TCREUR_Public/131211.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, December 11, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 245

                            Headlines

A Z E R B A I J A N

BAGHLAN GROUP: Fitch Rates Prospective Guaranteed Notes 'B-(EXP)'


C Y P R U S

BANK OF CYPRUS: Fitch Keeps 'B' Rating on Covered Bonds on Watch


G E R M A N Y

ATU AUTO-TEILE-UNGER: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to Ca
CONERGY AG: Administrator Applies for Share Delisting
WEPA HYGIENEPRODUKTE: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Corp. Family Rating


G R E E C E

ALPHA BANK: Moody's Lifts Mortgage Covered Bonds Rating to 'B3'


H U N G A R Y

HUNGARY: Moody's Rates EUR903.8MM Exchangeable Bonds 'Ba1'


I R E L A N D

IRELAND: Central Bank Sets Tougher Mortgage Resolution Targets
IRISH BANK: Pepper Asset Selected as Preferred Bidder for Loans


I T A L Y

BANCA CARIGE: Fitch Says Non-Payment Flags Regulatory Risks
GALLERIE 2013: Fitch Expects BB+ Deterioration Impacts on Notes


L A T V I A

LIEPAJAS METALURGS: Most Likely Not to Be Sold at Auction


L I T H U A N I A

BANKAS SNORAS: Bankruptcy Administrator Files Suit v. Two Banks


N O R W A Y

SPAREBANK 1: Fitch Affirms BB+ Hybrid Capital Instruments Rating


R U S S I A

CREDIT EUROPE: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
EUROPEAN TRUST: Moody's Reviews 'Caa1' Ratings for Downgrade
EUROPEAN TRUST: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2.ru' NSR for Downgrade
EVROFINANCE MOSNARBANK: Fitch Maintains 'B+' IDRs on Watch Pos.


S P A I N

PAESA ENTERTAINMENT: Moody's Assigns 'B3' CFR; Outlook Stable
PESCANOVA: Deloitte Seeks Fast Settlement With Creditors


S W E D E N

SELENA OIL: Creditor Withdraws Bankruptcy Petition


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALBEMARLE & BOND: Pre-Tax Profits Down to GBP4.9 Million
CAVENDISH TRAVEL: Ceases Trading, Can't Supply Paid Tickets
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Bank of England Committee Member Lauds Rescue
FARRELL: Peter Jones Saves Clothing Brand From Closure
WREKIN CONSTRUCTION: Directors Banned After Inflating Assets


                            *********


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A Z E R B A I J A N
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BAGHLAN GROUP: Fitch Rates Prospective Guaranteed Notes 'B-(EXP)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Baghlan Group FZCO prospective
guaranteed notes an expected rating of 'B-(EXP)' and an expected
Recovery Rating of 'RR4(EXP)'. Its Long-term foreign currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) has been affirmed at 'B-' with a
Positive Outlook.

The rating of the notes reflects a guarantee from Baghlan. The
notes also benefit from the security of the 66.7% shares owned by
the issuing vehicle Baghlan Group Limited in the group's main oil
& gas operating company Bahar Energy Limited.

The guarantee is not extended to the operating subsidiaries of
the group, covering its transport, logistics, construction and
real estate activities. Nevertheless, these operating
subsidiaries are fully controlled by the guarantor and legally
tied through cross default clauses. Fitch expects the proceeds
from the notes to be used to repay the majority of existing
secured debt facilities. Structural subordination risks are
contained with negative pledge restrictions.

The notes' final ratings are contingent upon the receipt of final
documentation conforming to information already received by the
agency.

Baghlan is a privately owned, diversified Azerbaijani corporate
benefiting from the expected structural growth of the country
through its transport services, construction and oil & gas
activities. Although moderately leveraged for the rating category
recent investments into start-up oil and gas assets have
increased the company's debt levels. Fitch expects funds from
operations (FFO) gross leverage to remain below 2.5x and FFO
gross interest cover above 4.0x in FY13. The agency also expects
on-going stability from its transport services business to offset
lumpy cash flow generation from its construction segment. The oil
and gas segment over FY13 has remained a modest drain on cash
flows and is expected by the company to break even in FY14.
However, the potential for this unit to outperform and up-stream
dividends to the group -- indicative of standalone strength -- is
a potential positive rating event.

Key Rating Drivers:

Notes Issue Positive for Liquidity

The prospective notes issue diversifies the group's funding
sources, extends maturities and is likely to aid liquidity.
Previously, as a private Azerbaijani issuer, access to medium-
term bank funding was constrained by an under-developed banking
market. The notes issue should further improve financial
discipline with an incurrence gross leverage covenant at below
3.0x, and a restriction on shareholder distributions of no more
than 50% of net income.

Diversified Operating Segments

The operating risk profile benefits from its diversified nature,
although concentration on large contracts is a weak point.
Transport and logistics services benefit from a strong domestic
market share, recurrent cash flow and privileged contracts with
government bodies. Construction is primarily focused on one large
civil works contract with a few more contracts in the order book
coming on-stream in FY14 and FY15. Although this is a higher
business risk than other segments with its volatile working
capital movements and fragmented market share, profit margins and
growth prospects are strong. Oil and gas operations are in a run-
up phase and still require financial support from the group.
Fitch expects positive cash flow from these activities from FY14
onwards.

Stable Transport Services Unit

As the leading freight agent in Azerbaijan this operating segment
requires minimal debt funding and has a solid track record of
generating reasonable free cash flow (FCF) for the rest of the
group to grow. This stability stems from Baghlan's leading
position as the key freight agent for Azerbaijani Railways
selling on its behalf around 60% of all freight volume through
the Azerbaijani railway network. The unit has high barriers to
entry with Baghlan benefiting from an exclusive medium-term
contract with Azerbaijani Railways.

Real Estate Divestments

Strong expected FY13 FCF generation is dependent on the disposal
of its portfolio of primarily residential, multi-purpose units in
central Baku. The positive impact on FCF from these divestitures
would aid de-leveraging, although not required to maintain
consolidated FFO gross leverage below 2.5x for FY13. Baghlan is
currently in negotiations with investors and banks to sell these
units in block sales.

Volatile Working Capital Movements

Solid P&L profits posted over the last three years have not fully
converted into cash flow. Negative working capital outflows
during 2011 and 2012 have led Baghlan to fund a working capital
requirement of around AZN181m as at FY12 (inventory plus current
receivables less current payables). Although working capital is
likely to become positive in 2013 and 2014 it is closely linked
to divesting real estate assets, receiving payment from deferred
consideration following the sale of a JV interest (AISBG) and
successful execution of their construction contracts. Receivables
risk is largely contained with the majority of receivables linked
to Azerbaijani state authorities.

Rating Sensitivities:

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

   -- Improved operating risk profile with reduced concentration
      on large single contracts

   -- Positive working capital generation and successful
      divestment of real estate assets

   -- Extension of existing debt maturities and diversifying
      sources of funding

   -- Sustainable financial metrics with Fitch adjusted FFO gross
      leverage below 3.0x and FFO gross interest cover above 4.0x

   -- Oil and gas activities being self-sufficient and able to
      generate sustainable FCF to upstream dividends

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Continued working capital outflows and increased
      requirement to use local bank funding

   -- Failure to renew key contracts or loss of licenses in the
      transport segment

   -- Oil and gas activities to drain material cash flow from the
      overall group and /or an underperformance on the oil and
      gas segment



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C Y P R U S
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BANK OF CYPRUS: Fitch Keeps 'B' Rating on Covered Bonds on Watch
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings is maintaining Bank of Cyprus Public Company Ltd's
(BoC; 'Restricted Default'(RD)) covered bonds -- rated 'B' -- on
Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The covered bonds, secured by Cypriot assets, were originally
placed on RWN on March 28, 2013 and the RWN was subsequently
maintained on September 17, 2013.

Key Rating Drivers:

The covered bonds remain on RWN pending Fitch's review of the
impact of the current economic environment on the performance of
the residential mortgage portfolio. Furthermore, Fitch is still
assessing the impact of the recapitalization plan on the bank's
rating.

Rating Sensitivities:

By way of exception to the agency's covered bond rating criteria,
Fitch no longer uses the Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) as
a starting point for its credit risk assessment of BoC's covered
bonds. However, once BoC's IDR is no longer 'RD', the rating of
the covered bonds could potentially be affected by movements in
BoC's IDR. The rating of the covered bonds would be vulnerable to
a deterioration of the performance of the residential mortgage
portfolio.



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G E R M A N Y
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ATU AUTO-TEILE-UNGER: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to Ca
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the corporate family
rating ("CFR") of A.T.U. Auto-Teile-Unger Investment GmbH & Co.
KG to Ca from Caa3 and the probability of default rating ("PDR")
to Ca-PD from Caa3-PD; the rating of the issuer's EUR 143 million
senior subordinated floating rate notes has been changed to C
from Ca. At the same time, Moody's has downgraded the rating of
the EUR 375 million senior secured notes as well as the EUR 75
million senior secured floating rate notes issued by A.T.U. Auto-
Teile-Unger Handels GmbH & Co. KG to Ca from Caa2. The outlook
remains negative.

The following ratings are affected:

Downgrades:

Issuer: A.T.U. Auto-Teile-Unger Invtmt GmbH & Co. KG

Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Ca from Caa3

Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Ca-PD from Caa3-PD

EUR143M Senior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture Oct 1, 2014,
Downgraded to C from Ca

EUR143M Senior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture Oct 1, 2014,
Downgraded to a range of LGD6, 95 % from a range of LGD5, 87 %

Issuer: ATU Auto-Teile-Unger Handels GmbH & Co. KG

EUR75M Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture May 15, 2014,
Downgraded to Ca from Caa2

EUR75M Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture May 15, 2014,
Upgraded to a range of LGD3, 36 % from a range of LGD3, 37 %

EUR375M 11% Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture May 15, 2014,
Downgraded to Ca from Caa2

EUR375M 11% Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture May 15, 2014,
Upgraded to a range of LGD3, 36 % from a range of LGD3, 37 %

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: A.T.U. Auto-Teile-Unger Invtmt GmbH & Co. KG

Outlook, Remains Negative

Issuer: ATU Auto-Teile-Unger Handels GmbH & Co. KG

Outlook, Remains Negative

Ratings Rationale:

Rating action has been triggered by (i) the non-payment of the
coupon under the company's senior notes due on December 1 and
(ii) the company's announcement made on December 5 of having
reached an agreement with its shareholders and more than 80% of
its senior bondholders regarding the financial restructuring of
the group. The agreement, which is still subject to customary
closing conditions, includes the conversion of the majority, if
not all, of its senior claims into preferred equity and
approximately 5% of common equity of ATU.

The rating changes mirror the result of Moody's recovery analysis
which indicates a recovery of approximately 35% for the senior
notes and zero recovery for the junior notes.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation of a very high
likelihood for a an upcoming default, which could be either a
limited default once the 30 days cure period for the missed
interest payment under the senior notes due on 1 December lapses
or a distressed exchange if the senior bondholders are forced to
engage in a debt-to-equity swap. Downward pressure would also
intensify if the group's restructuring efforts prove to be
insufficient to maintain an appropriate earnings level.

A further downgrade of the ratings is possible if it becomes
visible that the expected recovery ratio as outlined above could
not be reached which might be the case if ATU is put into
insolvency proceedings.

Positive rating pressure could build if ATU is able to timely and
sustainably refinance its upcoming debt maturities, or if ATU
were able to implement a more sustainable capital structure.

Based in Weiden, Germany, ATU is Germany's leading operator of
brand-independent car workshops with integrated specialist auto
retail stores. As of June 2013, ATU operated a network of 646
branches, 598 of which are located in Germany, others in Austria,
the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Italy. In
fiscal year 2012/13, ATU generated EUR1.16 billion revenues
through its 10,879 employees. The vast majority of sales (around
80%) are generated in the vehicle workshops through servicing and
repairs, with the remaining approximately 20% generated through
the sale of auto parts and accessories in stores and online. ATU
is owned by private equity firm KKR and management.


CONERGY AG: Administrator Applies for Share Delisting
-----------------------------------------------------
The insolvency administrator over the assets of Conergy AG,
attorney-at-law Dr. Sven-Holger Undritz, and the management board
of Conergy AG intend to jointly apply to the management of the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Frankfurter Wertpapierborse) for a
revocation of the admission to trading and the related delisting
of the shares of Conergy AG from the Regulated Market
(Regulierter Markt) (General Standard) according to sect. 39
para. 2 of the German Stock Exchange Act (Borsengesetz) in
connection with sect. 46 of the Stock Exchange Regulations
(Borsenordnung) of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.

Conergy AG is a Hamburg-based solar panel manufacturer.
The Company filed for insolvency on July 5 and stopped its module
production in Frankfurt an der Oder near the Polish border after
a delay in payments from a large project and the failure of
executives to bridge the financial gap, Bloomberg News reported.


WEPA HYGIENEPRODUKTE: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Corp. Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B1 Corporate Family
Rating ("CFR") and Probability of Default Rating at B1-PD of WEPA
Hygieneprodukte GmbH (WEPA). Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the
B2 rating for the increased 6.5% Senior Secured Notes due 2020
following the proposed tap issue of EUR50 to EUR60 million. The
outlook remains stable.

Proceeds from the proposed incremental issue are foreseen to be
used to fund (i) the acquisition of a 50% joint venture share of
a UK private label tissue business (Northwood & WEPA Limited) to
enhance WEPA's geographic footprint, (ii) the purchase of the
operating assets of Marsberger Kraftwerk GmbH (power plant),
which already is the supplier of energy to one of WEPA's major
production sites in Giershagen and will be formally integrated
into the group and (iii) strategic investment projects in various
production machines that are aimed to improve WEPA's operating
efficiency as well as increase self-sufficiency through internal
paper supply production.

Ratings Rationale:

Despite the increase in debt, WEPA is currently strongly
positioned in the B1 rating category. This is driven by an
estimated leverage per year-end 2013 proforma for the tap issue
of 4.4x and the expectation that the leverage will continuously
reduce through gradually improving performance. In addition the
rating is supported by the group's solid market positions in the
production of private label consumer tissue products, which
benefit from stable demand due to the largely non-discretionary
nature of the products. Strong ties with leading European
retailers including joint product development support WEPA's
market position. The group's focus on private label products is
seen as a strength in the currently challenging macroeconomic
environment as it could allow WEPA to gain market share at the
expense of branded products. The rating also considers the
earnings recovery since 2012 and assumes that these improvements
can largely be sustained on the back of portfolio optimization
measures and improved internal efficiencies.

Conversely, the rating is constrained by the fairly small scale
of WEPA as indicated by sales of about EUR846 million in the last
twelve months period to September 2013 as well as limited
geographic diversification. In addition, the relatively narrow
product portfolio and dependency on a couple of large retailers
makes WEPA vulnerable to changes in these markets. There is
further caution with regards to the price competitive nature of
the industry with strong bargaining power of retailers and
susceptibility of profitability to volatile input costs that
leave the company exposed to potential margin volatility.
Notwithstanding, WEPA was able to decrease its leverage to 3.9x
Debt/EBITDA for the LTM period to September 2013 from initially
4.7x as at year end 2012, underpinning Moody's positive long-term
view of WEPA's ratings.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that WEPA will
continue its track record of gradual profit improvements
supported by fairly balanced supply and demand conditions in
Europe with currently no new substantial capacity under
construction. The proposed financing to fund strategic investment
projects is consistent with WEPA's continued portfolio
optimization strategy which aims to focus on margin quality over
volumes.

Following the transaction, WEPA's liquidity profile is adequate.
Internal sources include cash on hand of EUR21 million as per
September 2013 which will temporarily increase by EUR50 to 60
million following the envisaged incremental issue. In addition,
Moody's notes that WEPA has access to a revolving credit facility
amounting to EUR90 million as well as to about EUR85 million of
factoring/securitization agreement. These sources as well as cash
flow generation should be sufficient to fund working cash
requirements, capex forecasted at around EUR30 million per year,
two envisaged acquisitions in a total amount of about EUR32
million and additional investment plans amounting to EUR75
million between 2014 and 2018, with the RCF in place to support
seasonal working capital swings. Moody's expects WEPA to generate
negative free cash flows due to the increased investment plans in
2014 but revert to positive value again during 2015 and
thereafter.

What Could Move the Rating UP:

Moody's would consider a positive rating action if Moody's
adjusted Debt/EBITDA (incl. Off-balance-financing) were to
decline to below 4 times with sustainable EBITDA margins around
12% (11.4% per LTM September 2013) and consistently positive free
cash flow generation.

What Could Move the Rating DOWN:

Negative pressure could build if WEPA was unable to achieve
further improvements in profitability, evidenced by Debt/EBITDA
materially above 4.5x on a Moody's adjusted basis (incl. Off-
balance-financing). A negative rating action could also be
triggered by a weakening liquidity profile due to WEPA incurring
material amounts of negative free cash flow and/or tightening
covenant headroom.

Ratings:

Issuer: Wepa Hygieneprodukte GmbH

Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed at B1-PD

Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed at B1

Senior Secured, Affirmed at B2, LGD4 -65%

Outlook:

Issuer: Wepa Hygieneprodukte GmbH

Outlook Stable

The B2 rating assigned to the EUR325 to EUR335 million senior
secured notes including the increase of EUR50 to EUR60 million is
one notch below the group's corporate family rating. The rating
on this instrument reflects its junior ranking behind the EUR90
million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) and Moody's
assumption of preferred treatment of trade payables in a going
concern scenario. The RCF and the senior secured notes share the
same collateral package, consisting of a pledge over materially
all of the group's assets as well as upstream guarantees from
most of the group's operating subsidiaries, representing more
than 85% of aggregate assets and EBITDA. However, RCF lenders
benefit from priority treatment in a default scenario as their
claims will be discharged before any remaining proceeds will be
distributed to the holders of the proposed senior secured notes.

WEPA Hygieneprodukte GmbH, based in Arnsberg (Germany), is a
leading producer and supplier of tissue paper products in Europe.
The company employs approximately 2,600 staff, which generated
about EUR846 million of sales in the LTM ending in September
2013.



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G R E E C E
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ALPHA BANK: Moody's Lifts Mortgage Covered Bonds Rating to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to B3 from Caa2 the
ratings of the mortgage covered bonds issued by Alpha Bank A.E.
(Alpha Bank, under its Direct Issuance Global Covered Bond
Programme), Eurobank Ergasias S.A. (Eurobank, under both of its
programs) and National Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG, under both of
its programs).

Ratings Rationale:

Rating actions reflect Moody's decision to raise the Greek
country ceiling to B3 from Caa2, following the upgrade of
Greece's government bond rating to Caa3 from C, and upgrades of
the deposit ratings of Alpha Bank and NBG.

Key Rating Assumptions/Factors:

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a "timely payment indicator" (TPI)
framework analysis.

   -- Expected Loss:

Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to determine a rating
based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL determines expected
loss as (1) a function of the issuer's probability of default
(measured by the issuer's rating); and (2) the stressed losses on
the cover pool assets following issuer default.

The cover pool losses are an estimate of the losses Moody's
currently models if the relevant issuer defaults. Moody's splits
the cover pool between market risk and collateral risk. Market
risk measures losses stemming from refinancing risk and risks
related to interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses
may also include certain legal risks). Collateral risk measures
losses resulting directly from the cover pool assets' credit
quality. Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral
score.

The cover pool losses of Alpha Bank Direct Issuance Global
Covered Bond Programme are 27.6%, with market risk of 18.3% and
collateral risk of 9.3%. The collateral score for this program is
currently 13.9%. The over-collateralization (OC) in this cover
pool is 14.9%, of which Alpha Bank provides 5.3% on a "committed"
basis. The minimum OC level that is consistent with the B3 rating
target is 0%, of which the issuer should provide 0% in a
"committed" form. These numbers show that Moody's is not relying
on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

The cover pool losses of Eurobank Ergasias S.A. Mortgage Covered
Bonds are 27.6%, with market risk of 18.1% and collateral risk of
9.4%. The collateral score for this program is currently 14.1%.
The OC in this cover pool is 14.5%, of which Eurobank provides
5.3% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level that is
consistent with the B3 rating target is 0%, of which the issuer
should provide 0% in a "committed" form. These numbers show that
Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss
analysis.

The cover pool losses of Eurobank Ergasias S.A. Mortgage Covered
Bonds II are 44.3%, with market risk of 27.3% and collateral risk
of 17.0%. The collateral score for this program is currently
25.4%. The OC in this cover pool is 21.6%, of which Eurobank
provides 5.3% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level that
is consistent with the B3 rating target is 0%, of which the
issuer should provide 0% in a "committed" form. These numbers
show that Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its
expected loss analysis.

The cover pool losses of National Bank of Greece S.A. Global
Covered Bond Programme are 47.1%, with market risk of 33.6% and
collateral risk of 13.5%. The collateral score for this program
is currently 20.2%. The OC in this cover pool is 93.4%, of which
NBG provides 81.8% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
that is consistent with the B3 rating target is 0%, of which the
issuer should provide 0% in a "committed" form. These numbers
show that Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its
expected loss analysis.

The cover pool losses of National Bank of Greece S. A. Covered
Bond Programme II are 28.8%, with market risk of 16.8% and
collateral risk of 12.0%. The collateral score for this program
is currently 17.9%. The OC in this cover pool is 12.3%, of which
NBG provides 5.3% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
that is consistent with the B3 rating target is 0%, of which the
issuer should provide 0% in a "committed" form. These numbers
show that Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its
expected loss analysis.

   -- TPI Framework:

Moody's assigns a TPI, which indicates the likelihood that the
issuer will make timely payments to covered bondholders if the
issuer defaults. The TPI framework limits the covered bond rating
to a certain number of notches above the issuer's rating.

The TPI Moody's assigns to the covered bonds issued by NBG under
its first program remains at Very Improbable. The TPIs assigned
to the other programs remain at Improbable.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The issuer's credit strength is the main determinant of a covered
bond rating's robustness. The TPI Leeway measures the number of
notches by which Moody's might downgrade the issuer's rating
before the rating agency downgrades the covered bonds because of
TPI framework constraints.

The TPI Leeway for these programs is limited, and thus any
downgrade of the issuer ratings may lead to a downgrade of the
covered bonds.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (1) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting both the issuer's senior unsecured rating
and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the issuer; or (3)
a material reduction of the value of the cover pool.



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H U N G A R Y
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HUNGARY: Moody's Rates EUR903.8MM Exchangeable Bonds 'Ba1'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a long-term Ba1 rating to
the EUR903.8 million Exchangeable Bond due 2019 issued by the
Government of Hungary. The obligation is a senior unsecured bond
issue and ranks pari passu with all current and future senior
unsecured indebtedness of Hungary.

Ratings Rationale:

In Moody's view, the Exchangeable Bond constitutes a senior
unsecured bond issue and ranks pari passu with all current and
future senior unsecured indebtedness of Government of Hungary. As
such, Moody's Ba1 rating for the issuance is in line with the
Government of Hungary's Ba1 issuer rating.

Hungary's Ba1 government issuer rating (negative outlook)
reflects the economy's limited medium-term growth prospects,
which are likely to complicate the government's efforts to reduce
its substantial debt burden. These concerns are balanced by
credit strengths such as Hungary's wealth levels, its economic
and financial integration with Europe and its predominantly
foreign-owned banking sector, which limits contingent liabilities
for the government.

The first credit challenge for Hungary is its limited medium-term
growth potential, which remains constrained by structural factors
such as weak demographics, comparatively low labor market
participation and a poor investment climate. Gross fixed capital
formation has just started to register positive growth after
contracting for the past 17 consecutive quarters (until Q1 2013,
year-on-year), partly reflecting the adverse impact of an
unpredictable policy environment. A significantly deleveraging
banking sector along with low profitability is a credit weakness,
as it remains unsupportive of economic growth.

The second credit challenge is the government's high debt levels,
which is estimated at 80.0% of GDP for 2013 and which exceed
those of similarly rated peers. Although debt has stabilized, its
trajectory remains uncertain in the next few years as the country
is in an extended period of low growth. Moreover, the economy's
substantial refinancing needs and a large proportion of external
debt (both in foreign currency and domestic debt held by non-
residents) expose the economy to shifts in investor sentiment.

Downward pressure on the government bond rating could arise if
there is a reduction in the Hungarian policymakers' commitment to
containing the budget deficit to below 3% of GDP and/or if
additional measures are enacted that significantly deteriorate
the growth path more severely than Moody's anticipates.
Furthermore, policies which affect the banking sector negatively
and have an effect on the growth environment could also yield
downward pressure on the rating. Moody's would consider
stabilizing the outlook on the rating if there is a resumption of
robust economic growth, which would place the debt trend on a
sustained downward path.

  GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 19,497 (2012 Actual) (also
  known as Per Capita Income)

  Real GDP growth (% change): -1.7% (2012 Actual) (also known as
  GDP Growth)

  Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 5% (2012 Actual)

  Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.1% (2012 Actual) (also
  known as Fiscal Balance)

  Current Account Balance/GDP: 1% (2012 Actual) (also known as
  External Balance)

  External debt/GDP: 162.9%

  Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
  resilience

  Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have
  been recorded since 1983.

On December 5, 2013, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Hungary, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The committee discussed whether this
issuance was pari passu with other senior unsecured issuance from
the Government of Hungary.



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I R E L A N D
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IRELAND: Central Bank Sets Tougher Mortgage Resolution Targets
--------------------------------------------------------------
Eoin Burke-Kennedy at The Irish Times reports that the Central
Bank has given Ireland's main lenders until next June to put in
place mortgage debt solutions for 75% of customers more than 90
days in arrears.

According to The Irish Times, the new targets, agreed in
conjunction with the EU-IMF troika, also stipulate the number
level of "concluded solutions" on the banks' books must reach 35%
by the same date.

There are just under 100,000 Irish mortgage accounts more than 90
days behind in their repayments, The Irish Times notes.

The State's six main mortgage lenders -- AIB, Bank of Ireland,
Permanent TSB, Ulster Bank, ACC Bank and KBC Bank -- now have
until the middle of next year to put debt arrangements in place
for 75,000 of them, The Irish Times discloses.

The banks can write down debt, reschedule the loan, put a new
payment plan such as a split mortgage in place or repossess the
home, The Irish Times says.


IRISH BANK: Pepper Asset Selected as Preferred Bidder for Loans
---------------------------------------------------------------
BreakingNews.ie reports that the National Asset Management Agency
has selected Pepper Asset Servicing as its preferred bidder to
provide services on the portfolio of personal loans, principally
residential mortgage loans, which it may acquire from the
liquidators appointed to Irish Bank Resolution Corp.

The announcement follows a competitive tendering process which
was launched in September, BreakingNews.ie notes.

According to BreakingNews.ie, this portfolio could potentially
comprise loans with an aggregate nominal par debt value of EUR1.8
billion, according to NAMA, depending on the extent to which
loans are sold by the liquidators during the current sales
process.

The appointment is subject to agreement on contractual terms,
BreakingNews.ie says.

                   About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

The IBRC liquidators want the U.S. bankruptcy judge to rule that
Ireland is home to the so-called foreign main bankruptcy
proceeding.  If the judge agrees and determines that IBRC
otherwise qualifies, creditor actions in the U.S. will halt
automatically.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA CARIGE: Fitch Says Non-Payment Flags Regulatory Risks
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Italy's decision not to authorize the reimbursement
of Banca Carige's subordinated convertible bond at maturity on 5
December 2013 highlights the regulatory risks for capital
securities, Fitch Ratings says. The non-payment of principal for
the 2003-2013 1.50% subordinated convertible bond has no
immediate impact on the bank's ratings.

Carige's ratings could be negatively affected if this enforced
non-payment resulted in material reputational damage for the bank
and loss of investor and depositor confidence. However, this is
not Fitch base scenario.

The affected instrument (IT0003563035) is a dated upper Tier 2
subordinated bond issued to retail investors in 2003 and is not
rated by Fitch. Under the Bank of Italy's prudential regulations,
the repayment of hybrid instruments recognized as Tier 2 capital
is subject to its authorization. The regulator has not approved
the repayment because of the weak level of capital at the bank.
The bank estimates a 9M13 pro-forma core Tier 1 ratio of 7.7%,
which is below the 8% Basel III Common Equity Tier 1 ratio set by
the ECB as the minimum ratio for its asset quality review next
year. Fitch believes the non-payment of principal highlights the
regulatory risk on junior debt instruments at Italian banks with
weaker credit profiles.

The bank's Long-Term IDR (BB/Negative Outlook) is currently at
its Support Rating Floor, reflecting potential support from the
Italian authorities. The IDR is not immediately sensitive to
junior securities' non-performance, but only to that of its
senior obligations. The next maturity for hybrid instruments is
in 2018, so the risk of another enforced non-payment for this
bank is limited in the medium-term.

Carige's low Viability Rating (VR) at 'b-'/Rating Watch Negative
is also unaffected by the enforced non-payment as this is
initiated by the regulator and does not reflect the bank's
inability to repay the instrument, which has a residual value of
only EUR9.8 million. The VR already reflects significantly
deteriorated asset quality and operating performance, and
material delays in strengthening its capital.


GALLERIE 2013: Fitch Expects BB+ Deterioration Impacts on Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Gallerie 2013 S.r.l. final ratings, as
follows:

  EUR271m class A due November 2025 (ISIN IT0004979198): 'Asf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR50m class B due November 2025 (ISIN IT0004980527): 'A-sf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR42m class C due November 2025 (ISIN IT0004980543): 'BBB-sf';
  Outlook Stable

The transaction is a securitization of a EUR363 million
commercial mortgage loan previously granted by Goldman Sachs
International Bank (GS) to an Italian closed-ended real estate
fund (Krypton) to enable it to acquire 13 shopping centers and
two retail park located across Italy.

Key Rating Drivers:

The ratings are based on Fitch's assessment of the underlying
collateral, available credit enhancement and the transaction's
sound legal structure. The property portfolio comprises 624
retail units and benefits from a granular and diverse income
profile, with the top 10 tenants providing around a quarter of
total passing rent. While the weighted average lease length to
first break for the portfolio is short at 3.3 years, the
occupancy ratio of 94% indicates the portfolio's appeal to
retailers. All the shopping centers benefit from an adjoining
hypermarket area owned and operated by Gallerie Commerciali
Italiane (GCI), a fully-owned Italian subsidiary of the French
conglomerate, Auchan SA. While these grocery areas are not part
of the collateral securing the loan, they nevertheless anchor
footfall.

GCI is an investor in Krypton (along with Morgan Stanley Real
Estate Fund VII) and provides integrated property management
services for the combined estate. Along with a 10-year Auchan
underwritten rental guarantee provided to Krypton to mitigate
occupational market risks, and the co-dependence between the
grocery and non-grocery components, the arrangement provides an
alignment of interests between Auchan and Krypton which is
relevant to an analysis of the property risks.

Fitch has analyzed the past five years of operating performance
at the relevant Auchan hypermarkets, which reported a decline in
sales that was reflective of wider stress in the Italian retail
sector. Nevertheless, the hypermarkets still report strong
turnover per unit and sound profitability.

Despite the alignment of interests, there is no guarantee that
Auchan will continue to operate out of each of the stores.
However, should Auchan dispose any of the stores there would be a
step-up in the payment liability it has assumed for the related
collateral under the rental guarantee in case they cannot find a
suitable replacement.

The portfolio purchase was financed by a five-year senior
securitized loan, a EUR107 million unsecured subordinated junior
loan and an equity investment made by the fund's unit holders
(approximately EUR98 million contributed by Morgan Stanley Real
Estate Fund VII and approximately EUR92 million by GCI). The
closing reported loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is 58%, which is
scheduled to reduce by loan maturity to 55% following annual
amortization of 1% of the starting loan balance. Semi-annual re-
valuations and a strong interest coverage ratio (ICR) and LTV
trap covenants (at 1.6x and 65%, respectively) should enable
performance deterioration to be detected well before loan
default.

The transaction features a seven-year tail period between loan
scheduled maturity (2018) and legal final maturity of the notes
(2025). This reduces the risk of an uncompleted workout by bond
maturity, particularly given the uncertainty over liquidation
timing for a distressed real estate fund. While the structure
envisages a "mandate to sell" upon loan default (whereby a sales
agent is responsible for out-of-court liquidation within certain
covenants), residual risk over its enforceability in case of fund
insolvency has not been eliminated to Fitch's satisfaction.
Therefore, Fitch has assumed a forced liquidation of the fund,
which typically entails additional work-out costs and a prolonged
resolution.

While the borrower-level interest rate cap expires at the loan's
scheduled maturity in 2018, EURIBOR on the notes thereafter will
be capped at 7%, partially mitigating interest rate risk during
the tail. Sales of property by the borrower presuppose repayment
of the allocated loan amount and 15% release premium. Since the
latter flows sequentially to noteholders, it mitigates the
exposure of senior bondholders to potentially adversely selected
assets, while excess spread is sufficient to absorb attendant
increases in the weighted average margin on the notes.

The unrated class X noteholder receives any excess spread (the
difference between interest available funds received under the
loan and the sum of ordinary issuer expenses including notes
interest payments). The class X notes rank pari-passu with class
A interest until the earlier of transfer to special servicing or
maturity, when it becomes subordinated to all rated notes'
payments. Another material feature of the structure is that the
issuer waterfall changes after loan maturity, so that issuer
available funds will be allocated on an interest principal-
interest principal basis, ensuring that the class A notes would
have to be redeemed before the class B notes receive further
distributions, and the same for the class B and C notes. This
reduces the "leakage" of cash flow to junior stakeholders of the
issuer, including the class X noteholder.

The transaction documents include counterparty triggers
supporting up to 'Asf' ratings for the notes. Together with the
design of the liquidity facility, this is unlikely to allow
upgrades of the notes above this level regardless of leverage and
asset performance.

Key Property Assumptions:

'Bsf' LTV: 75%
'Bsf' weighted average capitalisation rate: 8%
'Bsf' weighted average structural vacancy: 18%
'Bsf' weighted average rental value decline: 4%

Rating Sensitivities:

Fitch tested the rating sensitivity of the class A to C notes to
various scenarios, including an increase in rental value
declines, capitalization rates and structural vacancy. The
expected impact on the notes' ratings is as follows (class
A/class B/class C):

Current Rating: 'Asf'/'A-sf'/'BBB-sf'
Deterioration in all factors by 1.1x: 'Asf'/'BBB+sf'/'BB-sf'
Deterioration in all factors by 1.2x: 'BBB+sf'/'BB+sf/'CCCsf'



===========
L A T V I A
===========


LIEPAJAS METALURGS: Most Likely Not to Be Sold at Auction
---------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic Course, citing LETA/Nozare.lv, reports that Liepajas
Metalurgs will most likely not be sold at auction, instead, an
international tender will be organized, according to the
company's insolvency administrator Haralds Velmers in an
interview on "Rietumu Radio" on Dec. 5.

The Baltic Course relates that Mr. Velmers believes that a
metallurgical company of such a size should not be sold at
auction, and the law envisages the company may be sold without
going to auction, by harmonizing the process with creditors. It
would be an international tender, where the highest bids will be
assessed as well as other proposals made by the bidders.

According to The Baltic Course, Liepajas metalurgs sales plan
will be drafted by the middle of January. However, it will most
likely not be possible to sell the company for LVL130 million and
settle all creditor claims, since the company's new owner will
have to invest in restoring its operations and the amount of
investments will be significant. Around LVL30 million is required
for the company to resume operations.

Mr. Velmers said Liepajas metalurgs sale could take place in
spring 2014 and its buyer will be interested to restore the
company's operations as soon as possible, since each idle day
will bring losses, the report relays.

Mr. Velmers added that his goal is to restore the company's
operations, The Baltic Course reports.

Liepajas Metalurgs is a Latvian metallurgical company.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 15,
2013, The Baltic Times related that the Liepaja Court launched
insolvency process against the financially-troubled Liepajas
Metalurgs.  The court has decided to halt the companies legal
protection process and launch an insolvency process against it,
The Baltic Times disclosed.  Liepajas Metalurgs legal protection
administrator, Haralds Velmers, has been appointed the company's
insolvency administrator, The Baltic Times said.  Mr. Velmers'
insolvency petition was submitted to the court on Nov. 4, The
Baltic Times recounted.



=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================


BANKAS SNORAS: Bankruptcy Administrator Files Suit v. Two Banks
---------------------------------------------------------------
Milda Seputyte at Bloomberg News reports that Bankas Snoras's
bankruptcy administrator is taking legal action against Russia's
Investbank and Ukraine's Conversbank, both previously owned by
Vladimir Antonov.

According to Bloomberg, the administrator is also in talks with
three potential buyers to acquire Finasta Bank.

Bloomberg notes that the administrator recovered LTL1.9 billion
in bank assets and funds.

Snoras also filed LTL2.4 billion in claims, including LTL829
million against Julius Baer, Bloomberg relates.

                        About Bankas Snoras

Bankas Snoras AB is Lithuania's fifth biggest lender.  Snoras
held LTL6.05 billion in deposits and had assets of LTL8.14
billion at the end of September.  It competes with Scandinavian
lenders including SEB AB, Swedbank AB (SWEDA), and Nordea AB.  It
also controls investment bank Finasta and Latvian lender Latvijas
Krajbanka AS.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 2,
2011, The Baltic Times, citing LETA/ELTA, said Vilnius District
Court accepted the application regarding the initiation of
bankruptcy proceedings against Snoras bank.  The Bank of
Lithuania delivered application on Snoras bankruptcy on Nov. 28,
2011.

The TCR-Europe, citing Bloomberg News, reported on Nov. 28, 2011,
that Lithuania's central bank said that Snoras' financial
situation is "worse than previously identified" and saving the
bank "would cost significantly more and would take longer than
the available liquidity" at Snoras.  Governor Vitas Vasiliauskas
said at a news conference on Nov. 24 that some LTL3.4 billion
(US$1.3 billion) in assets are missing, according to Bloomberg.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


SPAREBANK 1: Fitch Affirms BB+ Hybrid Capital Instruments Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed SpareBank 1 SMN's (SMN), SpareBank 1
SR-Bank's (SR) and Sparebanken Vest's (SV) Long-term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDR) at 'A-', Short-term IDRs at 'F2' and
Viability Ratings (VRs) at 'a-'. The Outlooks on the Long-term
IDRs are Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge's (SNN) Long-term
IDR at 'A', Short-term IDR at 'F1' and VR at 'a'; and Sandnes
Sparebank's (Sandnes) Long-term IDR at 'BBB', Short-term IDR at
'F3' and VR at 'bbb'. The Outlook on SNN's and Sandnes' Long-term
IDRs is Stable.

Key Rating Drivers- IDRS, VRS and Senior Debt:

The affirmation of SNN's, SMN's, SR's, SV's (collectively
Sparebanken) and Sandnes' ratings, reflects Fitch's view that the
banks' sound asset quality will remain robust even in case of a
house price correction.

The Sparebanken's ratings are based on individually strong
regional franchises, sound asset quality, and healthy
profitability underpinning internal capital generation. The
ratings also take into account the banks' reliance on wholesale
funding, sharp rises in property prices over recent years,
potentially creating overheating of the market, and relatively
concentrated loan books by geography and by industry sector.

Sandnes' ratings are based on its sound performance, which
provides a buffer against increasing loan impairment charges
(LICs), an established but regionally concentrated franchise, and
acceptable asset quality. The latter is affected by a relatively
large portfolio of impaired but still performing loans. The
ratings also factor in the bank's small volume of equity compared
with similarly rated peers.

Improved profitability through margin enhancements has been
successful in 2013, and Fitch expects the high capital
requirements introduced in Norway will continue to support the
industry's efforts to reprice the loan book. LICs took up a
modest 5% to 15% of pre-impairment operating profits in 9M13, and
Fitch expects they will remain manageable for the Sparebanken and
Sandnes in 2014.

The Sparebanken's sound asset quality underpins the ratings and
is supported by a benign Norwegian operating environment. Fitch
expects the banks will maintain strict underwriting practices and
further build buffers to withstand a correction in house prices.
Nevertheless, a sharp fall in the property market represents a
downside risk for the banks. Fitch does not expect such a
scenario to lead to significant deterioration of the quality of
the banks' retail portfolios, although the banks' corporate
exposures would be more sensitive to a correction and possible
subsequent economic downturn including a drop in private
consumption.

Sandnes' non-performing loans represented a low 0.7% of gross
loans at end-September 2013. However, it has a relatively
significant legacy portfolio in its SME business, where non-
performing plus impaired (but still performing) loans represented
a more material 3.2% at end-September 2013. As the bank is
working out these exposures, changing the business towards less
risky business sectors, Fitch expects the stock of impaired loans
to continue to reduce.

Similar to most Nordic peers the Sparebanken and Sandnes rely on
wholesale funding to varying degrees. The Sparebanken have
maintained access to domestic and international funding markets,
in particular for covered bonds through SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt
(S1B; a joint funding vehicle of Alliance member banks) and
Sparebanken Vest Boligkreditt (unrated). However, they would be
affected by a prolonged dislocation of the debt capital markets,
and Fitch believes that the banks will retain significant
liquidity portfolios to mitigate this risk.

The Sparebanken's capital adequacy ratios, excluding Basel II
transitional floors, compare well with those of international
peers, but lag those of their larger Nordic peers partly due to
higher risk weights. Leverage is low in a European context, with
tangible common equity/tangible assets generally between 6%-10%
at end-September 2013.

SNN
SNN's VR is currently one notch higher than the other rated
Sparebanken. This reflects its lower dependency on the wholesale
markets as part of its funding structure, wider lending margins
due to lower competition, and the presence of a strong and stable
public sector in the region. SNN's asset quality also benefits
from a higher proportion of retail lending than its Alliance
partners. However, its smaller size has led to slightly higher
loan concentration as a proportion of Fitch core capital as well
as the proportion of impaired loans to gross loans. Credit growth
in 2012 and 9M13 was relatively high, which could put pressure on
reported capital ratios if it continues.

SMN
SMN's ratings are driven by Fitch's expectation that the bank's
asset quality will remain sound, backed by the diversified
economy in mid-Norway. SMN raised additional capital in 3Q13,
although Fitch expects the bank to improve capital ratios further
via retained earnings. Capitalization and leverage is slightly
weaker than the other rated Alliance banks, although it compares
well with similarly rated peers in an international context.

SR
SR's ratings reflect its strong position in the prosperous
western Norway and Fitch's expectation that asset quality will
remain sound. SR is the largest of the Sparebanken and maintains
strong profitability, aided by tight cost control. Capitalization
is adequate, in Fitch's view, and improving year on year.
Property prices in SR's region have increased more strongly than
the national average, making the bank's asset quality more
sensitive to a potential price correction. The bank is also more
sensitive to the oil economy than other Sparebanken and more
reliant on wholesale funding, which makes it more sensitive to a
prolonged dislocation of international wholesale funding markets
or a change in sentiment toward Norwegian issuers.

SV
SV's ratings are underpinned by its sound risk profile and
capitalization. Around three-quarters of SV's lending related to
retail, mainly mortgage, lending, making the bank sensitive to a
house price correction. SV left the Sparebank 1 Alliance in 2004
and set up jointly owned companies (offering leasing, insurance
and brokerage) with other savings banks. These companies are now
profitable and should continue to improve earnings. Wholesale
funding dependence is significant although the bank has
diversified its funding base through Sparebanken Vest
Boligkreditt (its wholly-owned covered bond vehicle). The higher
loan/deposit ratio at SV, compared with the rated Alliance banks,
is driven by the consolidation of its covered bonds issuer, while
the Alliance banks only have minority stakes in S1B.

SANDNES
Sandnes' ratings reflect its established, but regionally
concentrated retail and SME franchise in economically prosperous
municipalities around Sandnes in south-west Norway. The ratings
also factor in its reliance on wholesale funding, working-out of
troubled legacy assets and small absolute size of capital. Fitch
considers the bank's property management portfolio, which shows a
significant proportion of exposures in high loan-to-value
buckets, as a key risk, which could put pressure on the bank's
ratings. Fitch's expectation is that management will continue its
risk reducing strategy, which should lead to fewer borrower
concentrations in more volatile sectors, and underwriting
standards will remain conservative. Sandnes currently uses the
standardised approach to calculate its capital requirements for
both retail and corporate exposures, which leads to risk weights
higher than peers and therefore slightly lower reported capital
ratios. Leverage is relatively low in a European context, with a
tangible equity to tangible assets ratio of 6.7% at end-September
2013, but higher than most Sparebanken. The bank's small absolute
volume of capital makes it vulnerable to shocks.

Rating Sensitivities - Sparebanken's VRS, IDRS and Senior Debt:

The Stable Outlooks on the Sparebanken's ratings reflects Fitch's
view that rating action is currently not expected. It factors in
Fitch's expectation that house prices are likely to stabilize or
moderately fall in the near term; while capital ratios and
funding structures are strengthening and growth plans are
limited, providing a stronger buffer against unexpected shocks.

An upgrade is currently unlikely given the already high ratings,
geographical concentration and structural reliance on wholesale
funding.

The Sparebanken's ratings could be downgraded if credit growth
surpassed internal capital generation, weakening capitalization
materially. The ratings are also sensitive to a significant house
price correction, should the banks be unable to absorb losses via
earnings. The correction would probably lead to a drop in private
consumption, affecting corporate lending quality, which Fitch
expects to be the key driver for losses. In addition, this
scenario would likely also be followed by difficulties in
obtaining competitively priced funding in the wholesale funding
markets which is a further ratings sensitivity.

Rating Sensitivities - Sandnes's VR, IDRS and Senior Debt:

The Stable Outlook on Sandnes' ratings reflects Fitch's view that
rating action is currently not expected. The Outlook is supported
by Fitch's expectation of the operating environment in Norway
remaining sound, supporting Sandnes' asset quality and working
out of impaired exposures, and maintained access to market
funding. An upgrade is unlikely because the bank's small size
makes it relatively sensitive to shocks.

Sandnes' ratings are sensitive to a reduced activity in the
region should it lead to a significant house price correction or
increased losses in the corporate sector. A dislocation in debt
capital markets making Sandnes' unable to obtain competitively
priced funding is a further sensitivity.

Rating Drivers - Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors:

The Sparebanken's Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors
reflect Fitch's view that there is a moderate probability of
support, if required from the Norwegian authorities, given their
strong regional franchises.

In addition, there is a possibility of institutional support from
the members of the Alliance. However, Fitch understands that no
legal obligation arises from membership of the Alliance to
support member banks.

Sandnes' Support Rating reflects Fitch's view of an only low
extraordinary support probability from the Norwegian authorities,
given the bank's very small size in a Norwegian context, hence
its Support Rating Floor is 'No Floor'.

Rating Sensitivities - Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors:

The Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors are potentially
sensitive to any change in Fitch's assumptions about the ability
(as reflected in its ratings) or willingness of the Norwegian
state to provide timely support to the bank, if required. They
are also sensitive to a change in Fitch's assumptions around the
availability of sovereign support for banks more generally.

In Fitch's view, there is a clear intention ultimately to reduce
implicit state support for financial institutions in Europe. On
11 September 2013, Fitch outlined its approach to incorporating
support in its bank ratings in light of evolving support dynamics
for banks worldwide.

The Support Ratings would be downgraded and the Support Rating
Floors revised down if Fitch concludes that potential sovereign
support has weakened relative to its previous assessment.

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - SMN'S, SR'S and SV'S
Subordinated Debt and other Hybrid Securities:

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by the
Sparebanken are all notched down from the banks' VRs. Therefore,
their respective ratings have been affirmed and are sensitive to
any change in the banks' VRs.

The ratings are in accordance with Fitch's criteria 'Assessing
and Rating Bank Subordinated and Hybrid Securities' reflecting
each instrument's respective non-performance and relative loss
severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.

SNN's and SMN's subordinated debt instruments are notched down
once from the banks' VRs to reflect the notes' higher expected
loss severity relative to senior unsecured creditors.
SMN's and SV's hybrid Tier 1 securities are rated four notches
below the banks' VRs to reflect the higher loss severity risk of
these securities relative to average recoveries (two notches from
the VR) as well as high risk of non-performance (an additional
two notches).

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - Subsidiary and Affiliated
Company:

S1B's IDRs are aligned with those of the largest Alliance
members, SR and SMN, and reflect its role as a covered bond
funding vehicle for its shareholder banks. Given S1B's close
integration in the Alliance, including operational support and
servicing of the mortgage assets, no VR is assigned. S1B's
ratings are sensitive to the same factors that might drive a
change in the parent banks' ratings.

These rating actions have no impact on the ratings of the covered
bonds issued by S1B and Sparebanken Vest Boligkreditt.

The rating actions are as follows:

SpareBank 1 Nord-Norge (SNN):

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'A'
Subordinated debt affirmed at 'A-'

SpareBank 1 SMN (SMN):

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'A-'
Subordinated debt affirmed at 'BBB+'
Hybrid capital instruments affirmed at 'BB+

SpareBank 1 SR-Bank (SR):

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'A-'
Hybrid capital instruments affirmed at 'BB+

SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt (S1B):

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating affirmed at '1'

Sparebanken Vest (SV):

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'a-'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'A-'
Hybrid capital instruments affirmed at 'BB+'

Sandnes Sparebank:

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'bbb'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating affirmed at 'No Floor'



===========
R U S S I A
===========


CREDIT EUROPE: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Credit Europe Bank N.V.'s (CEB)
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB-' from 'BB' and its
Viability Rating (VR) to 'bb-' from 'bb'.

The agency has also affirmed the Long-term IDR of its Russian
subsidiary, Credit Europe Bank Ltd (CEBR), at 'BB-'. The Outlooks
on CEB's and CEBR's Long-term IDRs are Stable.

Key Rating Drivers - CEB's IDRs and VR:

The downgrade of CEB's Long-term IDR and VR reflects the bank's
tighter capitalization, some weaknesses in asset quality and
increasing alignment of the group's consolidated profile with
that of its Russian subsidiary. However, the ratings continue to
be supported by the overall group's fairly resilient performance,
CEB's stable deposit franchise and prudent liquidity management.

CEB's consolidated Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio fell to 7% at
end-1H13 from 9.1% at end-1H12, primarily as a result of further
business growth, in particular in Russia. Fitch views this as a
moderate level of capitalization, given the risk profile of the
group. At the same time, the double leverage ratio, defined as
investments in subsidiaries divided by parent bank equity,
remained high at 128%, based on CEB's end-2012 unconsolidated
accounts. This would have been a more moderate 83% if
subordinated debt, in part contributed by CEB's shareholder, was
included in the calculation. Nevertheless, it still indicates
limited free capital at the parent bank level to absorb losses.

Consolidated non-performing loans (NPLs, overdue by 90 days or
more) stood at 4.95% of total loans at end-1H13; this ratio has
been largely flat since end-2011, albeit in part due to
significant write-offs. NPL levels at CEB (unconsolidated ratio
3.8%) and CEBR (see below) remain moderate, while the Romanian
subsidiary (15.2%) saw greater asset quality problems. Unreserved
NPLs were a moderate 22% of consolidated FCC, although unreserved
NPLs and watch loans combined (the latter comprising 6.8% of the
book) slightly exceeded FCC.

Asset quality remains potentially vulnerable, in Fitch's view,
due to significant borrower concentrations (the largest 20
exposures amounted to 260% of FCC at end-June 2013), large
exposures to cyclical industries, such as shipping (77% of FCC)
and real estate (84% of FCC), the group's focus on emerging
markets (72% of credit exposures) and increased risks in the
Russian consumer finance sector. However, these risks are offset
by the bank's generally sound track record of managing these
risks, and moderate impairment (outside of Romania) to date.

A solid net interest margin (5% in 1H13) and pre-impairment
profit (annualized, equals to 4.6% of average loans) indicate
significant loss absorption capacity through income on a
consolidated basis. However, bottom line results have been
subdued (return on average assets of below 1% during 2011-1H13)
due to significant provision charges (64% of pre-impairment
profit in 1H13). CEBR contributed a high 72% of group net income
in 1H13 (2012: 89%), while the Romanian subsidiary was loss-
making in both periods.

The group's consolidated funding profile is balanced, with a
loans/deposits ratio of 111% at end-1H13. This is supported by
CEB's granular, and to date stable, deposit base (resulting in a
low unconsolidated loans/deposits ratio of 57% at end-2012),
while subsidiary banks are more reliant on wholesale funding.

Rating Sensitivities - CEB's IDRS and VR:

Significant asset quality deterioration, resulting in a further
tightening of capitalization, could put downward pressure on the
ratings. Further rapid asset growth, which outpaces internal
capital generation and/or equity injections, would also be
negative for the credit profile. Upward pressure could result
from an improvement in performance and stronger capitalization.

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - CEB's Subordinated Debt:

CEB's US$400 million issue of subordinated Tier 2 debt securities
(XS087849279) are rated one notch below its VR to reflect below-
average recovery prospects for this type of debt instrument. The
downgrade of the subordinated debt reflects the downgrade of
CEB's VR, and is broadly sensitive to the same factors as the VR.

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - CEB's Support Rating and
Support Rating Floor:

Fitch believes that while there is a possibility that CEB's sole
shareholder, the Turkish conglomerate Fiba, may support the bank
in case of need, its ability to do so cannot be relied upon due
to the holding company's limited size relative to CEB. Given the
bank's small franchise in the Dutch market, Fitch also believes
that sovereign support from the Dutch authorities cannot be
relied upon, as reflected in the Support Rating of '5' and
Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor'. Fitch currently does not
envisage any changes to CEB's Support Rating.

Key Rating Drivers - CEBR's IDRs, VR and National Rating:

CEBR's Long-term IDR and VR reflect (i) its sound performance,
and lower volatility of credit losses and profitability through
the cycle compared with other Russian retail banks; (ii) fairly
conservative management, translating into a somewhat lower-risk
profile of CEBR's retail loan book compared with peers; and (iii)
healthy capitalization. At the same time CEBR's VR considers
moderate near-term downside risks to asset quality following
recent rapid growth, the bank's high reliance on wholesale
funding, its fairly tight liquidity and high refinancing risks.

CEBR's NPL origination rate (defined as NPLs originated during
the period divided by the average performing portfolio) was a
moderate 5.2% in 9M13, albeit up by 190bps from 2012. The
increase was primarily driven by a higher NPL origination rate in
car lending (comprising 37% of the portfolio), which is partially
mitigated by potential collateral recoveries. Deterioration in
the unsecured part of the retail book (38% of total loans) was
only 100bps, which is modest relative to recent market trends.
However, the rapidly increasing share of unsecured cash loans
(18% of the portfolio, 9M13 growth of 84%) could lead to further
asset quality deterioration as the portfolio seasons. Positively,
the credit quality of corporate loans (21% of the book) has
remained stable. CEBR's annualized pre-impairment profit in 9M13
was equal to a high 6.6% of average loans (or 8.4% of the average
retail portfolio), which is above current NPL origination rates.

CEBR is funded to a large degree by locally placed debt (32% of
end-3Q13 liabilities), while the loans/deposits ratio was a high
219%. Parent funding accounted for only 4% of end-3Q13
liabilities. A significant RUB28 billion (22% of liabilities) of
third-party obligations mature by end-2014, while liquid assets
at end-3Q13 covered only about half of this amount, exposing the
bank to some refinancing risk. So far CEB has pencilled in only
RUB14bn of new debt issuance. However, a significant mitigating
factor is the fast amortization of CEBR's loan book (average loan
turnover of 20 months), which can support liquidity.

CEBR is currently well capitalized, as expressed by its healthy
15% FCC ratio at end-3Q13, although this may moderate somewhat
given that the bank's ability to generate capital (annualized
ROAE of 14% in 9M13) somewhat lags lending growth (22% for 9M13).
The bank's capital position could also be undermined by dividend
payments to its weaker-capitalized parent.

Rating Sensitivities - CEBR's IDR, VR and National Rating:

Downward pressure on CEBR's ratings could result from a marked
deterioration of asset quality, or a significant tightening of
liquidity / increase in refinancing risks. Conversely, a more
balanced funding profile and extended track record of reasonable
asset quality and performance could give rise to moderate upside
for the ratings.

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - CEBR's Support Rating:

CEBR's Support Rating has been downgraded to '4' from '3' to
reflect a more limited probability of support from CEB. This view
is based on CEB's reduced ability to provide support, given its
tight capitalization and CEBR's increasing size relative to the
group. An improvement, or further weakening, of CEB's
capitalization would affect its ability to support CEBR and could
therefore result in, respectively, upward or downward pressure on
the latter's Support Rating.

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities - CEBR's Senior Unsecured
Debt and Subordinated Debt:

CEBR's senior unsecured debt is rated in line with its Long-term
IDR, and its subordinated debt rating is notched once off the VR.
Any changes to the bank's Long-term IDR and VR would likely
impact the ratings of these instruments.

The rating actions are as follows:

CEB

Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR: downgraded to 'BB-' from 'BB';
  Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bb-' from 'bb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Subordinated debt securities (XS0878492791): downgraded to 'B+'
  from 'BB-'

CEBR

Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-', Outlook
  Stable
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'A+(rus)'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'
Support Rating: downgraded to '4' from '3'
Senior unsecured debt Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'BB-'
Subordinated debt (issued by CEB Capital SA): affirmed at 'B+'


EUROPEAN TRUST: Moody's Reviews 'Caa1' Ratings for Downgrade
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
Caa1 long-term global local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings
of European Trust Bank (Russia). The bank's E standalone
financial strength rating (BFSR) (equivalent to Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA) of caa1) and its Not Prime short-term global
local and foreign currency deposit ratings are not subject to the
review. The BFSR maintains a stable outlook.

Moody's rating action is primarily based on European Trust Bank's
audited financial statements for 2012 prepared under IFRS, as
well as the bank's unaudited financial statements for
January to November 2013 prepared in accordance with the local
GAAP.

Ratings Rationale:

The review for downgrade reflects a weakening of European Trust
Bank's liquidity profile following negative publicity in the
media relating to the bank in early November 2013, which was
coupled with the overall liquidity squeeze on Russia's money
market. In the period from November 1 to November 28, 2013, the
rating agency observed an outflow of funding from European Trust
Bank: interbank funding, which accounted for 13% of total
liabilities as at November 1, 2013, more than halved in volume
during this period, and the volume of corporate and retail
deposits declined by 11% and 6%, respectively. Concurrently, the
bank's liquid assets (including cash and "nostro" accounts,
deposits with banks with "up to one month" maturity and liquid
securities available for pledge) dropped to 12% of its total
assets as at November 28, 2013 from 21% reported as at
November 1, 2013.

Moody's also notes long-standing risks associated with European
Trust Bank's capital position, which is pressurized by
substantial investments in non-core assets. This factor has
historically been a major negative driver behind European Trust
Bank's Caa1 deposit rating. The bank's ratio of shareholders'
equity to total assets stood at a low 8.28% as at year-end 2012,
as reported under IFRS, and its investments in low-liquid equity
instruments and real estate accounted for 164% of the total
equity as at the same reporting date. European Trust Bank's
regulatory capital adequacy (N1) ratio was boosted to 11.2% as of
1 November 2013 following provision by the shareholders of a
RUB118 million subordinated loan in October 2013. The bank also
expects to receive -- in late 2013 or early 2014 -- a Tier 1
capital injection from the shareholders amounting to RUB335
million (approximately 20% of its current shareholder equity).
However, Moody's is of the opinion that this injection will
provide only a partial solution for the capital shortfall, as the
probability of efficient divestiture from non-core assets is
uncertain, whereas the bank's financial performance is weak and
thus its capital cannot be replenished with the aid of profits
generation.

Focus of the Review:

Over the next several months, Moody's will monitor European Trust
Bank's liquidity profile, as the liquidity shortage that has
emerged in November 2013 is the primary source of risk for the
bank's creditors.

The rating agency will also assess the progress of European Trust
Bank's planned capital enhancement. Moody's will consider the
success of the capital increase in conjunction with the bank's
achievements in gradually divesting from its non-core asset
holdings.

What Could Move the Ratings Down/Up:

European Trust Bank's deposit ratings could be downgraded as a
result of any failure to improve its liquidity profile and
reinstate the liquidity cushion to more comfortable levels.
Further deterioration of European Trust Bank's capital levels,
stemming from the weak quality of the bank's assets and/or its
poor profitability, may also negatively affect the bank's
ratings.

Moody's may confirm European Trust Bank's Caa1 deposit ratings if
the bank's liquidity profile stabilizes and the share of liquid
assets on the bank's balance sheet materially increases.
Completion of the announced capital injection is another pre-
requisite for rating confirmation.

European Trust Bank's Caa1 deposit ratings have low upside
potential in the next 12 to 18 months given that the ratings are
on review for downgrade. The standalone E BFSR (which is not
subject to the current review, and maintains a stable outlook)
also has limited upside potential given the review of the deposit
ratings.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, European Trust Bank reported --
under audited IFRS -- total assets of US$605 million and total
equity of US$50 million as at year-end 2012. The bank's net
income for 2012 stood at US$909,000.


EUROPEAN TRUST: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2.ru' NSR for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has placed on review for downgrade
the Ba3.ru national scale rating (NSR) of European Trust Bank
(Russia).

Moody's rating action is primarily based on European Trust Bank's
audited financial statements for 2012 prepared under IFRS, as
well as the bank's unaudited financial statements for January-
November 2013 prepared in accordance with the local GAAP.

Ratings Rationale:

The review for downgrade reflects a weakening of European Trust
Bank's liquidity profile following negative publicity in the
media relating to the bank in early November 2013, which was
coupled with the overall liquidity squeeze on Russia's money
market. In the period from November 1 to November 28, 2013, the
rating agency observed an outflow of funding from European Trust
Bank: interbank funding, which accounted for 13% of total
liabilities as at November 1, 2013, more than halved in volume
during this period, and the volume of corporate and retail
deposits declined by 11% and 6%, respectively. Concurrently, the
bank's liquid assets (including cash and "nostro" accounts,
deposits with banks with "up to one month" maturity and liquid
securities available for pledge) dropped to 12% of its total
assets as at November 28, 2013 from 21% reported as at
November 1, 2013.

Moody's also notes long-standing risks associated with European
Trust Bank's capital position, which is pressurized by
substantial investments in non-core assets. This factor has
historically been a major negative driver behind European Trust
Bank's Caa1 deposit rating. The bank's ratio of shareholders'
equity to total assets stood at a low 8.28% as at year-end 2012,
as reported under IFRS, and its investments in low-liquid equity
instruments and real estate accounted for 164% of the total
equity as at the same reporting date. European Trust Bank's
regulatory capital adequacy (N1) ratio was boosted to 11.2% as of
November 1, 2013 following provision by the shareholders of a
RUB118 million subordinated loan in October 2013. The bank also
expects to receive -- in late 2013 or early 2014 -- a Tier 1
capital injection from the shareholders amounting to RUB335
million (approximately 20% of its current shareholder equity).
However, Moody's is of the opinion that this injection will
provide only a partial solution for the capital shortfall, as the
probability of efficient divestiture from non-core assets is
uncertain, whereas the bank's financial performance is weak and
thus its capital cannot be replenished with the aid of profits
generation.

Focus of the Review:

Over the next several months, Moody's will monitor European Trust
Bank's liquidity profile, as the liquidity shortage that has
emerged in November 2013 is the primary source of risk for the
bank's creditors.

The rating agency will also assess the progress of European Trust
Bank's planned capital enhancement. Moody's will consider the
success of the capital increase in conjunction with the bank's
achievements in gradually divesting from its non-core asset
holdings.

What Could Move the Ratings Down/Up:

European Trust Bank's NSR could be downgraded as a result of any
failure to improve its liquidity profile and reinstate the
liquidity cushion to more comfortable levels. Further
deterioration of European Trust Bank's capital levels, stemming
from the weak quality of the bank's assets and/or its poor
profitability, may also negatively affect the bank's NSR.

Moody's may confirm European Trust Bank's NSR if the bank's
liquidity profile stabilizes and the share of liquid assets on
the bank's balance sheet materially increases. Completion of the
announced capital injection is another pre-requisite for rating
confirmation.

European Trust Bank's NSR has low upside potential in the next 12
to 18 months given that the rating is on review for downgrade.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, European Trust Bank reported --
under audited IFRS -- total assets of US$605 million and total
equity of US$50 million as at year-end 2012. The bank's net
income for 2012 stood at US$909,000.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia.

             About Moody's and Moody's Interfax:

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).


EVROFINANCE MOSNARBANK: Fitch Maintains 'B+' IDRs on Watch Pos.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings is maintaining Evrofinance Mosnarbank's (EMB)
ratings, including its Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of
'B+' on Rating Watch Positive (RWP).

Key Rating Drivers:

The RWP on EMB's ratings continues to reflect the bank's planned
transformation into an international financial institution. An
intergovernmental agreement (IA), signed by the Russian
Federation (BBB/Stable) and Venezuela (B+/Negative) in December
2011 but yet to be ratified, envisages Russia's acquisition of a
50% stake in EMB from two Russian state-controlled banks, and
Venezuela's acquisition of the remaining 50% stake from the
National Development Fund of Venezuela.

EMB's current ratings reflect the bank's limited and concentrated
franchise, volatile funding base and moderate performance but
also its currently solid capitalization, ample liquidity and
strong asset quality.

Positively for EMB's loan book risk profile, the bank's most
risky large construction/project finance exposures (around 25% of
Fitch Core Capital (FCC) at end-3Q13) were repaid in 4Q13. As
previously, EMB's loan book remained highly concentrated, with
the 20 largest exposures accounting for 91% of the loan book or
83% of FCC at end-3Q13. At end-3Q13, the FCC ratio was a solid
39%.

EMB's lumpy funding base is dominated by short-term accounts from
a limited number of Venezuelan entities. These, however, are
prudently covered with liquid assets. High funding concentrations
and balance sheet volatility reflect EMB's focus on trade finance
and settlement operations.

EMB's current Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating Floor of
'No Floor' reflect Fitch's view that support from the bank's
shareholders and/or the Russian authorities cannot be relied
upon, pending the planned change in the bank's status.

Rating Sensitivities:

Fitch expects to resolve the RWP upon completion of EMB's
transformation, which will follow ratification of the IA by
national parliaments. However, given the slow progress to date,
the change in the bank's status may still be delayed for a
considerable period of time, in Fitch's view.

Following the change in status, Fitch will likely upgrade EMB's
Long-term IDRs to the 'BB' category. The level of the ratings
will depend, amongst other things, on the ratings of the two main
shareholders, Fitch's assessment of the importance of the bank's
policy role in servicing joint Russian-Venezuelan projects, and
the extent of the shareholders' capital commitments to the bank.
Fitch would withdraw EMB's VR following the bank's transition
into a supranational institution.

Upside potential for the VR is currently limited given the bank's
narrow and concentrated franchise and moderate performance. A
sharp increase in leverage or asset quality deterioration could
result in downward pressure on the VR.

The rating actions are as follows:

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'B+'; maintained on
   RWP
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  National Long-Term Rating: 'A-(rus)'; maintained on RWP
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'
  Support Rating: '5', maintained on RWP
  Support Rating Floor: 'No Floor', maintained on RWP
  Senior unsecured debt: assigned at 'B+(EXP)'/RWP; Recovery
   Rating 'RR4(EXP)'; assigned at 'A-(rus)(EXP)'/RWP



=========
S P A I N
=========


PAESA ENTERTAINMENT: Moody's Assigns 'B3' CFR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time B3 corporate
family rating (CFR) and B3-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR)
to PAESA Entertainment Holding, S.L., the reporting entity for
PortAventura, a destination resort based in Vila Seca, Spain.

"The assigned B3 corporate family rating balances Moody's
expectation of a fairly high adjusted leverage post refinancing
and the company's small size and reliance on a single location
for revenues, against its generally strong performance in recent
years amidst a weak domestic economic in Spain," says
Richard Morawetz, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit
Officer and lead analyst for PortAventura.

At the same time, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B3 rating
with loss given default (LGD) 4 to the upcoming senior secured
EUR400 million notes due 2019 and 2020 to be issued at
PortAventura Entertainment Barcelona B.V., a special purpose
vehicle with no operations or affiliation with the rated group.
The notes proceeds will be on-lent to the company via a Secured
Credit Facility.

The outlook on all ratings is stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the notes. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

   -- Corporate Family Rating and Probability Of Default Rating:

In Moody's view, the key constraints to PortAventura's ratings
are its small scale relative to its peers in the theme park and
destination park industry, single location, and the rating
agency's expectation of a fairly aggressive capital structure
after the pending notes issuance. In last twelve months to
September 2013 the company reported sales of EUR181 million,
which is the smallest within Moody's rated peer group of theme
parks. The company has shown progressive growth in both revenues
and earnings in the past three years. However, Moody's continues
to believe that PortAventura's limited diversification, with one
theme park in Catalunya (Generalitat de Catalunya is rated Ba3 by
Moody's, with a negative outlook), exposes the company to
economic, regulatory or political risks in that region and in
Spain generally (Government of Spain is rated Baa3 by Moody's,
with a stable outlook). Its concentration of visitors from Spain,
which continued to make up nearly two thirds of visitors in 2012,
is significant and exposes the company to domestic tourism
trends, although PortAventura is gradually diversifying its
visitor base to other countries, with the share of foreign
visitors increasing from 29% in 2011 to 35% in 2012. The
company's gross leverage (debt/EBITDA), as adjusted by Moody's,
was 4.2x as of FYE2012, although Moody's expects that with the
current financing, and return of funds to shareholders, the
metric will rise to about 6.0x pro forma using last twelve month
reported EBITDA to September 2013 of EUR71.9 million. As the
company tends to generate positive free cash flows, the trend in
the leverage metric will depend on the company and its
shareholders' own financial policies. Moody's rating factors in
the expectation of continued steady growth in earnings without
any further debt-funded returns to shareholders.

The rating is supported by PortAventura's resilient performance
in recent years. Reported EBITDA grew to EUR68.8 million in 2012,
from EUR40.1 million in 2010, amidst a regional economy in
Catalunya that saw on average slightly negative growth of about
0.2% in 2007-12 (and negative 1.0% in 2012). The average national
GDP growth was also negative in those years, while Moody's
forecasts minus 1.3% in 2013 and growth of 0.7% in 2014. EBITDA
growth has continued on a positive trajectory in 2013 with last
twelve month reported EBITDA to September 2013 of EUR71.9
million. The park's earnings growth has benefited in part from
the park's own expansion in terms of adding new hotels and
renovating existing ones, as well as adding new attractions, most
notably the Shambhala, the tallest roller coaster in Europe which
opened in 2012 with an investment of EUR25 million. PortAventura
had 3.7 million visitors in 2012, of which about 34% from abroad,
making it the fifth most visited park in Europe, with the second
largest number of rooms after Eurodisney. Moody's expects that
the company will continue to invest in new rides and attractions,
which Moody's believes will remain fundamental to attract new and
repeat customers and to grow earnings.

Moody's notes that land development in the area where
PortAventura operates is regulated by the Recreational and
Tourism Centers (RTC), a consortium composed of the local
municipalities where PortAventura operates and the Government of
Catalunya. While the consortium could potentially impede
PortAventura's own development plans, it could also act as a
barrier to entry for new competitors. In this regard, Moody's
notes the application currently pending to develop Barcelona
World (BCN World), a luxury tourism complex adjacent to
PortAventura with six hotels. PortAventura has not committed any
funds to this project, but has an option to manage some of the
hotels. In Moody's view, such a development could bring more
tourism to the region in general, which would be to the benefit
of both companies, but also risks increasing competition over
hotel occupancy. However, the development is not expected to
begin operations until late 2016. In October 2013, the company
reached an option agreement with the BCN World shareholders to
participate in the potential development of the project through
the management of its family hotels.

The company is proposing to issue EUR400 million fixed and
floating rate notes which, together with existing cash, will be
used to: i) to refinance existing debt, including a vendor loan,
of about EUR270 million in total; ii) to pay certain transaction
fees of about EUR15 million; and iii) to pay a dividend to
shareholders of about EUR150 million. Of this amount, EUR49.6
million will be held in an escrow account and paid to World Park
Holdings upon consummation of the acquisition by KKR. Should this
not occur by May 15, 2014, the notes held in escrow will be
redeemed. The company also retains an EUR15 million secured
mortgage loan on Hotel Caribe, a hotel in which it holds a 60%
stake. Post transaction, this mortgage loan and the notes are
expected to be the only outstanding debt at the company.

In terms of liquidity, the company will benefit from an EUR50
million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) maturing in 2019, which
is expected to be undrawn at closing, as well as a pro forma cash
balance as of September 2013 of EUR26 million. The facility will
contain one covenant for leverage, for which Moody's expects
strong headroom. The covenant is only applicable if the aggregate
amount of utilisation amounts to at least 15% of the available
amount. The company's revenues are highly seasonal, with the
majority of revenues and earnings generated between June and
August. Seasonality is partly mitigated by the convention centre,
which is opened year-round, and where peak occupancy is in the
October to March period. Since the company tends to see cash
outflows in the fourth and first quarters of the year, Moody's
expects drawings under the RCF to be during those quarters. The
rating agency's assessment of adequate liquidity therefore
assumes access to the RCF at all times.

-- Provisional (P)B3 Rating of Senior Secured Notes:

The provisional (P)B3 rating of the notes, at the same level as
the CFR, reflects the fact that they will represent nearly all of
the company's debt obligations. The notes are issued by
PortAventura Entertainment Barcelona B.V., a special purpose
funding vehicle, with the proceeds on-lent to the restricted
group by means of a Secured Credit Facility. The facility will be
guaranteed by guarantors that represented 92% of the EBITDA, 91%
of total assets and 97% of revenues of the group as of September
2013. The Secured Credit Facility will also hold a security over
certain bank accounts and shares of the Issuer and the Subsidiary
Guarantors, as well as over certain material real estate assets.
Finally, although Hotel Caribe itself is not a Subsidiary
Guarantor, the Secured Credit Facility will also be secured by a
pledge over the 60% of the shares in Hotel Caribe held by
PortAventura. The RCF is secured by the same collateral as the
Secured Credit Facility except that the RCF will not benefit from
the security over shares held in Hotel Caribe. The notes will be
secured by a first-ranking security over the receivables owed to
the issuer, notably the Secured Credit Facility. In accordance
with the terms of an intercreditor agreement, in the event of
enforcement of the collateral, the Secured Credit Facility will
be repaid only after the RCF has been repaid in full. The PDR of
B3-PD reflects a group family recovery rate assumption of 50%, in
line with bank and bond capital structures.

Rationale for the Stable Outlook:

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that PortAventura's
recent performance and gradual growth in earnings, will result in
a gradual strengthening in metrics. The rating does not
anticipate any further distributions to shareholders after this
transaction. Given the single site nature of the company, Moody's
would expect it to retain a fairly conservative financial profile
for the rating. For the current B3 rating, the rating agency
would expect PortAventura to maintain its gross adjusted leverage
below 6x, such that Moody's expects there will be limited
flexibility for deviations from the business plan.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down:

Positive pressure could ensue if the gross leverage metric were
to fall well below 5.5x on a sustainable basis, with strong
liquidity and continued positive free cash flow generation.
Downward pressure on the rating would likely occur if operating
performance trends worsen or the gross leverage metric were to
exceed 6.25x on a continued basis, or following a significant
deterioration in liquidity (including, but not limited to,
diminishing covenant headroom) or free cash flow generation.


PESCANOVA: Deloitte Seeks Fast Settlement With Creditors
--------------------------------------------------------
Analia Murias at fis.com reports that Deloitte, the
reorganization administrator of the Galician multinational firm
Pescanova, hustles the company's investors' entry into a proposed
agreement by January.

Sources close to the negotiations said Deloitte has warned
creditor banks that if they do not accept a reduction of up to
75% of the debt, the fishing group would be subjected to
liquidation, according to fis.com.

The new capital that which enter the fishing firm will be known
this week.  It is estimated that the minimum amount needed is
around EUR250 million, the report notes.

The report relates that the board intends for several investment
funds to contribute with "fresh money."

Newspaper Faro de Vigo, the report relates, said the company must
be informed if they enter the process, the amount of money
available and under what conditions.

The report discloses that financial sources related to the Damm
Group indicated that "there have been expressions of interest,
but so far only Carceller has ensured its entry."

Pescanova has a debt of EUR3,644 million and a 'patrimonial gap'
of EUR1,667 million, so the scenario "does not allow a lot of
leeway," Damm Gro said, fis.com notes.

The company, fis.com avers, needs the "contribution of funds and
current shareholders" like Damm and Luxempart.

Meanwhile, Pescanova continues talking to BlueCrest, Mount
Kellet, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Angelo Gordon, York Capital,
Centerbridge, Och- Ziff "and more people," according to the
report.

The banks, according to fis.com, claims that the first ones to
deal with difficulties must be the shareholders.  Furthermore,
they argue that the required reduction will only be implemented
depending on the fresh money entering the Galician company, the
report adds.

Some banks have their debts accounted as ordinary and others as
subordinated.

A stock market expert explained to Faro de Vigo newspaper that
"in this case, they can accept any proposed agreement because, in
the event of liquidation, it is as if their debt was worth zero,"
the report relates.

Meanwhile, the report cites, Pescanova has completed the sale of
half of its Australian subsidiary Austral Fisheries to the group
Maruha Nichiro Holdings from Japan.

While Pescanova did not specify the amount of the transaction in
its communication to the National Securities Market Commission
(CNMV), sources close to the company stated it would range
between EUR30 million and EUR 40million, the report adds.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


SELENA OIL: Creditor Withdraws Bankruptcy Petition
--------------------------------------------------
Selena Oil Gas Holding AB has reached a settlement with the
creditor that filed for a bankruptcy petition on October 11,
2013, in relationship to an unpaid debt.

The settlement means that the filed petition at the district
court of Stockholm (Stockholms Tingsratt) has been withdrawn and
Selena Oil & Gas Holding AB undertake to repay the debt through
an installment plan.  The settlement has been reached through an
out of court action in a direct dialogue between the creditor and
the Company.

Selena Oil & Gas Holding AB (former Emitor Holding AB) is engaged
in the production and transportation of oil and gas in the Volga-
Ural region in the Russian Federation, including Perm and
Udmurtia.  The company is listed on NASDAQ OMX First North
Premier in Stockholm under the ticker SOGH.  Mangold
Fondkommission is the company's Certified Adviser and liquidity
provider.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALBEMARLE & BOND: Pre-Tax Profits Down to GBP4.9 Million
--------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Armstrong at The Telegraph reports that Albemarle & Bond
said on Monday there were no signs of a recovery in its business
as it reported a huge slump in full year profits.

Last week, the UK's second biggest pawnbroker said that it was
exploring a sale of its business after a sharp reversal in its
fortunes, The Telegraph relates.

According to The Telegraph, A&B said in a results statement that
while it has "received expressions of interest, there can be no
certainty that an offer will be made."

The cash-strapped pawnbroker said that pre-tax profits had fallen
to GBP4.9 million compared to GBP21.4 million the year before,
The Telegraph relays.  A&B said that the collapse in profits
reflected the 23% fall in gold price during the year, The
Telegraph notes.

The extent of the company's financial woes has already been laid
bare by revelations A&B has already taken the extraordinary step
of melting its own gold stock to avoid breaching covenants, The
Telegraph discloses.  The group, which embarked on a rampant
expansion plan of its gold buying business, has now shut all
loss-making gold stores, The Telegraph says.

The group is a whisker away from maxing out its bank facilities
as its net debt stands at GBP50.6 million as at December 2, 2013,
compared to bank facilities of GBP53.5 million, The Telegraph
discloses that A&B's banks have agreed to extend the company's
bank facility covenant testing dates until February 3, The
Telegraph relates.

A&B had hoped to bolster its balance sheet with a GBP35 million
rights issue however the cash call was abandoned after American
pawnbroker EZCORP, which owns a 30% stake in the company, refused
to underwrite the 50p-a-share sale, The Telegraph notes.

EZCORP, The Telegraph says, is now tipped as a bidder for A&B,
along with rival UK pawnbroker H&T and turnaround buyout group
Better Capital, owned by John Moulton.

Albemarle & Bond Holdings PLC provides pawnbrokering services.
The Company, through its subsidiaries, provide pawnbroking, check
cashing services, retail jewelry sales and unsecured lending.
Albemarle operates in the United Kingdom.


CAVENDISH TRAVEL: Ceases Trading, Can't Supply Paid Tickets
-----------------------------------------------------------
http://www.thetelegraphandargus.co.uk/news/10861964.Mums__agony_a
s_firm_taking_girls_to_One_Direction_concert_at_Etihad_Stadium_ce
ases_trading/

Telegraph and Andargus reports that Clark Business Recovery said
Cavendish Travel (Holdings) Ltd has ceased its trading and could
no longer able to supply paid tickets.

The director of Clark Business Recovery, Dave Clark, said it was
not yet clear how many people were affected, according to
Telegraph and Andargus.

The report notes that Mr. Clark said directors of Cavendish
Travel had reluctantly taken the decision to go into liquidation
after trading successfully for more than 30 years.  The report
relates that it is anticipated it will go into liquidation on
December 18.

"Clark Business Recovery Limited is assisting the company with
the liquidation process and are collating information regarding
bookings made by members of the public," the report quoted
Mr. Clark as saying.

Mr. Clark said the company was not able to honor bookings where
tickets had not yet been dispatched and that customers should
contact their credit card companies regarding refunds, the report
relays.


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Bank of England Committee Member Lauds Rescue
----------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Bain at Herald Scotland reports that Martin Taylor, former
Barclays chief, and now Bank of England committee member, said
the rescue of the Co-operative Bank without a government bail-out
was an "encouraging" sign for financial stability.

Mr. Taylor, who ran Barclays from 1994 to 1998, sat on the post-
crash Independent Commission on Banking and is one of four
external members of the central bank's Financial Policy
Committee, Herald Scotland discloses.

"The fact that a bank that was insolvent survives and let's hope
flourishes and the taxpayers haven't had to dip into their
pockets, that is not entirely a bad outcome of what was clearly a
very messy affair," Herald Scotland quotes Mr. Taylor as saying
on Dec. 4.

According to Herald Scotland, Mr. Taylor was roundly critical of
Barclays when the Libor scandal broke last year, but would not
comment on the recent wave of allegations at RBS, which with
Barclays on Dec. 4 agreed to pay EC anti-trust penalties totaling
GBP616 million for manipulating Libor.

                         Recapitalization

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 2,
2013, The Telegraph related that Co-operative Bank cleared a
major hurdle in its attempt to complete a GBP1.5
billion rescue recapitalization after bondholders gave their
"overwhelming" support to the plan.  The Telegraph disclosed that
the struggling lender said on Nov. 29 early votes showed 99.9% of
the investors in preference shares and two tranches of its junior
debt had given their support to the deal ahead of a final vote
this month.  The recapitalization will ultimately see the Co-op
Group cede control of the bank to its bondholders, who will
inject GBP1 billion into the troubled business through exchanging
their debt for new bonds, as well as shares in the lender, The
Telegraph noted.

                      About Co-operative Bank

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people, and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 14 and 18, 2013 has
reported that Moody's Investors Service has affirmed The
Co-operative Bank's Caa1 senior unsecured debt and deposit
ratings, and changed the outlook on the rating to negative from
developing, and Fitch Ratings has downgraded the company's Issuer
Default Rating to 'B' from 'BB-' and placed it on Rating Watch
Negative.


FARRELL: Peter Jones Saves Clothing Brand From Closure
------------------------------------------------------
Dave Simpson at starpulse.com reports that pop star Robbie
Williams' struggling clothing line has been saved from closure by
a British TV tycoon.

starpulse.com says the Angels hitmaker launched menswear brand
Farrell in 2011 but it struggled to stay afloat and went into
liquidation on Oct. 13.

However, it has been handed a new lease of life after Peter
Jones, a millionaire who stars on U.K. business show Dragon's
Den, gave the company a cash injection, the report notes.

According to the report, The Sun on Sunday said Mr. Jones is set
to buy 50 per cent of the company.

"Although the brand is in liquidation, he thinks it can be turned
around," the report quotes an unnamed source as saying.

The Farrell line was launched in September 2011 and sold through
high-end department stores, including Selfridges and House of
Fraser.  It also had an online outline through very.co.uk.


WREKIN CONSTRUCTION: Directors Banned After Inflating Assets
------------------------------------------------------------
David Unwin and Nicholas Ibbotson have become the latest
directors of Shropshire construction company Wrekin Construction
Company Limited to be banned as directors for ten and seven years
respectively, after inflating the company's accounts with an
GBP11 million ruby called 'The Gem of Tanzania', which was
eventually sold for GBP8,000.

The disqualifications, which come after the 2011 disqualification
of a third director Peter Greenwood for the same claim, follow
investigations by the Insolvency Service.

Mr. Unwin, 65, of Widnes, Cheshire, signed a ten-year
disqualification undertaking, which started on Nov. 12, 2013,
while Mr. Ibbotson, 56, of Sutton Coldfield, West Midlands,
signed a seven-year disqualification undertaking which started on
Nov. 14, 2013.  Mr. Greenwood, 62, of Telford, Shropshire, had
earlier signed a nine year disqualification undertaking, which
started on June 9, 2011.

The undertakings prevent the three directors from being involved
directly or indirectly in the promotion, formation or management
of a company for the duration of their bans.

Wrekin Construction Company Limited, set up in 1960, was a large
civil engineering company based in Shropshire. By March 31, 2007,
its annual turnover was more than GBP100 million, but it had
incurred trading losses and had a deficit on its accounts of
GBP7.6 million.

The investigations found that in June 2007 businessman Mr. Unwin
bought Wrekin from its then owners and in December 2007 he caused
another of his companies, Tamar Group Ltd, to transfer a ruby
gemstone known as 'The Gem of Tanzania' to Wrekin in return for
shares.

The gem, which was uncut and weighed approximately 2kgs, had been
bought by Mr. Unwin in 2006 and included as an asset in Tamar's
accounts at that time, at a value of GBP300,000. However, when
the gem was transferred to Wrekin's accounts in December 2007,
its value was shown as GBP11million, based on a valuation
supposedly carried out in Italy four months previously.

Wrekin collapsed into administration on March 10, 2009 with
losses of more than GBP45 million to creditors.  When the
administrators tried to sell the Gem, they found that the
document showing the GBP11 million valuation was a forgery.
Eventually, the Gem was sold for GBP8,000.

The investigations by the Insolvency Service also found that in
the weeks before the gem was transferred to Wrekin, Mr. Unwin
acknowledged in a meeting with the company's former auditors that
there were uncertainties about the gem's value.

Mr. Ibbotson, Wrekin's Finance Director, was aware of those
uncertainties, but nevertheless told Wrekin's new auditors that
GBP11 million was a genuine market value.  Mr. Ibbotson and
Wrekin's Managing Director Mr. Greenwood approved Wrekin's
accounts to Dec. 31, 2007, which included the gem as an asset
worth GBP11 million, without checking the reliability or
authenticity of the Italian valuation report. In the course of
the investigations, Mr. Unwin gave differing explanations as to
how he came by that valuation report.

By including the gem as an GBP11 million asset in the accounts to
Dec. 31, 2007, Wrekin gave the impression that it had a financial
surplus of GBP6.3 million, whereas its true position was an
insolvent one.

The Insolvency Service's investigations further showed that in
the months leading up to Wrekin's collapse, at a time when Wrekin
was under severe financial pressure and unable to pay its debts,
Mr. Unwin caused it to make substantial payments to two other
companies controlled by him: Britannia Management Services
Limited and Equatrek (UK) Limited.

In particular:

   * Between December 2008 and January 2009, Wrekin paid
     GBP768,177 to BMS supposedly with the intention that BMS
     would then pay the money to HM Revenue & Customs ("HMRC") on
     Wrekin's behalf. However, BMS did not pay HMRC and instead
     it transferred money to other group companies controlled by
     Mr. Unwin to assist their cash flow. The investigations
     showed that all along the intention was for BMS not to pay
     HMRC straightaway but instead to pay Mr Unwin's other
     companies.

   * In January 2009, Wrekin made net payments totalling
     GBP516,959 to Equatrek in connection with the sale and re-
     purchase of a substantial quantity of Wrekin's machinery
     and equipment. Mr. Unwin had caused Wrekin to sell these
     assets equipment. Mr. Unwin had caused Wrekin to sell these
     assets to Equatrek in November 2008 and then, one month
     later, to buy the same assets back again from Equatrek for
     GBP749,000 more than the sale price. Mr. Unwin and
     Mr. Greenwood had also caused a sham sales invoice to be
     created in Wrekin's records in order to account for the
     substantial difference between the sale and purchase price
     of the assets.

Commenting on the disqualification, Pabitar Powar, Head of the
Authorisations Team at the Insolvency Service, said:

"The purchase of an uncut ruby gemstone by Wrekin was
extraordinary and questionable. It is clear that the gemstone was
included in the accounts to portray Wrekin's financial position
as a sound one, whereas its true position was the exact opposite.

"Transferring funds to connected companies for no financial gain
at a time when Wrekin was insolvent and under severe financial
pressure clearly put the creditors at increased risk.
Furthermore, a business deal which involved the creation of a
sham invoice ought to have set alarm bells ringing for the
directors and made them question the appropriateness of the whole
deal in the first place.

"Directors who recklessly present misleading information in this
way damage the confidence of companies to do business with each
other and undermine the business environment. These bans are a
warning to other directors who might act recklessly and without
due regard to the interests of creditors, that the Insolvency
Service will investigate and remove them from the business
environment."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *