TCREUR_Public/131011.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, October 11, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 202


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NEW WORLD: Agrees with Lenders to Amend Financial Covenants


DANISH MIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable


RHEINMETALL AG: Moody's Cuts Rating on Sr. Unsecured Notes to Ba1
SPRINGER SBM: Moody's Assigns 'B3' CFR; Outlook Stable
UNITYMEDIA KBW: Moody's Confirms 'B1' CFR; Outlook Stable
VTB BANK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Deposit Ratings; Outlook Stable


NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR


ANGLO IRISH: Overcharged Clients by EUR500MM, Bankcheck Boss Says
CAIRN EURO: Fitch Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Dsf'
MMC FINANCE: Fitch Rates Loan Participation Notes 'BB+(EXP)'


ALITALIA SPA: May Be Put Under Safety Review; License at Risk
ALITALIA SPA: Aviation Authority Set to Assess Viability
MANUTENCOOP FACILITY: Moody's Rates EUR425MM Sr. Sec. Notes 'B2'


SHIP LUXCO 3: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


KOMBINAT ALUMINIJUMA: Declared Bankrupt; Sale Mulled


PALLAS CDO II: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Two Note Classes
UPC HOLDINGS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba3' CFR; Outlook Stable


POLIMEX-MOSTOSTAL: Warsaw Court Rejects Bankruptcy Motion


CB RENAISSANCE: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ratings to Negative
GE MONEY: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba2 Deposit Ratings to Neg.
SKB-BANK: Moody's Cuts Deposit & Sr. Unsec. Debt Ratings to B2
VOSTOCHNY EXPRESS: Moody's Changes Outlook on B1 Ratings to Neg.
YAMAL INVESTMENT: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B-' ICR


IM CAJAMAR 6: Fitch Confirms Ratings on Document Amendment


CB PRIVATBANK: Fitch's 'B' IDR Unaffected by New Rating Action

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABOVE BAR: Hairdressing College Goes Into Liquidation
HASTINGS INSURANCE: Fitch to Rate Long-term IDR at 'B+'
HASTINGS INSURANCE: Moody's Assigns B2 Ratings to Sr. Sec. Notes
IFA: Pushed Into Administration Over Arch Cru Liabilities
MALLORY PARK: Owners Set Up New Firm to Run Race Track

POOLE'S PIES: Had GBP1.75MM Claim When Administrator Called In
SAVOY HOTEL: At Risk of Breaching Bank Loan Terms
SOHO HOUSE: Moody's Assigns 'Caa1' Corporate Family Rating
WTB TRADING: Winterhill Sovereign Appointed as Administrator
ZATTIKKA: Administrators May Opt for CVA Deal

* UK: Clubs That Go Into Administration Could Be Relegated


* Low Skills to Impede Spain & Italy's Revival Efforts
* European Corporates Remain Hooked on Bond Funding, Fitch Says
* BOOK REVIEW: Rand Araskog's The ITT Wars


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NEW WORLD: Agrees with Lenders to Amend Financial Covenants
Ladka Bauerova at Bloomberg News reports that New World Resources
Plc agreed with lenders to amend financial covenants to its
revolving credit facility after this year's record losses.

According to Bloomberg, the Amsterdam-registered company and
creditors said the financial covenants of its undrawn EUR100
million (US$135 million) facility won't be tested until it
expires on Feb. 7, 2014.  It's the second time this year its debt
accords have been waived and amended, Bloomberg notes.

NWR posted a net loss of EUR315.4 million in the second quarter
on low commodity prices and falling demand from steelmakers, and
announced an asset disposal plan, Bloomberg discloses.

The company said that any further borrowing must be approved by
the creditors, Bloomberg relates.  Bloomberg notes that the
statement said further conditions of the credit facility
amendment include stricter financial reporting, limitations on
dividend payments and a maximum net debt to 12-month earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization of 5:1.

NWR has since announced the sale of its OKK coking plant unit for
EUR95 million, which the creditors approved, Bloomberg recounts.
It also said it will close down the loss-making Paskov mine by
the end of next year, Bloomberg discloses.  According to
Bloomberg, NWR has said Paskov, one of the four mines it operates
in the country, incurs an annual loss of about CZK1.5 billion
(US$79 million) at current coking coal prices.

New World Resources Plc is the largest Czech producer of coking


DANISH MIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that had assigned its
preliminary 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating to
Denmark-based ferry services provider Danish Midco 2 (known as
Scandlines).  The outlook is stable.

S&P also assigned its preliminary 'BB-' issue rating to the
company's proposed senior secured debt facilities, along with a
preliminary recovery rating of '2', indicating its expectation of
substantial (70%-90%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

Scandlines is issuing EUR875 million of senior secured debt
facilities to refinance its debt and facilitate 3i Group Plc's
(3i's) acquisition of an approximately 51% stake in Scandlines
held by a German private equity company, Allianz Capital Partners
(ACP) and former company management. 3i and ACP originally
acquired Scandlines through a buyout in 2007.  The acquisition
will be undertaken by a new holding company largely funded by new
cash equity from 3i.

The preliminary ratings are subject to the successful issuance of
the term loans and revolving credit facility (RCF) and S&P's
review of final documentation.  Any change in the amount or terms
of the issuance would trigger a review by Standard & Poor's and
could affect the ratings.

The preliminary rating reflects Scandlines' business risk
profile, which S&P assess as "fair," and its financial risk
profile, which S&P assess as "aggressive."

"We view Scandlines' business risk profile as "fair" because of
the company's narrow business scope if compared with global
shipping operators.  Its business model is built around three
ferry routes deploying 12 well-maintained, but aging, vessels and
two border/duty free shops.  Furthermore, the company is highly
dependent on one route and the related border/duty free shop,
which together account for 75% of Scandlines' EBITDA.  Scandlines
is exposed to cargo traffic, as well, which we consider to be
cyclical and which accounts for about 20% of Scandlines' sales.
We also see a long-term risk of the possible opening of a tunnel
that would connect Germany and Denmark, which would likely reduce
traffic volumes and, hence, earnings on Scandlines' largest
route, although from 2022 at the earliest," S&P said.

"These weaknesses are mitigated in our view by Scandlines'
leading and fairly protected position as a ferry operator for
foot passengers, cars, cargo, and border shoppers in the corridor
between Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, underpinned by a well-
recognized brand.  We also believe that Scandlines' efficient
business model and its ownership of key port infrastructure
provide the company with operational benefits and high barriers
to entry for competitors and, hence, recurring income streams.
Furthermore, Scandlines has demonstrated ability to manage costs
during a difficult market environment, as evidenced by a track
record of high and robust operating margins.  Moreover, the
company operates in the Northern European catchment area, with
German and Scandinavian economies holding up better than the
overall Eurozone economy, which results in relatively good
resilience to economic swings," S&P added.

Despite S&P's assessments of an "aggressive" financial risk
profile and a "fair" business risk profile, it caps its
preliminary long-term corporate credit rating on Scandlines at
'B+,' as per its criteria, incorporating the risk that
Scandlines' leverage could increase and credit quality
deteriorate over time, given no evidence that Scandlines will be
sufficiently insulated from its financial sponsor owner after the

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Scandlines will
sustain its fairly resilient operating performance underpinned by
its efficient business model and proven cost-control
capabilities. Combined with its solid liquidity, this should
enable the company to maintain a credit profile commensurate with
the rating.  For Scandlines, S&P considers a ratio of adjusted
debt to EBITDA of less than 5.0x to be consistent with a 'B+'
rating.  Furthermore, the rating is predicated on the assumption
that Scandlines will implement a prudent financial policy, which
should allow the company to keep its credit measures consistent
with the rating.

A downgrade would likely stem from an unexpected aggressive debt-
funded acquisition or shareholder returns, or from an unforeseen
significant setback in operating performance, which could
materially weaken credit measures or liquidity, for example with
the ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA increasing above 5.0x.

The possibility of an upgrade is limited while the current
shareholder structure remains in place.  Other constraining
factors include the company's narrow business scope and high
dependence on one route and its related retail business.


RHEINMETALL AG: Moody's Cuts Rating on Sr. Unsecured Notes to Ba1
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Rheinmetall AG's
EUR500 million senior unsecured notes due September 2017 to Ba1,
with a loss given default assessment (LGD) of LGD4, 50% from
Baa3, and short-term ratings to Not Prime (NP) from Prime-3.
Moody's has also assigned a Ba1 Corporate Family Rating and a
Ba1-PD Probability of Default Rating to Rheinmetall, at the same
time Moody's has withdrawn the Baa3 issuer rating. The outlook on
all ratings is stable.

Rating action concludes the review for possible downgrade of
Rheinmetall's ratings that Moody's had initiated on 1 August


  Issuer: Rheinmetall AG

     Issuer Rating, Downgraded to NP from P-3

    Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Downgraded to NP from P-3

    Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Sep 22, 2017,
Downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3


  Issuer: Rheinmetall AG

     Probability of Default Rating, Assigned Ba1-PD

     Corporate Family Rating, Assigned Ba1

    Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Sep 22, 2017,
Assigned a range of LGD4, 50 %

Outlook Actions:

  Issuer: Rheinmetall AG

    Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review


  Issuer: Rheinmetall AG

     Issuer Rating, Withdrawn , Previously rated Baa3

Ratings Rationale:

Rating action reflects Moody's expectation that Rheinmetall's
future credit metrics will be below Moody's requirements for an
investment grade rating for an extended period of time and at
least until 2015. While Moody's believes that Rheinmetall's
operating performance will reach a trough in 2013 Moody's
anticipate only a modest recovery in 2014. However, expected
improvements in financial ratios should position the company
solidly at the Ba1 rating level over the cycle supported by a
combination of modestly growing global light vehicle sales, a
record order backlog in its defense division of EUR6.4 billion
per July 2013 of which 60% will only be executed from 2015 and
initiated restructuring measures.

Moody's forecasts Rheinmetall will be able to achieve normalized
debt/EBITDA of around 3.5x, RCF/net debt of around 15-20% and
modest positive free cash flow generation by the end of 2014 (all
ratios incorporate Moody's standard adjustments). This represents
a material improvement compared to last twelve months metrics per
June 2013 (debt/EBITDA 5.4x; net debt/EBITDA 4.6x, RCF/net debt
7.3%) but is still more commensurate with a Ba-rating and remains
below the metrics set to maintain an investment grade rating.

In order to remain adequately positioned within the previous Baa3
rating category Moody's would have expected credit metrics such
as a normalized debt/EBITDA (based on a normalized year-end cash
position of EUR300 million) of 3.0x, RCF/net debt of around 25%
and material positive free cash flow generation. Rheinmetall has
not achieved most of these levels since 2012 due to weak end-
markets and a high pension deficit.

A critical consideration in the Ba1 rating is also Moody's
expectation that Rheinmetall's competitive position has not been
impaired and that the group's efforts will prove effective to
improve the performance at currently underperforming business
units (Air Defence, Tracked Vehicles and Logistic Vehicles).

The stable rating outlook reflects Rheinmetall's balanced
financial policy, limited unadjusted net financial debt (EUR337
million per June 2013, EUR98 million in 2012) and a solid
liquidity profile, providing Rheinmetall with the necessary time
to recover its operating performance over the next two years.

Rheinmetall's rating remains supported by (1) the company's
diversification into two business segments, the automotive and
the defense segment, which follow largely different economic
cycles. Other positive factors supporting Rheinmetall's ratings
are (2) the increasing international presence reducing its
dependence on a continued weak macroeconomic environment in
Europe; (3) a very strong orderbook in the defence division
providing for good visibility for the next three to four years;
(4) high levels of technological competence and substantial R&D
(historical ratio of R&D-to-sales is around 5%) which create
significant barriers to entry; (5) a conservative financial
policy with proven flexibility in terms of dividend payments, for
example in 2010 and (6) a good short term liquidity position with
no debt maturities prior to 2017.

At the same time, the rating continues to reflect (1) risks from
reduced defense budgets as a result of austerity measures
implemented by sovereigns mainly in the Western hemisphere; (2)
the ongoing trend towards consolidation in the European defense
business, which could alter the competitive landscape; the
inherent cyclicality of the automotive business; (3) the
company's still limited geographic diversification outside Europe
and (4) large working capital swings throughout the year and the
company's reliance on prepayments in the defense division.

Structural Considerations:

Moody's notes that the majority of the group's financial debt is
raised at holding company level. However, Rheinmetall's unsecured
notes are structurally subordinated to trade claims, pension
liabilities and short term operating lease rejection claims that
exist at its various operating subsidiaries. Under Moody's loss
given default methodology, this level of subordination is
borderline when considering a down notching of the senior
unsecured debt instruments raised at Rheinmetall AG. The Ba1
rating assigned to the EUR500 million in senior unsecured
notes -- the same as the corporate family rating -- reflects
their position as the preponderance of committed debt in
Rheinmetell's capital structure.

What Could Change the Rating Down/Up:

Positive rating pressure could result from Rheinmetall's ability
to reduce normalized debt/EBITDA to around 3.0x in 2015. Moody's
normalized debt/EBITDA is based on a normalized year-end cash
position of EUR 300 million. In addition, RCF/net debt of around
25% and material positive free cash flow generation could result
in an upgrade of the ratings if maintained for a sustained period
of time.

The rating could face further downward pressure if Rheinmetall
failed to improve earnings and cash flow generation from the
trough levels expected for 2013 contrary to current expectations.
Such a development would be exemplified by continued negative
free cash flow generation, a failure to reduce normalized
debt/EBITDA to below 3.5x and to improve RCF/net debt to above
15% by 2015.

Rheinmetall AG, established in 1889 and headquartered in
Dusseldorf, Germany, is a leading European player in defense
equipment (49.6% of group revenues in 2012) and, through its 100%
subsidiary KSPG AG, a first-tier supplier of automotive
components (50.4% of group revenues in 2012). In 2012,
Rheinmetall generated total revenues of EUR4.7 billion.
Rheinmetall AG is publicly listed with 100% of shares in free

SPRINGER SBM: Moody's Assigns 'B3' CFR; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B3 corporate
family rating (CFR) and B3-PD probability of default rating (PDR)
to Springer SBM One GmbH (formerly known as BLITZ 13-347 GmbH),
the holding company within the ring-fenced group (as defined in
the final senior facilities agreement (SFA)) for Springer
Science+Business Media ('Springer'), a leading international
publisher and provider of publishing services.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a definitive B2 rating with a
loss given default assessment of LGD3 (33%) to the senior secured
debt whose lead borrower is Springer Science+Business Media
Deutschland GmbH (formerly known as BLITZ 13-253 GmbH), a wholly
owned and fully guaranteed subsidiary of Springer SBM One GmbH.
The outlook on the ratings is stable.

Moody's has assigned the following instrument ratings --

Springer Science+Business Media Deutschland GmbH (the lead
borrower of the senior secured debt facilities)

   -- EUR1.820 billion equivalent of Term Loan B (TLB): B2

   -- EUR150 million of RCF: B2

Ratings Rationale:

The definitive B3 CFR is in line with the provisional (P)B3
rating assigned on July 18, 2013. Moody's adjusted leverage post
transaction closing however came out marginally higher than at
the time of the provisional rating, due to the EUR50 million
increase in size of TLB than originally envisaged. The executed
legal documents related to the debt facilities are largely in
line with the provisional draft documents, with the exception of
somewhat more demanding excess cash sweep requirements as well as
tighter net secured leverage based incurrence covenant for
incremental facilities under the SFA.

The B3 CFR for Springer SBM One GmbH, remains constrained by: (i)
the significant group leverage at transaction closing; (ii)
modest free cash flow generation; (iii) negative historical track
record in the Professional and Science, Technology and Medicine
German-language divisions of Springer and expectation that the
operating environment for these divisions will remain
challenging; (iv) moderate organic revenue growth reported by the
company over recent years; and (v) a degree of medium term
uncertainty regarding the further developments in Open Access
(OA) publishing.

However, the CFR also considers: (i) Springer's strong and
defensible market position; (ii) the resilience of the STM market
and the must-have nature of the Springer's core product offering
the company relative stability and good revenue visibility; (iii)
ongoing improvements in the quality and content of the STM
portfolio; (iv) early positioning in the Open Access market and
hitherto successful eBook initiative; and (v) expectation that
the global STM academic and scientific market will continue to
grow over the coming years, driven in particular by emerging
market growth for which the company appears well positioned.

Springer SBM One GmbH's leverage will remain high following the
introduction of a new capital structure with Moody's adjusted
Debt/EBITDA estimated at around 7.5x (including the EUR94.7
million of shareholder loans from former owners as debt).
However, the ratings assigned are forward-looking and incorporate
an assumption that de-leveraging will occur, consistent with the
description of the rating drivers set out below. Springer's
business plan envisages a degree of de-leveraging from EBITDA
improvements and modest free cash flow generation. Leverage will
remain elevated in the near-term and the de-leveraging process
might well be slower than currently envisaged, depending on
revenue development.

EUR1.82 billion of the first lien senior secured TLB (due 2020)
and the EUR150 million of revolving credit facility (RCF; due
2020) have been ranked highest in priority of claims. The B2
rating (LGD3-33%), for first lien senior secured TLB and the RCF
reflects their secured interest in a material portion of the
assets of the restricted group. The secured term loan and RCF is
guaranteed by members of the Restricted Group accounting for 80%
of consolidated EBITDA and gross assets.

The B2 instruments ratings for the senior secured debt are one
notch higher than the B3 CFR largely due to the presence of
contractually subordinated High Yield Notes of EUR640 million
(due 2021; unrated by Moody's) in the capital structure issued by
Springer SBM Two GmbH. In addition to non-financial liabilities,
the LGD waterfall (as well as the CFR) include EUR94.7 million of
shareholder loans which are effectively a pass-through of vendor


Moody's believes that Springer has an adequate liquidity position
given the presence of a EUR150 million RCF, which Moody's
considers adequate to manage the group's working capital
requirements. However, Moody's notes that EUR35 million of the
RCF remained drawn at transaction closing and Springer has no
additional cash on its balance sheet except the drawn revolver
amount. The EUR1.820 billion of term loan facility has a 1%
scheduled amortization payable in equal quarterly installments.
An excess cash flow sweep mechanism has also been built into the
SFA. The revolver has a leverage based maintenance financial
covenant which will only be tested should the RCF be drawn 30% or
more. There are no other maintenance financial covenants under
the SFA.

Rating Outlook:

A stable ratings outlook is based on Moody's expectation that
Springer will pursue a de-leveraging strategy and that its
current business plan appears broadly achievable. Failure to
achieve this deleveraging will lead to ratings pressure as
described below.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down:

Upward pressure could be exerted on the ratings once (i) Springer
is able to reduce its leverage to around or below 6.0x Gross
Debt/ EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) on a sustained basis; and
(ii) continues to generate positive free cash flow generation.

On the contrary, downward pressure could be exerted on the
ratings should (i) leverage remain at or above 7.0x Gross Debt to
EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) at the end of 2014, (ii) material
deterioration occur in the operating performance; (iii) free cash
flow generation fall towards zero; and/or (iv) any other factors
emerge with a negative impact on liquidity.

Springer SBM One GmbH is the ultimate holding company of the
ring-fenced group (as defined in the SFA) for Springer, a leading
international publisher and provider of publishing services. In
2012, Springer recorded EUR981.1 million in revenues and
EUR342.8 million in reported "adjusted" EBITDA.

UNITYMEDIA KBW: Moody's Confirms 'B1' CFR; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the B1 Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) and B1-PD Probability of Default Rating of
Unitymedia KabelBW. At the same time the agency has confirmed the
ratings of the senior secured debt instruments issued at
Unitymedia Hessen GmbH& Co. KG and Unitymedia NRW GmbH at Ba3 and
of the senior unsecured bonds issued at UM-KBW at B3. The rating
outlook is stable. The rating action concludes a review first
initiated in February 2013 and continued in June 2013.

Ratings Rationale:

The ratings confirmation recognizes that UM-KBW's credit profile
has not been affected by its parent company's (Liberty Global
plc) acquisition of Virgin Media Inc. concluded earlier this year
and also acknowledges that the terms of the company's shareholder
loan (EUR1.1 billion as of June 30, 2013) now meet the criteria
specified for equity-equivalent treatment from an analytical
perspective by Moody's.

The B1 CFR for UM-KBW continues to reflect (i) the significant
Moody's adjusted leverage for the company; (ii) the relatively
high capex requirements (26% of 2012 sales) and interest costs
which significantly limit its free cash flow (FCF) generation;
and (iii) increased competition for multi-dwelling units (MDU),
coupled with the negative impact of potential further remedy
agreements with the Federal Cartel Office ('FCO') following the
Dusseldorf Court of Appeal decision. Positively UM-KBW's CFR also
factors in (i) the good operating performance and future growth
potential of UM-KBW; (ii) Moody's view that the company's
strategic focus on an integrated bundle offering, transitioning
of customers from analog to digital TV, and enhancement of
customers economics should continue to support revenue growth and
solid margins; and (iii) the company's good capacity to de-
leverage through solid EBITDA growth.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that UM-KBW will
continue to maintain visible revenue and EBITDA growth.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down:

Continued solid operating performance in combination with
improvements in free cash flow generation and a Debt/EBITDA ratio
(as defined by Moody's) trending towards 5.0x on a sustained
basis is likely to result in upgrade pressure.

Negative rating pressure could develop, if UM-KBW's Debt/EBITDA
ratio were to move towards 6.0x and/or if FCF turned negative on
a sustained basis.

UM-KBW is the second largest cable operator in Germany by
customers. The company generated revenues and 'adjusted' reported
EBITDA of EUR1.9 billion and EUR1.1 billion respectively in LTM
ended June 30, 2013.

VTB BANK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Deposit Ratings; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to
Germany-based VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG (VTBD): local and foreign
currency deposit ratings of Ba1, bank financial strength of D-
(mapping to ba3 on the long-term scale), and Not-prime short-term
deposit rating. The outlook is stable.

Ratings Rationale:

Very High Probability of Parental Support From VTB Group:

VTBD's Ba1 deposit ratings incorporate Moody's very high support
assumptions from both its immediate parent VTB Bank (Austria)
(VTBA; Baa3 deposit rating) and ultimate parent, the Russia-based
Bank VTB (VTB; Baa2 deposit rating) in case of need. As a result,
VTBD's deposit ratings receive two notches of uplift above the
bank's ba3 standalone credit strength (as discussed below).
Moody's believes that VTBD could receive systemic support from
the Russian government in case of need; this support is
indirectly reflected in the ratings of the support providers
(Baa3 for VTBA and Baa2 for VTB).

VTBD is fully owned by VTBA, which in turn is owned by VTB
(Russia's second-largest bank, 60% government-owned). The
consolidated VTBA (which includes banking operations in Austria,
Germany and France) forms the European subholding of VTB group,
and accounts for around 7% of group assets. In turn, VTBD
accounts for around 40% of VTBA's consolidated assets.

Relatively Narrow Business Franchise Aimed at Servicing Accounts
of Russian Banks:

VTBD historically executes a focused strategy aimed at providing
payment services to Russian/CIS banks. VTBD maintains interbank
relationships with a large number of Russian/CIS banks, and is
the "bank of choice" for loro accounts of Russian/CIS banks for
payments in euros and dollars. In recent years, the bank has also
diversified into corporate banking and provides loans to and
attracts deposits from European and Russian/CIS companies.
Moody's notes that the Russian/CIS business origination is
supported by VTBD's membership in VTB group.

At end-August 2013, interbank deposits at VTBD made up around 80%
of its total liabilities (excluding equity). These deposits
mostly came from large Russian banks, and were highly
concentrated with the top-10 banks making up around one-third of
interbank funds. Moody's notes that interbank deposits were very
short-term (80% of those were payable on demand at end-August, or
EUR2.8 billion), which could introduce liquidity risks for VTBD
in case of market shocks. To mitigate liquidity risk, VTBD
maintains a large part of its assets in cash and interbank
(EUR2.2 billion) and ECB-eligible securities (EUR208 million),
which comprise an adequate liquidity buffer. In case of need,
Moody's believes that VTBD will receive liquidity support from
VTBA and VTB group.

Corporate Loans are Mostly within Germany/Core EU:

VTBD's net corporate loan book amounted to EUR1.8 billion at end-
August 2013, mostly composed of exposures to companies in Germany
and core EU (around 55%), with the rest formed by Russian (23%)
and other countries (22%) exposures. Moody's views as positive
that a large part of the loan book is provided to German/EU
companies, however the Russian/other part is also significant,
exposing the bank to comparatively higher credit risks.

VTBD's single-client credit risk concentration in the corporate
loan book was very high, with the aggregate of top 20 corporate
exposures amounting to around 390% of Tier 1 capital at YE2012,
thereby exposing the bank to the creditworthiness of its large
borrowers. The industry breakdown of the loan book was anchored
towards finance companies (36% of loans; these also include
reverse repo transactions), metals (15%) and EU regional
governments (7%).

Good Financial Fundamentals:

VTBD is adequately capitalized, with a 9.9% Tier 1 ratio and
11.44% total CAR at end-July 2013. Moody's notes that VTBD plans
to improve its Tier 1 ratio by releasing some of its "hidden"
reserves. Moody's also notes that VTBD has a low share of risk
weighted assets in total assets (less than 50%), due to its large
liquidity buffer stored in highly-rated assets. The bank targets
a marginal growth in risk assets for 2013, which should lead to
limited pressure on its capital adequacy.

The trend in asset quality is relatively stable. The bank had
three problem corporate exposures at YE2012 for a total of EUR10
million, fully provisioned. Profitability is good, with a return
on average RWA of 1.8%. Moody's notes that the bank's net
interest margin (NIM) has been pressured by the low interest rate
environment in Europe: NIM decreased to 1.9% in 2012 from 2.5% in


NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised to
stable from negative its outlook on Marshall Islands-registered
tanker shipping company Navios Maritime Acquisition Corp.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on the company, as well as the 'B' rating on the company's

The outlook revision reflects that Navios Acquisition's financial
results for the first half of 2013 indicate a sustained
improvement in the company's earnings and credit measures, and
that S&P expects this to continue in the next two years.  Under
S&P's base-case operating scenario, the company will be able to
achieve a ratio of Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) to debt of about 9% by 2014 that will
subsequently strengthen to more than 9% in 2015, which S&P
considers commensurate with a 'B' rating.  Furthermore, given its
demonstrated track record of proactive treasury management and
access to funding amid difficult industry and lending conditions,
S&P continues to believe that Navios Acquisition will preserve
its "adequate" liquidity profile.

Under S&P's base-case operating scenario, it assumes the
improvement in earnings to be underpinned by a sustained but
moderate recovery of charter rates for product tankers from 2013,
which will be accompanied by an increasing number of vessel-
available days as new tankers enter Navios Acquisition's fleet.
S&P estimates a resulting improvement in Navios Acquisition's
EBITDA to about US$160 million in 2014, from about US$130 million
in 2013 (about US$105 million in the 12 months to June 30, 2013).

"We take into account Navios Acquisition's high contracted
revenues, which provide good earnings visibility and consequently
downside protection.  As of Aug. 20, 2013, about 94% of Navios
Acquisition's vessel-operating days were fixed for the remainder
of 2013, about 63% for 2014, and about 40% for 2015.  We
understand that the average charter rates in these contracts are
above Navios Acquisition's cash flow break-even rates (including
capital repayments) and that the vast majority of contracts
include a profit-sharing provision, which will allow Navios
Acquisition to benefit if charter rates recover to more than the
contracted rate," S&P said.

S&P forecasts that Navios Acquisition's debt will remain fairly
stable over the investment period 2013-2015, helped by this
year's equity offerings, which brought in net proceeds of about
US$311 million.  This is assuming that the company makes no
acquisitions of new vessels beyond the current new-build program
of about US$330 million.

Combined with steady growth in EBITDA, Navios Acquisition should
gradually improve its credit measures over 2013-2015.  S&P notes
that 2013-2015 will be an expansion period for the company.
Therefore, the credit measures are distorted by cash flow and
debt mismatches.  S&P forecasts, for example, that in 2013 Navios
Acquisition's actual ratio of adjusted FFO to debt will be about
6%-7%, which compares with a pro forma ratio of about 10%
including the proportionate EBITDA contribution from vessels that
are not in the water, but have been financed with debt.  In
general, S&P considers 2015 to be a more representative year for
Navios Acquisition's credit ratios than 2013-2014 because 10 of
the 12 vessels to be delivered would have been operating, and
therefore generating cash flows for 12 months.  S&P currently
forecasts a ratio of adjusted FFO to debt of 13%-14% in 2015.

"The rating on Navios Acquisition remains constrained by our view
of the company's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged" and
the business risk profile as "weak," as our criteria define these
terms.  Further constraints are the company's high operating risk
in the cyclical, capital intensive, and competitive tanker
shipping industry, and its aggressive growth strategy.  We
consider these risks to be partly offset by Navios Acquisition's
conservative charter policy, competitive break-even rates, and
adequate liquidity.  We assess Navios Acquisition's management
and governance as "strong" as defined in our criteria.  We
believe that Navios Acquisition has a strong management team with
substantial industry experience and expertise and a demonstrated
track record in operational effectiveness," S&P added.

As of Aug. 20, 2013, Navios Acquisition, which is listed on the
New York Stock Exchange, owned and operated eight very large
crude carriers (VLCCs), eight long-range product tankers (LR1s),
10 medium-range product tankers (MR2s), and three chemical
tankers, with a total carrying capacity of about 3.6 million
dead-weight tons and an average age of 4.7 years.  Furthermore,
it has an extensive order book, including 12 MR2s to be delivered
by mid-2015.

S&P's ratings reflect Navios Acquisition's stand-alone credit
quality.  Although the company is partly owned by and shares
links with Navios Maritime Holdings Inc., these companies have
different shareholder groups and are separately listed.
Furthermore, management has informed S&P that, financially, each
company is to operate on a stand-alone basis.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Navios Acquisition's
earnings, and therefore its operating cash flow, will continue
increasing, thanks to its expanding fleet, competitive cost
structure, and profit-share income from the employed vessels.
Consequently, S&P believes that the company will achieve rating-
commensurate credit measures, further underpinned by a gradual
recovery in charter rates, as estimated in S&P's base case.

"We forecast that Navios Acquisition's adjusted ratio of FFO to
debt will recover to about 9% by 2014 and subsequently strengthen
to more than 9% in 2015, which we consider to be commensurate
with the 'B' rating on the company.  This also reflects our
assumption that Navios Acquisition will significantly curb its
fleet expansion and use free operating cash flow to reduce debt
from 2015.  Given the inherent volatility in the underlying
sector, we consider the company's consistently "adequate"
liquidity profile to be a critical and stabilizing rating
factor," S&P noted.

S&P could consider an upgrade if Navios Acquisition delivered
sustained EBITDA growth, pursued a balanced investment strategy,
reduced debt, and improved its cash-flow protection measures to
the level that S&P considers commensurate with a higher rating,
such as a ratio of adjusted FFO to debt of about 15% on a
sustainable basis.

Rating downside would primarily stem from unexpected downward
pressure on charter rates and asset values, in S&P's view.
Persistently depressed charter rates would likely prevent Navios
Acquisition from achieving favorable employment for vessels not
yet delivered and contracted, and those up for recharter.  They
would also hinder the company from earning profit-share income
from the employed vessels, resulting in persistently weak credit
measures and potential liquidity pressure.  Moreover, rating
pressure could arise if Navios Acquisition's debt were to
increase significantly on account of additional investments in
new vessels beyond the current order book.


ANGLO IRISH: Overcharged Clients by EUR500MM, Bankcheck Boss Says
RTE News reports that a U.S. court has been told that the former
Anglo Irish Bank overcharged clients by more than EUR500 million.

RTE News relates that the allegation was made by Eddie
Fitzpatrick, who runs a forensic banking firm called Bankcheck.

According to the report, Mr. Fitzpatick's claim is part of
litigation being taken by Irish developer John Flynn, who is
making allegations of fraud against IBRC, which was formerly
Anglo Irish Bank.

RTE New says Mr. Flynn is objecting to the liquidation of IBRC
because it could block him being paid damages if he won his fraud

IBRC is fighting attempts to frustrate the wind-down of IBRC,
which is now subject of a series of objections in the US, the
report relates.

It has said it would vigorously oppose attempts to block the
liquidation of the bank, the report notes.

According to the report, Mr. Fitzpatrick said in new documents
lodged in US Bankruptcy Court in Delaware he had audited 720
separate customer accounts.

He found the clients had been overcharged as a result of
"loading" of interest rates ranging from 0.5% to 0.05%, RTE News

"All of those accounts were subjected to both manual and
automated deceitful procedures which resulted in substantial
overcharging of interest to their accounts totalling in excess of
EUR7.7 million" the report quotes Mr. Fitzpatrick as saying.

                        About Anglo Irish

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IBRC) to 'D/D' from 'B-/C'.   S&P also
lowered the senior unsecured ratings to 'D' from 'B-'.  S&P then
withdrew the counterparty credit ratings, the senior unsecured
ratings, and the preferred stock ratings on IBRC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB+' issue rating on three government-
guaranteed debt issues.

The rating actions follow the Feb. 6, 2013, announcement that the
Irish government has liquidated IBRC.

The former Irish bank sought protection from creditors under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on Aug. 26, 2013 (Bankr.
D. Del., Case No. 13-12159).  The former bank's Foreign
Representatives are Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson.  Its
U.S. bankruptcy counsel are Mark D. Collins, Esq., and Jason M.
Madron, Esq., at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., in Wilmington,

CAIRN EURO: Fitch Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'Dsf'
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on Cairn Euro ABS CDO I
plc's notes as follows:

Class X (ISIN XS0314777946): PIF

Class A1S (ISIN XS0313770058): affirmed at 'B+'sf; withdrawn

Class A1J (ISIN XS0314555615): affirmed at 'Bsf'; withdrawn

Class A2 (ISIN XS0313783895): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; withdrawn

Class A3 (ISIN XS0313783895): downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'CCsf';

Class B (ISIN XS0313788936): downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';

Class C (ISIN XS0313789314): downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';

Key Rating Drivers:

The portfolio was liquidated pursuant to a written resolution by
100% of the noteholders in accordance with Condition 8(e) of the
notes. The optional redemption occurred on the June 23, 2013
payment date. The redemption proceeds were used to pay the class
X notes in full and EUR153 million was distributed to the class
A1S noteholders. None of the other classes of notes received any

Condition 8(e) of the notes states that all of the notes should
be redeemed in full but not in part, as a requirement for
optional redemption. However, the transaction documents were
amended to facilitate an optional redemption below par. Fitch was
notified of the amendment by the asset manager after the optional
redemption had been exercised.

Fitch cannot assign or maintain ratings to structured finance
bonds that may be redeemed for less than the par amount at the
option of the noteholder. This option would expose ratings to
market value risk. Therefore, Fitch has withdrawn the ratings on
all classes of notes. The agency affirmed the class A1S, A1J and
A2 notes as there was no imminent risk of default if the
transaction would not have been terminated early. The agency
downgraded the remaining notes to 'Dsf' based on the agency's
assessment that the notes would incur a loss on a hold to
maturity basis.

Cairn Euro ABS CDO I plc was a managed cash arbitrage
securitization of structured finance assets, primarily consisting
of RMBS and CMBS. The portfolio was managed by Cairn Capital

MMC FINANCE: Fitch Rates Loan Participation Notes 'BB+(EXP)'
Fitch Ratings has assigned MMC Finance Limited's proposed issue
of loan participation notes (LPN) an expected foreign currency
senior unsecured rating of 'BB+(EXP)'.

MMC Finance is an Ireland-based limited liability company
established for the sole purpose of providing a loan to the
Russian borrower, OJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel (NN), pursuant to the
terms of a loan agreement. The notes are limited recourse
obligations of MMC Finance under a trust deed. They are secured
by a first-fixed charge with full title guarantee in favor of the
trustee for the benefit of itself and the noteholders of certain
of its rights and interests under the loan agreement.

The LPNs are rated in line with NN's senior unsecured rating of
'BB+'. NN's senior unsecured rating, its Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) of 'BB+', and its Short-term IDR of 'B' are
unaffected by the proposed LPN issue. The Outlook on NN's Long-
term IDR is Positive. A longer period of shareholder stability
could result in NN's ratings being upgraded over the next 12

The notes' final rating is contingent on the receipt of final
documentation conforming to information already received and
final details regarding the notes' amount and tenor. Proceeds
from the notes will be used for refinancing as well as for
general corporate purposes including capital investments.

Key Rating Drivers

Positive Outlook
The revision of NN's Outlook to Positive in April 2013 followed
the resolution of the shareholder dispute involving United
Company RUSAL Plc (Rusal) and Interros Group (Interros), as well
as significant downward revisions to future capex spending. In
December 2012 Rusal and Interros announced the signing of a
shareholder agreement as well as the introduction of Crispian
Investments Limited (a company affiliated with Roman Abramovich)
as an arbiter shareholder.

Corporate Governance
NN's Long-term IDR continues to be notched down by three levels
from its standalone level of 'BBB+' due to a combination of
issuer-specific corporate governance factors and the weak Russian
business environment. The shareholder agreement and new
shareholding structure are positive developments, which have so
far been successful in creating a more stable environment for
company management to refocus on its core Russian assets. The
notching may be narrowed to two levels once the company has re-
established a track record of sound corporate governance.

Downward Revisions to Dividends

In early October NN announced a minimum dividend level for 2014
of US$2 billion, compared with US$3 billion previously. For 2015
the dividend will be based on a formula of 50% of EBITDA plus the
difference between US$7 billion and the aggregated base dividend
payments for 2014 and 2015. Together with previously disclosed
reduction in capex, the lower dividend levels should now see NN
record positive free cash flow (FCF) generation in 2014.

Financial Profile

NN's financial profile is currently consistent with an
investment-grade rating, which Fitch expects to remain so over
the next three to four years despite weak nickel market
conditions. NN's H113 results were in line with Fitch's
expectations. Over 2013-2015, we expect largely stable EBITDAR
margins of around 36-40% while FCF is now expected to be neutral
to positive. FFO net leverage is expected to be stable at around
1.0-1.5x, but could be lower if further flexibility is evident in
dividend levels (particularly in 2016 when some deferral is
permitted) or in the use of non-core asset proceeds (first USD1bn
received to be paid as special dividends).

Exceptional Operational Profile

NN's operational strength stems from its core Russian assets on
the Taimyr Peninsula, which benefits from a uniquely rich ore
body and long-life reserves. The company has more than 12% of
proved and probable nickel ore reserves in the world.

Leading Market Positions

NN is the world's largest producer of nickel and palladium,
providing approximately 17% and 41% of world total output,
respectively. The company is also a leading producer of platinum
(4th globally) and copper (12th globally).

Country and Industry Risks

Key rating constraints include NN's exposure to the base metal
demand cycle as well as the higher-than-average legal, business
and regulatory risks associated with Russia (BBB/Stable). With
respect to its exposure to cyclical base metal demand, NN's
industry leading cost position provides some protection compared
with peers.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

   -- Re-establishment of a track record of sound corporate
      governance over the next 12 months could result in an
      upgrade to 'BBB-' based on a narrowing of the corporate
      governance notching to two levels.

  -- An upgrade of NN's standalone rating based on its financial
     and operational characteristics is not considered likely at
     this time.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

  -- Re-occurrence of negative corporate governance events
     would likely result in the Outlook being revised to
     Stable from Positive.

  -- Large debt-funded acquisitions and/or significantly
     higher-than-expected capex, dividend or operating cost
     inflation resulting in FFO gross leverage being sustained
     in excess of 2.5x could result in a downgrade.


ALITALIA SPA: May Be Put Under Safety Review; License at Risk
Gilles Castonguay and Daniel Michaels at The Wall Street Journal
report that Alitalia's financial troubles threatened to bring the
Italian airline under review by the country's regulators
Thursday, raising the risk that it could eventually lose its
license to fly.

According to the Journal, Alitalia's chief executive, Gabriele
Del Torchio, were set to meet officials of the civil aviation
authority, Enac, in Rome to discuss his efforts to raise at least
EUR455 million ($617.6 million) to keep the airline solvent.

If Mr. Del Torchio fails to convince them of the viability of his
plan, he risks having them reassess the airline's license, the
Journal notes.

Short of having its license revoked outright, Alitalia could be
assigned a temporary one for up to 12 months to give it time to
recapitalize itself, the Journal says.

According to the Journal, Mr. Del Torchio is in a difficult
position because he has yet to reach an agreement with the
airline's creditors and shareholders to raise the vital funds.

Alitalia has also come under pressure from suppliers to pay its
bills, the Journal discloses.  Eni SpA has threatened to stop
giving it fuel if the airline fails to produce a convincing plan,
the Journal says, citing the local media.

"If it [Alitalia] doesn't get any more financing, it will have to
shut down," the Journal quotes Tommaso Di Tanno, a member of the
airline's board of statutory auditors, as saying.

Adding to that pressure is safety oversight, the Journal states.

According to the Journal, under European Union and Italian law,
regulators must consider an airline's financial health in
deciding whether to let it keep its license or not.  The Journal
relates that one regulation calls on them to "suspend or revoke
the operating license if it [the regulator] is no longer
satisfied that [the airline] can meet its actual and potential
obligations for a 12-month period."

So far, no doubts have been raised publicly about the safety of
Alitalia's operations, the Journal states.  But EU air safety
experts say Enac might have to act before problems emerge, the
Journal says.

Mr. Del Torchio needs at least EUR100 million from shareholders
by means of a capital increase and another EUR55 million via a
convertible loan, the Journal discloses.  He will try to get the
remaining EUR300 million from creditors, the Journal says.

Some shareholders, however, are either unable or unwilling to
give more money, while creditors are only prepared to help if
shareholders do their part, the Journal notes.

Time is running out for Mr. Del Torchio to find a solution
because Alitalia's shareholders are scheduled to vote on his
request for more money on Monday, the Journal says.

According to the Journal, people familiar with the meetings said
that mindful of concerns about the airline coming under foreign
control, the government is also looking for a way for the state
to buy a stake in Alitalia without violating EU antitrust rules.

                          About Alitalia

Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.

ALITALIA SPA: Aviation Authority Set to Assess Viability
Chiara Vasarri and Tommaso Ebhardt at Bloomberg News report that
Italy's aviation authority summoned Alitalia SpA executives for a
meeting yesterday morning to assess the carrier's continued
viability as it seeks financing to stay afloat.

According to Bloomberg, the Rome-based ENAC aviation body was
expected review the company's financial health as it seeks to
raise cash after losses widened 46% to EUR294 million
(US$397 million) in the first half and a key supplier threatened
to cut the company off.

Italian Prime Minister Letta's government is fighting against
time to save the airline after energy company Eni SpA said it
will halt fuel supplies on Oct. 12 unless Alitalia shows it is
able to continue operations, Bloomberg notes.  Mr. Letta met with
Alitalia representatives and some of its investors and creditors
this week in a bid to avert a collapse, according to four people
with knowledge of the plan, Bloomberg relates.

The people on Tuesday said that Mr. Letta is pushing for a
state-controlled company to invest in Alitalia and ease a
combination with Air France-KLM Group or another carrier,
Bloomberg notes.  The government, Bloomberg says, is also trying
to persuade shareholders to approve a plan to raise capital to
avoid a liquidity crunch and make Alitalia a more appealing
partner after Air France-KLM, its biggest shareholder, has been
hesitant to come to its rescue.

According to Bloomberg, Alitalia's board was set to reconvene in
Rome at 5:00 p.m. yesterday, after the carrier said following a
board meeting on Tuesday that it needed more time to define
rescue measures.  Alitalia is confident its "financial condition
will improve soon," Bloomberg quotes the company as saying in a
statement on Tuesday.

The company was set to meet with unions on Wednesday in Rome,
according to Marco Veneziani, head of the UIL union's
transportation section, Bloomberg discloses.  "We expect the
government to take a final decision on Alitalia, which is a
strategic asset for the country," Mr. Veneziani, as cited by
Bloomberg, said.

                          About Alitalia

Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring.  After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009.  Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania.  Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM.  An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.

MANUTENCOOP FACILITY: Moody's Rates EUR425MM Sr. Sec. Notes 'B2'
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B2 rating
(with a loss given default (LGD) assessment of LGD4) to the
EUR425 million of senior secured notes due 2020 issued by
Manutencoop Facility Management S.p.A., the holding company for
Manutencoop, a leading integrated facilities management company
in Italy. Manutencoop's B2 corporate family rating (CFR), B2-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) and the stable outlook on all
ratings remain unchanged.

Moody's definitive rating assignment on the senior secured notes
is in line with the provisional ratings assigned, as outlined in
Moody's press release dated July 25, 2013. The final terms of the
notes are not materially different to the drafts reviewed for the
provisional rating assignment, with the changes having limited
impact on the company's key credit metrics and liquidity profile
over the next 12-18 months. The changes to the notes relative to
the proposal during the provisional rating assignment are (1) a
EUR25 million reduction in the issuance to EUR425 million from
EUR450 million; and (2) that the notes were issued on a fixed-
rate basis, as opposed to a mix of fixed- and floating-rate

Ratings Rationale:

The B2 senior secured instrument rating is in line with
Manutencoop's CFR. This reflects the lack of significant
structural subordination and that the notes are guaranteed by
substantially all of Manutencoop's subsidiaries. The company's
probability of default (PDR) rating of B2-PD is in line with the
CFR, and reflects the use of a 50% family recovery rate,
consistent with a bond and bank debt capital structure.

Manutencoop's B2 CFR primarily reflects (1) the company's
moderate size, especially relative to some of its international
rated and unrated peers; (2) its exposure to the currently
challenged Italian economy, which limits growth prospects; (3)
its substantial focus on the Italian public sector, within which
spending cuts, which are affecting growth prospects, are likely
to continue for at least the next 12-18 months; (4) its
historically high working capital fluctuations, given its
reliance on Italian public authorities for timely payment of
revenues; (5) that a key contract is due for renewal in 2013; and
(6) the company's high Moody's-adjusted leverage of around 6.3x,
for the 12 months to March 31, 2013, pro forma for the
refinancing, with limited deleveraging prospects over the next
12-18 months.

More positively, the ratings reflect (1) the business's leading
market position in its core market, namely the Italian facility
management (FM) sector, albeit this is a very fragmented market;
and (2) its resilient profit-and-loss performance over the past
three fiscal years, which Moody's considers impressive, given the
challenging market conditions, and which demonstrates the
strength of Manutencoop's client proposition.


The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that (1) Manutencoop will maintain its current level of
performance and generate positive free cash flow; and (2) its
adjusted debt/EBITDA will trend comfortably below 6.0x in the
next 6-12 months.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down:

Positive pressure on the ratings could materialize if Manutencoop
(1) maintains its current operating performance in relation to
EBITDA margins; (2) generates sustained positive free cash flow;
and (3) improves its leverage profile such that its Moody's-
adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio moves towards 5.0x.

Conversely, negative pressure could be exerted on the ratings if
Manutencoop's liquidity profile and credit metrics deteriorate as
a result of (1) its operational performance weakening or the loss
of material contracts; (2) acquisitions; or (3) an aggressive
change in its financial policy. Quantitatively, Moody's would
also consider downgrading Manutencoop's ratings if (1) its
adjusted debt/EBITDA fails to sustainably decrease towards 6.0x
in the next 6-12 months; or (2) the company reports negative free
cash flow on a sustained basis.

Founded in 1938 and headquartered in Bologna, Italy, Manutencoop
Facility Management S.p.A. is Italy's largest integrated FM
company (based on revenues). Manutencoop's service offering
includes technical maintenance, cleaning, energy management, and
laundry & sterilization -- primarily to the Italian public and
healthcare sectors, but also the private sector. Manutencoop
generated fiscal 2012 (to December 31, 2012) reported revenues of
EUR1.1 billion and EBITDA of EUR114 million.


SHIP LUXCO 3: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on U.K.-based
payment processing company Ship Luxco 3 S.a.r.l. (Worldpay) at
'B'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its issue rating of 'B+' to the
proposed GBP150 million-equivalent term loan D to be issued by
Worldpay.  The recovery rating on the proposed term loan D is
'2', reflecting S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%)
recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on Worldpay's
existing senior secured facilities.  The recovery rating on these
facilities is unchanged at '2'.

The affirmation follows Worldpay's proposal to issue a
GBP150 million term loan D.  S&P understands that Worldpay plans
to use about GBP51.9 million of the proceeds to acquire U.S.
electronic payment processor Century Payments.  S&P further
understands that about GBP95.1 million will remain on the balance
sheet for general corporate purposes and potential future bolt-on

The affirmation reflects S&P's understanding that although
Worldpay is assuming additional debt of GBP150 million to finance
the acquisition, this will be accompanied by additional EBITDA of
about GBP6.4 million.  This results in Standard & Poor's-adjusted
leverage of 6x-7x, including Worldpay's preferred equity
certificates (PECs).

S&P believes that the acquisition of Century Payments will enable
Worldpay to improve its market position in the U.S., because the
acquisition will give Worldpay direct control over point-of-sale
technology.  This technology gives Worldpay access to additional
sales channels.

S&P continues to assess Worldpay's financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged" and its business risk profile as
"satisfactory."  In S&P's base-case credit scenario, it assumes a
flat to 1% increase in revenues for 2013, and almost stable
EBITDA margins of about 7% for 2013 and 2014.  This would lead to
funds from operations (FFO) of about GBP50 million for 2013
onward and positive free operating cash flow (FOCF).  S&P also
assumes FFO to debt of below 10%, and cash EBITDA interest
coverage in the 2.5x-3.0x range in 2013 and 2014.

In S&P's view, Worldpay will continue to maintain EBITDA margins
at about 7% and positive FOCF in the near term.  Rating stability
depends on Worldpay maintaining adjusted gross leverage of about
6x-7x including the PECs, and positive FOCF.  It also depends on
the group maintaining a coverage ratio of cash interest by EBITDA
of more than 2x.

In S&P's opinion, a positive rating action on Worldpay is remote
at this stage, due to the group's increased appetite for leverage
and modest free cash flow generation prospects.

S&P could lower the rating if it sees a deterioration in the
group's liquidity, particularly if covenant headroom tightens
consistently to less than 15%.  Equally, S&P could downgrade
Worldpay if the company's EBITDA declines over the next few
quarters without any reasonable prospect of meaningful recovery,
and if EBITDA coverage of cash interest falls below 2x over the
next few years.

Similarly, S&P could lower the rating if it observes that
Worldpay's technology platform-related investments in 2013 are
meaningfully higher than its base-case scenario, implying no
significant improvement in free cash flow generation.


KOMBINAT ALUMINIJUMA: Declared Bankrupt; Sale Mulled
Misha Savic at Bloomberg News reports that Kombinat Aluminijuma
Podgorica AD, was declared bankrupt after no one submitted a plan
to restructure the company before a court-imposed deadline on

According to Bloomberg, the court-appointed manager Veselin
Perisic said that the unprofitable company, once controlled by
Oleg Deripaska's En+ Group, may be offered for sale to cover at
least some of KAP's EUR459 million (US$620 million) in

"We'll try to keep up production as long as possible to make KAP
as attractive as possible to potential buyers," Mr. Perisic, as
cited by Bloomberg, said in a phone interview in Podgorica on

Bloomberg relates that court President Dragan Rakocevic, as
quoted by an RTCG report, said selling KAP as a whole rather than
some of its assets would be the best option, "if creditors
agree".  According to Bloomberg, the report said that an
invitation to bidders may be made in about 20 days.

The government borrowed EUR42.5 million in August to repay a
state-backed loan to KAP, which employs 1,200 of Montenegro's
620,000 people, Bloomberg recounts.

Claims against KAP include EUR148.4 million owed to Montenegro's
Finance Ministry, EUR43.4 million to En+ Group, EUR50 million to
En+ Groups's Central European Aluminum Company, EUR44.76 million
to Elektroprivreda Crne Gore AD, and EUR25.86 million to VTB Bank
OJSC, Bloomberg says, citing a list on KAP's website.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 19,
2013, PRIME related that bankruptcy proceedings were initiated by
Montenegro's finance ministry on June 14 due to KAP's EUR24.4
million debt to the ministry, which occurred after the repayment
of KAP's EUR24.4 million debt to Deutsche Bank from Montenegro's
budget under state guarantees.

Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica is an aluminium plant.  The
company is Montenegro's single biggest industrial employer.  It
is jointly owned by the state and the Central European Aluminium
Company of Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska.


PALLAS CDO II: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Ratings on Two Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Pallas CDO II BV's notes, as follows:

  Class A-1-a (ISIN XS0298493072): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook

  Class A-1-d(ISIN XS0298495523): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook

  Class A-2 (ISIN XS0298496505): affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook

  Class B (ISIN XS0298496927): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook

  Class C (ISIN XS0298497495): affirmed at 'CCCsf'

  Class D-1-a (ISIN XS0298498386): affirmed at 'CCsf'

  Class D-1-b (ISIN XS0298498386): affirmed at 'CCsf'

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation reflects levels of credit enhancement (CE)
commensurate with the ratings. The increase in CE available to
the notes has offset the deterioration in the portfolio's credit
quality since the last review in November 2012.

The senior class A-1-a and A-1-d notes have paid down further
over the past year and stood at 76.3% of their original notional
as of August 2013. Deleveraging has been possible due to both the
natural amortization of the portfolio and the interest diversion
caused by the breach of the class D over-collateralization (OC)
test and the deleveraging ratio test. All other OC tests and the
interest coverage test have been passing since end-2010, but with
reduced cushions.

Assets rated 'CCCsf' or below have increased since the last
review to 5.4% from 3.6% of the outstanding portfolio balance.
Assets rated below 'BB+sf' now represent 31.7% of the portfolio,
up from 26.6% in November 2012. One more defaulted asset has been
reported over the year, thus the transaction at the moment
inventories EUR3.4m of defaults.

The Negative Outlooks on the notes continue to reflect the
increased concentration in peripheral countries, as 48.0% of the
assets are located in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. This has
increased from 44.5% as of the last review. Fitch's view for
structured finance assets on those countries remains negative, as
do the Outlooks on the notes.

In addition, the transaction features an additional event of
default if the class A OC test drops below 100%, and additional
downgrades of the assets could see this ratio further
deteriorate. Although Fitch's calculation of the available
cushion does not indicate immediate risk of triggering an event
of default, this test has deteriorated over the past two years to
12.6% from 13.1% in 2012 and 14.0% in 2011. If an event of
default is triggered, the senior noteholders will have the option
to either cure the event of default or accelerate the
transaction, exposing it to additional market risk.

Pallas CDO II BV is a cash arbitrage securitisation of structured
finance assets. The portfolio is concentrated in RMBS assets
(56.1%) and CMBS (25.3%). Other assets in the pool are corporate
CDOs (15.6%) and commercial ABS (2.9%).

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch has tested the impact on the ratings of the notes of a
downgrade by one rating category on the assets which currently
have a Negative Outlook.

If these assets were downgraded by one category, the notes'
ratings would not be affected when using Fitch's expected
maturities. When bringing the maturities of the assets to their
legal maturity date, the stress would result in a downgrade of
the rated notes of up to one notch.

UPC HOLDINGS: Moody's Confirms 'Ba3' CFR; Outlook Stable
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the Ba3 Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) and the Ba3-PD Probability of Default Rating of UPC
Holding B.V. At the same time the agency has confirmed the
ratings of the senior secured debt instruments issued at UPC
Broadband Holding, UPCB Finance Limited and UPCB Finance Limited
II/III/V/VI at Ba3 and the senior unsecured bonds issued at UPC
at B2. The rating outlook is stable. The rating action concludes
a review first initiated in February 2013 and continued in June
and August 2013.

Ratings Rationale:

The ratings confirmation recognizes that UPC's credit profile has
not been affected by its parent company's (Liberty Global plc)
acquisition of Virgin Media Inc. concluded earlier this year and
also acknowledges that the terms of the company's shareholder
loan (EUR 8.5 billion as of June 30, 2013) now meet the criteria
specified for equity-equivalent treatment from an analytical
perspective by Moody's.

The Ba3 CFR for UPC continues to reflect (i) the significant
scale of the company's cable communications operations and their
geographical diversification across European markets; (ii) UPC's
steady overall operating performance and (iii) the company's
continued commitment to its publicly stated financial policy of
not exceeding 5.0x Total Debt to EBITDA (UPC covenant
definition). However, the Ba3 CFR also takes into account the
strong competition in the company's countries of operations
(notably in the Netherlands and in the CEE region), as well as
the fact that UPC is fully controlled by Liberty Global and
pursues a strategy whereby it aims to keep leverage close to its
stated leverage parameters which results in tight headroom under
the company's financial covenants.

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectations
that UPC will remain on a steady growth trajectory and that
leverage will be managed in line with guidance.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down:

Given Liberty Global's financial policy and leverage targets (see
above), Moody's does not expect any near-term upgrade pressure
for UPC. Over time, leverage, as measured by the Debt/EBITDA
ratio (as defined by Moody's) maintained consistently below 4.5x
moving towards 4.0x times in conjunction with continued visible
revenue and profit growth could prompt a positive rating

Sustained weak operating performance in conjunction with an
increase in the Debt/EBITDA ratio towards 5.5x could result in
downward pressure. Any marked weakening in the company's
liquidity profile would also put pressure on the ratings.

UPC is a pan-European provider of cable communications services
and a principal subsidiary of Liberty Global plc. In the last
twelve months ended 30 June 2013, the company generated EUR4.3
billion in revenue and EUR2.1billion in reported operating cash


POLIMEX-MOSTOSTAL: Warsaw Court Rejects Bankruptcy Motion
Maciej Martewicz at Bloomberg News reports that Polimex said the
Warsaw court rejected the bankruptcy motion filed in August by
Emtech, one of the company's creditors.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 14,
2013, Bloomberg News related that Polimex-Mostostal was in talks
with Emtech and planned to take "legal steps" that would lead to
withdrawing the motion.

Polimex-Mostostal is a Polish engineering and construction
company that has been on the market since 1945.  The Company is
distinguished by a wide range of services provided on general
contractorship basis for the chemical as well as refinery and
petrochemical industries, power engineering, environmental
protection, industrial and general construction.  The Company
also operates in the field of road and railway construction as
well as municipal infrastructure.  Polimex-Mostostal is a large
manufacturer and exporter of steel products, including platform
gratings, in Poland.


CB RENAISSANCE: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ratings to Negative
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the following ratings of CB Renaissance Credit LLC
(Russia): B2 long-term foreign and local-currency debt and
deposit ratings, and B3 "plain vanilla" subordinated debt

Concurrently, the standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) of E+, equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of
b2, has been affirmed with a stable outlook. Moody's has also
affirmed CB Renaissance Credit LLC's Not Prime short-term
foreign-currency and local-currency deposit ratings as well as
the Not-Prime foreign-currency debt rating.

Moody's assessment of the issuer's ratings is largely based on CB
Renaissance Credit LLC's audited financial statements for 2012,
its unaudited financial statements for H1 2013, prepared under
IFRS as well as information received from the bank.

Ratings Rationale:

The negative outlook on CB Renaissance Credit LLC's ratings
reflects (1) Moody's expectations that the bank's asset quality
deterioration will put significant pressure on profitability; and
(2) weakening capitalization, which has been pressured by rapid
loan growth.

The bank displays asset-quality erosion against the background of
general deterioration in the quality of retail portfolios in the
Russian market, with an increase in the bank's cost of risk to
20% in H1 2013 (year-end 2012: 13% and year-end 2011: 6%). As a
result, the bank's profitability fell sharply, with the return on
average assets and return on average equity declining to 0.4% and
2.1%, respectively, in H1 2013 (year-end 2012: 4.0% and 18.5%).
Given that non-performing loans (NPLs) are only 71% covered by
provisions (as mid-2013), the rating agency believes that the
bank's profitability for H1 2013 was somewhat overstated and the
bank is currently loss-making. In addition, profitability was
supported by one-off gains (RUB768 million) from the sale of
loans previously written off.

In the coming quarters, Moody's expects CB Renaissance Credit LLC
to report a further increase in provisions due to (1) seasoning
of the loan book; (2) general deterioration in the quality of
retail portfolios in the Russian market; and (3) the likely
deceleration of its loan book growth.

CB Renaissance Credit LLC's capital base has also deteriorated.
As at end-H1 2013, the bank's Tier 1 ratio declined to a several-
year low (albeit still robust) of 19% (year-end 2012: 23%). The
bank used its capital to finance very rapid loan growth,
increasing its loan portfolio by 2.7x since year-end 2010, while
equity grew by only 1.8x during this period. Moody's expects the
bank's capital base to be further pressured by any decline in
internal capital generation against the background of projected
loan growth.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:

Given the negative outlook on CB Renaissance Credit LLC's long-
term ratings, upward pressure is limited. The outlook could
stabilize if the bank improves its profitability and asset
quality on a sustainable basis while maintaining capital and
liquidity at adequate levels. Downward pressure could be exerted
on the ratings if further asset-quality erosion prevents the bank
from returning to reasonable profitability.

GE MONEY: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba2 Deposit Ratings to Neg.
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the Ba2 long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit
ratings of GE Money Bank CJSC (Russia). Concurrently, the
aforementioned ratings were affirmed along with the bank's Not
Prime short-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings. The
bank's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of E+,
equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b1, was also
affirmed with a stable outlook.

Moody's assessment is primarily based on GE Money Bank CJSC's
audited financial statements at year-end 2012 prepared under
IFRS, unaudited financial statements for H1 2013 prepared under
IFRS, its unaudited financial statements for January-August 2013
prepared under Russian Accounting Standards (RAS), and public

Ratings Rationale:

The change in outlook on GE Money Bank CJSC's ratings reflects
(1) perceived reduction in the bank's strategic fit with the
parent, given GE Capital's recently announced exit from several
consumer finance businesses globally and its stated intention to
increase its focus on commercial finance; and (2) Moody's
expectation of significant pressure on profitability because of
further asset-quality erosion.

Moody's notes the rising risk that GE Money Bank CJSC might be a
lesser strategic fit with its parent (GE Capital). This is
because (1) GE Capital has announced a number of recent consumer-
finance segment divestments globally; and (2) the current
diminishing attractiveness and rising risks of retail lending in
Russia. GE Money Bank CJSC's credit strengths could be impaired
if GE Capital divests GE Money Bank CJSC from the group. Such
strengths are evidenced by (1) support from the GE Capital group;
(2) GE Money Bank CJSC's low risk appetite; and (3) the bank's
good liquidity profile and capitalization.

The rating agency observes that the deteriorating operating
environment is exerting negative pressure on GE Money Bank CJSC's
asset quality, reflected in the increasing cost of risk, which
grew to 11% in H1 2013 from 7% in 2012. As a result, the bank's
profitability is under pressure: the bank reported a marginal
loss in H1 2013 according to unaudited IFRS.

GE Money Bank CJSC's global local-currency (GLC) deposit rating
of Ba2 incorporates two notches of parental support uplift from
the bank's b1 BCA. Moody's assesses a moderate probability of
support to GE Money Bank CJSC from GE Capital in case of need,
based on the former's full integration into the parent's
operations, its limited size and reputation considerations.

GE Money Bank CJSC's modest risk appetite is reflected in the
fact that the bank is not highly leveraged. Its total capital
adequacy ratio was 20% at end-H1 2013 (historically over 20%
during the past three years). In addition, the bank's
conservative provisioning policy -- whereby its NPLs (loans
overdue 90+ days) are more than 280% covered by provisions --
provides an additional capital buffer against current
asset-quality erosion. GE Money Bank CJSC's liquidity management
benefits from material and stable parental funding (which
accounted for 53% of total liabilities at end-H1 2013). The
bank's short-term assets (less than three months) plus unused
committed lines from the parent cover all of the bank's
third-party liabilities.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:

GE Money Bank CJSC's ratings are unlikely to be upgraded given
the negative outlook. However, the outlook could stabilize if its
US parent (GE Capital) demonstrates proven strategic commitment
towards GE Money Bank CJSC throughout the current period of
market deterioration in consumer loans.

Signs of weaker strategic commitment from GE Capital would lead
to a decrease of parental support uplift. Any notches of parental
support uplift from GE Capital will be fully eliminated if the
shareholder disposes of its controlling stake in GE Money Bank
CJSC. A potential sale of the bank could also trigger negative
rating pressure on the bank's BCA if the new owner adopted a
riskier lending, funding and capital strategy.

Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, GE Money Bank CJSC reported -- as at
end-2012 -- total IFRS (audited) assets of US$958 million and
total equity of US$299 million. The bank's net profit amounted to
US$29 million for 2012.

SKB-BANK: Moody's Cuts Deposit & Sr. Unsec. Debt Ratings to B2
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the following ratings of
SKB-Bank: long-term foreign and local-currency deposit ratings to
B2 from B1, and senior unsecured local-currency debt rating to B2
from B1.

Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the bank's Not Prime short-
term foreign-currency and local-currency deposit ratings and its
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of E+ (which is
now equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b2,
formerly b1). The outlook on long-term foreign- and local-
currency deposit and debt ratings has been changed to negative
from stable while the BFSR maintains a stable outlook.

Moody's assessment of SKB-Bank's ratings is largely based on its
audited financial statements for 2012, unaudited financial
statements for H1 2013, prepared under IFRS as well as
information received from the bank.

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade of SKB-Bank's ratings is driven by (1) the bank's
low capital buffer which, in recent years, has been under
pressure from the rapid increase in its exposure to the risky
unsecured retail loans sector; and (2) significant pressure on
the bank's asset quality and profitability due to the increasing
risks in its loan portfolio.

In the period 2010 to H1 2013, SKB-Bank's retail loan book
expanded six-fold and accounted for 66% of the bank's loan book
at H1 2013, up from 33% at year-end 2009, reflecting the bank's
high risk appetite.

Moody's notes that the recent weakening of SKB-Bank's risk
profile -- caused by rapidly increasing exposure to the risky
retail sector -- has not been adequately offset by an increase in

The bank's Tier 1 and Total Capital Ratios (under Basel I)
improved slightly to 8.3% and 12.6%, respectively, at end-H1 2013
(year-end 2012: 7.9% and 12.1%). However, the rating agency
regards SKB-Bank's capital buffer as low, given the rapid pace of
asset-quality deterioration. Moody's also expects that because of
limited loan growth, pre-provision income -- which has previously
enabled the bank to absorb higher provisioning costs -- will be
under pressure over the next 12-18 months.

Moody's notes material erosion in SKB-Bank's asset quality
against the background of the general deterioration in the
quality of Russian banks' retail portfolios. For SKB-Bank, this
deterioration is reflected in a weakening NPL ratio, with the
level of non-performing loans (loans overdue more than 90 days)
increasing to 11.9% of the total loan portfolio as at June 30,
2013 (year-end 2012: 8%). The rising NPL levels prompted an
increase in the bank's cost of risk to 11.5% in H1 2013 (year-end
2012: 8.4% and year-end 2011: 3.6%). Moody's expects that over
the next 12-18 months SKB-Bank's asset quality will further
deteriorate, leading to higher loan-loss provisions. Please see
Moody's Special Comment "Rising Credit Risks Accelerate Asset
Quality Weaknesses"

According to Moody's, the growing cost of risk has pressured the
bank's financial results. The rating agency expects that lower
business volumes and higher loan-loss provisions will further
pressure SKB-Bank's profitability. For H1 2013, SKB-Bank reported
a net profit of RUB342 million, down from RUB836 million reported
in H1 2012, which translated into a weak return on average assets
(RoAA) of 0.55% (annualized), down from 0.74% in 2012.

Rationale for the Negative Outlook:

The negative outlook on SKB-Bank's deposit ratings reflects the
ongoing negative pressure on the bank's financial fundamentals
due to weakening asset quality, which will result in higher loan-
loss reserves, thus exerting further pressure on the bank's
profitability and capital. Moody's also says that the expected
slowdown in lending growth following new regulatory measures that
aim to constrain risks in the retail market will exert additional
pressure on the bank's profitability over the next 12-18 months.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:

Given the negative outlook on the long-term deposit ratings,
upward pressure is limited. However, the outlook could stabilize
if SKB-Bank strengthens its capital base, or if asset-quality
pressures abate, thus enabling the bank to improve its
profitability. Downward pressure could be exerted on the ratings
if the bank fails to strengthen its capital buffer, or as a
result of increased pressure on its profitability caused by
further asset-quality erosion.

VOSTOCHNY EXPRESS: Moody's Changes Outlook on B1 Ratings to Neg.
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the following ratings of Vostochny Express Bank: B1
long-term foreign and local-currency deposit ratings and B1
senior debt ratings. The bank's E+ standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR), which maps into a baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of b1, was affirmed with a stable outlook. The
negative outlook on Vostochny Express Bank's ratings reflects the
pressure on its asset quality and profitability. At the same
time, Moody's affirmed the bank's Not Prime short-term foreign-
currency and local-currency deposit ratings.

Moody's assessment of Vostochny Express Bank's ratings is largely
based on its audited financial statements for 2012, unaudited
financial statements for H1 2013, prepared under IFRS and
reviewed by the auditors, as well as information received from
the bank.

Ratings Rationale:

The negative outlook on Vostochny Express Bank's ratings reflects
(1) significant pressure on asset quality and profitability
because of the increasing risks in the bank's loan portfolio; and
(2) the bank's relatively low reserve coverage of non-performing
loans (NPLs) and modest capital adequacy which weaken its loss-
absorption capacity.

Vostochny Express Bank displays asset-quality erosion against the
background of general deterioration in the quality of retail
portfolios in the Russian market, with an increase in the bank's
cost of risk to 12% in H1 2013 (2012: 6%, 2011: 4%).

As a result of the increased cost of risk, the bank's
profitability is under pressure: Vostochny Express Bank reported
a net loss in H1 2013, which translated into return on average
assets (ROAA) of -0.3% (2012: 3%). Moody's expects that the
negative asset-quality trends will continue to exert negative
pressure on Vostochny Express Bank's profitability. However,
Moody's notes that the bank has responded to these pressures by
cutting its operating costs (closing 636 small offices) and has
tightened its credit scoring since mid-2012 to contain risk.

Moody's estimates that the bank's loss-absorption capacity is
somewhat weaker than the average for the Russian consumer
lenders, driven by its insufficient reserves (covering 91% of
NPLs and not covering any portion of performing loans), modest
capital adequacy (a Tier 1 ratio of 12% and Total CAR of 14.5%)
and pre-provisioning profitability (PPI/Average assets of 10%),
all below the peer group's average. On the other hand, the bank
has consistently demonstrated somewhat lower risk appetite
compared with its peers: in particular, it limited its lending
growth in H1 2013 more than most other retail banks, posting loan
growth of just 10%.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:

Vostochny Express Bank's ratings are unlikely to be upgraded
given the negative outlook. However, the outlook could stabilize
if the bank strengthens its capital base and NPL coverage, and
improves asset quality and profitability.

Downward pressure might develop on the ratings as a result of (1)
failure to recover and sustain profitability; and/or (2) further
deterioration of asset quality not matched by an adequate
increase in capitalization and/or reserves.

YAMAL INVESTMENT: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B-' ICR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Yamal Investment Projects Development Fund OAO (Yamal
Investment Fund) to negative from stable.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed the 'B-' long-term issuer credit and 'ruBBB-' Russia
national scale ratings on the fund.

The outlook revision follows S&P's downgrade of Yamal-Nenets
Autonomous Okrug (YANAO; BBB-/Negative/--; Russia national scale
'ruAAA'), which is the 100% owner of the fund.

The ratings on Yamal Investment Fund reflect S&P's view that
there is a "moderately high" likelihood that the regional
government of YANAO would provide timely and sufficient
extraordinary support in the event of financial distress.  The
ratings also incorporate the fund's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP), which S&P assess at 'ccc', owing to its untested business
model, uncertainly about its long-term strategy, and political
risks challenging the fund's mission.

S&P considers Yamal Investment Fund to be a government-related
entity (GRE).  In accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs, its
view of a "moderately high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support is based on its assessment of Yamal Investment
Fund's "very strong" link with the YANAO government and "limited"
role for YANAO government policies. The long-term rating on Yamal
Investment Fund is therefore two notches higher than its SACP.

S&P uses its criteria for rating private equity companies to
assess the fund's SACP, reflecting its status as a private equity
investment vehicle.  The fund's SACP reflects its untested and
risky business model, uncertainty about its long-term strategy,
and political risks associated with its long-term role.  These
factors are somewhat mitigated by the fund's low debt, which S&P
nevertheless expects to increase, and strong capital.

The negative outlook on Yamal Investment Fund reflects that on

S&P might consider a positive rating action if it took a positive
action on YANAO.  S&P could also take a positive action if the
fund's role for and link with the YANAO government strengthened
through clear and documented policy statements and strategies.
Successful performances from the fund's projects resulting in
sustainable and sufficient cash flow may lead us to reassess the
company's SACP upward.

S&P could take a negative rating action within the next 12 months
if it downgraded YANAO, or if the likelihood of timely
extraordinary support from the YANAO government fell.  A
weakening of the fund's SACP resulting from poor implementation
of its business plan might also put pressure on the long-term


IM CAJAMAR 6: Fitch Confirms Ratings on Document Amendment
Fitch Ratings has confirmed the ratings of IM Cajamar 6, FTA
following an update of the swap transaction documentation. The
transaction is a prime RMBS securitisation.

Key Rating Drivers

- Ineligible Swap Counterparty

The update of the swap documentation has provided an exception
for Cajas Rurales Unidas, Sociedad Cooperativo de Credito
(Cajamar; BB/Stable/B) to carry on performing the role of swap
counterparty despite it breaching the minimum required
'BBB+'/'F2' triggers. According to Fitch's counterparty criteria
for structured finance transactions, Cajamar is not eligible to
support the current 'Asf' rating on the class A notes.

As a result, Fitch did not give credit to the swap in its
analysis and instead applied its cash flow model interest rate
stresses to the transaction to test whether the swap was material
to the rating of the notes.

The results show that the transaction has sufficient credit
enhancement available to withstand the increased risks and
therefore the notes' rating has been confirmed.

Rating Sensitivities

-- Home price declines beyond Fitch's expectations could have
   a negative effect on the ratings as this would limit
   recoveries, causing additional stress on portfolio cash

-- The Negative Outlooks on all tranches rated above 'CCCsf'
   reflect the uncertainty associated with changes to the
   mortgage enforcement framework currently being drafted.
   The eventual effects of framework changes on borrower
   payment behaviour, recovery timing and amounts are
   currently unclear and will be factored into Fitch's
   analysis as they emerge.

-- An unexpected sharp rise in interest rates beyond Fitch's
   stressed expectations would cause the transactions to suffer
   cash shortfalls and may cause the agency to take rating


CB PRIVATBANK: Fitch's 'B' IDR Unaffected by New Rating Action
Fitch Ratings has assigned Ukraine-based PJSC CB PrivatBank's
(Privat) a National Long-term Rating of 'A-(ukr)' with a Stable
Outlook.  Privat's other ratings are unaffected by this rating

Key Rating Drivers

Privat's National rating is driven by the bank's standalone
credit strength and reflects the agency's assessment of Privat's
default risk relative to other issuers in Ukraine. This view
takes into account the bank's broad domestic franchise, material
loss absorption capacity and moderate refinancing risk. Privat's
rating also reflects risks arising from recent rapid loan growth,
high borrower and industry concentrations, and a potentially
large related-party business.

The Stable Outlook on the National rating reflects Fitch's view
that any future deterioration in Privat's credit profile is
likely to be broadly in line with that of other Ukrainian
issuers, meaning that the bank's default risk relative to other
issuers will remain broadly unchanged.

Rating Sensitivities

An upgrade of Privat's National Long-term Rating could result
from improvements in the bank's asset quality and a reduction of
lending concentrations. A marked deterioration in these areas
could lead to a downgrade.

The following ratings of Privat are unaffected:

  Long-term Issuer Default Rating 'B'/Negative

  Senior unsecured debt 'B'/Recovery Rating 'RR4'

  Short-term Issuer Default Rating 'B'

  Viability Rating 'b'

  Support Rating '5'

  Support Rating Floor 'No Floor'

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABOVE BAR: Hairdressing College Goes Into Liquidation
Sian Davies at Daily Echo reports that Above Bar College has gone
into liquidation putting up to 250 apprenticeships and 25 jobs at

Liquidators are currently trying to find another further
education provider to take on Above Bar College which has
provided hairdressing apprentices to hundreds of salons across
the south coast for 20 years, the report relates.

Chantrey Vellacott LLP, the firm in charge of the liquidation,
said talks with another college to take over the training
currently provided by Above Bar at its sites in Southampton and
Salisbury are at an advanced stage, the report relays.

According to the report, liquidator Terry Evans said the economic
downturn meant fewer employers were using the college to train
their staff.

The Echo notes that Above Bar went into voluntary liquidation
earlier this month promoting concern among businesses and
apprentices who were completing their qualifications and training
through the scheme.

Talks are now under way with Eastleigh College to see whether
they can take over the running of the salons previously run by
Above Bar College, the report notes.

Along with the headquarters at Above Bar Street in Southampton
the college also ran studios in East Street and at Bitterne Park
School, where training was given to 14 to 16- year-olds.

HASTINGS INSURANCE: Fitch to Rate Long-term IDR at 'B+'
Fitch Ratings expects to rate UK-based Hastings Insurance Group
(Finance) plc and its proposed issuance of GBP415 million of
senior-secured fixed and floating rate notes as follows, upon
completion of the pending acquisition of a stake in Hastings by
Goldman Sachs Principal Investments (GS PIA):

Hastings Insurance Group (Finance) plc
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'(EXP) with a Stable

Hastings Insurance Group (Finance) plc
Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2019: 'BB-(EXP)'/RR3'.

Hastings Insurance Group (Finance) plc
Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2020: 'BB-(EXP)'/RR3'.

The proposed notes will refinance existing indebtedness and fund
the equity consideration of purchase price by GS PIA. Final note
ratings would be contingent upon the receipt of final
documentation conforming materially to information already
received. Failure to issue the notes according to plan would
result in the withdrawal of the above instrument ratings as well
as the IDR.

Key Rating Drivers
Ability to Manage Business Volumes through Integrated
Broker/Underwriter Business Model
Hastings Insurance Services Ltd (HISL), the retail broking arm of
Hastings Insurance Group operates a traditional insurer panel
model on which both Advantage Insurance Company Limited (AICL)
and third party insurers sit. This provides HISL with greater
ability to channel customers between AICL and third party panel
insurers, thus adjusting volumes to current pricing conditions in
accordance with AICL's risk-appetite. Price comparison websites
are the company's main distribution channel (90% of policies),
followed by 'direct to website' and call centers (10%).

Improved Underwriting Profitability in a Challenging Environment
Advantage Insurance Company Limited (AICL), the underwriting arm,
has achieved a notable improvement in its loss ratio in recent
years despite the competitive environment in the UK motor market.
This was achieved by discontinuing unprofitable policies and
improved fraud prevention measures. As a result, the underwriting
business has achieved sub-100% combined ratios over the past two

On-going Competitive Pressures
Hastings faces significant competition in its core market.
Leaders in the UK private car market are well recognized names
such as the Direct Line Group (15% market share), the Admiral
Group (9%), AA (8%), Aviva (8%) and LV= (7%). Hastings' exposure
is heavily concentrated in the UK motor market. This segment of
the market is subject to significant volatility and competition
which could cause pricing pressures. The group's main
distribution channel of aggregator websites also tend to be
characterized by high price sensitivity. Competitive pressure is
further increased by the sale and distribution of products
through web-based aggregators and broker panels, where customers
are more price sensitive.

Weakening Financial Flexibility Due To A Challenging Economic
The long-dated maturity profile of the notes, combined with
forecasted deleveraging through funds from operations (FFO)
generation (c.5.0x in 2014 to 3.85x in 2017) provides Hastings
with a considerable degree of financial flexibility at present.
However, the business could be subject to significant volatility,
given its target market and customer acquisition techniques.
Hastings needs to achieve significant EBITDA growth over the next
several years to achieve sufficient deleveraging. If growth does
not take place as envisaged by the business plan, in an
environment of softening prices, credits metrics are likely to
come under pressure and cause a reduction in financial

Management Execution of its Business Plan
To a significant extent, the success of Hastings' largely new
senior management team is key to determining the outcome of this

Rating Sensitivities
Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

  -- FFO gross leverage below 3.5x on a sustained basis;
  -- FFO interest cover above 3.0x on a sustained basis;
  -- Sustained increase in margin to 26% indicating an improved
     competitive positions across divisions.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

  -- FFO gross leverage above 5.0x on a sustained basis;
  -- FFO interest cover below 2.5x on a sustained basis.

HASTINGS INSURANCE: Moody's Assigns B2 Ratings to Sr. Sec. Notes
Moody's Investors Service has assigned B2 ratings to Hastings
Insurance Group (Finance) plc's proposed senior secured fixed
rate notes and senior secured floating rate notes, totaling
GBP415 million. The ratings are based on draft documentation and
on the assumption that the transaction will close with final
terms that do not differ materially from those received to date.
At the same time, Moody's has also assigned a first-time Ba3
insurance financial strength rating (IFSR) to Advantage Insurance
Company Limited, the insurance operating company of the Group.
The outlook on all ratings is stable.

The proposed senior secured debt issuance is part of a
transaction involving the sale of 50% of the existing
shareholders' stake in Hastings Insurance Group to a private
equity investor, Goldman Sachs Merchant Banking Division. The
transaction will involve setting up new legal entities above the
current Group structure, which will issue GBP1 million of
ordinary shares and a total of GBP305 million of preference
shares to existing rollover shareholders and Goldman Sachs, and a
nominal amount to the management team. Hastings Insurance Group
(Finance) plc will issue the GBP415 million senior secured notes,
which will remain in an escrow account until the transaction
completes, i.e., when Hastings Insurance Group (Finance) plc
acquires Hastings from the existing shareholders and becomes an
intermediary holding company of the new Hastings Group.

Advantage Insurance Company Ltd. is a relatively small, UK
personal lines insurer, and is one of the two main operating
subsidiaries of Hastings, with Hastings Insurance Services Ltd.
acting as the Group's insurance broking operating entity.
Although HISL provides broking services to an external panel of
insurers, around 90% of the policies it places are underwritten
by AIC. .

Ratings Rationale:

The ratings reflect the proposed Group's very high level of debt,
which will significantly constrain financial flexibility and
profitability, combined with a small equity cushion. These
weaknesses are offset somewhat by Hastings' relatively low
product risk given its focus on personal lines business, a small
but growing market presence in UK personal lines motor with a 4%
market share, and good operating profitability to date.

The B2 senior secured ratings are two notches below AIC's Ba3
IFSR as opposed to Moody's standard three-notch gap between an
insurance operating company's IFSR and holding company senior
debt. This reduction primarily reflects the notes' secured status
via first-priority security interests over substantially all of
the assets of a number of the Group's intermediate holding
companies, including the capital stock of both AIC and HISL. The
notes will also be guaranteed by various intermediate holding
companies as well as HISL. However, for regulatory reasons, the
recourse to cash under HISL's guarantee and the floating charge
over its assets is very limited. The narrower notching also
reflects the Group's ability to up-stream dividends from its
operating entities to Hastings Insurance Group (Finance) plc,
which is relatively flexible as a result of the Group's legal
structure and the relationship between AIC and HISL.

Elaborating on Hastings' credit profile, Moody's said the Group's
financial flexibility is considered the key rating constraint. At
YE12, adjusted financial leverage was very high at 77%, and will
increase further (in excess of 95%) following the transaction.
However, around 40% of the prospective debt is in the form of
preference shares with a long maturity, and although these are
treated as debt for the purposes of Moody's leverage
calculations, Moody's are mindful of the equity like features and
more flexible nature of these instruments. Since debt proceeds
will be used to repay outstanding shareholder loans and realize
part of the existing shareholders' investment in the Group,
deleveraging will depend entirely on the Group's ability to
organically grow its retained earnings base. However, given that
material finance costs will prospectively pressurize net
earnings, and consequently retained earnings, the Group is likely
to remain highly levered with relatively thin earnings coverage
in the medium term.

The Group's capital adequacy is another credit weakness, as
reflected in AIC's high gross underwriting leverage of 8.6x at
YE12. Given that the Group is looking to meaningfully grow and
continue using 50% quota share reinsurance for capacity, this
metric will remain high for the foreseeable future. Furthermore,
with limited retained earnings, the prospect for a material
improvement in the lean equity base (particularly on a group
consolidated basis) is considered remote in the medium term.

On the positive side, Hastings' operating profitability to date
has been good; at YE12 it reported net income of GBP40 million
with a return on capital (ROC) of 37% This high ROC reflects
AIC's high operating leverage via quota share reinsurance, and
cost-effective direct distribution, which enables Hastings to
compete on price, whilst maintaining healthy loss ratios. This in
turn allows the Group to receive significant profit commissions
from its reinsurers. However, a challenge for Hastings will be to
sustain operating performance whilst growing profitably within
the very competitive UK Motor market, where rates have been
declining in 2013 and which remains vulnerable to bodily injury
claims inflation. Furthermore, a key operating risk for Hastings
is a decline in reinsurance capacity, or less favorable profit
sharing conditions, which would materially weaken the Group's
operating performance and its ability to grow.

With regard to rating drivers going forward, Moody's said that
the following could put upward pressure on the ratings: (i)
sustained material increases in AIC's and the Group's equity
base; (ii) profitable growth of business, with Group ROC
exceeding 6%; (iii) material reduction in leverage; or (iv)
significantly enhanced business franchise. Conversely, negative
rating pressure could arise from: (i) a further increase in debt
levels or earnings coverage consistently below 1.5x; (ii)
deterioration in capital levels; or (iii) a material decline in
reinsurance capacity or materially less favorable quota share

The following ratings have been assigned with a stable outlook:

Hastings Insurance Group (Finance) plc - senior secured fixed
rate notes at B2

Hastings Insurance Group (Finance) plc - senior secured floating
rate notes at B2

Advantage Insurance Company Limited - insurance financial
strength at Ba3

Hastings Insurance Group was established in its current form in
2012, when Hastings Insurance Group acquired the Advantage Group.
Prior to this acquisition AIC (formed in 2002, incorporated in
Gibraltar) and HISL (formed in 1997, incorporated in the UK) were
related parties owned indirectly by substantially the same
shareholders. For 2012, Hastings reported profit after tax of
GBP40 million and net written premiums of GBP160 million. As of
June 30, 2013, the company reported equity of GBP33 million.

IFA: Pushed Into Administration Over Arch Cru Liabilities
Laura Miller at IFAonline reports that IFA Willow Financial has
been forced into administration over GBP1.5million in liabilities
relating to its Arch Cru advice - but has been bought back by
some of its former partners at a knock-down price, and they won't
be footing the bill for claims.

The administrator's report into the firm states that Willow found
itself in trouble after the regulator ordered firms to review the
Arch Cru advice they had given and offer redress if it was found
to be unsuitable, according to IFAonline.

The report notes that upon reviewing its files, Willow found that
the Arch Cru funds had mainly been marketed as low risk and, as
such, a "significant" number of claims were expected.

The report relates that the administrator's report puts the
figure for potential Arch Cru claims at GBP1.5million, in
addition to claims from two former clients at the Financial
Ombudsman Service (FOS) which totalled GBP70,000 and which Willow
could also not pay.

The report relays that Willow is now in administration, but
former partners in the failed firm - Ian Morris, Philip Martin,
Peter Holden and Calum Cameron - have bought the business, its
ongoing client remuneration and assets for GBP40,000, under two
new firms.

The report discloses that Morris, Martin and Holden made a 50%
purchase of Willow under the firm My Wealth Management, and
Cameron bought the remaining 50% under the firm Dynamic Wealth,
according to the administrator.

Cowgill Holloway joint administrator Craig Johns - who is
managing the administration of Willow - told IFAonlin News that
the company's assets have been bought and transferred to the new
owners but not its liabilities.

"The business has been bought including certain assets but not
the liabilities.  [Claims relating to Arch Cru] may be eligible
for compensation through the Financial Services Compensation
Scheme," the report quoted Mr. Holloway as saying.

The report notes that in total, the firm owes GBP1.6million to
creditors, including the estimated compensation claims relating
to Arch Cru.

The report relates that this includes GBP36,933.85 it owes to the
Financial Conduct Authority and a GBP23,040.46 debt to HM Revenue
and Customs.  It also owes the IFA Centre GBP95.00.

MALLORY PARK: Owners Set Up New Firm to Run Race Track
Dan Martin at this is Leicestershire reports that the parent
company which placed the operators of Mallory Park racing circuit
into administration has set up a new firm in the hope of running
the track.

The future of the venue was thrown into doubt last month when
British Automobile Racing Club (BARC) placed Mallory Park
(Motorsport) Ltd (MPML) into the hands of administrators,
according to this is Leicestershire.

The report notes that the move followed a successful prosecution
of MPML by Hinckley and Bosworth Borough Council for breaches of
a 1985 agreement, limiting noisy track days to 92 each year.  The
report relates that BARC said the enforcement of the restrictions
made it impossible to run the track without making a loss, so
administrators were called in.

The report relays that it has now emerged BARC formed a company
called Mallory Park Motor Racing Ltd, three days after MPML was
put into administration.

Villagers in Kirkby Mallory, who have complained about breaches
of the 1985 terms, now fear the new company could start running
the track without restrictions if it was able to buy MPML, the
report says.

A council spokesman told this is Leicestershire that, "The 1985
agreement applies to MPML, not the circuit.  In that sense the
residents would be correct.

"However, there are discussions going on with the administrators
about how the council will regulate any new operator . . . . In
the worst case, the council would serve the 1985 notice on the
new operator but there might be a short breathing space . . . .
We want racing to continue within limits acceptable to the
villagers," the report quoted the council spokesman as saying.

The report notes that Mark Jones, BARC chief operating officer,
who is listed as the sole director of the newly-formed company,
said: "We have always been clear we want to continue running
Mallory Park . . . .  It's normal to have a shell company set up
ready and this is what we have done . . . .  The administrators
know we are here but there is no deal on the table . . . .  We
are happy to have an agreement with the council but not the old

The report relays that the company had been fined GBP2,500 and
ordered to pay costs of GBP23,000 to the council following the
noise breach case.

Administrator Ian Robert, of Kingston Smith Partners, said MPML
staff were still working and being paid.

POOLE'S PIES: Had GBP1.75MM Claim When Administrator Called In
Chris Barry at reports that Poole's Pies was
facing a legal claim of GBP1.75 million from food production
group 2 Sisters, when it was placed in administration by owner
Dave Whelan. relates that the administrators said the
claim, brought by 2 Sisters' subsidiaries Northern Foods and FW
Farnworth, relate to alleged theft of recipes and the appointment
of its staff by Poole's, and other individual defendants.

The claim arose after Neil Court-Johnson, who used to work for
Northern Foods as MD of its Hollands Pies brand, took over as
boss of Poole's in 2012, according to the report.

SAVOY HOTEL: At Risk of Breaching Bank Loan Terms
Neil Callanan at Bloomberg News reports that The Savoy said it
would be at risk of breaching terms of bank loans if operating
results don't improve.

According to Bloomberg, an Oct. 7 filing to Companies House by
Breezeroad Ltd., the hotel's owner, said "This risk represents a
material uncertainty which could cast significant doubt as to the
group's ability to continue as a going concern".

Bloomberg relates that the filing said Breezeroad's directors
prepared projections that assume an improvement in business and
indicate the Savoy will continue to meet its debts.  If the
financial projections aren't met, loans to the company,
controlled by Saudi billionaire Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal and a
Lloyds Banking Group Plc unit, could become repayable on demand,
Bloomberg states.

The Breezeroad directors said that they don't think a covenant
breach would have a "detrimental impact" on the group's ability
to operate, according to the filing.  The directors, as cited by
Bloomberg, said that costs could be cut to avoid breaching loan
terms or talks with lenders and shareholders could be held to
resolve any loan violations.

Bloomberg notes that the filing to Companies House describing
last year's results show the hotel had a pretax loss of GBP53.5
million (US$85 million) in 2012, an 8% increase from a year

According to Bloomberg, Credit Agricole SA and DekaBank Deutsche
Girozentrale have loaned GBP200 million to a Breezeroad
affiliate.  The filing said that Lloyds and Kingdom Holding each
loaned the group GBP50.5 million.  The co-owners also provided
loans at a lower rate, Bloomberg says.

The Savoy is a five-star London hotel.

SOHO HOUSE: Moody's Assigns 'Caa1' Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive Caa1 corporate
family rating (CFR) to Soho House Bond Ltd., a fully owned
subsidiary of Soho House Group Ltd. Concurrently, Moody's has
assigned a definitive Caa1 rating to the GBP115 million senior
secured notes raised by Soho House Bond Ltd. Moody's has also
assigned a B3-PD probability of default rating (PDR). The outlook
on all ratings remains positive.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's definitive rating assignment on the GBP115 million of
notes reflects the fact that the final terms of the notes are in
line with the drafts reviewed for the provisional ratings
assigned on September 20, 2013, to GBP105 million of notes.

The company's liquidity profile, although not particularly
strong, has benefited from the upsizing of the notes issuance to
GBP115 million and should suffice to cover near-term operational
requirements (including high development capex to open new Houses
to sustain future profitability growth). There is no amortization
of the notes and no debt maturity before 2019. However, undrawn
availability under the RCF reduces in 2014 as it is used to fund
the expansion.

The positive outlook reflects Moody's view that the company's
credit profile will fit the B3 rating category should the
expansion program be successfully completed, and revenues and
EBITDA also grow as the company envisages. The ratings could be
upgraded if Soho House deleverages, while maintaining an adequate
liquidity profile and remaining free cash flow positive.

Negative pressure on the ratings or outlook could arise if the
company fails to successfully execute its development and growth
plans, with potentially reduced growth in revenue and EBITDA,
leading to a failure to deleverage and potentially liquidity

Soho House is a fully integrated hospitality company that
operates exclusive, private members clubs as well as hotels,
restaurants and spas across major cities worldwide. Founded in
London in 1995 as a membership club dedicated to the creative
industries, Soho House account for 36,000 members. Soho House
generated revenues of GBP141.1 million in 2012.

WTB TRADING: Winterhill Sovereign Appointed as Administrator
------------------------------------------------------------ reports that Winterhill Sovereign, a debt recovery
and credit management provider which is part of the Winterhill
Largo asset valuation and recovery group, has been appointed by
the joint administrators of civil engineering supplier, WTB
Trading Limited (formerly Burdens Limited).

Administrators from Duff & Phelps have appointed Winterhill
Sovereign to recover the outstanding company book debts of
Burdens, which had a turnover of GBP250million and employed about
350 employees across 16 branches nationwide when it was placed
into administration in late November 2012, according to  The report relates that most of the Bristol-based
company's branches have been sold on a going concern basis by the
administrators, after 22 depots were bought by Wolseley Utilities
UK Limited trading as Burdens for GBP30million shortly before the
appointment of the administrators.  Six hundred Burdens staff
also transferred to Wolseley as part of the deal, the report

"This is a complex task because of the size and diversity of
Burdens, which supplied a huge range of civil engineering
products and services.  After meeting earlier this year with the
administrators, who made a decision to uplift the ledger from
Wolsely and the Wolseley credit control team, we were able to
begin a full collect-out process immediately.  We are working
closely with the administrators from Duff & Phelps on an on-going
basis to recover Burdens' book debts and have adopted several
pre-agreed collection strategies to maximise the success of the
recovery," the report quoted Winterhill Sovereign managing
director, Sarah Hatswell, as saying.

Sovereign Credit Management was acquired by asset valuation and
recovery specialist and financial outsourcing group Winterhill
Largo in 2012, becoming Winterhill Sovereign.  Over the past 12
months the group has also acquired environmental consultancy
business Site Ops, along with field services provider Chase
Solutions.  The group has also launched a new risk management
division this year, Winterhill Risk.  Winterhill Largo now
operates from 12 offices in the UK and overseas and employs 95

ZATTIKKA: Administrators May Opt for CVA Deal
--------------------------------------------- reports that the Joint Administrators of
Zattikka have confirmed that their proposals for the conduct of
the administration have now been sent to all known creditors.

The report relates that the administrators are currently
exploring the possibility of an exit from administration via a
Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA). In the event that this is
not possible, administration will be exited via a Creditors'
Voluntary Liquidation (CVL).

Further announcements will be made by the company as and when
appropriate, the report notes. discloses that five of its directors, Richard
Adam, Anil Hansjee, Greg Bestick, Harald Ludwig and Andrew Kanter
have resigned.

Mark Opzoomer and Rob Gorle remain as directors, the report adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 25,
2013, MCVUK News said online games firm Zattikka could go into
administration next month as it struggles to make a loan payment
of GBP275,000.  The company revealed on July 9, 2013, that it was
due to pay the interest, but it has still failed to make the
payment, according to MCVUK News.

* UK: Clubs That Go Into Administration Could Be Relegated
Ewing Grahame at The Telegraph reports that the board of Scottish
Professional Football League is in the process of amending and
updating the rulebooks of their predecessors (the Scottish
Football League and the Scottish Premier League) and one key
alteration could mean that clubs which plunge into administration
are relegated rather than, as now, penalized by points

Any such move could spell bad news for some of football's biggest
names, according to The Telegraph.  The report notes that Rangers
Football Club have just disclosed losses of GBP14.4 million and
former director Dave King warned in August that the club was in
danger of sliding into administration by Christmas.

The report relates that they are eight points clear at the top of
League One after as many fixtures but, in the wake of the
publication of their annual accounts, some financial analysts
have claimed they may require another cash injection simply to
help them complete the campaign.

The report discloses that Hearts Football Club, at present, have
no idea when -- or if -- they may be able to exit administration
while Kilmarnock are almost GBP10 million in debt and enduring
record low attendances as supporters protest about the
stewardship of their club by chairman Michael Johnston.

The report relays that since 2001 Motherwell, Hearts, Livingston
(twice), Morton, Dundee (twice) and Dunfermline have, at some
point, been in administration while Gretna, Clydebank,
Airdrieonians and Rangers fatally descended into liquidation.

The report discloses that prior to the SPL taking over the SFL
this summer, the two bodies had their own rules when it came to
punishing clubs who were unable or unwilling to live within their

The report says that following Rangers' demise last year, the SPL
introduced a set penalty which saw offenders deducted a third of
the points they had won the previous season as well as being
placed under a signing embargo.

The report relays that Hearts were the first club to be affected
by that change, beginning this season with minus 15 points after
entering administration in June.

The report notes that in November, 2010 First Division Dundee
received a 25-point penalty by the SFL board - who had no limit
to the sanctions they could impose - because they had failed to
live within their means for the second time in a decade.

However, now that the league bodies have merged, the SPFL board -
chief executive Neil Doncaster, Duncan Fraser (Aberdeen), Stephen
Thompson (Dundee United), Eric Riley (Celtic), Les Gray (Hamilton
Accies), Mike Mulraney (Alloa Athletic) and Bill Darroch
(Stenhousemuir) - are drafting the rules for the new
organization, the report relays.

"In the past, the SPL's hands were tied when it came to punishing
clubs which had suffered an insolvency event because they had
authority over just the 12 members . . . . Consequently, they
couldn't impose a relegated club on the SFL . . . . Now, though,
there is the opportunity to provide a 42-club solution and
relegation is a punishment which has been discussed," the report
quoted a Hampden source as saying.


* Low Skills to Impede Spain & Italy's Revival Efforts
Paul Hannon at The Wall Street Journal reports that workers in
Spain and Italy are the least skilled among 24 developed
countries surveyed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, a deficit that is likely to impede the ability
of those two countries to boost their competitiveness as part of
efforts to overcome the euro-zone fiscal crisis.

In a report that covered a wide range of countries, the OECD also
concluded that in both the U.S. and the U.K., younger people are
significantly less-skilled relative to their peers than older
people, while Japan and Finland boast the most-skilled workers,
the Journal relates.

For Spain and Italy, its conclusions are chastening, the Journal
notes.  Both economies have suffered from a loss of
competitiveness over the past decade, resulting in large trade
deficits and high levels of borrowing.  To return to strong
growth, generate trade surpluses and pay off their debts, their
competitive position will have to improve, the Journal discloses.

But according to the OECD, Italy ranks bottom, and Spain second-
to-last among the 24 countries in literacy skills, the Journal

In a ranking of numeracy skills, the positions are reversed, with
Spain bottom, and Italy second-to-last, the Journal says.

Spain's government said the report's results underscore the need
for broad educational changes that improve student performance,
making workers more employable, the Journal relates.

According to the Journal, Italy faces an even greater challenge.
Not only does it have fewer highly skilled workers than most
other economies, it also uses them badly -- or in the case of
many highly skilled women, not at all, the Journal says.

The economies of Italy and Spain both contracted last year, and
are forecast by the European Commission to shrink again this
year, before returning to modest growth in 2014, the Journal

* European Corporates Remain Hooked on Bond Funding, Fitch Says
The share of bonds as a total of EMEA corporates' new funding
remained at a high level in the first nine months of 2013, Fitch
Ratings says in a new quarterly report.

Bonds accounted for 46% or EUR336 billion, still well above the
historical average of 30% based on our data since 1999. Overall,
total new debt (bonds and loans) so far this year was virtually
flat on the same period last year at EUR735 billion.

"Whilst the share of bonds was down marginally to 46% from 48% a
year ago, new issuance levels show that European corporates still
remain hooked on bond funding given continued low interest rates
and bank deleveraging," says Monica Insoll, Managing Director in
Fitch's Credit Market Research team.

On a geographical basis, corporates in Germany, the UK and France
(the top three issuing countries) reduced bond issuance by 7-25%
respectively over the last year, with their share of the total
issuance falling to 52% from 58%.

By contrast, periphery eurozone country companies raised one
third more in bonds to account for 14% of the total, up from 10%
while new loans reduced by 9% in absolute amounts. Spanish
corporate issuance rose by 56% to take the fifth place behind the
three large western European countries and Russia.

Bond issuance by the top industry sectors stayed roughly level or
increased. The main four sectors accounted for 50% of volume, up
from 44% in the same period in 2012. Oil & gas volumes rose 48%
and telecoms 17% while utilities/energy reduced by 11% and autos
by 6%.

The outlook for corporate bond issuance is sensitive to how
investors will manage the historic interest rate cycle shift. As
rates rise following an unprecedented period at extremely low
levels, bond investors need to avoid being locked in at
uncompetitive rates. Duration risk mitigation includes increased
appetite for floating rate instruments.

"Rising rates could slow the pace of issuance as investors turn
more selective and higher yields and benchmark rates raises
funding costs for the issuers. At the same time, banks still need
to improve capital ratios, restricting their capacity to lend,"
Insoll added.

* BOOK REVIEW: Rand Araskog's The ITT Wars
Author:      Rand Araskog
Publisher:   Beard Books
Soft cover:  236 pages
List Price:  $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Buy a copy for yourself and one for a colleague on-line at:

This book was originally published in 1989 when the author was
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of ITT Corporation, a $25
billion conglomerate with more than 100,000 employees and
operations spanning the globe with an amazing array of
businesses: insurance, hotels, and industrial, automotive, and
forest products.  ITT owned Sheraton Hotels, Caesars Gaming, one
half of Madison Square Garden and its cable network, and the New
York Knickerbockers basketball and the New York Rangers hockey
teams.  The corporation had rebounded from its troubles of the
previous two decades.

Araskog was made CEO in 1978 to make sense of years of wild
acquisition and growth. Under Harold Geneen, successor to ITT's
founder and champion of "growth as business strategy," ITT's
sales had grown from $930 million in 1961 to $8 billion in 1970
and $22 billion in 1979.  It had made more than 250 acquisitions
and had 2,000 working units.  (It once acquired some 20
companies in one month).

ITT's troubles began in 1966, when it tried to acquire ABC.
National sentiment against conglomerates had become endemic; the
merger became its target and was eventually abandoned.  Next
came a variety of allegations, some true, some false, all well
publicized: funding of Salvador Allende's opponents in Chile's
1970 presidential elections; influence peddling in the Nixon
White House; underwriting the 1972 Republican National
Convention.  ITT's poor handling of several antitrust cases was
also making headlines.

Then came recession in 1973.  ITT's stock plummeted from 60 in
early 1973 to 12 in late 1974.  Geneen found himself under fire
and, in Araskog's words, the "succession wars" among top ITT
officers began.  Geneen was forced out in 1977, and Araskog,
head of ITT's Aerospace, Electronics, Components, and Energy
Group, with more than $1 billion in sales, won the CEO prize a
year later.

Araskog inherited a debt-ridden corporation.  He instituted a
plan of coherent divesting and reorganization of the company
into more manageable segments, but was cut short by one of the
first hostile bids by outside financial interests of the 1980s,
by businessmen Jay Pritzker and Philip Anschutz.  This book is
the insider's story of that bid.

The ITT Wars reads like a "Who's Who" of U.S. corporations in
the 1970s and 1980s. Araskog knew everyone.  His writing
reflects his direct, passionate, and focused management style.
He speaks of wars, attacks, enemies within, personal loyalty,
betrayal, and love for his company and colleagues.  In the
book's closing sentences, Araskog says, "We fought when the odds
were against us.  We won, and ITT remains one of the most
exciting companies of the twentieth century.  We hope to keep
the wagon train moving into the twenty-first century and not
have to think about making a circle again.  Once is enough."
Araskog wrote a preface and postlogue for the Beard Books
edition, and provides us with ten years of perspective as well
as insights into what came next.  In 1994, he orchestrated the
breakup of ITT into five publicly traded companies.  Wagon
circling began again in early 1997 when Hilton Hotels made a
hostile takeover offer for ITT Corporation. Araskog eventually
settled for a second-best victory, negotiating a friendly merger
with The Starwood Corporation, in which ITT shareholders became
majority owners of Starwood and Westin Hotels, with the
management of Starwood assuming management of the merged entity.

Today Mr. Araskog continues to serve on the boards of the four
corporations created from ITT, as well as on the boards of Shell
Oil Company and Dow Jones, Inc.  He heads up his own investment
company with headquarters on Worth Avenue, in Palm Beach,


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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