, energy and healthcare.

TALISMAN-5 FINANCE: S&P Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Dsf'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' its credit ratings on Talisman-5 Finance PLC's class
D and E notes.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of cash flow disruptions in
the transaction.  The class D and E notes experienced principal
losses of EUR14.1 million according to the July 2013 cash
manager's report.  While the class D notes experienced a partial
loss, the class E notes have been written-off entirely.

The principal losses have occurred as a result of the Bird loan,
which failed to repay in July 2011, and therefore entered special
servicing.  The special servicer sold the property backing the
loan and used the recovery proceeds (EUR10.4 million) to repay
the outstanding loan balance (EUR24.1 million) at a loss of
EUR14.1 million.  The cash manager applied the losses reverse
sequentially to the notes on the July note payment date.

S&P's ratings on Talisman-5 Finance's notes address the timely
payment of interest quarterly in arrears, and the payment of
principal no later than the October 2016 legal final maturity

Following the principal losses experienced by the class D and E
notes, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its ratings
on the class D and E notes.

Talisman-5 Finance is a 2006-vintage commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction backed by four remaining loans
secured by commercial real estate properties in Germany, France,
and Finland.  The transaction closed in December 2006.  There are
four loans remaining, all of which are in special servicing.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



SEANERGY MARITIME: Incurs US$14.8 Million Net Loss in 2nd Quarter
Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. reported a net loss of US$14.76
million on US$6.80 million of net vessel revenue for the three
months ended June 30, 2013, as compared with a net loss of
US$28.35 million on US$18.14 million of net vessel revenue for
the same period during the prior year.

For the six months ended June 30, 2013, the Company reported a
net loss of US$13.70 million on US$12.45 million of net vessel
revenue, as compared with a net loss of US$34.72 million on
US$35.55 million of net vessel revenue for the same period last

The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2013, showed US$78.70
million in total assets, $194.01 million in total liabilities and
a US$115.31 million total deficit.

Stamatis Tsantanis, the Company's chief executive officer,
stated: "During the second quarter of 2013, Seanergy continued
the implementation of its financial restructuring plan that has
managed to significantly reduce its indebtedness since the
beginning of 2012.  We continue our efforts to deliver a viable
financial structure that should position our Company to benefit
from the prospective market recovery.  The sale, during the
second quarter of 2013, of the three Handysize-owning
subsidiaries that resulted in the full satisfaction of the
associated loan facilities, is positive for Seanergy as the
Company has currently one lender.  In addition, the Company
expects a non cash gain of approximately US$20 million as a
result of the sale of the three Handysize-owning subsidiaries,
which will be reflected in the third quarter 2013 results.

"We presently continue discussions with our remaining lender,
aiming to reach a solution that will enable Seanergy to complete
the restructuring of its outstanding debt."

A copy of the Form 6-K report with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission is available at

                          About Seanergy

Athens, Greece-based Seanergy Maritime Holdings Corp. is an
international company providing worldwide seaborne transportation
of dry bulk commodities.  The Company owns and operates a fleet
of seven dry bulk vessels that consists of three Handysize, two
Supramax and two Panamax vessels.  Its fleet carries a variety of
dry bulk commodities, including coal, iron ore, and grains, as
well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizer and steel products.

In its audit report on the consolidated financial statements for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2012, Ernst & Young (Hellas) Certified
Auditors Accountants S.A., in Athens, Greece, expressed
substantial doubt about Seanergy Maritime's ability to continue
as a going concern.  The independent auditors noted that the
Company has not complied with the principal and interest
repayment schedule and with certain covenants of its loan
agreements, which in turn gives the lenders the right to call the
debt.  "In addition, the Company has a working capital deficit,
recurring losses from operations, accumulated deficit and
inability to generate sufficient cash flow to meet its
obligations and sustain its operations."

The Company reported a net loss of US$193.8 million on US$55.6
million of net vessel revenue in 2012, compared with a net loss
of US$197.8 million on US$104.1 million of net vessel revenue in

* GREECE: S&P Affirms 'B-/B' Credit Ratings; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long- and short-
term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the
Hellenic Republic (Greece) at 'B-/B'.  The outlook is stable.


S&P's 'B-' long-term rating on Greece reflects its view of its
uncertain economic growth prospects, its high albeit long-dated
government debt burden, and its significant external debt
position.  At the same time, the rating is supported by Greece's
relatively high (although still falling) GDP per head, its
significant budgetary and structural reforms, and its large
conditional liquidity lines from the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU or eurozone) and the IMF.

S&P estimates real GDP will contract by about 4% in 2013 and 1%
in 2014 on declining disposable income due to further job losses,
falling wages, and budgetary consolidation, before recovering to
grow by about 1% in 2015.  Consumption has fallen because of
soaring unemployment, declining wages, tax hikes, and severe
budgetary contraction amid tightening credit conditions.  S&P
thinks investment growth will remain negative as domestic banks
curtail lending and businesses deleverage, accompanied by
significant credit risk in the economy.

Positively, S&P believes that the economy is rebalancing.  S&P
expects the current account deficit will decline to about 1% of
GDP in 2013, from almost 15% in 2008, on a substantial
contraction in imports and lower interest payments after two
stages of government debt restructuring in 2012.  In the medium
term, S&P believes the current account will strengthen gradually
as a result of the economy's ongoing reorientation toward
external demand.  S&P anticipates this will happen as the current
weak export performance strengthens on the back of restored
competitiveness, especially if accompanied by political

Intense economic pressures and the implementation of new labor
legislation are breaking down previous wage rigidities.  S&P
notes that, since 2010, Greek total economy unit labor costs have
reduced sharply; according to the European Commission, the
competitiveness index in second-quarter 2013 based on relative
unit labor costs was almost 3% below its 2000 level which more
than restores lost pre-crisis price competitiveness.

S&P expects ongoing downside pressure on nominal wages to
accompany a further increase in unemployment to about 28.5% by
end-2014, partly depending on the timing of any public sector
dismissals.  Since 2010, nominal private sector wages have
declined more in Greece than in any other European economy,
including those of the Baltic countries, which in S&P's view has
undermined Greek social stability.

While S&P views the shift in external flow dynamics relatively
positively, it notes that Greece's external vulnerabilities
persist given its large stock of external debt, as well as its
large net international liability position at almost 120% of GDP.

S&P views the government progress on budget deficit reduction as
significant.  S&P expects the general government deficit to fall
to around 4% of GDP this year from 15.6% in 2009, partly due to
reduced interest payments following successful debt exchanges
last year--possibly leading to a small primary surplus.

S&P notes that public administration, health care, and revenue
administration reforms are not yet complete, and that the
privatization process is slow.  However, if the government
achieves a primary budget surplus this year, this could in S&P's
view trigger an additional easing of borrowing terms by the
official lenders.  This could help the government reduce or even
eliminate the funding gap identified for 2015-2016.

Despite the commercial debt restructuring and significant easing
of borrowing conditions by official lenders so far (the weighted-
average residual maturity at the end of June 2013 stood at 16.12
years), S&P expects net general government debt at about 170% of
GDP in 2013-2015.  This will depend on Greece's compliance with
EMU/IMF financial program targets, including the government's
capacity to generate privatization revenues, and on its economic
growth performance.  S&P estimates the ratio of general
government interest expenditure to general government revenues at
around 11% on average during 2013-2015.


The stable outlook balances S&P's view of eurozone member states'
determination to support Greece's eurozone membership and the
Greek government's commitment to a fiscal and structural
adjustment against the economic and political challenges of doing
so.  S&P expects the government to implement the EMU/IMF
program and it assumes, at a 'B-' rating level of confidence, no
further distressed exchange on the sovereign's remaining stock of
commercial debt.

S&P could raise its long-term rating on Greece if the government
follows through fully on its steps to comply with the EMU/IMF
program, thereby restoring predictability to its policymaking as
well as contributing to a sustained economic recovery and
improved prospects of sustainable debt-servicing.

S&P could lower the ratings if it believes that there is a
likelihood of a distressed exchange on Greece's remaining stock
of commercial debt, due to further weakening of the political
situation or withdrawal of the scheduled official creditor

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.


Ratings Affirmed

Greece (Hellenic Republic)
Sovereign Credit Rating                B-/Stable/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   AAA
Senior Unsecured                       B-
Commercial Paper                       B


IRISH BANK: Solvent at Time of Liquidation, Ex-Directors Say
According to Bloomberg News' Donal Griffin, the Sunday Business
Post, citing company documents, reported that former directors of
the Irish Bank Resolution Corp. said the business was solvent
when the government placed it in liquidation earlier this year.

IBRC had assets of nearly EUR26.5 billion (US$35.9 billion),
Bloomberg discloses.  Bloomberg notes that the report said the
documents were filed with the Irish Department of Finance.

                   About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about 50 billion euros, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

The IRBC liquidators want the U.S. bankruptcy judge to rule that
Ireland is home to the so-called foreign main bankruptcy
proceeding.  If the judge agrees and determines that IBRC
otherwise qualifies, creditor actions in the U.S. will halt

M&J WALLACE: Costs Hit EUR420,000 for Takeover of Assets
Irish Independent reports that the receivership of flagship
assets owned by Mick Wallace's construction firm has cost more
than EUR420,000.

ACC Bank, one of the lenders owed money by Mr. Wallace's main
development firm M&J Wallace, appointed Declan Taite of
accountancy firm Farrell Grant Sparks to the Italian Quarter on
Ormond Quay, Dublin; the Behan Square apartment complex on
Russell Street, Dublin; and to development land in Rathgar in
2011, according to Irish Independent.

The report notes that documents show the receiver has brought in
EUR354,823, mainly through rent.  But costs under the
receivership total EUR420,324, Irish Independent notes.

Irish Independent relates that at its peak, Mr. Wallace's
construction business was worth EUR80million.

MERRILL LYNCH: Moody's Withdraws Rating on EUR50MM Cl. 1 Secs.
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has withdrawn the
rating of the Credit Default Swap entered into by Merrill Lynch
International, a transaction referencing a static portfolio of
corporate entities.

Issuer: Merrill Lynch International Credit Default Swaps

  EUR 50,000,000 Shamrock Class 1 (Reference N 06ML19662A),
  Withdrawn (sf); previously on Dec 20, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3

Merrill Lynch International Credit Default Swaps (Shamrock),
issued in February 2006, is a credit default swap referencing a
portfolio of senior unsecured bonds, subordinated bonds and
preferred stock.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


ALITALIA SPA: Etihad, Aeroflot Rule Out Potential Investment
Andrew Parker at The Financial Times reports that Etihad Airways,
the Abu Dhabi-based carrier, has signaled it is not interested in
investing in Alitalia.

According to the FT, some analysts have suggested that
state-controlled Etihad could be an alternative strategic
investor to Air France-KLM, but one person close to the Gulf
airline rejected this scenario.

"We are not interested [in Alitalia]," the FT quotes this person
as saying.

Etihad, which declined to comment on Alitalia, has been forging
links with Air France-KLM, after announcing a code-share
agreement last year, the FT discloses.  It has had a similar
agreement with Alitalia since 2010, the FT notes.

The FT relates that James Hogan, Etihad's chief executive, said
this month the company was open to making investments in other
airlines after buying minority stakes in four carriers over the
past two years.

Another airline that has attracted speculation as a potential
strategic investor at Alitalia is Aeroflot, the state-controlled
Russian carrier, the FT states.  But Aeroflot, as cited by the
FT, said: "We have no plans [to invest in Alitalia]."

                              Net Loss

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 4,
2013, The New York Times related that Alitalia's net loss had
widened to EUR294 million, or US$398 million, in the six months
that ended June 30, compared with EUR201 million in the same
period a year earlier.  Its net debt stood at EUR946 million, up
from EUR862 million a year ago, while its available cash flow was
down to a precarious EUR128 million from EUR159 million at the
end of March, The New York Times disclosed.

                         Cash Injection

Alitalia's management is seeking an injection of at least EUR100
million from existing shareholders in exchange for new shares, as
well as a syndicated shareholder loan of EUR55 million that would
be convertible into shares, The New York Times said.  According
to The New York Times, two people with knowledge of the
discussions said that Alitalia is also negotiating with a
consortium of banks, including Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit, for
a fresh EUR300 million line of credit to help fund current

                           About Alitalia

Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.

FIAT INDUSTRIAL: S&P Affirms, Withdraws 'BB+/B' Credit Ratings
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has affirmed its
'BB+/B' long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on Italian
truck and equipment maker Fiat Industrial SpA (FI).  S&P
subsequently withdrew the ratings because the company has merged
into the newly created CNH Industrial N.V. (CNH).  At the time of
withdrawal, the outlook was stable.

At the time of the withdrawal, the ratings reflected S&P's view
of FI's business risk profile as "satisfactory" and its financial
risk profile as "fair."

"Our assessment of FI's business risk profile reflected our
opinion of the cyclicality of the group's sales and
profitability, its capital intensity, and the tough competitive
environment for its subsidiaries, truck constructor Iveco and
CNH, specializing in the agricultural and construction equipment
businesses.  Positive offsetting factors included diversification
in the agricultural and construction equipment and the truck
business.  We also viewed favorably FI's geographical
diversification, in particular at CNH, which limited the group's
exposure to domestic markets," S&P said.

S&P based its view of FI's financial risk profile on the group's
limited ability to reduce debt and strengthen credit metrics.  At
the point of withdrawal, these metrics were low in S&P's range
for the current rating.  Among the positives, FI has shown its
ability to generate free operating cash flow, albeit on the low
side in 2012, due to increased investments.

S&P believes that the merger into CNH has created a leaner
structure.  But most of the benefits of merging were already
achievable in the former structure, in S&P's opinion.


CREDIT EUROPE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Deposit & Sr. Debt Ratings
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 deposit and senior
debt ratings of Credit Europe Bank N.V., based in the
Netherlands. The rating agency has also affirmed the bank's Ba3
subordinated debt rating, Not Prime short-term deposit ratings
and D standalone financial strength rating (BFSR), which is
equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba2.
Concurrently, the rating agency has changed the outlook on all
Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s long-term ratings and BFSR to negative
from positive.

Additionally, Moody's affirmed the Ba3 deposit and senior debt
ratings of Credit Europe Bank Ltd (Russia). The rating agency has
also affirmed the bank's B1 subordinated debt rating, Not Prime
short-term deposit ratings and D- BFSR (ba3 BCA). Concurrently,
the rating agency has changed the outlook on all Credit Europe
Bank Ltd's long-term debt and deposit ratings to negative from
positive and on the BFSR to negative from stable.


Credit Europe Bank N.V.


The affirmation of the Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s ratings reflects
its sound but gradually weakening financial indicators including
(1) a strong Tier 1 ratio indicating loss-absorption capacity
commensurate with Moody's central scenario; and (2) the overall
acceptable funding profile with a higher degree of self-
sufficiency of the group's key subsidiaries.

While gradually weakening, the factors supporting the bank's BCA
are its still-adequate profitability with net income over average
risk-weighted assets of 1.1% as of H1 2013, down from 1.5%
reported in 2010. Similarly, its Tier 1 ratio was 9.1% as of the
same date, representing a decline from 11.4% over the same
period. Based on its moderate asset quality -- non-performing
loans to gross loans of 4.95% are largely in line with 4.60%
reported in 2010 -- Moody's believes that Credit Europe Bank N.V.
displays sufficient loss-absorption capacity in line with the ba2
BCA under the rating agency's central scenario.

As a result of Credit Europe Bank N.V. resuming growth, its
reliance on wholesale funds has increased to 28% as of H1 2013
from 20% of total assets in 2010. During H1 2013, the group's
gross loan to deposit ratio increased to a satisfactory 100% from
a strong 73%. Moody's notes positively that the cross-border
intergroup funding has reduced to 10% of total assets from 15%
reported in 2010 (25%: 2008), increasing the self-reliance of the


The outlook change to negative from positive on the BFSR reflects
the lower diversification of Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s earnings,
with a high 80% reliance on profitability from Credit Europe Bank
Ltd, because of the lagging earnings generations from its other
European operations. As of H1 2013, the continuing losses
reported from its Romanian exposures, primarily through its
subsidiary Credit Europe Bank SA (unrated), equated to 70% of the
total net income generated from outside Russian operations,
constraining Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s ability to readily offset
headwinds from Credit Europe Bank Ltd.

Furthermore, Moody's believes that the tighter liquidity
indicators are due to (1) Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s increased
commercial leverage, which has prompted a gradual decline in the
share of liquid assets to total assets to 28% as of H1 2013 from
36% of the balance sheet reported in 2010; (2) the widening of
the liquidity gap in the up-to three and 12 month buckets, which,
according to Moody's estimates equates to a short position of 7%
and 23%, respectively, of the total balance sheet (from short 2%
and 9% respectively); and (3) the increased self-funding of the
subsidiaries via wholesale market funding. Moody's views these
funding sources as more volatile, reducing the bank's capacity to
adapt to changing market conditions. At the same time, the rating
agency takes into account the primarily short-term nature of the
group's lending activities, specialized in trade finance and
consumer lending, which affords a degree of additional
flexibility in managing liquidity requirements.

Credit Europe Bank Ltd (Russia)


The affirmation of Credit Europe Bank Ltd's ratings reflects the
good track record of asset-quality performance, healthy capital
adequacy, and strong pre-provision income, which enable the bank
to absorb potential losses, particularly compared to its single-b
rated Russian peers.

Moody's bases its view on the bank's (1) profitable lending
franchise with a healthy return on average assets (ROAAs) at
1.82% and sound pre-provision income to average total assets at
5.57% in H1 2013; (2) historically good asset quality stemming
from a conservative credit risk appetite; and (3) healthy capital
buffers, with a Tier 1 ratio of 14.6% at end-June 2013. In terms
of risk appetite, Moody's notes that the bank's cost of credit
risk (loan loss provisions as a percentage of average gross
loans) was at 3.66% (annualized) in H1 2013, a moderate level for
a Russian bank with a high share of consumer lending operations.


The outlook change to negative primarily reflects the bank's
greater operational focus on consumer lending, which over the
last two years increased to 74.0% of gross loans as of June 2013
(2010: 46.1%).

In addition, the outlook change is driven by (1) deterioration of
the bank's profitability, as ROAAs declined to 1.82% in H1 2013
from a strong 3.54% reported in 2010; and (2) weakening of the
bank's Tier 1 ratio to 14.6% at end-June 2013 (19.8% reported at
year-end 2010).

Moody's believes that these combined weaker trends render the
banks' operations more vulnerable, particularly given the
increasing credit risks in the Russian consumer lending segment.

Moody's also notes that the Russian bank is highly reliant on
wholesale funding sources and has a modest liquidity cushion. As
at end-June 2013, the share of customer deposits in total non-
equity funding stood at 47% and the loan-to-deposit ratio was at
219%. Moody's also notes the limited cushion of highly liquid
assets that accounted for only 7.9% of total assets as of 30 June
2013; this renders the bank's liquidity and profitability
potentially vulnerable to refinancing risks.


The negative outlook indicates that there is currently no upward
pressure on the ratings.

Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s ratings could experience downward
pressure following (1) further weakening in the performance of
non-Russian operations that would increase the convergence
between the risk profiles of Credit Europe Bank N.V. and Credit
Europe Bank Ltd, in the absence of strong revenue
diversification; (2) significant weakening of Credit Europe Bank
Ltd's risk profile; (3) further tightening of Credit Europe Bank
N.V.'s liquidity indicators; and/or (4) further deterioration of
the bank's core capitalization.

Credit Europe Bank Ltd's ratings could be downgraded if (1) the
parent's rating were downgraded; or (2) if the bank's risk
profile, profitability or loss-absorption capacity deteriorated.

HERMES SERIES: Moody's Lowers 15 Notes in Six Dutch RMBS
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded fifteen mezzanine and
junior classes of notes issued in five Dutch residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions of the HERMES
series. Also, Moody's has confirmed the rating of Class C in
actions were prompted by worse-than-expected collateral

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated by
Moody's on April 23, 2013.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade actions take into consideration revision of key
collateral assumptions due to the worse-than-expected performance
and declining house prices in the Netherlands. Today's
confirmation of the rating on Class C in HERMES VIII reflects
sufficient credit enhancement to withstand the increase in key
collateral assumptions and counterparty exposure.

The performance of the HERMES series has been deteriorating. 60+
day delinquencies have been trending above Moody's Dutch RMBS
Performance Index levels by approximately 2% in each reviewed
transaction with the exception of HERMES XV. Cumulative losses
reached approximately 0.1% of the original portfolio balance in
HERMES XV and between 0.5% and 0.75% of the original portfolio
balance in the remaining reviewed transactions.

After considering the current amounts of realized losses and
completing a delinquency roll rate analysis for the portfolio,
Moody's increased its lifetime expected loss assumptions for
HERMES VIII through XII to levels between 1.3% and 1.6% of the
original portfolio balance. The lifetime expected loss assumption
in HERMES XV remains unchanged at 0.75% of the original portfolio
balance. A list of the transactions with the updated assumptions
is available at the following link:


Moody's has re-assessed loan-by-loan information to determine the
MILAN Aaa CE. As a result, Moody's has increased its MILAN Aaa CE
assumption to 12% in HERMES VIII, 13% in HERMES IX through XII
and 7.5% in HERMES XV. This increase is mainly driven by higher
delinquency levels for a relatively smaller outstanding portfolio
compared to closing as well as by declining house prices in the

- Exposure to Counterparty

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the set-off
risk arising from exposure to SNS Bank N.V. as originator in the
six transactions. This exposure is not driving today's downgrade
actions. Each of the six transactions benefits from a commingling
reserve which mitigates the risk of commingling arising from
exposure to SNS Bank N.V. as collection account bank.


Expected loss assumptions remain subject to uncertainties such as
the future general economic activity, interest rates and house
prices. If realised recovery rates were to be lower or default
rates were to be higher than assumed, the rating would be
negatively affected.


Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions" published on 18 July

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed

List of Affected Ratings


  EUR20.5M C Notes, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  EUR37.5M C Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR15M D Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR28.5M E Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  EUR31.5M C Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR9M D Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR27.7M E Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  EUR31.5M C Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
  Apr 23, 2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR9M D Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR27.7M E Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  EUR44M B Notes, Downgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 26,
  2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

  EUR31.9M C Notes, Downgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 26,
  2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

  EUR28.6M D Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Apr
  2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR40.7M E Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


  EUR38.65M D Notes, Downgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Apr
  23, 2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR26.1M E Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Apr 23,
  2013 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


POLIMEX-MOTOSTAL: Creditors Extend Restructuring Deal Deadline
Maciej Martewicz at Bloomberg News reports that Polimex and its
creditors agreed to extend to Oct. 11 from Oct. 4 deadline for
reaching preliminary agreement in talks about debt restructuring.

According to Bloomberg, PKO, the company's biggest creditor, said
last month that both parties may sign new debt deal by

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 2,
2013, Bloomberg News related that Polimex failed to pay interest
on its debt by the June 28 deadline.  The company signed in
December 2012 a deal with creditors allowing it to restructure
outstanding debt and raise new capital, Bloomberg disclosed.

Polimex-Mostostal is a Polish engineering and construction
company that has been on the market since 1945.  The Company is
distinguished by a wide range of services provided on general
contractorship basis for the chemical as well as refinery and
petrochemical industries, power engineering, environmental
protection, industrial and general construction.  The Company
also operates in the field of road and railway construction as
well as municipal infrastructure.  Polimex-Mostostal is a large
manufacturer and exporter of steel products, including platform
gratings, in Poland.


PORTUGAL TELECOM: Moody's Places 'Ba2' CFR on Review for Upgrade
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade the
Ba2 corporate family rating (CFR), the Ba2-PD probability of
default rating (PDR) and the Ba2 senior unsecured long-term debt
ratings of Portugal Telecom SGPS, S.A. Concurrently, Moody's has
placed on review for upgrade the Ba2 ratings of Portugal
Telecom's fully owned subsidiary, Portugal Telecom International
Finance B.V. ("PTIF").

The rating action is triggered by Portugal Telecom's announced
proposal that it will combine its business with Oi S.A. (Baa3
negative; see separate PR), forming a new corporate structure
(CorpCo). The new combined entity will benefit from a minimum
BRL7 billion (EUR2.3 billion) to as much as BRL8 billion (EUR2.7
billion) capital increase and a shareholder restructuring at Oi.

"We are putting Portugal Telecom's ratings on review for upgrade
because if the corporate combination is successfully executed,
the company's bondholders could benefit from an explicit
guarantee from Oi," says Carlos Winzer, a Moody's Senior Vice
President and lead analyst for Portugal Telecom. "The combination
would also likely benefit Portugal Telecom in terms of synergies
and stronger international diversification, and it would become
part of a larger group with greater financial strength. In
addition, a guarantee from Oi could mitigate Portugal Telecom's
exposure to domestic Portuguese sovereign and macroeconomic
risks," adds Mr. Winzer.

The proposed transaction is subject to the successful completion
of the capital increase by Oi, shareholder and regulatory
approvals in Portugal and Brazil and is not expected to close
before June 2014.

Ratings Rationale

The rating review was prompted by Moody's expectation that if
Portugal Telecom's announced intention to combine with Oi is
successfully executed, Portugal Telecom's bondholders could
benefit from an explicit guarantee from Oi. Under the terms of
the transaction being proposed, Portugal Telecom bondholders will
have the option of either being paid at closing or redeeming
their existing bonds into newly issued bonds, which will rank
pari passu with the existing debt of Oi.

The new combined entity will use the capital increase of up to
EUR2.7 billion equivalent (BRL8 billion) to reduce existing debt
both at the holding company level as well as at the operating
company level.

Because of the guarantee to be issued by Oi, Moody's could
upgrade Portugal Telecom's instrument ratings by up to two
notches to the level of Oi's rating after the transaction closes
and assuming all proposed terms and conditions are met. To the
extent that, on completion of the transaction, the new issuing
entity is not Portugal Telecom, and if a separate rating for
Portugal Telecom is no longer appropriate, then Moody's may
ultimately withdraw Portugal Telecom's corporate family and
probability of default ratings.

From a liquidity risk management perspective, Moody's continues
to monitor Portugal Telecom's refinancing plans beyond 2017. The
telecoms operator has no need to issue more debt in the near term
and will only do so to take advantage of opportunities that may
arise in the market. In Moody's view, internal sources and
availability under long-term committed lines of credit should
enable Portugal Telecom to cover its debt maturities of
approximately EUR1.0 billion over the next 18 months and other
expected cash demands over this period. As of June 2013, Portugal
Telecom's cash in Portugal amounted to EUR2.6 billion. In
addition, the company has EUR900 million of undrawn committed
commercial paper and syndicated standby facilities.

Portugal Telecom's rating reflects the business risk that the
company is facing despite (1) its relatively resilient, albeit
highly competitive, underlying business, particularly in the
fixed-line segment; (2) its leading market positions; (3) its
international diversification; (4) management's track record of
executing the company's strategy under adverse circumstances; (5)
high-quality infrastructure, which will support Portugal
Telecom's revenues in the future and help to partially mitigate
the negative effects of the weak macroeconomic environment in
Portugal; and (6) the company's strong liquidity profile, with
pre-funded cash needs until the end of 2017.

However, whilst Moody's acknowledges Portugal Telecom's business
and geographical diversification, quality of execution and strong
liquidity profile, the rating also takes into account the
company's limited ability to isolate itself from (1) stresses in
the debt market for Portuguese issuers; and (2) local economic
and regulatory circumstances, which could worsen as a result of
pressures on the sovereign. Portugal Telecom's rating is weakly
positioned and evidence of a sustainable improvement in credit
metrics is required to preserve the rating.

The rating review will focus on the execution of the proposed


Moody's could upgrade the ratings if Portugal Telecom benefits
from an explicit guarantee from Oi following the completion of
the proposed corporate combination. In addition, upward rating
pressure could result if the rating agency perceives a material
improvement in the overall macroeconomic and market conditions in
Portugal, supported by improving consumer trends and a more
benign competitive environment. Such an improvement would likely
reduce pressure on Portugal Telecom's revenues. Furthermore,
Moody's could upgrade the ratings if Portugal Telecom reduces its
debt and improves its credit metrics and overall operating
performance on a sustainable basis, such that its adjusted net
leverage trends comfortably towards 2.5x and below.

Conversely, Moody's would consider downgrading Portugal Telecom's
ratings if the proposed transaction did not close and there were
signs that the company's liquidity was becoming constrained and
that it might not meet its medium-term funding needs, or if the
company's performance were to deteriorate beyond current
expectations. Specifically, a downgrade could occur if, for
example, (1) Portugal Telecom fails to reduce debt and its credit
metrics deteriorate, such that its adjusted net leverage trends
towards 3.5x over the next couple of years with no expected
improvement; or (2) the company's adjusted retained cash flow
(RCF)/net debt deteriorates towards 15%. Furthermore, Moody's
could consider downgrading Portugal Telecom's ratings in the
event of any further deterioration in the sovereign and broader
macroeconomic environment in Portugal.

Domiciled in Lisbon, Portugal Telecom is the leading
telecommunications operator in Portugal, servicing 5.2 million
fixed lines, which includes one million ADSL retail connections.
In addition, the operator had approximately 7.7 million mobile
phone customers in Portugal as of June 2013. Furthermore,
Portugal Telecom has operations in other countries, including
Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Angola, Sao Tome and Principe and
Namibia. The company's annual revenues amounted to EUR6.3 billion
and reported EBITDA to EUR2.1 billion for the 12-month period to
June 2013.

PORTUGAL TELECOM: S&P Puts 'BB' CCR on CreditWatch Developing
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has placed on
CreditWatch with developing implications its 'BB' long-term
corporate credit ratings on Portuguese telecommunications
provider Portugal Telecom SGPS S.A. (PT) and its wholly owned
subsidiary Portugal Telecom International Finance B.V. (PTIF).
The short-term corporate credit ratings on PT and PTIF were
affirmed at 'B'.

The rating action reflects S&P's belief that both rating upside
and rating downside risk exist, depending on the outcome of PT's
proposed merger with Brazilian telecom company Oi to form a new
entity that would be listed in Brazil.  PT currently holds a 23%
economic interest in Oi.

Should the merger be successful, S&P anticipates that it would
rate the new Brazilian entity higher than our current rating on
PT.  S&P currently rates Oi at 'BBB-/Watch Neg' and, based on
current preliminary evaluation of the transaction, S&P expects to
lower the rating on Oi by no more than one notch if the merger is
completed.  Under S&P's preliminary assessment, the combined
company would post total debt to EBITDA close to 4.0x and funds
from operations to debt between 15% and 20% in 2014 and 2015.
S&P would probably view the new entity's business risk profile as
"satisfactory."  The transaction would result in greater scale,
more geographic diversification, and some operational synergies.

Should the merger be unsuccessful and PT's credit metrics fail to
improve, S&P could consider a downgrade.  S&P believes that the
relentless pressures on PT's domestic EBITDA, stemming from
macroeconomic stresses in Portugal, could prevent its credit
metrics from improving to adequate parameters for the current
ratings.  After a leverage spike in the first semester 2013, S&P
believes that credit metrics for full-year 2013 might fall short
of our previous expectations.  Beyond 2013, despite a recent
decision to trim dividends from 2014, absolute debt reduction
(excluding Oi's proportionately consolidated figures) might not
be sufficient to offset domestic EBITDA declines, which would
therefore prevent any significant deleveraging at the domestic
level in the coming years.

Should the announced merger with Oi complete successfully, S&P
might lift the long-term rating by one notch, given its
anticipation of the likely credit quality of the new combined
entity.  S&P understands that Oi and PT's merger plans include
offering existing lenders of PT and PTIF adequate protection and
exposure to the enlarged group that would own Brazilian,
Portuguese, and international assets.  S&P do not expect an
upgrade to be constrained by the Portuguese sovereign rating,
based on the enlarged group's asset and revenue base outside
Portugal.  If S&P lowered the Portuguese sovereign rating by more
than one notch in the near term, it would only lower the rating
on PT if it believed that the merger's chances of success had
meaningfully weakened in the meantime.

Conversely, should the merger fail, S&P would likely lower the
ratings by one notch.  In addition, S&P would rate PT no higher
than one notch above the Portuguese government, so a downgrade of
Portugal (BB/Watch Neg/B) by several notches might also lead to a
downgrade of PT by more than one notch, in particular if S&P
believed that the combination of declining domestic earnings,
rising leverage, and a failed merger plan could threaten the
company's liquidity in the near term.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch status when the transaction has
closed, which could take longer than the usual three-month
horizon for a CreditWatch placement.


ALLIANCE OIL: S&P Lowers ICR to 'B'; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
issuer credit rating on the Russia-based midsize hydrocarbon
producer and refiner Alliance Oil Co. Ltd. to 'B' from 'B+'.  At
the same time, S&P lowered the Russia national scale rating on
Alliance to 'ruA-' from 'ruA+'.  The outlook is stable.

The rating action reflects S&P's belief that free operating cash
flow (FOCF) will likely stay heavily negative in 2013-2014,
compared with its previous forecast of broadly neutral FOCF for
2014.  Consequently, debt to EBITDA will likely be higher than
what S&P initially expected.

Owing to the unprecedented flood in the Russian Far East, S&P
understands that the completion of the modernization of the
Khabarovsk refinery and its connection to the Eastern Siberia-
Pacific Ocean oil pipeline is going to be delayed.  As a result,
S&P now expects FOCF to stay heavily negative in 2013 and 2014.
Consequently, Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt should increase.

S&P also expects Alliance's EBITDA will weaken over the second
half of 2013 and into 2015, compared with the level for 2012
through the first half of 2013.  S&P believes that the flood will
likely affect Alliance's downstream profits in the second half of
2013.  S&P understands that water levels are quite high and that
Alliance's assets have not suffered damages from the flood and
continue to operate.  However, sales volumes may decline, and
Alliance may not be able to pass the recent increase in domestic
crude oil prices on to the customers.  Moreover, S&P expects
domestic oil prices will further increase after the Russian
government decided to raise mineral extraction tax and reduce
export duty as of 2014.

Alliance's upstream production is expanding, mainly owing to
higher gas production.  But profits per barrel of oil equivalent
are lower than in oil.  Also, sizable tax cuts that Alliance
enjoys for its large Kolvinskoye field expire in 2015.  Under
S&P's base-case scenario of Brent at $95 per barrel (bbl) for the
rest of 2014, $90 in 2015, and $80 thereafter, upstream profits
will contract sharply.

The rating reflects S&P's view of Alliance's business risk
profile as "weak" and financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged." Alliance is smaller and less diverse than other rated
Russian oil companies, and it is more volatile because of a large
downstream segment.  The company has a large investment program
to achieve production growth and complete modernization of its
key refinery, leading to considerably negative FOCF.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Alliance's
liquidity will remain manageable, including covenant compliance.
S&P expects FFO to total debt to be about 15%-20% in 2013 and
about 15% in the longer term.  S&P also estimates adjusted debt
to EBITDA to be about 3.5x-4x in 2013 and about 4x thereafter.

S&P could lower the rating if liquidity becomes "weak," under its
criteria.  S&P could consider a positive rating action if
Alliance successfully completes its key investments, if oil and
product prices are supportive, and if its FOCF becomes positive.

At this moment, S&P considers both scenarios to be remote.

BANK SAINT PETERSBURG: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' IDRs; Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based OJSC Bank Saint
Petersburg (BSPB) Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook. Fitch has also assigned BSPB's upcoming
subordinated loan participation notes (LPN) issue an expected
Long-term rating of 'B+(EXP)'.

Key Rating Drivers - IDRs, National Rating, VR
BSPB's Long-term IDRs are driven by its Viability Ratings (VR) of
'bb-' reflecting bank's significant franchise in St. Petersburg,
its reduced risk appetite and moderate growth, well-managed
liquidity and low market risk. The ratings also reflect modest
capitalization, the relatively high level of problematic
exposures, although they are largely covered by loan impairment
reserves (LIR) and hard collateral, and modest performance.

Total problem loan exposures were 10.9% of gross loans at end-
H113, consisting of non-performing loans (NPLs; overdue more 90
days) of 4.6% and restructured exposures (would be NPLs if not
rolled over) of 6.3%. These problematic loans were reserved by
87%, while the unreserved portion was sufficiently covered by
hard collateral (land or completed real estate). After a detailed
review of the 50 largest loans (60% of the corporate loan book)
Fitch believes that most problems have already crystallized and
expects some moderation of impairment charges in the medium term.

Most problems are in the corporate book, while retail lending is
rather low risk, mainly consisting of mortgage loans and loans to
affluent individuals. Retail NPLs were 2.4% at end-H113.

At end-H113, the Fitch core capital (FCC) ratio was a modest
10.7% (11.5% adjusted for a RUB3 billion injection of new equity
by existing shareholders in September 2013). The regulatory
capitalization ratio under local GAAP (N1) was 11.6% at end-8M13
(12.4% adjusted for the equity injection), enabling the bank to
increase LIR only moderately without breaching the regulatory
minimum of 10%. Fitch estimates the bank would be able to comply
with upcoming Basel III requirements in Russia, and capital
pressure should be manageable due to the moderation of growth to
about 10% per annum. BSPB is not planning to raise further equity
in the medium term, but aims to replace RUB6 billion subordinated
debt, with the 'new style' subordinated issue.

Profitability is modest being pressured by competition from state
banks. The net interest margin contracted to 4.1% in H113 from
5.2% in 2011 and pre-impairment profit was only about 3.6%
(annualized) of gross loans in H113 (3.3% in 2012), offering a
limited additional cushion against potential impairment losses.

Liquidity is adequate. There is some depositor concentration at
the top end (the 10 largest accounted for 16% of total customer
accounts at end-H113), with many being Russian state-related
companies and funds placing money on a tender basis. However, the
bank had a significant cushion of liquid assets (cash and
equivalents, unpledged securities eligible for repo financing
with the central bank and short-term interbank placements) of
RUB63bn at end-7M13. This is sufficient to repay all money market
funding maturing within one year and 15% of customer accounts.

Market risk is limited, as the bank mainly holds investment grade
bonds and is not active in proprietary trading.

Rating Sensitivities - IDRs, National Rating, VR
The ratings could be downgraded in case of a marked deterioration
of the operating environment resulting in erosion of asset
quality and capitalization if not compensated by fresh equity
injections. A significant increase in risk appetite could also be
rating negative.

Upside potential is currently limited. Upward pressure may stem
from improved profitability, capitalization and franchise

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities -- Senior Unsecured Debt and
Subordinated Debt Expected Rating
Senior unsecured debt is rated in line with the bank's IDRs,
reflecting Fitch view on the average recovery prospect in case of

Fitch expects to rate BSPB's "new style" Tier 2 subordinated debt
issues one notch below the bank's 'bb-' VR. This includes (i)
zero notches for additional non-performance risk relative to the
VR, as Fitch believes these instruments should only absorb losses
once the bank reaches, or is very close to, the point of non-
viability; (ii) one notch for loss severity (rather than two, as
these issues would not be deeply subordinated, and will actually
rank pari passu with "old style" subordinated debt in case of a

Any changes to the bank's VR would likely impact the ratings of
both senior and subordinated debt.

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities -- Support Rating and
Support Rating Floor
The '5' Support Rating and 'No Floor' Support Rating Floor
reflect BSBP's limited national franchise, making government
support uncertain. An upgrade of these ratings is unlikely in the
foreseeable future.

BSBP is a medium-sized bank (ranked 14 by total assets at end-
8M13), headquartered in Saint Petersburg. The management controls
49.6% of total bank's shares, East Capital Fund - 8.5%, European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development - 5.5%, while the
remaining shares are free-float.

The rating actions are:


Long-term foreign currency IDR assigned at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR assigned at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR assigned at 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
National Long-term Rating assigned at 'A+(rus)'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating assigned at 'bb-'
Support Rating assigned at '5'
Support Rating Floor assigned at 'NF'
Senior unsecured RUB Issues Long-term rating assigned at
Subordinated debt Long-term rating assigned at 'B+(EXP)'

GAZPROMBANK: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' Rating to US$750MM Notes
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based Gazprombank's US$750
million Series 13 issue of loan participation notes (LPNs) a
final rating of 'BB-'.

Obligations under the issued LPNs are subordinated to the claims
of Gazprombank's depositors and other senior creditors and will
be included in the bank's Tier II capital, subject to the Russian
central bank's permission. The notes carry a fixed coupon of
7.495% and have a maturity date on 28 December 2023.

MOSCOW INTEGRATED: Fitch Keeps BB+ IDRs on Rating Watch Negative
Fitch Ratings is maintaining OJSC Moscow Integrated Power
Company's (MIPC) Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) of 'BB+' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).
This follows the recent ownership change driven by the City of
Moscow's (BBB/Stable/F3) sale of its 89.98% stake in MIPC to OOO
Gazpromenergoholding, a 100% subsidiary of OAO Gazprom
(BBB/Stable) for RUB98.6 billion.

The RWN reflects uncertainty related to the new owner's strategy
regarding MIPC including funding and capex, and any potential
changes to the City of Moscow's subsidies for uneconomic tariffs
following the recent sale. A full list of ratings actions is
provided at the end of this rating action commentary.

Before the recent sale, MIPC's ratings were notched down by two
levels from those of the City of Moscow, its former majority
shareholder, and reflected their strong operational and strategic
ties, including tangible support in the form of subsidies to
cover uneconomic residential tariffs. MIPC's ratings were placed
on RWN on April 4, 2013, due to the planned privatization of the
City of Moscow's stake in the company.

Following the recent disposal, Fitch will re-consider
incorporating the City of Moscow's support into MIPC's ratings
under the agency's Parent-Subsidiary Rating Linkage methodology.
This would depend on its ties with the City of Moscow, if any,
following the disposal, for instance related to subsidies. Fitch
will also analyze the ties with the new owner,
Gazpromenergoholding, under Fitch's Parent-Subsidiary Rating
Linkage methodology and depending on the strength of the ties may
either incorporate parental support into the ratings or the
company's ratings may converge towards its standalone profile.
Fitch assesses MIPC's standalone creditworthiness in the low 'BB'
or high 'B' rating category.

Key Rating Drivers

-- Parental Support

Fitch considers the acquisition of MIPC's stake to be strategic
for Gazpromenergoholding. MIPC's acquisition matches Gazprom's
strategy of vertical integration and creation of the full value
chain and their operational inter-dependence in regard to gas
supplies/purchases. We have not been provided with
Gazpromenergoholding's future strategy regarding MIPC; however,
Fitch would expect the timely financial support to be available
if the need arises. This is based on evidence of support in
another Gazpromenergoholding's subsidiary, OGK-2, which received
a capital injection of about RUB23 billion through an additional
share issue, and partly through a payment terms extension for
OJSC Mosenergo's (BB+/Stable) gas purchases from Gazprom during
the financial and economic crisis.

Fitch notes that gas, used on all MIPC's generation facilities,
is purchased from OAO Gazprom Mezhregiongas Moskva, owned by
Gazprom, and that Mosenergo, owned by Gazprom, is the major
supplier of heat energy to MIPC. Mosenergo supplies about 70% of
its heat to MIPC's network.

Fitch will review MIPC's ratings once the strategy regarding MIPC
including funding and capex, as well as any potential changes to
the subsidies for uneconomic tariffs become clear.

-- Supportive Subsidies

In 2012, MIPC continued to receive large subsidies from Moscow to
cover uneconomic residential utility tariffs. The subsidies
amounted to RUB16.1 billion in 2012 and for 2013 the company
expects to receive about RUB14.5 billion. However, Fitch expects
that over time the subsidies will decrease as Moscow probably
switches to a more targeted subsidization of households by

Modest Tariff Growth

Fitch does not expect significant power volume growth in 2013,
and power and heat price increases in the medium term are likely
to fall below expected inflation. The maximum heat tariff growth
for the City of Moscow for 2013 was approved at 2.7%, starting
from 1 July.

-- Higher Debt

At end-2012, MIPC had unadjusted debt of RUB31.7 billion, up from
RUB21.7 billion at end-2011 and from RUB9.9 billion at end-2009.
Higher leverage is mainly the result of the replacement of
outstanding trade accounts payable to Mosenergo for loans from
Sberbank of Russia (Sberbank, BBB/Stable) in 2011-2012 and partly
as a result of OAO Moskovskaya Teplosetevaya Kompaniya's
consolidation in October 2012.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

-- An economic residential heat tariff and profitable operations.
   However, Fitch does not expect this to happen in the medium

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- the new parent's strategy, which may adversely affect the
   availability of support and the parent-subsidiary arrangements
   put in place (including the effect of possible acquisition

-- A reduction of subsidies or other forms of tangible support
   from the City of Moscow following the privatization.

Liquidity and Debt Structure

Weak but Manageable Liquidity

At end-H113 MIPC had RUB25.7 billion of short-term debt compared
with RUB5 billion of cash in hand, RUB1 billion of unused credit
facilities and RUB7.4 billion under new loan agreement with
Sberbank signed in July 2013. Most of the short-term debt
comprises loans from state-owned Sberbank, which are likely to be
renewed or extended. In July 2013 MIPC redeemed its RUB6 billion
local bonds. In 2011-2012, MIPC rolled over its short-term bank
loans and concluded long-term loan agreements with Sberbank that
mature in 2013-2014. Fitch expects MIPC to roll over its short-
term bank loans in 2013. We expect MIPC's free cash flow to
remain negative in 2013.

Full List of Rating Actions

  Long-term Foreign Currency IDR of 'BB+' maintained on RWN
  Long-term Local Currency IDR of 'BB+' maintained on RWN
  National Long-term Rating of 'AA(rus)' maintained on RWN
  Short-term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
  National Short-term Rating of 'F1+(rus)', maintained on RWN

RASPADSKAYA OAO: Fitch Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based coal producer OAO
Raspadskaya's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'B+', senior unsecured rating at 'B+' (RR4),
Short-term IDR at 'B' and National Long-term rating at 'A(rus)'.
The Outlooks on the Long-term ratings are Stable.

Raspadskaya's standalone rating profile has deteriorated
significantly in 2013, and we expect year-end net leverage to
almost double from 2012. At the same time, we have seen ties with
its 82% parent Evraz plc strengthen since it took control in
January 2013. While we assess the links between the two companies
as strong, the presence of bonds at Raspadskaya which are
currently not covered by cross-default provisions at the parent
means that we notch Raspadskaya's rating down by one notch from
Evraz's 'BB-'/Stable rating.

Key Rating Drivers
One Notch Down from Evraz
Following Evraz's acquisition and consolidation of Raspadskaya,
there is evidence of stronger ties between the companies. Evraz
has historically been a top-three offtaker of Raspadskaya, which
plays a crucial part in its backward integration into coking
coal. The companies perform joint marketing, railway and seaport
logistic operations. The strength of these ties was recently
evidenced by Evraz refinancing most of Raspadskaya's outstanding
bank debt in Q313. However, the lack of legal ties, including
downstream corporate guarantees for Raspadskaya's debt or cross
default provisions, result in a one-notch differential between
the companies' ratings.

Limited Volume
Raspadskaya's new 8mtpa raw coal output guidance for 2013 is well
below its previous plans (12mtpa) due to a combination of volume-
limited Russian markets and a decision not to sell under certain
unprofitable export shipments. Raspadskaya's domestic sales are
limited by the high levels of vertical integration among
potential customers, which we estimate at over 60%.

Low Profit Export Markets
Weak Chinese spot markets and a lack of longer-term contracts
with Japanese and Korean offtakers limit Raspadskaya's
willingness to boost export volumes, which provide the only
alternative to Russian sales. Raspadskaya reported its H113 FCA-
based Asian average export price of US$60/t, marginally above its
US$54/t cash costs for the same period, and contrasting to
US$98/t price on the domestic market. Fitch expects H213 spot
prices to remain broadly flat with single digit price recovery in
2014. Raspadskaya's strategy to increase longer-term coal
supplies to premium Japanese and Korean markets will have a
positive, albeit protracted effect.

2013 Margins Plunge
Raspadskaya's reported H113 EBITDA margin of 9% is well below its
historical double-digit levels, mainly due to the weak demand
environment. Fitch expects Raspadskaya to deliver 2013 EBITDA
margin marginally above 10% due to lower cash costs (H113 level
is 13% lower yoy) and an increasing share of exports to premium
markets. Further margin recovery depends on export price dynamics
and volumes, which directly influence unit cash costs.

2013 Leverage Peak
Despite broadly flat debt at the levels within US$500 million-
US$550 million expected from 2012 onwards, we expect weaker
margins to result in FFO adjusted leverage temporarily peaking at
levels inconsistent with a 'B' rating, which is where we now
assess Raspadskaya's standalone credit profile. We expect a
modest single-digit coal market recovery from 2014 onwards, which
will allow deleveraging back to 3.0x-3.5x levels. Our forecasts
also factor in lower expected capex of around US$100 million per
annum, which will help the company maintain neutral free cash
flow from 2014.

Comfortable Liquidity
Raspadskaya's liquidity position remains comfortable with US$150
million of a total US$156 million short-term bank debt refinanced
in Q313 with Evraz's long-term intra-group loan. The remaining
debt is US$400 million Eurobonds due in 2017. Raspadskaya's net
debt has been rebased within the US$430 million-US$460 million
range since H112 when the company used US$396 million for a one-
off share buyback.

Rating Sensitivities
Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

-- Strengthening of operational links, and, more specifically,
   the legal ties between OAO Raspadskaya and Evraz, including
   a corporate guarantee of Raspadskaya's debt or explicit
   inclusion of Raspadskaya in Evraz Group SA's international
   bonds' cross-default provisions, could lead to the
   equalization of Raspadskaya's ratings with Evraz's.

-- A positive rating action on Evraz plc.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- Evidence of weakening operational and legal ties between Evraz
   and Raspadskaya.

-- A negative rating action on Evraz plc.

TRANSCONTAINER JSC: Moody's Alters Ba3 CFR Outlook to Positive
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive from stable the
outlook on the Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR) and Ba3-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) of TransContainer JSC, a
Russian rail-based container transportation company.
Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed these ratings.

Ratings Rationale

The change of outlook on the ratings to positive reflects the
potential for an upgrade of TransContainer's ratings over the
next 12-18 months, based on Moody's expectation that the company
will maintain its robust operating and financial performance and
leading position in its core Russian market, despite the
increasing competition and volatile railway container
transportation volumes in Russia.

In particular, Moody's expects that the company's debt/EBITDA
will remain below 1.5x, EBIT interest coverage above 6.0x and
retained cash flow (RCF)/debt above 40% on a sustainable basis,
compared with 1.3x, 7.0x and 51.9%, respectively, as of June 2013
(all metrics are as adjusted by Moody's).

Moody's expects there to be no material changes in
TransContainer's business model, strategy and financial policy
for at least 12-18 months after Russian Railways JSC (Baa1
stable) contributes its controlling stake of 50% plus two shares
in TransContainer to a new joint venture (JV), United
Transportation and Logistics Company (UTLC), as was announced in
June 2013. UTLC is Russian Railways' JV with Belarus and
Kazakhstan, which form a customs union with Russia.

In addition to robust operating and financial performance,
TransContainer's ratings continue to reflect the company's (1)
leading position in the Russian rail-based container
transportation market, which has potential for long-term growth;
(2) diversified customer base; and (3) balanced debt maturity
profile and adequate liquidity, which is supported by solid
operating cash flow and capital expenditure (capex) flexibility.

TransContainer's ratings also factor in (1) its exposure to
volatile domestic demand for rail-based container transportation
services, which is vulnerable to a potential deterioration in the
macroeconomic environment and is, to a significant extent, driven
by the volume of exports and imports; (2) increasing competition
and the weakened pricing environment in its core Russian market;
and (3) the company's overall exposure to an emerging market
operating environment with a less developed regulatory, political
and legal framework.


Moody's could consider an upgrade of TransContainer's ratings if
(1) the company continues to demonstrate robust financial
metrics, with debt/EBITDA below 1.5x (as adjusted by Moody's),
and adequate liquidity; and (2) maintains a strong operating
performance, with an operating margin of around 20% (as adjusted
by Moody's) and leading market position, despite the increasing
competition and volatile railway container transportation volumes
in Russia.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade TransContainer's ratings if
its debt/EBITDA were to grow above 2.5x (as adjusted by Moody's)
on a sustained basis, or if its operating performance, market
position or liquidity were to deteriorate materially.

TransContainer is Russia's dominant rail-based container
transportation business, controlled by Russian Railways, which
owns a 50%-plus-two-shares stake in the company. TransContainer
operates a fleet of 25,408 flatcars (as of June 2013). In the
last 12 months to June 2013, TransContainer generated revenue of
RUR37 billion ($1.1 billion) and transported around 1.5 million
twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). Its rail-side container
terminals in Russia had a throughput of around 1.4 million TEUs
in the same period.

* TOMSK OBLAST: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on the Russian region of Tomsk Oblast to 'BB-' from
'BB'.  The outlook is stable.  At the same time, S&P lowered the
Russia national scale rating on Tomsk to 'ruAA-' from 'ruAA'.


The downgrade incorporates S&P's expectation that Tomsk's
budgetary performance in the next three years will be weaker than
it had forecast in its previous base-case scenario, with mounting
debt.  S&P thinks the declining results will be due to sluggish
tax revenue growth, and the continued need to increase social-
related expenditure.

The ratings on Tomsk reflect S&P's view of Russia's "developing
and unbalanced" institutional framework; the region's moderate
wealth levels; a concentrated economy, which exposes its revenues
to the volatility of commodity markets; and "negative" financial
management in an international context, mostly owing to a lack of
reliable medium-term financial planning.  Low budgetary
flexibility and weak budgetary performance also constrain the

Tomsk's modest debt burden, limited contingent liabilities, and
its liquidity, which S&P views as credit "neutral," support the

Tomsk has very limited control over its revenues within the
Russian institutional framework, like other Russian regions.  The
federal government regulates the rates and distribution shares
for most taxes and transfers, leaving only about 6% of operating
revenues that the region can manage.  The federal government's
decisions regarding regional spending responsibilities, which are
sometimes ad hoc, also pressure the oblast's expenditure
flexibility and its budgetary performance.  The president's
decrees issued in 2012 require regions to significantly increase
social spending in the next five years, while the federal
government so far provides only partial financial compensation
for these additional mandates.  Although Tomsk's financial
management has a good record of containing costs, the need to
raise public sector salaries will likely make it increasingly
difficult to curb operating expenditure in the next few years, in
S&P's view.

Apart from systemic constraints, the concentrated economy and the
dependence on tax payments from the few largest taxpayers will
limit the predictability of the oblast's financial indicators.
S&P expected that, despite the ongoing development of the
services sector, in the coming years the regional economy will
remain reliant on the oil and gas sector, which will likely
account for almost 30% of Tomsk's gross regional product and 20%
of revenues. This exposes the economy and tax revenues to
volatility in global commodity markets and changes to the
national tax regime.  These risks have already materialized this
year.  S&P consequently expects the oblast's operating revenue
growth to slow to just 2% because it will lose a portion of
corporate income tax from several large taxpayers due to changes
in tax legislation.

In S&P's base-case scenario for 2013-2015, it expects the
oblast's budgetary performance to be weak.  S&P now forecasts the
oblast's operating balance to be negative on average, contrary to
its previous expectations for a small operating margin and an
average surplus of 1.5% of operating revenues in 2010-2012.  The
average deficit after capital accounts will likely exceed 5% of
total revenues compared with only 1.5% on average reported in
2010-2012. In S&P's base case, it now assumes that continued
fiscal consolidation, underpinned by some flexibility left within
the oblast's operating and capital expenditure, and a rebound in
operating revenues might lead to a gradual improvement in
performance in 2015-2016.

In 2013, Tomsk's tax-supported debt will likely exceed 30% of
consolidated operating revenues, compared with 22% on average in
2010-2012, due to gradual direct debt accumulation.  However, it
will still remain modest at about 35% in 2014-2015.  Guarantees
that the oblast provides to its government-related entities
(GREs) are included in tax-supported debt.  Outstanding
contingent liabilities are limited, in S&P's view.

S&P views Tomsk's financial management as a "negative" factor for
its creditworthiness in an international context, as it do for
most Russian local and regional governments.  In S&P's view,
although the oblast has a good record of expenditure and debt
management, it lacks reliable long-term financial planning.  The
oblast also doesn't have sufficient mechanisms that could protect
its financials from the volatility that stems from economic and
tax-base concentration risks.


S&P views Tomsk's liquidity as "neutral," as defined in its
criteria.  S&P expects the oblast's net average cash and
committed bank lines to exceed its debt service falling due
within the next 12 months.  At the same time, S&P views Tomsk's
access to external liquidity as "limited," given the weaknesses
of the domestic capital market.

In S&P's base-case scenario it expects that in 2013-2014, Tomsk
will maintain its practice of keeping modest cash reserves on its
accounts while organizing committed bank facilities for
refinancing well ahead of maturities.

S&P forecasts that, over the next 12 months, Tomsk's cash net of
the deficit after capital accounts will equal about Russian ruble
(RUB) 900 million (roughly US$30 million).

At the same time, the oblast will likely keep sufficient undrawn
amounts in bank lines.  As of Sept. 1, 2013, the oblast had
RUB4.4 billion in unused bank lines with maturities exceeding one
year, which it can use to cover the deficit after capital
accounts or refinance debt maturities.

Consequently, Tomsk's average net free cash and committed credit
lines will exceed 120% of debt service falling due within the
next 12 months, which S&P estimates at about RUB4.4 billion.  S&P
expects that, due to the lower deficit after capital accounts,
the average free cash and debt service coverage ratio throughout
2014 might increase.

S&P assumes in its base case that Tomsk will continue relying on
medium- to long-term borrowing.  This is likely to support a
smooth debt repayment profile and keep debt service at about 11%
of operating revenues in 2013-2015.


The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that a modest recovery in
Tomsk's revenues will support its budgetary performance and
stabilize its debt burden by 2015.  S&P also expects that
liquidity will remain "neutral" for the ratings thanks to prudent
committed facilities management and reliance on medium- to long-
term borrowing.

S&P could take a negative rating action within the next 12 months
if, in line with its downside scenario, the oblast depleted its
cash due to weaker revenues and loosened control over spending
and had lower amounts available in committed credit facilities,
prompting the debt service coverage ratio to fall below 120%.  It
would expose the oblast to refinancing risks and lead S&P to
revise its view of Tomsk's liquidity to "negative."

S&P could take a positive rating action within the next 12 months
if a stronger rebound in revenues enabled the oblast to achieve
moderate budgetary performance with a positive operating balance,
and to decrease its tax-supported debt to below 30% of
consolidated operating revenues.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.


                                      To             From
Tomsk Oblast
Issuer Credit Rating                 BB-/Stable/--  BB/Stable/--
Russia National Scale                ruAA-/--/--    ruAA/--/--
Senior Unsecured                     BB-            BB
Senior Unsecured                     ruAA-          ruAA


IM TERRASSA: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
IM TERRASSA 1 FTGENCAT, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class
C, D, and E notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its rating
on the class A(G) notes.

The rating actions are due to the increasing deleveraging of the
notes and the transaction's stable performance (based on the
latest available investor report and portfolio data from the
servicer), and the application of S&P's criteria for European
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) backed by small and
midsize enterprises (SMEs) and our current counterparty criteria.

                           CREDIT ANALYSIS

S&P has applied its updated European SME CLO criteria to
determine the scenario default rates (SDRs) for this transaction.

S&P's qualitative originator assessment is moderate because of
the lack of data the originator, Unnim Banc (now merged with
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. [BBVA]), provided.  Taking
into account Spain's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) of 6, S&P has applied a one-notch downward adjustment to
the archetypal European SME average credit quality assessment.
S&P further applied a portfolio selection adjustment of minus two
notches based on the transaction's performance.  As a result,
S&P's average credit quality assessment of the portfolio is

The originator did not provide S&P with internal credit scores,
therefore it assumed that each loan in the portfolio had a credit
quality that is equal to its average credit quality assessment of
the portfolio.  Given the significant portion of self-employed
borrowers in the pool (about 40% of the outstanding balance of
the loans), to determine the portfolio's 'AAA' SDR, S&P splits
its analysis into two sections (SMEs and self-employed).

For the self-employed part of the pool, S&P's took into account
the level of defaults that the loans have had, which was 1.49% of
the pool's outstanding balance at July 2013.  For the SME part of
the pool, the level of defaults was 9.96%.  S&P used CDO
Evaluator to determine the 'AAA' SDR for the SME part of the
pool.  S&P determined that the whole portfolio's 'AAA' SDR is

S&P has reviewed historical originator default data, and assessed
market trends and developments, macroeconomic factors, changes in
country risk, and the way these factors are likely to affect the
loan portfolio's creditworthiness.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's 'B' SDR is 7%.

The SDRs for rating levels between 'B' and 'AAA' are interpolated
in line with S&P's European SME CLO criteria.

                      RECOVERY RATE ANALYSIS

At each liability rating level, taking into account the observed
historical recoveries, S&P assumed a weighted-average recovery
rate (WARR) by taking into consideration the asset type, its
seniority, and the country recovery grouping.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's WARR assumptions in 'A+',
'BBB+', and 'B+' scenarios were 43.23%, 46.70%, and 60.42%,

                        CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P subjected the capital structure to various cash flow
scenarios, incorporating different default patterns and interest
rate curves, to determine each tranche's passing rating level
under our European SME CLO criteria.  In addition, S&P gave
benefit to the swap in its analysis of up to one notch above the
rating on the swap counterparty.

                        SUPPLEMENTAL TESTS

S&P's ratings on the class A(G), C, D, and E notes were not
constrained by the application of the supplemental tests, as the
maximum ratings achievable resulting from the tests were
'AAA (sf)' for class A(G) notes and 'A+ (sf)' for class C, D, and
E notes.  This was due the transaction's diversification, despite
its pool factor (the percentage of the pool's outstanding
aggregate principal balance) of 11.16%.

                         COUNTERPARTY RISK

As swap counterparty, Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment
Bank (A/Negative/A-1) covers basis risk and ensures a certain
yield in the transaction.  S&P has reviewed the swap
counterparty's downgrade provisions in the swap documentation,
which do not comply with its current counterparty criteria.
Under the swap agreement, the swap counterparty is eligible to
remain in the transaction, but the remedy actions covenanted in
the agreement do not comply with S&P's current counterparty
criteria. Therefore, under S&P's current counterparty criteria,
it caps the rating uplift at one notch above its rating on the
swap counterparty.  If the agreement were amended to be to be
fully in line with S&P's current counterparty criteria, its
analysis indicates that the class A(G) notes could achieve a 'AA-
(sf)' rating.

Consequently, S&P has affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the class
A(G) notes.  At the same time, based on their considerable
deleveraging and the application of S&P's European SME CLO
criteria, it has raised to 'A+ (sf)' from 'A (sf)' its rating on
the class C notes, to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' its rating on
the class D notes, and to 'BB (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on
the class E notes.

IM TERRASSA 1 FTGENCAT is a cash flow CLO transaction that
securitizes a portfolio of SME loans that Unnim Banc (now merged
with BBVA) originated in Catalonian.  The transaction closed in
November 2005.


SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:



Class               Rating
            To                From

IM TERRASSA 1 FTGENCAT, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR320 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed

A(G)        A+ (sf)

Ratings Raised

C           A+ (sf)           A (sf)
D           BBB+ (sf)         BBB- (sf)
E           BB (sf)           B+ (sf)

* Moody's: Spanish RMBS Market Shows Signs of Stabilization
The performance of the Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) market has been showing signs of stabilization
in the three-month period leading up to July 2013, according to
the latest indices published by Moody's Investors Service.

Moody's index of cumulative defaults remained at 3.27% of the
original balance, the same level as in June 2013. In July 2013,
60+ day delinquencies increased to 3.51% of the current balance,
up from 3.42% In March 2013 but down from 3.60% in June and 3.53%
in May. Delinquencies 90+ days stood at 2.41% of the current
balance in July 2013, slightly lower than the three previous
months and flat relative to March 2013.

The reserve funds of 90 transactions are currently below their
target levels, a decrease from 98 transactions in March. 22 of
these reserve funds are fully drawn down. 13 deals have breached
their interest deferral triggers, affecting 19 tranches. Moody's
also notes that the annualized constant prepayment rate (CPR)
decreased to 3.85% in July 2013, down from 4.13% in March 2013

Overall, Moody's currently rates 182 transactions in the Spanish
RMBS market, with a total outstanding pool balance of EUR96.5
billion as of July 2013.

Moody's outlook for Spanish RMBS remains negative.

Moody's concluded its review of the Spanish RMBS transactions,
following the downgrade of Spanish government bond ratings to
Baa3 in June 2012, the revision of key collateral for the entire
Spanish RMBS market and the introduction of a new methodology to
assess country risk in March 2013. As a result, 410 tranches were
downgraded (81% of the outstanding total), by an average of 3
notches; while 96 tranches were affirmed at its current rating
and only 3 tranches were upgraded. Country risk exposure and in
some cases linkage to counterparties were the main drivers for
these rating actions.


FERREXPO PLC: Fitch Affirms 'B' Issue Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed UK-incorporated Ukrainian iron ore
pellets producer Ferrexpo plc's Long- and Short-term Issue
Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B'. The Outlook on the Long-term IDR is
Negative. In addition, the senior unsecured rating of Ferrexpo
Finance plc's 2016 guaranteed notes issue was also affirmed at
'B' with a Recovery Rating (RR) of 'RR4'.

The ratings of Ferrexpo continue to reflect its competitive cost
position in the iron ore pellets market, its significant reserve
base, the favorable location of its core production assets, and
expected moderate leverage over the medium term. The ratings are
constrained by the Ukraine's sovereign rating (B/Negative) due to
the company's large operational exposure to that country. Absent
the sovereign constraint Fitch would view Ferrexpo's standalone
rating as 'B+'.

Key Rating Drivers

Ratings Constrained by Sovereign

Ferrexpo's ratings remain constrained by Ukraine's rating due to
its operating base within the country, as well as its exposure to
the weak domestic political, financial and regulatory
environment. In recent periods this risk has been reflected in
rising energy costs as well as in a significant amount of
outstanding VAT receivables due from the government. The
company's lack of geographic and commodity diversification are
also rating constraints.

Competitive Cost Producer

Ferrexpo retains a strong cost position in the upper second
quartile of the global cost curve. Cash operating costs have,
however, increased consistently in recent periods. Costs
increased 18% yoy in 2012 and reached US$60 per tonne in H113, up
from US$51 in 2011, due to the Yeristovo mine ramp-up, higher
Ukrainian energy tariffs, and oil price increases.

Expected Financial Performance

Over the next two to three years the primary influences on
Ferrexpo's revenues are expected to be rising volumes from the
ramp-up of the Yeristovo mine offset by declining market prices
for iron ore products. Fitch expects spot iron ore prices to
average US$110 per tonne in 2014 before declining to US$90 per
tonne in the medium term. Under Fitch's conservative operating
assumptions funds from operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage
will remain below 2.0x in 2013/14 before peaking around 2.25x in

Favourable Location

Ferrexpo benefits from a favorable location at its Poltava and
Yeristova mines, with strong access to the Black Sea ports and
into central Europe via rail and waterway links. The company is
also well-located to access Middle Eastern and Asian markets
which are the current areas of new export growth.

Rating Sensitivities

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- Downgrade of Ukraine's rating

-- FFO net leverage sustained above 2x (applicable only to
   'B+' standalone rating)

-- EBITDA margins consistently below 18% (applicable only to 'B+'
   standalone rating).

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

-- Upgrade of Ukraine's rating to Ferrexpo's standalone level
   of 'B+'

-- FFO net leverage below 1.0x on a sustained basis (applicable
   only to 'B+' standalone rating)

-- A reduction in key customer concentration and an increase in
   scale and diversification (applicable only to 'B+' standalone

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BEATBOX BARS: Buffalo Bought Out of Administration by 8 Bar Blue
Wales Online reports that Buffalo, which was owned by Beatbox
Bars Limited, has been acquired by bar management company 8 Bar
Blue Limited out of administration in a deal which has
safeguarded 22 jobs in the process.

According to Wales Online, nationwide insolvency practitioners
was appointed administrator by the Board of Beatbox Bars in July
and traded the company for two months with existing staff while
buyers were sought, Wales Online recounts.

Michael Griffiths and Daniel Rickard formed 8 Bar Blue Limited
and began trading at the beginning of August from its Celtic
Gateway offices in Cardiff, Wales Online relates.

Mr. Griffiths, director of 8 Bar Blue Limited, said he and his
business partner intend to trade up until Christmas as Buffalo to
enable them to assess the business and what investment may be
required, Wales Online notes.

Beatbox Bars also ran Cardiff city centre venue Fire Island.

CLARIS LIMITED: Moody's Lowers $10MM CDO Notes Rating to 'Caa2'
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has downgraded the
rating of the following notes issued by Claris Limited:

  Series 96/2007 Tranche 1 USD 10,000,000 Sonoma Valley 2007-3
  Synthetic CDO of CMBS Variable Notes due 2037, Downgraded to
  Caa2 (sf); previously on Oct 10, 2012 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

This transaction is a static synthetic CDO backed by a portfolio
of equally weighted US CMBS assets.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the overall credit deterioration of the portfolio. Five
underlying assets, representing about 18.5% of the portfolio,
were recently downgraded from 1 to 3 notches. The 10-year
weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the pool is 85,
equivalent to A2. This compares to a 10-year WARF of 45 from the
previous rating action.

The rated tranche, being an equity piece, is highly sensitive to
the credit quality of the worst rated assets in the pool because
of the lumpiness of the pool. Each obligor represents 3.7% of the
pool which currently covers the entire rated tranche. If one
obligor defaults with a recovery less than 80% the tranche would
be 100% written down.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used CDOROM(TM) to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The Moody's
CDOROM(TM) is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes the Moody's
default probabilities as input. Each corporate reference entity
is modelled individually with a standard multi-factor model
incorporating intra- and inter-industry correlation. The
correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. In each
Monte Carlo scenario, defaults are simulated. Losses on the
portfolio are then derived, and allocated to the notes in reverse
order of priority to derive the loss on the notes issued by the
Issuer. By repeating this process and averaging over the number
of simulations, an estimate of the expected loss borne by the
notes is derived. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

Moody's notes that in arriving at its ratings of SF CDOs, there
exist a number of sources of uncertainty, operating both on a
macro level and on a transaction-specific level. Primary sources
of assumption uncertainty are the extent of the slowdown in
growth in the current macroeconomic environment and the
commercial and residential real estate property markets. While
commercial real estate property markets are gaining momentum, a
consistent upward trend will not be evident until the volume of
transactions increases, distressed properties are cleared from
the pipeline and job creation rebounds. Among the uncertainties
in the residential real estate property market are those
surrounding future housing prices, pace of residential mortgage
foreclosures, loan modification and refinancing, unemployment
rate and interest rates.

EMPIRE MEATS: In Administration, Cuts 40 Jobs
Margaret Canning at Belfast Telegraph reports that 40 jobs have
been lost in a border area of Co Fermanagh after a family-run
food company went into administration.

Empire Meats in Roslea, which traded as Flynn's Fine Foods,
processed and sold meat products to shops and wholesalers, went
into administration on Sept. 4, according to Belfast Telegraph.

The report notes that in a statement, administrators Gregg
Sterritt and Stephen Armstrong of RSM McClure Watters said:
"Unfortunately, the company experienced deterioration in trading
over the past number of months which resulted in significant
cashflow pressures. . . . These pressures ultimately led to the
company ceasing to trade prior to the appointment of the
administrators. . . . There was no alternative but to make the
company's 40 employees redundant on September 5."

The report relates that Ulster Unionist MLA Tom Elliott said:
"This number of job losses will be a blow in the area as they
would have been a significant employer."

Empire Meats was set up in 2005.

HAWKE INDUSTRIES: In Administration, 69 Jobs at Risk
Insider Media Limited News reports that Hampshire-based
engineering and manufacturing business Hawke Industries has
fallen into administration putting 69 jobs at risk, Insider can

Joint administrators at FRP Advisory have now been appointed to
manage the affairs of the Totton-based company.

A spokesman for FRP told Insider the company had run into acute
financial difficulties in regard to its short-term trading
activities, according to Insider Media Limited News.

The report relates that administrators have taken control the
business' three sites in Totton, Chelmsford and High Wycombe in a
bid to find a buyer.

The report notes that FRP said business was continuing as usual
while the company is being marketed for sale.

Hawke Industries is made up broadly of four business areas: oil
and gas, aerospace and defence, medical and industrial

KILMARNOCK FC: Fans Fear Administration
Colin Duncan at Daily Record and Sunday Mail reports that
Kilmarnock Football Club fans' fear the club will follow Hearts
and Dunfermline into administration if embattled chairman Michael
Johnston continues to go it alone.

Fans groups have urged the under-fire Rugby Park supremo to
either start working with them or to hand over the club to
someone who can safeguard their future, according to Daily Record
and Sunday Mail

The report relates that the Kilmarnock Supporters Association
have invited Johnston to attend a crisis meeting at the town's
Grand Hall next October 12.

The report notes that Mr. Johnston has been subjected to
increasing protests in recent seasons with significant numbers of
the Killie support refusing to attend matches until he
relinquishes his position.

The report discloses that with revenue dropping rapidly, fans are
incensed at Mr. Johnston constant refusal to welcome on board
local businessmen and women, who have offered to help out.

The report recalls that the Ayr-based lawyer has been at the helm
since 2005 when former owner Jamie Moffat stepped down and
effectively handed him the club for free.  The report relates
that for the past eight years, Mr. Johnston has stood accused of
running the club like a dictatorship and treating Kilmarnock like
his own personal fiefdom.

The report notes that Mr. Johnston has been taking almost
GBP100,000 annually from the club - Johnston admitting he takes a
salary of around GBP60,000 while also paying himself for the bulk
of the club's legal work.

The report relates that KSA vice chairman James Morrison, a Troon
solicitor, feels enough is enough.

There are worries Kilmarnock could be the next Dunfermline or the
next Hearts . . . . Michael needs to bring in people with money
because he has not invested any himself . . . . The whole
situation is strange because we have somebody who has not
invested a single penny in a company but is effectively the
chairman and is the majority shareholder, collecting a
substantial salary. . . . The supporters' association represents
the fans and because Michael has not embraced us, there is a
significant number who feel his presence is detrimental to the
club. . . . The fact Kilmarnock are a one-man board is part of
the historic problem.  He never paid anything for the shares. . .
. Michael needs the football club to sustain the lifestyle for
him and his family. . . There is an element of fans who will not
go back while Johnston is there," the report quoted Mr. Morrison
as saying.

The report notes that with attendances dwindling and Killie still
searching for their first win of the season under new manager
Allan Johnston patience is wearing thin.

The report relates that Michael Johnston has denied claims he
asked for GBP2.5 million to sell his shares he received for
nothing and is adamant he is only doing what is best for the
ailing Ayrshire outfit.

LCP PROUDREED: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
Fitch Ratings has downgraded LCP Proudreed Plc's class A
commercial mortgage-backed floating rate notes due 2016 and
affirmed all other classes as follows:

  GBP231.1m class A (XS0233008936) downgraded to 'A+sf' from
  'AAsf'; Outlook Negative

  GBP32.2m class B (XS0233010163) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook

  GBP36.8m class C (XS0233010676) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook

  GBP9.2m class D (XS0233011054) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrade of the class A notes reflects a reduction in
occupancy of the commercial properties underlying the main loan,
which in Fitch's view weakens the loan's refinancing prospects.
While this loan, the GBP266 million LCP loan, has the backing of
its sponsor and is still expected to refinance in 2014, the
possibility of it entering a two-year tail period is no longer
consistent with a 'AAsf' rating.

In the last 12 months, London and Cambridge has shown commitment
to its loan by injecting equity, both cash and collateral (GBP7
million of debt repayment and GBP12 million of property), to
comply with the 70% loan to value ratio (LTV) covenant. This is a
positive sign as to the sponsor's access to unencumbered assets,
more of which may need to be called on to achieve a debt
refinancing. Sentiment in regional UK real estate markets
continues to improve, although it remains vulnerable to an
economic shock.

Across the 120 property LCP portfolio, vacancy has tripled to 15%
at the August 2013 interest payment date (IPD) from 5% recorded
in late 2009. The market value of the pool has reduced as a
consequence, although the effect on loan credit quality has been
mitigated by the aforementioned equity injection. Fitch believes
the LTV of the LCP loan is over 10% higher than the 69.8% (which
reflects a June 2013 Jones Lang Lasalle valuation arranged by the

The GBP43 million Proudreed loan is secured by a portfolio of
eight commercial properties dominated by a Basingstoke shopping
centre anchored by Asda on a lease expiring in 2029. A July 2012
valuation reports LTV just under the 70% covenant, although as
with LCP Fitch's estimate is in excess of 80%, which suggests
refinancing prospects will depend on an injection of equity.

The transaction is a securitization of two commercial mortgage
loans originated in the UK by HSBC Bank plc (AA-/Stable/F1+),
which closed in 21 December 2005. The loans are secured against
123 commercial properties located across England, comprising
retail (65%), industrial (34%) and a small proportion of office.

Rating Sensitivities

With both loans maturing in August 2014, the agency expects to
see some progress towards refinancing within the next six months.
A lack of progress may warrant a further downgrade insofar as it
signals weaker-than-expected lender appetite for exposure to
properties of the kind that secure the two loans.

LLOYD'S SYNDICATE 0260: Moody's B- Rating on Review for Downgrade
Moody's Analytics placed the B- (Below Average), stable
outlook, Continuity Opinion of Lloyd's syndicate 0260 (Canopius
Managing Agents Limited) under review for possible downgrade in
light of the announcement that there is potential uncertainty
over the syndicate trading forward for 2014.

The syndicate, 92% backed by Canopius Group Ltd and with a 2013
capacity of GBP70 million, writes a specialist Motor account.

In a recently released auction announcement, Canopius stated that
Lloyd's had indicated that its decision concerning the
syndicate's trading for the 2014 year of account, the approval of
its Syndicate Business Forecast (SBF) and any conditions with
regard to that, would not be advised until later in October 2013.
Canopius acquired the operation in June 2010 and have been re-
underwriting the account, although the open year, 3-year account
forecasts for the 2011 and 2012 accounts are currently forecast
to be loss-making, with mid-point losses of respectively 7% and
5% of capacity currently forecast. The current 2014 proposed SBF,
which has yet to be approved by Lloyd's, is for a loss of 5% of

Canopius had sought to acquire the remaining capacity on the
syndicate earlier this year and had intended to merge syndicate
260's business into Canopius managed syndicates 958 and 4444,
which write business in parallel, subject to Lloyd's approval.
However, with the offer not being accepted by some of the
remaining third party members, the syndicate was due to trade
forward as a stand-alone syndicate for 2014.

The latest auction announcement has now raised some uncertainty
over the syndicate trading forward for 2014.  However, with
Canopius having confirmed its commitment to syndicate 260's
business, Moody's commented that in terms of continuity of
business relationships, it considered the likelihood of the
business being placed into run-off at the end of 2013 as limited,
with it more likely that the syndicate would eventually be merged
into syndicates 958 and 4444.

With regard to potential future returns for investors
articipating on syndicate 260, Moody's stated that, should the
syndicate be merged into syndicates 958 and 4444, it expected
that a risk premium in terms of syndicate 260's RITC was likely
to apply, with the potential for returns for investors to be more
in line with benchmarks for the C+ (Below Average) peer group,
albeit that any such risk premium was likely to be significantly
less than might apply were the syndicate's business be placed
into run-off.  In terms of reported annual results since the
Canopius acquisition, the syndicate recorded a loss of 7% NPE on
an annually accounted basis for 2012 on a combined ratio of 112%
(including forex) at 31.12.12, having recorded a loss of 23% NPE
for 2011 on a combined ratio of 123%, with 2-year average results
currently being in line with C+/B- continuity opinion benchmark
returnsin terms of indicative average annual returns on capital.

LLOYD'S SYNDICATE 0382: Moody's Puts 'B(Ave)' Rating on Review
Moody's Analytics downgraded the B+ (Above Average), under review
for possible downgrade, Continuity Opinion of Lloyd's syndicate
0382 (Hardy (Underwriting Agencies) Limited) to B (Average). The
downgrade was in light of the syndicate having recorded further
annual losses in 2012, following losses in 2011, which were
outside expectations for its peer group, and with Moody's
internal scorecard, based on indicative returns on capital,
indicating a score of B (s). The outlook for the Opinion is

The syndicate, 100% backed by CNA Financial Corporation and with
a 2013 capacity of GBP330 million, writes a short tail, composite
account.  The syndicate recorded a loss of 9% NPE on an annually
accounted basis for 2012 on a combined ratio of 111% (including
forex) at 31.12.12, having previously recorded a loss of 20% NPE
for 2011 on a combined ratio of 121% at Dec. 31, 2011.

Moody's stated that, in terms of reported results, on a cross-
cycle basis the syndicate had recorded average profits of 8% of
NPE for 2004 to 2012 under annual accounting, performing in line
with B+ (Above Average) continuity opinion benchmark returns in
terms of indicative average annual returns on capital.  However,
the results included an exceptional foreign exchange gain of 21%
NPE for 2008, with returns in line with B (Average) benchmarks
based on adjusted results reflecting market average foreign
exchange gains for 2008. Moody's internal scorecard, based on
indicative annual returns on capital, also indicates a score of
B(s).  Moody's noted that the losses recorded in 2011 and 2012
had primarily been due to the Property Catastrophe account which
had been significantly restructured since 2011, with the book
reducing to18% of the book in 2012 from 35% of the book in 2011.
New capital had also come in to underpin the business with CNA
Financial (operating companies Moody's Investors Service A3,
positive outlook, Insurance Financial Strength Ratings) acquiring
the business in 2012, albeit that the syndicate represented only
circa 5% of the group's business.

However, with the further losses recorded in 2012 materially
outside expectations for its peer group and Moody's internal
scorecard, based on indicative annual returns on capital,
currently indicating a score of B (s), Moody's considers that
despite the additional support from CNA underpinning the business
and the restructuring of the Property Treaty account, the
syndicate's Continuity Opinion is best positioned towards
the top of the B (Average) peer group at this stage of its
development. Syndicate 0382's B+ (Above Average) Continuity
Opinion has therefore been downgraded to B(Average), reflecting
Moody's view of relative performance and continuity prospects for
the syndicate over the insurance cycle. The outlook for the
Opinion is stable.

The last action was in July 2013 when the syndicate's B+(Above
Average), stable outlook, Continuity Opinion was placed under
review for possible downgrade.

PIHL: Over-Aggressive Expansion, Costs Overruns Prompt Collapse
Keith Findlay at The Press and Journal reports that Pihl, the
Danish construction firm behind Aberdeen University's GBP57-
million library and a GBP120-million school-building program, has
gone bust.

According to The Press and Journal, Pihl filed for bankruptcy,
blaming over-aggressive expansion in Denmark and overseas and
cost overruns on several projects.

Its UK interests, which were run from a head office in Aberdeen,
are now under the administration of accountant and business
adviser Baker Tilly, The Press and Journal discloses.

SEEKER PHOTOGRAPHY: In Administration, With GBP40,000 Debts
Darren Slade at Daily Echo reports the publisher of a fortnightly
free newspaper has gone into administration.

Seeker Photography, which traded as Seeker News, ceased trading
with debts estimated at GBP40,000, according to Daily Echo.

The paper employed four people including proprietor and editor
Steve Cook and his wife Dawn.  The rest of its contributors were

The report relates that a statement from proprietor Steve Cook
said:  "It is with regret that we've taken the decision to end
publication of Seeker News with immediate effect.  The support
we've received from readers and advertisers has been wonderful
and is greatly appreciated . . . . Unfortunately, the industry-
wide decline in revenues from advertising within print media
meant that although the content and design of the paper delivered
everything we set out to achieve, the commercial side of the
operation struggled to keep pace with the growth of the
publication. . . . We have exciting plans for the future which I
hope to confirm shortly.  Thank you for all your support."

The report relates that Mark Liddle, of insolvency specialist
Mark Liddle Partnership Ltd, confirmed he was dealing with the
administration process.  Mr. Liddle said the company would be
liquidated in the first week of November, when there would be a
creditors' meeting, the report notes.

Public relations and photography company Seeker Photography
published the title first as a monthly magazine, then re-launched
it as a fortnightly newspaper last year.  It had an initial print
run of 10,000.  The title was distributed mainly through
supermarkets, leisure centers, hotels, cafes and hospitals in
Bournemouth and Poole.

TIUTA PLC: To Be Liquidated After Administration
Paul Thomas at mortgagestrategy News reports that the
administrators of Tiuta plc last week began to place the bridging
lender into liquidation.

Creditors have passed the resolution to put Tiuta into
liquidation and the lender will be liquidated once Companies
House has been notified, according to mortgagestrategy News.  The
report relates that the firm was placed into administration in
September last year, although the administration order expires on
September 27, 2013.

The report notes that Tiuta funded its lending with a GBP106
million funding line from the GBP118million Income Series 1 fund
provided by Connaught Asset Management, which is currently in
administration after huge shortfalls were discovered in several
of its funds, two of which provided funding lines to Tiuta

The report relates that when the funding line was agreed, in
April 2008, a guarantee was agreed whereby Tiuta promised to
guarantee all obligations to the fund, regardless of whether its
loans were redeemed fully or not.  The Tiuta subsidiary which
used the Series 1 funding line was called Tiuta International
Limited, which was later purchased by CAM, the report says.

The report relays that a statement published by Tiuta's
administrators on Companies House this week shows the fund has
lodged a GBP106million claim against the lender, citing the

The report notes that in the statement it says Tiuta's joint
administrators, David Rubin & Partners and Duff & Phelps, have
sought legal advice and have found the guarantee is enforceable.

However, the report relates that a source at David Rubin &
Partners who is working on the administration said, as an
unsecured creditor, the fund will only be paid if any Tiuta
assets are realized in the liquidation process.

The report relays that the last available accounts for Tiuta show
the lender made a GBP37.8million loss in the 18 months to
September 2011.

Duff & Phelps will handle the liquidation process.

Tiuta entered administration on September 21, 2012, about 10 days
after the former regulator, the FSA, confirmed it had approved
the decision.

* UK: Over A Quarter of Firms Entering Administration Survives
Hanna Sharpe at Business Sale Report News, citing research,
reports that twenty-seven per cent of UK businesses that enter
administration emerge intact and carry on trading in some form.

This indicates that buyers' efforts to rescue failed businesses
are largely successful, given that the worst cases will have no
bidders, according to Business Sale Report News.

Business Sale Report News notes that the survey was conducted by
research consultancy ComRes for the insolvency practitioner's
trade body R3.

Business Sale Report News says that the research confirms that a
company's fall into administration does not automatically signal
the death of a business.  In many instances, administration
actually facilitates a restructuring, putting the company on a
new path to growth, the report relates.

The report notes that ComRes interviewed 429 UK insolvency
practitioners (IPs) between December 12, 2012 and January 22,
2013.  The information garnered shows that out of all businesses
that had recently entered formal administration processes with
these IPs, 27 per cent continued to trade in some capacity,
Business Sale Report News discloses.

Business Sale Report News relates that many of these secured
businesses will have been bought by another company, or purchased
in a pre-pack administration, before being pared down or
restructured into profitable enterprises.  The survey revealed
that 6,100 businesses were saved out of administration, with
about 761,000 jobs secured, the report says.

The report relays that a total of 22,590 businesses entered
administration during 2012, representing an 11 per cent drop from
a peak in 2009 of 25,432 businesses.

The report notes that former R3 President Lee Manning observed:
"The insolvency profession may seem at first glance an unlikely
saviour of businesses and jobs, but a struggling business may
well survive in some form. . . . The findings also highlight
practitioner work involves advising a business pre-insolvency or
restructuring, often overlooked and by necessity under the radar.
Our insolvency regime is shown to be flexible with a variety of
options to suit any distress situation.  I am heartened by the
high numbers of jobs saved and the contribution that is making to
the UK economy."

The report relates that there has been widespread media coverage
of scores of companies that have stepped in to purchase and
rescue failed businesses over the course of the recession.  The
research hints at the value existing in distressed businesses.

Business Sale Report News discloses that many of these
opportunities are now becoming highly competitive amongst buyers.

* Matt Dunham Joins Smith & Williamson
Adam Jupp at Manchester Evening News reports that Matt Dunham,
former regional chairman of R3, has moved from Grant Thornton to
accountancy and investment firm Smith & Williamson.

Mr. Dunham will lead its restructuring and recovery services team
and will work with office managing partner Andrew McKenna to
further develop the firm's services across Manchester, Merseyside
and the north west, according to Manchester Evening News.

The report notes that Mr. Dunham, has worked on a series of high-
profile cases over the years, including the receivership of the
Free Trade Hall Hotel.  Mr. Dunham was also administrator of Bury
Football Club, helping it out of insolvency, and Barnsley
Football Club, the report discloses.

The report relates that Mr. Dunham has advised on more than 20
other football-related restructurings and is retained by the
Football League as an expert on sporting sanctions.

The report relays that he has also become recognized as an expert
in the restructuring of charities and other not- for-profit
organizations like schools and colleges.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week September 30 to October 4, 2013

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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