/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/131118.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, November 18, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 228
Headlines
A Z E R B A I J A N
BAGHLAN GROUP: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
C Z E C H R E P U B L I C
BEMARMARA CONSULTING: Chapter 15 Case Summary
F I N L A N D
TALVIVAARA MINING: Seeks Reorganization After Fund Raising Fails
F R A N C E
ALBEA BEAUTY: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+'; Outlook Stable
ALTICE B2B SARL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+'; Outlook Stable
NUMERICABLE GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
YPSO HOLDING: S&P Raises Corp Credit Rating to B+; Outlook Stable
G E R M A N Y
GETGOODS.DE AG: Files Insolvency Petition in Frankfurt Court
G R E E C E
NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Rates Proposed US$650-Mil. Notes 'BB-'
H U N G A R Y
KOKI TERMINAL: Put Up for Sale by Liquidator at HUF35 Billion
I R E L A N D
CORNERSTONE TITAN 2007-1: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. A2 Notes to 'D'
IRELAND: To Exit EU-IMF Bailout on Dec. 15
I T A L Y
ITALY: Corporate Bankruptcies Up 12% in First Nine Months
MARCOLIN SPA: S&P Assigns 'B-' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating
TELECOM ITALIA: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Ratings to 'BB+/B'
K A Z A K H S T A N
SAMRUK-ENERGY: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB+' CCR
STANDARD INSURANCE: A.M. Best Assigns B- Finc'l. Strength Rating
L A T V I A
LIEPAJAS METALURGS: Afina Pallada In Talks Over EUR37MM Buyout
N E T H E R L A N D S
GRAND HARBOUR I: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
PROSPERO CLO I: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
N O R W A Y
RESERVOIR EXPLORATION: Unit Files Liquidating Plan in U.S.
R O M A N I A
BRD-GROUPE SOCIETE: Fitch Lowers Viability Rating to 'b+'
R U S S I A
REPUBLIC INVESTMENT: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR; Outlook Stable
S P A I N
GRIFOLS SA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
IM FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on EUR19.8MM Notes
PYMES SANTANDER 6: S&P Assigns Prelim. CC Rating to Class B Notes
SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 3: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. B Tranche to CC
TDA 24: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCsf'
S W I T Z E R L A N D
NUANCE GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
U K R A I N E
UKREXIMBANK: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'B-'; Outlook Negative
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B', on Watch Negative
HIBU PLC: Shareholders Balk at Administration Threat
TRITON PLC: S&P Withdraws B Rating on Class E Notes
VICTORIA FUNDING: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to 'Dsf'
X X X X X X X X
EUROPE: Germany Challenges to Use EU Funds for Ailing Banks
* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 11 to November 15, 2013
*********
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A Z E R B A I J A N
===================
BAGHLAN GROUP: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had placed its
'B' long-term corporate credit rating on Azerbaijan-based
diversified company Baghlan Group FZCO on CreditWatch with
negative implications.
The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view that liquidity
risks could put downward pressure on the rating if Baghlan Group
doesn't manage to refinance its substantial short-term debt, or
boost free cash flow generation, for example by releasing working
capital or by finalizing planned sales in the construction
segment.
S&P plans to resolve the CreditWatch by mid-December 2013.
S&P will affirm the rating if Baghlan Group manages to materially
improve liquidity by refinancing its short-term debt or by
increasing cash flow generation, for example, via completing the
sale of the residential property, or via releasing working
capital if the company receives the payment for the
Azeryolservice road construction project.
If Baghlan Group fails to materially improve liquidity, S&P will
likely lower the rating by one or more notches. In that
scenario, the amount of downside will depend on S&P's liquidity
analysis.
==========================
C Z E C H R E P U B L I C
==========================
BEMARMARA CONSULTING: Chapter 15 Case Summary
---------------------------------------------
Chapter 15 Petitioner: JUDr.lng. Helena Horova
Chapter 15 Debtor: Bemarmara Consulting a.s.
aka Baest a.s.
Cernoleska 1930
256 01 Benesov
Czech Republic
Chapter 15 Case No.: 13-13037
Chapter 15 Petition Date: November 15, 2013
Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
District of Delaware (Delaware)
Judge: Hon. Kevin Gross
Chapter 15 Debtor's Counsel: Michael G. Busenkell, Esq.
GELLERT SCALI BUSENKELL & BROWN, LLC
913 N. Market St., 10th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
Tel: 302.425.5812
Fax: 302.425.5814
Email: mbusenkell@gsbblaw.com
Estimated Assets: $500,000 to $1 million
Estimated Debts: $500,000 to $1 million
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F I N L A N D
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TALVIVAARA MINING: Seeks Reorganization After Fund Raising Fails
----------------------------------------------------------------
Firat Kayakiran and Kati Pohjanpalo at Bloomberg News report that
Talvivaara Mining Co., which is struggling to avoid bankruptcy,
will attempt to reorganize after failing to raise funds from
investors to continue operations.
Talvivaara said in a statement on Thursday that the company asked
a group of investors to provide additional funding of EUR40
million (US$53.8 million) to finance a voluntary restructuring.
"However, such stakeholders informed Talvivaara late [Thurs]day
that, due to timing and other constraints, they were currently
not in a position to make any decisions in respect of funding
commitments," Bloomberg quotes the company as saying.
Some of those approached separately informed Talvivaara that they
can't make a final decision about the funding "unless and until
Talvivaara and Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. had filed for a corporate
reorganization," Talvivaara, as cited by Bloomberg, said. The
statement said Talvivaara Sotkamo is the operating unit,
Bloomberg notes.
Talvivaara, which has suffered from weakening nickel prices and a
slow production ramp-up at its mine in northern Finland, has
tried to raise additional cash to fund continued operations,
Bloomberg discloses. It reported a net loss of EUR29.9 million
in the third quarter, Bloomberg states.
According to Bloomberg, Talvivaara Chief Executive Officer
Pekka Pera told reporters at a press conference in Helsinki on
Friday bankruptcy would lead to the loss of 1,600 direct jobs.
The company, Bloomberg says, has "no exact plans" on the number
of job cuts needed in the restructuring. He declined to comment
on whether Talvivaara received or sought any acquisition
approaches, Bloomberg notes.
Critical Situation
"The situation is critical, our cash flow has fallen very low.
Operationally our situation is probably better than ever,"
Mr. Pera, as cited by Bloomberg, said. He said that holders of
the company's secured notes support the reorganization, Bloomberg
relates.
The company said in a statement that it will file for bankruptcy
if it fails to complete the reorganization, Bloomberg relays.
Bloomberg relates that the company said "The corporate
reorganization process can fail for a number of reasons,"
including an inability to raise funds and operational or
environmental issues hampering production. Bankruptcy "would
have a material value destructing effect and, therefore, would
not be in the best interests of Talvivaara and its stakeholders."
Mr. Pera said that the company, which had cash of about EUR46.5
million at the end of September, is reducing operations at the
mine to save funds, Bloomberg notes.
Talvivaara Mining Co. Ltd. is a Finnish nickel producer.
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F R A N C E
===========
ALBEA BEAUTY: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+'; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had raised to 'B+'
from 'B' its long-term corporate credit rating on France-based
cosmetics and personal care packaging manufacturer Albea Beauty
Holdings S.A. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P raised to 'B+' from 'B' our issue rating on
Albea's EUR200 million senior secured notes and US$385 million
senior secured notes, both due in 2019. The recovery rating on
these notes remains unchanged at '4', indicating S&P's
expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.
In parallel, S&P withdrew its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on Albea Beauty Partners S.A., the group's top holding
company, and its 'CCC+' issue rating on the previously proposed
US$150 million payment-in-kind (PIK) toggle notes due 2018.
The upgrade reflects S&P's revision of Albea's financial risk
profile to "aggressive" from "highly leveraged." This follows
management's decision to postpone its previously proposed
issuance of US$150 million of PIK toggle notes to fund a one-off
dividend payment. As a consequence, S&P anticipates adjusted
total debt of about US$800 million by year-end 2013, and credit
metrics commensurate with an "aggressive" financial risk profile.
That said, given the operating challenges related to the
integration of Rexam PLC's personal care division, adjusted total
debt to EBITDA is likely to slide beyond the 5x level.
Under S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes that Albea's revenues
will be about US$1.5 billion for the year to Dec. 31, 2013, and
mostly benefit from growth in emerging markets, where the company
derives about one-third of its revenues. In S&P's view,
management's focus on cost optimization and increased synergies
following the recent acquisition of Rexam PLC's cosmetics
business should lead to EBITDA margins close to 10% by year-end
2013.
Although the group's capital structure benefits from the
postponing of the dividend recapitalization project, S&P still
assess its financial policy as "very aggressive." This reflects
its private equity owner's recent attempt to monetize part of its
investment, and S&P's view that returns to shareholders may only
be temporarily off the table.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Albea's revenues and
profitability will likely benefit from the ongoing integration of
Rexam PLC's personal care division. That said, given the near-
term challenges related to this strategic acquisition, Albea's
credit metrics are weakly positioned for our "aggressive"
financial risk profile.
S&P could consider a negative rating action if credit metrics
deteriorated, prompting it to revise its financial risk profile
assessment to "highly leveraged" from "aggressive."
Ratings upside is limited while the current shareholder structure
remains in place, based on S&P's criteria for companies owned by
financial sponsors.
ALTICE B2B SARL: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on France-based alternative cable
operator Altice B2B Sarl to 'B+' from 'BB-'. The outlook is
stable. S&P also lowered the issue ratings on its senior secured
facilities to 'B+' from 'BB-'.
At the same time, S&P removed the long-term corporate credit
rating and issue ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with negative implications on Sept. 5, 2013.
The downgrade follows Numericable Group S.A.'s public
announcement that it intends to merge Altice B2B with its sister
company Ypso Holding Sarl. Numericable is a recently listed
entity that acts as the ultimate holding company for Altice B2B
and Ypso.
As the two companies are owned by the same listed company,
Numericable, the merger would be cashless. The merger would
expose Altice B2B to Ypso's substantial leverage, increasing
Altice B2B's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio to
well above 4.0x (the highest level commensurate with its previous
'BB-' rating). S&P expects the group's adjusted leverage to be
about 4.5x by the end of 2013.
"Our assessment of Altice B2B's business risk profile is
supported by our view of the good quality of the company's assets
and internet protocol-based network. It has a relatively wide
fiber network, which provides cost efficiencies that allow the
company to be competitive on pricing. We consider that the
French business-to-business (B2B) telecommunications market has a
relatively low degree of competition, with only three main
players. We therefore believe that Altice B2B can gain market
share thanks to its solid position as the No. 1 alternative B2B
fixed-line provider in France. We also anticipate that Altice
B2B's profitability--which we already consider to be good--will
continue to improve in the medium term, owing to a better mix of
products and an increase in higher-margin data products. This
should offset a decline in lower-margin voice products," S&P
noted. S&P's business risk profile assessment incorporates its
view of Altice B2B's management and governance as "fair."
However, S&P assess Altice B2B's business risk profile as "weak"
because it considers Altice B2B to be a small player, with
approximately 7.5% of the French B2B telecoms market.
Furthermore, Altice B2B lacks operating diversity, as it is
reliant on a single market in a single country. In addition, the
company has to compete with two larger and stronger local
telecoms incumbents -- France Telecom and SFR -- which benefit
from significantly greater financial resources than Altice B2B,
and can therefore be more aggressively competitive if they need
to be. S&P also considers the wider telecoms industry to be
highly competitive, which puts pressure on some of Altice B2B's
telecoms services, mainly within its voice business. The voice
business is still an important revenue generator, contributing
more than 40% to revenues in 2012. S&P anticipates that this
contribution will decrease over the coming years, but S&P
considers that Altice B2B's significant exposure to voice, which
is higher than that of peers, will remain a constraint on the
future growth of the overall business.
"We have revised our our assessment of the financial risk profile
downward to "aggressive" from "significant," reflecting Altice
B2B's meaningful increase in leverage. We anticipate that,
following the merger, Altice B2B's adjusted leverage will be 4.5x
by the end of 2013 (compared with 2.5x before the merger).
However, we consider that the capital structure will still be
quite healthy, with relatively robust free operating cash flow
(FOCF) generation and long-term debt maturities," S&P said.
S&P forecasts a revenue decline of about 2%-4% in 2013, mainly
due to a drop in voice revenues after a cut in the mobile
termination rate (MTR) in France in January 2013. S&P believes
this will be the last cut to the MTR in France for the next few
years. However, S&P envisage an improvement in Altice B2B's
EBITDA margin thanks to a better mix of products and an increase
in demand for data consumption. S&P projects revenue growth of
3%-4% in 2014, on the back of continued strong demand in data and
cloud hosting, combined with a stabilization of the decline in
voice revenues.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Altice B2B will at
least sustain its revenue base and even slightly improve its
EBITDA margin, despite the tough French competitive environment.
We expect the company to maintain an adjusted leverage ratio
between 4.0x-4.5x over the next two years, with limited free
operating cash flow generation in the near term, as a result of
its investment plans.
Although it is unlikely in the near term, S&P could consider
raising the rating to 'BB-' if Altice B2B's private equity
sponsorship decreases and it builds a track record of a
conservative financial policy under its main shareholder Altice
VI. An upgrade would also require Altice B2B to keep adjusted
leverage at 4.5x or below and sustain FOCF generation of at least
5% of adjusted debt.
S&P is also unlikely to downgrade Altice B2B in the near term, in
its view, assuming that the company keeps net leverage at about
3.5x-4.0x (equivalent to adjusted leverage of about 3.7x-4.2x),
in accordance with its public guidance. However, S&P could
consider lowering the ratings if the group's financial policy
became more aggressive than it expects, or if its liquidity
position deteriorated.
NUMERICABLE GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B+'
long-term corporate credit rating to France-based cable operator
Numericable Group S.A. The outlook is stable.
Numericable is a newly incorporated and listed top holding
company for the French telecommunications companies Ypso Holding
Sarl and Altice B2B Sarl. Numericable owns 100% of the capital
of the two companies. The rating on Numericable reflects S&P's
view of the combined creditworthiness of both entities. S&P
assess the group's business profile as "fair" and its financial
profile as "aggressive," as its criteria define the terms.
S&P understands that followings its IPO, Numericable will
continue to separate Altice and Ypso through a ring-fence
mechanism. However, Numericable's management has publicly stated
its intention to merge the two entities. Following such a
merger, S&P also expects a full refinancing of Altice B2B's debt,
and it incorporates this refinancing into its ratings assessment.
From now on, S&P will equalize the ratings on Ypso and Altice
with that on Numericable.
S&P's assessment of Numericable's "fair" business risk profile
reflects its combined view of the business positions of Ypso and
Altice B2B. S&P considers that the group benefits from a high-
quality network infrastructure, which offers fast and advanced
broadband and content services. S&P takes a positive view of the
group's steady growth in triple- and quadruple-play bundled
offers (a combination of TV, broadband, and fixed-line and mobile
telephone) in the French business-to-customer (B2C) segment. S&P
also considers that its relatively wide fiber network penetration
provides cost efficiencies that allow the company to be
competitive on pricing in the French business-to-business (B2B)
market.
Numericable's business risk profile is partly constrained by
S&P's view of the highly competitive nature of the group's main
markets. Numericable is a relatively small player, with about
8.5% market share in the B2C market and 7.5% in the B2B market,
and faces significant competition from telecoms incumbents and
big alternative operators. S&P views France as one of Europe's
most competitive fixed broadband markets, with all four of
Numericable's major competitors--Orange, SFR, Bouygues Telecom,
and Free--offering fixed-line and mobile services and having a
stronger financial standing. Numericable is the sole cable
operator in France and the market leader for high-speed broadband
(100 megabits per second and up), with a 70% market share. Over
the next few years, however, this position may come under threat
from the fiber broadband roll-outs of the other major
competitors, particularly Orange.
"We assess Numericable's financial risk profile as "aggressive,"
owing to its relatively leveraged capital structure. Our
assessment incorporates the group's recent actions to reduce its
debt burden. These include the conversion of the shareholder
loans at Ypso and Altice into equity and the partial repayment of
the most expensive debt instruments at Ypso (about EUR126 million
of the 12.375% senior secured notes and about EUR26 million of
the 8.75% senior secured notes.) The pro forma capital structure
following the different transactions (IPO, merger, and
refinancing) translates into a Standard & Poor's-adjusted net
leverage of 4.5x by the end of 2013," S&P noted.
S&P understands that the group's growth plan is to focus on
increasing the density of its network by reaching more houses
with its very high-speed broadband. This is likely to increase
costs linked to gaining customers, reducing profitability in
2014. The plan will also lead to higher capital expenditure
(capex), estimated at about EUR250 million over the next four
years, weakening the group's cash-flow generation. S&P therefore
expects a relatively weak ratio of adjusted free operating cash
flow (FOCF) to debt of about 3% for the next two years.
Numericable's management has set a target of sustaining a net
debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 3.5x-4.0x, which S&P estimates
would correspond to an adjusted ratio of about 3.7x-4.2x.
However, this policy is as yet untested, as the group has only
recently been incorporated. Private equity ownership has
declined significantly following the IPO, but remains significant
(40% compared with 75% before the IPO). Special
telecommunications fund Altice VI, which is owned by Numericable
founder Patrick Drahi, has increased its participation in the
group to 30% (mainly through the backing of private equity firms
Cinven and Carlyle Group) and is now the reference shareholder.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Numericable will at
least sustain its revenue base and even slightly improve its
EBITDA margin, despite the tough French competitive environment.
S&P expects the company to maintain an adjusted leverage ratio
between 4.0x-4.5x over the next two years, with limited free
operating cash flow generation in the near term, as a result of
its investment plans.
Although it is unlikely in the near term, S&P could consider
raising the rating to 'BB-' if Numericable's private equity
sponsorship decreases and it builds a track record of a
conservative financial policy under its main shareholder Altice
VI. An upgrade would also require Numericable to keep adjusted
leverage at 4.5x or below and sustain FOCF generation of at least
5% of adjusted debt.
S&P is also unlikely to downgrade Numericable in the near term,
in its view, assuming that the company keeps net leverage at
about 3.5x-4.0x (equivalent to adjusted leverage of about 3.7x-
4.2x), in accordance with its public guidance. However, S&P
could consider lowering the ratings if the group's financial
policy became more aggressive than it expects, or if its
liquidity position deteriorated.
YPSO HOLDING: S&P Raises Corp Credit Rating to B+; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its long-
term corporate credit rating on France-based cable operator Ypso
Holding Sarl to 'B+' from 'B'. The outlook is stable. S&P also
raised the issue ratings on Ypso's senior secured notes to 'B+'
from 'B'.
At the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
they were placed with positive implications on Sept. 5, 2013.
The upgrade follows Numericable Group S.A.'s public announcement
that it intends to merge Ypso Holding Sarl with its sister
company Altice B2B Sarl. Numericable is a recently listed entity
that acts as the ultimate holding company for Altice B2B and
Ypso, and owns 100% of the capital of both entities.
The upgrade also reflects S&P's expectation of a meaningful
improvement in Ypso's financial risk profile following the IPO.
As part of the IPO, Ypso converted all shareholder loans (which
S&P considers debt under its criteria) into common equity. It
has also used part of the IPO proceeds to repay a portion of its
expensive debt (about EUR126 million of the 12.375% senior
secured notes and about EUR26 million of the 8.75% senior secured
notes).
The ratings on Ypso reflect S&P's assessment of Ypso's "fair"
business risk profile and "aggressive" financial risk profile.
Underpinning S&P's business risk profile assessment is Ypso's
high-quality network infrastructure, which offers fast and
advanced broadband and content services, and its steady growth in
triple- and quadruple-play bundled offers (a combination of TV,
broadband, and fixed-line and mobile telephone). However, S&P
also sees fierce competition from the integrated French pay-TV,
broadband, and telephony markets. S&P continues to view Ypso's
network as narrower than those of national competitors.
"We have revised our assessment of Ypso's financial risk profile
upward to "aggressive" from "highly leveraged," reflecting our
view of the significant decrease in the group's debt burden after
the conversion of the shareholder loans into equity and the
repayment of a portion of the 12.375% and 8.75% senior secured
notes. Leverage will drop further following the expected merger
with lower-leveraged sister company Altice B2B. By the end of
2013, we expect Ypso's Standard & Poor's-adjusted net leverage to
decrease to 4.5x from its previous level of 6.0x (excluding
shareholder loans; 8.7x including shareholder loans)," S&P said.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Ypso will at least
sustain its revenue base and even slightly improve its EBITDA
margin, despite the tough French competitive environment. S&P
expects the company to maintain an adjusted leverage ratio
between 4.0x-4.5x over the next two years, with limited free
operating cash flow generation in the near term, as a result of
its investment plans.
Although it is unlikely in the near term, S&P could consider
raising the rating to 'BB-' if Ypso's private equity sponsorship
decreases and it builds a track record of a conservative
financial policy under its main shareholder Altice VI. An
upgrade would also require Ypso to keep adjusted leverage at 4.5x
or below and sustain free operating cash flow generation of at
least 5% of adjusted debt.
S&P is also unlikely to downgrade Ypso in the near term, in its
view, assuming that the company keeps net leverage at about 3.5x-
4.0x (equivalent to adjusted leverage of about 3.7x-4.2x), in
accordance with its public guidance. However, S&P could consider
lowering the rating if the group's financial policy became more
aggressive than it expects, or if its liquidity position
deteriorated.
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G E R M A N Y
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GETGOODS.DE AG: Files Insolvency Petition in Frankfurt Court
------------------------------------------------------------
getgoods.de AG disclosed that it has filed an application to open
insolvency on Nov. 15 at the responsible district court for
Frankfurt (Oder).
The provisional administration of property in accordance with
Sec. 21 para. 2 no. 1, 2 (2. HS) German insolvency act (InsO) was
ordered.
The lawyer Christian Graf Brockdorff, Potsdam was appointed as
the temporary insolvency administrator.
getgoods.de AG is a German operator of an online trading company.
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G R E E C E
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NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Rates Proposed US$650-Mil. Notes 'BB-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'BB-' issue rating to the proposed US$650 million first priority
ship mortgage notes due 2022, to be issued by Navios Maritime
Holdings Inc. (Navios Holdings). S&P has equalized the issue
rating on the proposed notes with the long-term corporate credit
rating on Navios Holdings, reflecting the secured nature of the
issue and negligible level of priority liabilities in the
company's capital structure that rank ahead of the proposed
notes.
The proposed notes are to be secured by first priority ship
mortgages on 23 drybulk vessels owned by certain subsidiary
guarantors, and other associated property and contract rights.
The notes will also benefit from a guarantee from the company's
direct and indirect subsidiaries. The guarantee from those
subsidiaries that own mortgaged vessels included in the notes'
collateral will be a senior guarantee. The current value of the
collateral, as assessed by the company and its third-party
consultants, is about US$637 million, indicating asset coverage
of about 98%. Of the proceeds, US$488 million is earmarked for
replacement of the existing first priority ship mortgage notes
due 2017, US$123 million for repayment of secured credit
facilities, and the balance for transaction fees and corporate
purposes.
The notes' documentation includes a fairly standard string of
covenants for an issue of this nature, including change of
control, limitation on incurrence of indebtedness subject to a
fixed-charge coverage ratio of 2.0x with some permitted debt and
permitted liens, restricted payments, limitations on asset sales,
mergers and consolidations, and transactions and affiliates.
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H U N G A R Y
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KOKI TERMINAL: Put Up for Sale by Liquidator at HUF35 Billion
-------------------------------------------------------------
According to MTI-Econews, business daily Napi Gazdasag, citing
the website Napi.hu, said on Friday that the bankrupt KOKI
Terminal, a shopping center at a transport hub in Budapest, has
been put up for sale by a liquidator at a price of HUF35 billion.
MTI-Econews relates that Napi.hu said the liquidator could accept
an offer as much as 15% under the price.
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I R E L A N D
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CORNERSTONE TITAN 2007-1: S&P Cuts Rating on Cl. A2 Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D(sf)' from
'CCC-(sf)' its credit rating on Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 PLC's
class A2 notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D(sf)'
ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes.
The rating actions reflect S&P's opinion of the transaction's
cash flow disruptions.
According to the October 2013 cash manager's report, the class A2
notes experienced additional interest shortfalls on the October
2013 interest payment date. As a result of ongoing interest
shortfalls, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its
rating on the class A2 notes.
S&P has also affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class B, C, D,
and E notes because these classes of notes continue to experience
interest shortfalls.
For the first time in this transaction, the issuer diverted a
relatively small amount of the principal collections toward the
interest payment due on the class A1 and unrated X notes. S&P's
'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class A1 notes is unaffected by its
rating actions because its current rating already reflects its
view of the potential risk of cash flow disruptions.
S&P's ratings in Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 address the timely
payment of interest quarterly in arrears, and the payment of
principal no later than the legal final maturity date in January
2017.
Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 is a European commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in March 2007, and is
currently secured on 17 pan-European commercial real estate
loans.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Rating Class
To From
Cornerstone Titan 2007-1 PLC
EUR1.322 Billion Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Rating Lowered
A2 D (sf) CCC- (sf)
Ratings Affirmed
B D (sf)
C D (sf)
D D (sf)
E D (sf)
IRELAND: To Exit EU-IMF Bailout on Dec. 15
------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Ireland is to make a clean break from its
three-year EUR85 billion (GBP71 billion) bailout program next
month, without seeking precautionary funding.
The Irish prime minister (taoiseach) Enda Kenny confirmed the
move during a speech to the Irish parliament, BBC relates.
According to BBC, the Irish economy is emerging from one of the
deepest recessions in the eurozone, having sought an
international bailout in November 2010.
Ireland is due to leave the EU-IMF bailout on Dec. 15, BBC
discloses.
Mr. Kenny, as cited by BBC, said: "We will exit the bailout in a
strong position. The government has been preparing for a return
to normal market trading.
"We will set out a path to a brighter economic future for our
people, a path from mass unemployment to full employment, from
involuntary emigration to the return of thousands of people who
have to leave for other countries to find work.
"[Fri]day is just the latest step in that ongoing journey, a
significant step indeed but also just another step towards our
ultimate job of getting Ireland working again."
He added that German chancellor Angela Merkel pledged to work
closely with Ireland to improve funding mechanisms for the
economy, including access to finance for small and medium
businesses, BBC relays.
According to RTE News, Ireland faces twice-yearly monitoring both
by the European Union and the European Central Bank when it exits
its bailout next month.
Head of the eurozone finance ministers group Jeroen Dijsselbloem
said a determination had yet to be reached on how long such
scrutiny would last, or what precisely would be involved, RTE
relates.
=========
I T A L Y
=========
ITALY: Corporate Bankruptcies Up 12% in First Nine Months
---------------------------------------------------------
ANSA, citing a study by the Cerved market-research agency,
reports that almost 10,000 businesses went bankrupt in recession-
hit Italy in the first nine months of this year.
According to ANSA, the agency said that the total of 9,902
bankruptcies was up 12% on the same period last year, making it
the "the highest level seen in over a decade". It added that in
the third quarter of this year around 14,000 companies filed for
voluntary liquidation, up 5.3% on the July-September period in
2012, ANSA relates.
ANSA notes the data show that over 50,000 firms filed for
liquidation in the first nine months of this year, up 5.2% on the
same period in 2012.
MARCOLIN SPA: S&P Assigns 'B-' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had assigned its 'B-'
long-term corporate credit rating to Italy-based eyewear
manufacturer Marcolin SpA. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B-' issue rating to
Marcolin's EUR200 million senior secured notes. The recovery
rating is '4', indicating EUR expectation of average (30%-50%)
recovery in the event of a payment default.
S&P also assigned its 'B' issue rating to Marcolin's EUR25
million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) due 2019.
The recovery rating is '2', indicating S&P's expectation of
substantial (70%-90%) recovery for the lenders in the event of a
payment default.
The ratings reflect S&P's view that Marcolin's operating
performance will continue to strengthen after a weak 2012 and a
slow start in 2013. S&P believes that Marcolin's operations will
benefit from moderately better economic conditions in Europe and
the U.S., the group's new license agreements, and synergies from
the acquisition of eyewear company Viva, which is No. 2 in the
U.S. S&P also anticipates that Marcolin's balance sheet will
remain highly leveraged, based on its opinion of the aggressive
financial policy of its main shareholder, which is a financial
sponsor according to its criteria.
S&P views Marcolin's business risk profile as "vulnerable." This
primarily reflects the group's No. 4 position in the global
eyewear market, well behind No. 1 player Luxottica Group SpA
(BBB+/Positive/A-2) and No. 2 in the market Safilo Group SpA
(B/Positive/--). Both competitors benefit from stronger and
wider portfolios of licensed brands than Marcolin's, in S&P's
opinion. S&P's assessment of Marcolin's business risk profile
also includes its view of its high concentration of licenses (the
top two account for about 50% of sales), its meaningful exposure
to the cyclical sunglasses segment, which represents more than
40% of sales, and its lack of sizable house brands. S&P also
factors in the weak operating performances of Marcolin and Viva
in 2012 and the first half of 2013, as competition intensified in
Europe and weak consumer confidence persisted in all mature
markets.
In addition, S&P incorporates in its assessment the group's
improved operating performance in the third quarter of 2013. S&P
views positively Marcolin's somewhat predictable revenues base,
owing to long-term agreements with its main licensors (Tom Ford
and Guess) and signed agreements with new licensors that will
bring additional revenues in the coming years.
Marcolin's "highly leveraged" financial risk profile primarily
reflects its financial sponsor ownership and S&P's calculations
that the Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will
remain above 5x for the two years after the transaction. S&P's
assessment of Marcolin's financial risk also encompasses its
positive--albeit small--free cash flow generation and adequate
liquidity.
S&P's base-case scenario for Marcolin over the next two years
encompasses the following assumptions:
-- An increase in sales due to new licensing contracts and the
growth of existing licenses, reflecting synergies with
Viva, resulting in a wider product offering.
-- Gradual improvements in EBITDA margins to about 14% in
2015, reflecting better operating leverage and synergies
with Viva.
-- Less than EUR8 million of annual capital expenditure,
reflecting the group's light asset base because, pro forma
the acquisition of Viva, Marcolin outsources more than 50%
of its production to China.
-- No dividend payments or acquisitions.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Marcolin will
continue to improve its operating performance, which strengthened
in the third quarter of 2013, and maintain adequate liquidity.
S&P anticipates that the adjusted EBITDA margin will recover to
14% in the next two years and that free cash flow will be
positive.
S&P could lower the rating if Marcolin's performance does not
recover, leading to negative free cash flow generation and
pressure on the group's liquidity. This could result from
declining performance on existing licenses, due to intensified
competition and persistently weak consumer demand. It could also
result from the termination of various small licenses (because of
the bankruptcy of the licensors, for example), or from
integration risks linked to the Viva acquisition.
S&P views an upgrade as remote at this stage, due to weak
operating performance, uncertainties linked to the integration of
Viva, and Marcolin's ownership by a financial sponsor.
Nevertheless, S&P could consider a positive rating action if
Marcolin improved its operating performance on a sustainable
basis and enhanced its diversification. Improvement and
stabilization of profitability and reduction in brand
concentration--coming from additional brand licenses or sizable
house brands--could prompt an upward revision of the group's
business risk profile.
TELECOM ITALIA: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Ratings to 'BB+/B'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long- and
short-term corporate credit ratings on Italy's incumbent
telecommunications operator Telecom Italia SpA (TI) to 'BB+/B'
from 'BBB-/A-3'. The outlook is negative.
At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on TI's existing
senior unsecured debt to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and assigned a '3'
recovery rating to this debt. S&P lowered its issue rating on
TI's EUR750 million subordinated hybrid bond to 'B+' from 'BB'
and assigned a '6' recovery rating to this bond.
S&P removed the issuer and issue ratings mentioned above from
CreditWatch, where S&P placed them with negative implications on
Oct. 7, 2013.
S&P has also assigned its 'B+' issue and '6' recovery ratings to
TI's proposed combined EUR1.3 billion, three-year mandatory
convertible bonds.
The downgrade reflects S&P's belief that TI's reported EBITDA
will continue to decline in the next two years, given the
challenging competitive, economic, and regulatory environments in
which it operates. S&P also considers that the group is unlikely
to trim adjusted debt enough to more than offset operating
pressures while rapidly and materially improving its key credit
metrics sufficiently to sustain the previous rating.
Following a recent meeting of its board of directors and the
resignation of the previous chairman, TI has announced measures
designed to accelerate debt reduction and strengthen domestic
performances, including the planned sale of its subsidiary in
Argentina and the proposed mandatory convertible. S&P
acknowledges that some of these steps could support TI's credit
quality, including its competitive position in the long run.
That said, S&P thinks it will take time for the group to deliver
tangible positive results and S&P sees potential execution risks.
In S&P's view TI will likely continue to face persistent
headwinds given Italy's weak economy, fierce competition, and
possible negative effects from regulation. In addition, a new
chairman has yet to be appointed and stability in senior
management, which S&P views as an important credit consideration,
remains to be confirmed over time.
The uncertainty about TI's governance continues to weigh
negatively in S&P's assessment of the group's management and
governance as "fair." In particular, it's difficult to foresee
what strategic impact Spain-based Telefonica S.A.'s potentially
controlling, indirect stake in TI may have. Telefonica recently
upped its stake in TI's largest shareholder, Telco, and S&P
understands it could increase it further in the future.
"We forecast sluggish GDP growth of 0.5% and 0.9% in 2014 and
2015 for Italy, with unemployment remaining at a high of about
12%. Households' constrained disposable income, a depressed
housing market, and small and midsize corporates seeking to cut
costs, will likely translate into a still-weak backdrop for the
telecoms sector. We consequently anticipate that highly price-
sensitive consumers and businesses and the fragmented wireless
market will exacerbate pricing pressures for traditional voice
products. In our view, it remains to be seen to what extent the
marketing of more value-added data centric, enriched, and
converged offers can compensate for the decline in revenue from
traditional products," S&P said.
In fixed-line communications, traditional telephony revenues--
still representing more than 40% of the division's revenues--will
likely continue to fall and weigh on revenues. In addition,
fixed-line broadband growth materially lags behind the levels S&P
sees in comparable European markets, despite low penetration in
Italy. While S&P sees TI's heightened focus on next generation
technology of fiber and fourth-generation (4G) wireless networks
as positive in the long run, S&P believes that this will require
large investments, potentially weakening TI's cash generation and
its organic ability to reduce debt.
S&P thinks TI's 67% owned Brazilian subsidiary broadens the
group's diversity and provides benefits from operating in a very
large and growing market. But this subsidiary will only partly
offset domestic pressures, and its contribution is also subject
to currency swings.
At this stage, S&P estimates group revenues (excluding
Argentinian operations) will drop by about 7% in full-year 2013
and by low single digits in 2014 and 2015. S&P believes the
falls will stem mainly from a midsingle-digit revenue drop in
Italy in 2014-2015 and low- to midsingle-digit organic growth in
Brazil (excluding handset sales). S&P foresees group EBITDA
(excluding Argentinian operations) falling by about 10% in full-
year 2013 and decreasing again in 2014-2015, but to a lesser
extent owing to softer revenue decline, a more benign impact from
regulated termination and roaming rates, and cost-cutting
efforts. Combined, these factors should help to sustain still-
high EBITDA margins of about 39%-40% (excluding Argentinian
operations) in 2014-2015. S&P foresees group EBITDA (excluding
Argentinian operations) eroding by 4%-5% in 2014 and by 2%-3% in
2015.
S&P foresees positive but diminishing discretionary cash flows,
held back by heavy investment outlays required to roll out 4G
mobile network and extend fiber penetration in the fixed network
in Italy. S&P also factors in continuously heavy outlays in
Brazil to extend and upgrade the network. S&P therefore
anticipates fixed investments of about 18%-20% of revenues and
annual free cash flow in the EUR1 billion to EUR1.5 billion range
over 2014-2015, leaving about EUR0.5 billion-EUR1.0 billion in
annual discretionary cash flow after dividends.
S&P think that the Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA
ratio of the group in 2014-2015 could exceed 3.3x but remain
below 3.7x (which would likely translate into 4.0x maximum
including Brazilian operations on a pro rata basis), which is the
maximum S&P would consider commensurate with the current rating.
S&P believes the group's cash flow metrics will remain very weak,
and that the adjusted ratio of FFO to debt will hover at about
20% in 2014-2015. S&P bases its estimates on our expectation of
further declines in EBITDA and FFO, balanced by some positive
discretionary cash flows and the proceeds from the announced sale
of TI's Argentinian subsidiary.
S&P will assess the proposed mandatory convertible bonds as
having "minimal" equity content at issuance under its criteria,
based on the bonds' maturity to conversion of more than two years
and given that the required shareholders' authorization might not
be obtained. The presence of a make-whole cash payment in case
of early conversion is also a negative. Apart from these
factors, S&P thinks other features of the proposed bonds are in
line with "high" equity content. Specifically, the proposed
bonds are deeply subordinated, can be converted into shares only
if the conversion date falls after the shareholders' agreement,
include a conversion price floor equal to the share reference
price, and are deferrable at the issuer's discretion. S&P could
raise the proposed bonds' equity content to "high" when their
remaining maturity becomes less than two years, assuming that
shareholders' approval for their conversion has been obtained,
and depending on S&P's perception of TI's financial policy at the
time.
The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of the group's business risk
profile as "satisfactory" and financial risk profile as
"significant." S&P's view of TI's business risk balances its
solid fixed and mobile positions, high EBITDA margins in Italy,
and the benefits of geographic diversity in the attractive
Brazilian market, against deep-seated mobile price competition,
lack of material growth traction in fixed broadband, the
challenging economic and regulatory environments in Italy, and
S&P's score of "fair" of TI's management and governance. The
group's financial risk profile is constrained by its high
indebtedness and our perception of TI's lack of flexibility given
its shareholder structure. This is tempered, however, by S&P's
expectation that TI will generate positive discretionary cash
flows.
The negative outlook reflects the possibility of further rating
downside in 2014-2015 if TI fails to improve domestic operating
performances and EBITDA continues falling by midsingle digits or
more through 2014-2015. This could occur if there's a renewed
price war in Italy's wireless market, absent a softening in the
decline of fixed-line revenues, or the group makes higher
investment outlays than S&P currently expects.
S&P could lower the ratings on TI if its fully adjusted ratios of
debt to EBITDA increase toward 3.7x and FFO to debt drops toward
15%, or if S&P considers that the group's liquidity is weakening.
S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the group structurally
strengthens its domestic operating performances. Such
strengthening would include gradually stabilizing EBITDA,
preventing debt to EBITDA and FFO to debt from deteriorating
materially, maintaining adequate liquidity, and stabilizing
management and governance.
===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================
SAMRUK-ENERGY: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB+' CCR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook on
Kazakhstan-based state-owned vertically integrated electric
utility Samruk-Energy JSC to negative from stable. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term corporate
credit ratings and 'kzAA-' national scale rating.
S&P affirmed the issue rating on Samruk-Energy's US$500 million
notes at 'BB+'. The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged
at '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%)
recovery in the event of a payment default.
The outlook revision reflects S&P's opinion that Samruk-Energy's
2013-2014 investment levels--including acquisitions--might be
higher than it previously anticipated and that the group could
struggle to sustainably maintain credit metrics commensurate with
the current 'b+' stand-alone credit profile (SACP). S&P's
current base-case scenario assumes that the Standard & Poor's-
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will remain below 4.0x in 2013-
2014.
S&P incorporates a significant positive contribution from the
commissioning of the Moinak hydropower plant, completed in 2012,
to the group's results from 2013. S&P forecasts revenues of
around Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 140 billion (about US$930 million)
and EBITDA of around KZT40 billion this year, compared with
KZT95 billion and KZT22 billion in 2012. Nevertheless, S&P
believes Samruk-Energy has an appetite for new investments, as
highlighted by a number of large-scale expansion projects and
potential acquisitions being considered. S&P believes that, if
realized, additional investments could lead to a higher debt-to-
EBITDA ratio than in its base-case projections and prompt it to
consider a negative rating action.
"We have revised our assessment of Samruk-Energy's management and
governance score to "weak" from "fair." This reflects existing
uncertainties around the group's strategic and financial planning
processes and risk tolerance, as well as weak governance. This
includes poor transparency around future investments and
acquisitions, which we believe is largely dictated by Samruk-
Energy's main shareholder, Samruk-Kazyna, and the government,
restricting the group's autonomy. Our assessment also
incorporates planning deficiencies, highlighted by sudden changes
in planned capital expenditure (capex) and debt funding," S&P
said.
Samruk-Energy is a vertically integrated group of companies with
business segments including coal mining and electricity
generation, distribution, and supply. The group controls about
47% of installed capacity and 38% of total electricity production
in Kazakhstan, including its share in joint ventures, or 17% and
15%, if excluding them.
The business risk profile assessment reflects S&P's view of
Samruk-Energy's evolving corporate structure, with a limited
track record of operations in their current form, an aged asset
base, uncertainties over regulatory framework after 2015, and the
transitional features of domestic power market. Supporting
factors include the group's solid domestic market position and
high vertical integration through its long position in coal,
electricity generation, distribution, and supply operations.
The financial risk profile assessment incorporates S&P's view of
Samruk-Energy's ambitious investment program, over which it has
limited flexibility, as it has been approved by the regulator,
and its relatively high debt to EBITDA. The group carries
significant exposure to foreign currency and interest-rate risk,
since about 64% of its total debt is dollar-denominated and
around 35% bears floating rates.
Samruk-Energy's financial risk profile is supported by its
favorable long-term debt maturity profile, adequate liquidity
backed by cash proceeds from a US$500 million, five-year term
bond placement, and strong track record of ongoing financial
government support.
S&P considers Samruk-Energy to be a government-related entity
(GRE), according to its criteria, based on its belief that there
is a "high" likelihood that the Kazakh government would provide
timely and sufficient extraordinary financial support to Samruk-
Energy in the event of financial distress. S&P's assessment
factors in its opinion of Samruk-Energy's:
-- "Important" role for the government, given its strategic
position as a leading provider of electricity in
Kazakhstan; and "Very strong" link with the government,
given its 100% ownership of the group through its
investment vehicle Samruk-Kazyna, our expectation that the
government will maintain majority ownership for at least
the next two years, the government's involvement in
strategic decision-making, and the risk to the sovereign's
reputation if Samruk-Energy was to default. This is
supported by historically strong financial support from the
government in the form of equity injections, asset
transfers, low interest-rate loans, debt guarantees, and
the provision of financial aid and tax benefits.
S&P assess the group's SACP at 'b+', based on its view of its
"fair" business risk profile and "aggressive" financial risk
profile.
The negative outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Samruk-Energy
might struggle to maintain financial ratios and performance
adequate for the current ratings over the rating horizon.
S&P might lower the ratings if Samruk-Energy demonstrated more
aggressive financial policies than it anticipates by proceeding
with a higher level of debt-financed investment or acquisition,
leading to deterioration in credit metrics. S&P currently deems
a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of below 4.0x
as commensurate with our "aggressive" financial risk profile and
SACP of 'b+'. A one-notch downward revision of the group's SACP
would result in a one-notch lowering of the long-term rating,
provided that the likelihood of extraordinary government support
remained unchanged.
S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the group implemented
less aggressive financial policies on investments and debt
management--including greater clarity on investments to be
undertaken--and improved the transparency and certainty of its
financial plans and group structure development. In addition,
ratings stability would depend on operating and financial results
leading to credit metrics remaining commensurate with the current
ratings and maintenance of adequate liquidity and maturity
profiles.
STANDARD INSURANCE: A.M. Best Assigns B- Finc'l. Strength Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Europe-Rating Services Limited has assigned a financial
strength rating of B- (Fair) and issuer credit rating of "bb-" to
Standard Insurance Company, JSC (Standard) (Kazakhstan). The
assigned outlook is stable.
The ratings of Standard reflect its developing business profile
as a start-up insurer in the domestic Kazakh market, as well as
the company's marginal level of risk-adjusted capitalization and
weak medium-term earnings prospects due to its high expense base.
Standard (formerly IC Astana Finance) is a non-life insurer that
has been operating under new management since 2012, following its
acquisition by a consortium of private investors at year-end
2011. Formerly a retail insurer with a large exposure to
compulsory motor business, the company plans to develop its
profile within the corporate segment of the market and increase
its underwriting of voluntary business. The successful execution
of Standard's business plan is largely dependent on the reduction
of its reliance on its high-cost agency network and growth
through its direct and bancassurance distribution channel. A.M.
Best will continue to monitor the progression of Standard's
business development.
Standard's risk-adjusted capitalization is considered to be
marginal, based on performance forecasts and A.M. Best's start-up
criteria. The company's capital management strategy is to
maintain a 10% margin above minimum regulatory requirements.
Capital contributions from shareholders are expected to support
the company's development in the medium term. Standard's risk-
adjusted capital position is underpinned by a conservative
investment portfolio consisting mainly of cash deposits and fixed
income investments. Additionally, the company places the
majority of its business with a panel of reinsurers that maintain
secure ratings. Standard's risk management framework is
underdeveloped and driven primarily by regulatory requirements.
Despite the low levels of loss frequency in Kazakhstan,
Standard's projected earnings (over the medium term) are expected
to be dampened largely by its substantial fixed costs as the
company establishes its bancassurance distribution network.
Based on regulatory returns for the first half-year of 2013,
Standard reported a combined ratio of 122% with an expense ratio
of 89%, compared to a combined ratio of 89% and an expense ratio
of 53% in the first half-year of 2012.
Positive rating actions could occur if Standard successfully
implements its business plans to a level that supports a higher
rating. This includes demonstrating a track record of solid
underwriting performance whilst strengthening risk-adjusted
capitalization. Worse than expected underwriting results, a
decline in the quality of its investments or reinsurance
protection, or a deterioration in risk-adjusted capitalization
could result in negative rating actions.
===========
L A T V I A
===========
LIEPAJAS METALURGS: Afina Pallada In Talks Over EUR37MM Buyout
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic Times reports that Russian firm Afina Pallada has
confirmed it is in talks over a possible EUR37 million buyout of
Liepajas Metalurgs.
"We are interested in acquisition of "Liepajas Metalurgs",
because what previously obstructed our investments in the company
is now gone. We are prepared to buy Liepajas Metalurgs and renew
production," The Baltic Times quotes Sergey Pisarchuk, a
representative of Afina Pallada who are in talks, as saying.
In October, Afina Pallada said it would not rush to invest in the
struggling Liepajas Metalurgs as the company's creditors or
shareholders did not offer a clear and safe investment
environment with guarantees until the end of the legal protection
plan, The Baltic Times relates.
It follows after courts launched a bankruptcy case against
Liepajas Metalurgs on Nov. 12, The Baltic Times discloses. Up to
1,500 workers have begun to be laid off at the company this
month, The Baltic Times relays.
In August, Afina Pallada said it was ready to buy Liepajas
Metalurgs for up to US$50 million (LVL27.5 million/ EUR37
million), The Baltic Times recounts.
"I can add that the talks will continue and the next meeting is
scheduled for early December. Now it is important to reach
agreement on Liepajas Metalurgs sales conditions and the amount
for which it could be sold," Mr. Pisarchuk, as cited by The
Baltic Times, said.
Meanwhile, stock-taking will take place at Liepajas Metalurgs and
an assessment of the company will be performed, The Baltic Times
discloses. According to The Baltic Times, Haralds Velmers, the
company's insolvency administrator said, that a sales plan for
the company will be drawn up.
Liepajas Metalurgs is a Latvian metallurgical company.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 15,
2013, The Baltic Times related that the Liepaja Court launched
insolvency process against the financially-troubled Liepajas
Metalurgs. The court has decided to halt the companies legal
protection process and launch an insolvency process against it,
The Baltic Times disclosed. Liepajas Metalurgs legal protection
administrator, Haralds Velmers, has been appointed the company's
insolvency administrator, The Baltic Times said. Mr. Velmers'
insolvency petition was submitted to the court on Nov. 4, The
Baltic Times recounted.
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
GRAND HARBOUR I: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed all of its credit
ratings on Grand Harbour I B.V.'s EUR355 million floating-rate
class A-1, A-2, B (deferrable), C (deferrable), D (deferrable),
and E (deferrable) notes following the transaction's effective
date as of Aug. 20, 2013.
Most European cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
close before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level
of portfolio collateral. On the closing date, the collateral
manager typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral
within the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to
reach the target level of portfolio collateral. Typically, the
CLO transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted
level of portfolio collateral must be reached. The "effective
date" for a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on
which the transaction acquires the target level of portfolio
collateral, or the date defined in the transaction documents.
Most transaction documents contain provisions directing the
trustee to request the rating agencies that have issued ratings
upon closing to affirm the ratings issued on the closing date
after reviewing the effective date portfolio (typically referred
to as an "effective date rating affirmation").
"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's
closing date. The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that we used in our analysis and the results
of our review based on the information presented to us," S&P
said.
"We believe the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction. This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more
diverse portfolio of assets," S&P added.
For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of our criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines. This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.
"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio. Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P noted.
"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation. In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated European cash flow CLO," S&P
said.
On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view,
the current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the
credit quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to
support the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Grand Harbour I B.V.
EUR403.35 Million Floating-Rate And Subordinated Notes
Ratings Affirmed
Class Rating
A-1 AAA (sf)
A-2 AA (sf)
B A (sf)
C BBB (sf)
D BB (sf)
E B (sf)
NR-Not rated.
PROSPERO CLO I: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Prospero CLO I's class A-2, B, and C notes. At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its ratings on Prospero CLO I's class A-1-A, A-
1-B, A-1-C, and D notes.
The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction, using data from the latest available trustee
report, dated Oct. 7, 2013. S&P has taken into account recent
developments in the transaction and reviewed the transaction
under its applicable corporate collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) criteria.
The amortization of class A-1-A, A-1-B, and A-1-C notes has
materially increased the available credit enhancement for all
classes of notes.
The trustee report shows that all overcollateralization tests are
currently passing and have substantially improved since S&P's
last review on March 19, 2012. In addition, since S&P's previous
review, the weighted-average spread earned on the collateral pool
has increased to 3.39% from 3.02%, and the weighted-average life
has reduced to 2.3 years from 3.5 years. In S&P's analysis, it
has observed a negative rating migration in the portfolio. The
proportion of the defaulted assets (i.e., debt obligations of
obligors rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective default], or 'D') has
increased since S&P's previous review, to 3.53% from 1.42%. The
proportion of CCC assets (rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') has
also increased to 9.11% from 3.77%.
S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each
rated class. In S&P's analysis, it used the performing portfolio
balance, the reported weighted-average spread of 3.39%, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate. S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using its standard default patterns and levels, for each rating
category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction with
different interest rate and exchange rate stress scenarios.
From S&P's analysis, it has observed that the available credit
enhancement for the class A-2, B, and C notes is now commensurate
with higher ratings, and it has therefore raised its ratings on
these classes of notes. S&P has affirmed its ratings on the
class A-1-A, A-1-B, A-1-C, and D notes because their available
credit enhancement is still commensurate with our currently
assigned ratings.
Prospero CLO I is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms. The transaction closed in
April 2005 and is managed by Alcentra NY, LLC.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
Prospero CLO I
EUR35.6 Million, GBP24.5 Million, And US$214.55 Million Senior
Secured Floating-Rate Notes (Issued By Prospero CLO I BV,
Prospero CLO I Inc.), Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes And
Subordinate Notes (Issued By Prospero CLO I B.V.)
Ratings Raised
A-2 AAA (sf) AA (sf)
B AA+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)
C BBB+ (sf) BB (sf)
Ratings Affirmed
A-1-A AAA (sf)
A-1-B AAA (sf)
A-1-C AAA (sf)
D B+ (sf)
===========
N O R W A Y
===========
RESERVOIR EXPLORATION: Unit Files Liquidating Plan in U.S.
----------------------------------------------------------
Reservoir Exploration Technology, Inc., filed a plan of
liquidation and accompanying disclosure statement the day it
filed for bankruptcy with the U.S. Bankruptcy for the Northern
District of Texas, Fort Worth Division.
The Plan incorporates a settlement and compromise with the
liquidator on behalf of parent Reservoir Exploration Technology
ASA, under which RXT ASA has agreed to expeditiously liquidate
the Debtor's Receivable Asset -- which is the Debtor's aliquot
share of a receivable owed by Shell E&P Ireland Limited in the
total amount of US$10.8 million -- and other unliquidated
intercompany receivables by taking an assignment of the Debtor's
interests in these assets and providing immediate Plan funding to
the Debtor to ensure its ability to presently propose and perform
its Plan.
Specifically, under the Settlement, RXT ASA agrees to:
(i) in exchange for an assignment of all of the Debtor's
interests in the Receivable Asset and any other
intercompany receivables, act as the Plan Funder, and
pay to the Liquidating Trust the Plan Funding in the
amount of US$630,000, to allow the Liquidating Trustee to
pay the costs of administration of the Liquidating Trust
and make distributions called for under the Plan; and
(ii) in connection with same, subordinate its Claim against the
Debtor, which the Debtor has assessed at a value of not
less than approximately US$18.5 million, to all general,
Allowed Unsecured Claims, to efficiently and equitably
resolve any disputes related to the allowability or
treatment of RXT ASA's Claim without the need for undue
delays or unnecessary litigation expense, and critically,
to ensure the maximization of distributions to non-insider
creditors.
According to the Debtor's proposed counsel, Joseph J.
Wielebinski, Esq. -- jwielebinski@munsch.com -- at Munsch Hardt
Kopf & Harr, P.C., in Dallas, Texas, absent the RXT ASA
Settlement, the Plan Funding is not available to the Estate and
Creditors of the Estate will not have the benefit of RXT ASA's
agreement to subordinate its $18.5 million Claim against the
Estate, which Claim, to the extent Allowed, would vastly dilute
recoveries and distributions on account of other General
Unsecured Claims that are Allowed against the Estate.
Although if the RXT ASA Settlement is not approved the Estate
would retain the Debtor's interests in the Receivable Asset and
its intercompany claims instead of assigning these to RXT ASA,
the Receivable Asset is currently in dispute, the subject of
potential litigation, and the intercompany receivables have a
questionable and unliquidated value because these are owed by
insolvent affiliates that are in the process of liquidating their
affairs, Mr. Wielebinski asserts.
Under the Liquidating Plan, Holders of Allowed Administrative
Claims, Allowed Priority Tax Claims, Class 1-Allowed Priority
Non-Tax Claims, Class 2-Secured Tax Claims, Class 3-Allowed Other
Secured Claims, and Class 4-Allowed General Unsecured Claims are
estimated to recover 100 cents on the dollar.
Holders of Class 5-Subordinated Claims, with an estimated
allowable claim of US$18,544,591, will be paid after satisfaction
of Allowed Claims in senior classes. Holders of Class 6-Equity
Interests will recover nothing.
A full-text copy of the Disclosure Statement dated Nov. 5, 2013,
is available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/RESERVOIRds1105.pdf
About Reservoir Exploration
Reservoir Exploration Technology, Inc., a provider of seismic
data and related geophysical services to the oil and gas industry
and specializing in multi-component sea-floor acquisition of
seismic data, sought protection under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Case No. 13-45148) on Nov. 5,
2013. The case is assigned to Judge Michael Lynn.
The Debtor's parent, Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA, filed
for bankruptcy protection under the laws of Norway on June 13,
2013. Mr. Jon Skjorshammer of The Selmer Law Firm, with offices
in Oslo, Norway, has been appointed by the Norwegian bankruptcy
court as the liquidator for RXT ASA in the Parent's Foreign
Bankruptcy Case.
The Debtor's proposed counsel are Jay Ong, Esq., Joseph J.
Wielebinski, Esq. -- jwielebinski@munsch.com -- and Thomas D.
Berghman, Esq. -- tberghman@munsch.com -- at Munsch Hardt Kopf &
Harr, P.C., in Dallas, Texas.
The petition was signed by Jason Rae, chief restructuring
officer. The Debtor's Schedules of Assets and Liabilities
disclosed US$13,660,336 in assets and US$18,823,697 in
liabilities.
=============
R O M A N I A
=============
BRD-GROUPE SOCIETE: Fitch Lowers Viability Rating to 'b+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed BRD-Groupe Societe Generale S.A.'s
(BRD) and Banca Comerciala Romana S.A.'s (BCR) Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BBB+' and Garanti Bank S.A.'s (Garanti
Romania) Long-term IDR at 'BBB-'. The Outlooks are Stable. The
agency has also downgraded BCR's Viability Rating (VR) to 'b+'
from 'bb-'. A full list of rating actions is at the end of this
rating action commentary.
Key Rating Drivers - IDRs and Support Ratings:
BCR's, BRD's and Garanti Romania's IDRs reflect the high
likelihood of support from their respective majority
shareholders: Erste Group Bank AG (A/Stable/a-), Societe Generale
(SG; A/Negative/a-) and Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. (TGB;
BBB/Stable/bbb).
Fitch believes that BCR and BRD remain strategically important to
their respective parents, notwithstanding the weak performance of
the Romanian market for the past four years, in light of Erste's
and SG's broader focus on Central and Eastern European (CEE), the
subsidiaries' strong integration into their respective groups and
the track records of support to date.
Fitch classifies Garanti Romania as a strategically important
subsidiary of TGB. Fitch's view on the high likelihood of support
for Garanti Romania reflects the strong integration of the bank
with TGB (the bank shares the parent's brand, systems and sources
top management from TGB), high reputational risk to TGB from any
default of Garanti Romania, the history of capital support and
Garanti Romania's small size relative to TGB. At the same time,
Fitch does not view Romania as a core market for TGB, despite its
long presence in the country.
Rating Sensitivities - IDRs and Support Ratings:
BCR's and BRD's IDRs are constrained by Romania's Country Ceiling
of 'BBB+' and the Stable Outlooks on the banks' IDRs reflect that
on the sovereign. Any change in the Country Ceiling would likely
result in a change in the banks' Long-term IDRs. Any marked
reduction in the parent banks' commitment to the CEE region and
to the Romanian market in particular (not Fitch's base case
expectation at present) could also trigger a negative rating
action.
In Fitch's view there is a clear intention to ultimately reduce
state support for systemically important banks in Europe. If the
agency changes its view about the propensity of the Austrian or
French authorities to provide support to major Austrian and
French banks, this would lead to downward pressure on Erste's and
SG's IDRs, Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors. However,
any downside risk for Erste and SG's Long-term IDRs should be
limited to one notch, to the level of their 'a-' VRs, and this
would therefore be unlikely to result in a downgrade of BCR or
BRD.
Garanti Romania's IDRs are sensitive to changes in TGB's IDRs,
and the Stable Outlook mirrors that on TGB. Garanti Romania's
IDRs could also be downgraded if there were a marked reduction in
the strategic importance of the bank for TGB.
Key Rating Drivers - BCR's VR:
The downgrade of BCR's VR reflects (i) high and still rising
impaired and non-performing loans (NPLs, defined as loans more
than 90 days overdue); (ii) the high level of uncovered impaired
loans relative to Fitch core capital (FCC); and (iii) the bank's
continued weak performance in 1H13 following the large loss in
2012. The VR also considers (i) high reliance on parent funding;
and (ii) tail risks related to the significant amount of foreign
currency lending.
At the same time, BCR's VR also reflects (i) the bank's
significant loss absorption capacity; (ii) the slowdown of NPL
growth in 2013 and improved coverage of impaired loans; (iii)
solid pre-impairment profitability, driven by high cost
efficiency and a healthy interest margin; and (iv) comfortable
liquidity.
The share of problem loans continued to rise in 1H13, with NPLs
reaching 25.6% of gross loans and impaired exposures (as reported
in IFRS accounts; this also includes most restructured loans)
standing at 29.2%. While the coverage ratio of both NPLs (70%)
and impaired loans (62%) are broadly in line with peers, the
uncovered portions of NPLs and impaired loans were equal to a
sizable 55% and 78%, respectively, of FCC at end-1H13.
Fitch calculates that BCR could have created reserves equal to
80% of impaired loans and still maintained a FCC ratio of 9.4% at
end-1H13 (compared with the actual level of 15.6%), which
suggests significant loss absorption capacity. Furthermore, pre-
impairment profit in both 1H13 and 2012 was equal to about 4% of
average gross loans, meaning that it should be possible to
further increase provisioning without eating into capital.
The reliance on parental funding fell slightly to 33% of
liabilities at end-1H13 (2012: 35%), but BCR still relies on
Erste for the bulk of its foreign currency funding. The share of
foreign currency loans remains high for both retail exposures and
non-retail exposures exposing the bank to asset quality risks
related to exchange rate movements, especially in the retail
portfolio. Fitch expects the share of foreign currency loans to
gradually decrease following the bank's decision made late last
year to discontinue foreign currency lending to unhedged
borrowers and focus on local currency loans.
Rating Sensitivities - BCR's VR:
Fitch expects BCR to be able to improve reserve coverage of
impaired loans without eating significantly into capital, and
therefore views a further downgrade of the VR as unlikely at
present. However, a sharper than expected further deterioration
of asset quality would put downward pressure on the VR.
An upgrade would require tangible improvement in asset quality
metrics and loan impairment charges as well as continued sound
pre-impairment profitability in an environment of lower interest
rates and limited growth.
Key Rating Drivers - Garanti Romania's VR:
Garanti Romania's 'b' VR reflects its limited track record,
modest franchise high loan concentrations, deterioration in asset
quality (with NPLs rising to 14.95% at end-1H13, but still below
the sector average of 20.3%) and reliance on foreign deposits
(26% of liabilities at end-1H13 and parent funding (15.2%) .
The VR also considers the improvement in the FCC ratio to 18% at
end-1H13 after a EUR20m equity injection in October 2012, with
impaired loan coverage in line with peers, and the currently
comfortable liquidity position. Profitability improved in 1H13
after losses in 2011 and 2012, driven by a reduction in
impairment charges and higher trading gains.
Rating Sensitivities - Garanti Romania's VR:
An upgrade of the VR would require a stabilization of asset
quality and evidence that the bank can generate sustainable
profits. A downgrade of the VR could result from a marked
deterioration in asset quality and profitability, leading to
erosion of capital.
BRD is Romania's second-largest bank, with around 12.7% of total
assets at end-1H13. Fitch has not undertaken a full review of
BRD, and has therefore not assigned a VR to the bank.
The rating actions are as follows:
BCR
Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook
Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating affirmed at '2'
Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating downgraded to 'b+' from 'bb-'
BRD
Long-term IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating affirmed at '2'
Garanti Romania
Long-term IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F3'
Support Rating affirmed at '2'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b'
===========
R U S S I A
===========
REPUBLIC INVESTMENT: S&P Affirms 'B' ICR; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had affirmed its 'B'
long-term issuer credit rating on Russia-based Republic
Investment Company (RIC) OJSC. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'ruA-' Russia national scale
rating on RIC.
The ratings reflect S&P's view that there is a "high" likelihood
that the Russian Republic of Sakha (BB+/Negative/--; Russia
national scale 'ruAA+'), which fully owns RIC, would provide
timely and sufficient extraordinary support to RIC in the event
of financial distress. The ratings also incorporate RIC's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP), which S&P assess at 'ccc+' owing to
the evolving nature of the company's medium-term business
strategy, RIC's lack of a track record, and a management with
limited experience in commercial investment activity.
In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities
(GREs), its view of a "high" likelihood of extraordinary
government support is based on its assessment of RIC's:
-- "Important" role in implementing Sakha's investment
program. In line with RIC's new strategy as of 2012, its
key aims include completing a railroad and other regional
transport and social infrastructure started under its
initial mandate, attracting off-budget financing for
infrastructure and business projects in Sakha, and
managing assets that the republic will transfer to it.
-- However, RIC doesn't provide essential public services
and, in S&P's view, credit stress or interruption of its
operations wouldn't have a systemic impact on the regional
economy; and
-- "Very strong" link with Sakha's government, which owns 100%
of RIC and doesn't plan to privatize it at least until
2017. Sakha outlines RIC's strategy, closely monitors its
operations, and approves its development strategy and
investment projects. Sakha also appoints RIC's board of
directors, which currently consists solely of Sakha
government officials.
-- Nevertheless, Sakha doesn't currently provide an explicit
guarantee for the timely repayment of RIC's debt.
Accordingly, the rating on RIC is two notches higher than the
SACP of 'ccc+'. The SACP reflects RIC's lack of a track record,
its management's limited experience in commercial investment
activity, and high implementation risks related to its
development strategy. Currently, the strategy envisions
transforming RIC into a more commercially oriented company that
invests in equity and debt of companies in Sakha. However, S&P
do not exclude the possibility that, in the future, RIC will
mainly be investing in infrastructure and socially important
projects in Sakha.
RIC was set up by Sakha in 2006 as a special-purpose company to
sell Sakha's coal-mining assets and finance the construction of a
railroad and other infrastructure with the proceeds. RIC's new
strategy as of 2012 assumes that the company will finish its
initial infrastructure project, which was 94% complete as of
midyear 2013, transfer the infrastructure assets to Sakha and the
federal government at cost with zero profit, and then continue to
operate as a for-profit development institution. In its new
role, RIC will invest in businesses, infrastructure development,
and socially important projects in Sakha. S&P understands that
RIC will remain one of the Sakha government's tools to implement
its policy for infrastructure investment and economic
diversification. RIC will also manage the assets that Sakha will
transfer to it in line with its privatization program.
In S&P's view, the Sakha government's plan to transfer and sell
assets and use the proceeds is not very clear at this stage. In
2013, Sakha created a special purpose joint-stock company--RIC
Plus--through which it sold 7% of its shares in Alrosa, the
world's largest diamond mining company, for about Russian ruble
(RUB) 18 billion (about US$550 million). S&P understands the
Sakha government intends to use the proceeds from the sale to
finance construction of housing, social, and transport
infrastructure, and that RIC will manage these investments.
Moreover, S&P understands that later this year or early in 2014,
RIC will sign an agreement outlining its role as a management
company coordinating all of RIC Plus' operations. However, the
details of this agreement, including the amount of any management
fee, are yet to be determined. In S&P's view, this new mandate
is in line with RIC's existing strategy and doesn't affect its
view of RIC's role for or link with Sakha's government.
It remains to be seen how RIC's investment activity will develop
in the medium term. There are as yet no detailed strategic and
financial plans for RIC's future investment and financing
activities. Given RIC's very limited track record and unclear
investment targets, we currently assess the implementation and
execution risks related with the new strategy as very high.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that the high likelihood
of extraordinary government support that we anticipate for RIC
would counterbalance uncertainty regarding the company's new and
untested business model.
Any positive rating action within the next 12 months would be
subject to potential changes to the development strategy,
including RIC's investment and funding plan, and its relations
and agreement with RIC Plus, which are yet to be clarified.
S&P could lower the ratings on RIC within the next 12 months if
it observed a decrease in the likelihood of timely extraordinary
support from Sakha, due for example to RIC's lower importance for
Sakha's investment program than S&P currently assumes in its
base-case scenario. Negative developments in RIC's financial
profile might also put pressure on the SACP and, consequently, on
the ratings. However, if S&P downgraded Sakha it would not
immediately lower the ratings on RIC.
=========
S P A I N
=========
GRIFOLS SA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
long-term corporate credit rating at 'BB' on Spain-based global
specialty biopharmaceutical company Grifols S.A. The outlook is
stable.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' issue rating on Grifols'
senior secured bank debt. The recovery rating on this instrument
remains unchanged at '2', indicating S&P's expectation of
substantial (70%-90%) recovery in the event of a payment default.
S&P also affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on the unsecured notes
issued by fully owned U.S. subsidiary Grifols Inc. The recovery
rating on this instrument remains unchanged at '6', indicating
S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of
a payment default.
The rating affirmation reflects S&P's view that Grifols' recently
announced acquisition of Novartis' blood transfusion diagnostic
unit will only have a moderate impact on our assessment of
Grifols' business and finance risk profiles. In particular, S&P
projects that Grifols' metrics will remain commensurate with the
'BB' rating, primarily consisting of a Standard & Poor's-adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 3x-4x.
Grifols announced on Nov. 10, 2013, that it had signed a
definitive agreement to acquire the transfusion diagnostic unit
of Swiss pharma group Novartis for US$1.675 billion. Grifols
will finance the transaction through a US$1.5 billion six-year
bridge loan, while the remainder will be financed by cash from
Grifols' balance sheet.
S&P believes that this acquisition will moderately improve
Grifols' diversification while enhancing its vertical
integration. However, S&P believes this improvement will be only
moderate, and it continues to assess the company's business risk
as "satisfactory."
The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Grifols will
continue its strong performance and maintain an adjusted debt-to-
EBITDA ratio of less than 4x, despite its appetite for
acquisitions. This is due to Grifols' solid growth prospects,
strong cash generation, and limited returns to shareholders.
S&P could lower the rating if leverage increased to more than 4x.
Conversely, an upgrade could occur if Grifols reduced its debt
leverage to close to 3x on a sustainable basis, through a
combination of EBITDA growth and further debt repayments.
IM FTGENCAT: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on EUR19.8MM Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed IM FTGENCAT SABADELL 2's and GC
FTGENCAT SABADELL 1's notes as follows:
IM FTGENCAT
EUR150.6m Class A(G) notes: affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Stable Outlook
EUR19.8m Class B notes: affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate
50%
EUR5.7m Class C notes: affirmed at 'CCsf', RR 0%
GC FTGENCAT
EUR45.5m Class A(G) notes: affirmed at 'Asf'; Stable Outlook
EUR19.8m Class B notes: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Stable Outlook
EUR5.7m Class C notes: affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate
60%
Both transactions are securitization of finance leases on real
estate and certain other assets originated in Spain by Banco de
Sabadell (Sabadell, BB+/Stable/B).
Key Rating Drivers:
The affirmations reflect satisfactory collateral performance and
continuing de-leveraging of the pool. The ratings of IM FTGENCAT
also take into account its high and volatile delinquency and loss
ratios; as of end-September 2013 90+ day delinquencies were at
4%, cumulative defaults at 4.9% and cumulative losses at 3.1%.
For GC FTGENCAT, its stronger performance is reflected in the
higher rating, with 90+ days delinquencies at 0.7%, cumulative
defaults at 3.9% and cumulative losses at 2.4%.
Fitch has not given credit to recourse to real estate collateral
in rating scenarios above the Issuer Default Rating of Sabadell.
The majority of assets in the pool are lease installments backed
by real estate (RE). RE leasing contracts under Spanish law do
not offer the same level of security as mortgages. This is
because repossession proceeds would only be available after the
originator Sabadell has covered its residual value loss, provided
it is not insolvent. The Spanish legal framework indicates that
the SPV would only have an unsecured claim against the insolvency
estate of the originator, which would rank pari passu with all
other unsecured claims against the insolvency estate.
Fitch therefore limits its recovery expectations for rating
levels above the originator's and has revised its default and
loss base case assumptions to 9.5% and 6.7% for IM FTGENCAT and
6% and 4.2% for GC FTGENCAT.
Fitch believes that direct exposure to Sabadell as collateral
servicer remains unmitigated although the transactions have
mitigated counterparty risk on the SPV bank accounts, which are
now held by Banco de Espana for IM FTGENCAT and by Barclays Bank
plc, Spanish Branch (A/Stable/F1) for GC FTGENCAT - banks which
Fitch considers as eligible counterparties under its criteria.
Sabadell continues to be the interest rate swap provider in both
transactions. While Fitch has been made aware that Sabadell is
implementing a weekly collateralization mechanism in GC FTGENCAT,
no such arrangement is in place for IM FTGENCAT. Fitch has taken
into account this information and any impact of Sabadell as the
swap counterparty in line with its counterparty criteria for
structured finance transactions.
Only the lease receivables portion of the lease contracts is
securitized (excluding any residual value component). All
obligors are small and medium-sized enterprises located in the
region of Catalunya, the home region of the originator.
Rating Sensitivities:
IM FTGENCAT
Expected impact upon the note rating of increased defaults (Class
A (G); Class B; Class C):
Current Rating: 'BBBsf'; 'Bsf'; 'CCCsf'
Increase base case defaults by 10%: 'BBB-sf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
Increase base case defaults by 25%: 'BBB-sf'; 'CCsf'; 'CCsf'
Increase base case defaults by 50%: 'BB+sf'; 'CCsf'; 'CCsf'
Expected impact upon the note rating of decreased recoveries
(Class A (G); Class B; Class C):
Current Rating: 'BBBsf'; 'Bsf'; 'CCCsf'
Reduce base case recovery by 10%: 'BBBsf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
Reduce base case recovery by 25%: 'BBB-sf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
Reduce base case recovery by 50%: 'BBB-sf'; 'CCsf'; 'CCsf'
Expected impact upon the note rating of increased defaults and
decreased recoveries (Class A (G); Class B; Class C):
Current Rating: 'BBBsf'; 'Bsf'; 'CCCsf'
Increase default base case by 10%; reduce recovery base case by
10%: 'BBB-sf'; 'CCsf'; 'CCsf'
Increase default base case by 25%; reduce recovery base case by
25%: 'BB+sf'; 'CCsf'; 'CCsf'
Increase default base case by 50%; reduce recovery base case by
50%: 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'; 'CCsf'
GC FTGENCAT
Expected impact upon the note rating of increased defaults (Class
A (G); Class B; Class C):
Current Rating: 'Asf'; 'BBsf'; 'CCCsf'
Increase base case defaults by 10%: 'Asf'; 'B+sf'; 'CCCsf'
Increase base case defaults by 25%: 'Asf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
Increase base case defaults by 50%: 'Asf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
Expected impact upon the note rating of decreased recoveries
(Class A (G); Class B; Class C):
Current Rating: 'Asf'; 'BBsf'; 'CCCsf'
Reduce base case recovery by 10%: 'Asf'; 'BB-sf'; 'CCCsf'
Reduce base case recovery by 25%: 'Asf'; 'B+sf'; 'CCCsf'
Reduce base case recovery by 50%: 'Asf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
Expected impact upon the note rating of increased defaults and
decreased recoveries (Class A (G); Class B; Class C):
Current Rating: 'Asf'; 'BBsf'; 'CCCsf'
Increase default base case by 10%; reduce recovery base case by
10%: 'Asf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
Increase default base case by 25%; reduce recovery base case by
25%: 'Asf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
Increase default base case by 50%; reduce recovery base case by
50%: 'BBBsf'; 'CCCsf'; 'CCsf'
PYMES SANTANDER 6: S&P Assigns Prelim. CC Rating to Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned preliminary credit
ratings to Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos PYMES SANTANDER 6's
class A, B, and C notes.
The issuer is a "fondo de titulizacion de activos" (a Spanish
special-purpose entity established to issue the notes), which S&P
considers to be in line with its European legal criteria.
S&P's preliminary ratings on the class A and B notes reflect its
assessment of the transaction's credit and cash flow
characteristics, as well as its analysis of the transaction's
exposure to counterparty, legal, and operational risks. For the
class A notes, S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit
enhancement is sufficient to mitigate the transaction's exposure
to credit and cash flow risks at a higher rating level than 'A
(sf)'. S&P considers that the class A notes can withstand all of
its relevant cash flow stresses applicable at a 'AA+ (sf)' rating
level. However, the transaction's exposure to counterparty risk
caps at 'A (sf)' its preliminary rating on the class A notes
under its current counterparty criteria.
As the class C notes are not an asset-backed security, the issuer
will use the class C notes' issuance proceeds to fund the initial
reserve fund.
This transaction is exposed to counterparty risk through Banco
Santander S.A. as bank account provider, holding the payment
account and the cash reserve account. Banco Santander is also
the originator and servicer of the loans. The transaction's
downgrade provisions state that if the rating on the bank account
provider falls below 'BBB/A-3', the issuer would have to find a
suitably rated replacement within 60 calendar days. Banco
Santander would bear any costs arising from the remedy action.
This counterparty risk exposure is classified as "bank account
limited" under S&P's current counterparty criteria, which cap at
'A (sf)' the transaction's maximum achievable rating.
S&P's European small and midsize enterprise (SME) collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) criteria contain supplemental stress tests.
S&P determined that the maximum achievable rating for the class A
notes is 'A (sf)'. Consequently, the largest industry and the
largest region default tests are not applicable under S&P's
criteria. The transaction's current capital structure passes the
largest obligor default test, which is the only stress test
applicable under S&P's criteria.
At closing, the transaction will have a reserve fund, which will
provide credit enhancement to the class A and B notes. This will
pay interest and principal shortfalls on the class A and B notes
during the transaction's life. The proceeds of the issuance of
the class C notes will fully fund the reserve fund at closing.
The reserve fund's initial amount will be 20% of the initial
collateral balance, and the issuer will deposit it in a treasury
account held with Banco Santander.
There will be no interest rate swap agreement in place to hedge
the transaction's exposure to interest rate risk arising from the
mismatch between the interest rate paid under the assets and the
interest rate paid under the notes.
As is typical in other Spanish transactions, interest and
principal will be combined into a single priority of payments,
with an interest deferral trigger for the class B notes, based on
cumulative defaults. Principal for the class B notes will be
fully subordinated to the class A notes.
The class A and B notes will pay floating-rate interest quarterly
(three-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate [EURIBOR] plus a 1.5%
and 1.6% margin, respectively). The class C notes will also pay
floating-rate interest. However, they are subordinated and
entitled to a distribution amount, depending on the extent of the
available funds.
Fondo de PYMES SANTANDER 6 securitizes a static pool of secured
and unsecured loans, which Banco Santander granted to Spanish
SMEs and self-employed borrowers.
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CRITERIA CHANGES
These preliminary ratings are based on S&P's applicable criteria,
including those set out in the criteria article.
As a result of this review, S&P's future criteria applicable to
ratings above the sovereign may differ from its current criteria.
This potential criteria change may affect the ratings on all
outstanding notes in this transaction. S&P will continue to rate
and surveil these notes using its existing criteria.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.
The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/2000.pdf
RATINGS LIST
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, PYMES SANTANDER 6
EUR408 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Class Prelim. Prelim.
rating amount
(mil. EUR)
A A (sf) 234.60
B B+ (sf) 105.40
C CC (sf) 68.00
SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 3: Fitch Cuts Rating on Cl. B Tranche to CC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 1 and affirmed 7 tranches of FTA
Santander Hipotecario 3. The recovery estimates have been
reduced.
The rating actions are as follows:
FTA Santander Hipotecario 3:
Class A1 (ISIN ES0338093000) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Oulook
Negative;
Class A2 (ISIN ES03 38093018) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Oulook
Negative;
Class A3 (ISIN ES0338093026) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Oulook
Negative;
Class B (ISIN ES0338093034) downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
Recovery Estimate 0%;
Class C (ISIN ES0338093042) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%;
Class D (ISIN ES0338093059) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%;
Class E (ISIN ES0338093067) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%;
Class F (ISIN ES0338093075) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
Key Rating Drivers:
Weak performance and significant principal deficiency
The collateral pool continues to deteriorate since our last
credit review in November 2012. The current ratio of arrears over
90 days (excluding defaults) stands at 2.1% of the current pool
balance, while gross cumulative defaults (defined as loans in
arrears by more than 18 months) reach 6.5% relative to the
original pool balance.
The underlying pool is composed of loans originated at the peak
of the housing market in Spain and are characterized by extremely
high loan-to value (LTV) ratios (original weighted average LTV of
92.4% and weighted average un-indexed current LTV of 90.2%).
Fitch incorporated this in the analysis by applying a higher
default probability to the underlying pool.
The gross excess spread available to the rated notes has not been
sufficient to compensate the provisioning requirements on
defaulted assets, and therefore an uncleared principal deficiency
ledger of EUR186 million remains (equivalent to 11.9% of the
notes balance). In addition, the cash reserve fund has been fully
depleted since October 2008 Interest Payment Date (IPD).
Limited recoveries
Given the very large pipeline of defaults which are pending to
crystallize recoveries, Fitch has incorporated into the credit
analysis a more conservative assumption in terms of recovery
timing and amounts. As of July 2013 IPD, the magnitude of
recoveries on defaulted assets amounted to only 54.7%.
High Market Value Declines (MVD)
Fitch has observed a higher than sector average MVD of 73.9% on
the properties backing the defaulted loans, following their
repossession and subsequently sale into the market. This property
price correction has been included in our recovery analysis.
Rating Sensitivities:
A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
unemployment, and/or material weakening of the property market
dynamics beyond our current expectations could negatively affect
the ratings of this transaction.
TDA 24: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'CCsf'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded nine and affirmed 13 tranches of TDA
24, 25, 27 and 28, four Spanish RMBS transactions. The recovery
estimates were reduced.
The rating actions are as follows:
TDA 24:
Class A1 (ISIN ES0377952009) downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
Outlook Negative;
Class A2 (ISIN ES0377952017) downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
Outlook Negative;
Class B (ISIN ES0377952025) downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
Recovery Estimate 0%;
Class C (ISIN ES0377952033) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%;
Class D (ISIN ES0377952041) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
TDA 25:
Class A (ISIN ES0377929007) downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
Recovery Estimate 50%;
Class B (ISIN ES0377929015) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%;
Class C (ISIN ES0377929023) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%;
Class D (ISIN ES0377929031) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
TDA 27:
Class A2 (ISIN ES0377954013) downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
Outlook Negative;
Class A3 (ISIN ES0377954021) downgraded to 'Bf' from 'BBsf';
Outlook Negative;
Class B (ISIN ES0377954039) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
Recovery Estimate 0%;
Class C (ISIN ES0377954047) downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
Recovery Estimate 0%;
Class D (ISIN ES0377954054) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%;
Class E (ISIN ES0377954062) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%;
Class F (ISIN ES0377954070) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
TDA 28:
Class A (ISIN ES0377930005) downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
Recovery Estimate 70%;
Class B (ISIN ES0377930013) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
Class C (ISIN ES0377930021) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
Class D (ISIN ES0377930039) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
Class E (ISIN ES0377930047) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
Class F (ISIN ES0377930054) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 0%.
Key Rating Drivers:
Weak Performance and Significant Principal Deficiencies
The collateral pools continue to deteriorate since Fitch's last
credit review in November 2012. The current ratio of arrears over
90 days (excluding defaults) stand in a range between 2.2% (TDA
24) and 7.4% (TDA 25) of the current pool balance across these
four transactions, while gross cumulative defaults (defined as
loans in arrears by more than 12 months) reach a level in the
range of 7% (TDA 24) and 23.2% (TDA 25) relative to the original
pools balance.
The underlying pools of these transactions are composed of loans
originated at the peak of the housing market in Spain and are
characterized by significant shares of broker origination
particularly linked to loans originated by Credifimo (unrated).
Credifimo share in today's portfolios ranges from 24.2% (TDA 27)
to 84.7% (TDA 25).
The combination of limited gross excess spread, large volumes of
new defaults and very limited recoveries from repossessed
properties has caused the depletion of the cash reserve funds in
all four transactions and also the continued built up of
principal deficiency ledgers (PDL), between EUR19.8 million. (TDA
24) and EUR84.8 million (TDA 28). These arguments explain the
downgrades of all senior most tranches across the four RMBS
transactions in scope.
Nearly Zero Recovery Cash Flows
Recovery cash flows across these transactions are extremely weak.
The very large pipeline of defaults is yet to deliver any
meaningful recovery. In light of such poor track record of
recoveries and foreclosure management, Fitch has decided to give
no credit at all to future cash flows from existing defaulted
accounts within its analysis.
High Market Value Declines (MVD)
Fitch has observed a higher than sector average MVD of 72.5% on
the properties backing the defaulted loans, following their
repossession and subsequently sale into the market. This property
price correction has been included in our recovery analysis.
Rating Sensitivities:
A worsening of the Spanish macroeconomic environment, especially
unemployment, and / or material weakening of the property market
dynamics beyond Fitch's current expectations could negatively
affect the ratings of these transactions.
=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================
NUANCE GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating to Swiss travel retailer The Nuance Group
AG (Nuance). The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the
EUR200 million senior secured notes, due 2019, issued by a Nuance
subsidiary, Stampos B.V. The recovery rating on the notes is
'3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%)
recovery prospects for debtholders in the event of a payment
default.
The rating on Nuance reflects S&P's view of the group's "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile and "fair" business risk
profile, as S&P's criteria define these terms.
S&P's assessment of Nuance's business risk profile reflects the
group's operating trends in the duty-free retail market, which is
exposed to global trends in travel and to the successful
management of its airport concessions.
S&P views Nuance as a leading global player in the growing, but
volatile, retail travel industry. Nuance's market share of about
10% in this highly fragmented airport retail segment makes the
group the second-largest operator in the world. However, a
series of adverse events--lossmaking concessions in Australia and
the loss of a key concession in Hong Kong--will likely result in
a decline of sales and profitability in 2013, which the group
will be able to only partly offset through growth in other
regions.
While some of Nuance's concessions are due for renegotiation
before 2015, S&P notes that the group's portfolio concentration
is relatively high: The top 10 concessions represent 66% of
group turnover. One of the top 10 concessions, representing 8%
of group sales, will expire within the next two years.
Therefore, S&P do not exclude a scenario in which new losses in
concessions could prevent the group from realizing its
deleveraging plans. That said, Nuance's good geographic
diversification, thanks to its presence in 18 countries across
the world, and its low fixed-cost base are mitigants against the
risk of further adverse operating events, in S&P's opinion.
S&P's assessment of the financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged" factors in the sizable presence of a financial sponsor
in the group's shareholder structure. It also reflects S&P's
view that, under its base-case scenario for the group's earnings,
Nuance's adjusted debt to EBITDA (including the subordinated
long-term shareholder loan) will remain at 5.0x-5.5x and adjusted
EBITDA cash interest cover (excluding noncash interest) will be
about 3.0x over the next two years. S&P acknowledges that
further unexpected adverse events in operations could prevent the
group from deleveraging beyond this time horizon. This is
because deleveraging depends to a large extent on EBITDA growth,
which, in S&P's view, is not a given. Nevertheless, the factors
supporting Nuance's financial risk profile are the group's
capacity to generate positive free cash flow, its comparatively
good interest cover, and the relatively low interest rate on the
subordinated long-term shareholder loan. Free cash flow is
buoyed by Nuance's relatively low capital expenditure needs,
which even under the current investment program do not exceed 2%
of revenues, and its low fixed-cost base.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, despite recent
operating setbacks, Nuance will likely maintain adjusted debt to
EBITDA of 5.0x-5.5x in the next 12 months, while adjusted cash
interest cover should remain close to 3.0x. This includes S&P's
view that growth in other regions will help to mitigate ongoing
losses in the Asia-Pacific region, and that the 2013 sales will
not exceed mid-single-digit percentage levels and EBITDA margin
decline will not exceed 50 basis points. This should enable the
company to continue generating positive free cash flow.
S&P could consider a positive rating action if improving
operations -- notably a turnaround in Nuance's Australian
operations -- caused the group's adjusted debt to EBITDA to
improve to below 4.5x and adjusted cash interest cover to improve
above 3.0x, supported by a financial policy that excludes
releveraging. S&P do not think this is likely over the coming 12
months, though.
S&P could take a negative rating action if regulatory or event
risks, or lower-than-expected operating performance, led to new
setbacks in operating trends, causing adjusted debt to EBITDA to
approach 6.0x and adjusted cash interest cover to approach 2.5x.
S&P thinks this scenario could materialize if Nuance's 2013 sales
decline exceeded mid-single-digit percentage levels, which is not
within its current base-case scenario.
=============
U K R A I N E
=============
UKREXIMBANK: Fitch Cuts Long-Term IDR to 'B-'; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the foreign currency Long-term
Issuer Default ratings (IDRs) of JSC The State Export-Import Bank
of Ukraine (Ukreximbank), JSC State Savings Bank of Ukraine
(Oschadbank), PJSC CB PrivatBank (Privat), Public Joint Stock
Company UkrSibbank, Ukrsotsbank (Ukrsots), PJSC VTB Bank (VTBU),
ProCredit Bank (Ukraine), PJSCCB Pravex-Bank (Pravex) and PJSC
Credit Agricole Bank (CAB) to 'B-' from 'B'. The Outlooks on the
Long-term IDRs are Negative. At the same time, the agency has
affirmed the Long-term IDRs of PJSC Alfa-Bank (ABU) and Pivdennyi
Bank (PB) at 'B-' and revised the Outlooks to Negative from
Stable.
Key Rating Drivers - IDRs, Senior Debt, Support Ratings and
Support Rating Floors:
The rating actions follow Fitch's downgrade of Ukraine's Long-
term foreign and local currency IDRs to 'B-' from 'B' with a
Negative Outlook. The Country Ceiling was also downgraded to 'B-'
from 'B'.
The downgrades of Oschadbank and Ukreximbank reflect the reduced
ability of the government to provide support in case of need, as
reflected by the downgrade of Ukraine's Long-term IDRs. In
Ukreximbank's case, the downgrade of the Long-term IDRs also
reflects the downgrade of the bank's Viability Rating (VR), which
is closely linked to the sovereign credit profile. Fitch still
believes the authorities' propensity to provide support to
Oschadbank and Ukreximbank would be high, based on their 100%-
state ownership, policy roles, high systemic importance, and the
track record of capital support for the banks under different
governments.
The downgrade of PrivatBank's Long-term IDR reflects the
downgrade of the bank's VR.
The downgrades of the foreign currency Long-term IDRs of
UkrSibbank, Ukrsots, VTBU, ProCredit Ukraine, Pravex and CAB are
in line with the downgrade of Ukraine's Country Ceiling, which
reflects Fitch's view of the increased risk of transfer and
convertibility restrictions being introduced. Such restrictions
could limit the extent to which support from the majority foreign
shareholders of these banks could be utilized to service the
banks' obligations. The banks' 'B' Long-term local currency IDRs
also take into account Ukrainian country risks.
The IDRs, Support and senior debt ratings of these six banks are
driven by the likelihood of support the banks may receive from
their majority shareholders. UkrSibbank is 85%-owned by BNP
Paribas (A+/Stable); Ukrsots is 98.64%-owned by UniCredit S.p.A.
(BBB+/Negative) through its Vienna subsidiary UniCredit Bank
Austria AG (A/Stable); VTBU is more than 99%-owned by Russia's
JSC Bank VTB (BBB/Negative); ProCredit Ukraine is controlled (60%
of voting stock) by Germany's ProCredit Holding AG & Co. KGaA.
(BBB-/Stable); Pravex is fully owned by Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
(BBB+/Negative); and CAB is fully owned by Credit Agricole S.A.
(A/Stable).
The Negative Outlooks on the above nine banks, and the revision
of the Outlooks on the Long-term IDRs of ABU and PB to Negative,
reflect the potential for a further downgrade of Ukraine's
Country Ceiling given the Negative Outlook on Ukraine's sovereign
ratings. PB's ratings are driven by its standalone credit
strength, as captured by its VR. ABU's IDRs and senior debt
ratings are driven by Fitch's view on potential support the bank
may receive from other assets controlled by its main
shareholders, including from its sister bank, Russia-based OJSC
Alfa-Bank (AB; BBB-/Stable), which holds a minority 19.9% stake
in ABU.
Rating Sensitivities - IDRs, Senior Debt, Support Rating Floors:
The Long-term IDRs and senior debt ratings of all 11 banks, and
the Support Rating Floors of Ukreximbank and Oschadbank, could be
downgraded further if Ukraine's Country Ceiling was downgraded
again as a result of a sovereign downgrade.
UkrSibbank, Ukrsots, Pravex, VTBU and ABU could also be
downgraded if they were sold to weaker shareholders. In Fitch's
view, UkrSibbank, Ukrsots and Pravex are of limited importance
for their groups' franchises, and the sales of these banks cannot
be excluded over the medium term. However, VTBU and ABU represent
more strategic holdings of their owners, in Fitch's view, making
disposals less likely. The foreign currency Long-term IDRs of CAB
and ProCredit Ukraine are underpinned by their VRs, and so would
not be downgraded even in the (unlikely) event of the banks being
sold.
Privat and PB, whose IDRs are driven by their VRs, could also be
downgraded in case of a sharp deterioration in their standalone
credit profiles, in particular a major asset quality
deterioration or a loss of liquidity.
A revision of the sovereign Outlook to Stable would help the
ratings of all 11 banks to stabilize at their current levels.
Key Rating Drivers - VRs:
The downgrades of the VRs of Ukreximbank, Privat and CAB to 'b-'
from 'b' reflect Fitch's view that in common with other banks in
Ukraine, these banks have limited resilience to risks stemming
from the deteriorating sovereign credit profile and operating
environment. Banks' asset quality, capital and liquidity
positions are likely to be highly sensitive to the performance of
the economy and any marked depreciation of the Ukrainian hryvna.
The downgrade of Ukreximbank's VR also reflects the significant
correlation between the bank's and the sovereign credit profiles,
notwithstanding the sizable capital buffer, due to (i) the bank's
large exposure to sovereign debt and the public sector more
generally, and some risk that this exposure could grow in case of
increased stress; and (ii) the likelihood that refinancing
challenges relating to the bank's maturing external debt would
increase in case of a sovereign default.
The affirmation of Oschadbank's and PB's VRs at 'b-', reflects
limited changes in the banks' standalone credit profiles since
their last reviews in July 2013.
Rating Sensitivities - VRs:
The 'b-' VRs of Ukreximbank, Oschadbank, Privat, CAB, PB and
ProCredit Ukraine could be further downgraded in case of a sharp
deterioration in their standalone credit metrics and/or Fitch's
expectation that deterioration is likely as a result of continued
weakening of the operating environment. Stabilization of the
operating environment would reduce downward pressure on the
ratings.
Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - Ukreximbank's Subordinated
Debt:
The downgrade of Ukreximbank's subordinated debt rating reflects
the downgrade of the bank's VR. The rating is sensitive to any
further changes in the bank's VR.
Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - National Ratings:
The affirmation of the banks' National Ratings with Stable
Outlooks reflects Fitch's view that the creditworthiness of the
banks relative to each other and to other Ukrainian issuers has
not changed significantly as a result of the sovereign downgrade.
The rating actions are as follows:
Ukreximbank:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured debt of Biz Finance PLC: downgraded to 'B-'from
'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'
Subordinated debt: downgraded to 'CC' from 'CCC'; Recovery
Rating 'RR5'
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'B-' from 'B'
VR: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook
Stable
Oschadbank:
Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: downgraded to 'B-'
from 'B'; Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured debt of SSB No.1 PLC: downgraded to 'B-' from
'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4'
Support Rating Floor: revised to 'B-' from 'B'
VR: affirmed at 'b-'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook
Stable
PJSC CB PrivatBank:
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B'; Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured debt of UK SPV Credit Finance plc: downgraded
to 'B-'from 'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
VR: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'A-(ukr)'; Outlook Stable
PJSC UkrSibbank:
Long-Term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
Outlook Negative
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'B+',
Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt: downgraded to 'B'/'RR4'
from 'B+', affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'
Short-Term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4'
VR: 'cc', not affected
National Long-Term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)', Outlook
'Stable'
Ukrsotsbank:
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
Outlook Negative
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'B+',
Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt: downgraded to 'B'/'RR4'
from 'B+', affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'
Upcoming senior unsecured local currency debt: downgraded to
'B(EXP)'/'RR4' from 'B+ (EXP)', affirmed at 'AAA (EXP)(ukr)'
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4'
VR: 'ccc', not affected
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook
Stable
PJSC VTB Bank:
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
Outlook Negative
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'B+',
Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt: downgraded to 'B'/'RR4'
from 'B+', affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4'
VR: 'ccc', not affected
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook
Stable
ProCredit Bank (Ukraine):
Long-Term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
Outlook Negative
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'B+',
Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt: downgraded to 'B'/'RR4'
from 'B+', affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'
Short-Term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4'
VR: 'b-', not affected
National Long-Term rating affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)', Outlook
'Stable'
Pravex:
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
Outlook Negative
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'B+',
Outlook Negative
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4'
VR: 'ccc', not affected
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook
Stable
CAB:
Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
Outlook Negative
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'B+',
Outlook Negative
Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: downgraded to '5' from '4'
VR: downgraded to 'b-' from 'b'
National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)', Outlook
Stable
PJSC Alfa-Bank:
Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B-',
Outlook revised to Negative from Stable
Senior unsecured local currency debt: affirmed at 'B-'/'RR4' and
'BBB-(ukr)'
Upcoming senior unsecured local currency debt: affirmed at 'B-
(EXP)'/'RR4' and 'BBB-(EXP)(ukr) '
Senior unsecured debt of Alfa Ukrfinance LLC: affirmed at 'B-';
Recovery Rating 'RR4'
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
VR: 'ccc', not affected
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB-(ukr)', Outlook
Stable
Pivdennyi Bank
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook revised to Negative
from Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
VR: affirmed at 'b-'
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B', on Watch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded The Co-operative Bank Plc's (Co-op
Bank) Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' from 'BB-' and placed it
on Rating Watch Negative (RWN). The Viability Rating (VR) has
been downgraded to 'c' from 'bb-'.
Key Rating Drivers - IDRs and Senior Debt:
The downgrade of the IDRs and senior debt ratings reflects the
implications that Fitch considers the bank's revised strategy is
likely to have on its internal capital generation ability. This
is particularly important for the ratings in light of
management's forecasted common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio
following the bank's anticipated recapitalization by way of a
planned liability management exercise (LME) on junior debt and a
capital injection from shareholders.
When Fitch last reviewed the bank's ratings on June 20, 2013, the
fully loaded Basel III CET1 ratio was projected to reach 9% by
end-2013 following a planned LME and increase thereafter. It is
now likely CET1 will start from a lower level following the
bank's planned recapitalization (the upper end of a 7%-9%
guidance) and that it is unlikely to improve materially from this
level in the foreseeable future, with potential further erosion
in the following two years at least. New disclosures show greater
weaknesses in some non-core portfolios since June.
Along with the higher execution risks of Co-op Bank's revised
strategy, which calls for significant cost-cutting and balance
sheet deleveraging, the full extent of historical IT
underinvestment has led to Co-op Bank announcing GBP500m of
mandatory and strategic development costs over three years, which
will impinge more on profitability than expected.
As a result, Fitch considers that the new strategy, including the
deleveraging of some non-core portfolios, while ultimately
beneficial for senior debt holders in the long term if
successful, to pose significant challenges over the medium term
and preclude the bank from being capital-generative for some
time. In addition, Fitch believes that the reduction of the Co-
operative Group's stake to 30% as a result of the LME has the
capacity to diminish Co-op Bank's small but stable domestic
franchise and loyal customer base. The ratings factor in some
benefit from Co-op Bank's acceptable liquidity and so far stable
funding profile.
The RWN reflects Fitch's belief that there are still material
risks to the success of the LME, which is scheduled to be
completed by end-December 2013. While the IDR reflects the
underlying risks inherent in the strategy and potential tail
risks over the rating horizon should the LME be successful, the
RWN signals that if the LME fails the bank would likely be placed
in resolution (Co-op Bank has confirmed this possibility in the
prospectus for the LME), at which point the IDR would likely be
downgraded to 'D'.
The senior debt has been assigned a Recovery Rating of 'RR4' in
line with our 'Recovery Ratings for Financial Institutions'
criteria. This reflects Fitch's expectation that in the event of
a default, recoveries on unsecured senior debt would be in the
range of 31% to 50%, due to the bank's considerable share of
encumbered assets (about 29% at end-1H13), potential additional
stress for the loan book and a reduced Tier 2 buffer after the
LME.
Management has indicated that it does not expect Co-op Bank to be
profitable in 2013 or 2014 and cannot guarantee profitability
after that. This lack of underlying profitability severely
constrains Co-op Bank from being capital generative in the medium
term. Fitch also considers potential significant conduct redress
to be a further risk to the bank's capital base.
Significant downside risk associated with the asset quality of
the non-core portfolio remains. Furthermore, non-core, non-prime
and commercial loan portfolios (44% of gross loans at end-1H13)
have fair values well below their carrying values, which is
likely to hinder the pace of deleveraging, leaving material tail
risk in the portfolio for several years. This could cause a
larger spike in credit impairment charges, damaging the bank's
capital ratios.
Rating Sensitivities - IDRs and Senior Debt:
The bank's IDR's and senior debt ratings are on RWN and will be
downgraded if the LME is not successfully completed.
If the LME is successfully completed, the ratings would remain
sensitive to the extent of losses incurred from restructuring and
credit impairment charges as well as strategic drift. Fitch
considers that the current strategy leaves very little margin for
error and downside risk still exists for the IDR if the combined
weak operating performance and asset quality impairments become
significantly destructive to capital ratios.
The ratings are also sensitive to a revision of strategy
following the change in ownership structure.
Upside potential is limited until the bank becomes capital
generative.
Key Rating Drivers - VR:
The VR has been downgraded to 'c' as Fitch considers the terms of
the offer to represent a distressed debt exchange for
subordinated debt holders and the enforcement of losses on them
is considered a failure of the bank under Fitch's definitions. At
the same time, senior creditors (the obligor category best
represented by the IDR) will benefit from a successful LME.
Consequently, as an exception to Fitch's 'Global Financial
Institutions Rating Criteria', dated 15 August 2012, Co-op Bank's
VR and Long-term IDR are no longer aligned.
Rating Sensitivities - VR:
The VR would likely be downgraded to 'f' on completion of the LME
as subordinated bondholders realize losses in order to restore
the bank's viability. The VR would then be upgraded to the
appropriate level reflecting the bank's underlying
creditworthiness. In Co-op Bank's case, Fitch considers that the
successful completion of the LME and consequent recapitalization
of the bank would restore the bank to a viable position and the
VR would likely be upgraded to 'b', realigning it with the Long-
term IDR.
Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - Support Rating and Support
Rating Floor:
The bank's Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating Floor of 'NF'
have been affirmed and are consistent with Fitch's view of a
clear political intention to ultimately reduce implicit support
for banks in the UK. Fitch does not expect any change to these
ratings.
Key Rating Drivers - Subordinated Debt and Other Hybrid
Securities:
The rating actions on Co-op Bank's subordinated debt are driven
by expected non-performance of these instruments and taking into
account expected recoveries in line with the proposed LME terms.
The recoveries were calculated based on the net present value of
expected cash flows of the exchange proceeds in comparison with
the original net present value of these instruments using a
discount rate of 5% in both cases (for more information on
Fitch's approach to ratings of non-performing hybrid obligations
see, 'Assessing and Rating Bank Subordinated and Hybrid
Securities', dated 5 December 2012).
Fitch has affirmed the bank's 5.5555% upper Tier 2 perpetual
securities at 'CC' and assigned a 'RR3' Recovery Rating. The 13%
upper Tier 2 note has been downgraded to 'C' from 'CC' and 'RR4'
has been assigned. All other subordinated securities have been
downgraded to 'C' from 'CC' and 'RR5' has been assigned.
Rating Sensitivities - Subordinated Debt and Other Hybrid
Securities:
If the LME is successful, Fitch would likely withdraw the ratings
on the hybrid instruments, reflecting that they have been
extinguished.
The rating actions are as follows:
Longterm IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'BB-'; placed on RWN
Shortterm IDR: 'B' placed on RWN
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'c' from 'bb-', removed from RWE
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'NF'
Senior unsecured notes' Long-term rating: downgraded to 'B' from
'BB-'/'RR4'; placed on RWN
Senior unsecured notes' Short-term rating: 'B' placed on RWN
5.5555% Upper Tier 2 securities GB00B3VMBW45: 'CC'/'RR3'; placed
on RWN
13% Upper Tier 2 securities GB00B3VH4201: downgraded to
'C'/'RR4', from 'CC', removed from RWE
Lower Tier 2 subordinated notes: downgraded to 'C'/'RR5', from
'CC', removed from RWE
HIBU PLC: Shareholders Balk at Administration Threat
----------------------------------------------------
Christopher Williams at The Telegraph reports that Hibu plc
shareholders fear their campaign to force the directors to
account for decisions leading up to the collapse of the Yellow
Pages publisher will be foiled by moves this week to call in
administrators.
According to The Telegraph, at an Emergency General Meeting
scheduled for Dec. 4, a series of motions will call on
Bob Wigley, the chairman of Hibu, and other board members to give
details of their role in the business.
Lenders won control of Hibu in July in a debt for equity deal
that left shareholders with nothing, The Telegraph recounts.
Hibu was GBP2.3 billion in debt following an acquisition spree in
the 2000s before the present management team or Mr. Wigley were
in place, The Telegraph recounts.
About 700 private shareholders have banded together to force the
EGM after Hibu said their consent was not required to turn the
business over to lenders, who agreed to an GBP800 million
haircut, The Telegraph discloses.
But it is understood that talks to take the company into
administration before it re-emerges as a new company focused on
the internet are well advanced and likely to be completed before
the scheduled confrontation, The Telegraph notes. The new Hibu
will be owned by the old company's creditors, The Telegraph says.
Waqas Chaudhry, a member of the Hibu Shareholders Group steering
committee, claimed Hibu directors had failed to comply with
duties to call a meeting when the company's liabilities massively
outstripped its assets after a GBP2 billion goodwill write-down
earlier this year, The Telegraph relates.
The activists also aim to install their own directors, which Hibu
claims would be pointless because its deal with creditors means
the board have to act in their interests, not those of
shareholders, The Telegraph relays.
A Hibu spokesman, as cited by The Telegraph, said Mr. Wigley had
been "completely open" about his dealing and had lost a
significant amount of money on Hibu.
The company said it had complied with the law on calling
meetings, The Telegraph notes. Mr. Wigley has said the directors
tried to secure some return for shareholders but that the deal as
planned will safeguard a future for the company and its 12,000
staff, according to The Telegraph.
Hibu operates in the UK, US, Spain, Argentina, Chile, Peru and US
Hispanic markets. In the twelve months to March 31, 2013, hibu
had one million SME customers and total revenues of GBP1.3
billion.
TRITON PLC: S&P Withdraws B Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its credit ratings on
Triton (European Loan Conduit No. 26) PLC's class A1, A2, D, and
E notes. The transaction's other rated classes of notes are
unaffected by the withdrawals.
The withdrawals follow the redemption of the class A1, A2, D, and
E notes.
Triton (European Loan Conduit No. 26) is a U.K. CMBS transaction
that closed in April 2007. The transaction is currently backed
by one loan secured on a portfolio of U.K. office premises. The
notes' legal final maturity date is Oct. 25, 2019.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating Rating
To From
Triton (European Loan Conduit No. 26) PLC
GBP556.65 Million, US$87.309 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Withdrawn
A1 NR A (sf)
A2 NR A (sf)
D NR B+ (sf)
E NR B (sf)
Ratings Unaffected
B BB+ (sf)
C B+ (sf)
F B (sf)
NR-Not rated.
VICTORIA FUNDING: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to 'Dsf'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Victoria Funding (EMC III) plc's
class E notes and withdrawn the rating, as follows:
GBP0.0m class D (XS0231023077): Paid in full
GBP0.0m class E (XS0231024802): downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
Recovery Estimate RE0%; rating withdrawn
Key Rating Drivers:
As a result of the resolution of the sole remaining loan, the
Brisk loan, the class D notes received principal back in full at
the October 2013 interest payment date (IPD), while, as expected,
a principal loss of GBP1.0 million was borne by the class E
noteholders, reflected in the downgrade to 'Dsf'. As this also
marks the end of the issuer's active life, the class E note
balance was extinguished and the rating has been withdrawn.
The Brisk loan had missed interest payments for some time prior
to resolution, magnifying the issuer's claim against the borrower
in respect of unpaid interest. In the meantime, drawings on the
liquidity facility had enabled the issuer to meet its periodic
obligations. However, and unusually in Fitch's view, recovery
proceeds in this transaction were documented in such a way as to
prioritize principal claims over interest claims, which is an
inversion of the conventional priority. This had the effect of
increasing the recorded loan principal recovery (although not
sufficiently to avoid a principal loss) at the expense of
imposing a full interest loss.
As with most EMEA CMBS, Victoria Funding had two features: a pre-
enforcement waterfall regime that treated interest and principal
separately; and cancellation of the liquidity facility on the
final payment date. Given the peculiar treatment of loan
recoveries that led to zero interest recoveries, no amounts were
allocated to the interest waterfall on the final IPD. Some
principal was transferred across to cover senior expenses,
including repayment of the liquidity facility, but no interest
was paid to noteholders. However, the shortfall on the class D
notes was GBP880, considered immaterial from a ratings
perspective.
Moreover, the interest shortfall on the class D notes could have
been avoided if the trustee had acted on the issuer's declaration
in October, once the Brisk loan has been resolved but prior to
the final note IPD, that it considered itself insolvent (using
the balance sheet test). If this had been considered a note event
of default by the trustee, it could have led to a switch to the
post-enforcement waterfall, combining interest and principal and
thus allowing recovery amounts to be applied against note
interest.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
EUROPE: Germany Challenges to Use EU Funds for Ailing Banks
-----------------------------------------------------------
John O'Donnell, Michelle Martin, Robin Emmott, Martin Santa and
Jan Strupczewski at Reuters report that Germany challenged a
central plank of plans to forge a banking union in the euro zone
on Thursday, arguing against the use of the currency bloc's funds
to help lenders exposed as dangerously weak by health checks next
year.
According to Reuters, people close to the talks said that as
finance ministers gathered in Brussels to outline plans to deal
with banks still in difficulty, Germany's finance minister
hardened his stance on the use of the bloc's emergency fund.
Ministers had been drafting a joint statement to outline their
plan of action after bank health tests next year to draw a line
under the region's financial crisis, Reuters relates.
But sharp divisions emerged between France, which wants a euro
zone safety net, and Germany, which is worried that it will
shoulder much of the burden if weak countries turn to the bloc's
emergency fund, Reuters states.
According to Reuters, many consider a euro zone backstop central
to building a banking union to avoid a repeat of events in
Ireland, which required a sovereign bailout when it buckled under
the weight of its banks' debts.
Earlier this year, euro zone countries agreed that their rescue
fund, the European Stability Mechanism, could provide direct
assistance to banks, not just indirectly by lending to
governments, Reuters recounts.
This is a key demand of some of Europe's biggest countries --
France, Italy and Spain, Reuters notes. On Thursday, Germany
called that into question, Reuters relays.
According to Reuters, ahead of the meeting, French Finance
Minister Pierre Moscovici told reporters: "France continues to
believe that we . . . must not exclude direct recapitalization by
the European Stability Mechanism as a last resort."
Speaking just yards away, however, Wolfgang Schaeuble, Germany's
finance minister, poured cold water on the idea, Reuters relates.
"The German legal position rules it out now," Mr. Schaeuble, as
cited by Reuters, said. "That's well known. I don't know if
everyone has registered that."
Inside the meeting room, people close to the talks said the two
clashed again, when Germany asked for the removal of any
reference to ESM bank aid from the ministers' statement,
Reuters relates. He was challenged by Mr. Moscovici, who was
backed by Spain's Economy Minister Luis de Guindos, Reuters
recounts.
* BOND PRICING: For the Week November 11 to November 15, 2013
-------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
IMMOFINANZ AG 4.25 3/8/2018 EUR 4.70
Alpine Holding Gmb 6.00 5/22/2017 EUR 0.25
Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 7/1/2015 EUR 0.25
Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 6/10/2016 EUR 0.25
A-TEC Industries A 8.75 10/27/2014 EUR 1.63
A-TEC Industries A 2.75 5/10/2014 EUR 2.00
A-TEC Industries A 5.75 11/2/2010 EUR 1.88
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.79 11/29/2032 EUR 70.93
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.68 12/18/2030 EUR 72.49
Investkredit Bank 4.63 4/12/2022 EUR 74.70
KA Finanz AG 4.90 6/23/2031 EUR 67.75
KA Finanz AG 4.44 12/20/2030 EUR 65.13
Oberoesterreichisc 0.63 11/6/2030 EUR 72.60
Oberoesterreichisc 0.52 4/25/2042 EUR 65.26
Oesterreichische V 1.06 7/29/2018 EUR 25.00
Oesterreichische V 5.27 2/8/2027 EUR 63.00
Raiffeisen Centrob 14.40 3/6/2014 EUR 73.77
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.75 8/20/2033 EUR 73.41
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.70 12/27/2031 EUR 71.81
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.57 1/25/2031 EUR 73.50
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.61 1/24/2031 EUR 73.64
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.72 1/22/2031 EUR 73.74
BELGIUM
-------
Econocom Group 4.00 6/1/2016 EUR 27.70
Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 72.33
Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 73.13
BULGARIA
--------
Petrol AD 8.38 1/26/2017 EUR 57.66
Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 75.05
Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 74.63
OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 12.03
OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 12.03
OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 11.88
OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 11.88
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 5.25 8/6/2014 CHF 65.59
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.50 8/13/2014 CHF 62.47
Credit Suisse/Nass 7.25 4/4/2014 USD 64.87
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.52 9/10/2014 CHF 65.99
CYPRUS
------
Cyprus Government 4.63 2/3/2020 EUR 73.86
Cyprus Government 6.00 7/1/2023 EUR 73.75
Cyprus Government 4.75 7/1/2020 EUR 73.13
Cyprus Government 5.25 7/1/2022 EUR 71.00
Cyprus Government 5.00 7/1/2021 EUR 71.75
CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
Sazka AS 9.00 7/12/2021 EUR 10.13
DENMARK
-------
Kommunekredit 0.50 7/30/2027 TRY 26.38
Kommunekredit 0.50 9/19/2019 BRL 53.55
Kommunekredit 0.50 2/20/2020 BRL 51.34
Kommunekredit 0.50 5/11/2029 CAD 50.52
Kommunekredit 0.50 10/22/2019 BRL 53.10
Kommunekredit 0.50 12/14/2020 ZAR 60.44
FINLAND
-------
Municipality Finan 0.50 10/27/2016 BRL 73.96
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/30/2016 BRL 73.14
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/16/2017 TRY 71.26
Municipality Finan 0.50 6/19/2024 ZAR 37.00
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/17/2017 BRL 71.34
Municipality Finan 0.50 4/27/2018 ZAR 70.77
Municipality Finan 0.50 5/31/2022 ZAR 45.84
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/17/2016 BRL 73.90
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/10/2021 NZD 67.05
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 ZAR 67.19
Municipality Finan 0.50 4/26/2022 ZAR 46.35
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/20/2018 ZAR 66.70
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/28/2018 BRL 62.02
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/14/2018 TRY 64.02
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/7/2018 BRL 68.42
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/16/2017 BRL 71.42
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/22/2019 IDR 65.22
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 TRY 64.13
Municipality Finan 0.50 1/10/2018 BRL 64.01
Municipality Finan 0.50 6/22/2017 IDR 74.39
Municipality Finan 0.50 1/23/2018 BRL 64.50
Municipality Finan 0.25 6/28/2040 CAD 23.91
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/21/2021 NZD 66.64
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/25/2020 ZAR 54.11
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/17/2025 CAD 61.50
Talvivaara Mining 4.00 12/16/2015 EUR 17.99
FRANCE
------
Air France-KLM 4.97 4/1/2015 EUR 12.75
Air France-KLM 2.03 2/15/2023 EUR 10.59
Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 4.25 7/1/2018 EUR 3.12
Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 5.00 1/1/2015 EUR 3.36
Assystem 4.00 1/1/2017 EUR 24.27
AtoS 2.50 1/1/2016 EUR 61.09
AtoS 1.50 7/1/2016 EUR 60.87
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 1/31/2018 RUB 73.33
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 11/16/2032 MXN 39.68
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 5/6/2021 MXN 71.71
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/16/2014 EUR 53.03
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/18/2015 EUR 9.08
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 9/10/2015 EUR 15.35
Cap Gemini SA 3.50 1/1/2014 EUR 48.05
CGG SA 1.75 1/1/2016 EUR 28.39
CGG SA 1.25 1/1/2019 EUR 31.31
Club Mediterranee 6.11 11/1/2015 EUR 19.71
Credit Agricole Co 0.50 2/28/2018 RUB 73.06
Credit Agricole Co 0.50 3/6/2023 RUB 48.05
Dexia Credit Local 0.88 7/10/2017 EUR 74.75
Dexia Credit Local 4.38 2/12/2019 EUR 71.75
Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2014 EUR 16.90
Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2015 EUR 15.67
Faurecia 4.50 1/1/2015 EUR 24.46
Faurecia 3.25 1/1/2018 EUR 27.55
GFI Informatique S 5.25 1/1/2017 EUR 5.30
Ingenico 2.75 1/1/2017 EUR 57.77
Le Noble Age 4.88 1/3/2016 EUR 19.50
Nexans SA 2.50 1/1/2019 EUR 72.92
Nexans SA 4.00 1/1/2016 EUR 58.43
Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50
Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50
OL Groupe 7.00 12/28/2015 EUR 6.53
Orpea 1.75 1/1/2020 EUR 48.99
Orpea 3.88 1/1/2016 EUR 51.28
Peugeot SA 4.45 1/1/2016 EUR 26.65
Publicis Groupe SA 1.00 1/18/2018 EUR 60.32
SG Option Europe S 8.00 9/29/2015 USD 62.49
SG Option Europe S 7.00 5/5/2017 EUR 52.35
SG Option Europe S 7.00 9/22/2017 EUR 68.73
SG Option Europe S 8.00 12/18/2014 USD 40.49
SG Option Europe S 7.50 12/24/2014 EUR 38.00
SG Option Europe S 7.25 8/5/2014 EUR 62.59
Societe Air France 2.75 4/1/2020 EUR 21.03
Societe Generale S 0.50 6/12/2023 RUB 45.95
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/3/2023 RUB 46.79
Societe Generale S 0.50 11/29/2022 AUD 63.45
Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 USD 71.63
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 USD 72.50
Societe Generale S 0.50 12/21/2022 AUD 63.21
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/30/2023 RUB 46.47
Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 AUD 64.99
Societe Generale S 0.50 12/6/2021 AUD 67.38
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 AUD 65.81
Societe Generale S 0.50 9/7/2021 AUD 69.04
SOITEC 6.75 9/18/2018 EUR 2.50
SOITEC 6.25 9/9/2014 EUR 8.61
Tem SAS 4.25 1/1/2015 EUR 55.58
Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00
Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00
GEORGIA
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Bank J Safra Saras 13.60 2/17/2014 CHF 71.13
Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/15/2014 CHF 63.95
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 12/13/2013 USD 67.65
Bank Julius Baer & 14.00 5/23/2014 USD 55.80
Bank Julius Baer & 8.50 12/13/2013 USD 56.05
Bank Julius Baer & 9.50 12/13/2013 USD 61.50
Bank Julius Baer & 12.60 12/13/2013 USD 52.65
Bank Julius Baer & 7.25 4/10/2014 USD 64.50
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 1/29/2014 CHF 71.40
Bank Julius Baer & 6.10 4/17/2014 CHF 65.15
Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/17/2014 EUR 65.45
Bank Julius Baer & 5.00 12/23/2013 CHF 67.05
Bank Julius Baer & 10.20 11/29/2013 USD 52.45
Bank Julius Baer & 11.50 3/18/2014 USD 61.85
Bank Julius Baer & 6.80 4/11/2014 USD 70.15
Bank Julius Baer & 6.50 4/11/2014 USD 71.25
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 4/11/2014 USD 71.05
Bank Julius Baer & 7.80 2/14/2014 USD 70.35
Bank Julius Baer & 7.50 2/14/2014 CHF 69.75
Bank Julius Baer & 10.00 4/4/2014 USD 62.75
Bank Julius Baer & 6.90 3/21/2014 USD 70.45
Banque Cantonale V 4.90 9/9/2014 CHF 73.73
EFG International 6.00 11/30/2017 EUR 39.45
EFG International 13.40 11/14/2013 CHF 58.64
EFG International 6.82 6/4/2014 CHF 70.01
EFG International 12.86 10/30/2017 EUR 35.40
EFG International 12.10 3/10/2014 USD 50.04
EFG International 4.50 2/20/2014 USD 58.50
EFG International 5.85 10/14/2014 CHF 72.75
EFG International 10.00 12/17/2013 USD 66.27
Leonteq Securities 11.90 1/15/2014 EUR 50.01
Leonteq Securities 17.00 11/21/2013 CAD 40.23
Leonteq Securities 9.25 11/5/2013 USD 36.80
Leonteq Securities 12.65 12/10/2013 EUR 50.06
Leonteq Securities 7.80 8/26/2014 CHF 55.40
Leonteq Securities 15.00 2/13/2014 CHF 55.94
Leonteq Securities 12.00 11/15/2013 CHF 54.70
Leonteq Securities 17.05 2/14/2014 CHF 42.69
Leonteq Securities 10.03 10/25/2013 CHF 48.39
Leonteq Securities 5.06 5/26/2014 CHF 74.49
Leonteq Securities 18.00 12/6/2013 CHF 58.34
Leonteq Securities 8.40 11/27/2013 CHF 69.11
Leonteq Securities 8.80 12/6/2013 EUR 66.34
Leonteq Securities 20.00 12/12/2013 CHF 59.36
Leonteq Securities 12.80 12/12/2013 CHF 56.01
Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/12/2013 CHF 67.47
Leonteq Securities 8.10 12/13/2013 CHF 56.63
Leonteq Securities 9.20 11/15/2013 CHF 72.96
Leonteq Securities 7.21 11/14/2013 CHF 72.00
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/21/2013 CHF 48.23
Leonteq Securities 13.60 12/6/2013 CHF 53.15
Leonteq Securities 8.75 6/6/2014 GBP 71.26
Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/6/2013 USD 65.15
Leonteq Securities 12.89 12/10/2013 GBP 52.10
Leonteq Securities 10.20 11/14/2013 CHF 56.32
Leonteq Securities 8.01 11/15/2013 CHF 44.99
Leonteq Securities 21.75 5/22/2014 USD 45.78
Leonteq Securities 20.00 5/27/2014 CHF 71.16
Leonteq Securities 12.00 2/24/2014 CHF 69.73
Leonteq Securities 9.46 6/3/2014 AUD 61.68
Leonteq Securities 24.40 2/25/2014 USD 44.15
Leonteq Securities 22.75 2/4/2014 USD 68.91
Leonteq Securities 15.60 2/6/2014 CHF 55.74
Leonteq Securities 12.25 1/30/2014 CHF 49.87
Leonteq Securities 20.52 3/25/2014 USD 50.23
Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/17/2014 CHF 54.64
Leonteq Securities 21.50 3/21/2014 USD 57.05
Leonteq Securities 8.90 3/28/2014 EUR 63.16
Leonteq Securities 14.25 2/13/2015 USD 62.34
Leonteq Securities 11.50 2/11/2014 USD 70.57
Leonteq Securities 20.50 2/13/2014 CHF 65.24
Leonteq Securities 5.80 8/20/2014 USD 70.34
Leonteq Securities 13.25 2/14/2014 USD 60.87
Leonteq Securities 10.00 7/29/2014 USD 58.84
Leonteq Securities 29.61 10/26/2017 EUR 39.70
Leonteq Securities 9.00 10/31/2013 CHF 43.77
Leonteq Securities 12.00 3/5/2014 CHF 60.81
Leonteq Securities 8.50 12/24/2013 USD 54.18
Leonteq Securities 14.06 12/18/2013 USD 52.76
Leonteq Securities 5.76 12/20/2013 GBP 67.92
Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/23/2014 CHF 54.82
Leonteq Securities 8.00 6/19/2014 CHF 73.01
Leonteq Securities 6.80 12/19/2014 USD 71.84
Leonteq Securities 14.05 12/27/2013 CHF 55.88
Leonteq Securities 6.00 5/20/2014 CHF 66.65
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/27/2013 CHF 74.15
Leonteq Securities 20.00 11/27/2013 CHF 57.98
Leonteq Securities 11.95 11/29/2013 EUR 54.01
Leonteq Securities 8.35 1/3/2014 AUD 70.38
Leonteq Securities 9.20 12/27/2013 CHF 70.21
Leonteq Securities 9.60 1/8/2014 USD 47.95
Leonteq Securities 8.40 1/15/2014 CHF 74.30
Leonteq Securities 14.00 9/22/2014 CHF 66.90
Leonteq Securities 10.80 1/15/2014 CHF 54.68
Leonteq Securities 5.50 1/25/2016 EUR 64.28
Leonteq Securities 12.00 12/6/2013 GBP 52.45
Leonteq Securities 20.14 4/9/2014 USD 55.40
Leonteq Securities 5.50 8/19/2014 USD 72.76
Leonteq Securities 20.07 2/19/2014 USD 41.82
Leonteq Securities 10.00 2/6/2014 USD 57.48
Leonteq Securities 23.90 1/24/2014 USD 43.75
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/5/2013 USD 71.34
Leonteq Securities 25.70 1/24/2014 USD 50.45
Mare Baltic PCC Lt 2.00 11/1/2015 DKK 0.00
Zurcher Kantonalba 12.35 11/13/2013 CHF 56.78
Zurcher Kantonalba 8.22 11/15/2013 CHF 56.56
Zurcher Kantonalba 6.05 12/19/2013 EUR 65.62
Zurcher Kantonalba 9.00 12/31/2013 CHF 58.57
Zurcher Kantonalba 10.40 12/5/2013 EUR 60.48
Zurcher Kantonalba 10.65 12/6/2013 CHF 57.99
GERMANY
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ATU Auto-Teile-Ung 7.47 10/1/2014 EUR 18.67
BDT Media Automati 8.13 10/9/2017 EUR 65.75
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 72.21
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 58.40
BNP Paribas Emissi 7.00 12/30/2013 EUR 60.64
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 60.09
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 60.05
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.50 12/30/2013 EUR 59.53
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 68.77
BNP Paribas Emissi 4.50 11/21/2013 EUR 72.24
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 74.37
Bremer Landesbank 0.69 3/21/2031 EUR 67.09
Bremer Landesbank 0.72 4/5/2041 EUR 54.49
Centrosolar Group 7.00 2/15/2016 EUR 13.75
Commerzbank AG 8.40 12/30/2013 EUR 2.56
Commerzbank AG 5.05 12/24/2013 EUR 67.54
DekaBank Deutsche 2.21 9/22/2021 EUR 13.92
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 56.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 65.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 64.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 61.70
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 6/24/2014 EUR 61.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 6/24/2014 EUR 66.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 6/24/2014 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 3/25/2014 EUR 61.50
Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 3/25/2014 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.10
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 61.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 56.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 62.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 57.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 70.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 66.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 63.20
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.70
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.24
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.20
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.10
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 4/24/2014 EUR 68.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 4/24/2014 EUR 65.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 4/24/2014 EUR 62.10
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 7/22/2014 EUR 72.10
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 62.10
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.60
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 9/23/2014 EUR 74.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 9/23/2014 EUR 73.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 63.80
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 64.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.40
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 60.00
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 60.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 3/25/2014 EUR 61.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 3/25/2014 EUR 62.80
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 53.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 63.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 72.80
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 2/28/2014 EUR 60.60
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 55.80
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 67.30
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 11/29/2013 EUR 54.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 10/31/2013 EUR 58.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 63.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.60
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 53.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 67.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 58.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 11/29/2013 EUR 73.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 11/29/2013 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.10
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.60
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.20
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.95
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 70.59
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40
Deutsche Bank AG 12.00 12/20/2013 EUR 51.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/24/2014 EUR 71.70
Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 3/25/2014 EUR 75.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/25/2014 EUR 72.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 1/31/2014 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 1/31/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.30
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 1/31/2014 EUR 65.80
Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 6/24/2014 EUR 73.70
Dresdner Bank AG 0.89 11/19/2029 EUR 51.13
Dresdner Bank AG 5.45 2/22/2029 EUR 65.92
Dresdner Bank AG 1.08 12/31/2021 EUR 72.13
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 12.00 10/25/2013 EUR 73.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 2.35 3/24/2023 EUR 70.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 10/25/2013 EUR 70.93
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.50 10/25/2013 EUR 72.67
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 10/25/2013 EUR 50.42
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 12/31/2013 EUR 55.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 12/31/2013 EUR 72.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.75 11/8/2013 EUR 54.90
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 10/25/2013 EUR 73.66
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 12/31/2013 EUR 51.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/13/2013 EUR 62.43
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 11/22/2013 EUR 74.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 11/22/2013 EUR 49.33
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 11/8/2013 EUR 56.39
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/31/2013 EUR 64.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.40 12/31/2013 EUR 58.13
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.50 10/25/2013 EUR 48.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 15.75 11/22/2013 EUR 4.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.75 12/31/2013 EUR 56.51
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.25 3/28/2014 EUR 58.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 6/27/2014 EUR 60.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.50 9/26/2014 EUR 59.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 4/7/2014 EUR 62.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/13/2014 EUR 63.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 10/25/2013 EUR 58.00
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 68.68
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.50 1/10/2014 EUR 65.98
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 12.25 1/10/2014 EUR 68.31
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.75 7/11/2014 EUR 74.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.30 7/11/2014 EUR 69.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.50 12/13/2013 EUR 55.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 3.50 12/31/2013 EUR 64.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/13/2014 EUR 66.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 2.50 12/13/2013 EUR 68.49
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 53.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.40 7/11/2014 EUR 68.63
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.75 12/13/2013 EUR 59.73
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 1/15/2014 EUR 74.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 11/11/2013 EUR 49.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/13/2013 EUR 59.41
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 3/7/2014 EUR 58.45
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.50 2/14/2014 EUR 56.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.00 12/31/2013 EUR 63.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.25 6/27/2014 EUR 69.05
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.75 9/26/2014 EUR 66.80
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.25 3/28/2014 EUR 65.56
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.38
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 12/13/2013 EUR 60.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.25 10/25/2013 EUR 54.26
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 12/13/2013 EUR 72.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 6/27/2014 EUR 64.75
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/27/2014 EUR 63.09
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/13/2014 EUR 64.24
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.50 12/31/2013 EUR 62.28
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 3/14/2014 EUR 52.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 1/17/2014 EUR 58.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 57.78
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 12/20/2013 EUR 68.55
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 11/22/2013 EUR 58.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 11/22/2013 EUR 53.48
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 1/10/2014 EUR 70.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.96
EDOB Abwicklungs A 7.50 3/29/2049 EUR 3.25
EDOB Abwicklungs A 7.50 3/29/2049 EUR 3.25
Estavis AG 7.75 6/25/2017 EUR 2.29
getgoods.de AG 7.75 10/2/2017 EUR 68.50
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 10/23/2013 EUR 60.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.86
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.38
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 12/27/2013 EUR 44.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 43.09
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 61.82
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.51
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 44.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.51
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.08
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 69.75
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.11
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.69
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.42
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 57.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 43.70
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 74.24
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 46.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 50.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.79
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/24/2014 EUR 72.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/24/2014 EUR 61.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.38
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 46.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.01
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.73
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.56
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.04
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.36
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.49
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.92
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.10
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 67.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 65.56
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 58.88
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.78
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 60.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.92
Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.61
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.52
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 62.76
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 9/24/2014 EUR 61.79
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 65.32
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 63.62
Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 6/25/2014 EUR 57.83
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 9/24/2014 EUR 67.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 9/24/2014 EUR 58.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.59
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 10/23/2013 EUR 62.52
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.99
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 58.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 64.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.50 12/27/2013 EUR 43.13
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 37.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 12/24/2014 EUR 68.05
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 2/26/2014 EUR 74.27
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.43
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 59.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 3/26/2014 EUR 55.75
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 1/22/2014 EUR 61.77
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 61.74
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 1/22/2014 EUR 72.86
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 12/27/2013 EUR 52.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 2/26/2014 EUR 52.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 1/22/2014 EUR 58.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 1/22/2014 EUR 56.41
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 1/22/2014 EUR 55.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 12/27/2013 EUR 70.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/24/2014 EUR 58.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.82
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 73.11
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 73.16
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 70.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 61.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 63.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.42
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 50.98
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.39
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 49.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 11/20/2013 EUR 45.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 42.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 11/20/2013 EUR 41.31
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.25
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 67.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.70
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.89
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 12/27/2013 EUR 52.01
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 2/26/2014 EUR 55.73
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.19
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 73.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 68.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 51.20
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 10/23/2013 EUR 74.87
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 66.31
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.91
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 11/20/2013 EUR 52.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 48.85
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 45.57
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 10/23/2013 EUR 74.03
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 11/20/2013 EUR 49.88
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 42.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 47.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 65.08
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.50
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.48
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.63
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.78
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 11/20/2013 EUR 64.83
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 51.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 50.28
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 52.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.43
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 50.76
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.69
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.61
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.59
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.44
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 3/26/2014 EUR 64.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 2/26/2014 EUR 48.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.85
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 64.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 63.13
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.62
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 6/25/2014 EUR 60.40
Gunther Zamek Prod 7.75 5/15/2017 EUR 55.50
Hamburgische Lande 0.60 1/22/2041 EUR 68.03
Hamburgische Lande 0.61 10/30/2040 EUR 68.07
Hamburgische Lande 0.61 11/28/2030 EUR 74.77
Hamburgische Lande 0.60 10/25/2030 EUR 75.00
Hamburgische Lande 0.56 10/30/2030 EUR 74.24
Hamburgische Lande 0.64 7/18/2031 EUR 74.20
Hamburgische Lande 0.69 11/8/2030 EUR 74.82
Hamburgische Lande 0.59 2/5/2031 EUR 73.86
Hamburgische Lande 0.58 10/25/2030 EUR 74.61
Hamburgische Lande 0.59 12/1/2030 EUR 73.55
Hanwha Q-CELLS Gmb 6.75 10/21/2015 EUR 1.32
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 10.50 12/30/2013 EUR 73.80
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 12.50 12/30/2013 EUR 70.21
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 11.00 12/30/2013 EUR 73.68
HSH Nordbank AG 1.03 2/14/2017 EUR 68.24
HSH Nordbank AG 1.07 2/14/2017 EUR 68.16
IKB Deutsche Indus 1.12 9/13/2016 EUR 74.66
IKB Deutsche Indus 0.97 1/23/2017 EUR 71.62
KFW 0.25 10/6/2036 CAD 33.42
Landesbank Berlin 4.80 11/7/2014 EUR 58.28
Landesbank Berlin 7.25 6/27/2014 EUR 58.30
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 12/30/2013 EUR 63.19
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 64.20
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 12/30/2014 EUR 68.24
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 12/30/2014 EUR 64.80
Landesbank Berlin 4.75 12/30/2014 EUR 65.47
Landesbank Berlin 8.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.32
Landesbank Berlin 4.75 3/28/2014 EUR 70.71
Landesbank Berlin 8.50 3/28/2014 EUR 65.88
Landesbank Berlin 11.00 12/30/2013 EUR 7.94
Landesbank Berlin 5.50 6/27/2014 EUR 62.69
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 61.97
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 8/8/2014 EUR 58.13
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.58
Landesbank Berlin 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 65.28
Landesbank Berlin 3.00 3/28/2014 EUR 72.82
Landesbank Berlin 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 68.83
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 12/30/2013 EUR 59.52
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 65.95
Landesbank Berlin 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.17
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 58.72
Landesbank Berlin 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 14.56
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 65.46
Landesbank Berlin 5.50 12/23/2013 EUR 60.90
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 68.01
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 62.46
Landesbank Hessen- 0.85 7/18/2031 EUR 63.96
Landesbank Hessen- 4.00 6/20/2014 EUR 59.10
Landeskreditbank B 0.25 10/13/2037 CAD 29.38
Landeskreditbank B 0.50 5/10/2027 CAD 57.81
Landwirtschaftlich 0.50 4/19/2017 TRY 74.97
LBBW 0.62 10/4/2030 EUR 71.11
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 74.51
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.31
LBBW 5.00 3/28/2014 EUR 57.49
LBBW 3.00 11/22/2013 EUR 66.79
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 62.53
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 65.79
LBBW 4.00 7/25/2014 EUR 64.82
LBBW 3.00 2/28/2014 EUR 67.30
LBBW 5.00 2/28/2014 EUR 58.88
LBBW 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.10
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 58.10
LBBW 3.00 11/22/2013 EUR 63.63
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 60.83
LBBW 3.00 6/27/2014 EUR 64.58
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 61.78
LBBW 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.62
LBBW 3.00 8/22/2014 EUR 67.39
LBBW 4.00 8/22/2014 EUR 65.35
LBBW 5.00 8/22/2014 EUR 63.72
LBBW 3.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.90
LBBW 5.00 2/28/2014 EUR 61.60
LBBW 5.00 9/26/2014 EUR 61.16
LBBW 4.00 10/25/2013 EUR 58.36
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 61.06
LBBW 3.00 3/28/2014 EUR 64.74
LBBW 4.00 1/24/2014 EUR 67.54
LBBW 6.00 1/24/2014 EUR 60.58
LBBW 7.00 1/24/2014 EUR 58.00
LBBW 7.00 11/22/2013 EUR 69.09
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.66
LBBW 6.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.62
LBBW 6.00 7/25/2014 EUR 61.69
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.09
LBBW 5.10 1/15/2014 EUR 68.01
LBBW 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 58.31
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.42
LBBW 3.00 6/27/2014 EUR 61.09
LBBW 3.00 9/26/2014 EUR 64.39
LBBW 4.00 9/26/2014 EUR 62.54
LBBW 7.00 9/26/2014 EUR 59.20
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 63.58
LBBW 6.00 11/22/2013 EUR 64.98
LBBW 8.00 11/22/2013 EUR 58.71
Norddeutsche Lande 0.69 10/21/2030 EUR 74.42
Praktiker AG 5.88 2/10/2016 EUR 1.50
Qimonda Finance LL 6.75 3/22/2013 USD 3.44
SiC Processing Gmb 7.13 3/1/2016 EUR 5.50
Solarwatt GmbH 7.00 11/1/2015 EUR 14.75
Solarworld AG 6.13 1/21/2017 EUR 37.25
Solarworld AG 6.38 7/13/2016 EUR 33.00
Solon SE 1.38 12/6/2012 EUR 0.63
Sparkasse KoelnBon 0.68 5/7/2031 EUR 71.54
Sparkasse KoelnBon 0.74 9/29/2034 EUR 68.26
TAG Immobilien AG 6.50 12/10/2015 EUR 9.45
TUI AG 2.75 3/24/2016 EUR 64.09
UniCredit Bank AG 0.92 11/19/2029 EUR 65.48
Vontobel Financial 5.45 12/31/2013 EUR 59.48
Vontobel Financial 5.47 3/17/2014 EUR 35.50
Vontobel Financial 4.30 12/31/2013 EUR 63.20
Vontobel Financial 7.70 12/31/2013 EUR 54.94
Vontobel Financial 5.30 6/27/2014 EUR 60.94
Vontobel Financial 4.25 12/31/2013 EUR 63.14
Vontobel Financial 5.30 12/31/2013 EUR 59.38
Vontobel Financial 9.85 12/31/2013 EUR 73.66
Vontobel Financial 4.20 12/31/2013 EUR 63.14
Vontobel Financial 5.35 12/31/2013 EUR 59.50
Vontobel Financial 7.40 12/31/2013 EUR 54.84
Vontobel Financial 9.85 12/31/2013 EUR 51.06
Vontobel Financial 6.10 12/31/2013 EUR 59.66
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 59.56
Vontobel Financial 6.85 12/31/2013 EUR 54.78
Vontobel Financial 7.15 12/31/2013 EUR 54.82
Vontobel Financial 9.10 12/31/2013 EUR 50.96
Vontobel Financial 5.10 4/14/2014 EUR 30.60
Vontobel Financial 17.15 12/31/2013 EUR 52.48
Vontobel Financial 4.25 12/31/2013 EUR 63.20
Vontobel Financial 8.65 12/31/2013 EUR 56.66
Vontobel Financial 6.30 12/31/2013 EUR 59.72
Vontobel Financial 8.70 12/31/2013 EUR 73.44
Vontobel Financial 7.85 12/31/2013 EUR 50.72
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 54.52
Vontobel Financial 5.10 6/27/2014 EUR 60.50
Vontobel Financial 8.00 12/31/2013 EUR 55.02
Vontobel Financial 7.35 6/27/2014 EUR 57.28
Vontobel Financial 4.60 3/28/2014 EUR 60.20
Vontobel Financial 4.75 12/31/2013 EUR 59.42
Vontobel Financial 7.20 3/28/2014 EUR 56.40
Vontobel Financial 7.45 12/31/2013 EUR 59.94
Vontobel Financial 10.20 12/31/2013 EUR 56.98
Vontobel Financial 4.80 12/31/2013 EUR 56.58
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 56.38
Vontobel Financial 8.85 12/31/2013 EUR 54.96
Vontobel Financial 8.35 12/31/2013 EUR 56.92
Vontobel Financial 7.70 12/31/2013 EUR 54.74
Vontobel Financial 7.40 12/31/2013 EUR 59.92
Vontobel Financial 5.40 6/27/2014 EUR 57.68
Vontobel Financial 5.05 3/28/2014 EUR 57.46
Vontobel Financial 7.60 3/28/2014 EUR 58.24
Vontobel Financial 5.65 3/28/2014 EUR 57.40
Vontobel Financial 4.35 12/31/2013 EUR 63.26
Vontobel Financial 8.65 12/31/2013 EUR 60.16
Vontobel Financial 7.75 12/31/2013 EUR 54.72
Vontobel Financial 8.15 12/31/2013 EUR 56.38
Vontobel Financial 15.75 12/31/2013 EUR 52.14
Vontobel Financial 10.45 12/31/2013 EUR 55.40
Vontobel Financial 6.35 12/31/2013 EUR 54.68
Vontobel Financial 8.00 12/31/2013 EUR 54.98
Vontobel Financial 5.25 12/31/2013 EUR 59.50
Vontobel Financial 6.45 12/31/2013 EUR 74.82
Vontobel Financial 5.00 1/24/2014 EUR 61.50
Vontobel Financial 7.39 11/25/2013 EUR 62.60
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 2.50 12/23/2013 EUR 68.43
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 1/30/2014 EUR 69.85
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 1/30/2014 EUR 65.48
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 1/30/2014 EUR 63.64
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 12/18/2013 EUR 52.92
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 12/18/2013 EUR 59.07
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 12/18/2013 EUR 55.81
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 7.50 12/18/2013 EUR 50.43
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 3/27/2014 EUR 66.20
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.31
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.50 6/25/2014 EUR 56.15
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 58.30
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 7.00 6/25/2014 EUR 54.32
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 1/30/2014 EUR 61.94
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 3/11/2014 EUR 54.62
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 9/30/2014 EUR 74.98
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 9/30/2014 EUR 73.89
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 9/30/2014 EUR 73.00
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 3/27/2014 EUR 68.09
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 3/27/2014 EUR 64.45
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 3/27/2014 EUR 62.91
Windreich GmbH 6.50 7/15/2016 EUR 11.13
Windreich GmbH 6.50 3/1/2015 EUR 9.88
Windreich GmbH 6.75 3/1/2015 EUR 11.13
Windreich GmbH 6.25 3/1/2015 EUR 11.13
GREECE
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Yioula Glassworks 9.00 12/1/2015 EUR 74.00
Yioula Glassworks 9.00 12/1/2015 EUR 74.00
ICELAND
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Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.13 5/19/2016 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.75 10/4/2011 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.75 10/4/2011 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.63 2/28/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.50 2/3/2045 EUR 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 3.00 2/12/2010 CHF 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.70 2/15/2010 CAD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.13 10/4/2016 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.65 2/19/2013 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.13 10/4/2016 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 2/1/2045 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.99 7/5/2012 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 9.75 9/10/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.13 5/19/2016 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.50 2/2/2009 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.80 10/20/2009 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.80 9/7/2012 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.63 2/28/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.80 2/15/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 12/5/2014 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 3.75 2/15/2024 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 4/28/2012 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.25 7/18/2017 BGN 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.65 7/5/2010 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.90 2/1/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.95 5/6/2009 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 8.00 6/22/2011 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.70 10/2/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.50 1/17/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.69 5/21/2011 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 7/24/2009 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.20 7/12/2009 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.00 11/8/2013 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 4/2/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 10/2/2010 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 1/3/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.47 10/27/2010 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.95 10/20/2010 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.00 1/4/2027 SKK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.90 5/29/2017 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.50 10/8/2010 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.40 3/22/2014 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.90 4/28/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.75 6/7/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.40 12/15/2015 EUR 22.88
LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00
LBI HF 3.20 5/10/2010 SKK 8.00
LBI HF 2.25 2/14/2011 CHF 8.00
LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00
LBI HF 3.00 12/7/2010 CHF 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 1/18/2010 CAD 8.00
LBI HF 4.38 10/20/2008 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.75 5/31/2013 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.25 4/2/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 8.65 5/1/2011 ISK 8.00
LBI HF 4.08 3/16/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 6.75 8/18/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 11/3/2009 CZK 8.00
LBI HF 6.00 6/6/2017 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 5.44 9/3/2018 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 4.28 11/19/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 2.14 2/3/2020 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.32 1/31/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 11/30/2035 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 5.25 6/5/2023 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 5.08 3/1/2013 ISK 8.00
LBI HF 7.00 4/2/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.00 10/22/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 1.68 12/22/2014 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.00 9/23/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.45 12/18/2033 JPY 0.13
LBI HF 2.22 10/15/2019 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.34 3/1/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.34 5/11/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.75 2/22/2016 USD 8.00
LBI HF 2.75 3/16/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.36 8/17/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.20 4/27/2026 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 6.75 2/18/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.11 11/10/2008 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.34 12/22/2025 EUR 8.00
IRELAND
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Corsicanto Ltd 3.50 1/15/2032 USD 74.94
Depfa ACS Bank 4.90 8/24/2035 CAD 69.73
Depfa ACS Bank 0.50 3/3/2025 CAD 46.53
Kalvebod PLC 2.00 5/1/2106 DKK 40.00
ITALY
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Banca delle Marche 1.18 6/1/2017 EUR 42.39
A2A SpA 3.20 8/10/2036 EUR 62.44
Banca delle Marche 5.50 9/16/2030 EUR 69.25
Banca di Cividale 0.34 10/2/2036 EUR 57.63
Banca Monte dei Pa 1.23 1/15/2018 EUR 74.60
Cassa Depositi e P 0.29 10/31/2029 EUR 61.70
Cirio Finanziaria 8.00 12/21/2005 EUR 0.63
City of Lecco Ital 0.46 6/30/2026 EUR 67.27
Comune di Andrano 3.92 12/31/2035 EUR 71.20
Comune di Fiumicin 0.49 12/31/2026 EUR 66.65
Comune di Grontard 4.10 12/31/2035 EUR 73.36
Comune di Marcheno 4.23 12/31/2036 EUR 74.59
Comune di Marscian 4.03 12/31/2035 EUR 72.47
Comune di Mercato 3.97 12/31/2035 EUR 71.83
Comune di Piadena 4.05 12/31/2035 EUR 72.74
Comune di San Ferd 0.53 12/27/2026 EUR 67.26
Comune di Santa Ma 0.60 5/31/2026 EUR 69.00
Comune di Seminara 0.72 10/31/2026 EUR 69.14
Comune di Verona 0.43 12/1/2026 EUR 64.53
Enel SpA 0.96 10/20/2032 EUR 63.62
Intesa Sanpaolo Sp 1.06 3/20/2023 EUR 74.70
Italy Government I 1.85 9/15/2057 EUR 65.06
Italy Government I 2.00 9/15/2062 EUR 67.03
Italy Government I 2.20 9/15/2058 EUR 72.77
Italy Government I 2.87 5/19/2036 JPY 69.43
Province of Bresci 0.73 12/22/2036 EUR 57.22
Province of Bresci 0.72 6/30/2036 EUR 57.58
Province of Chieti 0.65 12/29/2023 EUR 74.35
Province of Milan 0.59 12/22/2033 EUR 63.54
Province of Rovigo 0.59 12/28/2035 EUR 58.80
Province of Teramo 0.44 12/30/2030 EUR 60.80
Province of Teramo 0.47 12/30/2025 EUR 68.61
Province of Trevis 0.47 12/31/2034 EUR 58.04
Province of Trevis 0.57 12/31/2034 EUR 59.52
Province of Trevis 0.34 12/31/2034 EUR 56.82
Region of Abruzzo 0.68 11/7/2036 EUR 63.64
Region of Abruzzo 0.52 11/7/2031 EUR 61.27
Region of Abruzzo 4.45 3/1/2037 EUR 70.52
Region of Aosta Va 0.45 5/28/2021 EUR 73.65
Region of Molise I 0.72 12/15/2033 EUR 64.40
Region of Piemont 0.45 11/27/2036 EUR 55.47
Region of Puglia I 0.74 2/6/2023 EUR 69.69
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 23.00
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.75
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63
LUXEMBOURG
----------
3W Power SA 9.25 12/1/2015 EUR 55.75
ArcelorMittal 7.25 4/1/2014 EUR 20.83
Bank of New York M 4.48 12/30/2099 EUR 18.04
Bank of New York M 4.73 12/15/2050 EUR 52.00
Cerruti Finance SA 6.50 7/26/2004 EUR 3.00
Cirio Finance Luxe 7.50 11/3/2002 EUR 1.25
Cirio Holding Luxe 6.25 2/16/2004 EUR 0.13
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 52.02
Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.50
Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.98
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 51.75
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75
Del Monte Finance 6.63 5/24/2006 EUR 13.63
ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38
ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38
Erste Europaeische 0.27 2/1/2037 USD 55.57
European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00
European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00
Finmek Internation 7.00 12/3/2004 EUR 0.13
Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13
Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13
Hypothekenbank Fra 0.25 12/20/2029 USD 67.37
International Indu 9.00 7/6/2011 EUR 1.00
International Indu 11.00 2/19/2013 USD 0.88
IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13
IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13
La Veggia Finance 7.13 11/14/2004 EUR 0.25
Teksid Aluminum Lu 11.38 7/15/2011 EUR 0.75
NETHERLANDS
-----------
Astana Finance BV 7.88 6/8/2010 EUR 4.00
Astana Finance BV 9.00 11/16/2011 USD 3.50
Astana Finance BV 14.50 7/2/2013 USD 3.75
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/10/2017 TRY 73.62
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2022 ZAR 52.90
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2017 TRY 72.46
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/7/2022 ZAR 53.32
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/12/2017 TRY 73.13
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2017 TRY 72.30
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/22/2021 ZAR 57.64
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/29/2021 NZD 70.64
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/15/2022 ZAR 52.50
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2022 MXN 64.98
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/3/2021 NZD 64.80
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 2/24/2025 CAD 65.15
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/12/2021 ZAR 58.17
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 9/20/2022 ZAR 52.08
BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.01
BLT Finance BV 12.00 2/10/2015 USD 10.25
BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.63
Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38
Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38
Cirio Del Monte NV 7.75 3/14/2005 EUR 3.38
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/26/2021 ZAR 48.95
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/30/2043 MXN 23.60
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 8/21/2028 MXN 46.15
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 7/30/2043 MXN 23.80
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 1/31/2033 MXN 36.68
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/29/2027 MXN 48.35
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/30/2027 MXN 48.11
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 12/29/2027 MXN 47.89
Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.77
Cooperatieve Centr 8.60 3/13/2014 CHF 60.50
Cooperatieve Centr 8.15 3/5/2014 CHF 58.60
Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.43
JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/7/2014 USD 69.19
JP Morgan Structur 5.00 12/3/2013 CHF 64.32
JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/25/2014 EUR 73.83
JP Morgan Structur 12.30 11/29/2013 USD 48.32
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 10.00 3/15/2012 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.13 6/1/2009 USD 0.38
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/5/2035 EUR 9.75
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 11/2/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 3/16/2035 EUR 14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/15/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 5/17/2035 EUR 10.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.88 3/14/2013 CHF 2.13
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/22/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/16/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 5/8/2017 HKD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/26/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/14/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/27/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/5/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/16/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 9/15/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/18/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.03 1/31/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/24/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 5/9/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 5/26/2026 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 12/3/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/18/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 6/6/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 12/2/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.46 2/19/2012 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/23/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.75 2/7/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/20/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/17/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 10/22/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/27/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.44 11/22/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/16/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.22 11/21/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/13/2010 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 6/10/2014 SGD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 4/20/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.86 9/21/2011 SGD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 12/20/2027 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/12/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/1/2025 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.55 3/12/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.05 4/8/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 9/5/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 23.30 9/16/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/17/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.88 1/28/2011 HKD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 11/21/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 2/19/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/3/2012 BRL 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 6/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 8/7/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/21/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 11/28/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/11/2038 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/19/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 4/23/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/22/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 2/16/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 3/10/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/13/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/7/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 1/31/2013 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 11/9/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.75 6/22/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.12 4/30/2027 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/28/2032 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 7/6/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 6/22/2046 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.65 8/24/2011 AUD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 12/26/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 12/15/2011 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.68 12/12/2045 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.06 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/28/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/4/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.69 2/19/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.59 11/22/2009 MXN 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.28 11/6/2010 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/9/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 6/2/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.38 2/4/2014 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.30 12/21/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2010 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.20 5/14/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 10/11/2017 ILS 2.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 3/30/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 10/24/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 8/3/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.60 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 7/2/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 7/8/2014 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 5/16/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 11/16/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.72 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 6/4/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 18.25 10/2/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/31/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.80 3/19/2018 JPY 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 11/16/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/6/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 11/22/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.25 6/20/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 5/21/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.01 9/20/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/19/2023 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.60 4/22/2014 MXN 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 12/3/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/23/2012 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.37 7/15/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.87 10/8/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.75 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/24/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.38 9/20/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/15/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/29/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/8/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 2/3/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.43 1/8/2009 ILS 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/8/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/13/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 4/1/2023 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.63 7/22/2011 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.80 3/31/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/2/2022 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 5/15/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.28 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.35 8/8/2016 SGD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/6/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.50 8/9/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 7/11/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.82 12/18/2036 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.20 12/3/2008 HKD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/3/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.40 6/12/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/4/2011 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 7/8/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.30 12/21/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 12/31/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 2/8/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/19/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.50 4/1/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.15 3/21/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 11/30/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 2/26/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 6/20/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 2/14/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/22/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.45 2/20/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 8/1/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 3/4/2010 NZD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.63 3/2/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 2/21/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.80 12/27/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.75 3/29/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 12/6/2011 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 1/4/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.75 3/1/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.82 10/20/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/13/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.80 11/16/2012 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/12/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 9/20/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.40 9/21/2009 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 4/28/2014 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 6/15/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/30/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 5/20/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 5/17/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 7/25/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 8/2/2037 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/12/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 8/23/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 11/9/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/14/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/12/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/22/2012 EUR 1.13
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.20 3/19/2018 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.95 11/4/2013 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/19/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 3/27/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 10/24/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 4/14/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/30/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 7/21/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.95 10/25/2036 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 6/29/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/25/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.75 4/5/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 4/24/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.39 5/4/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.35 10/13/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.80 12/30/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/23/2018 CZK 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/30/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/17/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.48 5/12/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.25 5/12/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/27/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/24/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 10/19/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.68 3/5/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/15/2022 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.32 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 9/13/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 7/24/2026 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 8/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 2/16/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 3/13/2021 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/17/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/6/2016 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/1/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.70 6/6/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/6/2013 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/24/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 6/13/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 3/17/2009 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/28/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.85 4/24/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 7/24/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 12/30/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/3/2012 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.10 6/4/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/15/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.15 10/30/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 8/1/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.10 11/12/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 8/11/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/13/2037 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 8/1/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.90 7/28/2020 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.15 8/25/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/30/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 5/9/2020 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.30 6/4/2012 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 6/5/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/6/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/4/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 17.00 6/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.80 8/21/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.22 3/1/2024 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 5/23/2012 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.45 5/23/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/28/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/15/2018 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/6/2011 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.75 10/28/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 11/30/2012 CZK 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 11/9/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 11/24/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/12/2036 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 12/14/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.40 6/20/2011 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.60 6/21/2010 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.05 12/20/2010 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 6/20/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 9/20/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.70 4/21/2011 USD 6.00
Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 45.04
Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 44.63
Morgan Stanley BV 9.00 4/16/2015 EUR 71.90
Nederlandse Waters 0.50 3/11/2025 CAD 65.79
New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.24
New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.78
New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.25
New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.47
NIBC Bank NV 25.98 5/7/2029 EUR 50.62
Nutritek Internati 8.75 12/11/2008 USD 2.00
Q-Cells Internatio 1.38 4/30/2012 EUR 32.45
Q-Cells Internatio 5.75 5/26/2014 EUR 32.09
Sairgroup Finance 4.38 6/8/2006 EUR 10.50
Sairgroup Finance 6.63 10/6/2010 EUR 12.13
Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.25
Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.00
SNS Bank NV 6.25 10/26/2020 EUR 2.13
SNS Bank NV 6.63 5/14/2018 EUR 4.13
WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.90
WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.38
NORWAY
------
Eksportfinans ASA 0.25 7/14/2033 CAD 8.50
Eksportfinans ASA 0.50 5/9/2030 CAD 14.25
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/7/2017 BRL 69.77
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/10/2017 BRL 68.32
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/29/2017 BRL 66.85
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/25/2018 ZAR 70.89
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/26/2017 BRL 65.80
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/28/2017 BRL 68.91
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/28/2017 BRL 67.67
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/20/2018 BRL 64.71
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/2/2018 BRL 62.66
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/1/2017 BRL 68.22
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/15/2018 BRL 67.16
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/29/2017 BRL 70.51
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/16/2016 BRL 73.83
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/27/2022 ZAR 47.60
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 7/28/2016 BRL 74.11
Norske Skogindustr 7.00 6/26/2017 EUR 60.59
Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 74.02
Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 72.75
Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 69.53
Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 51.63
Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 73.50
Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 50.08
Petromena ASA 9.75 5/24/2014 NOK 6.75
Petromena ASA 10.85 11/19/2010 USD 6.75
PORTUGAL
--------
AdP - Aguas de Por 0.33 1/23/2023 EUR 63.88
Banco Espirito San 3.50 1/2/2043 EUR 50.13
Caixa Geral de Dep 5.98 3/3/2028 EUR 57.00
CP - Comboios de P 5.70 2/5/2030 EUR 60.31
Empresa de Desenvo 0.33 11/21/2018 EUR 66.63
Metropolitano de L 4.80 12/7/2027 EUR 73.38
Metropolitano de L 4.06 12/4/2026 EUR 71.93
Parpublica - Parti 4.20 11/16/2026 EUR 68.25
Portugal Obrigacoe 4.10 4/15/2037 EUR 72.12
Rede Ferroviaria N 4.25 12/13/2021 EUR 70.38
Rede Ferroviaria N 4.05 11/16/2026 EUR 71.78
ROMANIA
-------
City of Iasi Roman 4.45 11/15/2028 RON 71.23
RUSSIA
------
Arizk 3.00 12/20/2030 RUB 46.44
Kuzbassenergo-Fina 8.70 4/15/2021 RUB 72.01
Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.02
Mechel 8.40 6/1/2021 RUB 70.13
Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.21
Mobile Telesystems 5.00 6/29/2021 RUB 74.25
MORTGAGE AGENT AHM 3.00 9/9/2045 RUB 9.17
Novosibirsk TIN Pl 12.50 8/26/2014 RUB 5.00
RBC OJSC 3.27 4/19/2018 RUB 51.50
Russian Railways J 8.40 6/8/2028 RUB 100.00
Saturn Research & 8.50 6/6/2014 RUB 1.01
TGC-2 12.00 10/10/2018 RUB 75.00
World of Building 4.20 6/25/2019 RUB 3.60
SPAIN
-----
Autonomous Communi 4.25 10/31/2036 EUR 65.75
Autonomous Communi 4.22 4/26/2035 EUR 64.14
Autonomous Communi 4.69 10/28/2034 EUR 68.88
Autonomous Communi 2.97 9/8/2039 JPY 59.88
Autonomous Communi 0.48 10/17/2022 EUR 70.50
Autonomous Communi 2.10 5/20/2024 EUR 73.97
Autonomous Communi 0.27 11/29/2021 EUR 74.92
Banco de Castilla 1.50 6/23/2021 EUR 65.00
Bankinter SA 6.00 12/18/2028 EUR 65.13
City of Madrid Spa 0.34 10/10/2022 EUR 66.37
City of Madrid Spa 4.55 6/16/2036 EUR 73.57
Comunidad Autonoma 3.90 11/30/2035 EUR 63.84
Comunidad Autonoma 4.20 10/25/2036 EUR 66.58
Comunidad Autonoma 4.06 11/23/2035 EUR 63.94
Diputacion Foral d 4.32 12/29/2023 EUR 61.41
Ibercaja Banco SAU 1.09 4/20/2018 EUR 70.93
Junta Comunidades 0.41 12/5/2023 EUR 54.38
Junta Comunidades 3.88 1/31/2036 EUR 60.38
Junta de Extremadu 0.95 6/10/2024 EUR 72.31
Pescanova SA 5.13 4/20/2017 EUR 18.74
Pescanova SA 8.75 2/17/2019 EUR 17.79
Pescanova SA 6.75 3/5/2015 EUR 17.96
Spain Government I 2.92 12/2/2030 JPY 69.99
SWEDEN
------
Dannemora Mineral 11.75 3/22/2016 USD 41.50
Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 USD 6.63
Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 NOK 7.00
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/14/2016 BRL 74.58
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/22/2022 ZAR 46.97
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/29/2017 IDR 73.20
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/31/2022 ZAR 47.32
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/28/2022 ZAR 45.13
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/19/2018 IDR 68.74
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2018 BRL 59.21
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/15/2022 ZAR 46.66
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/26/2021 AUD 68.36
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/17/2027 USD 60.33
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/14/2016 BRL 72.32
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/28/2017 IDR 71.27
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/3/2017 BRL 70.83
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 7/21/2017 BRL 67.44
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/21/2016 BRL 72.17
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/20/2017 TRY 71.95
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/22/2016 BRL 72.19
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2020 TRY 54.02
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/5/2017 IDR 71.10
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/10/2017 BRL 70.65
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/26/2017 BRL 71.31
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/30/2017 BRL 67.86
Svensk Exportkredi 1.00 11/15/2021 AUD 72.00
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/21/2017 BRL 68.05
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/25/2021 ZAR 56.85
SWITZERLAND
-----------
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.60
Banque Cantonale V 11.80 1/29/2014 CHF 63.63
Banque Cantonale V 6.50 10/5/2015 CHF 72.74
Banque Cantonale V 2.00 7/8/2014 CHF 61.29
SAir Group 6.25 10/27/2002 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 4.25 2/2/2007 CHF 11.63
SAir Group 2.13 11/4/2004 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 0.13 7/7/2005 CHF 11.25
SAir Group 5.50 7/23/2003 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.13
SAir Group 6.25 4/12/2005 CHF 10.88
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 53.44
UBS AG 23.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.46
UBS AG 8.87 4/15/2014 USD 10.17
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.67
UBS AG 24.25 1/3/2014 EUR 60.63
UBS AG 18.45 10/24/2013 USD 8.73
UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 56.56
UBS AG 7.25 7/29/2014 USD 31.57
UBS AG 6.03 5/14/2014 USD 54.95
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 7.50 1/3/2014 EUR 64.51
UBS AG 12.70 4/22/2014 USD 66.71
UBS AG 8.94 2/13/2014 USD 14.64
UBS AG 6.29 2/26/2014 USD 32.99
UBS AG 6.22 2/26/2014 USD 38.93
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 72.58
UBS AG 16.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02
UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.41
UBS AG 17.25 1/3/2014 EUR 42.91
UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 52.05
UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.73
UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 61.74
UBS AG 17.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.54
UBS AG 6.04 8/29/2014 USD 35.75
UBS AG 10.46 1/2/2014 USD 35.35
UBS AG 8.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50
UBS AG 15.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.26
UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.94
UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 62.75
UBS AG 19.00 1/3/2014 EUR 53.05
UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 70.59
UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50
UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.72
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.30
UBS AG 22.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.98
UBS AG 9.53 12/17/2013 USD 48.94
UBS AG 6.49 5/23/2014 USD 21.20
UBS AG 6.53 5/27/2014 USD 21.09
UBS AG 6.33 5/12/2014 USD 19.48
UBS AG 9.25 4/30/2014 USD 9.78
UBS AG 14.00 6/27/2014 EUR 55.27
UBS AG 11.75 6/27/2014 EUR 48.70
UBS AG 8.29 1/14/2014 USD 19.98
UBS AG 5.22 1/28/2014 USD 11.48
UBS AG 7.86 1/31/2014 USD 20.24
UBS AG 9.17 6/30/2014 USD 67.70
UBS AG 7.25 8/8/2014 USD 45.54
UBS AG 8.35 10/24/2013 USD 50.89
UBS AG 9.45 10/22/2013 USD 20.95
UBS AG 9.00 1/3/2014 EUR 48.64
UBS AG 14.75 1/3/2014 EUR 44.63
UBS AG 7.15 2/26/2014 USD 32.50
UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 55.72
UBS AG 5.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.46
UBS AG 8.21 2/26/2014 USD 50.39
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 43.67
UBS AG 13.50 1/3/2014 EUR 56.28
UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 56.97
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 8.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.15
UBS AG 23.00 1/3/2014 EUR 69.99
UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.15
UBS AG 7.25 1/3/2014 EUR 69.51
UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.61
UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.35
UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.38
UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 68.73
UBS AG 14.50 1/3/2014 EUR 74.99
UBS AG 16.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.69
UBS AG 21.00 1/3/2014 EUR 38.60
UBS AG 6.19 1/8/2014 USD 19.82
UBS AG 9.93 6/18/2014 USD 50.46
UBS AG 9.89 11/22/2013 EUR 71.22
UBS AG 8.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.16
UBS AG 4.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.04
UBS AG 4.50 6/27/2014 EUR 48.72
UBS AG 8.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.09
UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.83
UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.76
UBS AG 5.50 3/28/2014 EUR 55.86
UBS AG 9.50 3/28/2014 EUR 50.93
UBS AG 13.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.47
UBS AG 12.00 3/28/2014 EUR 42.70
UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 39.79
UBS AG 14.00 3/28/2014 EUR 52.93
UBS AG 7.75 6/27/2014 EUR 45.94
UBS AG 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 49.43
UBS AG 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 50.45
UBS AG 11.00 3/28/2014 EUR 46.42
UBS AG 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.64
UBS AG 13.00 6/27/2014 EUR 45.50
UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 59.17
UBS AG 10.75 3/28/2014 EUR 58.16
UBS AG 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 10.50 6/27/2014 EUR 52.89
UBS AG 12.25 6/27/2014 EUR 71.08
UBS AG 6.25 6/27/2014 EUR 56.36
UBS AG 11.25 3/28/2014 EUR 72.74
UBS AG 11.00 1/3/2014 EUR 70.06
UBS AG 12.25 3/28/2014 EUR 68.98
UBS AG 12.00 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02
UBS AG 13.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 67.22
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 59.05
UBS AG 21.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.98
UBS AG 12.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.20
UBS AG 18.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.61
UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.63
UBS AG 19.25 1/3/2014 EUR 71.52
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.60
UBS AG 18.50 1/3/2014 EUR 71.37
UBS AG 6.50 1/3/2014 EUR 63.77
UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 49.48
UBS AG 5.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.70
UBS AG 4.25 1/3/2014 EUR 54.36
UBS AG 6.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.11
UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.93
UBS AG 14.41 11/21/2013 USD 40.01
UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 65.06
UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 45.13
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.49
UBS AG 6.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.80
UBS AG 20.75 1/3/2014 EUR 70.05
UBS AG 16.25 1/3/2014 EUR 72.22
UBS AG 19.75 1/3/2014 EUR 64.89
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.96
UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 47.78
UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 49.77
UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 60.73
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 36.11
UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.75
UBS AG 19.50 1/3/2014 EUR 65.22
UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 70.00
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.55
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 72.66
UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19
UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.80
UBS AG 7.98 3/17/2014 USD 10.60
UBS AG 14.75 3/28/2014 EUR 71.70
UBS AG 11.50 6/27/2014 EUR 74.62
UBS AG 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 64.14
UBS AG 6.50 3/28/2014 EUR 44.45
UBS AG 7.30 7/7/2014 USD 28.53
TURKEY
------
APP International 11.75 10/1/2005 USD 5.00
Yuksel Insaat AS 9.50 11/10/2015 USD 72.64
UKRAINE
-------
Agroton Public Ltd 12.50 7/14/2014 USD 50.00
UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
Alpha Credit Group 0.73 2/21/2021 EUR 52.38
Alpha Credit Group 6.00 7/29/2020 EUR 72.88
Barclays Bank PLC 0.61 12/28/2040 EUR 64.00
Barclays Bank PLC 8.00 5/23/2014 USD 10.81
Barclays Bank PLC 2.20 11/30/2025 USD 21.86
Barclays Bank PLC 0.50 3/13/2023 RUB 47.04
Barclays Bank PLC 6.75 10/16/2015 GBP 1.15
Barclays Bank PLC 7.40 2/13/2014 GBP 1.04
Barclays Bank PLC 2.50 3/7/2017 EUR 35.67
Barclays Bank PLC 8.25 1/26/2015 USD 1.13
Barclays Bank PLC 1.99 12/1/2040 USD 71.38
Barclays Bank PLC 1.64 6/3/2041 USD 66.57
Barclays Bank PLC 7.50 4/29/2014 GBP 1.06
Barclays Bank PLC 2.33 1/2/2041 USD 73.08
Cattles Ltd 6.88 1/17/2014 GBP 2.50
Cattles Ltd 7.13 7/5/2017 GBP 2.50
Commercial Bank Pr 5.80 2/9/2016 USD 69.01
Co-Operative Bank 9.25 4/28/2021 GBP 72.74
Co-Operative Bank 5.75 12/2/2024 GBP 68.46
Co-Operative Bank 7.88 12/19/2022 GBP 70.52
Co-Operative Bank 5.88 3/28/2033 GBP 69.57
Co-Operative Bank 5.63 11/16/2021 GBP 55.13
Co-Operative Bank 1.01 5/18/2016 EUR 69.71
Credit Suisse AG/L 11.50 4/4/2014 CHF 70.01
Credit Suisse AG/L 8.50 11/5/2013 CHF 45.66
Credit Suisse AG/L 6.50 1/14/2014 CHF 55.22
Credit Suisse AG/L 9.00 11/14/2013 CHF 51.41
Credit Suisse AG/L 1.64 6/1/2042 USD 46.62
Credit Suisse AG/L 8.00 1/14/2014 USD 55.38
Credit Suisse AG/L 6.85 8/8/2014 USD 57.36
Credit Suisse AG/L 10.50 11/15/2013 USD 51.48
Credit Suisse Inte 4.40 10/24/2013 EUR 57.10
Credit Suisse Inte 4.45 12/13/2013 EUR 53.20
Dunfermline Buildi 6.00 3/31/2015 GBP 1.38
Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 2/24/2022 EUR 60.75
Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 12/2/2021 EUR 61.13
Emporiki Group Fin 5.10 12/9/2021 EUR 62.13
ERB Hellas PLC 0.52 9/3/2014 EUR 72.13
Goldman Sachs Inte 2.50 8/17/2018 EUR 20.40
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/3/2023 AUD 62.86
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/2/2022 AUD 64.19
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2023 AUD 63.27
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/25/2021 AUD 68.62
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/30/2021 NZD 65.52
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/20/2018 RUB 69.82
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 6/30/2021 NZD 67.16
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/2/2023 AUD 63.51
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2022 AUD 63.89
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/5/2018 RUB 74.86
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 3/1/2018 RUB 74.48
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/27/2027 NZD 47.02
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/22/2021 AUD 68.35
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 7/30/2027 NZD 46.29
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 1/29/2027 NZD 47.70
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/30/2026 NZD 48.42
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2026 AUD 50.10
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/8/2026 AUD 50.28
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2027 NZD 47.50
Royal Bank of Scot 1.69 11/14/2016 GBP 1.10
RSL Communications 10.50 11/15/2008 USD 1.20
RSL Communications 10.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 9.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 9.88 11/15/2009 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 12.00 11/1/2008 USD 1.25
UBS AG/London 25.00 3/20/2014 CHF 62.25
UBS AG/London 7.63 9/30/2015 USD 16.71
UBS AG/London 20.25 4/17/2014 CHF 66.13
UBS AG/London 6.88 8/31/2015 USD 15.37
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *