/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/131202.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Monday, December 2, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 238 Headlines B U L G A R I A HOLDING ROADS: Files for Insolvency Following Financial Woes C Y P R U S CYPRUS: S&P Raises Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'B-/B' SONGA OFFSHORE: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Corp. Family Rating SONGA OFFSHORE: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'CC' F I N L A N D KRISTINA CRUISES: Goes In Administration G E O R G I A GEORGIA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings G R E E C E FREESEAS INC: Crede CG to Sell 75 Million Common Shares FREESEAS INC: Had US$29.9-Mil. Loss for 3 Quarters Ended Sept. 30 I R E L A N D A|WEAR: Kavanagh Fennell Appointed as New Receiver INTERMEDIATE FINANCE: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. C Notes to Ba1 I T A L Y ALITALIA SPA: Attempt to Raise Emergency Cash Falls Short BANCA MONTE: Seeks to Return to Profitability Under Rescue Plan BANCA MONTE: Securitisation Services Appointed as Servicer SOCIETA CATTOLICA: S&P Rates Planned Sub. Unsecured Debt 'BB+' K A Z A K H S T A N URANIUM ONE: S&P Lowers Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'B+' URANIUM ONE: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating M O N T E N E G R O MONTENEGRO: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB-' Rating N E T H E R L A N D S LAMBDA FINANCE: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to Ba2 LEVERAGED FINANCE: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes NXP FUNDING: S&P Raises Rating on Sr. Secured Term Loan to 'BB' R U S S I A GAZPROM-MEDIA HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms BB LT Issuer Default Rating ROSSIYSKIY KREDIT: Moody's Alters Caa1 Rating Outlook to Negative ROSSIYSKIY KREDIT: Moody's Cuts National Scale Rating to Ba3.ru SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'BB+' ICR S P A I N IBERCAJA BANCO: Moody's Lowers Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3' U N I T E D K I N G D O M AA BOND CO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes BLOCKBUSTER UK: To Close 30 More Stores, To Cut 182 More Jobs CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Bondholders Back GBP1.5BB Rescue Plan INVERCLYDE: In Administration Due to "Refinancing Agreement" PRINCE OF WHALES: Stonegate Pub Buys Firm Out of Administration X X X X X X X X * BOND PRICING: For the Week November 25 to November 29, 2013 ********* =============== B U L G A R I A =============== HOLDING ROADS: Files for Insolvency Following Financial Woes ------------------------------------------------------------ Novinite.com reports that Holding Roads has filed for insolvency. The company made the statement exactly two years after a spate of reports about its poor financial state flooded local media, Novinite.com notes. According to Novinite.com, the company posted a loss of BGN6.12 million at the end of September 2011 and said its debts to banks and non-banking financial institutions increase. In the middle of September 2011, the United Bulgarian Bank, a unit of the National Bank of Greece SA, froze the bank accounts of the company, Novinite.com relates. "Accounts, receivables and bank tapes of Holding Roads at First Investment Bank and Bulbank, worth BGN7.5 million have been distrained for the benefit of United Bulgarian Bank," Novinite.com quotes the company as saying in a statement. A loan borrowed from the United Bulgarian Bank, a unit of the National Bank of Greece SA, was due on May 31, but the company said it had no money, Novinite.com relays. Its construction machines and other equipment have been seized by Interlease, the company that leased them, Novinite.com discloses. Holding Roads is a Bulgarian road construction company. =========== C Y P R U S =========== CYPRUS: S&P Raises Sovereign Credit Ratings to 'B-/B' ----------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long- and short- term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on the Republic of Cyprus to 'B-/B from 'CCC+/C'. The outlook is stable. Rationale The upgrade reflects S&P's view that the immediate risks to Cyprus' program implementation, and, therefore, to full and timely payment of debt service, appear to have receded. The stable outlook reflects S&P's view of the implementation risks that remain as the end of the three-year Troika program approaches, balanced against the upside potential we see coming from Cyprus' economy. S&P anticipates that the Cypriot government -- having successfully completed the first two Troika program reviews -- will continue to timely comply with the program recommendations it has agreed with the Troika. The program has improved the government's debt profile, covering its borrowing requirements (apart from 6% of GDP in short-term debt) through to March 2016. As part of the program, the government has merged and recapitalized Cyprus' two largest banks. The new Bank of Cyprus has regained access to ECB facilities, although it still relies on Central Bank of Cyprus Emergency Liquidity Assistance for an estimated 45% of GDP. Thanks partly to the Cypriot government's policy response S&P now believes that Cyprus' economic contraction will be less severe than we had initially anticipated. Although the pace of contraction of the Cypriot economy (5.5% year-on-year in third-quarter 2013) has been the most rapid in the eurozone in 2013, it is now contracting less quickly than S&P forecasts in July (when S&P thought it would shrink by 14% for the year). For this reason, S&P is revising its GDP forecasts for 2013 and 2014 to -8% and -6%, but S&P remains uncertain about these estimates. Factors preventing a more severe contraction-- savings have helped to support consumption and Cyprus' tourism and business services sectors have proved resilient--are, in part, temporary. The Cypriot population's ability to draw down deposits further to support consumption is limited, corporate indebtedness is high (about 160% of GDP), and unemployment continues to increase, even as real wages are cut. The July 2013 debt exchange has termed out the government's maturity profile. Apart from short-term instruments, all remaining commercial debt payments are covered by the support program for its duration. The Cypriot government has also renegotiated the terms of a EUR2.5 billion bilateral loan from the Russian Federation, extending its grace period and maturity date and lowing its interest rate to 2.5% from 4.5%. S&P expects the government's debt burden to peak at about 135% of GDP at end- 2016. By then, slightly less than one-third of Cyprus' sovereign debt (excluding treasury bills) will be commercial debt. S&P views Cyprus' small economy as relatively flexible; it sees some evidence of business services exports being relatively stable despite the default of Cypriot flagship banks to non- insured depositors. Financial stability does, however, remain a key risk, in S&P's opinion. Once capital controls are lifted, the stability of private sector deposits will be uncertain. At the same time, financial intermediation has come close to a standstill within Cyprus, with a notable increase in private- sector debt and commercial arrears: a warning sign for future growth performance. The restructuring of Cyprus' financial sector will, in S&P's view, have a major effect on its economy. By the end of 2013, S&P anticipates that the sector will have been downsized to below 4x GDP from 9x GDP in 2009. This reflects sales of Cypriot banks' foreign branches and subsidiaries, as well as the write- down of their head office loan books. This has happened in parallel with the conversion into equity of 47.5% of uninsured deposits at the Bank of Cyprus. Risks to the government's compliance with the Troika program remain, and continue to constrain the ratings. In S&P's view, the Cypriot authorities could potentially be unable to meet the EUR1.4 billion privatization objective (equivalent to 8% of GDP) through to 2018, due to political and popular resistance to state asset sales. However, there are also potential upside risks to the government's credit profile. Primarily, if current exploration for oil and gas in offshore fields were to yield additional discoveries, this could materially improve the Cypriot government's revenues. This prospect, however, is enmeshed in geopolitics, as Turkey would be the logical offtaker for Cyprus' gas exports, but commercial incentives could be thwarted by the contentious issues regarding the partition of Cyprus. The prospect is further clouded by differences among the Cypriot coalition party members. If the coalition weakened, the entire Troika program implementation would be put at risk. S&P also notes that the Troika program provides little margin for error; fiscal slippage, either through implementation problems, lower-than-anticipated growth, or additional financial sector recapitalization needs, could deplete program buffers, leaving a financing gap. To reduce this risk, the government has strictly restrained expenditure and is targeting more ambitious reductions in the primary fiscal deficit than the program envisaged. S&P believes that the government's fiscal buffers may be exhausted before the end of the program, however, requiring either additional measures or a new support program. Outlook The stable outlook reflects S&P's view of the implementation risks that remain as the end of the three-year Troika program approaches, balanced against the upside potential S&P sees coming from Cyprus' economy. "We could lower the ratings if the government appeared unable to fulfill the Troika's conditions or if a large government financing gap emerged. In our view, the biggest risk to complying with Troika borrowing conditions will likely be in the area of the government's privatization targets. We expect that the first steps toward privatizing public enterprises (telecoms, electricity utilities, and the port authority) could potentially trigger opposition from those with vested interests in these sectors, and could likely require a change in Cyprus' constitution. If Cyprus' economy does not start growing again by the first half of 2015, the Troika would, in our view, likely reappraise the financing assumptions in its Memorandum of Understanding with Cyprus," S&P said. S&P could raise the ratings if the economy were to bottom-out sooner and at higher levels than S&P currently projects, enabling general government debt to GDP to plateau earlier and lower. Stabilization of the financial system would likely be a prerequisite for renewed growth. Ratings could also improve if the fledgling oil and gas sector appeared likely to boost economic activity over the 2013-2016 rating horizon. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. RATINGS LIST Upgraded To From Cyprus (Republic of) Sovereign Credit Rating B-/Stable/B CCC+/Stable/C Senior Unsecured B- CCC+ Short-Term Debt B C Commercial Paper B C Ratings Affirmed Cyprus (Republic of) Transfer & Convertibility Assessment AAA SONGA OFFSHORE: Moody's Affirms 'Caa1' Corp. Family Rating ---------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Songa Offshore SE's probability of default rating (PDR) to Ca-PD from Caa1-PD. Concurrently, the rating agency has affirmed the Caa1 corporate family rating (CFR) and revised the outlook to negative. The rating actions follow the company's announcement of a proposed debt refinancing and restructuring, with the issuance of up to US$425 million in new capital, in the form of up to US$275 million in new equity and a US$150 million convertible bond. The capital raise is dependent on a number of conditions, including the extension of the existing bank facility and unsecured bond maturities, reductions in the bond interest rates and the bank amortization payments, and waivers on certain maintenance covenants, and the company has already received the required pre- acceptance from two-thirds of the bond holders that is necessary. Upon successful completion of the restructuring -- expected around the end of December 2013 -- Moody's expects to review the ratings and assign the LD suffix to the PDR. Ratings Rationale: The downgrade of the PDR to Ca-PD reflects Moody's view that under its definition of default, Songa's recapitalization including maturity extensions and interest rate reductions, will constitute a default within the company's group structure. Moody's notes, however, that this recapitalization will not adversely affect Songa's CFR as, at maturity, the company still intends to redeem all debt at par and the 2016 bonds at 103.5%. Songa will use the proceeds from up to US$425 million in new capital to boost liquidity and refinance existing debt, including a US$111 million prepayment of a US$222 million vendor loan from Statoil ASA that is due on delivery of two of the new Cat-D rigs under construction. Moody's expects that the proposed recapitalization will improve Songa's liquidity profile and resolve the 2014 funding gap that was one of the reasons for the rating downgrade to Caa1 (from B3) in October of this year. Negative Outlook: The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that, under its rating definitions, a default will occur as a result of the proposed recapitalization, maturity extensions and interest rate and payment profile amendments. Songa, established in Norway in 2005 and listed on the Norwegian stock exchange with a market capitalization of approximately NOK1 billion, has grown rapidly through both acquisitions and some re- commissioning of second-hand floaters and currently has a fleet of five semisubmersibles, with four under construction. For the year ending December 2012, it reported revenue of about US$600 million. SONGA OFFSHORE: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'CC' ------------------------------------------------------ Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term corporate credit rating on Cyprus-domiciled drilling company Songa Offshore S.E. to 'CC' from 'B-'. The outlook is negative. The downgrade follows Songa's announcement to implement an extensive debt restructuring plan, including amendments to existing bank and bond debt with a reduced debt amortization schedule and the extension of maturity dates. S&P views this as a distressed exchange, which constitutes an event of default under its criteria. To consider an exchange offer as tantamount to default, S&P assess whether two conditions have been met: -- The offer, in S&P's view, implies that the investor will receive less value than the promise of the original securities; and -- The offer, in our view, is distressed, rather than purely opportunistic. Where the issuer credit rating is 'B-' or lower, the exchange would ordinarily be viewed as distressed and would therefore lead to de facto restructuring. S&P's view is further supported by what it sees as Songa's "weak" liquidity profile, "weak" management and governance (including high management turnover), and recent financial covenant issues. Songa has obtained a waiver on the leverage ratio covenant specified under the existing bond documentation, valid up to and including Dec. 31, 2013. S&P notes that the amendments to financial covenants included in the plan should relieve recurring issues with maintenance covenant headroom. S&P views a 'CC' corporate credit rating as appropriate for an entity that has announced its intention to undertake an exchange offer or a similar restructuring that we classify as distressed, but that has not yet completed the transaction. S&P notes that successful completion of the plan is contingent on final agreement from several stakeholders, including its bankers. S&P understands that Songa has already received commitments from the majority of its bondholders, and has successfully placed US$425 million of new capital as part of the proposal. Songa is also negotiating improved terms with Statoil ASA on its existing charter agreements. Furthermore, Songa has announced that it will continue to pursue sales of Songa Venus and Songa Mercur, which should bring in more cash flow. S&P acknowledges that if agreed, these comprehensive proposals will be beneficial to Songa, improving its long-term capital structure and relieving liquidity issues. However, S&P notes that financing for the four new Cat D rigs has not yet been concluded, although S&P understands that funding for the first two, which are due to be delivered in the last quarter of 2014, is in its final stages of documentation. The negative outlook reflects the likelihood of S&P lowering the rating to 'D' (Default) if the debt restructuring is completed as expected. If all of Songa's stakeholders accept the changes to the capital structure and contract terms that the company is proposing, S&P will review the ratings shortly after the transaction has been completed. In this case, the 'D' ratings would no longer be applicable; S&P would conduct a forward-looking review after the transaction closes and raise the rating as expediently as possible. The magnitude of the potential rating change would take into account benefits realized from the debt restructuring, including the US$425 million of new capital, the extended debt maturity profile, and reduced interest rates, as well as any interim developments. ============= F I N L A N D ============= KRISTINA CRUISES: Goes In Administration ---------------------------------------- Uutiset News reports that Kristina Cruises has gone into administration and cancelled all cruises to the Canary Islands scheduled for the winter season. The family-owned company is seeking a corporate reorganization and is therefore unable to provide customers the cruises they have booked, according to Uutiset News. The cancellations affect some 2,500 holiday-makers, the report notes. The company did not want to estimate how much money it would need to continue operations in the spring and summer, when it has planned cruises to the Mediterranean, Norway, Iceland and Spitzbergen, the report relates. Managing Director Mikko Partanen said that his firm would return payments to customers, the report adds. Kristina Cruises is a Finnish shipping company. ============= G E O R G I A ============= GEORGIA: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings ----------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long- and short- term sovereign credit ratings on the Government of Georgia at 'BB-/B'. The outlook is stable. Rationale The ratings reflect S&P's view that the ongoing political transition in Georgia will support the medium-term stabilization of fiscal and external balance sheets. S&P views economic growth prospects as strong, despite this year's economic slowdown and ongoing near-term political tension and policy uncertainty. The ratings are constrained by Georgia's high external vulnerabilities, limited monetary flexibility, and low GDP per capita. These factors are partially offset by the moderate levels of government debt and stabilizing government finances. Georgia is entering a new phase in its political transition, with a new president and new prime minister, neither of which are well-known political figures. The October election of President Giorgi Margvelashvili ends the nearly decade-long rule of Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power in the 2003 Rose Revolution. The leadership change marks an end to the awkward cohabitation between President Saakashvili (United National Movement) and Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, whose Georgian Dream (GD) coalition unexpectedly won a parliamentary election one year ago. The new president will have much less power than Mr. Saakasvhili, after constitutional changes adopted in 2010 shifted power from the president to the parliament and prime minister. Mr Ivanishvili, having previously indicated that he did not intend to stay in politics for the long term, stepped down in November and chose interior minister Irakli Garibashvili as his successor. Mr. Garibashvili will be tasked with foreign, domestic, and economic policymaking. In S&P's view, Mr. Ivanishvili's departure from politics leaves questions as to the functioning of the sometimes divided GD coalition, which he founded. It remains to be seen what role he will play in the future, particularly with regard to the president and the prime minister, both of whom he handpicked. The two democratic and peaceful transfers of power over the last year bode well, in S&P's view, for medium-term political stability and strengthening institutional effectiveness. That said, the domestic political scene has been tense over the last year, and uncertainty over the new government's policy agenda has weighed on public and private investment and economic growth. S&P anticipates that only net exports will make a substantial positive contribution to GDP growth in 2013 on the back of an increase in commodity exports and tourism receipts. Nevertheless, S&P expects real GDP growth to recover in 2014. S&P bases its growth forecast on its assumptions of stabilization in the political environment, coherent policymaking, and higher public investment. The current account deficit has narrowed significantly over 2013 to an estimated 6.4% of GDP, from 11.7% in 2012. The main causes of the reduced deficit are slower growth and the related contraction in imports. Despite the narrowing of the current account balance, which will be mostly covered by net foreign direct investment this year, Georgia's large net external liability position remains a source of external vulnerability. External liabilities amount to about 100% of GDP and 180% of current account receipts. "We expect the government to meet its fiscal target this year for a deficit of below 3% of GDP. Given the slowdown in the economy and low inflation, revenue fell slightly in 2013 in nominal terms. There has also been an increase in public wages, pensions, and social expenditures, as part of the government's agenda to support more inclusive growth. Offsetting the decline in revenue and increase in social spending, the government has cut goods and services expenditures and capital spending. We expect there will be a break in the recent trend of fiscal consolidation in the near-term as the government ramps up social expenditures, resulting in the deficit widening to 3.9% of GDP in 2014," S&P said. Georgia has been experiencing deflation since early 2012; October was the first month this year that the CPI was up. The central bank has loosened monetary policy, cutting the policy rate to 3.75% from 8% in 2011, but this has had limited effect because policy transmission mechanisms are weak in light of the country's still-high dollarization. Growth in depository corporation claims has slowed to an estimated 11% this year from 13% in 2012. However, with depository corporation claims still comparatively low at about 35% of GDP, S&P expects credit growth to accelerate after the political environment stabilizes. S&P notes that the central bank would like to see more long-term lari lending, and the government plans to issue longer-dated local-currency treasury bills. About two-thirds of loans and deposits are in dollars, a proportion which has fallen slightly in recent years. Outlook The stable outlook on the ratings balances S&P's view of Georgia's large net external liability position and dependence on external financing against its strong economic growth prospects and potential for improved policy effectiveness, provided that the political environment stabilizes. S&P might lower the ratings if the uncertainties in the political environment continue, depressing economic growth, owing to poorly coordinated or ineffective policymaking or worsening tensions between the political groups. S&P might consider raising the ratings if the political transition continues smoothly, with policy predictability and effectiveness improving. Continued strong economic performance, propelled by domestic and foreign direct investment, and the stabilization of external balance sheets, could also support an upgrade. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed Georgia (Government of) Sovereign Credit Rating BB-/Stable/B Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB Senior Unsecured BB- Commercial Paper B =========== G R E E C E =========== FREESEAS INC: Crede CG to Sell 75 Million Common Shares ------------------------------------------------------- FreeSeas Inc. registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 75,000,000 shares of its common stock for resale by Crede CG III, Ltd. These shares of Common Stock include 5,625,000 shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of Series B Convertible Preferred Stock, 31,875,000 shares of Common Stock issuable upon conversion of Series C Convertible Preferred Stock and 37,500,000 shares issuable upon exercise or exchange of warrants. The shares of Common Stock offered by the selling stockholder have been or may be issued pursuant to the Securities Purchase Agreement dated Nov. 3, 2013. The Company's common stock is currently quoted on The NASDAQ Capital Market under the symbol "FREE." On Nov. 19, 2013, the closing price of the Company's common stock was US$0.34 per share. A copy of the Form F-1 prospectus is available for free at: http://is.gd/qZ9Ovp About FreeSeas Inc. Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding company of ship-owning companies. The management of FreeSeas' vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal shareholders. The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities, including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as "major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks." As of Oct. 12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational fleet is approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its fleet is 15 years. Freeseas disclosed a net loss of US$30.88 million in 2012, a net loss of US$88.19 million in 2011, and a net loss of US$21.82 million in 2010. The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2012, showed US$114.35 million in total assets, US$106.55 million in total liabilities and US$7.80 million in total shareholders' equity. RBSM LLP, in New York, issued a "going concern" qualification on the consolidated financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012. The independent auditors noted that the Company has incurred recurring operating losses and has a working capital deficiency. In addition, the Company has failed to meet scheduled payment obligations under its loan facilities and has not complied with certain covenants included in its loan agreements. It has also failed to make required payments to Deutsche Bank Nederland as agreed to in its Sept. 7, 2012, amended and restated facility agreement and received notices of default from First Business Bank. Furthermore, the vast majority of the Company's assets are considered to be highly illiquid and if the Company were forced to liquidate, the amount realized by the Company could be substantially lower that the carrying value of these assets. These conditions, among others, raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern. FREESEAS INC: Had US$29.9-Mil. Loss for 3 Quarters Ended Sept. 30 ----------------------------------------------------------------- FreeSeas Inc. reported a net loss of US$29.94 million on US$4 million of operating revenues for the nine months ended Sept. 30, 2013, as compared with a net loss of US$24.25 million on US$12.13 million of operating revenues for the same period a year ago. As of Sept. 30, 2013, the Company had US$107.35 million in total assets, US$106.63 million in total liabilities, all current, and US$711,000 in total shareholders' equity. "Management is currently seeking and will continue to seek to restructure the Company's indebtedness and obtain waivers on covenant violations. Based on the Company's cash flow projections for the remainder of 2013, cash on hand and cash provided by operating activities will not be sufficient to cover scheduled debt service as of September 30, 2013, operating expenses and capital expenditure requirements for at least twelve months from the balance sheet date. All of the above raises doubt regarding the Company's ability to continue as a going concern," the Company said in the Report. A copy of the Report is available for free at: http://is.gd/jZeWeX About FreeSeas Inc. Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding company of ship-owning companies. The management of FreeSeas' vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal shareholders. The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities, including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as "major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks." As of Oct. 12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational fleet is approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its fleet is 15 years. Freeseas disclosed a net loss of US$30.88 million in 2012, a net loss of US$88.19 million in 2011, and a net loss of US$21.82 million in 2010. RBSM LLP, in New York, issued a "going concern" qualification on the consolidated financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012. The independent auditors noted that the Company has incurred recurring operating losses and has a working capital deficiency. In addition, the Company has failed to meet scheduled payment obligations under its loan facilities and has not complied with certain covenants included in its loan agreements. It has also failed to make required payments to Deutsche Bank Nederland as agreed to in its Sept. 7, 2012, amended and restated facility agreement and received notices of default from First Business Bank. Furthermore, the vast majority of the Company's assets are considered to be highly illiquid and if the Company were forced to liquidate, the amount realized by the Company could be substantially lower that the carrying value of these assets. These conditions, among others, raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern. ============= I R E L A N D ============= A|WEAR: Kavanagh Fennell Appointed as New Receiver -------------------------------------------------- Independent.ie reports that Ken Fennell of Kavanagh Fennell -- kfennell@kavanaghfennell.ie -- has been appointed as receiver to A|wear. A|wear owner Latzur Limited had been in examinership since October. The purpose of the examinership had been to re-structure A|wear to put the business on a sustainable footing and to protect as many jobs as possible, according to Independent.ie. The company said in a statement that this had not happened, the report notes. "In the intervening weeks post-examinership, sales projections for the business have not materialised and no viable investment proposal was forthcoming, leaving the business with no option but to seek the appointment of a receiver," the company said, the report relates. Independent.ie discloses that the receiver will assess the feasibility of trading some of the stores over the coming days but it is inevitable that some stores will cease to trade. A|wear has 31 retail locations in Ireland and 9 concession stores in the UK. The business employs 358 staff across its locations and head office which is based on Grafton Street, Dublin. There are 117 full-time staff and 241 part-time staff between all retail operations and the head office functions. INTERMEDIATE FINANCE: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. C Notes to Ba1 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the following notes issued by Intermediate Finance II PLC: Issuer: Intermediate Finance II PLC EUR63M Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade EUR15M Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade EUR78M Class C Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade Moody's confirmed the ratings of the following notes: EUR39M Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to B2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade Moody's affirmed the ratings of the following notes: EUR195M (current outstanding balance of EUR 24.5M) Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf) Intermediate Finance II PLC, issued in July 2007, is a Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield mezzanine European and US loans. The portfolio is managed by Intermediate Capital Managers Limited. This transaction ended the reinvestment period in July 2013. Ratings Rationale: According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are primarily a result of significant amortization of the Class A notes and subsequent improvement of the overcollateralization ratios of all outstanding tranches. Moody's notes that there were significant pay-down of the A-2 notes since the last payment date in July 2013. The deal has accumulated a very large amount of principal proceeds over the past couple of years, that was applied to paydown the senior notes instead of being reinvested during the reinvestment period. In its rating analysis, Moody's typically assumes cash is reinvested during the reinvestment period until a few months before the reinvestment period is to end. On November 14th, 2013, Moody's upgraded and/or placed under review for upgrade all outstanding classes of notes. Action concludes the review of this transaction. As of the trustee report dated September 2013, the Class A&B, C and D notes overcollateralization ratios are reported at 169.6%, 131.9% and 118.8%, respectively, as compared to 147.7%, 120.0% and 109.7% since June 2013. Moody's notes that following its analysis, the latest trustee report in October has become available. Moody's took into consideration the latest report. Moody's notes that the key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR181.8 million and GBP31.7 million, defaulted par of EUR76.1 million, a weighted average default probability of 40.6% (consistent with a WARF of 4411), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 15% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 16.4 and a weighted average spread of 4.2%. As part of the base case, Moody's has addressed the exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country ceiling rating of A1 and below. Given the portfolio is exposed to 14.8% of obligors located in Spain, the model was run with different par amounts depending on the target rating of each class of notes as further described in the Section 4.2.11 and Appendix 14 of the methodology published in November 2013. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the rated notes and amount to a 1.4% par haircut for the Class A and B notes. The default probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realised on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 100% of the portfolio is exposed to non first-lien loan corporate assets that would recover 15% upon default. In each case, historical and market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's also performed sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes: Deteriorating credit quality of portfolio to address the refinancing risks. Approximately 3.6% of the portfolio is European corporate rated B3 and below and maturing between 2013 and 2015, which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. Moody's considered a model run where the base case WARF was increased to 4521 by forcing ratings on 25% of refinancing exposures to Ca. This run generated model outputs that were consistent with the base case results. Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration of lowly rated debt maturing between 2013 and 2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities. Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described below: 1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying portfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subject to market conditions and this may have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan market or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed by rising loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the senior notes but may negatively impact the mezzanine and junior notes. 2) Moody's also notes that around 88.2% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009. 3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries would positively impact the ratings of the notes. 4) Foreign currency exposure: The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated tranches. Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in November 2013. Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realised on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA CLO Cash-Flow model. This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios. In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the final rating decision. ========= I T A L Y ========= ALITALIA SPA: Attempt to Raise Emergency Cash Falls Short --------------------------------------------------------- Agnieszka Flak at Reuters reports that loss-making Alitalia Spa has yet to raise all of the EUR300 million (US$407 million) it was seeking in an emergency cash call, piling more pressure on the Italian airline and find a strategic investor to keep it flying. According to Reuters, Alitalia said on Thursday it had received EUR173 million by a deadline for existing shareholders to subscribe to its cash call via pledges and bank guarantees and expected to raise the rest from the state-owned postal service and other investors. The emergency cash, part of a bigger rescue package engineered by the government to keep Alitalia's aircraft in the air, is seen as a stopgap measure giving the airline a few more months to find a partner to help revamp the group, Reuters notes. But with EUR700,000 of daily losses and net debt of EUR800 million Alitalia could soon have to ground its planes, Reuters states. The failure to fully cover the capital increase illustrates that some of Alitalia's existing investors have doubts that the carrier, which has made a profit only sporadically in its 67-year history, can be turned around, Reuters discloses. Alitalia said on Thursday it had received the EUR173 million by the Nov. 27 deadline in pledges from current shareholders and guarantee payments by Italy's top two banks Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit, Reuters relays. According The Wall Street Journal's Gilles Castonguay, Intesa and UniCredit, Italy's two largest banks by assets, have committed to buy EUR100 million worth of unsubscribed shares. Intesa is also a shareholder with a 8.9% stake, the Journal discloses. The airline, Reuters says, expects to sell remaining unsubscribed shares in a second phase of the cash call that ends on Dec. 10. Italy's postal service, which the government brought into the rescue plan last month, has said it would invest EUR75 million and the airline hopes to convince other investors to stump up the remainder, Reuters recounts. "Given the information received to date and taking into account subscription commitments already made, the company believes that the conditions exist for the capital increase to be fully covered," Reuters quotes Alitalia as saying. Even after it raises all the money, Alitalia will still be in a precarious position because it has yet to find an airline other than Air France-KLM with which to form an alliance that can help it survive over the long run, the Journal says. Air France-KLM has so far expressed support for the airline, but not much else, the Journal states. But Tommaso Di Tanno, a member of Alitalia's board of statutory auditors, told a weekly television news program on Nov. 25 that he had doubts about reassurances from some shareholders and politicians regarding the possibility of finding another partner, the Journal relays. "It doesn't seem to me that there's a fight [among potential partners] for Alitalia," the Journal quotes Mr. Di Tannon as saying. Alitalia also has EUR200 million in new credit lines from Intesa and UniCredit, but Andrea Giuricin, a transport expert at Bicocca University in Milan, said the amount -- in addition to the EUR300 million -- would only keep Alitalia in the air until March or April. "It's enough to get it through winter," Mr. Giuricin, as cited by the Journal, said. About Alitalia Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through a successful restructuring. After filing for bankruptcy protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline in early 2009. Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the airline now serves more than 75 national and international destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice, Naples, and Catania. Alitalia extends its network as a member of the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM. An Italian investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France- KLM owns 25%. BANCA MONTE: Seeks to Return to Profitability Under Rescue Plan --------------------------------------------------------------- Sonia Sirletti at Bloomberg News reports that Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, the bailed-out Italian bank, is seeking to return to profit after it reduces costs and increases capital under a European Union-backed reorganization plan. According to Bloomberg, Monte Paschi said in a statement on Nov. 28 it is targeting net income of EUR200 million (US$272 million) in 2015 and EUR900 million in 2017. The bank, Bloomberg says, plans to shed 8,000 staff; sell EUR3 billion of new shares; and shrink its balance sheet by 25% under a plan that received EU approval two days ago. Chief Executive Officer Fabrizio Viola and Chairman Alessandro Profumo are being forced by European regulators to conduct a more rigorous overhaul of the world's oldest bank than initially planned to secure approval for state aid, Bloomberg discloses. The pair, appointed last year, sought the cash after their predecessors lost billions of dollars on Italian sovereign debt and derivatives contracts, Bloomberg recounts. Monte Paschi, engulfed by probes into alleged misconduct by its former managers, said it plans to cut its sovereign-debt holdings and trading activities and reduce its consumer credit and leasing portfolios, Bloomberg relays. The bank, Bloomberg says, will cut the assets on its balance sheet to EUR181 billion by the end of 2017 from about EUR207 billion on Sept. 30. Assets amounted to EUR240 billion at the end of 2011, Bloomberg discloses. The company, as cited by Bloomberg, said the reorganization will allow it to repay EUR4.1 billion of state aid by 2017. Monte Paschi plans to reduce its EUR23 billion of Italian sovereign debt, the most among the country's biggest banks relative to tangible equity, to about EUR17 billion in 2017, Bloomberg says. The lender, which has paid back EUR1 billion from the EUR29 billion it borrowed in the European Central Bank's long-term refinancing operations, plans to repay the full amount by 2015, Bloomberg notes. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector. It provides traditional banking services, asset management and private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and investment trusts. In addition, it offers investment banking, including project finance, merchant banking and financial advisory services. The Company comprises more than 3,000 branches, and a structure of channels of distribution. Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa. It has numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA. * * * As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 18, 2013, Fitch downgraded MPS's Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc' from 'b' and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN). TCR-Europe also reported on June 19, 2013, that Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'B' from 'BB', and affirmed the 'B' short-term rating. S&P also lowered its rating on MPS' Lower Tier 2 subordinated notes to 'CCC-' from 'CCC+'. S&P affirmed the ratings on MPS' junior subordinated debt at 'CCC-' and on its preferred stock at 'C'. At the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2012. BANCA MONTE: Securitisation Services Appointed as Servicer ---------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service stated that Securitisation Services S.p.A. (NR) has been recently appointed back up servicer in the following transactions: -- Five residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) deals serviced by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (MPS; B2/Not Prime): Siena Mortgages 2010 -7; Siena Mortgages 07-5; Siena Mortgages 07-5, Series 2; Siena Mortgages 09-6 and Siena Mortgages 09-6 Series 2 -- One SME deal serviced by MPS Capital Services (MPSCS; B2/Not Prime): Siena SME 11-1 -- One leasing transaction serviced by Monte dei Paschi di Siena Leasing & Factoring, Banca per i Servizi Finanziari alle Imprese S.p.A. (MPS L&F; NR): Siena Lease 11-1 This appointment is the result of the rating trigger existing in the servicing agreements of these deals. These agreements consider the appointment of a back up servicer at loss of Ba3 by the parent company, MPS (B2/Not Prime). This rating trigger was hit in May 2013 after MPS was downgraded to B2 from Ba2. Additionally, the respective servicers will be effectively replaced at the loss of Caa2 by MPS. The Siena Lease 11-1 S.r.l. deal explicitly contemplates the subcontracting of servicing tasks from Securitisation Services S.p.A. to Trebi GeneralconsultS.p.A. (which specializes in IT services) and Eurholding S.p.a. (which specializes in administrative tasks). The appointment of a back up servicer is a mitigant to the disruption risk in these transactions, being consistent with the current rating on the notes, as described in Global Structured Finance Operational Risk, published in June 2013. SOCIETA CATTOLICA: S&P Rates Planned Sub. Unsecured Debt 'BB+' -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its 'BBB' insurer financial strength and counterparty credit ratings on Italy-based composite insurer Societa Cattolica di Assicurazione (Cattolica). The outlook is negative. At the same time, S&P assigned a 'BB+' issue rating to Cattolica's planned subordinated, unsecured debt issue. The affirmation reflects S&P's view that the announcement of the acquisition of Fata Assicurazioni from Assicurazioni Generali SpA for EUR179 million does not change S&P's view of Cattolica's satisfactory business risk profile and lower adequate financial risk profile. Based on the draft prospectus received, S&P has classified the subordinated notes as having intermediate equity content under its hybrid capital criteria. S&P includes securities of this nature, up to a maximum of 25%, in its calculation of total adjusted capital, which forms the basis of S&P's consolidated risk-based capital analysis of insurance companies. Such inclusion is subject to the bonds being considered eligible for regulatory solvency treatment and the aggregate amount of included hybrid capital not exceeding the total amount eligible for regulatory solvency treatment. The confirmation of the equity content and rating are also subject to the notes' final terms and conditions. S&P expects no changes compared with the draft prospectus. Cattolica's financial flexibility remains adequate, in S&P's view. S&P considers that Cattolica's exposure to Italian sovereign risk is high. Italian government bonds alone made up two-thirds of the group's invested assets on Sept. 30, 2013. Consequently, S&P is unlikely to rate Cattolica higher than the long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on Italy. The negative outlook on Cattolica primarily reflects that on Italy, given the high concentration of Cattolica's investments in Italian government bonds. In application of S&P's criteria, any downgrade of Italy would trigger a similar downgrade of Cattolica. The negative outlook also incorporates potential deterioration of Cattolica's capital adequacy as a result of further unfavorable economic and financial trends in Italy. S&P could lower the ratings on Cattolica if further potential deterioration in Italian financial markets was such that S&P believed it would materially impair its view of the company's capital adequacy or risk position. S&P could consider revising the outlook to stable, at any time over the next two years, if the outlook on Italy were revised to stable. =================== K A Z A K H S T A N =================== URANIUM ONE: S&P Lowers Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'B+' ------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term corporate credit rating on Toronto-based uranium producer Uranium One Inc. to 'B+' from 'BB-'. The outlook is stable. Standard & Poor's also lowered its assessment of the company's stand-alone credit profile to 'b' from 'b+'. At the same time, Standard & Poor's assigned its 'B+' issue-level rating and '3' recovery rating to Uranium One's proposed US$350 million senior secured notes. In addition, Standard & Poor's assigned its 'B-' issue-level rating and '6' recovery rating to Uranium One's senior unsecured ruble bond notes outstanding. A '3' recovery rating indicates meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in a default scenario; a '6' recovery rating indicates negligible (10%-30%) recovery. "We downgraded Uranium One given our expectation of a high level of expected volatility for cash flow/leverage ratios based on the company's pro forma debt balance and contemporary uranium prices," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst George Economou. Pro forma to the proposed senior secured notes offering, S&P believes that the company's credit measures will be very sensitive to the price of uranium with a US$5.00 per pound contraction increasing its 2014 adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio to more than 6.0x and a funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio below 10%, ratios that are consistent with a "highly leveraged" financial risk profile. S&P views Uranium One's business risk profile as "weak," reflecting its assessment of the company's competitive position, country risk, and risk in the mining industry. In S&P's view, the company has a better-than-average position on an industry cost curve and average profitability compared with mining industry peers; however, Uranium One also has high mine and geographic concentration as well as a relatively short aggregate mining life based on proven and probable reserves that are reported in accordance with National Instrument 43-101, the Canadian mineral resource classification system. S&P considers Uranium One to be a government-related entity under its criteria and have assigned a one-notch uplift based on this analysis. S&P assess Uranium One's financial risk profile as highly leveraged, reflecting high potential volatility in financial measures; a great reliance on indirect, subordinated cash flows from its joint venture mines; and reduced financial flexibility from lower cash balances. The stable outlook reflects Standard & Poor's view that Uranium One's low-cost production profile and long-term sales contracts should help support the company's operating performance and cash flow generation through next year. S&P estimates that, under its base case assumptions, the company's proportionately consolidated adjusted debt-to-EBITDA leverage ratio should increase to 4.5x- 5.5x and its FFO-to-debt ratio should decrease to 15%-20% with modestly positive cash available for debt repayment through 2015. S&P expects that the ratings could be pressured if any combination of significantly tighter uranium margins, higher capital expenditures, or acquisitions contributed to a debt-to- EBITDA leverage ratio above 5.5x for an extended period. S&P estimates that this could occur if EBITDA were to deteriorate significantly following a decline in uranium margins below US$15.00 per pound due to a combination of weaker uranium demand expectations and accelerating cash costs at Uranium One. Although S&P don't expect in the next year, it could consider a positive rating action on the company's stand-alone credit profile if Uranium One demonstrates sustainably improved credit metrics, including an adjusted debt-to-EBITDA leverage ratio close to 3x, due to better-than-expected profitability and reduced debt balances. In addition, S&P would reassess its view on extraordinary government support if it sees a fundamental change in Uranium One's role and link to the Russian Federation. URANIUM ONE: Fitch Assigns 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating --------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned Canada-based Uranium One Inc. a Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB-'. The Outlook is Stable. Fitch has also assigned an expected 'BB-(EXP)' rating to the US$350 million senior secured notes to be issued by Uranium One Investment Inc., a fully-owned subsidiary of Uranium One. The final notes rating is contingent on the receipt of final documents conforming materially to the preliminary documentation reviewed. Uranium One's rating is notched up three levels from Fitch's standalone assessment of 'B-' for support from its Russian state- owned parent, JSC Atomic Energy Power Corporation (Atomenergoprom) (BBB/Stable), and, ultimately, from the Russian Federation (BBB/Stable), in line with the agency's Parent and Subsidiarity Rating Linkage. Atomenergoprom is a principal company of the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom (Rosatom), wholly owned by the Russian Federation. Fitch's view of support is based on Uranium One's strong strategic and operational ties with its parent. Fitch believes that Uranium One's low-cost position for the extraction of triuranium octoxide (U3O8) is important for Rosatom's successful future development. Rosatom is the world's leader in integrated uranium mining, enrichment and fuel fabrication, in nuclear power plant engineering, fabrication and construction, and a top nuclear power utility in Russia. Uranium One currently accounts for about 38% of Rosatom's uranium needs but given the recently announced delays in the development of Rosatom's own mining assets in Russia, Fitch expects this share to increase in the medium term. Uranium One obtains nearly all of its uranium from Kazakhstan from joint ventures (JVs) with JSC National Atomic Company Kazatomprom (BBB-/Stable) and sells over half of its production to Rosatom predominantly at spot prices. Uranium One's standalone creditworthiness is constrained by its small size, by its dependence on production and dividends from the JVs, and by exposure to a single commodity and spot uranium prices. Based on Fitch conservative uranium price forecast ranging between US$35.5 per pound (lb) to US$44.5/lb until 2016, Fitch expects that Uranium One's funds from operations (FFO) that includes income from wholly-consolidated operations and a proportionate share of dividends from JVs will drop sharply in 2014-2015 and its FFO adjusted leverage will deteriorate dramatically to above 15x in 2014-2015 before improving to about 6x (gross) and about 4.5x (net) by end-2016. In Fitch view, Uranium One does not have robust legal ties with its parent, such as financial guarantees from Atomenergoprom / Rosatom for a large portion of its debt nor cross default provisions in the parent's debt documentation that would cover Uranium One and indicate stronger linkage between the subsidiary and the parent. Key Rating Drivers: Strategic Mining Asset Fitch views the full consolidation of Uranium One by Rosatom in October 2013 as an indication of the company's importance to the latter's long-term growth strategy. In 2012, Uranium One had total attributable production of 12.2m lbs of uranium, 93% of which were produced in Kazakhstan. Uranium One's production is a key factor in Rosatom's long-term aim of maintaining its leading position across global nuclear markets. Low Production Cost Using the low-cost in situ leaching method, Uranium One obtains nearly all of its uranium from JVs with Kazatomprom. In 2012 the company reported cash costs of US$16/lb of U3O8, and forecasts 2013 cash costs of US$19/lb, making it one of the lowest-cost producers worldwide. Being a low-cost supplier, Uranium One should help Rosatom to improve its enrichment margins. The company sells its products predominately at spot prices, which distinguishes it from some other mining companies such as Kazatomprom that sell their uranium at a mix of long-term and spot prices. Prices Impede New Projects Uranium spot prices reached a multi-year low of US$35/lb in October 2013, making production at many existing and new fields unprofitable. As a result, a number of new projects have been placed on care and maintenance with a potential for further temporary suspension. It has recently been reported that due to low uranium prices, Rosatom has decided to stop developing several mining assets including Uranium One's projects Willow Creek in the US (annual production below 1m lb to be maintained) and Honeymoon in Australia (production to be placed on care and maintenance). Fitch believes that Uranium One's position as a key supplier of uranium to Rosatom will become even more important over the medium term. 'B-' Standalone Assessment The standalone assessment is capped by the company's small size, by its dependence on production and dividends from the JVs and by high expected FFO-adjusted gross leverage. Uranium One almost exclusively depends on dividends from its JVs to service its debt. In 2012, it received US$185 million in dividends from JVs and in 9M13, dividends received amounted to US$98.3 million, down from US$129.1 million in 9M12. In addition, Uranium One had US$67.3 million in dividends receivable at 30 September 2013. Despite the JVs' production being in line with management forecasts, Fitch believes that in the current price environment the dividend stream from the JVs could be significantly lower than that per management expectations. Therefore, Fitch expects Uranium One's standalone credit profile to deteriorate significantly in 2014-2015 before improving by end-2016. Liquidity and Debt Structure: Fitch views Uranium One's current liquidity position as currently satisfactory but limited. At September 30, 2013, it had US$482 million in unrestricted cash, plus US$1.45 billion in restricted cash earmarked for repayment of a US$1.45 billion revolving credit facility from an affiliate of its intermediate parent, JSC Atomredmetzoloto, which was fully repaid on November 5, 2013. Uranium One's other short-term debt includes US$260 million convertible debentures that the company made an offer for on November 15, 2013. Its long-term debt consists of US$465 million RUB-denominated bonds that mature in 2016 and 2020. Uranium One does not maintain any open bank credit facilities. Uranium One's proposed US$350 million notes will be guaranteed by certain subsidiaries that accounted for 4.7% of its adjusted EBITDA and 24.5% of its consolidated total assets at September 30, 2013. Uranium One's fully-owned mining assets in the US and Australia will also serve as the security interest for the notes. Nonetheless, Fitch expects that the company will predominantly rely on dividends from its Kazakh JVs, which are not included as security for the notes, to service the notes. Consequently, Fitch assigns the expected rating to Uranium One's notes at the same level as the IDR. Rating Sensitivities: Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating action include: -- A stronger linkage between Atomenergoprom/Rosatom and Uranium One, i.e., more robust legal ties such as financial guarantees from Atomenergoprom/Rosatom for a large portion of Uranium One's debt or cross default provisions that would include Uranium One -- Improved financial profile, e.g., FFO adjusted gross leverage of below 3x and FFO fixed charge cover of at least 6x on a sustained basis would be positive for Uranium One's standalone profile Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating action include: -- Weakening linkage between Atomenergoprom/Rosatom and Uranium One may result in Fitch reviewing the notching gap -- Failure to improve the financial profile by end-2017 in line with expectations of a 'B-' rated mining company, e.g., FFO adjusted gross leverage of above 3.5x and FFO fixed charge cover of 5x and less on a sustained basis would be negative for the standalone profile Full List of Rating Actions: Uranium One Inc. -- Foreign Currency Long-term IDR: 'BB-'; Outlook: Stable -- Local Currency Long-term IDR: 'BB-'; Outlook: Stable -- Foreign Currency Short-term IDR: 'B' -- Local Currency Short-term IDR: 'B' -- Senior Unsecured Rating: 'BB-' Uranium One Investment Inc. -- Senior secured USD350m notes: 'BB-(EXP)' =================== M O N T E N E G R O =================== MONTENEGRO: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB-' Rating -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Montenegro to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term sovereign credit ratings on Montenegro. Rationale The outlook revision reflects what S&P considers to be considerable external risks. S&P estimates the country's gross external financing needs as very high, at 155% of current account receipts (CARs) and usable reserves. In addition, S&P estimates its net external liabilities position as very high at 440% of CARs. These ratios indicate that Montenegro is exposed to the risk of increasing external debt servicing costs or a reversal of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. S&P considers that emerging market sovereigns may be particularly exposed should the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank tighten monetary conditions. Montenegro's vulnerability is heightened because the authorities' monetary flexibility is reduced by its unilateral adoption of the euro, meaning that the central bank lacks effective lender of last resort capabilities. S&P anticipates that external risks would rise should economic and budgetary performance significantly underperform its current expectations. The ratings affirmation balances S&P's view of the external vulnerabilities and very limited monetary policy flexibility against the country's stable political environment, coupled with S&P's expectation that the government net debt ratio will gradually decline to 47.5% in 2016 from 54.0% of GDP in 2013. Montenegro's economy is characterized by relatively low GDP per capita, estimated at close to US$7,000 in 2013. It is primarily based on tourism and related services. The economy has emerged from the double-dip recession into which it fell in 2012 when bad weather affected agriculture at the same time as the country experienced a decline in manufacturing. S&P expects relatively high levels of corporate indebtedness, coupled with significant nonperforming loans in the banking sector, to constrain growth in the coming years as credit continues to contract. S&P's forecasts show economic growth of 1.9% in 2013, accelerating to an average of 2.7% in 2014-2016, largely propelled by an increase in investments. S&P forecasts investment growth of over 6% in real terms in 2014. Given the small size of the economy, one or two large investment projects can have a noticeable influence. S&P understands that there is significant potential for Montenegro to further develop its tourism sector, which is currently approaching capacity constraints. It could also take advantage of its mountainous territory to generate hydropower for export. There are several projects of this type in the pipeline, including the construction of an underwater electric cable from Montenegro to Italy, building the second block of the thermal power plant Pljevlja, and others. Apart from construction of a Bar-Boljare highway, which is not expected to proceed under S&P's base-case scenario, it includes these projects in its forecasts. With gross external financing needs estimated at close to 155% of CARs and usable reserves and narrow net external debt amounting to 178% of CARs in 2013, Montenegro faces significant external risks. Although current account deficits have recently declined, they are expected to remain substantial at close to 17% of GDP for the two-to-three-year forecast horizon, fueled by the high deficit in the goods account. The quality of external data in Montenegro is relatively poor. Errors and omissions, which we estimate at around 5.5% of GDP this year and next, are consistently large and positive. S&P considers that this may indicate unrecorded tourism export revenue, which would suggest that the official current account deficit data could overstate the imbalance significantly. The upcoming investment projects will likely increase imports of capital goods, preventing recorded current account deficits from shrinking significantly over the forecast horizon. S&P expects these deficits will be financed largely by FDI, which is forecast to be close to 15% of GDP in 2014-2016. High deficits mean that Montenegro remains vulnerable to sudden changes in the market environment, which could lead to a disorderly unwinding of the existing imbalances. No official statistics exist on Montenegro's international investment position. S&P's estimates suggest that gross external debt accounts for a high 128% of GDP in 2013 and will decline only gradually to 119% in 2016. The decline will reflect the slower accumulation of public external debt as budget deficits continue to moderate and the only gradual increase in banking sector external debt. S&P expects banks to continue to rely more on the domestic deposit base than on external borrowing to support their operations. In recent years, the government has concentrated on delivering fiscal consolidation measures and making Montenegro more business-friendly. Talks on potential EU accession, which started in the summer of 2012, could bring further improvements, given the EU's continued focus on implementing structural reforms. That said, S&P do not expect Montenegro to join the EU within the forecast horizon. The ratings are also supported by S&P's expectation of the country's improving budget position, although risks remain. Although general government budget deficits rose above 5.0% of GDP on average in 2009-2011, the headline deficit narrowed to 3.4% of GDP in 2012 and S&P expects it to narrow further to 1.8% this year. S&P considers that there is potential for further fiscal consolidation. Revenues could increase if the government enforces more efficient collection of companies' tax arrears and tackles the grey economy, the size of which is estimated to be substantial. The government paid around 3% of GDP this year in relation to guarantees for bankrupt aluminum producer Kombinat Aluminijuma Podgorica (KAP). S&P excluded this one-off payment in its deficit calculations and expect no sizable additional public outlays related to KAP. S&P's forecasts also exclude the potentially very high costs associated with the construction of the Bar-Boljare highway -- S&P do not expect this project to proceed in the near future. Were it to go ahead, the project could reverse recent improvements in fiscal dynamics and cause a sizable increase in the debt ratio. S&P estimates that net general government debt will amount to nearly 54% of GDP in 2013, up from 26% in 2008. Close to 76% of government debt is to nonresidents and nearly all of it is in euros. S&P anticipates debt levels will stabilize and gradually reduce over the next three years as budget deficits continue to moderate. There are downside risks, however, given that more guarantees might be called, causing debt levels to increase above the 60% threshold established under S&P's sovereign rating methodology. That said, the remaining guarantees are less likely to be called than those made to KAP, in S&P's view. Montenegro's debt servicing costs have not been a significant burden for the public finances so far; they represented just 3.5% of general government revenues on average over 2010-2012. The low cost stemmed from the excess liquidity present in global financial markets and the high proportion of Montenegro's borrowing that was on concessional terms -- this might change should quantitative easing be tapered off, especially given Montenegro's large refinancing requirements. S&P views contingent liabilities as limited, as defined in its sovereign rating methodology. The lack of monetary policy flexibility is reflected in Montenegro's decision to unilaterally adopt first the deutschmark and then the euro as its currency. The country is not part of the eurozone (European Economic and Monetary Union), and Montenegrin banks have no access to European Central Bank (ECB) liquidity facilities. The government's policy options are further constrained by shrinking domestic credit and a relatively undeveloped capital market. The 'AAA' transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment reflects S&P's opinion of the extremely low likelihood of the sovereign restricting nonsovereign access to foreign currency needed for debt service, while the local currency remains the euro. Outlook The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of Montenegro's persistent external vulnerabilities in the context of a possible tightening of global liquidity conditions. It reflects S&P's view that there is at least a one-in-three chance of a rating downgrade during 2014. Specifically, we could lower the ratings on Montenegro if one or more of the following scenarios materializes: -- FDI inflows stopping suddenly, leading to a disorderly adjustment of the high current account deficits; -- External debt servicing costs rising significantly beyond S&P's current expectations; -- Foreign-owned banks operating in Montenegro being materially hit by problems in their parent institutions; -- Sizable fiscal slippages occurring, caused either by deviating from budget deficit reduction or one-off developments that substantially increase public debt levels (for example, guarantees being called). S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it concludes that these risks have abated or if EU accession talks bring structural improvements to Montenegro's policymaking and institutions, beyond its current expectations. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues according to the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action To From Montenegro (Republic of) Sovereign Credit Rating BB-/Neg/B BB-/Stable/B Senior Unsecured BB- Transfer & Convertibility Assessment AAA ===================== N E T H E R L A N D S ===================== LAMBDA FINANCE: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to Ba2 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Class B1, B2 and B3 notes (the "Class B notes") to A2(sf) from Baa1(sf), the Class C1, C2 and C3 notes (the "Class C notes") to Baa1(sf) from Ba1(sf) and the class D1 and D2 notes (the "Class D notes") to Ba2(sf) from B2(sf) of the Gracechurch Corporate Loans Series 2007-1 transaction. At the same time, Moody's affirmed the A1(sf) rating of Class A1, A2 and A3 notes (the "Class A notes"), the A2(sf) rating of class AB1 and AB2 (the "Class AB notes") and the Caa1(sf) rating of Class E1 and E2 notes (the "Class E notes"). Rating action reflects the (1) better-than-expected collateral performance and (2) deleveraging of the transaction and the build-up of credit enhancement since the closing date. Gracechurch Corporate Loans Series 2007-1 is a synthetic securitization backed by loans granted to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) originated by Barclays Bank PLC (A2/P-1) and issued in 2007. Ratings Rationale: Solid Collateral Performance: Upgrade reflects the better-than-expected collateral performance, evidenced by the low default levels observed in the transaction since the closing date in February 2007. As of October 2013, cumulative defaults represented 2.5% of the pool balance at closing. Moody's decreased its default rate over current balance assumption to 12.0% from 18.6%, reflecting the lower-than- expected default rate, which corresponds to a rating proxy of Ba3 over the assumed weighted average life of the pool of 4.9 years. In addition, Moody's decreased its mean recovery rate assumption to 45%, reflecting lower-than-expected recoveries; and increased its coefficient of variation assumption to 51.5% from 40.2%, which results in a portfolio credit enhancement of 23.8%. Deleveraging of The Transaction And Build Up Of Credit Enhancement: Upgrade also reflects the deleveraging of the transaction and the increase in credit enhancement since the closing date, which at present is 46.9%, 33.8% and 25.6% for the Class B, C and D notes, respectively. Moody's believes these levels of credit enhancement are sufficient to support the upgrades. Affirmation of the Class A and AB notes were driven by their very high levels of credit enhancement, which stand at 82.2% and 58.0% respectively. However, the maximum rating achievable by those notes is constrained by counterparty risk considerations (see "MOODY'S HAS CONSIDERED EXPOSURE TO COUNTERPARTY RISK" section). The affirmation of the rating on the Class E notes is mainly driven by borrower concentration risk to which the Class E notes are exposed. According to Moody's computations, the current level of credit enhancement available to the Class E notes covers only the seven largest borrowers of the pool. At the October 2013 reporting date, the top borrower represented 4.3% while the top 10 borrowers represented 20.2%. Moody's Has Considered Exposure to Counterparty Risk Moody's has also taken into consideration the exposure of the notes to Barclays Bank PLC (Barclays), which performs a variety of roles in the transaction: servicer, CDS counterparty, cross currency swap counterparty and cash deposit bank. In its role as cash deposit bank, Barclays holds the note proceeds until the final discharge date, which is the earlier of the legal final maturity date (September 2031), the 10% clean-up call date or any other date on which all the notes are fully redeemed. Following Barclays' downgrade to A2 by Moody's in June 2012 and the consequent cash deposit bank downgrade event, the bank did not replace itself nor put a guarantee in place. As a result, Moody's considers that the notes are fully exposed to Barclays' risk until their maturity. As such, the ratings for the Class A and all other classes of notes are constrained at A1(sf) and A2(sf), respectively. Moody's considers that the Class A notes can achieve a higher rating than the cash deposit bank as their exposure to the latter is mitigated by their short remaining life, at less than a year. The rating agency also assessed the exposure to Barclays as cross currency swap counterparty, which does not have a negative effect on the rating levels at this time. Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash flows and determine the losses for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario, Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes, given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the probability of occurrence of each default scenario and the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios. List of Affected Notes Issuer: Lambda Finance B.V. - Gracechurch Corporate Loans Series 2007-1 GBP1046M A1 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Downgraded to A1 (sf) EUR1058.75M A2 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Downgraded to A1 (sf) US$2290M A3 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Downgraded to A1 (sf) GBP106.75M AB1 Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Downgraded to A2 (sf) EUR103.75M AB2 Notes, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2013 Downgraded to A2 (sf) GBP32.6M B1 Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) EUR65.15M B2 Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) US$10M B3 Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) GBP36.4M C1 Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) EUR70.6M C2 Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) US$23M C3 Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) GBP33M D1 Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf) EUR40.25M D2 Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to B2 (sf) GBP43.1M E1 Notes, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) EUR40.95M E2 Notes, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 8, 2009 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf) LEVERAGED FINANCE: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating actions on notes issued by Leveraged Finance Europe Capital III B.V.: EUR213.6M (currently EUR20.57 M outstanding) Class A Bond, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf) EUR26.25M Class B Bond, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade EUR11.7M Class C Bond, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade EUR19.8M Class D Bond, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2013 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf) EUR7.35M (currently EUR2.86M outstanding) Class E Bond, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2013 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) EUR6M Class R Bond (EUR0.56M Rated Balance outstanding), Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2013 Downgraded to Caa3(sf) EUR15M Class S Bond (EUR1.8M Rated Balance outstanding), Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 5, 2013 Downgraded to Aa1(sf) Leveraged Finance Europe Capital III B.V., issued in August 2004, is a Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans. The portfolio is managed by BNP Paribas. The reinvestment period of this transaction ended in October 2009. NXP FUNDING: S&P Raises Rating on Sr. Secured Term Loan to 'BB' --------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised to 'BB' from 'BB-' its issue rating on the senior secured term loan A issued by NXP Funding LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of NXP B.V. At the same time, S&P removed the issue ratings on the senior secured loans from CreditWatch, where they had been placed with positive implications on Sept. 10, 2013. In addition, S&P revised upward the recovery rating on the loan to '2' from '3', indicating its expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery in the event of a default. S&P also assigned a 'BB' issue rating and a recovery rating of '2' to the new US$400 million senior secured term loan D, the proceeds of which were used to repay the US$496 million outstanding term loan C. The existing issue and recovery ratings on the group's super senior revolving credit facility and senior notes are affirmed. The rating action on NXP's senior secured debt reflects S&P's view that the recovery prospects for senior secured lenders have improved following the issuance of US$500 million of senior notes in September 2013. The issuer used the proceeds of this issuance to repay US$422 million of senior secured floating-rate notes in October 2013. Recovery Analysis At S&P's hypothetical point of default in 2017, it calculates that EBITDA would decline to about US$395 million. S&P estimates the group's stressed enterprise value at the point of hypothetical default to be approximately US$2.37 billion, which is equivalent to 6x stressed EBITDA. After taking these factors into account and deducting the costs of enforcement and other priority liabilities totaling about US$270 million, S&P arrives at a net enterprise value of about US$2.1 billion. S&P's valuation assumes a proportionate consolidation of its 61.2% stake in Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC). However, S&P considers there could be additional upside to its valuation of SSMC at the point of default. S&P expects that about US$830 million of super-priority debt will be outstanding at the hypothetical point of default, including the fully drawn revolving credit facility (RCF) and six months of prepetition interest. This equates to very high (90%-100%) recovery prospects for the RCF lenders, and translates into a recovery rating of '1' on this instrument. Following the repayment of the senior secured notes due 2018, S&P estimates that the recovery prospects for the remaining senior secured debtholders have improved to 70%-90%, which equates to a recovery rating of '2'. The value held outside of the guarantor group would, in S&P's view, be shared between senior unsecured and unsatisfied secured claims on a pari passu basis. It will allow for modest recovery prospects within the 10%-30% range for the proposed senior unsecured debtholders. This translates into a recovery rating of '5' on the senior notes. =========== R U S S I A =========== GAZPROM-MEDIA HOLDINGS: Fitch Affirms BB LT Issuer Default Rating ----------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed Gazprom-Media Holding's (GMHP) Long- term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook on the announcement of a planned acquisition of ProfMedia. GMPH is a diversified media company, with most revenues and EBITDA generated by its two free-to-air channels, NTV and TNT. The company also owns content production company Comedy Club, a few radio channels and print magazines, and NTV-Plus, a direct- to-home pay-TV operator. Key Rating Drivers: Acquisition is Rating Neutral GMHP has announced that it is planning to acquire the TV, radio and content production assets of ProfMedia, a diversified Russian media company. Fitch views the acquisition as having an appealing strategic rationale and synergetic with GMPH's existing assets. Fitch expects that leverage will not exceed 1.2x net debt/EBITDA, which is consistent with the current rating. This estimate is based on the assumption that the deal price does not exceed RUB35 billion including debt. If the final price of the acquisition significantly differs from this estimate, Fitch would likely review GMPH's ratings. The company will remain strongly free cash flow generative, supporting its robust deleveraging flexibility. Good Operating Fit The company will be able to significantly expand its portfolio of TV and radio channels and strengthen its market share. GMPH has agreed to acquire three free-to-air TV channels, four leading radio stations and a controlling stake in Central Partnership, a large TV and films content producer and distributor. The assets are complementary to GMPH's existing businesses and would allow the company to use its content production capacity and a library of content rights more efficiently across the group. Following the acquisition, GMHP's TV channels will account for over 30% of the federal TV ad market in Russia by revenues. Leverage to Remain Below 1.2x Net Debt/EBITDA Fitch understands GMPH's leverage will remain below 1.2x net debt/EBITDA following the transaction. Although no exact financial terms have been announced, the size of Prof Media's business and current market valuations suggest that this acquisition is unlikely to cost GMHP more than RUB35 billion, including ProfMedia's debt, which was reported at RUB9.7 billion at end-2012. The ProfMedia segments that are to be acquired by GMPH generated RUB3.8 billion of adjusted EBITDA (company's definition) in 2012. Ample Liquidity GMPH's has ample liquidity, which will significantly reduce its dependence on external funding to finance the transaction. The company had over RUB15bn of cash and bank deposits on its balance sheet as of end-September 2013. Fitch understands the acquisition will be for cash. GMPH will assume a major part of ProfMedia's debt. The deal is subject to regulatory scrutiny, and is expected to close in 1H14. Rating Sensitivities: Although not considered an imminent risk, structural changes in the TV market such as a fragmenting TV audience or a growing share of ad revenues diverting to the Internet could weaken GPMH's leadership and pricing power. -- A significant decline in viewership share/TV ad market share would be rating negative. -- A leverage increase to above 1.2x net debt/EBITDA on a sustained basis could be negative. -- A stronger commitment to maintain net leverage at or below 1x net debt/EBITDA and more clarity on the targeted capital structure/dividend policy would be credit positive. Full List of Rating Actions: * Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB', Outlook Stable * National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)', Outlook Stable ROSSIYSKIY KREDIT: Moody's Alters Caa1 Rating Outlook to Negative ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has affirmed and changed to negative from stable the outlook on Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank's Caa1 long-term deposit ratings. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the bank's Not-Prime short-term deposit ratings as well as the standalone E bank financial strength rating (BFSR), which is equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of caa1. The BFSR maintains a stable outlook. Ratings Rationale: Moody's rating action reflects Moody's view of the risks associated with (1) the rapid growth of Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's loan book; (2) the deterioration of the bank's capital adequacy level; and (3) the bank's increasing reliance on interbank funding. After the change in ownership of Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit in mid-2012, the bank's loan book grew sharply and reached RUB44.4 billion as at end-September 2013, a threefold increase from RUB13.3 billion reported as at end-September 2012 (under local GAAP). In Moody's view, such rapid growth poses higher risks of asset quality erosion, particularly considering: (1) the predominance of high single-name concentrations associated with this growth, with the largest loans accounting for about 25% of the bank's regulatory capital; and (2) most of the new exposures are loans granted in order to finance purchases of real estate assets and securities. Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's regulatory capital adequacy ratio declined sharply to 11.1% as at end-September 2013 from 22.5% as at year-end 2012 owing to the bank's weak profitability and the rapid loan book growth. Moody's notes that for the first nine months of 2013, the bank's revenue (in accordance with local GAAP) hardly covered its operating expenses, thus resulting in modest profits, mostly because of non-recurring items such as reversal of loan loss reserves. Moody's also notes liquidity risks associated with Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's increasing reliance on short-term interbank funding. As at end-September 2013, borrowings from banks reached 45% of total non-equity funding (0% as at year-end 2011). Most of these borrowings are of a short-term nature and are predominantly used to finance the aforementioned loan growth. What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down: Moody's notes that Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's ratings have limited upside potential, as captured in the negative outlook. However, the outlook can be changed to stable if the bank improves its capital adequacy and profitability. Moody's says that Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's ratings could be downgraded if the ongoing rapid loan growth exerts further negative pressure on the bank's financial fundamentals such as asset quality and profitability. ROSSIYSKIY KREDIT: Moody's Cuts National Scale Rating to Ba3.ru --------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has downgraded the national scale rating (NSR) of Rossiyskiy Kredit Bank to Ba3.ru from Ba2.ru. The NSRs carry no specific outlooks. Ratings Rationale: The rating action reflects Moody's view of the risks associated with (1) the rapid growth of Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's loan book; (2) the deterioration of the bank's capital adequacy level; and (3) the bank's increasing reliance on interbank funding. After the change in ownership of Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit in mid-2012, the bank's loan book grew sharply and reached RUB44.4 billion as at end-September 2013, a threefold increase from RUB13.3 billion reported as at end-September 2012 (under local GAAP). In Moody's Interfax view, such rapid growth poses higher risks of asset quality erosion, particularly considering: (1) the predominance of high single-name concentrations associated with this growth, with the largest loans accounting for about 25% of the bank's regulatory capital; and (2) most of the new exposures are loans granted in order to finance purchases of real estate assets and securities. Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's regulatory capital adequacy ratio declined sharply to 11.1% as at end-September 2013 from 22.5% as at year-end 2012 owing to the bank's weak profitability and the rapid loan book growth. Moody's Interfax notes that for the first nine months of 2013, the bank's revenue (in accordance with local GAAP) hardly covered its operating expenses, thus resulting in modest profits, mostly because of non-recurring items such as reversal of loan loss reserves. Moody's Interfax also notes liquidity risks associated with Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's increasing reliance on short-term interbank funding. As at end-September 2013, borrowings from banks reached 45% of total non-equity funding (0% as at year-end 2011). Most of these borrowings are of a short-term nature and are predominantly used to finance the aforementioned loan growth. What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down: Moody's Interfax notes that Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's ratings have limited upside potential, as captured in the negative outlook. However, the outlook can be changed to stable if the bank improves its capital adequacy and profitability. Moody's Interfax says that Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit's ratings could be downgraded if the ongoing rapid loan growth exerts further negative pressure on the bank's financial fundamentals such as asset quality and profitability. Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Bank Rossiyskiy Kredit reported total (unaudited; local GAAP) assets of RUB59.9 billion and shareholder equity of RUB7.8 billion at 30 September 2013. Net income for the first nine months of 2013 was RUB329 million. Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For further information on Moody's approach to national scale ratings, please refer to Moody's Rating Methodology published in October 2012 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to Global Scale Ratings". About Moody's and Moody's Interfax: Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's Corporation (NYSE: MCO). SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'BB+' ICR -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Russia's Samara Oblast to positive from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit rating and 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating on the oblast. Rationale The outlook revision reflects that S&P might improve its assessment of the region's financial management over the next two years if it sustains sound budgetary performance and positive liquidity, despite slower revenue growth and higher social expenditure. The ratings reflect S&P's view of Russia's "developing and unbalanced" institutional framework, which limits the oblast's budgetary flexibility, as well as S&P's view of the oblast's low economic wealth and "negative" financial management in an international comparison. Moderately sound budgetary performance, which remains somewhat volatile, is neutral for the oblast's creditworthiness. The ratings are supported by S&P's expectation that the oblast will maintain modest debt, positive liquidity, and low contingent liabilities. Samara is one of Russia's key industrial regions, with oil production and refining providing an estimated 16% of its gross regional product (GRP). S&P forecasts economic growth in Samara to continue over the next three years, but GRP per capita to stay below US$12,000 until 2015. S&P also expects the oblast's tax base to remain dominated by a few large taxpayers. In 2012, the oblast's 10 largest taxpayers provided more than 35% of its tax revenues, with an estimated 13% from subsidiaries of OJSC Oil Co. Rosneft. This modest concentration exposes the oblast's budget revenues to the volatility of global oil prices and changes in the national tax regime. In 2013, the oblast will likely receive lower corporate profit tax revenues from members of consolidated taxpayer groups than S&P previously forecasts, which will translate into lower revenue growth. "In our view, Russia's developing and unbalanced institutional framework hinders long-term financial planning and limits the predictability of regions' financial indicators, including those of Samara Oblast. The system leaves the region's management with little flexibility in revenues and expenditure. We expect that in 2013-2016 more than 90% of the oblast's revenues will come from state-regulated taxes and transfers from the federal government. The oblast's modifiable revenues, mainly transport tax and non-tax revenues, will likely not exceed a low 7% of its operating revenues. Moreover, in 2012 the federal government required the regions to increase social expenditure, primarily for public-sector salaries, without providing adequate compensation. In our view, these mandates will put pressure on regional budgets over the medium term and require regions to seek resources to fund them," S&P said. In S&P's base-case scenario for 2013-2016, it therefore forecasts Samara's budgetary performance to gradually weaken. This is particularly owing to the expected slowdown in economic and budget-revenue growth and the need to fund increasing social spending. S&P assumes the oblast will post operating balances of 6% of operating revenues on average over the period, compared with 9% in 2010-2012. On the capital side, the oblast will have to address infrastructure development needs and prepare for the Federation of International Football Association's World Cup in 2018 in the city of Samara. Currently, S&P expects the federal government to provide 80% of the amount required for the World Cup preparation, estimated at about Russian ruble (RUB) 210 billion (about US$6.6 billion), or about 1.7x S&P's forecast of Samara Oblast's revenues for 2013. The oblast will likely finance the remaining 20% from its budget. Therefore, deficits after capital accounts will likely widen to just beyond 5% of total revenues this year, and remain at this moderate level over the next three years, compared with 3% on average in 2010-2012. In S&P's view, the oblast's tax-supported debt will therefore remain relatively low in an international context, and gradually increase to about 43% of consolidated operating revenues in 2016. However, unlike some of its peers, Samara has demonstrated a cautious approach to spending in 2012-2013, in S&P's view. The oblast now thoroughly reviews budget expenditure items and has implemented cost-containing measures for maintenance and other discretionary operating spending to control overall spending growth and stabilize debt levels. In S&P's view, if management adheres to fiscal discipline in 2014-2016 and follows its draft budget, which currently forecasts modest deficits after capital accounts, it might sustain consistently sound budgetary performance. "We continue to view Samara's financial management as a "negative" factor for its creditworthiness in an international context, as we do for most Russian local and regional governments. This is mainly due to our view of a lack of reliable long-term financial and capital planning, and limited visibility regarding the policy for government-related entities," S&P added. In line with S&P's upside scenario for Samara, if it observed continuity in expenditure, debt, and liquidity management, which are currently relatively sophisticated and better than the Russian average, S&P might improve its assessment of financial management to "neutral." The oblast's contingent liabilities will likely remain low over the next three years, thanks to its limited involvement in the regional economy and a relatively financially healthy municipal sector. Liquidity S&P considers Samara Oblast's liquidity position to be "positive," as defined in its criteria. S&P expects the oblast's average cash reserves to exceed debt service falling due within the next 12 months. However, S&P views its access to external liquidity as "limited," given the weaknesses of the domestic capital market. S&P expects that throughout the last quarter of 2013 and first three quarters of 2014 the oblast will have average cash -- net of the deficit after capital accounts -- of about RUB16 billion (about US$500 million), which will exceed its annual debt service. For S&P's base-case scenario, it also assumes that over the next three years the oblast will mainly finance its deficit after capital accounts by placing amortizing bonds with maturities of five to seven years. This should allow the oblast to maintain a relatively smooth debt-maturity schedule and average annual debt service of about 11% of operating revenues in 2014-2016. In 2013, the oblast started organizing committed bank lines that it could use to cover temporary cash shortfalls. S&P expects it will continue this practice in 2014 and therefore secure an additional liquidity reserve. Outlook The positive outlook reflects S&P's view that in 2013-2016 Samara Oblast will be able to meet increasing social expenditure needs, with only modest weakening of its budgetary performance, and maintain positive liquidity. S&P could raise the ratings within the next 12 to 24 months if the oblast's management maintains control over operating spending growth, as well as cautious financial, debt, and liquidity management policies. This would likely underpin the oblast's consistently sound budgetary performance, with deficits after capital accounts below 5% of total revenues. These factors could lead S&P to revise its view of management to "neutral" from "negative" for the oblast's creditworthiness. S&P could revise the outlook to stable within the next 12 months if Samara's management failed to adjust spending growth to a slowdown in revenue growth and the oblast's budgetary performance remained volatile, with average deficits after capital accounts exceeding 5% of total revenues. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action To From Samara Oblast Issuer Credit Rating BB+/Pos/-- BB+/Stable/-- Russia National Scale ruAA+ ruAA+ Senior Unsecured BB+ BB+ Senior Unsecured ruAA+ ruAA+ ========= S P A I N ========= IBERCAJA BANCO: Moody's Lowers Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba3' -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one notch the long term senior debt and deposit ratings of Ibercaja Banco SA to Ba3 from Ba2, following the lowering of the bank's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to E+ (equivalent to a b1 baseline credit assessment) from D-/ba3. The short term ratings were unaffected. All of the bank's ratings now carry a negative outlook. The downgrade of Ibercaja's ratings reflects the bank's weakened financial profile following (1) the integration with Grupo Banco Cajatres S.A. (Caja 3, unrated) that was recently completed (at end-June 2013 Caja 3 had EUR20.1 billion in assets compared to EUR44.2 billion for Ibercaja at the same date); and (2) the deterioration of the group's asset-quality metrics, particularly in the corporate segment, for which Moody's expects further deterioration. This rating action concludes the review for downgrade that was extended on July 11, 2013. Ratings Rationale: Downgrade of the Senior Debt and Deposit Ratings: The one-notch downgrade of Ibercaja's senior debt and deposit ratings reflects (1) the one notch lowering of its standalone BCA to b1; and (2) Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of support from the Spanish government for the bank in case of need. The negative outlook on Ibercaja's standalone BFSR drives the negative outlook on the bank's debt and deposit ratings. Downgrade of Standalone Credit Assessment: The lowering of Ibercaja's BCA to b1 reflects the rating agency's view that the integration of Caja 3 has weakened the combined entity's financial strength. On a consolidated basis (post- integration) Moody's considers Ibercaja's risk-absorption capacity to be weaker, based on the incremental expected losses in the combined entity's risk assets according to the rating agency's own scenario analyses. The downgrade also reflects Ibercaja's asset-quality deterioration throughout the first nine months of 2013, because of the ongoing negative pressures from the adverse domestic operating environment, with domestic demand showing very weak signs of recovery. Moody's therefore anticipates a further decline in asset quality for the remainder of 2013 and during 2014. This deterioration not only affects those exposures related to the real-estate and construction sectors, but also loans extended to companies in other economic sectors. Ibercaja's exposure to these two segments represented 30% of the bank's total loan book at end-September 2013. Ibercaja's asset-quality metrics have compared very favorably to the system's average during the crisis. However, in Q2 2013 the bank reclassified some corporate exposures to non-performing loans, namely related to the real estate segment that resulted in a sharp increase in the amount of non-performing loans (NPLs). The NPL ratio rose to 7.5% at end-June 2013 and reached 8.9% (including Caja 3) at end-September 2013 from 5.5% at year-end 2012. Despite standing below the system's average of around 12%, this ratio highlights the asset-quality challenges the bank is facing. Moody's also notes that in addition to rising NPLs, Ibercaja has other problematic assets that indicate the broad balance-sheet pressures the bank faces (even before considering any possible further deterioration of the loan book). The problematic assets are broadly defined to include NPLs, plus real-estate assets received in return for the cancellation of loans, plus refinanced loans categorized as substandard or performing. In aggregate, these totaled a non-earning assets ratio (as a percentage of gross loans) of 20.1% as of end-September 2013. Furthermore, Moody's says that subdued lending volumes, low interest rates and increasing non-earning assets have significantly diminished Ibercaja's capacity to generate recurring earnings, which are expected to continue to suppress its ability to use its earnings to fully offset its asset-quality pressures, especially if the pressures from the operating environment continue. Moody's also notes that Ibercaja's earnings following the integration with Caja 3 are supported by the income from the securities carry trade (primarily borrowing ECB money at low rates and investing that into higher yielding Spanish government securities). Furthermore, Ibercaja's underlying bottom-line profitability remains pressured by the need to book provisions against weakening assets. This would be the case even if its 2013 results will show significant improvement from the losses recorded in 2012, which included the extraordinary provisioning requirements that the Spanish government introduced. Rationale For the Negative Outlook: The negative outlook that Moody's has assigned to the BFSR reflects (1) the bank's vulnerability to a further weakening of its credit profile in light of the anticipated modest recovery of the Spanish economy; and (2) the negative implications for its corporate loan exposures. The outlook also reflects the downside risks to Moody's macroeconomic forecasts, which could exert further credit- negative pressure if these risks were to materialize. Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Ratings: In line with the lowering of the bank's BCA, Moody's has downgraded the senior subordinated debt ratings of Ibercaja to B2 from B1 with a negative outlook. At the same time, Moody's has also downgraded to Caa2 (hyb) from Caa1 (hyb) the preference shares of the bank. What Could Move the Rating Up/Down: Further downward pressure would be exerted on the bank's standalone BCA if (1) a broad deterioration of its financial fundamentals means that the bank cannot deliver its solvency targets of a core Tier 1 ratio above 10% for 2013 and 2014; (2) operating conditions worsen beyond Moody's current expectations of a very modest GDP recovery for 2014; and/or (3) the bank's liquidity profile deteriorates significantly. The bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the standalone BCA, and any change to the BCA would likely also affect these ratings. Furthermore, any change in Moody's systemic support assumptions may directly impact Ibercaja's senior debt ratings. Moody's is unlikely to raise the banks' BCA, given the negative outlook. An improvement of its BCA could be driven by clear visibility of an asset-quality improvement, together with a sustainable recovery in its recurring earnings. Any significant macroeconomic growth beyond Moody's central scenario of 0-1% in 2014 could underpin signs of a turnaround and also increase positive rating pressure. =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== AA BOND CO: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class B Notes ---------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BBB-(sf)' credit rating to AA Bond Co. Ltd.'s fixed-rate secured class A3 notes. S&P has also affirmed its credit ratings on AA Bond Co.'s original class A and B notes. The transaction is a corporate securitization of the operating business of the Automobile Association group (the AA group). The group operates a roadside assistance service in the U.K. and Ireland, and also provides complementary services such as insurance, driving services, and home emergency response. Breakdown services are provided either through a membership model or as part of a business service agreement, whereby the services are provided to the underlying customer base of the AA group's corporate clients. Business customers typically include fleet operators and motor manufacturers. The AA group is also a large U.K. personal lines insurance broker, particularly for motor and home insurance. AA Bond Co. will onlend the proceeds from the issuance of the class A3 notes to the borrower, AA Senior Co Ltd. (AA), via an issuer-borrower secured loan. The proceeds of the class A3 notes will be used to redeem a portion of the borrower's floating bank debt that has been outstanding since the transaction closed in July 2013. This means that the issuance of the new class of debt will have no impact on the transaction's leverage. AA's payment of interest and repayment of principal under the issuer-borrower secured loan provides AA Bond Co. with its primary source of funds to make interest payments and principal payments when due on the class A3 notes. The new class A3 notes will rank pari passu with the class A1 and class A2 notes and the outstanding bank debt. Similar to the other classes of notes, the A3 notes feature a bullet maturity in 2043 and benefit from a cash flow-trapping mechanism that diverts residual cash flows toward the pro rata prepayment of the notes if they are outstanding after their expected maturity. In the case of the A3 notes, the expected maturity falls seven years from the closing date. No termination will occur under the current swap portfolio following the redemption of a portion of the floating-rate bank debt entered into at closing. In fact, part of the interest-rate swap that previously hedged the prepaid portion of debt against interest-rate fluctuations has been overlaid to avoid termination and the payment of termination costs. However, the terms and conditions of the overlay swap result in an increased swap cost for the remaining bank debt. The existing noteholders and those acceding to the financing platform benefit from first-ranking security rights over the AA group's cash flow-generating assets, even if the borrower becomes insolvent. Consistent with our criteria "Methodology For Rating And Surveilling European Corporate Securitizations," published Jan. 23, 2008, on RatingsDirect, S&P's analysis looks beyond the AA's and its operating subsidiaries' insolvency, based on a long- term cash flow analysis where S&P projects their business performance under scenarios corresponding to specific rating levels. The cash flows S&P projects under each rating scenario in its analysis are predicated on its view of the AA's and its operating subsidiaries' business risk profile, and is guided by the parameters defined in S&P's criteria article titled "Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions," published on June 3, 2009. S&P subsequently applies the projected cash flows available for debt service at each rating level in line with the priority of payments. S&P's cash flow analysis focuses on a scenario where a refinancing does not take place on the expected maturity date of each class of notes. As such, the entire cash flow generated by the securitization is used to repay the loans and notes in the capital structure, rather than for purposes benefitting the equity holders. This is due to certain structural features such as mandatory cash sweeps and lock-up triggers. S&P continues to view the AA and its operating subsidiaries' business risk profile as "satisfactory." This, combined with the level of stress that S&P considers to be commensurate with 'BBB-' and 'BB' rating scenarios under the abovementioned criteria, continues to require the class A and B notes to withstand a cumulative EBITDA loss of about 15%-30% over a 25-year period. S&P has compared this with a "flat" case, that is, one that forecasts the AA's current operations, taking into account the nature of the business and S&P's views on the automobile industry. S&P's modeling validates that, in 'BBB-' and 'BB' rating scenarios, the cash flow generated by the securitized business would be sufficient to meet the interest and principal obligations on the class A and B notes. Consequently, S&P has assigned a 'BBB- (sf)' rating to the class A3 notes and affirmed its ratings on the class A and B notes. RATINGS LIST Class Rating Amount (GBP in Millions) AA Bond Co. Ltd. GBP3.405 Bil. Fixed-Rate Secured Notes (Including Tap Issuances) New Ratings A3 Notes BBB- (sf) 500 Ratings Affirmed A1 Notes BBB- (sf) 475 A2 Notes BBB- (sf) 500 B Notes BB (sf) 655 BLOCKBUSTER UK: To Close 30 More Stores, To Cut 182 More Jobs ------------------------------------------------------------- Ian Silvera at International Business Times reports that Blockbuster UK is to shut 30 more stores across the UK resulting in 182 further job losses after going into administration. The embattled retailer had already disclosed earlier this month that 72 stores will be scrapped and 452 jobs will be lost -- bringing the total number of job losses to 634, according to International Business Times. But after the high-street veteran's administrators could not find an acceptable offer for the business, it has had to take further measures, the report notes. "It is unfortunate that we have been unable to secure a buyer to date, and therefore we have had to take the decision to make further store closures," said administrators Simon Thomas and Nick O'Reilly, of Moorfields Corporate Recovery, the reports discloses. "We are continuing to review the profitability of the portfolio and may have to make further closures over the next couple of weeks," they added, the report relates. The reports notes that Moorfields Corporate said it is listing job vacancies for a number of leading retailers, including Santander, to support employees affected by the store closures. In addition, the administrators stressed they are making every effort to support customers and to date have issued more than 30,000 refunds for goods and services not received, the report relays. The report discloses that the news comes after the company faced a period of poor trading performance across both rental and retail sales since its acquisition for an unspecified amount by investment firm Gordon Brothers Europe in March. The UK became Blockbuster's largest business outside of the US, where it was born. The report notes that Blockbuster follows the demise of entertainment business HMV Group and digital photography specialist Jessops, both of which have recently succumbed to the difficult trading environment. Blockbuster UK is a DVD rental company. It is part of Blockbuster L.L.C. CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Bondholders Back GBP1.5BB Rescue Plan -------------------------------------------------------- Harry Wilson at The Telegraph reports that Co-operative Bank has cleared a major hurdle in its attempt to complete a GBP1.5 billion rescue recapitalization after bondholders gave their "overwhelming" support to the plan. According to The Telegraph, the struggling lender said late on Friday that early votes showed 99.9% of the investors in preference shares and two tranches of its junior debt had given their support to the deal ahead of a final vote this month. In a statement, the Co-op Bank said it was "highly confident" the recapitalization of the business would go ahead, meaning the chances of the lender being forced to put itself into resolution have diminished, The Telegraph relates. The recapitalization will ultimately see the Co-op Group cede control of the bank to its bondholders, who will inject GBP1 billion into the troubled business through exchanging their debt for new bonds, as well as shares in the lender, The Telegraph discloses. About Co-operative Bank Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to 1872. The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical investment. It refuses to lend to companies that test their products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms. Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million members, employs more than 100,000 people, and has turnover of more than GBP13 billion. * * * The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 14 and 18, 2013 has reported that Moody's Investors Service has affirmed The Co- operative Bank's Caa1 senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings , and changed the outlook on the rating to negative from developing, and Fitch Ratings has downgraded the company's Issuer Default Rating to 'B' from 'BB-' and placed it on Rating Watch Negative. INVERCLYDE: In Administration Due to "Refinancing Agreement" ------------------------------------------------------------ Evening Times reports that Inverclyde has gone into administration as it enters its busiest period of the year. Inverclyde has been placed in administration due to a "refinancing agreement", according to a recently released statement, according to Evening Times. However, the report relates that mall boss Claire Jefcoate insists it is business as usual at the beleaguered center as the Christmas shopping period nears. "It's just due to refinancing . . . . This is a very vibrant and busy shopping center," the report quoted Ms. Jefcoate as saying. "There could possibly be a change of ownership in the coming months," Ms. Jefcoate said, the report relates. The report notes that when pressed on whether she could guarantee the center would remain open, Ms. Jefcoate said: "No, because nobody can say that. "There have been other centers that have gone into administration and come out of it . . . . That's what we foresee happening here," Ms. Jefcoate said, the report discloses. Inverclyde is an Oak Mall Shopping Center in Greenock. PRINCE OF WHALES: Stonegate Pub Buys Firm Out of Administration --------------------------------------------------------------- Lacashire Telegraph reports that Stonegate Pub Company has acquired the Prince of Wales in New Market Street from the administrators of its previous owner, Bramwell Pubs. The process saved 16 jobs. The company went into administration on October 31 and the acquisition is one of 78 pubs nationally. The report notes that Toby Smith, head of Stonegate Pub Company, said: "We are delighted to have concluded the purchase of the Prince of Wales and welcome the team to Stonegate. . . . It is a fantastic site with great potential and we are particularly pleased that with this deal we can secure the jobs of approximately 1600 people nationally too." The acquisition was completed and the pub will continue to operate with its current staff, the report relates. The report recalls that Bramwell Pubs' administration involved all 185 of their sites and was being handled by three partners at restructurers Zolfo Cooper. Prince of Wales is a Chorley town-center pub. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * BOND PRICING: For the Week November 25 to November 29, 2013 ------------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price ------ ------ -------- -------- ----- AUSTRIA ------- IMMOFINANZ AG 4.25 3/8/2018 EUR 4.70 Alpine Holding Gmb 6.00 5/22/2017 EUR 0.25 Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 7/1/2015 EUR 0.25 Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 6/10/2016 EUR 0.25 A-TEC Industries A 8.75 10/27/2014 EUR 1.63 A-TEC Industries A 2.75 5/10/2014 EUR 2.00 A-TEC Industries A 5.75 11/2/2010 EUR 1.88 Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.79 11/29/2032 EUR 70.93 Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.68 12/18/2030 EUR 72.49 Investkredit Bank 4.63 4/12/2022 EUR 74.70 KA Finanz AG 4.90 6/23/2031 EUR 67.75 KA Finanz AG 4.44 12/20/2030 EUR 65.13 Oberoesterreichisc 0.63 11/6/2030 EUR 72.60 Oberoesterreichisc 0.52 4/25/2042 EUR 65.26 Oesterreichische V 1.06 7/29/2018 EUR 25.00 Oesterreichische V 5.27 2/8/2027 EUR 63.00 Raiffeisen Centrob 14.40 3/6/2014 EUR 73.77 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.75 8/20/2033 EUR 73.41 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.70 12/27/2031 EUR 71.81 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.57 1/25/2031 EUR 73.50 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.61 1/24/2031 EUR 73.64 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.72 1/22/2031 EUR 73.74 BELGIUM ------- Econocom Group 4.00 6/1/2016 EUR 27.70 Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 72.33 Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 73.13 BULGARIA -------- Petrol AD 8.38 1/26/2017 EUR 57.66 Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 75.05 Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 74.63 OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 12.03 OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 12.03 OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 11.88 OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 11.88 Clariden Leu Ltd/N 5.25 8/6/2014 CHF 65.59 Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.50 8/13/2014 CHF 62.47 Credit Suisse/Nass 7.25 4/4/2014 USD 64.87 Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.52 9/10/2014 CHF 65.99 CYPRUS ------ Cyprus Government 4.63 2/3/2020 EUR 73.86 Cyprus Government 6.00 7/1/2023 EUR 73.75 Cyprus Government 4.75 7/1/2020 EUR 73.13 Cyprus Government 5.25 7/1/2022 EUR 71.00 Cyprus Government 5.00 7/1/2021 EUR 71.75 CZECH REPUBLIC -------------- Sazka AS 9.00 7/12/2021 EUR 10.13 DENMARK ------- Kommunekredit 0.50 7/30/2027 TRY 26.38 Kommunekredit 0.50 9/19/2019 BRL 53.55 Kommunekredit 0.50 2/20/2020 BRL 51.34 Kommunekredit 0.50 5/11/2029 CAD 50.52 Kommunekredit 0.50 10/22/2019 BRL 53.10 Kommunekredit 0.50 12/14/2020 ZAR 60.44 FINLAND ------- Municipality Finan 0.50 10/27/2016 BRL 73.96 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/30/2016 BRL 73.14 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/16/2017 TRY 71.26 Municipality Finan 0.50 6/19/2024 ZAR 37.00 Municipality Finan 0.50 2/17/2017 BRL 71.34 Municipality Finan 0.50 4/27/2018 ZAR 70.77 Municipality Finan 0.50 5/31/2022 ZAR 45.84 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/17/2016 BRL 73.90 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/10/2021 NZD 67.05 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 ZAR 67.19 Municipality Finan 0.50 4/26/2022 ZAR 46.35 Municipality Finan 0.50 12/20/2018 ZAR 66.70 Municipality Finan 0.50 3/28/2018 BRL 62.02 Municipality Finan 0.50 12/14/2018 TRY 64.02 Municipality Finan 0.50 2/7/2018 BRL 68.42 Municipality Finan 0.50 3/16/2017 BRL 71.42 Municipality Finan 0.50 2/22/2019 IDR 65.22 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 TRY 64.13 Municipality Finan 0.50 1/10/2018 BRL 64.01 Municipality Finan 0.50 6/22/2017 IDR 74.39 Municipality Finan 0.50 1/23/2018 BRL 64.50 Municipality Finan 0.25 6/28/2040 CAD 23.91 Municipality Finan 0.50 12/21/2021 NZD 66.64 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/25/2020 ZAR 54.11 Municipality Finan 0.50 3/17/2025 CAD 61.50 Talvivaara Mining 4.00 12/16/2015 EUR 17.99 FRANCE ------ Air France-KLM 4.97 4/1/2015 EUR 12.75 Air France-KLM 2.03 2/15/2023 EUR 10.59 Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 4.25 7/1/2018 EUR 3.12 Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 5.00 1/1/2015 EUR 3.36 Assystem 4.00 1/1/2017 EUR 24.27 AtoS 2.50 1/1/2016 EUR 61.09 AtoS 1.50 7/1/2016 EUR 60.87 BNP Paribas SA 0.50 1/31/2018 RUB 73.33 BNP Paribas SA 0.50 11/16/2032 MXN 39.68 BNP Paribas SA 0.50 5/6/2021 MXN 71.71 Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/16/2014 EUR 53.03 Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/18/2015 EUR 9.08 Caisse Centrale du 7.00 9/10/2015 EUR 15.35 Cap Gemini SA 3.50 1/1/2014 EUR 48.05 CGG SA 1.75 1/1/2016 EUR 28.39 CGG SA 1.25 1/1/2019 EUR 31.31 Club Mediterranee 6.11 11/1/2015 EUR 19.71 Credit Agricole Co 0.50 2/28/2018 RUB 73.06 Credit Agricole Co 0.50 3/6/2023 RUB 48.05 Dexia Credit Local 0.88 7/10/2017 EUR 74.75 Dexia Credit Local 4.38 2/12/2019 EUR 71.75 Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2014 EUR 16.90 Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2015 EUR 15.67 Faurecia 4.50 1/1/2015 EUR 24.46 Faurecia 3.25 1/1/2018 EUR 27.55 GFI Informatique S 5.25 1/1/2017 EUR 5.30 Ingenico 2.75 1/1/2017 EUR 57.77 Le Noble Age 4.88 1/3/2016 EUR 19.50 Nexans SA 2.50 1/1/2019 EUR 72.92 Nexans SA 4.00 1/1/2016 EUR 58.43 Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50 Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50 OL Groupe 7.00 12/28/2015 EUR 6.53 Orpea 1.75 1/1/2020 EUR 48.99 Orpea 3.88 1/1/2016 EUR 51.28 Peugeot SA 4.45 1/1/2016 EUR 26.65 Publicis Groupe SA 1.00 1/18/2018 EUR 60.32 SG Option Europe S 8.00 9/29/2015 USD 62.49 SG Option Europe S 7.00 5/5/2017 EUR 52.35 SG Option Europe S 7.00 9/22/2017 EUR 68.73 SG Option Europe S 8.00 12/18/2014 USD 40.49 SG Option Europe S 7.50 12/24/2014 EUR 38.00 SG Option Europe S 7.25 8/5/2014 EUR 62.59 Societe Air France 2.75 4/1/2020 EUR 21.03 Societe Generale S 0.50 6/12/2023 RUB 45.95 Societe Generale S 0.50 4/3/2023 RUB 46.79 Societe Generale S 0.50 11/29/2022 AUD 63.45 Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 USD 71.63 Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 USD 72.50 Societe Generale S 0.50 12/21/2022 AUD 63.21 Societe Generale S 0.50 4/30/2023 RUB 46.47 Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 AUD 64.99 Societe Generale S 0.50 12/6/2021 AUD 67.38 Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 AUD 65.81 Societe Generale S 0.50 9/7/2021 AUD 69.04 SOITEC 6.75 9/18/2018 EUR 2.50 SOITEC 6.25 9/9/2014 EUR 8.61 Tem SAS 4.25 1/1/2015 EUR 55.58 Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00 Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00 GEORGIA ------- Bank J Safra Saras 13.60 2/17/2014 CHF 71.13 Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/15/2014 CHF 63.95 Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 12/13/2013 USD 67.65 Bank Julius Baer & 14.00 5/23/2014 USD 55.80 Bank Julius Baer & 8.50 12/13/2013 USD 56.05 Bank Julius Baer & 9.50 12/13/2013 USD 61.50 Bank Julius Baer & 12.60 12/13/2013 USD 52.65 Bank Julius Baer & 7.25 4/10/2014 USD 64.50 Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 1/29/2014 CHF 71.40 Bank Julius Baer & 6.10 4/17/2014 CHF 65.15 Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/17/2014 EUR 65.45 Bank Julius Baer & 5.00 12/23/2013 CHF 67.05 Bank Julius Baer & 10.20 11/29/2013 USD 52.45 Bank Julius Baer & 11.50 3/18/2014 USD 61.85 Bank Julius Baer & 6.80 4/11/2014 USD 70.15 Bank Julius Baer & 6.50 4/11/2014 USD 71.25 Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 4/11/2014 USD 71.05 Bank Julius Baer & 7.80 2/14/2014 USD 70.35 Bank Julius Baer & 7.50 2/14/2014 CHF 69.75 Bank Julius Baer & 10.00 4/4/2014 USD 62.75 Bank Julius Baer & 6.90 3/21/2014 USD 70.45 Banque Cantonale V 4.90 9/9/2014 CHF 73.73 EFG International 6.00 11/30/2017 EUR 39.45 EFG International 13.40 11/14/2013 CHF 58.64 EFG International 6.82 6/4/2014 CHF 70.01 EFG International 12.86 10/30/2017 EUR 35.40 EFG International 12.10 3/10/2014 USD 50.04 EFG International 4.50 2/20/2014 USD 58.50 EFG International 5.85 10/14/2014 CHF 72.75 EFG International 10.00 12/17/2013 USD 66.27 Leonteq Securities 11.90 1/15/2014 EUR 50.01 Leonteq Securities 17.00 11/21/2013 CAD 40.23 Leonteq Securities 9.25 11/5/2013 USD 36.80 Leonteq Securities 12.65 12/10/2013 EUR 50.06 Leonteq Securities 7.80 8/26/2014 CHF 55.40 Leonteq Securities 15.00 2/13/2014 CHF 55.94 Leonteq Securities 12.00 11/15/2013 CHF 54.70 Leonteq Securities 17.05 2/14/2014 CHF 42.69 Leonteq Securities 10.03 10/25/2013 CHF 48.39 Leonteq Securities 5.06 5/26/2014 CHF 74.49 Leonteq Securities 18.00 12/6/2013 CHF 58.34 Leonteq Securities 8.40 11/27/2013 CHF 69.11 Leonteq Securities 8.80 12/6/2013 EUR 66.34 Leonteq Securities 20.00 12/12/2013 CHF 59.36 Leonteq Securities 12.80 12/12/2013 CHF 56.01 Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/12/2013 CHF 67.47 Leonteq Securities 8.10 12/13/2013 CHF 56.63 Leonteq Securities 9.20 11/15/2013 CHF 72.96 Leonteq Securities 7.21 11/14/2013 CHF 72.00 Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/21/2013 CHF 48.23 Leonteq Securities 13.60 12/6/2013 CHF 53.15 Leonteq Securities 8.75 6/6/2014 GBP 71.26 Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/6/2013 USD 65.15 Leonteq Securities 12.89 12/10/2013 GBP 52.10 Leonteq Securities 10.20 11/14/2013 CHF 56.32 Leonteq Securities 8.01 11/15/2013 CHF 44.99 Leonteq Securities 21.75 5/22/2014 USD 45.78 Leonteq Securities 20.00 5/27/2014 CHF 71.16 Leonteq Securities 12.00 2/24/2014 CHF 69.73 Leonteq Securities 9.46 6/3/2014 AUD 61.68 Leonteq Securities 24.40 2/25/2014 USD 44.15 Leonteq Securities 22.75 2/4/2014 USD 68.91 Leonteq Securities 15.60 2/6/2014 CHF 55.74 Leonteq Securities 12.25 1/30/2014 CHF 49.87 Leonteq Securities 20.52 3/25/2014 USD 50.23 Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/17/2014 CHF 54.64 Leonteq Securities 21.50 3/21/2014 USD 57.05 Leonteq Securities 8.90 3/28/2014 EUR 63.16 Leonteq Securities 14.25 2/13/2015 USD 62.34 Leonteq Securities 11.50 2/11/2014 USD 70.57 Leonteq Securities 20.50 2/13/2014 CHF 65.24 Leonteq Securities 5.80 8/20/2014 USD 70.34 Leonteq Securities 13.25 2/14/2014 USD 60.87 Leonteq Securities 10.00 7/29/2014 USD 58.84 Leonteq Securities 29.61 10/26/2017 EUR 39.70 Leonteq Securities 9.00 10/31/2013 CHF 43.77 Leonteq Securities 12.00 3/5/2014 CHF 60.81 Leonteq Securities 8.50 12/24/2013 USD 54.18 Leonteq Securities 14.06 12/18/2013 USD 52.76 Leonteq Securities 5.76 12/20/2013 GBP 67.92 Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/23/2014 CHF 54.82 Leonteq Securities 8.00 6/19/2014 CHF 73.01 Leonteq Securities 6.80 12/19/2014 USD 71.84 Leonteq Securities 14.05 12/27/2013 CHF 55.88 Leonteq Securities 6.00 5/20/2014 CHF 66.65 Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/27/2013 CHF 74.15 Leonteq Securities 20.00 11/27/2013 CHF 57.98 Leonteq Securities 11.95 11/29/2013 EUR 54.01 Leonteq Securities 8.35 1/3/2014 AUD 70.38 Leonteq Securities 9.20 12/27/2013 CHF 70.21 Leonteq Securities 9.60 1/8/2014 USD 47.95 Leonteq Securities 8.40 1/15/2014 CHF 74.30 Leonteq Securities 14.00 9/22/2014 CHF 66.90 Leonteq Securities 10.80 1/15/2014 CHF 54.68 Leonteq Securities 5.50 1/25/2016 EUR 64.28 Leonteq Securities 12.00 12/6/2013 GBP 52.45 Leonteq Securities 20.14 4/9/2014 USD 55.40 Leonteq Securities 5.50 8/19/2014 USD 72.76 Leonteq Securities 20.07 2/19/2014 USD 41.82 Leonteq Securities 10.00 2/6/2014 USD 57.48 Leonteq Securities 23.90 1/24/2014 USD 43.75 Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/5/2013 USD 71.34 Leonteq Securities 25.70 1/24/2014 USD 50.45 Mare Baltic PCC Lt 2.00 11/1/2015 DKK 0.00 Zurcher Kantonalba 12.35 11/13/2013 CHF 56.78 Zurcher Kantonalba 8.22 11/15/2013 CHF 56.56 Zurcher Kantonalba 6.05 12/19/2013 EUR 65.62 Zurcher Kantonalba 9.00 12/31/2013 CHF 58.57 Zurcher Kantonalba 10.40 12/5/2013 EUR 60.48 Zurcher Kantonalba 10.65 12/6/2013 CHF 57.99 GERMANY ------- ATU Auto-Teile-Ung 7.47 10/1/2014 EUR 18.67 BDT Media Automati 8.13 10/9/2017 EUR 65.75 BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 72.21 BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 58.40 BNP Paribas Emissi 7.00 12/30/2013 EUR 60.64 BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 60.09 BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 60.05 BNP Paribas Emissi 6.50 12/30/2013 EUR 59.53 BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 68.77 BNP Paribas Emissi 4.50 11/21/2013 EUR 72.24 BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 74.37 Bremer Landesbank 0.69 3/21/2031 EUR 67.09 Bremer Landesbank 0.72 4/5/2041 EUR 54.49 Centrosolar Group 7.00 2/15/2016 EUR 13.75 Commerzbank AG 8.40 12/30/2013 EUR 2.56 Commerzbank AG 5.05 12/24/2013 EUR 67.54 DekaBank Deutsche 2.21 9/22/2021 EUR 13.92 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 56.20 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 65.00 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 64.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 61.70 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 62.00 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 56.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 6/24/2014 EUR 61.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 6/24/2014 EUR 66.00 Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 6/24/2014 EUR 62.90 Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40 Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 3/25/2014 EUR 61.50 Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 3/25/2014 EUR 62.90 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.00 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.10 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 61.50 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 56.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.90 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 62.30 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 57.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 70.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 66.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 63.20 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.50 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.70 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.24 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.50 Deutsche Bank 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EUR 44.22 Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.58 Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.54 Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.02 Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 43.09 Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 61.82 Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.51 Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06 Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 44.71 Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.30 Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.51 Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.08 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.54 Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 69.75 Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.11 Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.69 Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.67 Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.17 Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.23 Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.71 Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.90 Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.42 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 57.14 Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.84 Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.14 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.12 Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 43.70 Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 74.24 Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.22 Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.96 Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.46 Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40 Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 46.58 Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 50.67 Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.12 Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.79 Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/24/2014 EUR 72.15 Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/24/2014 EUR 61.30 Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.38 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.72 Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.02 Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 46.96 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.65 Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.01 Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.73 Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.64 Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.56 Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.04 Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.36 Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.95 Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.49 Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.92 Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.10 Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 67.72 Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 65.56 Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 58.88 Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.78 Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 60.15 Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.58 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.84 Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.71 Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.92 Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.61 Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.52 Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 62.76 Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 9/24/2014 EUR 61.79 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 65.32 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 63.62 Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 6/25/2014 EUR 57.83 Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 9/24/2014 EUR 67.95 Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 9/24/2014 EUR 58.17 Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.59 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40 Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 10/23/2013 EUR 62.52 Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.12 Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94 Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.46 Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.58 Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.99 Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.96 Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 58.55 Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 64.12 Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.02 Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15 Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.26 Goldman Sachs & Co 6.50 12/27/2013 EUR 43.13 Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 37.67 Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 12/24/2014 EUR 68.05 Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.84 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11/10/2008 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 4.34 12/22/2025 EUR 8.00 IRELAND ------- Corsicanto Ltd 3.50 1/15/2032 USD 74.94 Depfa ACS Bank 4.90 8/24/2035 CAD 69.73 Depfa ACS Bank 0.50 3/3/2025 CAD 46.53 Kalvebod PLC 2.00 5/1/2106 DKK 40.00 ITALY ------- Banca delle Marche 1.18 6/1/2017 EUR 42.39 A2A SpA 3.20 8/10/2036 EUR 62.44 Banca delle Marche 5.50 9/16/2030 EUR 69.25 Banca di Cividale 0.34 10/2/2036 EUR 57.63 Banca Monte dei Pa 1.23 1/15/2018 EUR 74.60 Cassa Depositi e P 0.29 10/31/2029 EUR 61.70 Cirio Finanziaria 8.00 12/21/2005 EUR 0.63 City of Lecco Ital 0.46 6/30/2026 EUR 67.27 Comune di Andrano 3.92 12/31/2035 EUR 71.20 Comune di Fiumicin 0.49 12/31/2026 EUR 66.65 Comune di Grontard 4.10 12/31/2035 EUR 73.36 Comune di Marcheno 4.23 12/31/2036 EUR 74.59 Comune di Marscian 4.03 12/31/2035 EUR 72.47 Comune di Mercato 3.97 12/31/2035 EUR 71.83 Comune di Piadena 4.05 12/31/2035 EUR 72.74 Comune di San Ferd 0.53 12/27/2026 EUR 67.26 Comune di Santa Ma 0.60 5/31/2026 EUR 69.00 Comune di Seminara 0.72 10/31/2026 EUR 69.14 Comune di Verona 0.43 12/1/2026 EUR 64.53 Enel SpA 0.96 10/20/2032 EUR 63.62 Intesa Sanpaolo Sp 1.06 3/20/2023 EUR 74.70 Italy Government I 1.85 9/15/2057 EUR 65.06 Italy Government I 2.00 9/15/2062 EUR 67.03 Italy Government I 2.20 9/15/2058 EUR 72.77 Italy Government I 2.87 5/19/2036 JPY 69.43 Province of Bresci 0.73 12/22/2036 EUR 57.22 Province of Bresci 0.72 6/30/2036 EUR 57.58 Province of Chieti 0.65 12/29/2023 EUR 74.35 Province of Milan 0.59 12/22/2033 EUR 63.54 Province of Rovigo 0.59 12/28/2035 EUR 58.80 Province of Teramo 0.44 12/30/2030 EUR 60.80 Province of Teramo 0.47 12/30/2025 EUR 68.61 Province of Trevis 0.47 12/31/2034 EUR 58.04 Province of Trevis 0.57 12/31/2034 EUR 59.52 Province of Trevis 0.34 12/31/2034 EUR 56.82 Region of Abruzzo 0.68 11/7/2036 EUR 63.64 Region of Abruzzo 0.52 11/7/2031 EUR 61.27 Region of Abruzzo 4.45 3/1/2037 EUR 70.52 Region of Aosta Va 0.45 5/28/2021 EUR 73.65 Region of Molise I 0.72 12/15/2033 EUR 64.40 Region of 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10/9/2011 EUR 10.38 ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38 Erste Europaeische 0.27 2/1/2037 USD 55.57 European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00 European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00 Finmek Internation 7.00 12/3/2004 EUR 0.13 Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13 Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13 Hypothekenbank Fra 0.25 12/20/2029 USD 67.37 International Indu 9.00 7/6/2011 EUR 1.00 International Indu 11.00 2/19/2013 USD 0.88 IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13 IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13 La Veggia Finance 7.13 11/14/2004 EUR 0.25 Teksid Aluminum Lu 11.38 7/15/2011 EUR 0.75 NETHERLANDS ----------- Astana Finance BV 7.88 6/8/2010 EUR 4.00 Astana Finance BV 9.00 11/16/2011 USD 3.50 Astana Finance BV 14.50 7/2/2013 USD 3.75 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/10/2017 TRY 73.62 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2022 ZAR 52.90 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2017 TRY 72.46 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/7/2022 ZAR 53.32 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/12/2017 TRY 73.13 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2017 TRY 72.30 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/22/2021 ZAR 57.64 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/29/2021 NZD 70.64 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/15/2022 ZAR 52.50 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2022 MXN 64.98 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/3/2021 NZD 64.80 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 2/24/2025 CAD 65.15 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/12/2021 ZAR 58.17 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 9/20/2022 ZAR 52.08 BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.01 BLT Finance BV 12.00 2/10/2015 USD 10.25 BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.63 Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38 Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38 Cirio Del Monte NV 7.75 3/14/2005 EUR 3.38 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/26/2021 ZAR 48.95 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/30/2043 MXN 23.60 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 8/21/2028 MXN 46.15 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 7/30/2043 MXN 23.80 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 1/31/2033 MXN 36.68 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/29/2027 MXN 48.35 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/30/2027 MXN 48.11 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 12/29/2027 MXN 47.89 Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.77 Cooperatieve Centr 8.60 3/13/2014 CHF 60.50 Cooperatieve Centr 8.15 3/5/2014 CHF 58.60 Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.43 JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/7/2014 USD 69.19 JP Morgan Structur 5.00 12/3/2013 CHF 64.32 JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/25/2014 EUR 73.83 JP Morgan Structur 12.30 11/29/2013 USD 48.32 KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 10.00 3/15/2012 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 8.13 6/1/2009 USD 0.38 KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/5/2035 EUR 9.75 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 11/2/2035 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 3/16/2035 EUR 14.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/15/2035 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 5/17/2035 EUR 10.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.88 3/14/2013 CHF 2.13 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/22/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/16/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 5/8/2017 HKD 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/26/2013 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/14/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/27/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/5/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/16/2017 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 9/15/2008 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/18/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.03 1/31/2015 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/24/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 5/9/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 5/26/2026 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 12/3/2015 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/18/2015 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 6/6/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 12/2/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.46 2/19/2012 JPY 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/23/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.75 2/7/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/28/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/20/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/17/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 10/22/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/27/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.44 11/22/2008 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/16/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 12.22 11/21/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/13/2010 JPY 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 6/10/2014 SGD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 4/20/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.86 9/21/2011 SGD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 12/20/2027 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/12/2011 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/1/2025 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.55 3/12/2015 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.05 4/8/2015 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 9/5/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 23.30 9/16/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/17/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.88 1/28/2011 HKD 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 11/21/2009 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 2/19/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/3/2012 BRL 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 6/2/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 8/7/2013 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/21/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 11/28/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/11/2038 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/19/2017 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 4/23/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/22/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 2/16/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 3/10/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/13/2011 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/7/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 1/31/2013 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 11/9/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.75 6/22/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.12 4/30/2027 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/28/2032 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 7/6/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 6/22/2046 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.65 8/24/2011 AUD 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 12/26/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 12/15/2011 GBP 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.68 12/12/2045 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.06 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/28/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/4/2015 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.69 2/19/2017 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.59 11/22/2009 MXN 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.28 11/6/2010 JPY 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/9/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 6/2/2020 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.38 2/4/2014 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.30 12/21/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2010 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.20 5/14/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 10/11/2017 ILS 2.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 3/30/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 10/24/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 8/3/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.60 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 7/2/2020 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 7/8/2014 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 5/16/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 11/16/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.72 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 6/4/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 18.25 10/2/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/31/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.80 3/19/2018 JPY 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 11/16/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/6/2008 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 11/22/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.25 6/20/2012 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 5/21/2013 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.01 9/20/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/19/2023 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.60 4/22/2014 MXN 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 12/3/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/23/2012 GBP 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.37 7/15/2013 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.87 10/8/2013 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.75 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/24/2008 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.38 9/20/2008 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/15/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/29/2017 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/8/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 2/3/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.43 1/8/2009 ILS 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/8/2008 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/13/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 4/1/2023 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.63 7/22/2011 HKD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.80 3/31/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/2/2022 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 5/15/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.28 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.35 8/8/2016 SGD 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/6/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.50 8/9/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 7/11/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.82 12/18/2036 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.20 12/3/2008 HKD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/3/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 12.40 6/12/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/4/2011 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 7/8/2013 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.30 12/21/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 12/31/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 2/8/2012 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/19/2012 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.50 4/1/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.15 3/21/2013 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 11/30/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 2/26/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 6/20/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 2/14/2010 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/22/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.45 2/20/2010 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 8/1/2013 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 3/4/2010 NZD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.63 3/2/2012 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 2/21/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.80 12/27/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.75 3/29/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 12/6/2011 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 1/4/2011 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.75 3/1/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.82 10/20/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/13/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.80 11/16/2012 HKD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/12/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 9/20/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.40 9/21/2009 HKD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 4/28/2014 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 6/15/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/30/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 5/20/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 5/17/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 7/25/2012 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 8/2/2037 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/12/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 8/23/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 11/9/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/14/2012 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2012 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/12/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/22/2012 EUR 1.13 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.20 3/19/2018 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.95 11/4/2013 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/19/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 3/27/2009 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 10/24/2008 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 4/14/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/30/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 7/21/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.95 10/25/2036 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 6/29/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/25/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.75 4/5/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 4/24/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.39 5/4/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.35 10/13/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.80 12/30/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/23/2018 CZK 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/30/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/17/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.48 5/12/2009 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.25 5/12/2009 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/27/2013 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/24/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 10/19/2012 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.68 3/5/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/15/2022 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.32 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 9/13/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 7/24/2026 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 8/2/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 2/16/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 3/13/2021 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/17/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/6/2016 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/1/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.70 6/6/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/6/2013 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/24/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 6/13/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 3/17/2009 GBP 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/28/2008 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.85 4/24/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 7/24/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 12/30/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/3/2012 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.10 6/4/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/15/2012 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.15 10/30/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 8/1/2020 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 14.10 11/12/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 8/11/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/13/2037 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 8/1/2035 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.90 7/28/2020 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.15 8/25/2020 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/30/2010 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 5/9/2020 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.30 6/4/2012 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 6/5/2011 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/6/2013 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/4/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 17.00 6/2/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.80 8/21/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.22 3/1/2024 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 5/23/2012 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.45 5/23/2013 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/28/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/15/2018 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/6/2011 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.75 10/28/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 11/30/2012 CZK 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 11/9/2011 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 11/24/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/12/2036 JPY 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 12/14/2012 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.40 6/20/2011 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.60 6/21/2010 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.05 12/20/2010 HKD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 6/20/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 9/20/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.70 4/21/2011 USD 6.00 Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 45.04 Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 44.63 Morgan Stanley BV 9.00 4/16/2015 EUR 71.90 Nederlandse Waters 0.50 3/11/2025 CAD 65.79 New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.24 New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.78 New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.25 New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.47 NIBC Bank NV 25.98 5/7/2029 EUR 50.62 Nutritek Internati 8.75 12/11/2008 USD 2.00 Q-Cells Internatio 1.38 4/30/2012 EUR 32.45 Q-Cells Internatio 5.75 5/26/2014 EUR 32.09 Sairgroup Finance 4.38 6/8/2006 EUR 10.50 Sairgroup Finance 6.63 10/6/2010 EUR 12.13 Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.25 Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.00 SNS Bank NV 6.25 10/26/2020 EUR 2.13 SNS Bank NV 6.63 5/14/2018 EUR 4.13 WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.90 WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.38 NORWAY ------ Eksportfinans ASA 0.25 7/14/2033 CAD 8.50 Eksportfinans ASA 0.50 5/9/2030 CAD 14.25 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/7/2017 BRL 69.77 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/10/2017 BRL 68.32 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/29/2017 BRL 66.85 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/25/2018 ZAR 70.89 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/26/2017 BRL 65.80 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/28/2017 BRL 68.91 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/28/2017 BRL 67.67 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/20/2018 BRL 64.71 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/2/2018 BRL 62.66 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/1/2017 BRL 68.22 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/15/2018 BRL 67.16 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/29/2017 BRL 70.51 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/16/2016 BRL 73.83 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/27/2022 ZAR 47.60 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 7/28/2016 BRL 74.11 Norske Skogindustr 7.00 6/26/2017 EUR 60.59 Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 74.02 Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 72.75 Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 69.53 Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 51.63 Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 73.50 Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 50.08 Petromena ASA 9.75 5/24/2014 NOK 6.75 Petromena ASA 10.85 11/19/2010 USD 6.75 PORTUGAL -------- AdP - Aguas de Por 0.33 1/23/2023 EUR 63.88 Banco Espirito San 3.50 1/2/2043 EUR 50.13 Caixa Geral de Dep 5.98 3/3/2028 EUR 57.00 CP - Comboios de P 5.70 2/5/2030 EUR 60.31 Empresa de Desenvo 0.33 11/21/2018 EUR 66.63 Metropolitano de L 4.80 12/7/2027 EUR 73.38 Metropolitano de L 4.06 12/4/2026 EUR 71.93 Parpublica - Parti 4.20 11/16/2026 EUR 68.25 Portugal Obrigacoe 4.10 4/15/2037 EUR 72.12 Rede Ferroviaria N 4.25 12/13/2021 EUR 70.38 Rede Ferroviaria N 4.05 11/16/2026 EUR 71.78 ROMANIA ------- City of Iasi Roman 4.45 11/15/2028 RON 71.23 RUSSIA ------ Arizk 3.00 12/20/2030 RUB 46.44 Kuzbassenergo-Fina 8.70 4/15/2021 RUB 72.01 Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.02 Mechel 8.40 6/1/2021 RUB 70.13 Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.21 Mobile Telesystems 5.00 6/29/2021 RUB 74.25 MORTGAGE AGENT AHM 3.00 9/9/2045 RUB 9.17 Novosibirsk TIN Pl 12.50 8/26/2014 RUB 5.00 RBC OJSC 3.27 4/19/2018 RUB 51.50 Russian Railways J 8.40 6/8/2028 RUB 100.00 Saturn Research & 8.50 6/6/2014 RUB 1.01 TGC-2 12.00 10/10/2018 RUB 75.00 World of Building 4.20 6/25/2019 RUB 3.60 SPAIN ----- Autonomous Communi 4.25 10/31/2036 EUR 65.75 Autonomous Communi 4.22 4/26/2035 EUR 64.14 Autonomous Communi 4.69 10/28/2034 EUR 68.88 Autonomous Communi 2.97 9/8/2039 JPY 59.88 Autonomous Communi 0.48 10/17/2022 EUR 70.50 Autonomous Communi 2.10 5/20/2024 EUR 73.97 Autonomous Communi 0.27 11/29/2021 EUR 74.92 Banco de Castilla 1.50 6/23/2021 EUR 65.00 Bankinter SA 6.00 12/18/2028 EUR 65.13 City of Madrid Spa 0.34 10/10/2022 EUR 66.37 City of Madrid Spa 4.55 6/16/2036 EUR 73.57 Comunidad Autonoma 3.90 11/30/2035 EUR 63.84 Comunidad Autonoma 4.20 10/25/2036 EUR 66.58 Comunidad Autonoma 4.06 11/23/2035 EUR 63.94 Diputacion Foral d 4.32 12/29/2023 EUR 61.41 Ibercaja Banco SAU 1.09 4/20/2018 EUR 70.93 Junta Comunidades 0.41 12/5/2023 EUR 54.38 Junta Comunidades 3.88 1/31/2036 EUR 60.38 Junta de Extremadu 0.95 6/10/2024 EUR 72.31 Pescanova SA 5.13 4/20/2017 EUR 18.74 Pescanova SA 8.75 2/17/2019 EUR 17.79 Pescanova SA 6.75 3/5/2015 EUR 17.96 Spain Government I 2.92 12/2/2030 JPY 69.99 SWEDEN ------ Dannemora Mineral 11.75 3/22/2016 USD 41.50 Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 USD 6.63 Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 NOK 7.00 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/14/2016 BRL 74.58 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/22/2022 ZAR 46.97 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/29/2017 IDR 73.20 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/31/2022 ZAR 47.32 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/28/2022 ZAR 45.13 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/19/2018 IDR 68.74 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2018 BRL 59.21 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/15/2022 ZAR 46.66 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/26/2021 AUD 68.36 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/17/2027 USD 60.33 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/14/2016 BRL 72.32 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/28/2017 IDR 71.27 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/3/2017 BRL 70.83 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 7/21/2017 BRL 67.44 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/21/2016 BRL 72.17 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/20/2017 TRY 71.95 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/22/2016 BRL 72.19 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2020 TRY 54.02 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/5/2017 IDR 71.10 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/10/2017 BRL 70.65 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/26/2017 BRL 71.31 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/30/2017 BRL 67.86 Svensk Exportkredi 1.00 11/15/2021 AUD 72.00 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/21/2017 BRL 68.05 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/25/2021 ZAR 56.85 SWITZERLAND ----------- UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.60 Banque Cantonale V 11.80 1/29/2014 CHF 63.63 Banque Cantonale V 6.50 10/5/2015 CHF 72.74 Banque Cantonale V 2.00 7/8/2014 CHF 61.29 SAir Group 6.25 10/27/2002 CHF 11.00 SAir Group 4.25 2/2/2007 CHF 11.63 SAir Group 2.13 11/4/2004 CHF 11.00 SAir Group 0.13 7/7/2005 CHF 11.25 SAir Group 5.50 7/23/2003 CHF 11.00 SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.00 SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.13 SAir Group 6.25 4/12/2005 CHF 10.88 UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 53.44 UBS AG 23.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.46 UBS AG 8.87 4/15/2014 USD 10.17 UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.67 UBS AG 24.25 1/3/2014 EUR 60.63 UBS AG 18.45 10/24/2013 USD 8.73 UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.30 UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 56.56 UBS AG 7.25 7/29/2014 USD 31.57 UBS AG 6.03 5/14/2014 USD 54.95 UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 67.05 UBS AG 7.50 1/3/2014 EUR 64.51 UBS AG 12.70 4/22/2014 USD 66.71 UBS AG 8.94 2/13/2014 USD 14.64 UBS AG 6.29 2/26/2014 USD 32.99 UBS AG 6.22 2/26/2014 USD 38.93 UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 72.58 UBS AG 16.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19 UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22 UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02 UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.41 UBS AG 17.25 1/3/2014 EUR 42.91 UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 52.05 UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.73 UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 61.74 UBS AG 17.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.54 UBS AG 6.04 8/29/2014 USD 35.75 UBS AG 10.46 1/2/2014 USD 35.35 UBS AG 8.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50 UBS AG 15.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.26 UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.94 UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 62.75 UBS AG 19.00 1/3/2014 EUR 53.05 UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 70.59 UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50 UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.72 UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.30 UBS AG 22.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.98 UBS AG 9.53 12/17/2013 USD 48.94 UBS AG 6.49 5/23/2014 USD 21.20 UBS AG 6.53 5/27/2014 USD 21.09 UBS AG 6.33 5/12/2014 USD 19.48 UBS AG 9.25 4/30/2014 USD 9.78 UBS AG 14.00 6/27/2014 EUR 55.27 UBS AG 11.75 6/27/2014 EUR 48.70 UBS AG 8.29 1/14/2014 USD 19.98 UBS AG 5.22 1/28/2014 USD 11.48 UBS AG 7.86 1/31/2014 USD 20.24 UBS AG 9.17 6/30/2014 USD 67.70 UBS AG 7.25 8/8/2014 USD 45.54 UBS AG 8.35 10/24/2013 USD 50.89 UBS AG 9.45 10/22/2013 USD 20.95 UBS AG 9.00 1/3/2014 EUR 48.64 UBS AG 14.75 1/3/2014 EUR 44.63 UBS AG 7.15 2/26/2014 USD 32.50 UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 55.72 UBS AG 5.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.46 UBS AG 8.21 2/26/2014 USD 50.39 UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 43.67 UBS AG 13.50 1/3/2014 EUR 56.28 UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 56.97 UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22 UBS AG 8.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.15 UBS AG 23.00 1/3/2014 EUR 69.99 UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.15 UBS AG 7.25 1/3/2014 EUR 69.51 UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.61 UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.35 UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.38 UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 68.73 UBS AG 14.50 1/3/2014 EUR 74.99 UBS AG 16.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.69 UBS AG 21.00 1/3/2014 EUR 38.60 UBS AG 6.19 1/8/2014 USD 19.82 UBS AG 9.93 6/18/2014 USD 50.46 UBS AG 9.89 11/22/2013 EUR 71.22 UBS AG 8.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.16 UBS AG 4.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.04 UBS AG 4.50 6/27/2014 EUR 48.72 UBS AG 8.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.09 UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.83 UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.76 UBS AG 5.50 3/28/2014 EUR 55.86 UBS AG 9.50 3/28/2014 EUR 50.93 UBS AG 13.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.47 UBS AG 12.00 3/28/2014 EUR 42.70 UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 39.79 UBS AG 14.00 3/28/2014 EUR 52.93 UBS AG 7.75 6/27/2014 EUR 45.94 UBS AG 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 49.43 UBS AG 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 50.45 UBS AG 11.00 3/28/2014 EUR 46.42 UBS AG 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.64 UBS AG 13.00 6/27/2014 EUR 45.50 UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 59.17 UBS AG 10.75 3/28/2014 EUR 58.16 UBS AG 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.87 UBS AG 10.50 6/27/2014 EUR 52.89 UBS AG 12.25 6/27/2014 EUR 71.08 UBS AG 6.25 6/27/2014 EUR 56.36 UBS AG 11.25 3/28/2014 EUR 72.74 UBS AG 11.00 1/3/2014 EUR 70.06 UBS AG 12.25 3/28/2014 EUR 68.98 UBS AG 12.00 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02 UBS AG 13.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.24 UBS AG 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 56.96 UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 67.22 UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 59.05 UBS AG 21.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.98 UBS AG 12.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.20 UBS AG 18.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.27 UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.61 UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.63 UBS AG 19.25 1/3/2014 EUR 71.52 UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.60 UBS AG 18.50 1/3/2014 EUR 71.37 UBS AG 6.50 1/3/2014 EUR 63.77 UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 49.48 UBS AG 5.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.70 UBS AG 4.25 1/3/2014 EUR 54.36 UBS AG 6.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.11 UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.93 UBS AG 14.41 11/21/2013 USD 40.01 UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 65.06 UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 45.13 UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.49 UBS AG 6.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.80 UBS AG 20.75 1/3/2014 EUR 70.05 UBS AG 16.25 1/3/2014 EUR 72.22 UBS AG 19.75 1/3/2014 EUR 64.89 UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.96 UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 47.78 UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 49.77 UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 60.73 UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 36.11 UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.75 UBS AG 19.50 1/3/2014 EUR 65.22 UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 70.00 UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.59 UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.55 UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 72.66 UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19 UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.80 UBS AG 7.98 3/17/2014 USD 10.60 UBS AG 14.75 3/28/2014 EUR 71.70 UBS AG 11.50 6/27/2014 EUR 74.62 UBS AG 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 64.14 UBS AG 6.50 3/28/2014 EUR 44.45 UBS AG 7.30 7/7/2014 USD 28.53 TURKEY ------ APP International 11.75 10/1/2005 USD 5.00 Yuksel Insaat AS 9.50 11/10/2015 USD 72.64 UKRAINE ------- Agroton Public Ltd 12.50 7/14/2014 USD 50.00 UNITED KINGDOM -------------- Alpha Credit Group 0.73 2/21/2021 EUR 52.38 Alpha Credit Group 6.00 7/29/2020 EUR 72.88 Barclays Bank PLC 0.61 12/28/2040 EUR 64.00 Barclays Bank PLC 8.00 5/23/2014 USD 10.81 Barclays Bank PLC 2.20 11/30/2025 USD 21.86 Barclays Bank PLC 0.50 3/13/2023 RUB 47.04 Barclays Bank PLC 6.75 10/16/2015 GBP 1.15 Barclays Bank PLC 7.40 2/13/2014 GBP 1.04 Barclays Bank PLC 2.50 3/7/2017 EUR 35.67 Barclays Bank PLC 8.25 1/26/2015 USD 1.13 Barclays Bank PLC 1.99 12/1/2040 USD 71.38 Barclays Bank PLC 1.64 6/3/2041 USD 66.57 Barclays Bank PLC 7.50 4/29/2014 GBP 1.06 Barclays Bank PLC 2.33 1/2/2041 USD 73.08 Cattles Ltd 6.88 1/17/2014 GBP 2.50 Cattles Ltd 7.13 7/5/2017 GBP 2.50 Commercial Bank Pr 5.80 2/9/2016 USD 69.01 Co-Operative Bank 9.25 4/28/2021 GBP 72.74 Co-Operative Bank 5.75 12/2/2024 GBP 68.46 Co-Operative Bank 7.88 12/19/2022 GBP 70.52 Co-Operative Bank 5.88 3/28/2033 GBP 69.57 Co-Operative Bank 5.63 11/16/2021 GBP 55.13 Co-Operative Bank 1.01 5/18/2016 EUR 69.71 Credit Suisse AG/L 11.50 4/4/2014 CHF 70.01 Credit Suisse AG/L 8.50 11/5/2013 CHF 45.66 Credit Suisse AG/L 6.50 1/14/2014 CHF 55.22 Credit Suisse AG/L 9.00 11/14/2013 CHF 51.41 Credit Suisse AG/L 1.64 6/1/2042 USD 46.62 Credit Suisse AG/L 8.00 1/14/2014 USD 55.38 Credit Suisse AG/L 6.85 8/8/2014 USD 57.36 Credit Suisse AG/L 10.50 11/15/2013 USD 51.48 Credit Suisse Inte 4.40 10/24/2013 EUR 57.10 Credit Suisse Inte 4.45 12/13/2013 EUR 53.20 Dunfermline Buildi 6.00 3/31/2015 GBP 1.38 Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 2/24/2022 EUR 60.75 Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 12/2/2021 EUR 61.13 Emporiki Group Fin 5.10 12/9/2021 EUR 62.13 ERB Hellas PLC 0.52 9/3/2014 EUR 72.13 Goldman Sachs Inte 2.50 8/17/2018 EUR 20.40 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/3/2023 AUD 62.86 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/2/2022 AUD 64.19 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2023 AUD 63.27 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/25/2021 AUD 68.62 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/30/2021 NZD 65.52 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/20/2018 RUB 69.82 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 6/30/2021 NZD 67.16 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/2/2023 AUD 63.51 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2022 AUD 63.89 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/5/2018 RUB 74.86 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 3/1/2018 RUB 74.48 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/27/2027 NZD 47.02 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/22/2021 AUD 68.35 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 7/30/2027 NZD 46.29 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 1/29/2027 NZD 47.70 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/30/2026 NZD 48.42 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2026 AUD 50.10 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/8/2026 AUD 50.28 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2027 NZD 47.50 Royal Bank of Scot 1.69 11/14/2016 GBP 1.10 RSL Communications 10.50 11/15/2008 USD 1.20 RSL Communications 10.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25 RSL Communications 9.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25 RSL Communications 9.88 11/15/2009 USD 1.25 RSL Communications 12.00 11/1/2008 USD 1.25 UBS AG/London 25.00 3/20/2014 CHF 62.25 UBS AG/London 7.63 9/30/2015 USD 16.71 UBS AG/London 20.25 4/17/2014 CHF 66.13 UBS AG/London 6.88 8/31/2015 USD 15.37 ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200. * * * End of Transmission * * *