TCREUR_Public/131220.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, December 20, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 252

                            Headlines

D E N M A R K

SCANDFERRIES APS: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating


G E R M A N Y

HSH NORDBANK: Navios Europe Acquires Ten Vessels From Debtors
TALISMAN-5 FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'Dsf'
* Moody's: German Coalition Agreement Has Mix Credit Implications


I R E L A N D

ARNOTTS: Apollo Acquires EUR230-Mil. Loans From Liquidators
BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Lowers Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2'
IRELAND: Senior Police Officer to Liase with NAMA Over "Leaks"
IRISH BANK: Granted Protection Under Ch. 15 of US Bankruptcy Code
IRISH BANK: Three Ex-Senior Officials Face Fraud Charges


L U X E M B O U R G

OXEA SARL: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Corp. Family Rating


M A C E D O N I A

STIP: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Global Scale Issuer Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
EURO-GALAXY III: Fitch Rates EUR20.75-Mil. Class E Notes 'BB'
HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class B2 Notes
MTS OJSC: Moody's Says Rostelecom-Tele2 JV Credit Neutral
VIMPELCOM OJSC: Moody's Says Rostelecom-Tele2 JV Credit Neutral


R U S S I A

EXPOBANK LLC: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
O'KEY GROUP: Fitch Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'B+' IDRs
VOLOGDA OBLAST: Moody's Alters 'Ba3' Rating Outlook to Negative


S P A I N

BANCO POPULAR: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
NCG BANCO: Venezuela's Banesco Group Wins Bidding Race


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SUNTECH POWER: European Unit Granted Payment Moratorium


U K R A I N E

NAFTOGAZ OF UKRAINE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Foreign Currency IDR


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

INDUS ECLIPSE 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
LEE DEMOLITION: Halts Trading; Owes More Than GBP3 Million
LONDON & REGIONAL: S&P Reinstates 'BB+' Rating on Class A Notes
RSA INSURANCE: Top Shareholders Want Former Auditor Probed


X X X X X X X X

* EU Finance Ministers Agree on New Bank Resolution System

* BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy Crimes


                            *********


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D E N M A R K
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SCANDFERRIES APS: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had assigned its 'B+'
long-term corporate credit rating to Denmark-based ferry services
provider Scandferries Aps, known as Scandlines.  The outlook is
stable.

S&P also assigned its 'BB-' issue rating to the company's senior
secured debt facilities, along with a recovery rating of '2',
indicating S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery in
the event of a payment default.

The rating reflects Scandlines' business risk profile, which S&P
assess as "fair", and its financial risk profile, which S&P
assess as "highly leveraged", incorporating its view of the
influence of Scandlines' financial sponsor ownership.

Scandlines has issued EUR875 million of senior secured debt
facilities, the proceeds of which were used to refinance its debt
and facilitate 3i Group Plc's (3i's) acquisition of an
approximately 51% stake in Scandlines held by a German private
equity company, Allianz Capital Partners (ACP) and former company
management.  3i and ACP originally acquired Scandlines through a
buyout in 2007.  The acquisition was undertaken by a new holding
company largely funded by new cash equity from 3i.

S&P views Scandlines' business risk profile as "fair",
incorporating its assessment of the shipping industry's "high"
risk and the company's narrow business scope and diversity
compared with global shipping operators.  Scandlines' business
model is built around three ferry routes deploying 12 well-
maintained, but aging, vessels and two border/duty free shops.

These weaknesses are mitigated in S&P's view by Scandlines'
leading and fairly protected position as a ferry operator for
foot passengers, cars, cargo, and border shoppers in the corridor
between Denmark, Sweden, and Germany, underpinned by a well-
recognized brand.

"We assess the influence of Scandlines' financial sponsor
ownership at "Financial Sponsor-6" ("FS-6"), leading to a
financial risk profile assessment of "highly leveraged", as our
criteria define the terms.  We believe that there is a risk that
the company's financial policy decisions, involving for example
potential acquisitions, may weaken credit metrics (and therefore
increase the ratio of debt to EBITDA to more than 5.0x) over the
coming 12-18 months, compared with our forecasts based on
normalized operating and cash flow assumptions," S&P said.

S&P's assessments of a "highly leveraged" financial risk profile
and a "fair" business risk profile indicate an anchor of 'b', as
per S&P's criteria.  S&P applies an upward adjustment of one
notch for its "comparable rating analysis" to reflect Scandlines'
credit measures that are above the financial risk profile range.
This leads to a corporate credit rating of 'B+.'

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Scandlines will
sustain its fairly resilient operating performance underpinned by
its efficient business model and proven cost-control
capabilities. Combined with its solid liquidity, this should
enable the company to maintain a credit profile commensurate with
the rating.



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G E R M A N Y
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HSH NORDBANK: Navios Europe Acquires Ten Vessels From Debtors
-------------------------------------------------------------
Navios Europe Inc. on Dec. 18 announced the closing of the
transaction for the acquisition of ten vessels from debtors of
HSH Nordbank AG.

The ten vessels are five tankers and five container vessels with
an average age of 6.0 years and a current fair market value of
approximately US$218 million.  Five vessels have already been
delivered to Navios Europe's fleet with the remaining vessels
expected to be delivered by the end of 2013.

Angeliki Frangou, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, stated,
"This innovative financing structure provides relief to
distressed assets from bankruptcy and places them into Navios's
stable ownership, thereby leveraging our economies of scale and
superior technical and commercial management.  Navios and HSH are
committed to their excellent working relationship and look
forward to doing similar deals in near future."

Fleet Purchase Price The purchase price consists of US$127.8
million in cash and the assumption of US$173.4 million
Subordinated HSH Participating Loan.  The cash payment is funded
by US$120.4 million senior bank debt and US$10 million investment
from Navios Maritime Holdings Inc., Navios Maritime Acquisition
Corporation and Navios Maritime Partners L.P.  The senior bank
debt is secured by a first priority mortgage on the vessels and
does not include any holding company guarantees from the Navios
public entities.

Navios Holdings, Navios Acquisition and Navios Partners will
provide additional working capital to Navios Europe on a priority
basis.  The Navios Working Capital Loans will accrue interest at
12.7%.

The material terms of the transaction were generally in
accordance with the letter of intent signed with HSH in April
2013.

Strategic Partnership HSH has agreed to provide Navios Group the
opportunity to acquire more vessels at terms no less favorable
than this transaction.

Fleet Exhibit

          Tankers

                Vessel          Vessel Type      Built       DWT

                Star N              MR1           2009     37,872
               Hector N             MR1           2008     38,402
               Perseus N            MR1           2009     36,264
               Aurora N             LR1           2008     63,495
                Lumen N             LR1           2008     63,599

          Containers

                Vessel          Vessel Type      Built       TEU
            Fesco Almathea        Panamax         2007      3,091
              Protostar N       Sub Panamax       2007      2,741
              Esperanza N       Sub Panamax       2008      2,007
               Harmony N        Sub Panamax       2006      2,824
                Solar N           Panamax         2006      3,398

                      About Navios Europe

Navios Europe is an owner and operator of container and tanker
vessels.  Navios Europe is owned 47.5% by Navios Maritime
Holdings Inc., 47.5% by Navios Maritime Acquisition Corporation
and 5% by Navios Maritime Partners L.P.

                        About HSH Nordbank

HSH Nordbank -- http://www.hsh-nordbank.com/-- is a commercial
bank in northern Europe with headquarters in Hamburg as well as
Kiel, Germany.  It is active in corporate and private banking.
HSH's main focus is on shipping, transportation, real estate and
renewable energy.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 22,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded HSH Nordbank AG's
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to E, equivalent
to a standalone credit assessment of caa2, from E+/b3.
Concurrently, Moody's extended the review for downgrade on
HSH's long and short-term debt and deposit ratings of Baa2 and
Prime-2, respectively.

The lowering of the standalone BFSR reflects the significant
challenges faced by HSH in its efforts to stabilize its franchise
and comply with compensation measures for earlier state aid.
Asset-quality deterioration and the resulting pressure on capital
have triggered renewed requirements for capital strengthening
which Moody's expects to include additional support from the
bank's owners. This support would imply an additional financial
burden for the fragile group. The E/caa2 standalone credit
strength better reflects Moody's view that HSH has reached a
critical stage.


TALISMAN-5 FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'Dsf'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms TALISMAN - 5 Finance plc's class A floating
rate notes due 2016 and downgrades the others as follows:

EUR125.3m class A (XS0278333736) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
revised to Negative from Stable

EUR35.9m class B (XS0278334460) downgraded to 'BBBsf-' from
'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative

EUR26.1m class C (XS0278334973) downgraded to 'CCsf' from
'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate RE75%

EUR9.4m class D (XS0278335277) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf';
RE0%

EUR0m class E (XS0278335863) downgraded to 'Dsf' from 'Csf'; RE0%

Key Rating Drivers:

The downgrades reflect the loss allocation stemming from the Bird
loan workout and the revised recovery expectation relating to the
Monkey loan following its collateral revaluation in September
2013.

In October 2013, four loans remain in the transaction, three of
which are in workout following maturity default. Another loan,
the EUR24.2 million Bird loan, repaid at the July 2013 interest
payment date (IPD) with a EUR14 million loss, affecting the class
D and E notes.

The fourth remaining loan, the EUR52.8 million Penguin loan,
accounts for 27% of the current balance and is secured on seven
Greater Paris assets, predominantly office assets. After
defaulting at its extended maturity in October 2013, the loan was
restructured and extended by one year. The terms now include some
scheduled amortization and trapping of all surplus funds until
the loan repays in full. Fitch believes that the targeted full
redemption prior to bond maturity is achievable due to the
improved exit position and likely avoidance of a complex judicial
resolution.

Negotiations regarding a discounted pay-off (DPO) of the EUR60
million Fish loan (30%) ceased in 3Q13. The collateral, an
office/car showroom property located in Hamburg, had been
revalued in 2012, increasing the securitized loan-to-value (LTV)
to 133%, from 70% previously. The special servicer is exploring
alternative strategies to a DPO while surplus is trapped. Fitch
expects a significant ultimate loss.

The EUR42.7 million Reindeer (22%) loan had its borrower's
directors replaced by the special servicer following an
unauthorized change of control. Although vacancy across the
collateral (20 mixed Finnish properties) has peaked since, a new
asset manager has been appointed and asset performance is
expected to stabilize while exit strategies are being assessed.

Meanwhile, the loan swept an average of EUR0.9 million each
quarter over the past two years, contributing towards an overall
redemption of 29.2% of the original loan balance since closing in
2006. The reduced loan size countered a significant downwards
valuation of the collateral in 2013, resulting in a reported
securities LTV of 64.6% in October 2013, compared to 70.2% at
closing. Fitch does not expect a loss.

The EUR41.4 million Monkey loan (21%) is backed by a mixed-use
property located near Munich, Germany. The collateral, comprising
a business hotel and office/business park space, was revalued in
September 2013. The resulting LTV of 99% makes a full recovery
unlikely without equity injections, although all surplus is
trapped for recovery and expenses. Fitch expects a moderate loss
from this loan.

Rating Sensitivities:

The agency recoveries estimate at 'Bsf' is EUR175 million. The
realisation of recoveries below Fitch's expectations would put
downward pressure on the ratings of classes A, B and C. The two
most senior tranches' rating would likely be under pressure if
they remain outstanding 12 months prior to bond maturity in July
2016. The Class C notes will be downgraded if losses exceeding
the balance of Class D are to be realised.


* Moody's: German Coalition Agreement Has Mix Credit Implications
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The recent coalition agreement between the two largest political
parties in Germany will have a diverse impact on the credit
profiles of the country's energy and infrastructure companies,
says Moody's Investors Service in a new Special Comment
published. It will be credit positive for energy-intensive
industrial companies, building materials and construction
companies, and telecoms equipment companies. Conversely, it will
be credit negative for conventional power generators, and for the
personnel service industry and manufacturing companies.

Moody's notes that one of the aims of the grand coalition between
the Christian Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD),
which comes on the back of the SPD achieving a majority vote of
76% for the coalition agreement on 14 December 2013, is to keep
power prices low. This will have positive implications for
energy-intensive industrial companies, especially aluminium and
steel producers and chemicals companies.

Moody's notes, however, that the agreement suggests no support
for conventional power generators, which are suffering from
depressed power prices and low generation spreads. In addition,
the commitment to expand renewable energy sources could further
displace conventional plants and put pressure on spreads. This is
credit negative for power generators such as E.ON (A3 negative),
EnBW (A3 negative) and RWE (Baa1 stable).

The grand coalition will (1) increase federal funding for public
transport infrastructure and (2) invest additional funds raised
by the expansion of the lorry toll and the introduction of the
"Auslander Maut," a toll for passenger vehicles not registered in
Germany, into road infrastructure development. This will be
credit positive for building materials and construction
companies, such as HeidelbergCement AG (Ba1 stable) and Holcim
Ltd. (Baa2 stable). The envisaged expansion of investment in rail
infrastructure is credit positive for Deutsche Bahn AG (Aa1
negative).

In addition, the planned creation of additional investment
incentives for telecommunications service providers will likely
accelerate investment in broadband Internet infrastructure. This
will be credit positive for telecomms equipment companies such as
Alcatel-Lucent (B3 stable), Nokia Solutions Networks (B1
developing) and Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson (A3 negative).

However, the coalition agreement sets a minimum wage of EUR8.50
per hour and introduces a more restrictive framework for the use
of temporary workers. These measures are credit negative for the
personnel service industry and manufacturing companies.



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I R E L A N D
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ARNOTTS: Apollo Acquires EUR230-Mil. Loans From Liquidators
-----------------------------------------------------------
Roisin Burke at Irish Independent reports that US investment firm
Apollo has acquired loans secured on the Arnotts department store
in Dublin following a lengthy bidding process.

According to Irish Independent, the loans, which have a face
value of EUR230 million, have been bought from the liquidators of
IBRC, the former Anglo Irish Bank.

What Apollo has bought is a portion of debt taken out by
Arnotts's previous owners to develop the shop and surrounding
properties in the Henry Street area of Dublin in a scheme that
was to be known as the Northern Quarter, Irish Independent
discloses.

The remainder of the debt has already been bought by a
combination of the billionaire Brown Thomas-owning Weston family
and developer Noel Smyth's Fitzwilliam Finance, Irish Independent
notes.  They bought their share of the loans from Ulster Bank in
a separate deal, Irish Independent relays.

It is believed the two debt deals value Arnotts at around EUR95
million in total -- a fraction of its price during the boom,
according to Irish Independent.

IBRC and Ulster Bank took control of Arnotts and a portfolio of
neighboring properties in 2010 when the lenders wrote off a
separate EUR300 million of debt in exchange for ownership of the
business -- squeezing out former owners, Irish Independent
recounts.

In 2010, when the business fell into the hands of its creditors,
Anglo Irish Bank was reported to control 45% of the business,
while Ulster Bank controlled 49.5%, Irish Independent relates.

Arnotts is a Dublin-based retailer.


BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Lowers Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one notch Bank of
Ireland's (BOI) deposit ratings to Ba2/NP from Ba1/NP and senior
debt ratings to Ba3 from Ba2, prompted by the concurrent lowering
of the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) by two notches to
b1 from ba2. In line with the downgrade of BOI, Moody's has also
downgraded the deposit ratings of BOI's subsidiary ICS Building
Society to Ba2/NP and lowered its BCA to b1.

The lowering of the BCA reflects Moody's view of the increase in
risks to bondholders arising from

(1) ongoing asset-quality challenges that have the potential to
put pressure on BOI's capital levels beyond the expectations of
the Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR) undertaken by the
Irish regulator in 2011. These pressures are at least partially
reflected in the adjustments required by the Central Bank of
Ireland (CBI), following its Balance Sheet Assessment (BSA) of
BOI; and

(2) the closely-related risk for BOI's bondholders stemming from
the prospect of the stress test that will be undertaken by the
European Central Bank (ECB) in 2014. While the design of the
stress test remains unclear and its result difficult to
anticipate, banks such as BOI with poor quality lending books,
relatively low levels of provisions and poor profitability are at
relatively greater risk of 'failing' the test. Any resulting
material capital shortfall, if it cannot be remedied by BOI or
its shareholders within a certain (still undefined) period,
directly raises the risks for BOI's bondholders.

At the same time, Moody's believes that BOI's increasingly
visible return path to sustainable profitability should help it
to offset some of these asset quality and capital pressures,
while the potential for the bank to tap the private capital
markets -- to which it currently has some access -- for equity
injections should also be a further protection for bondholders.

The moderate expectation of support from the Irish government
leads to a one-notch uplift for BOI's senior unsecured debt
ratings. In line with previous government actions to support
depositors, Moody's continues to incorporate a higher degree of
support likelihood for BOI's deposits, resulting in two notches
of rating uplift from the standalone BCA.

Ratings Rationale:

Ongoing Asset-Quality Challenges Pose Downside Risks:

The continued rise and high level of non-performing loans
illustrates the extent of BOI's asset quality problems in its
Irish lending book and the ongoing downside risk this poses for
BOI's capitalization. The data as of June 2013 suggest that over
14% of mortgage loans in Ireland, about 23% of the Irish non-
property SME and corporate book and, overall, 19% of the lending
book (including the UK) is non-performing. Moody's takes some
comfort from tentative signs that the build up of new NPLs is
weakening. However, even if these positive signs were to persist,
the expected loss in BOI's balance sheet could still increase in
view of regulatory pressure to increase still further the
provisions, which remain low by comparison with BOI's peers in
Ireland and some other countries facing similar challenges such
as Spain. The results of the BSA reflect this risk because under
the terms of the BSA published by BOI, but which it currently
contests, BOI would have to set aside EUR360 million of
additional impairment provisions for its Irish mortgage portfolio
and EUR486 million for its property & construction, small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) and corporate portfolios respectively.
The bank would also have to take 547 million of additional
provision to cover the additional potential updated treatment of
expected loss on defaulted assets. The sum of all potential
provisions would increase its coverage ratio above 50%, in line
with the current system average. In addition, the bank might have
to increase its RWAs by approximately EUR6.8 billion.

Adequate Capitalization Under Current Rules, However BOI Still
has to Pass The ECB Stress Test and Replace Non-Qualifying
Capital Instruments Under CRD IV:

Moody's is concerned that these underlying asset quality
problems, reflected in the continued rise in NPLs and the low
level of provisions, leave the bank in a more vulnerable position
to face the stress test the ECB will conduct in 2014 as part of
its comprehensive assessment of European banks. There remains
considerable uncertainty surrounding the stress testing process
and the key parameters it will incorporate -- for example loss
rates, target capital levels, corrective windows -- which make
the outcome difficult to anticipate. However, in Moody's opinion,
banks such as BOI, with vulnerable lending books, relatively low
provisions and poor profitability, are at relatively greater risk
of 'failing' the stress test.

In Moody's view the ECB's Asset Quality Review (AQR) poses a
lower threat than the stress test since the ECB will likely use
the data from the BSA for its comprehensive assessment in line
with CBI's expectations. As a result, the rating agency believes
that BOI will remain adequately capitalized under the Basel III
transitional rules even after meeting all the potential
requirements outlined as a result of the ECB's AQR. However, the
starting point CRDIV transitional CET1 ratio will be eroded,
increasing the uncertainty as to whether BOI's CET1 ratio will be
deemed adequately capitalized on a stressed basis. The bank's
stressed ratio would face additional pressure from the phased-in
deduction for deferred tax assets that remain sizable for BOI,
the deduction which will continue to have a negative impact on
its fully loaded CET1 ratio.

The implications of 'failing' the stress test are difficult to
predict and the offsetting actions management could take
correspondingly uncertain. Moody's believes that BOI's proven
ability to raise equity from private investors is positive for
bondholders. The bank recently placed EUR580 million of ordinary
stocks to redeem preference shares held by the Irish government
and the government sold its remaining stake in the banks
represented in EUR1.3 billion of preference shares to private
investors. Nevertheless access to private capital following the
stress test cannot be taken for granted, in which case additional
capital would need to be sourced elsewhere. Moody's believes that
the slightly heightened risks to bondholders need to be reflected
in both lower baseline credit assessment (to signal the potential
for some sort of support event) and lower debt ratings (to signal
the heightened risk to creditors).

Some Positive Signs Stemming from the Return to Growth in the
Irish Economy:

Action reflects a balance of factors, including some positive
signs. Despite the significant challenges that the Irish economy
still faces, signs of stabilization -- reduced unemployment
levels and increased asset prices -- could help BOI to improve
its asset quality and profitability metrics. In Moody's opinion,
the bank's solid retail and commercial banking franchise will
facilitate BOI's expected return to stable profitability.
Improved net interest margins will also increase profitability,
despite the negative effect on profits that lower ECB base rates
could have on the bank's tracker mortgages.

In line with these views, the rating agency says that the quality
of BOI's mortgage portfolio could improve in line with the
system, after the CBI reported a decline in the number of
mortgage accounts for principal dwelling houses in arrears during
Q3 2013. BOI has traditionally reported lower levels of problem
loans than its peers, at 19.3% compared with an average of 30.3%
for rated banks in Ireland. BOI's lower level of problem loans
reflects its traditionally more conservative underwriting
standards and added geographic diversification from its lending
in the UK.

Support Assumptions:

BOI's senior unsecured debt ratings incorporate one notch of
uplift. The uplift reflects Moody's assumption of a moderate
probability for systemic support likely to be forthcoming from
the Irish government, if an increase in capital is required,
given BOI's systemic importance to the financial stability and
economic prospects for the now stabilizing Irish economy.

BOI's deposit ratings incorporate two notches of rating uplift
from the BCA, reflecting Moody's expectation that support for
deposits would likely be forthcoming in the event of need. The
rating agency bases its view on the supportive stance of the
Irish government towards depositors as witnessed by the 2011
transfer orders to sell the deposits of Anglo Irish Bank and
Irish Nationwide Building Society to AIB and IL&P.

Upgrade of Subordinated and Hybrid Instruments:

Moody's upgraded the subordinated debt ratings to B2 from C and
the preference share ratings to Caa2 (hyb) from C (hyb), in line
with the rating agency's guidelines for junior bank obligations.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:

The current negative outlook implies that upward pressure on the
BCA is unlikely in the short term. However, upward pressure on
the BCA could develop if the bank's management took steps to
improve the bank's capital position ahead of the ECB stress test
in 2014.

Other elements that could exert upward pressure on the bank's BCA
in the medium term are (1) a sustainable recovery of asset-
quality indicators; (2) further improvements in profitability and
efficiency; and (3) an improved liquidity position, with lower
reliance on funding from monetary authorities.

An upgrade of the bank's debt and deposit ratings could be
triggered by an improvement in the bank's standalone financial
strength.

The bank's BCA could be adversely affected by (1) a greater-than-
expected deterioration in the bank's existing capital buffers;
(2) an additional capital requirement resulting from the ECB
stress test exercise that could not be met organically or through
available management actions; (3) an unexpected deterioration in
the bank's profitability metrics; and (4) a material
deterioration in its liquidity or funding position.

Negative pressure on the bank's long-term debt and deposit
ratings could result from a lowering of the bank's BCA.


IRELAND: Senior Police Officer to Liase with NAMA Over "Leaks"
--------------------------------------------------------------
Jamie Smyth at The Financial Times reports that Ireland's police
commissioner on Wednesday appointed a senior officer to liaise
with the National Asset Management Agency, Ireland's bad bank,
over allegations of impropriety.

NAMA, which is one of the biggest property companies in the
world, has reported two former employees to the police in
relation to the possible use of unauthorized information at the
agency, the FT relates.

According to the FT, the disclosure followed allegations made by
an opposition politician that former staff at NAMA had "leaked or
given" sensitive information to third parties, vulture funds and
other investors.  The politician, senator Darragh O'Brien, as
cited by the FT, said the information he had received and given
to police would "rock Nama to its very core".

Paddy McKillen, an Irish businessmen who is embroiled in a legal
dispute with the Barclay Brothers over the ownership of three
luxury hotels in London, has made a complaint to police that
sensitive information about him was leaked to his rivals by a
Nama employees, the FT relays.

On Wednesday, Enda Kenny, Ireland's prime minister, told
parliament a police officer had been appointed to ensure all
complaints were fully pursued, the FT discloses.


IRISH BANK: Granted Protection Under Ch. 15 of US Bankruptcy Code
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the liquidation vehicle for Ireland's failed
Anglo Irish Bank has been granted bankruptcy protection in the
United States.

The bank, whose failure cost Irish taxpayers some EUR30 billion
(US$41 billion) in the financial crisis, was put into an
accelerated liquidation process during an emergency session of
Ireland's parliament in February, Reuters relates.

Now known as Irish Bank Resolution Corp, or IBRC, the liquidating
bank applied in August for U.S. court protection to prevent
creditors from going after more than US$1 billion in U.S. assets,
Reuters relays.

Liquidator Kieran Wallace of KPMG confirmed that IBRC was granted
protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S. bankruptcy code in the
district of Delaware, Reuters discloses.

The recognition was opposed by property developer John Flynn, an
Irish resident of Florida, Reuters notes.

The decision will freeze Mr. Flynn's lawsuit in Manhattan, where
he is suing to recover US$11 million he claims he was overcharged
by Anglo Irish, Reuters states.

                   About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

The IBRC liquidators want the U.S. bankruptcy judge to rule that
Ireland is home to the so-called foreign main bankruptcy
proceeding.  If the judge agrees and determines that IBRC
otherwise qualifies, creditor actions in the U.S. will halt
automatically.


IRISH BANK: Three Ex-Senior Officials Face Fraud Charges
--------------------------------------------------------
Ciaran Hancock at The Irish Times reports that former senior bank
officials John Bowe, Denis Casey, and Peter Fitzpatrick were on
Wednesday charged in relation to an alleged EUR7.2 billion fraud
involving Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Life Assurance and Irish Life &
Permanent in 2008.

In a sitting before Judge Patricia McNamara, all three were
charged with conspiracy to defraud contrary to common law, The
Irish Times relates.

Mr. Bowe, a former head of capital markets at Anglo Irish Bank,
faced an additional charge that on December 3, 2008, he falsified
accounts contrary to section 10 of the Theft and Fraud Act, The
Irish Times notes.

Mr. Casey is the former chief executive of Irish Life &
Permanent, once one of Ireland's biggest public companies, The
Irish Times discloses.  He is now a barrister and junior counsel,
The Irish Times states.  Mr. Fitzpatrick is a former finance
director of IL&P, The Irish Times says.

Det Garda Insp Gerry Walsh of the Garda Bureau of Fraud
Investigation took the court through the charge sheets and
outlined the bail conditions being sought, The Irish Times
relays.

He told the court that the three had replied "No" when the
charges were read to them earlier that day, The Irish Times
recounts.

The three were remanded on bail until March 12 when a book of
evidence will be produced, The Irish Times states.  The court was
told that this case was unlikely to be heard in 2014, The Irish
Times relates.

                    About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

The IBRC liquidators want the U.S. bankruptcy judge to rule that
Ireland is home to the so-called foreign main bankruptcy
proceeding.  If the judge agrees and determines that IBRC
otherwise qualifies, creditor actions in the U.S. will halt
automatically.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


OXEA SARL: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Corp. Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the B2 corporate family
rating and B2-PD probability of default rating of Oxea S.a.r.l.
the ultimate holding company of the subsidiary guarantors to the
group's senior secured credit facilities. Moody's has
concurrently confirmed the B1 rating on the first-lien senior
secured credit facility and the Caa1 rating on the second-lien
senior secured credit facility due 2020 at Oxea's subsidiary Oxea
Finance & Cy S.C.A. ("OF"). The outlook on all ratings is stable.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating actions follow the completion of Oman Oil Company's
(OOC unrated) acquisition of Oxea from private-equity firm Advent
International Corporation. OOC is pursuing investments in the
wider energy sector that are consistent with the long-term
strategy of its owner, the Government of Oman (A1 stable). The B2
CFR reflects Moody's view that OOC is a more strategic owner than
Advent, with the acquisition in line with its downstream strategy
to become an integrated player in the chemical industry with the
production of higher margin specialty chemicals. The rating also
incorporates Moody's expectation that the new owner will adopt a
more conservative financial policy than Advent, especially after
the company raised more debt to pay out a dividend and repay a
shareholder loan to Advent in June this year, totaling EUR615
million.

The rating continues to be supported by Oxea's solid market
position in a consolidated oxo chemicals industry and historical
record of cash generation and deleveraging, with a proven ability
to generate solid cash flows through past global and European
economic cycles.

However, the CFR is constrained by Oxea's recent operating
performance, which was below Moody's expectations. Before the
leveraging refinancing transaction in June, Oxea's debt/EBITDA,
as adjusted by Moody's for operating leases, pensions and the
off-balance sheet securitization program, had fallen to
approximately 3.0x for the 12 months ended March 2013, from 3.2x
at the end of 2011. This deleveraging, primarily from higher
EBITDA generation, was a product of higher volumes, an improved
product mix and the pass-through of higher raw material costs to
customers. The June refinancing brought pro forma debt/EBITDA up
to 6.1x for the last 12 months ended March 2013, and Moody's had
expected Oxea to reduce leverage over the coming quarters and
achieve debt/EBITDA of around 5.5x, after Moody's standard
adjustments, by the end of 2013. However recent results have been
significantly below Moody's expectations, with debt/EBITDA after
Moody's standard adjustments rising to 6.5x in the third quarter
because of unplanned production outages and suppliers'
turnarounds and competition. Moody's now expects leverage to
remain at approximately 6.5x at the end of 2013. Nonetheless,
Moody's expects that the positive effect of the acquisition will
mitigate performance-related downward rating pressure.

Oxea's liquidity is good for its near-term requirements. As of
September 30, 2013, it had unrestricted cash of EUR154 million
and EUR88 million available under its EUR110 million revolving
credit facility (RCF) that matures in July 2018. Moody's expects
positive free cash flow during 2014 despite approximately EUR80
million in capex, which should cover the company's ongoing basic
cash needs. Moody's views covenant headroom related to the RCF is
acceptable as it is only tested if the RCF is drawn by more than
25%.

The stable outlook assumes that, despite the weaker recent
performance, Oxea is well positioned to deliver solid operating
performance, stable credit metrics, and deleveraging over the
next 18 months, following the completion of the turnaround at its
Oberhausen facility and with a full year of production from the
new Carboxylic acid unit. Moreover, the stable outlook reflects
Moody's expectation of a more conservative financial policy going
forward.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down:

Positive pressure on the rating could materialize if Oxea were to
sustainably achieve a Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio
approaching 4.0x, and sustain positive free cash flow generation.
Conversely, Moody's would consider a downgrade if the company
fails to deleverage over the next 18 months. Quantitatively,
Moody's would likely downgrade Oxea's ratings if over the next 18
months (1) the company's Moody's-adjusted EBITDA margin falls
sustainably to the low teens on a percentage basis; (2) its
debt/EBITDA ratio stays above 5.5x; or (3) its Moody's-adjusted
RCF/debt ratio stays consistently below 10%.

Incorporated in Luxembourg, Oxea S.a.r.l. (Oxea) is a leading
global producer of oxo intermediates and derivatives with a key
product portfolio of oxo chemical products and well-established
market positions in Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, and
South America. Oxo chemicals are critical to the production of
other chemicals used in a variety of industries such as
automotive, construction, industrial goods, consumer and retail,
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, agriculture and packaging. As of
financial year-end (FYE) December 2012, Oxea reported revenues
and EBITDA of EUR1.5 billion and EUR211 million, respectively and
on a Moody's-adjusted basis.



=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


STIP: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Global Scale Issuer Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B1 global scale
issuer rating with stable outlook of the Municipality of Stip in
Macedonia.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

The Municipality of Stip is situated in the Eastern region of the
Republic of Macedonia. With its 48,000 inhabitants, it ranks
among mid-size Macedonian municipalities.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-1: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed all of its credit
ratings on Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro CLO 2013-1
B.V.'s EUR350.00 million fixed- and floating-rate notes following
the transaction's effective date as of Oct. 14, 2013.

Most European cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
close before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level
of portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral
manager typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral
within the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to
reach the target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the
CLO transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted
level of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective
date" for a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on
which the transaction acquires the target level of portfolio
collateral, or the date defined in the transaction documents.
Most transaction documents contain provisions directing the
trustee to request the rating agencies that have issued ratings
upon closing to affirm the ratings issued on the closing date
after reviewing the effective date portfolio (typically referred
to as an "effective date rating affirmation").

"An effective date rating affirmation reflects our opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
us by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with the
transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support to
maintain the ratings that we assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that we used in our analysis and the results
of our review based on the information presented to us," S&P
said.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more
diverse portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of its criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P added.

In S&P's published effective date report, it discusses its
analysis of the information provided by the transaction's trustee
and collateral manager in support of their request for effective
date rating affirmation.  In most instances, S&P intends to
publish an effective date report each time it issues an effective
date rating affirmation on a publicly rated European cash flow
CLO.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view,
the current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the
credit quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to
support the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as
it deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro CLO 2013-1 B.V.
EUR350 Million Fixed- and Floating-Rate Notes

Class                   Rating

A                       AAA (sf)
B-1                     AA (sf)
B-2                     AA (sf)
C-1                     A (sf)
C-2                     A (sf)
D-1                     BBB (sf)
D-2                     BBB (sf)
E                       BB (sf)
S-1                     NR
S-2                     NR

NR-Not Rated.


EURO-GALAXY III: Fitch Rates EUR20.75-Mil. Class E Notes 'BB'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Euro-Galaxy III CLO B.V.'s notes final
ratings, as follows:

EUR67m Class A-1R: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR94m Class A-1: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR40m Class A-2: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR19m Class B-1: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22.25m Class B-2: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR7.75m Class C-1: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR11.25m Class C-2: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR6.75m Class D-1: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR7.75m Class D-2: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR20.75m Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR38.5m subordinated notes: not rated

Transaction Summary:

Euro-Galaxy III CLO B.V. is an arbitrage cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the issuance of the
notes were used to purchase a EUR327.75 million portfolio of
European leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio is managed by
Pinebridge Investments Europe Limited. During the reinvestment
period, Credit Industriel et Comercial acts as junior collateral
manager. The reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2017.

Key Rating Drivers:

Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B' category. Fitch has explicit rating or credit opinion on 66
of the 69 obligors in the indicative portfolio.

Above-average Recoveries
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 74 of the 77
assets in the indicative portfolio. The covenanted minimum
weighted average recovery rates are significantly higher than in
other recent European CLOs rated by Fitch.

Limited Reset Risk
The transaction uses an interest smoothing account and a
liquidity facility (LF) to mitigate reset risk. The notes
initially pay interest quarterly, before switching to semi-annual
payments once the LF matures. The LF expires after four years
(unless renewed) and in any case no later than the repayment of
the class A-2 notes in full.

The LF documents only include rating triggers based on another
agency's ratings. If the LF provider defaults, the transaction
switches to a semi-annual payment frequency. There is a residual
risk of an event of default if a jump to default of the LF
provider occurs in a quarterly period when a large proportion of
assets resets to a semi-annual payment frequency and the
portfolio has already incurred substantial losses. Fitch
considers the scenario to be sufficiently remote to be
commensurate with a 'AAAsf' rating.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge
Between 5% and 10% of the portfolio may be invested in fixed rate
assets while fixed rate accounts for 10% of total liabilities.
Therefore the transaction is hedged against rising interest
rates. Most other CLOs rated by Fitch in 2013 included an
unhedged fixed-rate bucket, exposing the structure to a rise in
interest rates.

Limited FX Risk
Asset swaps are used to mitigate any currency risk on non-euro-
denominated assets. Exposure to any single asset swap provider
may not exceed 20% of the portfolio.

Trading Gain Release
The asset manager may designate trading gains as interest
proceeds if, following such designation, the portfolio balance is
above the reinvestment target par balance and below the target
par cap and the class E OC test is above its value as at the
effective date.

Amendments to Documents
The documents allow the trustee to approve certain changes to
transaction documents upon the receipt of rating confirmation
without further reference to investors. However, the rating
impact is not equivalent to determining whether such a change is
prejudicial to the interests of investors. It should also be
noted that the provision of rating confirmations is at the
discretion of Fitch and Fitch may choose not to provide rating
confirmations.

Rating Sensitivities:

A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of one to two notches for the rated notes.

A 25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of one to five notches for the rated notes.


HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class B2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Harbourmaster CLO 10 B.V.'s notes, as
follows:

Class X (XS0331132935): paid in full
Class A1 (XS0331138890): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2 (XS0331143973): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A3 (XS0331156108): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Negative Outlook
Class A4 (XS0331171081): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Negative Outlook
Class B1 (XS0331161017): affirmed at 'BB-sf'; Negative Outlook
Class B2 (XS0331162684): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Negative Outlook

Harbourmaster CLO 10 B.V. is a managed cash arbitrage
securitization of secured leveraged loans, primarily domiciled in
Europe.

Key Rating Drivers:

The ratings reflect the transaction's stable performance over the
past 12 months and enhanced overcollateralization for class A2,
A3 and A4, which are balanced by ongoing uncertainty over
defaulted assets for the purpose of coverage tests.

The stable performance of the underlying pool is reflected by the
Fitch-weighted average rating factor. The factor stood at 27.9 as
of November 29, 2013, little changed from 28.9 as of
November 30, 2012, and below the transaction's threshold of 30.
Assets rated 'CCC' represent 4.9% of the total investment amount,
down from 10.5% a year ago. Yet, defaulted assets have increased
to 5.8% from 2.8% of the total investment amount during the same
period. The transaction benefited from an increase in the
weighted average spread of the portfolio, which would support the
transaction if interest diversion is triggered. The weighted
average spread (WAS) increased to 3.99% as of 29 November 2013
from 3.69% as of 30 November 2012 and is above its trigger of
2.56%.

Class A2, A3 and A4 notes have passed the overcollateralization
tests while class B1 and B2 have not. The additional coverage
test is also failing and stands at 105.09%, below the
transaction's threshold of 106.37%. A breach of this test
triggers a diversion of interest proceeds to redeem the notes in
order of seniority first. The class A interest coverage test has
consistently been passed and currently stands at 938.86%, above
its threshold of 107%. This is due to a combination of the
increasing WAS of the assets and declining interest rates.

Uncertainty remains with regard to the treatment of defaulted
assets for the purpose of the coverage tests. Although
discussions are continuing between the relevant parties, Fitch
has no further visibility on the potential outcome. Despite
pending resolution, the trustee calculates the
overcollateralization ratios differently by including defaulted
assets at the lower of market value and recovery estimates
instead of at par. Additionally, if an overcollateralization test
is breached, the amounts that are to be diverted are instead
currently held in a suspense account by the trustee.

The Negative Outlooks on the class A3 through B2 notes reflect
the uncertainty around the default definition in the
overcollateralization test calculation. They also reflect
potential sensitivity to the future refinancing wall faced by
leveraged loans, even though the current magnitude has been
partly mitigated via amend-and-extend activities.

Rating Sensitivities:

Fitch ran various rating sensitivity stresses on the transaction
to outline the impact on the notes' ratings if the key risk
drivers -- default rates and recovery rates -- were stressed.
Increasing the default probability by 25% would likely result in
a downgrade of up to one notch on the senior notes, of up to two
notches on the A3 notes, while having a limited impact on the
junior notes. Furthermore, applying a recovery rate haircut of
25% on all the assets would likely result in a downgrade of one
notch on the senior notes, of up to two notches on the mezzanine
notes and of one notch on the junior notes.

Class X was paid in full in January 2013. The class ranked pari-
passu with the class A1 and was neither included in the credit
enhancement calculation nor in the overcollateralization tests.
The class A1, A2 and A3 notes' ratings address the timely payment
of interest and the ultimate repayment of principal by the stated
maturity date as per the governing documents. The class A4, B1
and B2 notes' ratings address the ultimate payment of interest
and the ultimate repayment of principal by the stated maturity
date as per the governing documents.

Transaction Characteristics:

As of November 29, 2013, non-euro-denominated assets comprised
15% of the total portfolio. The portfolio is managed by
Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Europe Limited.

The reinvestment period ended in February 2013. Given that in
2010 an international rating agency downgraded the class A1 and
A2 notes below their initial ratings, unscheduled principal
proceeds cannot be reinvested. All principal proceeds since
February 2013 were thus either transferred to the suspense
account following a breach of the B1 overcollateralization test
or used directly to redeem the class A1 notes.


MTS OJSC: Moody's Says Rostelecom-Tele2 JV Credit Neutral
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has said that the establishment of a
joint venture between Rostelecom OJSC (unrated) and Tele2 Russia
(unrated) is credit neutral for the Russian "big three" mobile
operators (Mobile TeleSystems OJSC, or MTS (Ba2 positive),
MegaFon OJSC (Baa3 negative) and Vimpel-Communications OJSC (Ba3
stable)) because it is unlikely to immediately challenge their
competitive positions or put material pressure on their margins.

On December 12, Rostelecom's board of directors approved the
contribution of its mobile assets into a joint venture (T2 RTK
Holding) with Tele2 Russia, currently controlled by Bank VTB JSC
(Baa2 stable) and a consortium of investors in equal 50% shares.
Combining the subscriber bases of the two contributors, T2 RTK
Holding will become the fourth-largest mobile operator in Russia,
with a 16% market share by subscriber (as of September 2013,
according to the research agency Advanced Communications and
Media (AC&M)). The major advantage of this business combination
will be its control over 3G and country-wide LTE licenses
currently owned by Rostelecom but not available for Tele2 Russia.

While recognizing the strong business fundamentals of the new
joint venture, Moody's does not expect T2 RTK Holding to
immediately challenge the "big three" operators' market
positions. This is because it will take time and significant
investments for it to close the gap in terms of mobile network
coverage and, importantly, 3G and LTE offerings.

Historically, Rostelecom's market share in the mobile segment has
been constrained by the fairly modest scale of its mobile
network, as the company operates in only 35 out of 83 Russian
regions, and consequently has a share of only 6% of the Russian
mobile market by subscriber (as of September 2013 according to
AC&M). Although Tele2 Russia's network coverage is wider (the
company operates in more than 40 regions), the key constraint for
its development has been the absence of 3G and LTE licenses, as
well as of any licenses in Moscow, which represents 17% of the
Russian market in terms of subscribers (as of September 2013
according to AC&M).

Although the new joint venture will be present in more than 60
Russian regions, its scale will still lag that of the "big three"
players, particularly in terms of 3G offerings. Moody's views the
mobile data segment as the key driver of revenue growth for
Russia's mobile operators over the next three years. The rating
agency also believes that expansion of 3G and LTE networks will
be essential for T2 RTK Holding to increase its share in the
saturated Russian mobile market.

It is likely to take a few years and significant investments to
build a 3G/LTE network comparable with those of the "big three"
in terms of scale and quality of services. In addition, Moody's
expects that at the initial stage, some time will be needed for
the new joint venture to complete the integration of Rostelecom
and Tele2 Russia's contributed assets and establish business and
management processes.

Moody's acknowledges that T2 RTK Holding might decide to continue
pursuing a discounter strategy, as it has been the case for Tele2
Russia so far. This could put pressure on the "big three"
operators' margins in the longer term as T2 RTK Holding expands
its 3G/LTE network. However, unless the new joint venture makes a
strategic decision to focus on gaining market share at the
expense of cash flow generation and profitability, its pricing
difference with the "big three" is likely to be moderate.
Nevertheless, the uncertainty over the potential effect of T2 RTK
Holding's pricing policy for the "big three" operators' margins
represent a risk for the latter, which Moody's will monitor.


VIMPELCOM OJSC: Moody's Says Rostelecom-Tele2 JV Credit Neutral
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has said that the establishment of a
joint venture between Rostelecom OJSC (unrated) and Tele2 Russia
(unrated) is credit neutral for the Russian "big three" mobile
operators (Mobile TeleSystems OJSC, or MTS (Ba2 positive),
MegaFon OJSC (Baa3 negative) and Vimpel-Communications OJSC (Ba3
stable)) because it is unlikely to immediately challenge their
competitive positions or put material pressure on their margins.

On December 12, Rostelecom's board of directors approved the
contribution of its mobile assets into a joint venture (T2 RTK
Holding) with Tele2 Russia, currently controlled by Bank VTB JSC
(Baa2 stable) and a consortium of investors in equal 50% shares.
Combining the subscriber bases of the two contributors, T2 RTK
Holding will become the fourth-largest mobile operator in Russia,
with a 16% market share by subscriber (as of September 2013,
according to the research agency Advanced Communications and
Media (AC&M)). The major advantage of this business combination
will be its control over 3G and country-wide LTE licenses
currently owned by Rostelecom but not available for Tele2 Russia.

While recognizing the strong business fundamentals of the new
joint venture, Moody's does not expect T2 RTK Holding to
immediately challenge the "big three" operators' market
positions. This is because it will take time and significant
investments for it to close the gap in terms of mobile network
coverage and, importantly, 3G and LTE offerings.

Historically, Rostelecom's market share in the mobile segment has
been constrained by the fairly modest scale of its mobile
network, as the company operates in only 35 out of 83 Russian
regions, and consequently has a share of only 6% of the Russian
mobile market by subscriber (as of September 2013 according to
AC&M). Although Tele2 Russia's network coverage is wider (the
company operates in more than 40 regions), the key constraint for
its development has been the absence of 3G and LTE licenses, as
well as of any licenses in Moscow, which represents 17% of the
Russian market in terms of subscribers (as of September 2013
according to AC&M).

Although the new joint venture will be present in more than 60
Russian regions, its scale will still lag that of the "big three"
players, particularly in terms of 3G offerings. Moody's views the
mobile data segment as the key driver of revenue growth for
Russia's mobile operators over the next three years. The rating
agency also believes that expansion of 3G and LTE networks will
be essential for T2 RTK Holding to increase its share in the
saturated Russian mobile market.

It is likely to take a few years and significant investments to
build a 3G/LTE network comparable with those of the "big three"
in terms of scale and quality of services. In addition, Moody's
expects that at the initial stage, some time will be needed for
the new joint venture to complete the integration of Rostelecom
and Tele2 Russia's contributed assets and establish business and
management processes.

Moody's acknowledges that T2 RTK Holding might decide to continue
pursuing a discounter strategy, as it has been the case for Tele2
Russia so far. This could put pressure on the "big three"
operators' margins in the longer term as T2 RTK Holding expands
its 3G/LTE network. However, unless the new joint venture makes a
strategic decision to focus on gaining market share at the
expense of cash flow generation and profitability, its pricing
difference with the "big three" is likely to be moderate.
Nevertheless, the uncertainty over the potential effect of T2 RTK
Holding's pricing policy for the "big three" operators' margins
represent a risk for the latter, which Moody's will monitor.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


EXPOBANK LLC: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT Issuer Default Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based Expobank LLC's (EB) Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' with a Stable Outlook.

Key Rating Drivers:

The affirmation of EB's ratings reflects the moderate improvement
in the bank's performance, its adequate capitalization and
liquidity position and good reported asset quality. At the same
time, the ratings also take into account the narrow franchise,
fast growth through M&A activities, some asset quality concerns
and significant balance sheet concentrations.

At end-1H13 the bank reported a low non-performing loans (NPLs;
loans 90 days overdue) ratio of 1.6%, while restructured
exposures made up a further 7.4% of the portfolio. The IFRS
reported level of related party loans was just 2% of the book.
There were a number of borrowers among the 25 largest loans
(representing 81% of the corporate portfolio at end-1H13) with
which the bank's shareholders have/had connections, companies
controlled by shareholders' business partners and clients the
management previously had relationships with from their time
working in other banks. Such exposures accounted for 32% of
corporate loans, or 57% of Fitch Core Capital (FCC).

EB's shareholders actively pursue bank acquisitions, targeting
purchases of banks/financial companies at significant discounts
to book value. Acquisitions may be made on to EB's balance sheet
or directly by the bank's shareholders. EB's loan book grew by
60% in 9M13, mainly due to M&A deals or purchases of loan
portfolios from other banks. As a result of the expanded loan
book (and in particular due to the purchase of RUB18 billion of
car loans) the bank improved its performance in 9M13, with
annualized operating profit equal to 11%. Although Fitch views
the current market situation as a favorable for such deals, the
bank's strategy carries considerable risks, and there is
significant uncertainty about its longer-term sustainability.

Customer accounts, the core funding source (76% of liabilities at
end-1H13), are highly concentrated, with the top 20 names making
up 40% of deposits. To offset concentration risk, the bank had an
adequate cushion of liquid assets (cash and equivalents,
unpledged securities available for repo financing with the
Central Bank of Russia and net short-term interbank placements),
which covered customer accounts by 31% at end-9M13.

The total regulatory capital ratio stood at 15.3% at end-10M13,
and Fitch estimates the bank could reserve 13.5% of its loan book
without breaching minimum capital requirements.

EB's senior unsecured debt is rated in line with the bank's Long-
term IDRs, reflecting Fitch's view of average recovery prospects,
in case of default. The 5' Support Rating and 'No Floor' Support
Rating Floor reflect EB's small size and limited franchise,
making state support uncertain.

Rating Sensitivities:

Downward pressure on EB's ratings could arise if there was a
marked deterioration in asset quality and/or substantial losses
resulting from bank acquisitions, causing a significant weakening
of the bank's capital position, or if deposit outflows and/or
acquisitions cause a marked tightening of liquidity. A marked
increase in related party lending or deterioration in the quality
of credit underwriting could also lead to a downgrade.

Upside potential for the bank's ratings is currently limited.
However, strengthening and diversification of the bank's
franchise, and further improvement in performance, would be
positive for the credit profile.

EB was purchased from Barclays Bank plc in Q411 by a group of
individuals, headed by Igor Kim. Mr. Kim currently holds a 69%
stake in the bank.

The rating actions are as follows:

EB

  Long-Term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B';
   Outlook Stable
  Short-Term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
  Support Rating affirmed at '5'
  Viability Rating affirmed at 'b'
  National Long-Term Rating affirmed at 'BBB-(rus)'; Outlook
    Stable
  Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'
  Senior unsecured debt affirmed at 'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'
  Senior unsecured debt National Long-term rating affirmed at
   'BBB-(rus)'


O'KEY GROUP: Fitch Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'B+' IDRs
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Russia-based food retailer O'key Group
S.A.'s Outlook to Positive from Stable. Its foreign and local
currency Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) have been
affirmed at 'B+'. Fitch has also affirmed LLC O'key's senior
unsecured debt at 'B+' with a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'. The
National Long-term rating has been upgraded to 'A(rus)' from 'A-
(rus)'.

The revision in the Outlook to Positive reflects O'key's
improving operating performance leading to better-than-expected
credit metrics for the next three years. It also reflects Fitch's
confidence in management's ability to deliver on its growth plans
while maintaining fairly stable credit metrics. Fitch expects
O'key will continue to grow and achieve EBITDAR of near EUR500
million by 2015 which, together with greater format
diversification and an enlarged geographic footprint, will be
more commensurate with a higher rating. Although O'key's credit
metrics are currently consistent with a higher rating -- in the
'BB' category -- they are offset by its modest size and systemic
corporate governance risks stemming from operating in Russia.

Key Rating Drivers:

High Profitability but Constrained by Size
The ratings reflect O'key's strong position in the growing
hypermarket food retail segment in Russia, its high profit
margins and a growing presence across Russia's regions (48% of
sales in St. Petersburg expected in 2013 vs. 59% in 2010). This
is balanced with the group's moderate size in terms of EBITDAR
and market position (sixth largest) compared with other domestic
and international leading food retailers in Russia.

Better-than-expected Credit Metrics
FY12 reflected better-than-expected credit metrics owing to lower
capex. In FY12, funds from operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage
was 2.7x compared with Fitch's expectation of above 3x. FFO fixed
charge cover was 2.9x. Given a smaller than expected capex
program and to reflect the current trading environment, Fitch
expects FFO-adjusted net leverage to remain within 3.0x-3.3x by
2015. Similarly, FFO fixed charge cover is expected to remain
above 2.8x, which is strong for the ratings.

Negative Free Cash Flow
Fitch projects that O'key will be able to finance more than 80%
of its capex needs with internally generated cash flows. O'key
is, however, expected to show negative free cash flow (FCF) over
the next four years averaging 2% of net sales per annum due to
its large expansion program and a dividend payout of up to 25% of
group's net profit. This is mitigated by O'key's proven access to
both bank and capital markets and its ability to obtain trade
creditors' financing for its working capital as sales continue to
grow at a solid pace.

Key Russian Hypermarket Operator
The group's positioning in the fast-growing hypermarket format
enables O'key to capture the structural shift towards modern food
retail chains in Russia. Fitch notes that the group has been
resilient during the 2008/9 economic downturn. In addition, the
group's operating performance in terms of sales per sq m compares
positively against other food retailers: RUB312,000 for O'key vs.
RUB268,000 for X5 Retail Group and RUB 292,000 for Lenta in FY12.

Tougher Retail Competition in Russia
O'key will face more intense competition from major market
players, who have also aggressive expansion plans and have
targeted hypermarkets as one of their areas of growth.
Additionally as pricing remains the major factor for Russian
customers, further expansion from competitors will translate into
pressure on retailers' operating margins especially if the
Russian consumer environment remains subdued next year.

Although O'key has been successful in one of the most competitive
regions in Russian (St. Petersburg - 51% of group sales in 2012),
there are execution risks embedded in O'key's expansion plans
into Moscow and other main regions in Russia where consumer
purchasing power and infrastructure are less developed compared
with its core St. Petersburg's market. However, Fitch expects
that the group's expansion will enable O'key to reinforce its
purchasing power over suppliers.

Further Expansion and Growth in Scale
O'key plans to increase its selling space annually by 20%, mostly
on the back of organic expansion in its core hypermarket format,
continued development of its supermarket format and the launch of
a new discounter format. O'key plans to open its first 100
smaller stores around 2015-16 in the Moscow region. This should
result in significant growth in scale with EBITDAR projected to
exceed EUR550 million by 2016. Fitch will consider this factor
positively for the ratings provided that management remains
disciplined in its expansion strategy and maintains strong profit
margins, robust cash flow from operations (after changes in
working capital) and conservative credit metrics.

Adequate Liquidity
At end-September 2013 about 90% of O'key's debt was long-term
(RUB15 billion) and all of short-term debt maturities were
revolving credit facilities. In addition, O'key registered a new
bond program with a total value of RUB25bn including six tranches
(RUB3bn-5 billion) of five-year maturity. In October 2013, O'key
placed a tranche of RUB5 billion. Combined with strong operating
cash flow expected in FY13-14 Fitch believes that liquidity
sources are sufficient both for debt servicing and for financing
O'key's expansion plans. Adequate liquidity is supported by
available cash of RUB2.5 billion as of end-June 2013 and RUB7.9
billion of undrawn credit facilities as of end-September 2013.

Corporate Governance Risks
While O'key's corporate governance is considered by Fitch to be
above average relative to other Russian corporates, this is still
insufficient to justify a higher rating given the lack of
independence on its Board of Directors.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that could lead to a positive
rating action include:

   -- Solid execution of its expansion plan and positive like-
      for-like sales growth

   -- Group's size expanding to at least EUR500 million in
      EBITDAR by 2016

   -- Ability to maintain the group's EBITDAR margin of at least
      9.5%-10%.

   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage below 3x (or the equivalent of
      lease adjusted net debt/EBITDAR to below 2.5x) on a
      sustained basis

   -- FFO fixed charge coverage above 3x on as sustained basis

Negative: Future developments that could lead to a negative
rating action including but not limited to the Outlook being
revised to Stable, include:

   -- A sharp contraction relative to close peers in like-for-
      like sales growth

   -- EBITDAR margin erosion to below 9%

   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage remaining above 4x (or the
      equivalent of lease adjusted net debt/EBITDAR to above
      3.5x) on a sustained basis


VOLOGDA OBLAST: Moody's Alters 'Ba3' Rating Outlook to Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on Vologda's
local and foreign-currency Ba3 ratings to negative from stable.
Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the ratings.

The outlook change is driven by the region's growing financing
deficits, increasing debt burden and substantial refinancing
requirements in 2014.

Ratings Rationale:

The main driver of the outlook change is Vologda's growing
financing deficit, which is likely to widen to between -12%
and -13% of total revenue in 2013 from -6.8% posted in 2012. The
deterioration reflects an acute decline in corporate income tax
(CIT) proceeds, particularly from its largest taxpayers in the
steel and chemical sectors. Overall, CIT proceeds are expected to
decrease by 47% in 2013 relative to 2012, which is likely to be
the worst result posted by Moody's-rated Russian regions in 2013.
In addition, inflationary adjustments and a substantial increase
in public salaries following President Putin's decrees have also
put adverse pressure on the oblast's budget expenditure.

The outlook change is also driven by Vologda's increasing debt
burden, with its net direct and indirect debt (NDID) ratio
anticipated to reach 86% of operating revenue at year-end 2013,
from 74.7% posted in 2012. Moody's notes that this debt ratio
will be among the highest levels recorded by Moody's-rated
Russian sub-sovereigns. The debt pressures are exacerbated by its
short-term debt-redemption profile, with around one-third of its
direct debt due in 2014. Although 16% of forthcoming debt
repayments are represented by federal low-interest soft loans
that are likely to be refinanced or rolled over the federal
government, this will be insufficient to seriously mitigate
short-term refinancing risks.

The aforementioned adverse pressures, however, have not resulted
in an immediate rating downgrade due to the region's substantial
budget consolidation efforts, which are expected to improve its
financial profile in 2014-16. Vologda's budget plan envisages a
decline in financing deficits to around -5% of total revenue in
2014-16 on average. The regional government also aims to
stabilize its NDID ratio at around 84% over next three years,
while its debt-maturity profile will be enhanced towards three-
to-five-year bank loans and rouble bonds. Moody's notes that some
recovery in CIT proceeds, which is currently not foreseen by
Vologda's three-year budget, will likely partially offset short-
term debt repayments.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down:

Considering the negative outlook, any rating upgrade is unlikely.
Successful fiscal consolidation and stabilization of its debt
burden may be considered as factors supportive for a
stabilization of the rating outlook.

In turn, persistently high financing deficits and any further
debt growth, as well as a significant deterioration in market
conditions for debt refinancing could result in a rating
downgrade.

Specific economic indicators as required by EU regulation are not
applicable for this entity.

On December 13, 2013, a rating committee was called to discuss
the rating of the Vologda, Oblast of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased.

The Vologda Oblast is situated in the North European part of
Russia and has a population of 1.2 million. The oblast's gross
regional product (GRP) per capita on a purchasing power parity
(PPP) basis is around 80% of the Russian average. The steel
industry (mainly represented by OAO Severstal) dominates the
local industrial output, which accounts for 45% of Vologda's GRP.
Moreover, chemicals, food processing and the timber industry play
an important role in the oblast's economy. Around 90% of its
industrial production is concentrated in the cities of
Cherepovets and Vologda.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO POPULAR: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB-/B' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
Spain-based Banco Popular Espanol S.A. (Popular).  The outlook is
negative.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that, despite the beneficial
impact of the announced capital increase on Popular's solvency,
S&P's assessment of Popular's capital position remains "weak" as
such term is used in its criteria.

On Dec. 11, 2013, Popular announced a strategic alliance with the
Mexico-based bank Grupo Financiero BX+ (BX+).  As part of their
alliance, Popular will support the implementation of its SME
banking model in BX+ as a way to expand the Mexican group jointly
with BX+ controlling shareholders.  Their agreement includes two
proposed transactions:

   -- Popular's EUR450 million capital increase.  The controlling
      shareholders of BX+ and other Mexican entrepreneurs will
      invest up to EUR450 million in Popular in December 2013.
      This capital increase, in addition to their previous stakes
      in Popular, will increase the total stake in Popular of
      this group of investors to 6%.

   -- BX+'s capital increase.  Popular will inject about
      EUR97 million of new capital into Grupo Financiero BX+ in
      exchange for a 24.99% stake in the first half of 2014.

After taking into account the positive impact of the above-
mentioned capital increase under the agreement with BX+ and its
controlling shareholders, S&P's assessment of Popular's capital
and earnings remains "weak" according to its criteria.  S&P's
assessment incorporates its view of the elevated economic risk in
Spain, the level of potential unexpected losses that Popular
could face, and S&P's expectations of organic capital generation
for Popular.  S&P estimates that over the next 18-24 months its
risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio will stay in the region of
4.25%-4.75%, a level that is consistent with S&P's "weak"
assessment of Popular's capital position.

In addition to the EUR450 million capital increase just
announced, S&P's estimates of the evolution of its RAC ratio for
Popular take into account the EUR500 million of contingent
convertible bonds that Popular issued in October 2013 and the
capital gains on transactions that it has already confirmed
closing, including the sale of its real estate management
business.  S&P already includes in its total adjusted capital
ratio calculation Popular's mandatory convertible bonds.

S&P has not included in this review an assessment of the impact
on Popular of the Royal Decree-Law 14/2013, published on Nov. 30,
2013.  S&P understands that this Royal Decree has modified, among
other things, the legislation on income tax and the
characteristics of certain deferred tax assets for Spanish
financial institutions.  S&P is currently undertaking a review of
this recently published legislation and will determine and
communicate within the next few weeks if it considers that it
will likely affect its assessment of the creditworthiness of
Spanish financial institutions.

S&P also considers that the corporate reorganization of Popular's
business in Galicia, which it announced on Dec. 9, 2013, has no
significant impact on S&P's assessment of its credit standing.
Under the proposed new structure, Popular will undertake a
spinoff of its business and branches in Galicia to a new legal
entity, Banco Pastor, S.A.  While in S&P's view this transaction
does not contribute to efficiency or operational benefits and is
a departure from Popular's past strategy of merging regional
subsidiaries into the parent bank, we believe its size is not
material in the context of the whole group.

S&P has maintained its assessments of Popular's "adequate"
business position, "weak" risk position, "average" funding, and
"moderate" liquidity, as S&P's criteria define these terms.  S&P
continues to assess Popular's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
at 'b'.

S&P also continues to incorporate a one-notch uplift in its
ratings for short-term support to reflect its belief that the
European Central Bank's (ECB) long-term refinancing operations
(LTRO) give Popular time to address its liquidity imbalances and
achieve an adequate funding and liquidity position.  On the back
of Popular's ongoing repayment of ECB resources and the recent
contraction in its commercial gap (which S&P defines as customer
loans minus customer deposits), S&P believes Popular is on track
to meet expectations.

S&P also maintains a one-notch uplift over the SACP for potential
extraordinary government support, based on its view of Popular's
high systemic importance and Spain's supportive stance toward its
banking system.

The negative outlook on Popular reflects S&P's view of the
challenges that its management faces in containing the impact of
ongoing, significant asset quality deterioration it continues to
experience on its financial and business profile.  In S&P's view,
the ongoing pressure on Popular's financial profile could weaken
its business position or stability.  S&P also believes that
continued asset quality deterioration significantly above the
market average -- particularly in the context of what S&P expects
to be stabilizing asset quality for the system -- and a further
reduction of its reserve coverage levels for nonperforming assets
could weaken Popular's risk position.

The negative outlook also reflects the possibility that S&P could
lower the ratings if, contrary to its current expectations,
Popular is not able to rebalance its liquidity position to an
"adequate" level, as such term is used in S&P's criteria, by the
time the LTRO expires.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the downside risks it
currently sees for Popular's asset quality and overall financial
position abate and, in S&P's view, Popular's management team
deals effectively with the challenges it faces.


NCG BANCO: Venezuela's Banesco Group Wins Bidding Race
------------------------------------------------------
Jeannette Neumann at The Wall Street Journal reports that Spain's
bank-bailout fund said on Wednesday Banesco Grupo Financiero
Internacional and its Spanish unit Banco Etcheverria SA offered
to pay EUR1.003 billion (US$1.38 billion) to buy NCG Banco SA, a
nationalized Spanish bank.

Banesco's biggest unit, Banesco Banco Universal C.A., is
Venezuela's largest private bank by deposits and assets and holds
just under 14% of the market, the Journal says, citing
Venezuela's banking regulator.

According to the Journal, people familiar with the auction said
that the other entities that bid for the bank were Spanish
banking powerhouses Banco Santander SA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria SA, or BBVA, and Caixabank SA and Guggenheim Partners
LLC, as well as a joint bid from J.C. Flowers & Co. LLC and
Oaktree Capital Management L.P.

The bailout fund said Banesco's price included the purchase of
two portfolios of bad loans, the Journal relates.  The bank
didn't ask for an asset-protection scheme, meaning a guarantee
from the Spanish government to protect against future losses, the
Journal notes.  The bailout fund said Banesco would pay 40% of
the amount up front, with the remaining to be paid out through
2018, the Journal relates.

The bailout fund said the sale of NCG Banco to Banesco needs to
be approved by other state and European authorities, the Journal
relays.

The sale of NCG Banco is an important step in Spain's
privatization of its nationalized banks, the Journal notes.

The auction of NCG Banco has attracted the greatest interest from
international investors in a Spanish bank since the European
Union agreed last year to bail out the country's ailing lenders,
the Journal discloses.  NCG Banco received EUR9 billion in aid
from Spain and the EU, the Journal recounts.

NCG Banco SA is the largest bank in Spain's northwestern region
of Galicia.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SUNTECH POWER: European Unit Granted Payment Moratorium
-------------------------------------------------------
Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., said Dec. 12 that Suntech Power
International Ltd., its principal operating subsidiary in Europe,
has been granted an extension of its definitive moratorium on
creditor claims from the judicial authorities in Schaffhausen,
Switzerland until June 19, 2014.

On June 18, 2013, the Company announced that SPI had been granted
a definitive moratorium for a six month period which may be
extended thereafter.

The extension of the definitive moratorium allows SPI additional
time to restructure its debt and reach an agreement with its
creditors.

                          About Suntech

Wuxi, China-based Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., produces
solar products for residential, commercial, industrial, and
utility applications.  Suntech has delivered more than 25,000,000
photovoltaic panels to over a thousand customers in more than 80
countries.

Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd., received from the trustee of
its 3 percent Convertible Notes a notice of default and
acceleration relating to Suntech's non-payment of the principal
amount of US$541 million that was due to holders of the Notes on
March 15, 2013.  That event of default has also triggered cross-
defaults under Suntech's other outstanding debt, including its
loans from International Finance Corporation and Chinese domestic
lenders.

Suntech Power had involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings
initiated against it on Oct. 14, 2013, in U.S. Bankruptcy Court
in White Plains, New York (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 13-bk-13350),
by holders of more than US$1.5 million of defaulted securities
under a 2008 US$575 million indenture.  The Chapter 7 Petitioners
are Trondheim Capital Partners, L.P., Michael Meixler, Longball
Holdings, LLC, and Jiangsu Liquidators, LLC.  They are
represented by Jay Teitelbaum, Esq., at Teitelbaum & Baskin LLP,
in White Plains, New York.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


NAFTOGAZ OF UKRAINE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Foreign Currency IDR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine's Long-term
foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'CCC' and its
US$1,595 million state-guaranteed notes maturing in September
2014 at 'B-'.

Naftogaz's ratings continue to reflect Fitch assessment that
default is a real possibility due to the continued weakness of
the company's business and financial profiles, and its exposure
to political risks. The political and economic environment in
Ukraine continues to evolve rapidly, amid on-going mass protests
and negotiations with both EU and Russia regarding economic
cooperation and financial aid.

While in principle Fitch views positively the 35 per cent gas
price reduction to US$269 per thousand cubic meters (mcm) that
Ukraine and Russia announced on December 17, 2013, Fitch will
need to analyze both the details of the deal and the extent to
which Naftogaz will benefit from it before forming a firmer view.
Fitch considers that timely financial support from the government
of Ukraine (B-/Negative), Naftogaz's sole shareholder, remains
critical for its solvency, and Fitch believes that the company is
likely to default without such support.

Key Rating Drivers:

State Support Critical
Fitch views Naftogaz's standalone credit profile as extremely
weak. Fitch forecasts that at current import gas prices and
domestic tariffs, and poor payment discipline of some customers,
Naftogaz will have continued to generate negative free cash flows
(FCF) in 2013, though this is likely to reduce in 2014 due to
lower Gazprom prices. The company currently has limited access to
debt markets. Naftogaz continues to rely on state subsidies and
other forms of support to meet its obligations. In 2012, total
state subsidies to Naftogaz were UAH10 billion (US$1.2 billion),
and in 2013 state support is expected by the company to have
totalled UAH19 billion (US$2.3 billion).

Fitch believes that state support remains critical for Naftogaz's
solvency. The state continues to guarantee some Naftogaz's debt,
including its 2014 notes. There is also uncertainty over
Ukraine's ability to continue supporting Naftogaz given the
sovereign's fiscal deficit and external financing gap, though the
US$15 billion financial aid offered by Russia on December 17,
2013 mitigates this risk.

Price-Driven Deficit Remains
The disparity between the prices for gas supplied by Russia's OAO
Gazprom (BBB/Stable) and regulated domestic tariffs for heat
utilities is a key risk, though this is likely to reduce in 2014
due to lower gas import prices. Tariffs for residential customers
and utilities have not been reviewed since August 2010 due to
political pressure. In 2013, Naftogaz's purchases of gas from
Gazprom may reach 13bn cubic meters (bcm) at US$400 per mcm, 8bcm
of which Naftogaz will re-sell to utilities at US$95 per mcm.
This translates into nearly a US$2.5 billion loss that Naftogaz
needs to fund from the state and transit fees. Furthermore,
Naftogaz is currently trying to recover from heat utilities about
US$2 billion of overdue receivables accrued from January 2010.

The new gas price agreement of December 17, 2013 between Russia
and Ukraine provides for US$269 per mcm that would reduce the
deficit in 2014, at flat resale prices and volumes, to US$1.4
billion that Naftogaz would still need to fund. Fitch expects
Naftogaz to continue generating negative FCF and to depend upon
the state for financial support even at the lower gas price.

On-going Disputes with Gazprom
Fitch understands from media reports that the contract, under
which Naftogaz purchases gas from Gazprom and which runs through
2019, has now been amended to allow Naftogaz to purchase gas at a
significantly lower price starting from 2014 (US$269 instead of
US$400/mcm). However, a dispute with Gazprom over a US$7 billion
bill issued to Naftogaz in January 2013 under the contact's 'take
or pay' clause for unmet 2012 gas volumes remains unresolved.
Naftogaz has not recognized the bill and Fitch is not aware of
any further steps by Gazprom to enforce the claim. Naftogaz's
overdue payables to Gazprom for gas delivered between August and
November 2013 reached US$2 billion, which it intends to repay
over the coming winter. Gazprom has not publicly approved the new
repayment schedule yet.

Lower Transit Volumes Expected
Ukraine's gas transit volumes started to fall in 2012 as Russia
began diversifying its gas transportation routes by launching the
Nord Stream pipeline in late 2011. In 2012, Naftogaz received
US$3 billion in revenue for gas transit from Gazprom, or around
25% of its 2012 revenue. Fitch believes that gas transit revenues
will gradually decrease in the medium term as Nord Stream
increases its utilization, which will have a negative impact on
one of Naftogaz's principal income sources.

Restructuring is a Possibility
Fitch believes that Naftogaz's restructuring remains possible,
although no concrete decisions have been taken. It could take
different forms, including splitting Naftogaz into separate
entities to comply with EU regulations or leasing the gas transit
infrastructure to Gazprom or a consortium of international
players, as privatisation of Ukraine's gas infrastructure is
currently prohibited by law. Fitch will assess the impact of
restructuring on Naftogaz's credit profile when there is more
certainty on the subject.

Low Transparency
Fitch assess Naftogaz's level of financial transparency as low
but sufficient to maintain the current ratings. The company plans
to publish its consolidated 2012 accounts in January 2014, and
its other disclosures remain limited. Improvements to
transparency would be credit-positive but are not, by themselves,
sufficient to result in a positive rating action.

US$1.595 billion Notes Unaffected
Fitch rates Naftogaz's US$1,595 million notes 'B-', in line with
Ukraine's sovereign rating, based on the unconditional and
irrevocable guarantee from the state. Fitch does not expect
Naftogaz's potential restructuring to have an impact on the state
guarantee.

Rating Sensitivities:

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action include:

   -- Positive FCF from improved gas pricing coupled with
      improved receivables collections and higher level of
      financial transparency

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include:

   -- Significantly lower gas transit volumes resulting in deeper
      operating losses and negative FCF

   -- Failure by the state to provide timely financial support to
      Naftogaz

   -- Further debates with Gazprom over the current payable
      amounts

Liquidity and Debt Structure:

   -- Weak Liquidity, Higher Leverage
Naftogaz's liquidity remains weak, with expected negative FCF in
2013 and 2014 (before state subsidies). At September 30, 2013 the
company's consolidated debt was UAH58 billion (US$7 billion), of
which UAH27 billion (US$3.3 billion) was payable in 2014.
Naftogaz expects to receive sufficient aid from the government
and raise new loans to repay upcoming maturities, which Fitch
views as optimistic. In December 2013, Ukrainian government
announced that it would guarantee the company's upcoming UAH4.8
billion (US$580 million) domestic bond.

   -- Elevated Refinancing Risks
Fitch assess Naftogaz's refinancing risks as high, taking into
account its weak credit quality, high yields for Ukrainian
eurobonds, expected decline of transit revenues (which are
pledged as security under some loans) as well as a high portion
of loans from Ukrainian banks in the company's credit portfolio.

Full List of Ratings Actions

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'

  Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'

  US$1,595m government-guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'B-
'/Recovery
  Rating 'RR4'



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


INDUS ECLIPSE 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'D' Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Indus (Eclipse 2007-1) plc, as
follows:

  GBP131.0m class A (XS0294756449) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Stable

  GBP47.0m class B (XS0294757173) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
   Stable

  GBP52.9m class C (XS0294757256) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
   Estimate (RE) 80%

  GBP16.5m class D (XS0294757504) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%

  GBP0m class E (XS0294757686) affirmed at 'Dsf'; RE0%

Key Rating Drivers:

The affirmation of the class A, B and C notes is primarily driven
by the broadly stable performance of the collateral since last
year, the sequential pay down, loan repayments (the Adelphi, St.
George, Alba Gate and Pitch 2 loans fully repaid as expected) and
the bar-belled nature of the portfolio.

The Criterion loan now accounts for 43% of the outstanding deal
amount and is backed by a mixed-use asset on Piccadilly Circus
that houses McKinsey & Company (60% of income), and the sports
retailer Lillywhites (5%), among others. Although the asset sits
in a prime location, there have always been difficulties in
letting certain sections of the retail space, possibly due to the
property's configuration. For instance, the space previously
occupied by Zavvi (which went into administration in 2009) is
currently let on a "tenancy at will" basis, increasing the risk
of income volatility. Nevertheless, income has remained largely
stable over the past 12 months. While the loan suffers from a
large mark-to-market swap exposure of circa GBP23 million, this
has reduced from around GBP30 million due to rising interest
rates, improving future recovery prospects. Fitch estimates
breakage costs on the basis of long-term interest rate stresses
and therefore these market dynamics are rating neutral.

The second and third-largest loans, NOS 2 & NOS 3 and Workspace,
like some of the smaller loans, are backed by secondary or
tertiary quality assets. Although there are signs of improvement
in the investment and occupational markets for good secondary
assets, Fitch believes most of the assets are unlikely to benefit
from this change in sentiment. In particular, the GBP26.6 million
Workspace Portfolio loan, where a consensual disposal of the
portfolio is planned by the special servicer, is likely to incur
heavy losses as the sales plan progresses. The latest investor
report indicates that three of the Workspace properties securing
the loan, Durham, Ashington and Seaham, are likely to be sold
with a 26% discount compared with the January 2012 valuation.

In Fitch's view, the estimated losses are likely to be fully
absorbed by the class C and D notes.

Rating Sensitivities:

Fitch estimates 'Bsf' principal recoveries of approximately
GBP220 million. A failure to successfully sell off the Workspace
Portfolio assets and a further deterioration in the performance
of the loans backed by secondary/tertiary assets, such as the NOS
2 & NOS 3 loan, is likely to have a detrimental effect on the
junior notes. The senior classes are susceptible to a decline in
the performance of the Criterion loan, in particular its retail
space let on a "tenancy at will" basis and the future break
option of McKinsey and Company in 2018.


LEE DEMOLITION: Halts Trading; Owes More Than GBP3 Million
----------------------------------------------------------
Grant Prior at Construction Enquirer reports that Lee Demolition
has ceased trading owing more than GBP3 million.

According to Construction Enquirer, all employees at the firm
have been made redundant as business rescue specialist Begbies
Traynor prepares to liquidate the firm.

Lee Demolition flagged-up financial problems this summer when the
company entered into a Company Voluntary Arrangement in a bid to
head-off action by creditors, Construction Enquirer says.

The firm reached an agreement with creditors to repay 23.6p in
the pound over a five-year period on debts of around GBP3.5
million, Construction Enquirer relays.

Construction Enquirer relates that Begbies Traynor told
Demolition News: "Following creditor approval of the CVA of Lee
Demolition Limited on September 16, 2013, the company's directors
have been unable to adhere to the terms of the CVA due to
sustained delays in customer payments and declining turnover.

"As a result, the Company has now ceased trading and,
unfortunately, the directors have had to make all of the
employees redundant."

More recently the firm has been hit be several loss-making jobs,
Construction Enquirer discloses.

Lee Demolition is based in Kent.


LONDON & REGIONAL: S&P Reinstates 'BB+' Rating on Class A Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services reinstated its credit ratings
on London & Regional Debt Securitisation No. 1 PLC's class A and
B notes, at the issuer's request.

On Dec. 17, 2013, S&P withdrew its ratings on London & Regional
Debt Securitisation No. 1's class A and B notes at the issuer's
request.  The issuer has subsequently requested that it
reinstates the ratings.  S&P has therefore reinstated its ratings
on the class A and B notes at 'BB+ (sf)' and 'BB (sf)',
respectively.  The reinstated ratings are at the rating levels at
which S&P withdrew them on Dec. 17, 2013--for details of S&P's
analysis, see its publication on that date.

London & Regional Debt Securitisation No. 1 is a U.K. commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in
2005.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

London & Regional Debt Securitisation No. 1 PLC
GBP234.2 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Reinstated

A           BB+ (sf)          NR
B           BB (sf)           NR

NR-Not rated.


RSA INSURANCE: Top Shareholders Want Former Auditor Probed
----------------------------------------------------------
Alistair Gray and David Oakley at The Financial Times report that
top shareholders in RSA are demanding explanations from the
insurer's former auditor Deloitte for failing to spot accounting
irregularities at its Irish arm which have damaged investor
confidence in the FTSE 100 company.

According to the FT, four of RSA's largest 15 institutional
investors said they were turning their attention to the role of
Deloitte after their pressure on RSA led its chief executive
Simon Lee to quit last week.

One shareholder called on the UK's auditing watchdog, the
Financial Reporting Council, to investigate, the FT discloses.

The FT relates that people familiar with the situation said the
FRC was monitoring the situation closely and could launch a
formal investigation into RSA and Deloitte's failure to spot the
problems in Ireland.

However, the FRC said no formal investigation was under way, the
FT notes.

Investors said concerns they had raised about Deloitte's
independence from RSA last year have deepened since the group
issued three profit warnings in the past six weeks which have
seen the insurer's shares fall 30%, the FT relays.

Over those profit warnings, RSA has revealed accounting
irregularities in Ireland and that it needs to strengthen its
reserves by GBP200 million in the country, the FT discloses.
Analysts have warned the group needs to raise up to GBP1 billion
to shore up its finances, the FT relates.  The insurer, the FT
says, is expected to slash its dividend and dispose of various
assets.  Bankers warn it is vulnerable to a takeover bid, the FT
states.

According to the FT, while scrutinizing its accounts, Deloitte
was paid GBP10 million by RSA for management consulting, as well
as tax and other advice.  This compared with less than GBP6
million in auditing fees, the FT notes.

RSA Insurance Group plc is a multinational general insurance
company headquartered in London, United Kingdom.  It has over 17
million customers in 140 countries across the World.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EU Finance Ministers Agree on New Bank Resolution System
----------------------------------------------------------
Tom Fairless and Gabriele Steinhauser at The Wall Street Journal
report that European Union finance ministers agreed late
Wednesday on a new system to centralize control of failing euro-
zone lenders, in the hope that it will stop expensive banking
crises from ruining the finances of entire countries.

The deal brings to an end a month-long standoff between Berlin
and other European capitals over the design of the so-called
Single Resolution Mechanism, and particularly over its ability to
tap European taxpayer money as a last resort, the Journal notes.

"Taxpayers will no longer foot the bill when banks make mistakes
and face crises, ending the era of massive bailouts," the Journal
quotes Michel Barnier, the EU's internal market commissioner, as
saying.

But EU governments appeared to be heading for a clash with the
European Parliament, which must approve a compromise deal before
the law can enter into force, and critics have questioned whether
Mr. Barnier's promises will actually hold true, the Journal
discloses.  EU lawmakers agreed on their own version of the
proposal Tuesday, and it differs significantly from the one
adopted by finance ministers, the Journal relates.

According to the Journal, analysts and members of the European
Central Bank have also warned that the mechanism's decision-
making procedures may be to complex and its financial buffers too
small to safeguard against a major crisis.

The single resolution mechanism will be responsible for
shuttering or restructuring the 130 biggest euro-zone banks if
they run into trouble, as well as 200 or so cross-border banks,
the Journal discloses.  It will also have the right to intervene
in any of the about 6,000 euro-zone lenders if it sees the need,
the Journal states.

Decisions on whether to wind up a struggling bank and how to
share costs among creditors will be prepared by a single
resolution board, made up of representatives from euro-zone
governments plus five permanent officials, the Journal says.  But
any board recommendation will have to be approved by EU finance
ministers, a procedure that critics say could hold up
controversial decisions, according to the Journal.

As a safety net, governments will build up national resolution
funds by imposing levies on banks the Journal notes.  These funds
will be gradually merged over 10 years into one European pot
containing around EUR55 billion (US$75 billion), the Journal
relays.


* BOOK REVIEW: Bankruptcy Crimes
--------------------------------
Author: Stephanie Wickouski
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 395 Pages
List Price: $124.95
http://is.gd/LuspaE
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Did you know that you could be executed for non-payment of debt
in England in the 1700s? Or that the nailing of an ear was the
sentence for perjury in bankruptcy cases in 1604? While ruling
out such archaic penalties, Stephanie Wickouski does believe "in
the need for criminal sanctions against bankruptcy fraud and for
consistent, effective enforcement of those sanctions." She
decries the harm done to individuals through fraud schemes and
laments the resulting erosion in public confidence in the
judicial system. This leading authoritative treatise on the
subject of bankruptcy fraud, first published in August 2000 and
updated annually with new material, will prove invaluable for
bankruptcy law practitioners, white collar criminal
practitioners, and prosecutors faced with criminal activity in
bankruptcy cases. Indeed, E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. of Paul,
Hastings, Janofsky, and Walker, in Washington, DC, says, "If I
were a lawyer involved in a bankruptcy matter, whether civil or
criminal, and had only one reference work that I could rely
upon, it would be this book." And, Thomas J. Moloney with
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton describes the book as "an
essential reference tool."

An estimated ten percent of bankruptcy cases involve some kind
of abuse or fraud. Since launching Operation Total Disclosure in
1992, the U.S. Department of Justice has endeavored to send the
message that bankruptcy fraud will not be tolerated. Bankruptcy
judges and trustees are required to report suspected bankruptcy
212 crimes to a U.S. attorney. The decision to prosecute is
based on the level of loss or injury, the existence of sufficient
evidence, and the clarity of the law. In some cases, civil
penalties for fraud are deemed sufficient to punish and deter.
Ms. Wickouski suggests that some lawyers might not recognize
criminal activity that the DOJ now targets for investigation.
She gives several examples, including filing for bankruptcy
using an incorrect Social Security number, and receiving
payments from a bankruptcy debtor that were not approved by the
bankruptcy court. In both of these real life examples, DOJ
investigations led to convictions and jail time.
Ms. Wickouski says that although new schemes in bankruptcy fraud
have come along, others have been around for centuries. She
takes the reader through the most common traditional schemes,
including skimming, the bustout, the bleedout, and looting, as
well as some new ones, including the bankruptcy mill.
The main substance of Bankruptcy Crimes is Ms. Wickouski's
detailed analysis of the U.S. Bankruptcy Criminal Code, chapter
9 of title 18, the Federal Criminal Code. She painstakingly
analyzes each provision, carefully defining terms and providing
clear and useful examples of actual cases. She ends with a good
chapter on ethics and professional responsibility, and provides
a comprehensive set of annexes.

Bankruptcy Crimes is never dry, and some of the cases will make
you nostalgic for the days of ear-nailing. This comprehensive,
well researched treatise is a particularly invaluable guide for
debtors' counsel in dealing with conflicts, attorney-client
relationships, asset planning, and an array of legal and ethical
issues that lawyers and bankruptcy fiduciaries often face in
advising clients in financially distressed situations.

Stephanie Wickouski is a partner in the New York office of Bryan
Cave LLP. Her practice is concentrated in business bankruptcy,
insolvency, and commercial litigation.

This book may be ordered by calling 888-563-4573 or through your
favorite Internet bookseller or through your local bookstore.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *