/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/131021.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, October 21, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 208
Headlines
B E L A R U S
BELARUS: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-/B' Ratings
B U L G A R I A
STARA ZAGORA: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
C R O A T I A
CROATIA AIRLINES: Croatia Set to Begin Sale of Minority Stake
C Z E C H R E P U B L I C
LAZN VELICHOVKY: Hradec Kralove Court Affirms Bankruptcy Verdict
PILSEN STEEL: Brno Court Approves Reorganization Plan
F I N L A N D
WINWIND: Files for Bankruptcy; Owes EUR300 Million
F R A N C E
AVANSSUR: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings From 'BBpi'
G E R M A N Y
CENTROSOLAR GROUP: Applies for Creditor Protection in Hamburg
GERMAN GROUND: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Four Note Classes to 'CCC'
JUNO LTD: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D(sf)'
KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Hikes LT Corp. Credit Rating From 'BB'
PRAKTIKER AG: In Exclusive Talks to Sell Max Bahr Stores
SOLUTRONIC AG: Overcrowded Inverter Market Prompts Insolvency
G R E E C E
ALPHA BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B' Greek Mortgage Covered Bonds Rating
NAVIOS MARITIME: Moody's Revises Ratings Outlook to Negative
I R E L A N D
CLIFTON STREET: Moody's Lowers Rating on Two Note Classes to C
I T A L Y
ALITALIA SPA: Deeper Ties with Air France Hinges on Overhaul
RHIAG INTER: S&P Withdraws Preliminary 'B' Corp. Credit Rating
* Tax Changes May Aid Italian Banks' Asset Quality
L A T V I A
BALTIC INT'L: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Long-term Deposit Rating
LIEPAJAS METALURGS: Shareholder Says PM Paving Way for Sale
TRASTA KOMERCBANKA: Moody's Confirms B3 Long-term Deposit Rating
L U X E M B O U R G
ALTICE VII: Moody's Give B1 Corp. Family Rating; Outlook Stable
EUROPROP SA: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR53MM C Notes to 'C'
OXEA SARL: S&P Puts 'B' Long-Term CCR on CreditWatch Positive
N E T H E R L A N D S
ST JAMES: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR12MM Class E Notes to B1
P O L A N D
POLIMEX: Arcellor Mitall, Instal File Bankruptcy Motions
R U S S I A
BANK VOZROZHDENIE: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Ratings; Outlook Stable
DZERZHINSK CITY: S&P Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Credit Rating
LENINGRAD OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
NIZHNY NOVGOROD: S&P Affirms 'BB' Issuer Rating; Outlook Stable
S L O V E N I A
BANKA CELJE: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws 'B-' Issuer Default Rating
S P A I N
PESCANOVA SA: Liquidation Process at Chile Units Progresses
* Spanish Mortgage Market Index Shows Rising NPLs, Fitch Reveals
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
CAXTON TRANSPORT: To Liquidate as Sole Customer Withdraw Support
CENTER GROUP: Appoints SFP as Administrators
FRANZ SILL: Goes Into Preliminary Administration
* Annual UK Banks Stress Test Should Improve Transparency
X X X X X X X X
* Eurozone Fiscal Governance Progresses, Challenges Remain
* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 14 to October 18, 2013
*********
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B E L A R U S
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BELARUS: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-/B' Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised to stable from
positive the outlook on its foreign and local currency sovereign
credit ratings on the Republic of Belarus. At the same time, S&P
affirmed its long- and short-term foreign and local currency
sovereign credit ratings on Belarus at 'B-/B'.
Rationale
The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that there is no longer
a one-in-three likelihood of an upgrade in the next 12 months.
The weakening in the country's external balances and rising
pressures on the currency render its external position highly
fragile.
The ratings on Belarus are constrained by political risks, high
government financing needs, and reliance on external funding.
The government's stalled efforts to introduce much-needed
structural reforms to improve competitiveness and growth
prospects are also a key ratings weakness.
The country's relatively high GDP per capita for the rating level
(2013 estimate: US$7,650) supports the ratings. Belarus also
benefits from a strong industrial capital stock and a highly
educated workforce.
Policy setting and direction is highly concentrated in the hands
of the president and the presidential administration, raising
political risks, in S&P's view. The centralized decision making
and the uncertain checks and balances between institutions
undermine policy effectiveness and create policy uncertainty.
Political participation is largely absent; opposition is
suppressed and elections are skewed and do not meet international
standards for free and fair balloting. Near-complete dependence
on Russia for financial and economic support also poses risks for
Belarus.
Economic growth in Belarus continues to be sluggish; it was 1.4%
in the first half of 2013. The boost to consumption and
investment -- which the government largely orchestrated -- was
not sufficient to offset the negative contribution from net
exports and the contraction in industrial production. Moreover,
the country's growth potential appears to be eroding in view of
the economy's weak competitiveness. GDP per capita, estimated at
$7,650 for 2013, is high for the ratings level and partly
reflects Belarus' resilient industrial base and better human
development indicators. Real growth in per capita GDP, which S&P
calculates to average about 3.5% over a 10-year period, is in
line with peers in the same GDP-per-capita category.
Belarus is in a large net external liability position amounting
to an estimated 64% of current account receipts (CARs). External
debt (net of official reserves and financial sector external
assets) is estimated at 52% of CARs in 2013 and forecast to rise
to 64% by 2016.
Since the beginning of the year, Belarus has faced heightened
external financing pressures -- as the worsening current account
deficit in the first half of year and the increasing pressures on
the exchange rate have shown. The country registered a current
account deficit of about 8% of GDP (at an annualized rate) in
first-half 2013 compared with a small surplus in first-half 2012.
S&P estimates gross external financing needs at 130% of CARs plus
usable reserves, on average, for 2013-2016. At end-September
2013, international reserves stood at 1.4 months of current
account payments, down from 1.6 at end-2012. This includes about
half a month of current account payments in foreign currency
swaps, which the National Bank of Belarus (NBRB) owes to
commercial banks.
Apart from 1.2% of GDP received under the Eurasian Development
Bank's EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF) program, Belarus has not
tapped any new sources of external funding this year; moreover,
FDI receipts have been modest. In addition to the current
account deficit, the country faces a heavy amortization burden
during 2013-2015 with obligations due in 2013-2014 totaling 8% of
GDP, over half of which is owed to the IMF. At end-June 2013,
government debt in foreign currency stood at 78% of total
government debt.
On the fiscal front, the Belarusian government has largely
observed modest surpluses or deficits in its general government
accounts. While the government registered a surplus in the first
half of this year, S&P's medium-term forecast nonetheless factors
in an average 4% of GDP increase in the general government debt.
This is to account for the impact of the weakening currency and
off-budget support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state
banks. S&P estimates contingent liabilities from the financial
system, SOEs, and government guaranteed debt as moderate.
"We expect inflation to average 18% in 2013, down from 59% in
2012. While inflation has markedly declined, it remains high and
susceptible to pass-through from the developments on the exchange
rate front. The NBRB continued to reduce the refinancing rate in
the first half of the year, to 23.5% by June 2013 from 30.0% at
end-2012. Given the pick-up in depreciation pressures in the
third quarter, the bank appears to have stopped reducing the rate
for now. In our view, the NBRB's policy conduct seems at times
to compromise price stability for growth objectives. We believe
this undermines the credibility of monetary policy," S&P said.
Partly due to the weak transmission channels in the economy, the
reductions in the refinancing rate did not help stem the increase
in foreign currency lending. Foreign currency loans are 44% of
total loans while foreign currency deposits are 60% of total
deposits in the banking system. Lending in foreign currency
increases the banking system's exposure to exchange rate risk and
could increase contingent liabilities, particularly if combined
with a deterioration in asset quality.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook balances Belarus' political risks, high
external indebtedness, and weakening external liquidity against
its relatively high per capita GDP for the ratings level and
durable capital base.
S&P could lower the ratings if renewed expansionary policies --
for example, in the run-up to presidential elections in 2015 --
lead to the return of exchange rate and inflationary pressures.
S&P could also lower the ratings if external liquidity or the
availability of external funding significantly decline.
Deterioration in Belarus' relationship with Russia would also
likely pose downside risks to the ratings.
Government policy leading to a sustained improvement in
competitiveness, a diversification of funding sources, and
increased availability of foreign exchange could eventually
support an upgrade. S&P could also consider raising the ratings
if it saw an improvement in external balances indicated by lower
external financing needs, lower external debt, and improved
current account balances.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
Belarus (Republic of)
Sovereign Credit Rating B-/Stable/B B-/Positive/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment B-
Senior Unsecured B-
===============
B U L G A R I A
===============
STARA ZAGORA: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its issuer credit
rating on the Bulgarian city of Stara Zagora at 'BB+'. The
outlook is stable.
Rationale
The rating on Stara Zagora is constrained by the limited
predictability and high volatility of the city's financial
ratios, caused by its small budget; the consolidated but uneven
institutional framework under which Bulgarian cities operate; and
S&P's "negative" assessment of management due to its limited
experience in long-term financial planning. Restricted
expenditure flexibility and low wealth levels also weigh on the
rating. The rating is supported by a relatively low, although
growing, debt burden; limited contingent liabilities; a high
degree of flexibility around setting taxes; and the city's
adherence to tight spending policies. S&P views the city's
liquidity position as neutral for the rating.
Stara Zagora has low, albeit increasing, economic wealth. S&P
estimates the city's GDP per capita at about a modest $6,200 in
2012, and assume that real GDP will increase in line with that of
Bulgaria at about 1.5% on average in 2013-2015.
The city's aim to combat the declining trend in its population
will, in S&P's view, constrain its ability to rein in spending,
especially on public services and infrastructure development.
Therefore, S&P considers the city's spending flexibility to be
limited. The city faces large infrastructure needs, which it
plans to start addressing over 2013-2015 with hefty cofinancing
from already available EU funds.
The city's budgetary performance is difficult to predict. This
reflects its consolidating, but still uneven, institutional
framework and management's limited experience in long-term
financial planning -- which S&P views as negative for the rating
-- combined with uncertainty around the availability of EU funds
and central government grants. The small size of the city's
budget also makes its financial indicators vulnerable to sudden
shocks, which is why S&P considers its budgetary performance and
liquidity position to be volatile.
That said, S&P anticipates the city will remain committed to a
tight spending policy over the medium term despite rising
pressure to spend. Nevertheless, in S&P's base-case scenario,
increasing expenditure on maintenance, which was suppressed in
recent years, and sluggish economic growth will result in a
moderate weakening of the city's operating surplus to a still-
sound 7% of operating revenues in 2013-2015 from about 14% on
average in 2011-2012.
Due to the recent decentralization of budget revenue management,
Stara Zagora may be able to improve its budgetary performance by
increasing taxes, albeit within nationally legislated limits.
S&P understands that local governments have the power to raise
almost all local taxes and charges. If the tax rates had been
set at the maximum level, the city could have increased own
operating revenues in 2012 by about 30% assuming that it was able
to successfully collect taxes due.
The city is embarking on a sizable investment program, which will
be cofinanced with central government and EU grants.
Consequently, in S&P's base-case scenario the city's balance
after capital accounts will turn negative in 2013. S&P assumes
the city's deficit after capital accounts will reach about 9.5%
of revenues on average in 2013-2015, compared with a very strong
surplus of about 7% on average in 2010-2012. Following the
implementation of EU-sponsored projects, the city's borrowing
requirements will increase, but its tax-supported debt, in S&P's
base-case scenario, will not exceed a modest 50% of consolidated
operating revenues by year-end 2015. S&P views contingent
liabilities as limited to obligations of few health care
institutions and do not see them as weakening the city's credit
profile.
Liquidity
S&P assess Stara Zagora's liquidity as neutral. This is because
its average cash on accounts, which now exceeds debt service
falling due within the next 12 months, remains volatile. S&P
also views its access to external liquidity as limited.
S&P expects that the city's average cash on accounts will stay at
about Bulgarian lev (BGN) 12 million, comfortably covering debt
service falling due within the next 12 months. S&P estimates
this at about BGN3.7 million in 2013 and BGN3.3 million in 2014.
Nevertheless, S&P expects the city's liquidity position to remain
volatile, as its cash holdings are small and future exposure to
short-term debt is difficult to predict.
Stara Zagora's access to external liquidity also remains limited
in the context of Bulgaria's relatively weak banking sector and
shallow capital market. Standard & Poor's assigns a Banking
Industry Country Risk Assessment score of '7' to the Bulgarian
domestic banking sector.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, thanks to projected
economic recovery in Bulgaria, the city's continued adherence to
tight spending policies, and a large revenue-raising capacity,
the city will be able to address its infrastructure needs with
only a gradual debt accumulation and without weakening its
currently neutral liquidity position.
S&P could raise the rating within the next year if, in line with
its upside scenario, the combination of still-tight spending and
faster tax revenue growth paves the way for stronger budgetary
performance, while the city remains committed to its
infrastructure development program. S&P would consider operating
surplus exceeding 10% of operating revenues and a moderate
deficit after capital accounts, despite an increase of capital
spending, as commensurate with a higher rating.
S&P could lower the rating within the next 12 months if the city
relaxes its spending policy and allows expenditures to grow
faster than S&P envisage in its base-case scenario, leading to
weaker budgetary performance and constrained flexibility. S&P
considers a deficit after capital accounts averaging 14% of
revenues in 2013-2015 as commensurate with a lower rating. As a
result, tax-supported debt would approach 60% of operating
revenues by 2016, while the city's liquidity position would
weaken, with cash coverage set to fall short of a 12-month debt
service.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Stara Zagora (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating BB+/Stable/--
Senior Unsecured BB+
=============
C R O A T I A
=============
CROATIA AIRLINES: Croatia Set to Begin Sale of Minority Stake
-------------------------------------------------------------
Jasmina Kuzmanovic at Bloomberg News reports that Croatian
Transport Minister Sinisa Hajdas Doncic said Croatia will begin
the sale of a minority stake in Croatia Airlines d.d. in a
process that favors bringing in a strategic partner over price.
According to Bloomberg, Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic's
cabinet agreed on Thursday to start seeking a buyer for 49% in
the money-losing carrier, part of a plan to shore up Croatia's
public finances by selling state companies.
Croatia will keep a 50.25% stake, it said in materials
distributed to reporters, and Mr. Hajdas Doncic said he expected
the sale to be concluded by mid-2014, Bloomberg notes.
Mr. Hajdas Doncic, as cited by Bloomberg, said that a fair offer
would include creating a regional hub, fresh capital and new
planes to refurbish Croatia Airlines, whose routes are limited to
European cities with code-sharing agreements to four U.S.
destinations. He said that as many as four international
companies have expressed interest, including PT Garuda Indonesia
Ltd., Bloomberg relates.
"We are willing to look into all the possible models," Bloomberg
quotes Mr. Hajdas Doncic as saying after the cabinet meeting,
without giving a timetable for the start of the sale. "The
priority is that the money will not go into the budget but be
invested into the company."
According to Bloomberg, Mr. Hajdas Doncic said that a state
agency will determine the value of the company in the next four
months, declining to elaborate on the price.
In August, he said the company had been valued at HRK350 million
(US$64 million), Bloomberg recounts. The Zagreb-based company,
founded in 1990 as the former Yugoslavia was breaking apart,
posted a net loss of HRK475 million (US$85 million) in 2012,
Bloomberg relates.
"Plan B"
According to Bloomberg, Mr. Hajdas Doncic said that should no
offers materialize, "Plan B" would include selling the company
piecemeal. He said that in its present state, Croatia Airlines
can't function past 2015, Bloomberg notes.
Croatia, the second former Yugoslav republic to join the European
Union, is selling off stakes in state companies to help stop
deterioration in its budget deficit, Bloomberg discloses.
Croatia Airlines d.d. is the national airline and flag carrier of
the Republic of Croatia.
===========================
C Z E C H R E P U B L I C
===========================
LAZN VELICHOVKY: Hradec Kralove Court Affirms Bankruptcy Verdict
----------------------------------------------------------------
CTK reports that the bankruptcy declared on Lazn Velichovky by
the Regional Court in Hradec Kralove is valid a the Prague High
Court has affirmed the verdict, rejecting the company's appeal.
According to CTK, the insolvency administrator is already
preparing a tender for selling the spa as a whole.
"Calling of the tender is expected within a month," CTK quotes
insolvency administrator David Janosik as saying on Thursday.
The spa, which focused on the treatment of musculoskeletal
system, has been out of operation since July, CTK recounts.
According to CTK, if the sale is successful, the creditors could
be compensated in full.
Lazn Velichovky is a Czech spa company.
PILSEN STEEL: Brno Court Approves Reorganization Plan
-----------------------------------------------------
CTK reports that Brno Regional Court Judge Milos Benetka said in
the insolvency register on Friday the court rejected the
bankruptcy of Pilsen Steel and approved its reorganization plan,
like the company's creditors and insolvency administrator.
According to CTK, the verdict means that Pilsen Steel will
continue to operate without limitations and that the company will
pay a small part of debts, reaching billions of crowns, to
creditors.
Creditors holding 86% of claims, that is almost CZK3.7 billion,
voted for a reorganization plan at a creditor meeting on Monday,
CTK discloses. The court said that the total amount of
registered unconditioned claims in the insolvency proceedings was
CZK4.37 billion, CTK relates.
Pilsen Steel has been in insolvency proceedings since November
2011, CTK notes.
Pilsen Steel is a Czech steel maker and forge shop.
=============
F I N L A N D
=============
WINWIND: Files for Bankruptcy; Owes EUR300 Million
--------------------------------------------------
Rajesh Chandramouli at The Times of India reports that WinWinD, a
wind turbine maker-based in Finland, in which C Sivasankaran
holds controlling stake has filed for bankruptcy.
According to The Times of India, the company is learnt to have
run up debt of EUR300 million.
"WinWinD has submitted a voluntary petition on bankruptcy to the
district court on October 3. The district court has allowed the
petition and appointed attorney Pauliina Tenhunen as the
administrator to take care of the further process," The Times of
India quotes a filing by WinWinD as saying.
The Times of India relates that the company statement said, "The
efforts of WinWinD in trying to arrange for necessary funding and
approval for restructuring process has not been successful and
hence this decision. This bankruptcy will affect a total of 130
employees from Finland and Sweden".
The Times of India notes that while officials at Siva Ventures
could not be reached for a comment, a source in the group said
that the issue was a larger industry problem. "Today, every wind
turbine company is in financial trouble. It is a sectoral
problem. Sivasankaran tried to restructure the company, but with
Europe going through a recessionary phase, banks were unwilling,
which lead to the voluntary bankruptcy filing," the source, as
cited by The Times of India, said and added that such filings are
part of the system and should not be seen with any negative
connotation.
"We regret that the current international financial uncertainty
and the decrease in demand in wind energy sector have made it
difficult in recent years to develop the business, increase sales
and reach profitability. We . . . would like to inform one and
all that as there was no other alternative in sight, the company
had to resort to the decision to submit a voluntary bankruptcy
petition," The Times of India quotes the company statement as
saying.
Mr. Sivasankaran entered WinWinD in 2006 when be bought
controlling stake in the company, The Times of India relates. He
acquired a 40% stake for EUR22 million, The Times of India
recounts.
WinWind, which sells a 1MW and 3MW turbines, has factories in
Hamina in Finland and Vengal near Chennai.
===========
F R A N C E
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AVANSSUR: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings From 'BBpi'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had raised its
unsolicited public information financial strength and
counterparty credit ratings on France-based insurer Avanssur
(commercially known as Direct Assurance and part of the AXA
Group) to 'BBBpi' from 'BBpi'.
The rating action reflects an improvement in Avanssur's retained
earnings, leading to a strengthening of its capital adequacy,
which we believe is sustainable at lower adequate levels.
The ratings predominantly reflect S&P's view of Avanssur's
satisfactory business risk profile and lower adequate financial
risk profile. S&P bases its assessment of Avanssur's business
risk profile on its opinion of its low industry and country risk
and adequate competitive position. As regards its financial risk
profile, S&P factors in its view of the company's lower adequate
capital and earnings, intermediate risk position, and adequate
financial flexibility. S&P combines these factors to derive a
'bbb' anchor for Avanssur. The ratings on the company are
'BBBpi'.
Avanssur, commercially known as Direct Assurance, is a wholly
owned subsidiary of France-based AXA Group (core entities rated
A+/Stable/--). S&P considers Avanssur "nonstrategic" to the AXA
Group, given its small size within the group and its
profitability, which, albeit improving, is not in line with AXA
Group's standards.
Avanssur faces low industry and country risks, given that it
writes 87% of its business in the property and casualty (P/C)
French market, where S&P sees only a limited risk of new
entrants, generally good underwriting practices, and a declining
expense base for the sector. Partly offsetting these positive
factors are the highly competitive nature of France's P/C
insurance market, and declining investment returns due to the
continuing low interest rate environment.
S&P views Avanssur's competitive position as adequate. At year-
end 2012, gross premium written (GPW) had increased by a sound
20% to EUR491 million from EUR409 million in 2011. The company's
strong compounded average growth rate of 13% reported over the
past five years reflects S&P's view of Avanssur's fairly
aggressive growth strategy, which encompasses attractive pricing
and high media visibility. Avanssur has a leading position in
direct insurance sales in France, where its GPW increased by 19%
in 2012.
S&P expects Avanssur's capital adequacy will remain lower
adequate over the next three years. Avanssur's capital base is
small, and highly susceptible to market sensitivity, notably
owing to the high contribution of unrealized gains on bonds to
total adjusted capital.
In S&P's view, Avanssur's risk position is intermediate. In
2012, the insurer invested about 85% of its assets in bonds and
11% in cash and equivalents. Mortgage loans represent an
additional 3%, while equity exposure is limited compared with
that French peers at 1%. S&P regards Avanssur's financial
flexibility as adequate. The insurer's main source of capital is
internal profit generation and its main capital need is funding
for aggressive growth.
S&P views Avanssur's enterprise risk management and management
and governance practices as neutral rating factors.
Furthermore, S&P regards Avanssur's liquidity as adequate.
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G E R M A N Y
=============
CENTROSOLAR GROUP: Applies for Creditor Protection in Hamburg
-------------------------------------------------------------
SolarServer reports that Centrosolar Group AG (Munich),
Centrosolar AG and Centrosolar Sonnenstromfabrik GmbH have
applied for "protective shield" creditor protection at a court in
Hamburg, Germany, which the company says will allow for faster
implementation of its restructuring plans.
Centrosolar has also released select third quarter 2013 results,
reporting a 40% year-over-year decline in revenues to EUR27.5
million (US$37.6 million), and a -16% EBIDTA margin, SolarServer
relays. Over the first nine months of 2013 the company reports a
41% fall in revenues to EUR85 million (US$116 million), and a
-21% EBITDA margin, SolarServer discloses.
SolarServer relates that the company had originally planned to
reorganize and clear its debts through continuing business
operations, but notes that the recovery of the solar photovoltaic
(PV) industry is proceeding more slowly than expected.
According to SolarServer, Centrosolar notes that once approved,
parts of the company affected by the protective shield will
continue to be run by the current Management Board and directors,
and that business operations at the company's five German
locations will continue "without restriction".
Centrosolar is a German PV company.
GERMAN GROUND: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Four Note Classes to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and withdrawn the ratings of German
Ground Lease Finance 2's (GGLF2)'s and German Ground Lease
Finance 3's (GGLF3) floating-rate notes due February 2020 and
November 2018, respectively, and resolved the Rating Watch
Negative (RWN) assigned in July 2013.
GGLF2
EUR74.5m Class A1 (XS0279782238) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
"Asf"; Recovery Estimate (RE) 90%
EUR41.1m Class B1 (XS0279784796) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
"Asf"; RE 0%
GGLF3
EUR81m Class A1 (XS0390304110) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
'Asf'; RE 80%
EUR3m Class B1 (XS0390304979) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Asf';
RE 0%
GGLF2 and GGLF3 are securitizations of ground rent cash flows
derived from the freehold interest in respective portfolios of
10,712 residential and 222 commercial units and 7,743 residential
and 210 commercial units located in Germany.
Key Rating Drivers
The downgrades are driven by increasing uncertainty over the
collateral value affecting the ability to repay the notes by
maturity. The increased uncertainty is due to the portfolio's
weak performance, insolvency of Vivacon AG, and the magnitude of
swap termination payments.
The ground rent receivable market in Germany is illiquid and
opaque with little evidence available to assess market values.
Both ground rent receivable portfolios have seen weak performance
and are subject to very high levels of operational risk; also
Fitch understands that Vivacon AG, the parent company of the
borrowers and appointed portfolio manager, has filed for
insolvency and uncertainty over its replacement remains.
Moreover, some documentation provisions, especially for GGLF2,
are unclear and further complicate potential outcomes, in Fitch's
opinion.
The original third-party appraisal of portfolios was based on
discounting inflation-linked ground rents at a proxy of risk-free
rate, given the very low default risk that ground rent contracts
are generally associated with. No updated valuations have been
provided to Fitch since closing.
Fitch has assumed that, prior to legal final maturity, annual
inflation-linked income increases to approximately EUR6 million
and EUR4.7 million for GGLF 2 and GGLF 3 respectively. Current
income is approximately EUR5.3 million and EUR4.3 million. Fitch
estimates that sale proceeds (break-even valuation) representing
a multiple of annual ground rent income in excess of 25x would be
required to repay the notes and swap termination payments. Fitch
believes this to be in excess of potential market valuations,
albeit evidence of actual trading is limited. In the case of
GGLF2 the agency has assumed a multiple of 20x for deriving the
recovery estimates assigned to the notes and deducted expected
costs and accrued step-up interest.
Fitch has assumed that swap termination payments of approximately
EUR50 million and EUR31 million in respect of GGLF II and GGLF
III respectively will be payable at maturity on a pari-passu
basis to the senior note holders. However, to the extent that the
swaps are not terminated until after repayment of the
noteholders, the termination payments may be time-subordinated
and reduce the break-even valuation required to repay noteholders
to around 22x and 19x annual income respectively.
GGLF2 notes include the provision to pay step-up interest margins
from February 2014. Fitch has assumed that non-payment will not
constitute an issuer event of default. However, the definition of
missed interest is rather vague and non-payment of step-up
amounts could be read as triggering a note event of default. The
occurrence of this event is rating-neutral.
Fitch highlighted in previous rating commentaries how both deals
are subject to increased operational risks and how the default of
the ground rent obligors (ie. hereditary building right holders)
may diminish the portfolio valuation given the uncertainty over
arrears clearance and substitution of obligors at terms
substantially neutral for the transactions. Using a risk-free
basis to value the portfolios does not appear to be appropriate
in light of the facts. The insolvency of the portfolio manager
further increases the likelihood of disruption.
The rating withdrawals are driven by lack of sufficient
information to adequately monitor the performance of the
portfolios on a periodic basis. Fitch has requested detailed
updates on the portfolios and sponsor's strategy over the
delinquent obligors but has not received sufficient information
to maintain a rating on the bonds. Fitch will no longer provide
ratings or analytical coverage of the transactions.
Rating Sensitivities
Subordination of swap termination payments could result in full
repayment of classes A1 for both deals and improved recovery
prospects for the classes B1.
JUNO LTD: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D(sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'B- (sf)' from
'B (sf)' its credit rating on JUNO (ECLIPSE 2007-2) Ltd.'s class
B notes and to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the class
C notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings
on the class D and E notes.
The rating actions reflect S&P's view of principal recoveries in
the transaction. According to the August 2013 cash manager's
report, the class C notes experienced principal losses of
EUR12.7 million. While the class C notes experienced a partial
loss, the cash manager reports that the remaining class D notes
have been fully written off (EUR11.4 million).
The principal losses have occurred as a result of the Senior Den
Tir loan, which entered special servicing in January 2009. The
special servicer approved the sale of the property backing the
loan in May 2012. The cash manager applied the losses
(EUR24.1 million) reverse sequentially to the notes on the August
2013 note payment date.
S&P's ratings on JUNO (ECLIPSE 2007-2)'s notes address the timely
payment of interest quarterly in arrears, and the payment of
principal no later than the November 2022 legal final maturity
date.
S&P has lowered to 'B- (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on the
class B notes, as under its base-case scenario the class B notes
are vulnerable to principal losses.
Following the principal losses experienced by the class C and D
notes, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on
the class C notes and affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class D
notes.
S&P has also affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class E notes
because they have experienced losses on previous note payment
dates.
JUNO (ECLIPSE 2007-2) is a 2007-vintage commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction backed by nine loans (down
from 17 at closing) secured on mixed-use commercial real estate
properties in Germany, Belgium, and Italy. The transaction
closed in May 2007. Of the nine loans remaining, two are in
special servicing.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
JUNO (Eclipse 2007-2) Ltd.
EUR867.95 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Class Rating Rating
To From
Ratings Lowered
B B- (sf) B (sf)
C D (sf) CCC- (sf)
Ratings Affirmed
D D (sf)
E D (sf)
KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: S&P Hikes LT Corp. Credit Rating From 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on Germany-based cable operator Kabel
Deutschland Holding AG (KDH) to 'BBB+' from 'BB.' The outlook is
stable. S&P also removed the rating from CreditWatch with
positive implications, where S&P placed it on Aug. 2, 2013.
At the same time, S&P raised its issue rating on KDH's
EUR700 million senior secured notes due 2018 to 'BBB+' from 'BB+'
and its issue rating on the EUR400 million senior notes due 2017
to 'BBB' from 'B+'. S&P also withdrew its recovery ratings on
these instruments.
The upgrade primarily reflects the anticipated considerable
reduction in KDH's external financial leverage, and its closer
operational and legal integration into the Vodafone group after
the completion on Oct. 14, 2013, of Vodafone's acquisition of a
76.57% stake in KDH. Vodafone has already provided KDH with a
EUR2.15 billion intragroup loan and EUR300 million credit line to
fully redeem KDH's outstanding bank loans and replace its
revolving credit facilities. S&P anticipates that Vodafone will
also refinance KDH's EUR700 million senior secured notes and
EUR400 million senior notes at their first call date in June 2014
at the latest, in line with Vodafone's track record of not
maintaining debt at the subsidiary level.
"In our view, the repayment of KDH's bank loans and the further
deleveraging we anticipate in the next 12 months significantly
strengthens the German cable operator's financial risk profile,
which we now assess as "modest." We forecast that, following the
repayment of the outstanding notes, KDH's net debt-to-EBITDA
ratio, as adjusted by us, will decline to less than 1.5x by the
end of June 2014 and will largely represent our operating lease,
pension, and asset retirement obligation adjustments.
Nevertheless, we anticipate that KDH's financial risk profile
will remain somewhat constrained by the group's limited free
operating cash flow generation, due to substantial capital
expenditure (capex) for additional infrastructure investments in
fiscal 2014 and 2015, ending March 31, and ongoing significant
subscriber acquisition costs," S&P said.
"Our assessment of KDH's business risk profile remains
"satisfactory," reflecting the group's stable and very profitable
utility-like cable-TV (CATV) revenues and the potential for
further solid revenue growth in the near term, via further uptake
of broadband Internet, telephony, and premium-TV services. In
addition, we believe that KDH could benefit from closer
operational integration into the Vodafone group, such as shared
marketing expenses and a larger retail footprint, after KDH
assumes responsibility for Vodafone's fixed line business in
Germany. This is partly offset by the significant competition
the group faces from Deutsche Telekom AG and from various
technology platforms, such as satellite TV, digital terrestrial
TV, and Internet-Protocol TV," S&P added.
In S&P's updated base-case forecast, it expects mid-single-digit
organic year-on-year revenue growth in fiscals 2014 and 2015,
compared with a 7.7% increase in revenues in fiscal 2013. S&P
now expects KDH to generate adjusted EBITDA, as defined by the
group, of about EUR910 million-EUR920 million in 2014 and about
EUR1 billion in 2015, up from EUR862 million in 2013.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectations of mid-single-
digit EBITDA growth over the next 24 months and the full
refinancing of KDH's debt through intragroup loans by the end of
June 2014, at the latest. As result, S&P expects KDH's debt-to-
EBITDA ratio, after its adjustments, to decline to and remain
below 1.5x from mid-2014 onward.
The outlook on KDH also reflects the outlook on KDH's majority
owner, Vodafone. This is due to our expectation that KDH will be
closely integrated into the Vodafone group in upcoming months and
represent an integral part of Vodafone's operations in Germany.
S&P could lower the rating on KDH if it lowered its rating on
Vodafone. S&P could also consider a downgrade if it believed
that Vodafone's financial policy for KDH would become more
aggressive.
As regards upside, S&P caps the rating on KDH at one notch below
the rating on Vodafone.
PRAKTIKER AG: In Exclusive Talks to Sell Max Bahr Stores
--------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Praktiker group on Thursday said exclusive
talks were under way to sell its upmarket brand Max Bahr stores
to rival Hellweg.
According to Reuters, Praktiker, a household name in Europe's
biggest economy, is being sold off piecemeal after the
administrator failed to find a buyer for the whole group.
"The creditor committee [Thurs]day decided to conduct final
negotiations about a takeover with the Hellweg bidder
consortium," Reuters quotes Praktiker as saying in a statement
that cited Max Bahr's insolvency administrator.
Sources familiar with the transaction told Reuters earlier on
Thursday Hellweg has teamed up with former Max Bahr chief Dirk
Moehrle and is in advanced talks to buy 73 Max Bahr stores for
more than EUR100 million (US$136.6 million).
However, it has no interest in 50 sites that were recently
reflagged from Praktiker to Max Bahr, Reuters notes.
The sources added that talks are to be concluded by the end of
October, Reuters discloses.
Reuters relates that a financial source said Hellweg had
initially struggled to line up financing for the deal, but is
close to clinching an arrangement to borrow over
EUR60-EUR65 million from Commerzbank and other lenders.
According to Reuters, a bondholder representative said despite
the prospective sale, holders of bonds issued by the Praktiker
group are unlikely to recoup any of their investment.
Ingo Scholz, a lawyer who represents holders of a EUR250 million
bond, said the break-up of the business was likely to cover the
costs of insolvency proceedings but little else, Reuters notes.
Praktiker AG is a German home-improvement retailer.
SOLUTRONIC AG: Overcrowded Inverter Market Prompts Insolvency
-------------------------------------------------------------
PHOTON reports that Solutronic AG has filed for insolvency at the
German district court of Esslingen.
The court will now work to determine what will be done with the
company's assets, PHOTON says. Marcus Winkler has been appointed
as provisional insolvency manager, PHOTON relates.
The Solutronic insolvency is further evidence that, "A rapid
decrease in solar inverter shipments and intense price pressure
in Germany has pushed domestic suppliers to the brink," PHOTON
quotes Cormac Gilligan, senior PV market analyst at research firm
IHS, as saying.
Evidence that the solar inverter market has become overcrowded in
certain key PV markets such as Germany is growing following
Solutronic's recent announcement of insolvency, PHOTON notes.
According to PHOTON, due to the high concentration of inverter
suppliers in Germany, and a rapid decrease in inverter shipments
from over 9 GW in 2010 to just 4 GW in 2013, inverter prices have
decreased by over 40% since 2010 as inverter suppliers compete in
a shrinking domestic market. Although, numerous German inverter
suppliers have expanded outside of their domestic market into
growth inverter markets such as the UK, the US and South Africa,
the pace of expansion has been in some instances too slow to
compensate for the German market's contraction, with revenue
decreasing from US$2.7 billion in 2010 to US$0.7 billion in 2013,
PHOTON says, citing IHS's latest forecast.
Solutronic AG was German inverter maker. The company was founded
in 2004 and had a workforce of 50 as of 2011.
===========
G R E E C E
===========
ALPHA BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B' Greek Mortgage Covered Bonds Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Alpha Bank A.E.'s (Alpha, B-
/Stable/B), Eurobank Ergasias S.A.'s (Eurobank, B-/Stable/B),
National Bank of Greece S.A.'s (NBG, B-/Stable/B) and Piraeus
Bank S.A.'s (Piraeus, B-/Stable/B), Greek mortgage covered bonds
at 'B' with Negative Outlook as follows:
Alpha EUR3.75bn covered bonds: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
Negative
Eurobank EUR2.45bn covered bonds: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
Negative
NBG (programme I) EUR0.846bn covered bonds: affirmed at 'B';
Outlook Negative
NBG (programme II) EUR6.9bn covered bonds: affirmed at 'B';
Outlook Negative
Piraeus EUR1.25bn covered bonds: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
Negative
The rating actions follow a full review of the programmes and,
notably, the application of the agency's updated covered bond
master criteria and assumptions for assessing credit risk of
Greek residential mortgage loans pools.
The Discontinuity Cap (D-Cap) remains unchanged for all
programmes. Alpha's, Eurobank's, NBG's programme II and Piraeus's
covered bond programmes have a D-Cap of 3 (moderate high
discontinuity risk), despite their pass-through structure; the D-
Cap assessment is driven by potential systemic challenges related
to the alternative management component.
The D-Cap of 0 for NBG's programme I reflects a full
discontinuity assessment, which is driven by the liquidity gaps
and systemic risk component. It reflects Fitch's view that the
extendible maturity feature of 12 months would not be sufficient
to successfully refinance the cover assets in the event of an
issuer default (see "Fitch Assigns Portuguese, Greek and Cypriot
Covered Bonds Outlooks & D-Caps" dated Sept. 19, 2012 at
www.fitchratings.com).
In its cash flow analysis, Fitch has modelled interest rate
mismatches stemming from fixed-rate loans that switch to a
floating-rate regime in the absence of a total return swap. In
its stressed recovery analysis, the agency has kept unchanged its
refinancing spread assumptions.
The Negative Outlook on all Greek covered bond programmes
reflects deteriorating asset performance and an adverse operating
environment for Greek banks.
Key Rating Drivers
Alpha's covered bonds
The rating of Alpha's covered bonds is based on the issuer's
Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR), the D-Cap of 3 and the
minimum level of over-collateralization (OC) of 5.26% required by
the Greek covered bond law, which is equivalent to the 95% asset
percentage (AP), and which Fitch relies upon for its analysis.
This level of OC allows at least 51% recoveries on bonds assumed
to default in a stress scenario, hence a one-notch uplift above
the IDR of Alpha.
As of end-June 2013, the cover pool consisted of approximately
78,500 residential mortgage loans originated by Alpha, totaling
approximately EUR4.2bn, with a weighted average current indexed
loan-to-value (WA Indexed CLTV) of 72% and weighted average
original loan-to-value (WA OLTV) of 74.5% as calculated by the
agency using a random sample. Fitch has determined a cumulative
weighted average frequency of foreclosure (WAFF) for the cover
assets of 27.3% and a weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of
66.2% at the 'B' category.
All assets and liabilities are denominated in euros. The cover
pool is made up of fixed-rate assets (1.7%), floating-rate assets
(87.7%) and fixed-rate assets that revert to floating during the
life of the loan (10.6%).
Eurobank's covered bonds
The rating of Eurobank's covered bonds is based on the issuer's
IDR, the D-Cap of 3 and the minimum level of OC of 5.26% required
by the Greek covered bond law, which is equivalent to the 95% AP
and which Fitch relies upon for its analysis. This level of OC
allows at least 51% recoveries on bonds assumed to default in a
stress scenario, hence a one-notch uplift above the IDR of
Eurobank.
As of end-June 2013, the cover pool consisted of approximately
46,000 residential mortgage loans originated by Eurobank,
totaling EUR2.8 billion, with a WA Indexed CLTV of 58.8% and WA
OLTV of 68% as calculated by the agency. Fitch has determined a
cumulative WAFF for the cover assets of 28.9% and a WARR of 77.3%
at the 'B' category.
All assets and liabilities are denominated in euros. The cover
pool is made up of fixed-rate assets (0.3%), floating-rate assets
(94.9%) and fixed-rate assets that revert to floating during the
life of the loan (4.8%).
NBG's programme I covered bonds
The rating on NBG programme I is based on the issuer's IDR, the
D-Cap of 0 and an AP commitment of 55% as published in NBG's
monthly investor report which Fitch takes into account in its
analysis. This AP commitment is lower than the 95% break-even AP
calculated by Fitch for the current rating that would allow an
uplift of up to three notches. However, the rating of the covered
bonds is constrained by the current Country Ceiling of 'B'.
As of end-June 2013, the cover pool consisted of approximately
35,500 residential mortgage loans originated by NBG, totaling
EUR1.8 billion, with a WA Indexed CLTV of 58.4% and WA OLTV of
61.9% as calculated by the agency. Fitch has determined a
cumulative WAFF for the cover assets of 29.6% and a WARR of 79.7%
at the 'B' category.
All assets and liabilities are denominated in euros. The cover
pool is made up of fixed-rate assets (10%), the majority of which
revert to floating during the life of the loan, and floating-rate
assets (90%) while the outstanding covered bonds pay a fixed rate
of interest.
Fitch has compared the cash flows from the cover pool in a wind-
down scenario, subject to stressed defaults and losses and under
the management of a third party, to the payments due under the
outstanding covered bonds. The cover assets have a weighted
average remaining term of about 11.3 years and the covered bonds
of 3.3 years. The mismatches between the soft bullet covered
bonds and the amortizing cover pool assets expose the programme
to material refinancing risk. A liability swap is in place with
Deutsche Bank AG (DBAG, A+/Stable/F1+) to hedge the interest rate
risk between the floating-rate loans in the cover pool and the
fixed-rate covered bonds.
NBG's programme II covered bonds
The rating of NBG's programme II covered bonds is based on the
issuer's IDR, the D-Cap of 3 and the minimum level of OC of 5.26%
required by the Greek covered bond law which is equivalent to the
95% AP and which Fitch relies upon for its analysis. This level
of OC allows at least 51% recoveries on bonds assumed to default
in a stress scenario, hence a one-notch uplift above the IDR of
NBG.
As of end-June 2013, the cover pool consisted of approximately
219,500 residential mortgage loans originated by NBG, totaling
EUR9.4 billion, with a WA Indexed CLTV of 61.7% and WA OLTV of
65.2% as calculated by the agency using a random sample. Fitch
has determined a cumulative WAFF for the cover assets of 30% and
a WARR of 73.2% at the 'B' category.
All liabilities are denominated in euros while 3.4% of the cover
assets are denominated in Swiss francs. Fitch has applied
additional stresses for the portion of the pool which is
denominated in Swiss francs to reflect the impact of potential
adverse exchange rate movements. The cover pool is made up of
fixed-rate assets (17.7%) approximately half of which revert to
floating during the life of the loan and floating-rate assets
(82.3%) while the outstanding covered bonds pay a floating-rate
of interest linked to the ECB reference rate.
Piraeus's covered bonds
The rating of Piraeus's covered bonds is based on the issuer's
IDR, the D-Cap of 3 and the minimum level of OC of 5.26% required
by the Greek covered bond law, which is equivalent to the 95% AP
and which Fitch relies upon for its analysis. This level of OC
allows at least 51% recoveries on bonds assumed to default in a
stress scenario, hence a one-notch uplift above the IDR of
Piraeus.
As of end-June 2013, the cover pool consisted of approximately
19,000 residential mortgage loans originated by Piraeus, totaling
EUR1.4 billion, with a WA Indexed CLTV of 63.5% and WA OLTV of
68% as calculated by the agency. Fitch has determined a
cumulative WAFF for the cover assets of 29.3% and a WARR of 74.6%
at the 'B' category.
All assets and liabilities are denominated in euros. The cover
pool is made up of fixed-rate assets (0.4%), floating-rate assets
(96.7%) and fixed-rate assets that revert to floating during the
life of the loan (2.9%). The outstanding covered bonds pay a
floating-rate of interest linked to the one month Euribor rate.
Rating Sensitivities
The ratings of all Greek covered bond programmes would be
vulnerable to a downgrade if the Country Ceiling for Greece is
revised downwards by one or more notches.
All else being equal the ratings of Alpha's, Eurobank's, NBG's
programme II and Piraeus's covered bonds would be vulnerable to a
downgrade if the respective banks' IDRs are downgraded by one or
more notches.
All else being equal the rating of the covered bonds outstanding
under NBG's programme I would be vulnerable to downgrade if NBG's
IDR is downgraded below 'CCC'.
Fitch breakeven AP for the covered bond ratings will be affected,
among others, by the profile of the cover assets relative to
outstanding covered bonds, which can change over time, even in
the absence of new issuances. Therefore it cannot be assumed to
remain stable over time.
NAVIOS MARITIME: Moody's Revises Ratings Outlook to Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Navios
Maritime Partners L.P.'s ("NMP") ratings to negative from stable.
At the same time, the rating agency has affirmed NMP's Ba3
Corporate Family Rating (CFR), Ba3-PD Probability of Default
Rating (PDR) and its Ba3 senior secured banking facility rating
assigned to its Term Loan B, currently amounting $250 million.
This rating action was triggered by the $182.5 million add-on on
its Term loan B, recently announced by NMP.
Moody's understanding is that the proceeds of this add-on will be
utilized to partly finance the acquisition of five container
vessels, whose acquisition price is US$275 million (whereas the
remaining US$92.5 million will be covered with cash on hand
deriving from a US$82 million capital increase made by NMP in
3Q). All these vessels have a 10 year contract.
Ratings Rationale:
NMP's CFR is constrained by the company's small size; its
refinancing risk (which will significantly increase after the
completion of the proposed transaction) due to its statute; the
high probability that it will not be able to redeploy some of its
vessels at the same high rates; and its dependence on Navios
Maritime Holdings, Inc. (Navios Holdings, B2 negative) for its
operations.
Moody's notes Navios Holdings is not only NMP's sponsor and major
shareholder with 19.6 % holding, but also fully controls NMP's
general partner (Navios GP. L.L.C.).
More positively, the rating is supported by its relatively low
financial leverage, relative to its peers, its charter policy
(based largely on long-term contracts, ie 2 to 9 years
currently), which provides good revenue visibility; its low
operating costs(as a result of the low average age of its fleet,
the fleet-management contract the company signed with Navios
Holdings) and NMP's strong assets base.
"In addition, NMP benefits from a strong customer base, and the
protection accorded to the majority of the company's long-term
revenues by credit insurance granted by an Aa3-rated insurance
company of a European Union member state; this mitigates the risk
that some of the company's current charterers may ask to
renegotiate their contracts," explains Marco Vetulli.
The Term Loan B will be secured with a first lien on part of its
assets and its stock. The rating assigned to this financial
instrument is in line with NMP's CFR and PDR of Ba3, because all
of the company's debt is secured.
Rationale for the Change of the Outlook:
"Following the completion of the proposed $ 182.5 million add-on
on its Term B loan, NMP's will improve the backlog of its
contracted revenues, but it will also substantially increase its
leverage," says Marco Vetulli, Moody's Vice President and NMP's
lead analyst.
Moody's previously said that to maintain the current rating NMP's
debt EBITDA should remain lower than 3.5x, its FFO interest
coverage should be higher than 7x and the debt asset coverage of
the company(computed as market value of the vessels divided total
financial debt) should remain above 175%.
After the completion of the transaction, NMP's credit metrics are
anticipated -- at least in part -- not be in line for Moody's
previous expectation for almost the next two years. Consequently,
the rating agency has changed the outlook on NMPs' ratings to
negative from stable, in order to signal that NMP will be weakly
positioned in its current rating category in the next 12-18
months, and that therefore any other increase of leverage and/or
a deterioration of the current positive trend of the dry bulk
market may translate in material pressure on the rating of the
company.
Change the Rating Down/Up:
The outlook on the ratings could be changed if NMP can
demonstrate the ability to deleverage, to the extent that its (1)
debt/EBITDA ratio is sustained below 2.5x; and (2) funds from
operations (FFO) interest coverage (FFO + interest/interest)
approaches 10x. Furthermore it could be stabilized if the
redeployment of charters expiring in the next 12 months provide
visibility into the regaining of metrics in line with the rating
category.
The ratings could be downgraded if the company's (1) debt/EBITDA
remains above 3.5x in the intermediate term; and (2) FFO interest
coverage (FFO + interest/interest) is sustained below 7x.
In addition to that, Moody's outlines that refinancing risk is
particularly high for NMP giving its nature of General
Partnership that constrains its capability to produce positive
Free Cash Flow as by its statute it must distribute most of the
operating cash flow it generates. As a result of that, Moody's
will monitor carefully the capability of the company to repay its
financial debt with its own assets and thus the rating could be
downgraded if the debt asset coverage of the company (computed as
market value of the vessels divided by total financial debt)
decreases below 175%.
=============
I R E L A N D
=============
CLIFTON STREET: Moody's Lowers Rating on Two Note Classes to C
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Clifton Street Finance Limited:
EUR48.75M Class A-2 Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on
Feb 20, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)
EUR37.5M Class B Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Feb
20, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)
Moody's also withdrew the ratings of the following notes issued
by Clifton Street Finance Limited:
EUR53.25M Class A-1 Notes, Withdrawn (sf); previously on Feb 20,
2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)
Clifton Street Finance Limited was issued in March 2005. This
transaction refers to credit-linked Notes exposed to a portfolio
of corporate reference obligations representing 80% of the total
1.5B exposure - 50% of the total 1.5B exposure being direct
corporate credit exposures and 30% of the total 1.5B exposure
being through ten bespoke CDO obligations. The remaining 20% of
the total 1.5B exposure are ABS reference obligations.
Ratings Rationale:
According to Moody's, the downgrade actions taken on the Class A-
2 and Class B notes are primarily a result of a structured
finance security whose principal balance has been fully written
down following an execution of the Swap Termination Option on
October 7, 2013.
The ratings of Class A-2 and Class B notes are being adjusted
before the subsequent withdrawal of those ratings to reflect
Moody's current policy.
=========
I T A L Y
=========
ALITALIA SPA: Deeper Ties with Air France Hinges on Overhaul
------------------------------------------------------------
Andrea Rothman at Bloomberg News reports that Air France-KLM
Group Chief Executive Officer Alexandre de Juniac said Alitalia
SpA must commit to a deeper overhaul before the French carrier
considers deeper ties that would help create a pan-European
airline.
"Air France, KLM and Alitalia would make a great European
carrier," Bloomberg quotes Mr. de Juniac as saying in an
interview [Thursday] night on French television broadcaster LCI.
"But at this point, it's not guaranteed, because to do what we've
asked, there has to be an industrial restructuring of Alitalia
that goes a lot further than what we've seen so far."
According to Bloomberg, the CEO said that Air France, which
already owns 25% of Alitalia and is a partner in the Skyteam
alliance, isn't in a position to keep funding Alitalia without a
restructuring plan at the Italian carrier. The French airline
has been reluctant to invest as it undertakes its own
restructuring and has seen the value of its holding in Alitalia
plunge, Bloomberg notes.
Air France, Bloomberg says, is considering whether to contribute
to a capital increase at Alitalia, which was recently agreed by
the Italian airline's board. Time is running out for Alitalia,
as its sales slump deepened over the last month as concerns over
the airline's future deterred travelers from booking, Bloomberg
states.
Alitalia's last major overhaul occurred in 2009 after the company
declared bankruptcy and got a fresh start by eliminating its debt
and merging its assets with those of another Italian carrier, Air
One SpA, Bloomberg recounts.
About Alitalia
Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring. After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009. Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania. Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM. An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.
RHIAG INTER: S&P Withdraws Preliminary 'B' Corp. Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it withdrew its 'B'
preliminary corporate credit ratings on Italy-incorporated
distributor of components for private and commercial vehicles
Rhiag Inter Auto Parts Italia SpA and its parent Lanchester S.A.,
and its preliminary issue-level and recovery ratings on the
proposed instruments to be issued by Rhiag and Lanchester. The
outlook at the time of the withdrawal was stable.
The withdrawal followed Rhiag's Oct. 9, 2013, announcement that
it and Lanchester are no longer pursuing the proposed EUR350
million refinancing initiated in October 2013 and comprising
EUR195 million senior secured notes to be issued by Rhiag and
EUR155 million Senior PIK toggle notes to be issued by
Lanchester.
* Tax Changes May Aid Italian Banks' Asset Quality
--------------------------------------------------
The proposed changes to the tax treatment of loan loss charges
and write-offs in Italy's 2014 draft budget, approved by the
government this week, could help improve Italian banks' asset
quality over time, Fitch Ratings says. But the domestic economy
will still be the most important driver of asset-quality trends.
The proposed changes allow larger amounts of loan loss charges
and write-offs to be deducted for tax purposes by shortening the
period for deduction to five years. This should give Italian
banks flexibility to increase loan provisioning and write-offs to
fully reflect the underlying asset quality of portfolios.
Although profitability would be depressed by higher bad debt
charges, it would benefit from a lower effective tax rate. We
believe the proposed changes would encourage lenders to clean up
balance sheets, lower impaired loan ratios and improve coverage
over time.
The new tax treatment should also improve the comparability of
Italian bank's asset quality with European peers. There is
variation in how loan losses are treated for fiscal deductibility
across Europe. Italy's current rules are particularly
restrictive -- the maximum amount of loan impairment charges
deductible for tax purposes is 0.3% of loan value, with the
residual amount deducted over the following 18 years. In
contrast, the UK and France generally allow banks to deduct all
specific loan impairments in the year incurred.
This strict tax treatment is one of the key reasons why Italian
banks tend not to actively write off loans and take loan
impairment charges above the amount that is tax deductible each
year, unless an insolvency procedure is in place or the borrower
is declared insolvent. However, these are subject to long court
processes. As a result, the banks have reported very high
deferred tax assets (DTAs) in recent years as loan impairment
charges have risen materially during the recession.
The relaxation of the tax regime would lower DTAs and benefit
Basel III capital ratios as this would reduce the deduction from
common equity Tier 1. But we view the change in capital to be
largely superficial. Our primary measure of bank
capitalization -- Fitch core capital -- is unlikely to be
materially affected by the potential changes. We already include
DTAs arising from temporary differences in loan impairment
charges in Fitch core capital as they would bring a real tax
benefit if the loan impairment they stem from crystallizes into
genuine losses.
Italy is experiencing one of the longest and deepest recessions
in the eurozone, so the economy remains the most important driver
of asset-quality trends. We forecast Italian GDP to shrink by
1.8% in 2013, before recovering to moderate growth of 0.6% in
2014 and 1% in 2015. We expect banks' impaired loans to continue
to rise in Q413 and 2014. It is too early to see a reversal in
trends for non-performing loans, even if the proposed tax changes
are passed.
===========
L A T V I A
===========
BALTIC INT'L: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Long-term Deposit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed Baltic International
Bank's (BIB) long-term deposit rating of B3. Moody's also
confirmed the bank's bank financial strength rating of E+,
equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b3. The Not
Prime short-term deposit rating was unaffected. The outlook on
all ratings is negative.
The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
August 23, 2013 which reflected concerns over the high proportion
of problem loans and decreasing profitability.
Ratings Rationale:
Confirmation of BIB's ratings is based on Moody's assessment that
whilst problem loan levels remain elevated, the potential impact
on the bank's capital position is constrained by (1) the
relatively low proportion of loan assets on BIB's balance sheet
which constituted only 27% of total assets at end-June 2013 --
44% of total assets consisted of bank receivables, the majority
of which are at highly rated Western European banks; (2) BIB's
current Tier 1 capital position of 12.4% at end-June 2013, and;
(3) the additional capital requirements imposed by the regulator
on BIB in relation to its non-resident business.
The negative outlook reflects the continuing increase in problem
loans which, whilst in line with the b3 rating at their current
level, may create negative ratings pressure in the future. This
is particularly the case when considered alongside the high
borrower concentration and low profitability (BIB reported a loss
of LVL17,000 for the half year to June 2013), which limits the
bank's ability to cope with further asset quality shocks. The
negative outlook also reflects the pressures in many of the CEE
and CIS economies that the bank operates in, in contrast to the
improving economic conditions within Latvia itself.
What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:
A stabilization of BIB's ratings would likely follow a sustained
improvement in both the bank's problem loan level and
profitability. Additional upwards rating pressure could be
created through a reduction in borrower concentration.
A downgrade of BIB's ratings would be predicated on further asset
quality deterioration and weak profitability, resulting in
declining capital strength. Negative ratings pressure would also
follow any sign of deposit instability or reduction in business
volumes, suggesting a weakening of the bank's franchise.
LIEPAJAS METALURGS: Shareholder Says PM Paving Way for Sale
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic Course, citing LETA/Nozare.lv, reports that Liepajas
metalurgs shareholder Kirovs Lipmans said Prime Minister Valdis
Dombrovskis' (Unity) statements in support of insolvency of the
financially-troubled joint-stock metallurgical company are meant
to cover up the company's insolvency procedure administrator
Haralds Velmers' slackness, and they show that the government is
uninterested in rescuing the company.
On September 2, The Baltic Course recalls, Mr. Dombrovskis told
reporters that the conflict between Liepajas metalurgs
shareholders was obviously continuing, and that the creditors'
club suspected that the shareholders were deliberately arguing
with each other in order to finally have the company declared
insolvent.
"Unfortunately, the stakes are very high because, once the legal
protection process ends, the creditors' club will have just one
option -- insolvency," emphasized Mr. Dombrovskis, the report
relates. The current situation is very troublesome as the
creditors' club has done very much so Liepajas metalurgs could
continue operations by supporting the company's legal protection
plan and ensuring maintenance of the company's technical
equipment, Mr. Dombrovskis, as cited by The Baltic Course, said.
The Baltic Course relates that Mr. Lipmans, however, opines that
such statements are paving the way for Liepajas metalurgs
insolvency process and sale of the company's assets. "This is
just what Velmers wants, as he has admitted previously that
insolvency of Liepajas metalurgs, in financial terms, would be a
better option for the administrator."
"Dombrovskis' statements that "no investor wants to participate
in the company's operations" are untrue, because I am the only
shareholder who has confirmed readiness to invest own money in
the company and take full responsibility for renewing the
company's operations. But this will no longer be possible if the
company is declared insolvent and Liepajas metalurgs assets are
sold," Mr. Lipmans emphasized in the statement, The Baltic Course
relays.
Mr. Lipmans added that the problem is not about "shareholders'
squabbles" as Mr. Dombrovskis thoughtlessly said, but about the
largest metallurgical company in Latvia, thousands of jobs and a
significant portion of budget revenue, according to The Baltic
Course.
Mr. Lipmans goes on to say that everybody has realized by now
that no one will want to invest money in the company as long as
it is run by such people as Sergejs Zaharjins, Ilja Segals or
Velmers. "The simplest common sense solution to prevent the
company's insolvency and bankruptcy, and renew the company's
operations, would be to entrust the company's management to
Lipmans - who has the money necessary for this as well as
experience of rescuing Liepajas metalurgs," Mr. Lipmans said in
the statement cited by The Baltic Course.
Liepajas metalurgs is a Latvian metallurgical company. The
Liepaja Court has accepted Liepajas metalurgs legal protection
plan, drafted by the company's specialists, The Baltic Course
disclosed. The plan has been harmonized with all secured and
more than 55% of unsecured creditors, The Baltic Course noted.
TRASTA KOMERCBANKA: Moody's Confirms B3 Long-term Deposit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed Trasta Komercbanka's
(TKB) long-term deposit rating of B3. Moody's also confirmed the
bank financial strength rating of E+, equivalent to a baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of b3. The Not-Prime short-term deposit
rating was unaffected. The outlook on all ratings is negative.
The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
August 23, 2013 which reflected concerns over the high proportion
of problem loans and low, albeit improving, profitability.
Ratings Rationale:
Confirmation of TKB's ratings is based on Moody's assessment that
whilst problem loan levels remain elevated at around 30% of gross
loans, there has been a consistent reduction in this figure over
the past four years. Additionally, the potential impact of the
problem loans on the bank's capital position is constrained by:
(1) the relatively low proportion of loan assets on TKB's balance
sheet which constituted only 24% of total assets at end-June 2013
(27% of total assets consisted of on-demand bank receivables and
21% cash or equivalents); (2) TKB's current Tier 1 capital
position of 14.7% at end-June 2013, and; (3) the additional
capital requirements imposed by the regulator in relation to
TKB's non-resident business.
The negative outlook recognizes that despite the improvement in
problem loans, the absolute levels remain high and well above the
system average of 14% at end-2012. Moody's says that whilst such
levels are currently in line with the b3 rating, the high levels
combined with high borrower concentration and low, albeit
improved, profitability leave a degree of susceptibility captured
by the negative outlook. The outlook also reflects the pressures
in many of the CEE and CIS economies that the bank operates in,
in contrast to the improving economic conditions within Latvia
itself.
What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:
A stabilization of TKB's ratings would likely follow a sustained
improvement in both the bank's problem loan level and
profitability. Additional upwards rating pressure could be
created through a reduction in borrower concentration.
A downgrade of TKB's ratings would be predicated on further asset
quality deterioration and weak profitability, resulting in
declining capital strength. Negative ratings pressure would also
follow any sign of deposit instability or reduction in business
volumes, suggesting a weakening of the bank's franchise.
===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================
ALTICE VII: Moody's Give B1 Corp. Family Rating; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's assigned a B1 corporate family rating (CFR) and a B1-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) to Altice VII S.a.r.l. At the
same time Moody's has withdrawn the B1 CFR and B1-PDR of Cool
Holding Ltd. (Cool Holding). Moody's also assigned a definitive
B1 rating to the USD-equivalent 1 billion senior secured term
loan of Altice Financing SA's and a definitive B3 rating to
Altice Finco SA.'s senior notes due 2023. Altice Financing and
Altice Finco are finance subsidiaries of Altice VII.
Ratings Rationale:
Rating assignments and withdrawals follow the substantial
completion of a number of transactions that lead to the creation
of the Altice VII group as is configured now and the accession of
Altice VII itself as a guarantor for debt at Altice Financing and
Altice Finco. Transactions included the fold-in and refinancing
of (i) Cabovisao, a cable operator in Portugal; (ii) Coditel, a
cable operator in Belgium and Luxembourg; (iii) Le Cable, a cable
operator in the French Overseas Territories of Martinique and
Guadeloupe and (iv) Green.Ch, a provider of IT and communications
services, based in Switzerland. They also included the
acquisition of Outremer, a mobile telecoms operator in the French
Overseas Territories, in the process of being integrated with Le
Cable and ONI, an alternative telecoms operator in Portugal, in
the process of being integrated with Cabovisao. The only
transaction still outstanding is the buy-out of minorities in
Coditel (for EUR85 million), which is currently expected to be
concluded by the end of November (subject to amongst other things
to a 4x Gross Debt/EBITDA debt incurrence test).
The B1 CFR reflects (i) Altice VII's significant leverage (around
4.8x Debt/EBITDA on a last-two-quarter-annualized basis as of
June 2013 (as adjusted by Moody's), pro forma for the
transactions); ii) the execution risk surrounding Altice VII's
business plans for each of its subsidiaries, in particular
realizing all targeted synergies from combining existing
operations with newly acquired businesses; iii) the timing of
economic recovery in some countries of operation such as
Portugal; iv) the complexity of the capital structure; (v) slower
than expected progress in growing the subscriber base for HOT
Mobile in Israel and vi) limited liquidity leeway following the
enlargement transactions with a significant reliance on timely
dividend up-streaming from subsidiaries in diverse jurisdictions.
Moody's also notes that there could be incremental adjustments to
the way Moody's calculates the Altice group's Debt/EBITDA ratio
once fully consolidated group accounts become available. Altice
VII will provide consolidated financial statements for the Altice
group from the 3rd quarter of 2013 onwards. More positively, the
rating is supported by i) the increased size and scope of the
Altice group; ii) its well diversified geographic presence and
sources of revenue and cash flow; iii) the potential for
meaningful operational synergies and iv) the expectation that all
major asset pools will generate free cash flow before dividends.
Altice VII's EUR-based combined pro forma results for the second
quarter showed year-on-year revenue growth (+3.4%), helped by the
strengthening of the Shekel vis-a-vis the Euro. However,
underlying revenues for the Israeli operations were flat in cable
and mobile revenue, while up year-on-year, is stagnating (flat
quarter-on-quarter). The company's reduced focus on marketing
spend in Portugal is evidenced by a 6% year-on-year revenue
decline. However, successful cost control meant that all
operations, with the exception of Switzerland, produced EBITDA
growth (up 13.5% year-on-year). A stable outlook assumes that
Altice VII (i) can regain growth momentum and exercise continued
cost control in its key Israeli mobile operations, (ii) will
generate consolidated EBITDA and revenue growth and; (iii) does
not encounter material obstacles as it integrates the newly
formed group.
Moody's views the liquidity profile of the Altice group as
adequate for its near-term needs. As of June 30 2013, Altice
Financing reported cash position of EUR41 million. This, combined
with amounts available under the group's two undrawn revolving
credit facilities of US$80 million and Euro 60 million
respectively and the expected cash generation at the operating
subsidiary level should cover the company's near-term operational
and financial needs in the ordinary course of business. Covenant
headroom is moderate and will remain so in the near term as the
company seeks to maximize its borrowing capacity. While Moody's
acknowledges that availability under the credit facilities is no
longer subject to covenant step-downs, the group will still need
to manage its cash resources carefully before expected EBITDA
growth increases the available leeway.
What Could Change the Rating Up:
While Moody's sees no near-term upward pressure on the ratings,
such pressure could develop over time should the company's
leverage (as measured by the Debt/EBITDA ratio) fall to well
below 4.0x on a sustainable basis combined with visible levels of
free cash flow generation.
What Could Change the Rating Down:
Negative pressure on the ratings could develop as a result of (i)
leverage trending towards 5.5x on a sustained basis, (ii) signs
of deteriorating liquidity either as a result of operating
performance or due to the company's inability to distribute
dividends from its subsidiaries as planned; (iii) sudden negative
changes in local regulation which would impact the company's
subsidiaries', and in particular HOT's ability to maintain market
shares and (iv) any indication that the company's pending cases
of litigation will lead to material unplanned cash outflows.
Altice VII S.a.r.l. is a Luxembourg-based holding company, which
through its indirect subsidiaries operates a multinational cable
and telecommunications business with presence in three regions --
Israel, Western Europe and the French Overseas Territories. As at
June 30, 2013, the company passed 3.6 million homes with 1.6
million cable customer relationships and had 1.1 million mobile
telephony RGUs. The company is controlled by French entrepreneur
Patrick Drahi through his investment vehicle, Next L.P.
EUROPROP SA: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR53MM C Notes to 'C'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating action on the
following classes of Notes issued by EuroProp (EMC VI) S.A.
(amounts reflect initial outstanding):
EUR380.25M A Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2012
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
EUR30M B Notes, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2012
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)
EUR35M C Notes, Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Dec 18, 2012
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
Moody's does not rate the Class D, Class E, Class F and the Class
R Notes.
Ratings Rationale:
Downgrade action on the Class C Notes reflects Moody's increased
loss expectation for the pool since its last review. This is
primarily due to a lower recovery expectation for the Epic Rhino
and Epic Horse loans, together accounting for 18% of the
outstanding balance. Additionally, a large percentage of loans
(68% of current pool balance) are already beyond maturity and are
not expected to fully repay.
The current credit enhancement levels on the Class A and B Notes
are sufficient to maintain the ratings despite the high loss
expectation for the outstanding pool. Following the full
repayment of two loans sequentially since the last review in
December 2012, the Class A credit enhancement level increased to
31.3%. The Class B credit enhancement is currently 22.3%.
The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool. Based on Moody's
revised assessment of these parameters, the loss expectation has
increased since last review.
Moody's current weighted average A-loan and whole loan LTV is
128% and 137 % respectively. In comparison, the UW A-loan LTV is
83.1% as per the July 2013 interest payment date (IPD). Moody's
notes that for seven of the 12 remaining loans (70% of the
portfolio), the Moody's whole loan LTV ratios are above 100%,
translating into high probability of default at maturity (>50%).
In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.
Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) lending
will remain constrained over the next years, while subject to
strict underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the
underlying property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between
prime and secondary properties, with further value declines
expected for non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets
will remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
for the world's largest economies is for only a gradual
strengthening in growth over the coming two years. Fiscal
consolidation and volatility in financial markets will continue
to weigh on business and consumer confidence, while heightened
uncertainty hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. In
2013, Moody's expects no growth in the Euro area and only slow
growth in the UK.
Moody's Portfolio Analysis:
EuroProp (EMC VI) S.A. closed in June 2007 and represents the
securitization of initially 18 commercial mortgage loans.
Currently, 12 loans remain in the pool, secured by 105
properties. The pool exhibits below average diversity in terms of
geographic location. 11 of the 12 remaining loans are secured by
assets located in Germany (85% by portfolio balance), while the
remaining loan is secured by a single office property in France.
Moody's uses a variation of Herf to measure diversity of loan
size, where a higher number represents greater diversity. Large
multi-borrower transactions typically have a Herf of less than 10
with an average of around 5. This pool has a Herf of 6.3 compared
to a Herf of 8.9 at closing. Since Moody's last rating action in
December 2012, the Flensburg and Luneburg loans have repaid and
all principal proceeds have been allocated to the Notes
sequentially, benefiting the Class A Notes.
The largest loan (Sunrise II; 30% of current pool balance)
secured by a portfolio of 48 retail properties located across
Germany represents a 50% pari passu piece of a whole loan. The
other 50% of the whole loan was securitised in Deco 10 -- Pan
Europe 4 plc, where it is known as the Treveria II Loan. The loan
was transferred into special servicing due to the non-payment at
its extended maturity date in July 2012. Based on the current
pari passu loan balance of EUR98.7 million this reflects an U/W
LTV of 119% based off a June 2012 revaluation of the portfolio.
The LTV based on Moody's current value estimate is 137%. The
workout strategy for the loan involves an orderly liquidation of
the portfolio however, since default on the extended maturity
date in July 2012, the borrower was able to sell only one
property. The Moers property was sold at above market value and
principal proceeds of EUR3.5 million were applied to the note at
the last IPD. In Moody's view, the ability to fully repay the
loan is limited by the high leverage, the total loan size
(EUR197.4 million), the secondary quality of the assets with
significant lease rollovers over the next three years and the
sponsor's indication not to inject further equity. As a result,
Moody's expects very large losses for the loan (> 40%).
The second largest loan of the portfolio (Gutperle; 13.1% of
current pool balance) is performing. The loan with a current
outstanding securitized balance of EUR38.65 million failed to
repay at its extended January 2013 maturity date and was
subsequently transferred to special servicing. It was secured by
two large logistics properties in Offenbach-Queich and Minden and
each property is leased to a single tenant. Since transfer to
special servicing, the Minden property was sold, with proceeds of
EUR14.0 million being used to repay principal on the loan. The
remaining property is leased to Daimler AG (rated A3) on three
longer term leases. Two leases expire in 2021 and one lease in
2017. The whole loan LTV based on Moody's current value estimate
is 96%. Moody's loss expectation is in the 0%-10% range.
The Signac loan (11.6% of current pool balance) is secured by a
single office property located in Gennevilliers, Paris. Following
the loan's non-payment at maturity in July 2011, the borrower
pursued Safeguard proceedings at the French courts. Under
proposed terms accepted by the court in July 2012, the repayment
date has been extended to June 2015. In addition, the borrower is
required to reduce the outstanding principal in annual
installments beginning in June 2012. The loan is currently
subject to two claims filed with the French courts, the first, a
claim by the Issuer, FCC Europrop against the originator,
Citibank citing defects in respect of the underlying security on
the loan and a contingent claim filed by the originator. As a
result of the contingent claim, Moody's understands that all
funds payable under the Safeguard Plan are being retained in
Escrow by Commissaire … l'Ex‚cution du Plan and will not be
released until the outcome of the court proceedings brought by
the issuer against the originator. As part of the safeguard plan,
the borrower aims to re-let the vacant space with the aim to sell
the property at a later stage. Moody's believes that it continues
to be challenging over the short-term to re-let the space at an
adequate rental level due to the secondary office location in
Paris and the level of local competition. As a result, Moody's
base case expects very large losses for the loan (> 50%) given
the whole loan LTV of 206% based on Moody's current value
estimate. In its analysis, Moody's also considered a scenario in
which the loan is repurchased by the originator owing to the
ongoing proceedings.
The Epic Rhino and Epic Horse Loan (combined 18% of the current
portfolio balance) have experienced further performance
deterioration. Both loans have been placed into special servicing
following their non-payments at maturity in April 2011. A
February 2013 revaluation of both portfolios has resulted in a
market value decline of 36% for the Epic Rhino loan and 18% for
the Epic Horse loan. The resulting LTV ratios of 139.1% and
206.6% respectively are far beyond refinancing levels. Both
portfolios are currently being marketed for sale and Moody's
expects significant losses ranging between 25%-50%.
Portfolio Loss Exposure: Moody's expects large amount of losses
on the securitized pool, stemming mainly from the collateral
performance and the refinancing profile of the loans. As of the
October 2012 IPD, a total of six loans (59% of the current pool
balance) were already in special servicing and Moody's expects
additional loans will eventually move to special servicing in
2014.
OXEA SARL: S&P Puts 'B' Long-Term CCR on CreditWatch Positive
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard and Poor's Ratings Services said that it placed its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-headquartered
chemicals intermediates and derivatives company Oxea S.a.r.l.,
Luxembourg on CreditWatch with positive implications.
At the same time, S&P placed on CreditWatch positive its 'B'
issue ratings on Oxea's senior secured EUR110 million revolving
credit facility (RCF) and first-lien term loans B-1 (EUR450
million) and B-2 (US$535 million). The recovery rating on these
debt instruments is unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery prospects in the
event of a payment default.
In addition, S&P placed on CreditWatch positive its 'B' issue
rating on Oxea's US$325 million (EUR248 million) second-lien term
loan. The recovery rating on the second-lien term loan is
unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible
(0%-10%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.
The CreditWatch placement follows Oxea's announcement that its
private equity sponsor Advent has sold its 100% stake in Oxea to
Oman Oil Company, which is wholly owned by the government of the
Sultanate of Oman. The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view
that Oxea's credit quality could improve following the
acquisition.
S&P understands that the new owner supports Oxea's strategy of
capacity additions and the gradual shift of its product mix
toward higher-margin derivative products. In addition, S&P
anticipates operational synergies between Oxea and Oman Oil
Company. In S&P's view, Oxea could gain feedstock benefits and a
sound platform for expansion into Asia. For Oman Oil Company and
the Sultanate of Oman, S&P believes that the acquisition of Oxea
reflects the government's strategic objective to decrease the
country's dependence on oil and develop the downstream industry
value chain.
S&P do not anticipate that the acquisition will have any effect
on Oxea's financial risk profile in the near term. However, S&P
believes that Oxea's financial policy under new owner could
become more conservative, in contrast to the previous policy
under private equity ownership, which S&P considered relatively
aggressive.
S&P understands that the acquisition is subject to anti-trust
approval.
S&P could raise the rating by one or more notches on completion
of the acquisition. The amount of uplift would depend on the
changes to Oxea's financial policy, as well as the degree of
Oxea's strategic importance to Oman Oil Company and S&P's related
assessment of ongoing and extraordinary parental support. At the
same time, if the acquisition does not go ahead, S&P could remove
the rating from CreditWatch and affirm it.
S&P currently anticipates that the acquisition could close by the
end of 2013. S&P therefore anticipates resolving the CreditWatch
within a similar time frame, after evaluating the effect of the
acquisition on Oxea and its importance to Oman Oil Company, as
well as the strategy, policies, and financial strength of the new
owner.
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
ST JAMES: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR12MM Class E Notes to B1
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating actions
on the notes issued by St. James's Park CDO B.V.:
EUR28,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2011
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)
EUR24,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 2,
2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)
EUR12,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2020 (current outstanding balance EUR 11.4M),
Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba3 (sf)
Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes issued by
St. James's Park CDO B.V.:
EUR100,000,000 Revolving Loan Facility due 2020 (current
outstanding balance EUR 22.05M), Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Dec 6, 2007 Assigned Aaa (sf)
EUR50,000,000 Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded
to Aaa (sf)
EUR26,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2020, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 2, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
St. James's Park CDO B.V., issued in December 2007, is a multi
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield senior secured European and US
leveraged loans. The portfolio is managed by Blackstone Debt
Advisors L.P. This transaction passed its reinvestment period in
Nov 2010.
Ratings Rationale:
According to Moody's, the upgrade of the Class B and Class C
notes result primarily from increase in overcollateralization
("OC") ratios across the liability capital structure, due to
deleveraging.
Since the payment date in February 2013 the remaining outstanding
balance of EUR7.6 million of Class A-1 notes has been fully paid
down and further EUR33 million of Revolving Loan has amortized.
As a consequence the OC ratios of the all rated notes have
improved. As of the latest trustee report dated September 2013,
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E OC ratios are
reported at 172.65%, 139.25%, 115.12% and 106.99%, respectively,
versus February 2013 reported levels of 149.52%, 129.30%, 112.78%
and 106.80% respectively.
The downgrade of the Class E notes results primarily from the
deterioration in the credit quality of the remaining asset pool
and their increased exposure to assets rated Caa1 and below.
Since the last rating action trustee reported WARF has increased
to 2,992 from 2,828, Diversity Score has reduced to 25 from 38,
percentage of Caa rated assets has increased to approximately 21%
from approximately 8% and large single exposures to obligors
bearing a credit estimate, which are subject to stress, has
increased to approximately 15% from 3%.
In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR175.8 million, defaulted par of EUR5.8 million, a weighted
average default probability of 23.80% (consistent with a WARF of
3,607), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.24%
for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 25 and a
weighted average spread of 3.72%. The default probability is
derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and
Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool.
The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is
based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral
pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that
95.2% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets
would recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-
lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%. In each case,
historical and market performance trends and collateral manager
latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant factors.
These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are
incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject
to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability being reviewed.
In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the
rated notes:
Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing and
sovereign risks - Approximately 29.01% of the portfolio is rated
B3 and below with maturities between 2014 and 2016, which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. The portfolio is also
exposed to 10.16% of obligors located in Ireland and Spain.
Moody's considered the scenario where the WARF of the portfolio
was increased to 4,271 by forcing to Ca the credit quality of 25%
of such exposures subject to refinancing or sovereign risks. This
scenario generated model outputs that were up to one notch lower
than in the base case.
Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.
Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:
1) Portfolio Amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
proceeds will continue and at what pace. Delevering may
accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
and/or collateral sales by the liquidation agent, which may have
significant impact on the notes' ratings.
2) Moody's also notes that around 34.12% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.
3) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct
impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the
transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated
tranches.
4) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.
Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.
Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority and jurisdiction of the assets in the collateral pool.
The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.
This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. Therefore,
Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.
On August 14, 2013, Moody's released a report, which describes
how Moody's propose to incorporate/assess the additional credit
risk of exposures domiciled in countries with country ceilings
that are single A or lower when rating CLO tranches that carry
ratings higher than those ceilings.
===========
P O L A N D
===========
POLIMEX: Arcellor Mitall, Instal File Bankruptcy Motions
--------------------------------------------------------
Minda Alicja at Polska Agencja Prasowa reports that Polimex-
Mostostal faces bankruptcy motions from its creditors Arcellor
Mittal Distribution Solutions and Instal Belchatow.
According to PAP, Polimex said the company intends to take legal
steps to discontinue the proceedings.
Polimex-Mostostal is a Polish engineering and construction
company that has been on the market since 1945. The Company is
distinguished by a wide range of services provided on general
contractorship basis for the chemical as well as refinery and
petrochemical industries, power engineering, environmental
protection, industrial and general construction. The Company
also operates in the field of road and railway construction as
well as municipal infrastructure. Polimex-Mostostal is a large
manufacturer and exporter of steel products, including platform
gratings, in Poland.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
BANK VOZROZHDENIE: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Ratings; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'BB-/B' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
Russia-based Bank Vozrozhdenie. The outlook is stable. At the
same time, the 'ruAA-' Russia national scale rating was affirmed.
Although Bank Vozrozhdenie's asset quality has recently
deteriorated moderately, due to one-off problem loans, and
earnings are pressured by higher credit costs and tougher market
competition, S&P believes that the bank's underwriting track
record and risk appetite are better than the Russian banking
system averages and that its provisioning policy is more
conservative than those of many of its Russian peers.
S&P do not anticipate that the bank's asset quality will
significantly deteriorate further, despite its expectation that
the Russian economy will slow. After one-off asset quality
deterioration of a small number of large corporate exposures,
nonperforming loans (NPLs), or impaired loans with repayment
overdue by over 90 days, stabilized at 8.2% of gross loans by
mid-2013, when the provision coverage ratio was an adequate 123%
of NPLs.
The long-term rating on Bank Vozrozhdenie reflects the 'bb'
anchor for a commercial bank operating in Russia and S&P's view
of the bank's "moderate" business position, "moderate" capital
and earnings, "adequate" risk position, "average" funding, and
"adequate" liquidity, as S&P's criteria define these terms. The
stand-alone credit profile is 'bb-'.
The stable outlook balances Bank Vozrozhdenie's recently
deteriorated asset quality and increased credit costs against its
relatively moderate risk appetite and still sustainable earning
power in its core banking business, with no significant
deterioration in capitalization,
S&P could lower the long-term rating in the event of a sharp and
unexpected further material deterioration in the bank's risk
profile, with reported NPLs and loan losses significantly higher
than the system average. S&P could also take a negative rating
action if the bank's structural earning power were to weaken
further, resulting in a significant drop in capitalization, such
that the bank's risk-adjusted capital ratio fell below 5%,
although this is not S&P's base-case scenario for the next 12-18
months.
S&P could raise the long-term rating if the bank displays a
significant and durable improvement in concentration and
diversity of its business activity or loan portfolio, evidenced
by the increased granularity of its lending and funding profiles
and supported by an improving market position, while maintaining
asset quality at levels not worse than the industry average. The
rating could also change depending on any movements in S&P's
assessment of economic and industry risks in Russia, which S&P
views as unlikely in the near term.
DZERZHINSK CITY: S&P Affirms 'B+' LT Issuer Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+' long-term
issuer credit rating on the Russian City of Dzerzhinsk, located
in the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast. The outlook is stable. S&P also
affirmed its 'ruA' Russia national scale rating.
Rationale
The ratings reflect S&P's view of Dzerzhinsk's concentrated and
volatile economy and limited revenue and spending flexibility and
predictability, owing to what S&P sees as Russia's "developing
and unbalanced" public finance system, as well as the city's
"negative" financial management and "negative" liquidity. These
weaknesses are somewhat mitigated by the city's moderate
budgetary performance, low debt, and low contingent liabilities.
Dzerzhinsk's economy is dominated by the chemical industry, which
is dependent on external markets and on average provides one-half
of the city's output and one-fifth of total employment. S&P
expects it will post only modest economic growth in the medium
term and will continue to be highly dependent on demand from
international markets or Russia's state sector.
Dzerzhinsk's financial flexibility and predictability are
extremely limited, owing to its "developing and unbalanced"
public finance system, which is reflected in the federal control
over local revenues and expenditures and frequent shifts in the
city's grant allocation and tax-sharing policies. About 75% of
the city's total revenues come either from taxes--which Nizhny
Novgorod Oblast unilaterally controls through annual changes to
the personal income tax (PIT) share allocated to the city--or
from nontransparent and volatile grants allocated by the oblast.
New changes to the federal legislation, effective in 2014, will
move some spending responsibilities from the municipal government
to the regional level, and redistribute some tax revenues to the
regions. Given Nizhny Novgorod Oblast's only modest budgetary
performance, S&P believes Dzerzhinsk might need to cofinance some
of the new regional spending responsibilities. According to
S&P's base case, the lower PIT-sharing rates and stronger
operating grants envisaged in the oblast's existing 2014-2016
draft budget for Dzerzhinsk for the next three years will allow
the city to stabilize budgetary performance posted in 2012, but
not to improve it.
S&P believes privatization revenues and capital grants, in
particular those directed to the regeneration of polluted
industrial sites, will make up for the expansion of the city's
investment program, leading to only modest deficits after capital
accounts of 3% of revenues in the medium term.
This will result in only modest growth in Dzerzhinsk's tax-
supported debt, which will not likely exceed 30% of operating
revenues through to 2015. Owing to the city's modest involvement
in the local economy and that its government-related entities
have relatively stable financial positions, S&P views
Dzerzhinsk's contingent liabilities as modest.
S&P regards the city's financial management as "negative", as it
do for most of Russian local and regional governments. Despite
the city's relatively prudent debt policies, its management is
constrained by a lack of external risk management and weak long-
term planning and budgeting.
Liquidity
S&P regards Dzerzhinsk's liquidity position as "negative",
according to its criteria. The city's cash and committed
facilities cover its debt services, which alleviates any
refinancing risks. However, liquidity is constrained by the
city's weak and volatile cash position and limited access to
external liquidity.
The city's cash on average has historically been very low, at
about 1% of annual operating expenditures, and volatile. Owing
to Dzerzhinsk's recovering but still modest budgetary
performance, S&P's base case forecasts that the city will likely
not consolidate its cash position over the next 12 months.
However, the city continues its policies of securing committed
bank lines. As of early October 2013, Dzerzhinsk had several
committed bank lines maturing in 2016, which have fully covered
debt service needs for the next 12 months. Given management's
proven track record in extending the city's debt profile and
attracting medium-term loans at favorable rates, S&P's base-case
scenario assumes debt service will stay at about 5% of operating
revenues.
According to S&P's criteria, it qualifies the city's access to
financial markets as "limited" in an international context
because of what it sees as a weak domestic bank system and the
limited development of Russia's capital market.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook reflects S&P's belief that the ratings will
not be affected by its uncertainly regarding upcoming changes in
Dzerzhinsk's revenues and spending, and that the city will
maintain modest operating surpluses in 2013-2015. The outlook
also reflects management's commitment to medium-term borrowing to
keep debt service under 5% of operating revenues.
S&P could consider a positive rating action over the next 12
months if the changes in revenues and spending in 2014 had a
positive effect, for instance if the city consolidated its cash
position as a result of stronger budgetary performance, including
average operating surpluses of about 4% in the medium term.
A negative rating action could follow within the next 12 months
if budgetary performance suffered from the changes to the
spending-revenue balance, or if management were unable to
maintain spending discipline. This would also translate into
tax-supported debt's exceeding 30% of operating revenues and a
weaker liquidity position.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Dzerzhinsk (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating B+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruA
LENINGRAD OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' issuer
credit and 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating at ratings on
Russian region Leningrad Oblast. The outlook is stable.
Rationale
The ratings reflect S&P's view of Russia's "developing and
unbalanced" institutional framework, which limits the region's
budgetary flexibility; the oblast's modest wealth levels; some
concentration of the tax base; and "negative" financial
management in an international context. S&P believes that the
oblast's budgetary performance will remain moderate and will be
neutral for its creditworthiness over the next three years. The
oblast's low debt burden, "positive" liquidity, and limited
contingent liabilities support the ratings.
Leningrad Oblast's favorable location surrounding the Russian
city of St. Petersburg and on the transit routes to the EU, along
with an inflow of investment into transport and energy
infrastructure and manufacturing sector, support its economic
growth. In S&P's view, the oblast's wealth is gradually
approaching a moderate level in an international context. S&P
estimates that gross regional product (GRP) per capita might
reach US$12,560 in 2013 and continue to grow in line with
Russia's average national growth rates in 2014-2015.
Nevertheless, in S&P's view, the oblast is still subject to some
economic concentration, which leads to tax revenue volatility.
S&P expects the oblast's 10 largest taxpayers to provide about
30% of tax revenues over the next three years.
Similar to most Russian local and regional governments (LRGs),
Leningrad Oblast suffers from low budgetary flexibility and
predictability within Russia's "developing and unbalanced"
institutional framework. The oblast has very limited control
over its revenues, about 95% of which come from state-regulated
taxes and transfers from the federal government. Ongoing changes
to the national tax legislation also make the oblast's tax
revenues less predictable and will likely lead to a slowdown in
tax revenue growth in 2013. Since several large taxpayers joined
consolidated taxpayer groups in 2012, corporate profit tax (CPT)
payments that the oblast receives have become subject to their
nationwide performance and hence more volatile. S&P expects that
after a rapid 24% growth in 2012, CPT revenues will decrease by
5% in 2013.
The oblast also has little leeway in managing its expenditures,
especially given the federal decisions which require it to
increase inflexible social expenditures. In S&P's view, the need
to continue raising public sector salaries will fuel operating
spending growth and pressure the oblast's budgetary performance
over the next three years. Nevertheless, S&P believes the oblast
might use some of the flexibility that it has within its capital
program to constrain deficits and debt accumulation.
S&P views Leningrad Oblast's financial management as "negative"
for its creditworthiness in an international context, as it do
for most Russian LRGs, mainly due to the lack of reliable
budgeting and long-term financial planning. S&P also thinks that
it remains to be seen whether the management will be able to
constrain spending growth despite federal pressure to increase
expenditures in 2014-2015. At the same time, S&P believes the
oblast will stick to its cautious debt management.
"We therefore expect budgetary performance to weaken in 2013
because of a slowdown in revenue growth and rising expenditure on
salaries. However, we think it will remain moderate on average
over the next three years, thanks to consolidation measures. In
our base-case scenario, we forecast that the operating balance
will turn negative in 2013-2014 and balance in 2015. This will
be lower than the average 8% of operating revenues that we
observed in 2010-2012, as well as the 6% that we expected in our
previous forecast. The average positive balance after capital
accounts that the oblast achieved in 2010-2012 will likely turn
into moderate deficits after capital accounts of 7% of total
revenues in 2013-2015," S&P said.
Consequently, S&P thinks the oblast will gradually accumulate
direct debt and that tax-supported debt will increase to 26% of
consolidated operating revenues in 2015, which is still
relatively low in S&P's view, from 9% in 2012. S&P includes into
tax-supported debt the guarantees that the oblast provides to its
government-related entities. Outstanding contingent liabilities
are limited, in S&P's view, thanks to the oblast's low
involvement in the local economy.
Liquidity
S&P considers Leningrad Oblast's liquidity to be "positive", as
its criteria define the term. S&P's base-case scenario assumes
that the oblast's average cash reserves will exceed its debt
service falling due in the next 12 months. At the same time, S&P
views the oblast's access to external liquidity as "limited",
given the weaknesses of the domestic capital market.
In S&P's base-case scenario, it expects that the oblast's average
cash net of deficits after capital accounts throughout 2014 will
decrease compared with 2013 to about RUB3.4 billion
(US$106 million). S&P also assumes that the oblast will continue
to rely on medium-term borrowing and that its debt service will
be moderate at 4% of operating revenues in 2014 and might
increase to 6% in 2015.
As of Oct. 1, 2013, the oblast had already repaid all bank loans
falling due in 2013 and had organized RUB4.8 billion in committed
bank lines with maturities exceeding one year, which it can use
to finance both the deficit after capital accounts and an
outstanding RUB800 million loan that is due in 2014. S&P expects
that by year-end 2013, the oblast will contract up to RUB2
billion more in two- and three-year bank lines. In S&P's
base-case scenario, it also assumes that the oblast will start
issuing medium-term bonds in 2014 so as to extend its debt
maturity profile and build a gradual repayment schedule for 2015
and beyond.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Leningrad Oblast will
maintain moderate budgetary performance and a low debt burden in
2014-2015, despite sluggish revenue growth and federal pressure
to increase social spending. This is mainly because S&P believes
that the oblast will contain overall expenditures. The outlook
also assumes that the oblast's liquidity will remain "positive",
thanks to reliance on medium-term borrowing.
S&P could take a negative rating action within the next 12 months
if, in line with its downside scenario, looser expenditure
controls led to weak budgetary performance, with a persistently
negative operating balance and lower net average cash, and
together with short-term debt accumulation resulted in weaker
debt service coverage and "neutral" liquidity.
S&P could take a positive rating action within the next 12 months
if it observed continuity and institutionalization of the
oblast's prudent financial, debt, and liquidity management
practices. Together with recovering revenues, these would
underpin the oblast's consistently sound budgetary performance,
with only modest deficits after capital accounts in line with
S&P's upside scenario, and would lead S&P to revise its view of
financial management to "neutral".
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Leningrad Oblast
Issuer Credit Rating BB+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale Rating ruAA+
Senior Unsecured BB+
ruAA+
NIZHNY NOVGOROD: S&P Affirms 'BB' Issuer Rating; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB' long-term
issuer and 'ruAA' Russia national scale ratings on the Russian
city of Nizhny Novgorod. The outlook is stable.
Rationale
The ratings on Nizhny Novgorod reflect S&P's view of Russia's
"developing and unbalanced" institutional framework, the city's
modest wealth levels and concentrated economic base, and limited
budgetary flexibility and predictability. S&P also views Nizhny
Novgorod's financial management as a "negative" factor for its
creditworthiness, as S&P do for most Russian local and regional
governments (LRGs). In S&P's view, it lacks reliable long-term
financial planning when compared with international peers.
Nevertheless, the city's management has a good track record of
debt management and will maintain it over the medium term, in
S&P's view.
The city's low debt levels, limited contingent liabilities, and
moderate budgetary performance underpin its ratings. In S&P's
view, the city's liquidity is "neutral" for its creditworthiness.
Nizhny Novgorod is Russia's fifth-largest city, with a growing
services sector, but in S&P's view its economy and employment
still largely depend on machinery production and auto
manufacturing group GAZ (not rated). S&P estimates the city's
wealth levels as only modest in an international context,
although personal income per capita is higher than the Russian
average.
Similar to other Russian municipalities, Nizhny Novgorod's
budgetary flexibility and predictability are limited. Under
Russia's institutional framework, the federal government and
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast control the majority of the city's
revenues and expenditures by regulating tax-sharing rates,
transfers, and spending responsibilities. S&P estimates that in
2013-2015, about 45% of the city's total revenues will come from
transfers from higher-tier budgets, and the share of personal
income tax (PIT), which the oblast regulates, will provide
another 9% of revenues. S&P expects that, in 2014, the oblast
will leave the city's share of PIT unchanged, because the oblast
will take on some preschool education expenditure responsibility
from the city, and will compensate it by transferring the
maintenance of some sport and cultural facilities to the city.
However, the predictability of this revenue source over the
medium term is limited.
In S&P's base case, it expects budgetary performance to be
moderate over the next three years, although continued growth of
social expenditures will likely outpace revenue growth in 2013-
2014. S&P forecasts the average operating margin to decrease to
about 3.6% of operating revenues in 2013-2015, compared with
almost 6% in 2010-2012. S&P also believes that cofinancing and
direct investment into Nizhny Novgorod's infrastructure from
higher-tier budgets should support its balance after capital
accounts and translate into only moderate deficits of less than
3% of total revenues.
Nizhny Novgorod will be one of the hosts of the Federation of
International Football Association's (FIFA) World Cup in 2018,
which will require significant investment into infrastructure
development. In line with the draft preparation plan, the city
should provide only about 8% of the total Russian ruble
(RUB)72.4 billion (US$2.2 billion), while the majority of funds
will come from the federal budget (including for the construction
of a new stadium), private investors, and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.
In S&P's view, increased investment into road and metro
construction might alleviate some of the city's transport
infrastructure needs, but it remains to be seen whether the event
boosts the city's economic growth in the long term. S&P's
previous assessments of the impact of major worldwide sporting
events on the economy and public finances of the host have been
mixed.
S&P believes that, due to moderate deficits after capital
accounts, Nizhny Novgorod will accumulate direct debt only
gradually and that its tax-supported debt will remain low, at an
average 23% of consolidated operating revenues through 2015. S&P
includes the debt of the city-owned heating company into its tax-
supported debt and believe that outstanding obligations and
payables of other government-related entities (GREs) are minor
compared with the city's budget. S&P therefore views contingent
liabilities as limited.
Liquidity
S&P views Nizhny Novgorod's liquidity as "neutral", as its
criteria define the term. This is because S&P expects the city
to maintain average free cash reserves and undrawn amounts
available in committed credit lines that will exceed debt service
falling due in the next 12 months by more than 120%. At the same
time S&P views the city's access to financial markets as
"limited", as for most Russian LRGs, due to the weaknesses of the
domestic banking sector.
In S&P's base-case scenario, it expects that, throughout 2014,
the city's average cash, net of the deficit after capital
accounts, will remain very low. S&P expects that the city will
continue organizing short- and medium-term liquidity facilities
in the form of revolving bank lines and will actively use them
for liquidity purposes within the budget year.
S&P understands that, as of Sept. 1, 2013, the city had
RUB5.9 billion undrawn from credit lines that mature in June
2014. S&P expects that by year-end 2013, the city will contract
about RUB6 billion in new three-year lines. It will use them to
refinance RUB3.1 billion in outstanding bank lines maturing
within the next 12 months and to cover the deficit after capital
accounts. In 2014, the city also plans to issue bonds to finance
the deficit after capital accounts and improve the debt structure
by extending its maturity profile.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that continued operating
and capital transfers from the Nizhny Novgorod Oblast will help
the city of Nizhny Novgorod meet increasing expenditure needs and
will support its budgetary performance at moderate levels, with
an average operating balance of about 4% of operating revenues
and a deficit after capital accounts of 3% of total revenues in
2013-2015. It also assumes that the city will maintain its
existing liquidity policy and liquidity will remain "neutral"
over the medium term.
S&P could take a negative rating action within the next 12 months
if lower revenues and more rapid spending growth lead to higher
deficits after capital accounts and higher borrowing, and result
in a weakening liquidity position with the debt service coverage
ratio falling below 120%. In such a case S&P would revise its
assessment of liquidity to "negative".
S&P could take a positive rating action if, in line with its
upside scenario, tight control over expenditures results in
consistently strong operating margins above 7% of operating
revenues, which, together with continued reliance on medium-term
borrowing, would underpin the city's high cash-generating
capacity and improve S&P's view of its liquidity position to
"positive".
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Nizhny Novgorod (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating BB/Stable/--
Russia National Scale Rating ruAA
===============
S L O V E N I A
===============
BANKA CELJE: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws 'B-' Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Banka Celje's (BC's) ratings,
including its Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-'. The
Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Negative. At the same time, the
agency has withdrawn the ratings as the bank has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process. Therefore, Fitch will no
longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings.
Accordingly, the agency will no longer provide ratings or
analytical coverage for BC.
Key Rating Drivers
The affirmation of BC's Viability Rating (VR) and hence also its
Long-term IDR at 'B-', and of the Negative Outlook on the Long-
term IDR, reflects its pressured capital base (end-June 2013:
Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio of 8.4%) resulting from a high
level of non-performing loans (NPLs) (around 23% of gross loans),
which has yet to peak, and the bank's weak profitability. BC
remained loss-making in H113 following two years of consecutive
losses, primarily as a result of sizeable loan impairment
charges. Furthermore, BC's capitalization should be viewed in
light of significant unreserved NPLs relative to equity, which
resulted in net NPLs to FCC ratio in excess of 1.5x at end-H113.
Fitch notes that BC's asset quality and performance will remain
under pressure for the foreseeable future given the country's
heavily indebted corporate sector and the weak economic outlook
in Slovenia, putting further pressure on an already tight capital
base. However, liquidity is comfortable reflecting a sizeable
pool of liquid assets and BC's limited refinancing needs.
The rating actions are as follows:
BC:
Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook
Negative, rating withdrawn
Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B', rating
withdrawn
Support Rating: affirmed at '5', rating withdrawn
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'NF', rating withdrawn
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-', rating withdrawn
=========
S P A I N
=========
PESCANOVA SA: Liquidation Process at Chile Units Progresses
-----------------------------------------------------------
Analia Murias at fis.com reports that the liquidator of the
company Pesca Chile, Herman Chadwick Larrain, expects that the
sale of the nine vessels of this fishing subsidiary of
Pescanova's and the salmon farms Nova Austral and Acuinova
generate around EUR32 million to the multinational Galician firm.
The money obtained will be used to pay all debts of the company
operating in Chile, which invoices about EUR200 million annually
and whose debts do not exceed EUR230 million, the report relates.
According to fis.com, Pescanova itself appears among Pesca
Chile's creditors and is recognized to have a reorganisation
liability amounting to US$42.8 million by Chadwick.
fis.com, citing newspaper La Tercera, relates that Chadwick
rejected more than US$100 million of the US$237 million of
liabilities that are attributed to the company. Sources close to
the process stated that the contestation is loans granted to
Pesca Chile by banks that are outside Chile and by its parent
firm, fis.com says.
Of the total of US$100 million, about US465 million would be
debts to banks and the rest with the Galician multinational firm
Pescanova, the report adds.
In Chile, unlike what happens in Spain, a bankruptcy process is
only intended to repay a debt, and this time the liquidation of
all assets is sought, fis.com discloses, citing newspaper Faro de
Vigo.
After the inventory, the distribution of the sales book and the
arrival of offers, Chadwick recognized that the process is "very
satisfactory," fis.com reports.
* Spanish Mortgage Market Index Shows Rising NPLs, Fitch Reveals
----------------------------------------------------------------
In its Q313 'Mortgage Market Index - Spain', Fitch Ratings
reveals a sharp increase in non-performing loans, with the NPL
ratio at the national level for residential mortgages increasing
to 5.2% from 4.1% last quarter. The agency believes that this is
due to the recent requirements of the Bank of Spain, as banks
have been instructed to reassess the creditworthiness of
borrowers whose loans have been either refinanced or
restructured.
In structured finance transactions, the effects of the economic
deterioration are having a toll on the default intensity in RMBS,
as the rate of default continues with its upward trend, reaching
an annualized rate of 1.6% in Q313 (up 10bps from Q213 levels).
New delinquencies in Spanish RMBS transactions have equaled the
volume of newly recognized defaults. This has resulted in the
three-month plus arrears ratio (excluding defaults) being
maintained at 2.6% for another quarter.
Meanwhile, the official house price index, published by the
Ministry of Development, shows another drop in Q213 of 2.5%,
bringing the peak-to-current house price levels to -29.5% in
nominal terms. Data from other providers, such as the National
Institute of Statistics, suggest that national average sale value
of residential properties declined by 7.3% during the first six
months of 2013 equating to a 12.0% decline versus H112.
Fitch's 'Mortgage Market Index - Spain' is part of the agency's
quarterly series of structured finance index reports. It includes
information on the performance of residential mortgages,
predominantly from RMBS transactions, but also those held on bank
balance sheets. The report sets the housing market against the
macroeconomic background and provides commentary on the emerging
trends.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
CAXTON TRANSPORT: To Liquidate as Sole Customer Withdraw Support
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alex Evans at thewestonmercury.co.uk reports that up to 18 jobs
may be lost and two Somerset firms liquidated after their 'sole
customer' withdrew support.
Caxton Transport Limited and Caxton Home Delivery Limited, based
in Walrow Industrial Estate, Highbridge, are facing a
'liquidation situation' after Woodberry Brothers and Haines Ltd,
also based on the estate, announced it will no longer fund the
firms.
"We have been under an improvement plan for the last 12 months.
As part of that plan we decided that the two transport companies
that distribute for us - Caxton Transport Limited and Caxton Home
Delivery Limited, they are both loss-making businesses, and in
the current climate Woodberry Brothers is no longer able to
support or fund those losses," the report quotes Director Mark
Woodberry as saying.
"Woodberry being the sole customer, those businesses are looking
at a voluntary liquidation as a result. They are two very
separate businesses that are looking at a liquidation situation.
"We are stressing the point that they are very much separate and
Woodberry as a whole is unaffected."
He confirmed that the two firms may have to make job cuts of up
to 18 staff, the report notes.
CENTER GROUP: Appoints SFP as Administrators
--------------------------------------------
Insolvency practitioners SFP has been appointed Administrators to
High Wycombe-based CCTV security systems distributors Center
Group Limited after the firm encountered financial difficulties.
Center Group Limited specializes in the distribution of CCTV
systems and had a relationship with Panasonic, JVC and Sony to
distribute its systems from its base in Lane End near High
Wycombe in Buckinghamshire.
In 2007, company turnover peaked at GBP7 million, but due to the
economic downturn, the company experienced a downturn in business
that put greater pressure on its cash flow leading to it accruing
significant debts to Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and
creditors.
SFP's Simon and Daniel Plant -- both licensed members of the
Insolvency Practitioners' Association -- were appointed Joint
Administrators on September 23, 2013.
"The security industry has been particularly hard hit by the
downturn in the economy," says Simon Plant, Director of the SFP
Group. "The company ceased to trade prior to our appointment and
we are in the process of marketing the company for potential
buyers."
FRANZ SILL: Goes Into Preliminary Administration
------------------------------------------------
Lisa Burn at lighting.co.uk reports that German lighting
manufacturer Franz Sill has succumbed to difficult market
conditions and filed for preliminary insolvency.
lighting.co.uk relates that the company, which manufactures
floodlights, luminaires and projectors, now has three months to
come up with a way forward and has already initiated a
reorganisation and restructuring strategy.
"Despite the insolvency, the business activities will remain as
usual. The orders already placed with us will be processed with
the same care and reliability," the company said in a statement,
lighting.co.uk reports.
According to the report, Oxfordshire-based Sill Lighting UK -- a
wholly owned subsidiary of Franz Sill -- is so far unaffected.
"They have gone into preliminary administration, but the
administrators have said the UK team goes on as normal at the
moment," the report quotes Bob Bohannon, former general manager
and now part-time consultant to Sill Lighting UK, as saying.
Franz Sill has been involved in lighting landmarks around the
world, including the Brandenburg Gate and the Red Town Hall in
Berlin, the Nelson Mandela Bridge in Johannesburg, South Africa,
and the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, Spain.
* Annual UK Banks Stress Test Should Improve Transparency
---------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of England's proposed framework for an annual stress
test of the UK's largest banks and building societies should
improve transparency for investors to assess capital, Fitch
Ratings says. This should help boost market confidence if the
stress scenarios are sufficiently robust and plausible, and
encourage management to improve capital planning and governance
standards.
The consultation paper for the framework highlights the growing
importance of qualitative risk assessment factors in the eyes of
the regulator. Rather than being a pass-fail test, the exercise
would involve the Prudential Regulatory Authority's own models to
identify weaknesses in banks' stress testing, capital planning
and governance. Remedial actions could include capital
strengthening plans, procedural improvements, and even changing
banks' management. Improvements to reinforce risk management
should be positive for banks' credit profiles.
While the proposals published this month are finalized and
eventually implemented, a stress test exercise limited to just
the eight largest lenders has been set for Q214. Unlike the
recent capital shortfall exercise, more details on the
methodologies and results will be published for the 2014 stress
test, so that investors get some visibility into the regulator's
views of UK banks' potential performance under a severely
stressed economic scenario. This should reduce uncertainty during
the process, especially as the results will only be announced in
Q414.
Nevertheless, there is a risk that two stress tests in 2014 --
the Bank of England and the European Banking Authority's
exercises -- could cause market confusion, especially if
conflicting numbers are released at different times. This would
be likely to be exacerbated by varying disclosure rules,
submission requirements and stress scenarios set by each
authority. The UK banks will not be subject to the ECB's asset
quality review, but an assessment of asset portfolios is already
conducted as part of regulatory monitoring.
When the UK framework is in place, an annual stress test applied
to a broader range of lenders is likely to reduce the variation
in UK banks' regulatory risk-based capital and push the average
higher as stronger banks build up safety margins. This is likely
to be positive for banks' credit profiles.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* Eurozone Fiscal Governance Progresses, Challenges Remain
----------------------------------------------------------
The submission of 2014 draft budgets by the 17 members of the
eurozone to the European Commission is an important step towards
deeper fiscal and financial integration in the single currency
bloc, Fitch Ratings says. Progress towards deeper integration
underpins our sovereign ratings for those countries and is in
line with commitments by euro area policy makers.
But the new budgetary surveillance system also demonstrates some
of the challenges that this process will face.
The Commission will review the budgets by the end of November and
publish its opinion on the compliance with fiscal rules. It can
publicly request the revision of any budget deemed out of line
with medium-term targets. October 15 was the deadline for
eurozone members to publish draft budgets for review under the
so-called "Two Pack" regulations that came into force at the end
of May.
In line with the new rules, the Commission's assessment will
focus on the structural fiscal position, filtering out cyclical
and one-off effects. However, the calculation of the structural
position, especially measuring the output gap in real time, is
analytically challenging and several issues have been raised by
the European Central Bank regarding the Commission's methodology.
A fiscal rule that is not based on a directly observable target
is less transparent.
For example, according to Italy's draft budget the structural
deficit in 2013 will be only 0.4% of the GDP, while the headline
deficit will be very close to 3%. Financing needs are determined
by headline deficits that remain wide in all periphery countries,
and ultimately drive debt dynamics and determine debt
sustainability. Economic growth also remains vitally important in
securing debt sustainability.
In its latest Eurozone Snapshot, Fitch forecast debt to continue
to increase beyond 2015 in Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia and
the Netherlands.
"Medium-term public debt projections remain a key factor driving
our individual sovereign ratings, but the new budgetary
surveillance process is also part of the moves to reform and
enhance economic governance in the eurozone as a whole. The fact
that this week's deadline was met by all eurozone members
suggests a strong commitment to the new enhanced fiscal
framework. But the real test of its effectiveness will be to
improve debt sustainability in all member states, and that has
yet to be seen," Fitch says.
* BOND PRICING: For the Week October 14 to October 18, 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
IMMOFINANZ AG 4.25 3/8/2018 EUR 4.70
Alpine Holding Gmb 6.00 5/22/2017 EUR 0.25
Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 7/1/2015 EUR 0.25
Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 6/10/2016 EUR 0.25
A-TEC Industries A 8.75 10/27/2014 EUR 1.63
A-TEC Industries A 2.75 5/10/2014 EUR 2.00
A-TEC Industries A 5.75 11/2/2010 EUR 1.88
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.79 11/29/2032 EUR 70.93
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.68 12/18/2030 EUR 72.49
Investkredit Bank 4.63 4/12/2022 EUR 74.70
KA Finanz AG 4.90 6/23/2031 EUR 67.75
KA Finanz AG 4.44 12/20/2030 EUR 65.13
Oberoesterreichisc 0.63 11/6/2030 EUR 72.60
Oberoesterreichisc 0.52 4/25/2042 EUR 65.26
Oesterreichische V 1.06 7/29/2018 EUR 25.00
Oesterreichische V 5.27 2/8/2027 EUR 63.00
Raiffeisen Centrob 14.40 3/6/2014 EUR 73.77
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.75 8/20/2033 EUR 73.41
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.70 12/27/2031 EUR 71.81
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.57 1/25/2031 EUR 73.50
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.61 1/24/2031 EUR 73.64
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.72 1/22/2031 EUR 73.74
BELGIUM
-------
Econocom Group 4.00 6/1/2016 EUR 27.70
Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 72.33
Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 73.13
BULGARIA
--------
Petrol AD 8.38 1/26/2017 EUR 57.66
Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 75.05
Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 74.63
OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 12.03
OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 12.03
OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 11.88
OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 11.88
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 5.25 8/6/2014 CHF 65.59
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.50 8/13/2014 CHF 62.47
Credit Suisse/Nass 7.25 4/4/2014 USD 64.87
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.52 9/10/2014 CHF 65.99
CYPRUS
------
Cyprus Government 4.63 2/3/2020 EUR 73.86
Cyprus Government 6.00 7/1/2023 EUR 73.75
Cyprus Government 4.75 7/1/2020 EUR 73.13
Cyprus Government 5.25 7/1/2022 EUR 71.00
Cyprus Government 5.00 7/1/2021 EUR 71.75
CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
Sazka AS 9.00 7/12/2021 EUR 10.13
DENMARK
-------
Kommunekredit 0.50 7/30/2027 TRY 26.38
Kommunekredit 0.50 9/19/2019 BRL 53.55
Kommunekredit 0.50 2/20/2020 BRL 51.34
Kommunekredit 0.50 5/11/2029 CAD 50.52
Kommunekredit 0.50 10/22/2019 BRL 53.10
Kommunekredit 0.50 12/14/2020 ZAR 60.44
FINLAND
-------
Municipality Finan 0.50 10/27/2016 BRL 73.96
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/30/2016 BRL 73.14
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/16/2017 TRY 71.26
Municipality Finan 0.50 6/19/2024 ZAR 37.00
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/17/2017 BRL 71.34
Municipality Finan 0.50 4/27/2018 ZAR 70.77
Municipality Finan 0.50 5/31/2022 ZAR 45.84
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/17/2016 BRL 73.90
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/10/2021 NZD 67.05
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 ZAR 67.19
Municipality Finan 0.50 4/26/2022 ZAR 46.35
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/20/2018 ZAR 66.70
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/28/2018 BRL 62.02
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/14/2018 TRY 64.02
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/7/2018 BRL 68.42
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/16/2017 BRL 71.42
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/22/2019 IDR 65.22
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 TRY 64.13
Municipality Finan 0.50 1/10/2018 BRL 64.01
Municipality Finan 0.50 6/22/2017 IDR 74.39
Municipality Finan 0.50 1/23/2018 BRL 64.50
Municipality Finan 0.25 6/28/2040 CAD 23.91
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/21/2021 NZD 66.64
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/25/2020 ZAR 54.11
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/17/2025 CAD 61.50
Talvivaara Mining 4.00 12/16/2015 EUR 17.99
FRANCE
------
Air France-KLM 4.97 4/1/2015 EUR 12.75
Air France-KLM 2.03 2/15/2023 EUR 10.59
Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 4.25 7/1/2018 EUR 3.12
Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 5.00 1/1/2015 EUR 3.36
Assystem 4.00 1/1/2017 EUR 24.27
AtoS 2.50 1/1/2016 EUR 61.09
AtoS 1.50 7/1/2016 EUR 60.87
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 1/31/2018 RUB 73.33
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 11/16/2032 MXN 39.68
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 5/6/2021 MXN 71.71
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/16/2014 EUR 53.03
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/18/2015 EUR 9.08
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 9/10/2015 EUR 15.35
Cap Gemini SA 3.50 1/1/2014 EUR 48.05
CGG SA 1.75 1/1/2016 EUR 28.39
CGG SA 1.25 1/1/2019 EUR 31.31
Club Mediterranee 6.11 11/1/2015 EUR 19.71
Credit Agricole Co 0.50 2/28/2018 RUB 73.06
Credit Agricole Co 0.50 3/6/2023 RUB 48.05
Dexia Credit Local 0.88 7/10/2017 EUR 74.75
Dexia Credit Local 4.38 2/12/2019 EUR 71.75
Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2014 EUR 16.90
Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2015 EUR 15.67
Faurecia 4.50 1/1/2015 EUR 24.46
Faurecia 3.25 1/1/2018 EUR 27.55
GFI Informatique S 5.25 1/1/2017 EUR 5.30
Ingenico 2.75 1/1/2017 EUR 57.77
Le Noble Age 4.88 1/3/2016 EUR 19.50
Nexans SA 2.50 1/1/2019 EUR 72.92
Nexans SA 4.00 1/1/2016 EUR 58.43
Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50
Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50
OL Groupe 7.00 12/28/2015 EUR 6.53
Orpea 1.75 1/1/2020 EUR 48.99
Orpea 3.88 1/1/2016 EUR 51.28
Peugeot SA 4.45 1/1/2016 EUR 26.65
Publicis Groupe SA 1.00 1/18/2018 EUR 60.32
SG Option Europe S 8.00 9/29/2015 USD 62.49
SG Option Europe S 7.00 5/5/2017 EUR 52.35
SG Option Europe S 7.00 9/22/2017 EUR 68.73
SG Option Europe S 8.00 12/18/2014 USD 40.49
SG Option Europe S 7.50 12/24/2014 EUR 38.00
SG Option Europe S 7.25 8/5/2014 EUR 62.59
Societe Air France 2.75 4/1/2020 EUR 21.03
Societe Generale S 0.50 6/12/2023 RUB 45.95
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/3/2023 RUB 46.79
Societe Generale S 0.50 11/29/2022 AUD 63.45
Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 USD 71.63
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 USD 72.50
Societe Generale S 0.50 12/21/2022 AUD 63.21
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/30/2023 RUB 46.47
Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 AUD 64.99
Societe Generale S 0.50 12/6/2021 AUD 67.38
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 AUD 65.81
Societe Generale S 0.50 9/7/2021 AUD 69.04
SOITEC 6.75 9/18/2018 EUR 2.50
SOITEC 6.25 9/9/2014 EUR 8.61
Tem SAS 4.25 1/1/2015 EUR 55.58
Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00
Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00
GEORGIA
-------
Bank J Safra Saras 13.60 2/17/2014 CHF 71.13
Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/15/2014 CHF 63.95
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 12/13/2013 USD 67.65
Bank Julius Baer & 14.00 5/23/2014 USD 55.80
Bank Julius Baer & 8.50 12/13/2013 USD 56.05
Bank Julius Baer & 9.50 12/13/2013 USD 61.50
Bank Julius Baer & 12.60 12/13/2013 USD 52.65
Bank Julius Baer & 7.25 4/10/2014 USD 64.50
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 1/29/2014 CHF 71.40
Bank Julius Baer & 6.10 4/17/2014 CHF 65.15
Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/17/2014 EUR 65.45
Bank Julius Baer & 5.00 12/23/2013 CHF 67.05
Bank Julius Baer & 10.20 11/29/2013 USD 52.45
Bank Julius Baer & 11.50 3/18/2014 USD 61.85
Bank Julius Baer & 6.80 4/11/2014 USD 70.15
Bank Julius Baer & 6.50 4/11/2014 USD 71.25
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 4/11/2014 USD 71.05
Bank Julius Baer & 7.80 2/14/2014 USD 70.35
Bank Julius Baer & 7.50 2/14/2014 CHF 69.75
Bank Julius Baer & 10.00 4/4/2014 USD 62.75
Bank Julius Baer & 6.90 3/21/2014 USD 70.45
Banque Cantonale V 4.90 9/9/2014 CHF 73.73
EFG International 6.00 11/30/2017 EUR 39.45
EFG International 13.40 11/14/2013 CHF 58.64
EFG International 6.82 6/4/2014 CHF 70.01
EFG International 12.86 10/30/2017 EUR 35.40
EFG International 12.10 3/10/2014 USD 50.04
EFG International 4.50 2/20/2014 USD 58.50
EFG International 5.85 10/14/2014 CHF 72.75
EFG International 10.00 12/17/2013 USD 66.27
Leonteq Securities 11.90 1/15/2014 EUR 50.01
Leonteq Securities 17.00 11/21/2013 CAD 40.23
Leonteq Securities 9.25 11/5/2013 USD 36.80
Leonteq Securities 12.65 12/10/2013 EUR 50.06
Leonteq Securities 7.80 8/26/2014 CHF 55.40
Leonteq Securities 15.00 2/13/2014 CHF 55.94
Leonteq Securities 12.00 11/15/2013 CHF 54.70
Leonteq Securities 17.05 2/14/2014 CHF 42.69
Leonteq Securities 10.03 10/25/2013 CHF 48.39
Leonteq Securities 5.06 5/26/2014 CHF 74.49
Leonteq Securities 18.00 12/6/2013 CHF 58.34
Leonteq Securities 8.40 11/27/2013 CHF 69.11
Leonteq Securities 8.80 12/6/2013 EUR 66.34
Leonteq Securities 20.00 12/12/2013 CHF 59.36
Leonteq Securities 12.80 12/12/2013 CHF 56.01
Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/12/2013 CHF 67.47
Leonteq Securities 8.10 12/13/2013 CHF 56.63
Leonteq Securities 9.20 11/15/2013 CHF 72.96
Leonteq Securities 7.21 11/14/2013 CHF 72.00
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/21/2013 CHF 48.23
Leonteq Securities 13.60 12/6/2013 CHF 53.15
Leonteq Securities 8.75 6/6/2014 GBP 71.26
Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/6/2013 USD 65.15
Leonteq Securities 12.89 12/10/2013 GBP 52.10
Leonteq Securities 10.20 11/14/2013 CHF 56.32
Leonteq Securities 8.01 11/15/2013 CHF 44.99
Leonteq Securities 21.75 5/22/2014 USD 45.78
Leonteq Securities 20.00 5/27/2014 CHF 71.16
Leonteq Securities 12.00 2/24/2014 CHF 69.73
Leonteq Securities 9.46 6/3/2014 AUD 61.68
Leonteq Securities 24.40 2/25/2014 USD 44.15
Leonteq Securities 22.75 2/4/2014 USD 68.91
Leonteq Securities 15.60 2/6/2014 CHF 55.74
Leonteq Securities 12.25 1/30/2014 CHF 49.87
Leonteq Securities 20.52 3/25/2014 USD 50.23
Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/17/2014 CHF 54.64
Leonteq Securities 21.50 3/21/2014 USD 57.05
Leonteq Securities 8.90 3/28/2014 EUR 63.16
Leonteq Securities 14.25 2/13/2015 USD 62.34
Leonteq Securities 11.50 2/11/2014 USD 70.57
Leonteq Securities 20.50 2/13/2014 CHF 65.24
Leonteq Securities 5.80 8/20/2014 USD 70.34
Leonteq Securities 13.25 2/14/2014 USD 60.87
Leonteq Securities 10.00 7/29/2014 USD 58.84
Leonteq Securities 29.61 10/26/2017 EUR 39.70
Leonteq Securities 9.00 10/31/2013 CHF 43.77
Leonteq Securities 12.00 3/5/2014 CHF 60.81
Leonteq Securities 8.50 12/24/2013 USD 54.18
Leonteq Securities 14.06 12/18/2013 USD 52.76
Leonteq Securities 5.76 12/20/2013 GBP 67.92
Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/23/2014 CHF 54.82
Leonteq Securities 8.00 6/19/2014 CHF 73.01
Leonteq Securities 6.80 12/19/2014 USD 71.84
Leonteq Securities 14.05 12/27/2013 CHF 55.88
Leonteq Securities 6.00 5/20/2014 CHF 66.65
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/27/2013 CHF 74.15
Leonteq Securities 20.00 11/27/2013 CHF 57.98
Leonteq Securities 11.95 11/29/2013 EUR 54.01
Leonteq Securities 8.35 1/3/2014 AUD 70.38
Leonteq Securities 9.20 12/27/2013 CHF 70.21
Leonteq Securities 9.60 1/8/2014 USD 47.95
Leonteq Securities 8.40 1/15/2014 CHF 74.30
Leonteq Securities 14.00 9/22/2014 CHF 66.90
Leonteq Securities 10.80 1/15/2014 CHF 54.68
Leonteq Securities 5.50 1/25/2016 EUR 64.28
Leonteq Securities 12.00 12/6/2013 GBP 52.45
Leonteq Securities 20.14 4/9/2014 USD 55.40
Leonteq Securities 5.50 8/19/2014 USD 72.76
Leonteq Securities 20.07 2/19/2014 USD 41.82
Leonteq Securities 10.00 2/6/2014 USD 57.48
Leonteq Securities 23.90 1/24/2014 USD 43.75
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/5/2013 USD 71.34
Leonteq Securities 25.70 1/24/2014 USD 50.45
Mare Baltic PCC Lt 2.00 11/1/2015 DKK 0.00
Zurcher Kantonalba 12.35 11/13/2013 CHF 56.78
Zurcher Kantonalba 8.22 11/15/2013 CHF 56.56
Zurcher Kantonalba 6.05 12/19/2013 EUR 65.62
Zurcher Kantonalba 9.00 12/31/2013 CHF 58.57
Zurcher Kantonalba 10.40 12/5/2013 EUR 60.48
Zurcher Kantonalba 10.65 12/6/2013 CHF 57.99
GERMANY
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ATU Auto-Teile-Ung 7.47 10/1/2014 EUR 18.67
BDT Media Automati 8.13 10/9/2017 EUR 65.75
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 72.21
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 58.40
BNP Paribas Emissi 7.00 12/30/2013 EUR 60.64
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 60.09
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 60.05
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.50 12/30/2013 EUR 59.53
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 68.77
BNP Paribas Emissi 4.50 11/21/2013 EUR 72.24
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 74.37
Bremer Landesbank 0.69 3/21/2031 EUR 67.09
Bremer Landesbank 0.72 4/5/2041 EUR 54.49
Centrosolar Group 7.00 2/15/2016 EUR 13.75
Commerzbank AG 8.40 12/30/2013 EUR 2.56
Commerzbank AG 5.05 12/24/2013 EUR 67.54
DekaBank Deutsche 2.21 9/22/2021 EUR 13.92
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 56.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 65.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 64.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 61.70
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 6/24/2014 EUR 61.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 6/24/2014 EUR 66.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 6/24/2014 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 3/25/2014 EUR 61.50
Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 3/25/2014 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.10
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 61.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 56.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 62.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 57.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 70.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 66.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 63.20
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.70
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.24
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.20
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.10
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 4/24/2014 EUR 68.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 4/24/2014 EUR 65.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 4/24/2014 EUR 62.10
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 7/22/2014 EUR 72.10
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 62.10
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.60
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 9/23/2014 EUR 74.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 9/23/2014 EUR 73.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 63.80
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 64.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.40
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 60.00
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 60.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 3/25/2014 EUR 61.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 3/25/2014 EUR 62.80
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 53.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 63.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 72.80
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 2/28/2014 EUR 60.60
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 55.80
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 67.30
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 11/29/2013 EUR 54.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 10/31/2013 EUR 58.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 63.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.60
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 53.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 67.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 58.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 11/29/2013 EUR 73.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 11/29/2013 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.10
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.60
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.20
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.95
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 70.59
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40
Deutsche Bank AG 12.00 12/20/2013 EUR 51.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/24/2014 EUR 71.70
Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 3/25/2014 EUR 75.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/25/2014 EUR 72.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 1/31/2014 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 1/31/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.30
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 1/31/2014 EUR 65.80
Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 6/24/2014 EUR 73.70
Dresdner Bank AG 0.89 11/19/2029 EUR 51.13
Dresdner Bank AG 5.45 2/22/2029 EUR 65.92
Dresdner Bank AG 1.08 12/31/2021 EUR 72.13
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 12.00 10/25/2013 EUR 73.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 2.35 3/24/2023 EUR 70.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 10/25/2013 EUR 70.93
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.50 10/25/2013 EUR 72.67
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 10/25/2013 EUR 50.42
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 12/31/2013 EUR 55.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 12/31/2013 EUR 72.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.75 11/8/2013 EUR 54.90
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 10/25/2013 EUR 73.66
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 12/31/2013 EUR 51.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/13/2013 EUR 62.43
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 11/22/2013 EUR 74.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 11/22/2013 EUR 49.33
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 11/8/2013 EUR 56.39
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/31/2013 EUR 64.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.40 12/31/2013 EUR 58.13
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.50 10/25/2013 EUR 48.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 15.75 11/22/2013 EUR 4.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.75 12/31/2013 EUR 56.51
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.25 3/28/2014 EUR 58.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 6/27/2014 EUR 60.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.50 9/26/2014 EUR 59.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 4/7/2014 EUR 62.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/13/2014 EUR 63.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 10/25/2013 EUR 58.00
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 68.68
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.50 1/10/2014 EUR 65.98
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 12.25 1/10/2014 EUR 68.31
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.75 7/11/2014 EUR 74.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.30 7/11/2014 EUR 69.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.50 12/13/2013 EUR 55.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 3.50 12/31/2013 EUR 64.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/13/2014 EUR 66.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 2.50 12/13/2013 EUR 68.49
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 53.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.40 7/11/2014 EUR 68.63
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.75 12/13/2013 EUR 59.73
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 1/15/2014 EUR 74.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 11/11/2013 EUR 49.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/13/2013 EUR 59.41
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 3/7/2014 EUR 58.45
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.50 2/14/2014 EUR 56.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.00 12/31/2013 EUR 63.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.25 6/27/2014 EUR 69.05
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.75 9/26/2014 EUR 66.80
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.25 3/28/2014 EUR 65.56
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.38
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 12/13/2013 EUR 60.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.25 10/25/2013 EUR 54.26
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 12/13/2013 EUR 72.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 6/27/2014 EUR 64.75
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/27/2014 EUR 63.09
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/13/2014 EUR 64.24
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.50 12/31/2013 EUR 62.28
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 3/14/2014 EUR 52.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 1/17/2014 EUR 58.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 57.78
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 12/20/2013 EUR 68.55
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 11/22/2013 EUR 58.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 11/22/2013 EUR 53.48
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 1/10/2014 EUR 70.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.96
EDOB Abwicklungs A 7.50 3/29/2049 EUR 3.25
EDOB Abwicklungs A 7.50 3/29/2049 EUR 3.25
Estavis AG 7.75 6/25/2017 EUR 2.29
getgoods.de AG 7.75 10/2/2017 EUR 68.50
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 10/23/2013 EUR 60.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.86
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.38
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 12/27/2013 EUR 44.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 43.09
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 61.82
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.51
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 44.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.51
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.08
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 69.75
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.11
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.69
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.42
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 57.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 43.70
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 74.24
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 46.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 50.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.79
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/24/2014 EUR 72.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/24/2014 EUR 61.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.38
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 46.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.01
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.73
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.56
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.04
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.36
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.49
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.92
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.10
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 67.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 65.56
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 58.88
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.78
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 60.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.92
Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.61
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.52
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 62.76
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 9/24/2014 EUR 61.79
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 65.32
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 63.62
Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 6/25/2014 EUR 57.83
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 9/24/2014 EUR 67.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 9/24/2014 EUR 58.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.59
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 10/23/2013 EUR 62.52
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.99
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 58.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 64.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.50 12/27/2013 EUR 43.13
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 37.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 12/24/2014 EUR 68.05
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 2/26/2014 EUR 74.27
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.43
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 59.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 3/26/2014 EUR 55.75
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 1/22/2014 EUR 61.77
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 61.74
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 1/22/2014 EUR 72.86
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 12/27/2013 EUR 52.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 2/26/2014 EUR 52.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 1/22/2014 EUR 58.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 1/22/2014 EUR 56.41
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 1/22/2014 EUR 55.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 12/27/2013 EUR 70.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/24/2014 EUR 58.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.82
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 73.11
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 73.16
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 70.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 61.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 63.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.42
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 50.98
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.39
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 49.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 11/20/2013 EUR 45.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 42.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 11/20/2013 EUR 41.31
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.25
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 67.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.70
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.89
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 12/27/2013 EUR 52.01
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 2/26/2014 EUR 55.73
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.19
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 73.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 68.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 51.20
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 10/23/2013 EUR 74.87
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 66.31
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.91
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 11/20/2013 EUR 52.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 48.85
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 45.57
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 10/23/2013 EUR 74.03
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 11/20/2013 EUR 49.88
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 42.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 47.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 65.08
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.50
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.48
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.63
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.78
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 11/20/2013 EUR 64.83
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 51.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 50.28
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 52.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.43
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 50.76
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.69
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.61
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.59
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.44
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 3/26/2014 EUR 64.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 2/26/2014 EUR 48.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.85
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 64.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 63.13
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.62
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 6/25/2014 EUR 60.40
Gunther Zamek Prod 7.75 5/15/2017 EUR 55.50
Hamburgische Lande 0.60 1/22/2041 EUR 68.03
Hamburgische Lande 0.61 10/30/2040 EUR 68.07
Hamburgische Lande 0.61 11/28/2030 EUR 74.77
Hamburgische Lande 0.60 10/25/2030 EUR 75.00
Hamburgische Lande 0.56 10/30/2030 EUR 74.24
Hamburgische Lande 0.64 7/18/2031 EUR 74.20
Hamburgische Lande 0.69 11/8/2030 EUR 74.82
Hamburgische Lande 0.59 2/5/2031 EUR 73.86
Hamburgische Lande 0.58 10/25/2030 EUR 74.61
Hamburgische Lande 0.59 12/1/2030 EUR 73.55
Hanwha Q-CELLS Gmb 6.75 10/21/2015 EUR 1.32
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 10.50 12/30/2013 EUR 73.80
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 12.50 12/30/2013 EUR 70.21
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 11.00 12/30/2013 EUR 73.68
HSH Nordbank AG 1.03 2/14/2017 EUR 68.24
HSH Nordbank AG 1.07 2/14/2017 EUR 68.16
IKB Deutsche Indus 1.12 9/13/2016 EUR 74.66
IKB Deutsche Indus 0.97 1/23/2017 EUR 71.62
KFW 0.25 10/6/2036 CAD 33.42
Landesbank Berlin 4.80 11/7/2014 EUR 58.28
Landesbank Berlin 7.25 6/27/2014 EUR 58.30
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 12/30/2013 EUR 63.19
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 64.20
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 12/30/2014 EUR 68.24
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 12/30/2014 EUR 64.80
Landesbank Berlin 4.75 12/30/2014 EUR 65.47
Landesbank Berlin 8.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.32
Landesbank Berlin 4.75 3/28/2014 EUR 70.71
Landesbank Berlin 8.50 3/28/2014 EUR 65.88
Landesbank Berlin 11.00 12/30/2013 EUR 7.94
Landesbank Berlin 5.50 6/27/2014 EUR 62.69
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 61.97
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 8/8/2014 EUR 58.13
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.58
Landesbank Berlin 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 65.28
Landesbank Berlin 3.00 3/28/2014 EUR 72.82
Landesbank Berlin 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 68.83
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 12/30/2013 EUR 59.52
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 65.95
Landesbank Berlin 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.17
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 58.72
Landesbank Berlin 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 14.56
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 65.46
Landesbank Berlin 5.50 12/23/2013 EUR 60.90
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 68.01
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 62.46
Landesbank Hessen- 0.85 7/18/2031 EUR 63.96
Landesbank Hessen- 4.00 6/20/2014 EUR 59.10
Landeskreditbank B 0.25 10/13/2037 CAD 29.38
Landeskreditbank B 0.50 5/10/2027 CAD 57.81
Landwirtschaftlich 0.50 4/19/2017 TRY 74.97
LBBW 0.62 10/4/2030 EUR 71.11
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 74.51
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.31
LBBW 5.00 3/28/2014 EUR 57.49
LBBW 3.00 11/22/2013 EUR 66.79
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 62.53
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 65.79
LBBW 4.00 7/25/2014 EUR 64.82
LBBW 3.00 2/28/2014 EUR 67.30
LBBW 5.00 2/28/2014 EUR 58.88
LBBW 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.10
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 58.10
LBBW 3.00 11/22/2013 EUR 63.63
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 60.83
LBBW 3.00 6/27/2014 EUR 64.58
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 61.78
LBBW 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.62
LBBW 3.00 8/22/2014 EUR 67.39
LBBW 4.00 8/22/2014 EUR 65.35
LBBW 5.00 8/22/2014 EUR 63.72
LBBW 3.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.90
LBBW 5.00 2/28/2014 EUR 61.60
LBBW 5.00 9/26/2014 EUR 61.16
LBBW 4.00 10/25/2013 EUR 58.36
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 61.06
LBBW 3.00 3/28/2014 EUR 64.74
LBBW 4.00 1/24/2014 EUR 67.54
LBBW 6.00 1/24/2014 EUR 60.58
LBBW 7.00 1/24/2014 EUR 58.00
LBBW 7.00 11/22/2013 EUR 69.09
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.66
LBBW 6.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.62
LBBW 6.00 7/25/2014 EUR 61.69
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.09
LBBW 5.10 1/15/2014 EUR 68.01
LBBW 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 58.31
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.42
LBBW 3.00 6/27/2014 EUR 61.09
LBBW 3.00 9/26/2014 EUR 64.39
LBBW 4.00 9/26/2014 EUR 62.54
LBBW 7.00 9/26/2014 EUR 59.20
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 63.58
LBBW 6.00 11/22/2013 EUR 64.98
LBBW 8.00 11/22/2013 EUR 58.71
Norddeutsche Lande 0.69 10/21/2030 EUR 74.42
Praktiker AG 5.88 2/10/2016 EUR 1.50
Qimonda Finance LL 6.75 3/22/2013 USD 3.44
SiC Processing Gmb 7.13 3/1/2016 EUR 5.50
Solarwatt GmbH 7.00 11/1/2015 EUR 14.75
Solarworld AG 6.13 1/21/2017 EUR 37.25
Solarworld AG 6.38 7/13/2016 EUR 33.00
Solon SE 1.38 12/6/2012 EUR 0.63
Sparkasse KoelnBon 0.68 5/7/2031 EUR 71.54
Sparkasse KoelnBon 0.74 9/29/2034 EUR 68.26
TAG Immobilien AG 6.50 12/10/2015 EUR 9.45
TUI AG 2.75 3/24/2016 EUR 64.09
UniCredit Bank AG 0.92 11/19/2029 EUR 65.48
Vontobel Financial 5.45 12/31/2013 EUR 59.48
Vontobel Financial 5.47 3/17/2014 EUR 35.50
Vontobel Financial 4.30 12/31/2013 EUR 63.20
Vontobel Financial 7.70 12/31/2013 EUR 54.94
Vontobel Financial 5.30 6/27/2014 EUR 60.94
Vontobel Financial 4.25 12/31/2013 EUR 63.14
Vontobel Financial 5.30 12/31/2013 EUR 59.38
Vontobel Financial 9.85 12/31/2013 EUR 73.66
Vontobel Financial 4.20 12/31/2013 EUR 63.14
Vontobel Financial 5.35 12/31/2013 EUR 59.50
Vontobel Financial 7.40 12/31/2013 EUR 54.84
Vontobel Financial 9.85 12/31/2013 EUR 51.06
Vontobel Financial 6.10 12/31/2013 EUR 59.66
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 59.56
Vontobel Financial 6.85 12/31/2013 EUR 54.78
Vontobel Financial 7.15 12/31/2013 EUR 54.82
Vontobel Financial 9.10 12/31/2013 EUR 50.96
Vontobel Financial 5.10 4/14/2014 EUR 30.60
Vontobel Financial 17.15 12/31/2013 EUR 52.48
Vontobel Financial 4.25 12/31/2013 EUR 63.20
Vontobel Financial 8.65 12/31/2013 EUR 56.66
Vontobel Financial 6.30 12/31/2013 EUR 59.72
Vontobel Financial 8.70 12/31/2013 EUR 73.44
Vontobel Financial 7.85 12/31/2013 EUR 50.72
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 54.52
Vontobel Financial 5.10 6/27/2014 EUR 60.50
Vontobel Financial 8.00 12/31/2013 EUR 55.02
Vontobel Financial 7.35 6/27/2014 EUR 57.28
Vontobel Financial 4.60 3/28/2014 EUR 60.20
Vontobel Financial 4.75 12/31/2013 EUR 59.42
Vontobel Financial 7.20 3/28/2014 EUR 56.40
Vontobel Financial 7.45 12/31/2013 EUR 59.94
Vontobel Financial 10.20 12/31/2013 EUR 56.98
Vontobel Financial 4.80 12/31/2013 EUR 56.58
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 56.38
Vontobel Financial 8.85 12/31/2013 EUR 54.96
Vontobel Financial 8.35 12/31/2013 EUR 56.92
Vontobel Financial 7.70 12/31/2013 EUR 54.74
Vontobel Financial 7.40 12/31/2013 EUR 59.92
Vontobel Financial 5.40 6/27/2014 EUR 57.68
Vontobel Financial 5.05 3/28/2014 EUR 57.46
Vontobel Financial 7.60 3/28/2014 EUR 58.24
Vontobel Financial 5.65 3/28/2014 EUR 57.40
Vontobel Financial 4.35 12/31/2013 EUR 63.26
Vontobel Financial 8.65 12/31/2013 EUR 60.16
Vontobel Financial 7.75 12/31/2013 EUR 54.72
Vontobel Financial 8.15 12/31/2013 EUR 56.38
Vontobel Financial 15.75 12/31/2013 EUR 52.14
Vontobel Financial 10.45 12/31/2013 EUR 55.40
Vontobel Financial 6.35 12/31/2013 EUR 54.68
Vontobel Financial 8.00 12/31/2013 EUR 54.98
Vontobel Financial 5.25 12/31/2013 EUR 59.50
Vontobel Financial 6.45 12/31/2013 EUR 74.82
Vontobel Financial 5.00 1/24/2014 EUR 61.50
Vontobel Financial 7.39 11/25/2013 EUR 62.60
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 2.50 12/23/2013 EUR 68.43
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 1/30/2014 EUR 69.85
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 1/30/2014 EUR 65.48
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 1/30/2014 EUR 63.64
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 12/18/2013 EUR 52.92
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 12/18/2013 EUR 59.07
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 12/18/2013 EUR 55.81
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 7.50 12/18/2013 EUR 50.43
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 3/27/2014 EUR 66.20
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.31
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.50 6/25/2014 EUR 56.15
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 58.30
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 7.00 6/25/2014 EUR 54.32
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 1/30/2014 EUR 61.94
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 3/11/2014 EUR 54.62
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 9/30/2014 EUR 74.98
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 9/30/2014 EUR 73.89
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 9/30/2014 EUR 73.00
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 3/27/2014 EUR 68.09
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 3/27/2014 EUR 64.45
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 3/27/2014 EUR 62.91
Windreich GmbH 6.50 7/15/2016 EUR 11.13
Windreich GmbH 6.50 3/1/2015 EUR 9.88
Windreich GmbH 6.75 3/1/2015 EUR 11.13
Windreich GmbH 6.25 3/1/2015 EUR 11.13
GREECE
------
Yioula Glassworks 9.00 12/1/2015 EUR 74.00
Yioula Glassworks 9.00 12/1/2015 EUR 74.00
ICELAND
-------
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.13 5/19/2016 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.75 10/4/2011 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.75 10/4/2011 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.63 2/28/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.50 2/3/2045 EUR 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 3.00 2/12/2010 CHF 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.70 2/15/2010 CAD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.13 10/4/2016 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.65 2/19/2013 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.13 10/4/2016 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 2/1/2045 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.99 7/5/2012 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 9.75 9/10/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.13 5/19/2016 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.50 2/2/2009 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.80 10/20/2009 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.80 9/7/2012 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.63 2/28/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.80 2/15/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 12/5/2014 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 3.75 2/15/2024 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 4/28/2012 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.25 7/18/2017 BGN 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.65 7/5/2010 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.90 2/1/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.95 5/6/2009 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 8.00 6/22/2011 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.70 10/2/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.50 1/17/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.69 5/21/2011 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 7/24/2009 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.20 7/12/2009 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.00 11/8/2013 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 4/2/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 10/2/2010 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 1/3/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.47 10/27/2010 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.95 10/20/2010 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.00 1/4/2027 SKK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.90 5/29/2017 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.50 10/8/2010 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.40 3/22/2014 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.90 4/28/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.75 6/7/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.40 12/15/2015 EUR 22.88
LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00
LBI HF 3.20 5/10/2010 SKK 8.00
LBI HF 2.25 2/14/2011 CHF 8.00
LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00
LBI HF 3.00 12/7/2010 CHF 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 1/18/2010 CAD 8.00
LBI HF 4.38 10/20/2008 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.75 5/31/2013 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.25 4/2/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 8.65 5/1/2011 ISK 8.00
LBI HF 4.08 3/16/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 6.75 8/18/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 11/3/2009 CZK 8.00
LBI HF 6.00 6/6/2017 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 5.44 9/3/2018 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 4.28 11/19/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 2.14 2/3/2020 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.32 1/31/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 11/30/2035 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 5.25 6/5/2023 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 5.08 3/1/2013 ISK 8.00
LBI HF 7.00 4/2/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.00 10/22/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 1.68 12/22/2014 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.00 9/23/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.45 12/18/2033 JPY 0.13
LBI HF 2.22 10/15/2019 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.34 3/1/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.34 5/11/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.75 2/22/2016 USD 8.00
LBI HF 2.75 3/16/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.36 8/17/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.20 4/27/2026 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 6.75 2/18/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.11 11/10/2008 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.34 12/22/2025 EUR 8.00
IRELAND
-------
Corsicanto Ltd 3.50 1/15/2032 USD 74.94
Depfa ACS Bank 4.90 8/24/2035 CAD 69.73
Depfa ACS Bank 0.50 3/3/2025 CAD 46.53
Kalvebod PLC 2.00 5/1/2106 DKK 40.00
ITALY
-------
Banca delle Marche 1.18 6/1/2017 EUR 42.39
A2A SpA 3.20 8/10/2036 EUR 62.44
Banca delle Marche 5.50 9/16/2030 EUR 69.25
Banca di Cividale 0.34 10/2/2036 EUR 57.63
Banca Monte dei Pa 1.23 1/15/2018 EUR 74.60
Cassa Depositi e P 0.29 10/31/2029 EUR 61.70
Cirio Finanziaria 8.00 12/21/2005 EUR 0.63
City of Lecco Ital 0.46 6/30/2026 EUR 67.27
Comune di Andrano 3.92 12/31/2035 EUR 71.20
Comune di Fiumicin 0.49 12/31/2026 EUR 66.65
Comune di Grontard 4.10 12/31/2035 EUR 73.36
Comune di Marcheno 4.23 12/31/2036 EUR 74.59
Comune di Marscian 4.03 12/31/2035 EUR 72.47
Comune di Mercato 3.97 12/31/2035 EUR 71.83
Comune di Piadena 4.05 12/31/2035 EUR 72.74
Comune di San Ferd 0.53 12/27/2026 EUR 67.26
Comune di Santa Ma 0.60 5/31/2026 EUR 69.00
Comune di Seminara 0.72 10/31/2026 EUR 69.14
Comune di Verona 0.43 12/1/2026 EUR 64.53
Enel SpA 0.96 10/20/2032 EUR 63.62
Intesa Sanpaolo Sp 1.06 3/20/2023 EUR 74.70
Italy Government I 1.85 9/15/2057 EUR 65.06
Italy Government I 2.00 9/15/2062 EUR 67.03
Italy Government I 2.20 9/15/2058 EUR 72.77
Italy Government I 2.87 5/19/2036 JPY 69.43
Province of Bresci 0.73 12/22/2036 EUR 57.22
Province of Bresci 0.72 6/30/2036 EUR 57.58
Province of Chieti 0.65 12/29/2023 EUR 74.35
Province of Milan 0.59 12/22/2033 EUR 63.54
Province of Rovigo 0.59 12/28/2035 EUR 58.80
Province of Teramo 0.44 12/30/2030 EUR 60.80
Province of Teramo 0.47 12/30/2025 EUR 68.61
Province of Trevis 0.47 12/31/2034 EUR 58.04
Province of Trevis 0.57 12/31/2034 EUR 59.52
Province of Trevis 0.34 12/31/2034 EUR 56.82
Region of Abruzzo 0.68 11/7/2036 EUR 63.64
Region of Abruzzo 0.52 11/7/2031 EUR 61.27
Region of Abruzzo 4.45 3/1/2037 EUR 70.52
Region of Aosta Va 0.45 5/28/2021 EUR 73.65
Region of Molise I 0.72 12/15/2033 EUR 64.40
Region of Piemont 0.45 11/27/2036 EUR 55.47
Region of Puglia I 0.74 2/6/2023 EUR 69.69
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 23.00
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.75
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63
LUXEMBOURG
----------
3W Power SA 9.25 12/1/2015 EUR 55.75
ArcelorMittal 7.25 4/1/2014 EUR 20.83
Bank of New York M 4.48 12/30/2099 EUR 18.04
Bank of New York M 4.73 12/15/2050 EUR 52.00
Cerruti Finance SA 6.50 7/26/2004 EUR 3.00
Cirio Finance Luxe 7.50 11/3/2002 EUR 1.25
Cirio Holding Luxe 6.25 2/16/2004 EUR 0.13
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 52.02
Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.50
Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.98
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 51.75
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75
Del Monte Finance 6.63 5/24/2006 EUR 13.63
ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38
ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38
Erste Europaeische 0.27 2/1/2037 USD 55.57
European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00
European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00
Finmek Internation 7.00 12/3/2004 EUR 0.13
Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13
Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13
Hypothekenbank Fra 0.25 12/20/2029 USD 67.37
International Indu 9.00 7/6/2011 EUR 1.00
International Indu 11.00 2/19/2013 USD 0.88
IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13
IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13
La Veggia Finance 7.13 11/14/2004 EUR 0.25
Teksid Aluminum Lu 11.38 7/15/2011 EUR 0.75
NETHERLANDS
-----------
Astana Finance BV 7.88 6/8/2010 EUR 4.00
Astana Finance BV 9.00 11/16/2011 USD 3.50
Astana Finance BV 14.50 7/2/2013 USD 3.75
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/10/2017 TRY 73.62
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2022 ZAR 52.90
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2017 TRY 72.46
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/7/2022 ZAR 53.32
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/12/2017 TRY 73.13
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2017 TRY 72.30
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/22/2021 ZAR 57.64
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/29/2021 NZD 70.64
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/15/2022 ZAR 52.50
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2022 MXN 64.98
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/3/2021 NZD 64.80
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 2/24/2025 CAD 65.15
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/12/2021 ZAR 58.17
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 9/20/2022 ZAR 52.08
BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.01
BLT Finance BV 12.00 2/10/2015 USD 10.25
BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.63
Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38
Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38
Cirio Del Monte NV 7.75 3/14/2005 EUR 3.38
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/26/2021 ZAR 48.95
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/30/2043 MXN 23.60
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 8/21/2028 MXN 46.15
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 7/30/2043 MXN 23.80
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 1/31/2033 MXN 36.68
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/29/2027 MXN 48.35
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/30/2027 MXN 48.11
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 12/29/2027 MXN 47.89
Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.77
Cooperatieve Centr 8.60 3/13/2014 CHF 60.50
Cooperatieve Centr 8.15 3/5/2014 CHF 58.60
Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.43
JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/7/2014 USD 69.19
JP Morgan Structur 5.00 12/3/2013 CHF 64.32
JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/25/2014 EUR 73.83
JP Morgan Structur 12.30 11/29/2013 USD 48.32
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 10.00 3/15/2012 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.13 6/1/2009 USD 0.38
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/5/2035 EUR 9.75
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 11/2/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 3/16/2035 EUR 14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/15/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 5/17/2035 EUR 10.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.88 3/14/2013 CHF 2.13
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/22/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/16/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 5/8/2017 HKD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/26/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/14/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/27/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/5/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/16/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 9/15/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/18/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.03 1/31/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/24/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 5/9/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 5/26/2026 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 12/3/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/18/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 6/6/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 12/2/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.46 2/19/2012 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/23/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.75 2/7/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/20/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/17/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 10/22/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/27/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.44 11/22/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/16/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.22 11/21/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/13/2010 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 6/10/2014 SGD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 4/20/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.86 9/21/2011 SGD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 12/20/2027 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/12/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/1/2025 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.55 3/12/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.05 4/8/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 9/5/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 23.30 9/16/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/17/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.88 1/28/2011 HKD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 11/21/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 2/19/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/3/2012 BRL 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 6/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 8/7/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/21/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 11/28/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/11/2038 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/19/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 4/23/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/22/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 2/16/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 3/10/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/13/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/7/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 1/31/2013 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 11/9/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.75 6/22/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.12 4/30/2027 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/28/2032 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 7/6/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 6/22/2046 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.65 8/24/2011 AUD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 12/26/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 12/15/2011 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.68 12/12/2045 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.06 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/28/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/4/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.69 2/19/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.59 11/22/2009 MXN 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.28 11/6/2010 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/9/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 6/2/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.38 2/4/2014 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.30 12/21/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2010 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.20 5/14/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 10/11/2017 ILS 2.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 3/30/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 10/24/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 8/3/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.60 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 7/2/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 7/8/2014 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 5/16/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 11/16/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.72 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 6/4/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 18.25 10/2/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/31/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.80 3/19/2018 JPY 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 11/16/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/6/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 11/22/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.25 6/20/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 5/21/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.01 9/20/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/19/2023 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.60 4/22/2014 MXN 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 12/3/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/23/2012 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.37 7/15/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.87 10/8/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.75 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/24/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.38 9/20/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/15/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/29/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/8/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 2/3/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.43 1/8/2009 ILS 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/8/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/13/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 4/1/2023 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.63 7/22/2011 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.80 3/31/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/2/2022 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 5/15/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.28 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.35 8/8/2016 SGD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/6/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.50 8/9/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 7/11/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.82 12/18/2036 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.20 12/3/2008 HKD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/3/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.40 6/12/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/4/2011 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 7/8/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.30 12/21/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 12/31/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 2/8/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/19/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.50 4/1/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.15 3/21/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 11/30/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 2/26/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 6/20/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 2/14/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/22/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.45 2/20/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 8/1/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 3/4/2010 NZD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.63 3/2/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 2/21/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.80 12/27/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.75 3/29/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 12/6/2011 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 1/4/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.75 3/1/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.82 10/20/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/13/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.80 11/16/2012 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/12/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 9/20/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.40 9/21/2009 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 4/28/2014 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 6/15/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/30/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 5/20/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 5/17/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 7/25/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 8/2/2037 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/12/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 8/23/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 11/9/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/14/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/12/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/22/2012 EUR 1.13
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.20 3/19/2018 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.95 11/4/2013 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/19/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 3/27/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 10/24/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 4/14/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/30/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 7/21/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.95 10/25/2036 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 6/29/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/25/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.75 4/5/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 4/24/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.39 5/4/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.35 10/13/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.80 12/30/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/23/2018 CZK 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/30/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/17/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.48 5/12/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.25 5/12/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/27/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/24/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 10/19/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.68 3/5/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/15/2022 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.32 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 9/13/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 7/24/2026 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 8/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 2/16/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 3/13/2021 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/17/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/6/2016 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/1/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.70 6/6/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/6/2013 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/24/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 6/13/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 3/17/2009 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/28/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.85 4/24/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 7/24/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 12/30/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/3/2012 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.10 6/4/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/15/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.15 10/30/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 8/1/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.10 11/12/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 8/11/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/13/2037 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 8/1/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.90 7/28/2020 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.15 8/25/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/30/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 5/9/2020 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.30 6/4/2012 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 6/5/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/6/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/4/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 17.00 6/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.80 8/21/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.22 3/1/2024 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 5/23/2012 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.45 5/23/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/28/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/15/2018 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/6/2011 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.75 10/28/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 11/30/2012 CZK 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 11/9/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 11/24/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/12/2036 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 12/14/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.40 6/20/2011 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.60 6/21/2010 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.05 12/20/2010 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 6/20/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 9/20/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.70 4/21/2011 USD 6.00
Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 45.04
Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 44.63
Morgan Stanley BV 9.00 4/16/2015 EUR 71.90
Nederlandse Waters 0.50 3/11/2025 CAD 65.79
New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.24
New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.78
New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.25
New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.47
NIBC Bank NV 25.98 5/7/2029 EUR 50.62
Nutritek Internati 8.75 12/11/2008 USD 2.00
Q-Cells Internatio 1.38 4/30/2012 EUR 32.45
Q-Cells Internatio 5.75 5/26/2014 EUR 32.09
Sairgroup Finance 4.38 6/8/2006 EUR 10.50
Sairgroup Finance 6.63 10/6/2010 EUR 12.13
Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.25
Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.00
SNS Bank NV 6.25 10/26/2020 EUR 2.13
SNS Bank NV 6.63 5/14/2018 EUR 4.13
WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.90
WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.38
NORWAY
------
Eksportfinans ASA 0.25 7/14/2033 CAD 8.50
Eksportfinans ASA 0.50 5/9/2030 CAD 14.25
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/7/2017 BRL 69.77
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/10/2017 BRL 68.32
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/29/2017 BRL 66.85
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/25/2018 ZAR 70.89
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/26/2017 BRL 65.80
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/28/2017 BRL 68.91
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/28/2017 BRL 67.67
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/20/2018 BRL 64.71
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/2/2018 BRL 62.66
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/1/2017 BRL 68.22
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/15/2018 BRL 67.16
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/29/2017 BRL 70.51
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/16/2016 BRL 73.83
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/27/2022 ZAR 47.60
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 7/28/2016 BRL 74.11
Norske Skogindustr 7.00 6/26/2017 EUR 60.59
Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 74.02
Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 72.75
Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 69.53
Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 51.63
Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 73.50
Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 50.08
Petromena ASA 9.75 5/24/2014 NOK 6.75
Petromena ASA 10.85 11/19/2010 USD 6.75
PORTUGAL
--------
AdP - Aguas de Por 0.33 1/23/2023 EUR 63.88
Banco Espirito San 3.50 1/2/2043 EUR 50.13
Caixa Geral de Dep 5.98 3/3/2028 EUR 57.00
CP - Comboios de P 5.70 2/5/2030 EUR 60.31
Empresa de Desenvo 0.33 11/21/2018 EUR 66.63
Metropolitano de L 4.80 12/7/2027 EUR 73.38
Metropolitano de L 4.06 12/4/2026 EUR 71.93
Parpublica - Parti 4.20 11/16/2026 EUR 68.25
Portugal Obrigacoe 4.10 4/15/2037 EUR 72.12
Rede Ferroviaria N 4.25 12/13/2021 EUR 70.38
Rede Ferroviaria N 4.05 11/16/2026 EUR 71.78
ROMANIA
-------
City of Iasi Roman 4.45 11/15/2028 RON 71.23
RUSSIA
------
Arizk 3.00 12/20/2030 RUB 46.44
Kuzbassenergo-Fina 8.70 4/15/2021 RUB 72.01
Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.02
Mechel 8.40 6/1/2021 RUB 70.13
Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.21
Mobile Telesystems 5.00 6/29/2021 RUB 74.25
MORTGAGE AGENT AHM 3.00 9/9/2045 RUB 9.17
Novosibirsk TIN Pl 12.50 8/26/2014 RUB 5.00
RBC OJSC 3.27 4/19/2018 RUB 51.50
Russian Railways J 8.40 6/8/2028 RUB 100.00
Saturn Research & 8.50 6/6/2014 RUB 1.01
TGC-2 12.00 10/10/2018 RUB 75.00
World of Building 4.20 6/25/2019 RUB 3.60
SPAIN
-----
Autonomous Communi 4.25 10/31/2036 EUR 65.75
Autonomous Communi 4.22 4/26/2035 EUR 64.14
Autonomous Communi 4.69 10/28/2034 EUR 68.88
Autonomous Communi 2.97 9/8/2039 JPY 59.88
Autonomous Communi 0.48 10/17/2022 EUR 70.50
Autonomous Communi 2.10 5/20/2024 EUR 73.97
Autonomous Communi 0.27 11/29/2021 EUR 74.92
Banco de Castilla 1.50 6/23/2021 EUR 65.00
Bankinter SA 6.00 12/18/2028 EUR 65.13
City of Madrid Spa 0.34 10/10/2022 EUR 66.37
City of Madrid Spa 4.55 6/16/2036 EUR 73.57
Comunidad Autonoma 3.90 11/30/2035 EUR 63.84
Comunidad Autonoma 4.20 10/25/2036 EUR 66.58
Comunidad Autonoma 4.06 11/23/2035 EUR 63.94
Diputacion Foral d 4.32 12/29/2023 EUR 61.41
Ibercaja Banco SAU 1.09 4/20/2018 EUR 70.93
Junta Comunidades 0.41 12/5/2023 EUR 54.38
Junta Comunidades 3.88 1/31/2036 EUR 60.38
Junta de Extremadu 0.95 6/10/2024 EUR 72.31
Pescanova SA 5.13 4/20/2017 EUR 18.74
Pescanova SA 8.75 2/17/2019 EUR 17.79
Pescanova SA 6.75 3/5/2015 EUR 17.96
Spain Government I 2.92 12/2/2030 JPY 69.99
SWEDEN
------
Dannemora Mineral 11.75 3/22/2016 USD 41.50
Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 USD 6.63
Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 NOK 7.00
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/14/2016 BRL 74.58
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/22/2022 ZAR 46.97
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/29/2017 IDR 73.20
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/31/2022 ZAR 47.32
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/28/2022 ZAR 45.13
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/19/2018 IDR 68.74
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2018 BRL 59.21
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/15/2022 ZAR 46.66
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/26/2021 AUD 68.36
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/17/2027 USD 60.33
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/14/2016 BRL 72.32
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/28/2017 IDR 71.27
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/3/2017 BRL 70.83
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 7/21/2017 BRL 67.44
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/21/2016 BRL 72.17
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/20/2017 TRY 71.95
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/22/2016 BRL 72.19
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2020 TRY 54.02
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/5/2017 IDR 71.10
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/10/2017 BRL 70.65
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/26/2017 BRL 71.31
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/30/2017 BRL 67.86
Svensk Exportkredi 1.00 11/15/2021 AUD 72.00
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/21/2017 BRL 68.05
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/25/2021 ZAR 56.85
SWITZERLAND
-----------
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.60
Banque Cantonale V 11.80 1/29/2014 CHF 63.63
Banque Cantonale V 6.50 10/5/2015 CHF 72.74
Banque Cantonale V 2.00 7/8/2014 CHF 61.29
SAir Group 6.25 10/27/2002 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 4.25 2/2/2007 CHF 11.63
SAir Group 2.13 11/4/2004 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 0.13 7/7/2005 CHF 11.25
SAir Group 5.50 7/23/2003 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.13
SAir Group 6.25 4/12/2005 CHF 10.88
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 53.44
UBS AG 23.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.46
UBS AG 8.87 4/15/2014 USD 10.17
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.67
UBS AG 24.25 1/3/2014 EUR 60.63
UBS AG 18.45 10/24/2013 USD 8.73
UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 56.56
UBS AG 7.25 7/29/2014 USD 31.57
UBS AG 6.03 5/14/2014 USD 54.95
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 7.50 1/3/2014 EUR 64.51
UBS AG 12.70 4/22/2014 USD 66.71
UBS AG 8.94 2/13/2014 USD 14.64
UBS AG 6.29 2/26/2014 USD 32.99
UBS AG 6.22 2/26/2014 USD 38.93
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 72.58
UBS AG 16.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02
UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.41
UBS AG 17.25 1/3/2014 EUR 42.91
UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 52.05
UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.73
UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 61.74
UBS AG 17.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.54
UBS AG 6.04 8/29/2014 USD 35.75
UBS AG 10.46 1/2/2014 USD 35.35
UBS AG 8.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50
UBS AG 15.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.26
UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.94
UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 62.75
UBS AG 19.00 1/3/2014 EUR 53.05
UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 70.59
UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50
UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.72
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.30
UBS AG 22.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.98
UBS AG 9.53 12/17/2013 USD 48.94
UBS AG 6.49 5/23/2014 USD 21.20
UBS AG 6.53 5/27/2014 USD 21.09
UBS AG 6.33 5/12/2014 USD 19.48
UBS AG 9.25 4/30/2014 USD 9.78
UBS AG 14.00 6/27/2014 EUR 55.27
UBS AG 11.75 6/27/2014 EUR 48.70
UBS AG 8.29 1/14/2014 USD 19.98
UBS AG 5.22 1/28/2014 USD 11.48
UBS AG 7.86 1/31/2014 USD 20.24
UBS AG 9.17 6/30/2014 USD 67.70
UBS AG 7.25 8/8/2014 USD 45.54
UBS AG 8.35 10/24/2013 USD 50.89
UBS AG 9.45 10/22/2013 USD 20.95
UBS AG 9.00 1/3/2014 EUR 48.64
UBS AG 14.75 1/3/2014 EUR 44.63
UBS AG 7.15 2/26/2014 USD 32.50
UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 55.72
UBS AG 5.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.46
UBS AG 8.21 2/26/2014 USD 50.39
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 43.67
UBS AG 13.50 1/3/2014 EUR 56.28
UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 56.97
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 8.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.15
UBS AG 23.00 1/3/2014 EUR 69.99
UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.15
UBS AG 7.25 1/3/2014 EUR 69.51
UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.61
UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.35
UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.38
UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 68.73
UBS AG 14.50 1/3/2014 EUR 74.99
UBS AG 16.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.69
UBS AG 21.00 1/3/2014 EUR 38.60
UBS AG 6.19 1/8/2014 USD 19.82
UBS AG 9.93 6/18/2014 USD 50.46
UBS AG 9.89 11/22/2013 EUR 71.22
UBS AG 8.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.16
UBS AG 4.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.04
UBS AG 4.50 6/27/2014 EUR 48.72
UBS AG 8.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.09
UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.83
UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.76
UBS AG 5.50 3/28/2014 EUR 55.86
UBS AG 9.50 3/28/2014 EUR 50.93
UBS AG 13.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.47
UBS AG 12.00 3/28/2014 EUR 42.70
UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 39.79
UBS AG 14.00 3/28/2014 EUR 52.93
UBS AG 7.75 6/27/2014 EUR 45.94
UBS AG 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 49.43
UBS AG 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 50.45
UBS AG 11.00 3/28/2014 EUR 46.42
UBS AG 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.64
UBS AG 13.00 6/27/2014 EUR 45.50
UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 59.17
UBS AG 10.75 3/28/2014 EUR 58.16
UBS AG 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 10.50 6/27/2014 EUR 52.89
UBS AG 12.25 6/27/2014 EUR 71.08
UBS AG 6.25 6/27/2014 EUR 56.36
UBS AG 11.25 3/28/2014 EUR 72.74
UBS AG 11.00 1/3/2014 EUR 70.06
UBS AG 12.25 3/28/2014 EUR 68.98
UBS AG 12.00 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02
UBS AG 13.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 67.22
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 59.05
UBS AG 21.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.98
UBS AG 12.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.20
UBS AG 18.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.61
UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.63
UBS AG 19.25 1/3/2014 EUR 71.52
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.60
UBS AG 18.50 1/3/2014 EUR 71.37
UBS AG 6.50 1/3/2014 EUR 63.77
UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 49.48
UBS AG 5.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.70
UBS AG 4.25 1/3/2014 EUR 54.36
UBS AG 6.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.11
UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.93
UBS AG 14.41 11/21/2013 USD 40.01
UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 65.06
UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 45.13
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.49
UBS AG 6.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.80
UBS AG 20.75 1/3/2014 EUR 70.05
UBS AG 16.25 1/3/2014 EUR 72.22
UBS AG 19.75 1/3/2014 EUR 64.89
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.96
UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 47.78
UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 49.77
UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 60.73
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 36.11
UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.75
UBS AG 19.50 1/3/2014 EUR 65.22
UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 70.00
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.55
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 72.66
UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19
UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.80
UBS AG 7.98 3/17/2014 USD 10.60
UBS AG 14.75 3/28/2014 EUR 71.70
UBS AG 11.50 6/27/2014 EUR 74.62
UBS AG 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 64.14
UBS AG 6.50 3/28/2014 EUR 44.45
UBS AG 7.30 7/7/2014 USD 28.53
TURKEY
------
APP International 11.75 10/1/2005 USD 5.00
Yuksel Insaat AS 9.50 11/10/2015 USD 72.64
UKRAINE
-------
Agroton Public Ltd 12.50 7/14/2014 USD 50.00
UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
Alpha Credit Group 0.73 2/21/2021 EUR 52.38
Alpha Credit Group 6.00 7/29/2020 EUR 72.88
Barclays Bank PLC 0.61 12/28/2040 EUR 64.00
Barclays Bank PLC 8.00 5/23/2014 USD 10.81
Barclays Bank PLC 2.20 11/30/2025 USD 21.86
Barclays Bank PLC 0.50 3/13/2023 RUB 47.04
Barclays Bank PLC 6.75 10/16/2015 GBP 1.15
Barclays Bank PLC 7.40 2/13/2014 GBP 1.04
Barclays Bank PLC 2.50 3/7/2017 EUR 35.67
Barclays Bank PLC 8.25 1/26/2015 USD 1.13
Barclays Bank PLC 1.99 12/1/2040 USD 71.38
Barclays Bank PLC 1.64 6/3/2041 USD 66.57
Barclays Bank PLC 7.50 4/29/2014 GBP 1.06
Barclays Bank PLC 2.33 1/2/2041 USD 73.08
Cattles Ltd 6.88 1/17/2014 GBP 2.50
Cattles Ltd 7.13 7/5/2017 GBP 2.50
Commercial Bank Pr 5.80 2/9/2016 USD 69.01
Co-Operative Bank 9.25 4/28/2021 GBP 72.74
Co-Operative Bank 5.75 12/2/2024 GBP 68.46
Co-Operative Bank 7.88 12/19/2022 GBP 70.52
Co-Operative Bank 5.88 3/28/2033 GBP 69.57
Co-Operative Bank 5.63 11/16/2021 GBP 55.13
Co-Operative Bank 1.01 5/18/2016 EUR 69.71
Credit Suisse AG/L 11.50 4/4/2014 CHF 70.01
Credit Suisse AG/L 8.50 11/5/2013 CHF 45.66
Credit Suisse AG/L 6.50 1/14/2014 CHF 55.22
Credit Suisse AG/L 9.00 11/14/2013 CHF 51.41
Credit Suisse AG/L 1.64 6/1/2042 USD 46.62
Credit Suisse AG/L 8.00 1/14/2014 USD 55.38
Credit Suisse AG/L 6.85 8/8/2014 USD 57.36
Credit Suisse AG/L 10.50 11/15/2013 USD 51.48
Credit Suisse Inte 4.40 10/24/2013 EUR 57.10
Credit Suisse Inte 4.45 12/13/2013 EUR 53.20
Dunfermline Buildi 6.00 3/31/2015 GBP 1.38
Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 2/24/2022 EUR 60.75
Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 12/2/2021 EUR 61.13
Emporiki Group Fin 5.10 12/9/2021 EUR 62.13
ERB Hellas PLC 0.52 9/3/2014 EUR 72.13
Goldman Sachs Inte 2.50 8/17/2018 EUR 20.40
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/3/2023 AUD 62.86
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/2/2022 AUD 64.19
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2023 AUD 63.27
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/25/2021 AUD 68.62
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/30/2021 NZD 65.52
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/20/2018 RUB 69.82
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 6/30/2021 NZD 67.16
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/2/2023 AUD 63.51
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2022 AUD 63.89
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/5/2018 RUB 74.86
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 3/1/2018 RUB 74.48
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/27/2027 NZD 47.02
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/22/2021 AUD 68.35
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 7/30/2027 NZD 46.29
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 1/29/2027 NZD 47.70
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/30/2026 NZD 48.42
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2026 AUD 50.10
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/8/2026 AUD 50.28
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2027 NZD 47.50
Royal Bank of Scot 1.69 11/14/2016 GBP 1.10
RSL Communications 10.50 11/15/2008 USD 1.20
RSL Communications 10.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 9.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 9.88 11/15/2009 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 12.00 11/1/2008 USD 1.25
UBS AG/London 25.00 3/20/2014 CHF 62.25
UBS AG/London 7.63 9/30/2015 USD 16.71
UBS AG/London 20.25 4/17/2014 CHF 66.13
UBS AG/London 6.88 8/31/2015 USD 15.37
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *