---

        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, December 26, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 254

                            Headlines

A Z E R B A I J A N

BANK TECHNIQUE: Fitch Raises LT Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'


G E R M A N Y

ENTERPRISE NETWORKS: S&P Keeps 'CCC+' CCR on CreditWatch Positive


H U N G A R Y

MOL HUNGARIAN: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB' & Removes Rating from Watch


I R E L A N D

ELY PROPERTIES: Records Were Shredded, Liquidators Say
IRELAND: ECB President Raises Concerns About Banks' Health
LIGHTPOINT PAN-EUROPEAN: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB


K A Z A K H S T A N

NURBANK JSC: Moody's Affirms B3 Deposit & Unsecured Debt Ratings


M A L T A

ARRIVA: Paramount Coaches Shows Interest in Buying Assets


N E T H E R L A N D S

DALRADIAN EUROPEAN: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to CCC+
ENDEMOL BV: Buys 33% Stake in Reshet Amid Restructuring
HOLLAND HOMES 2000-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on Class D Notes


P O R T U G A L

PORTUGAL: May Need 10 Years to Tackle Structural Challenges


R U S S I A

IRKUTSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR; Outlook Stable


S P A I N

FONDO DE TITULIZACION: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to CCC-
NH HOTELES: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR250MM Sr. Sec. Notes


S W E D E N

DOMETIC GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'CCC+' CCR


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SRLEV NV: S&P Cuts Rating on CHF105MM Hybrid Debt Issue to 'D'


U K R A I N E

CRIMEA REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'B-' ICR; Outlook Negative
KYIV CITY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating; Outlook Neg.


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ABSOLUTE RETURN: To Make 1st Interim Liquidation Distribution
GREAT HALL 2006-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
KDJ SLADE: Goes Into Liquidation, Closes Doors
NORTH WEST ELECTRICITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' LT Corp. Credit Rating
RADIO THEATRE: Goes Into Liquidation on Economic Pressures

RANGERS FOOTBALL: May Need GBP10MM Cash Injection to Stay Afloat
RSA INSURANCE: Shareholders Raise Concerns Over Executives' Pay


U Z B E K I S T A N

SAMARKAND BANK: S&P Withdraws 'CCC' Counterparty Credit Ratings


                            *********


===================
A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


BANK TECHNIQUE: Fitch Raises LT Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA) at 'BB',
AccessBank (AB) at 'BB+', and Kapital Bank (KB) and Pasha Bank
(PB) at 'B+'. At the same time, the agency has upgraded Bank
Technique's (BT) Long-term IDR to 'B-' from 'CC'. All five banks
have Stable Outlooks.

Key Rating Drivers - All Banks' IDRS And Viability Ratings (VRS):

The rating actions reflect limited recent changes in most of the
banks' credit profiles and the currently stable operating
environment. The latter is supported by high oil prices and
significant budget spending, which remains the major growth
driver for the non-oil economy and bank lending. Liquidity in the
sector is adequate, underpinned by banks' reasonable deposit
collection capacity and fairly sticky funding.

The relatively high risk operating environment constrains the VRs
of local banks at quite low levels. Fitch assesses the
environment as high risk in light of Azerbaijan's weak
institutional development, reflected in a weak business climate
and limited financial transparency of the corporate sector, and
potentially high cyclicality of the economy as a result of its
commodity dependence. Banks' risks are further heightened by
their often long-term and concentrated loan exposures, sometimes
with significant grace periods and bullet repayments, including
for project and acquisition finance purposes. In Fitch's view,
these weaknesses are likely to translate into high and volatile
levels of credit losses at most of the country's banks. The
higher VRs of AB (bb-) and PB (b+) relative to IBA, KB and TB
(b-) reflect their better track records, to date, of managing
credit risks, and larger capital buffers.

Key Rating Drivers - IBA:

The affirmation of IBA's IDRs, SR and SRF reflects Fitch's view
that there is a moderate probability of support for the bank, if
needed, from Azerbaijan (BBB-/Stable). This view factors in (i)
IBA's high systemic importance stemming from its large domestic
franchise (the bank accounts for 35% of sector assets) and
substantial funding from state-owned corporations (AZN1bn or 16%
of end-3Q13 liabilities); (ii) the bank's majority (50.2%) state
ownership; (iii) it's fairly small size relative to the
sovereign's available resources; and (iv) the potentially
significant reputational damage for the authorities in case of
IBA's default.

However, Fitch views the sovereign's propensity to provide
support as only moderate due to the recent track record of quite
slow (and limited in volume) capital support in 2011-2012 and
weaknesses in the bank's corporate governance. Fitch views as
moderately positive the recapitalization plan announced by IBA in
October 2013, which provides for total equity injections of
AZN500 million by end-2016, including AZN100 million already
contributed in 4Q13. However, in the agency's view, planned loan
growth (management targets 15%-20% per annum) and dividend
payments mean that there is unlikely to be a significant
improvement in capital ratios.

IBA's 'b-' VR primarily reflects its weak capitalization, as
reflected by the low 6.8% Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio at end-
1H13, and asset quality. Although reported NPLs (non-performing
loans, 90 days overdue) were a moderate 8% at end-1H13, in
Fitch's view, high risk loans among IBA's largest exposures,
including lending to start-up businesses and construction loans
exposed to high non-completion risk, were equal to a sizable 1.3x
of end-1H13 FCC. Additional capital pressure stems from a
potentially under-provisioned promissory notes portfolio (1.7x
FCC net of loan impairment reserves; LIR), which is largely
exposed to construction projects in Russia. In Fitch's view, the
recoverability of these assets will be lengthy and may require
absorption of considerable additional credit losses.

In the absence of meaningful amortization of the loan book and
significant dependence on wholesale funding (at end-1H13, the
loans/deposits ratio was a high 2.1x) refinancing risk is
significant. However, the near-term refinancing schedule is
manageable for IBA, following recent funding rollovers. In
assessing IBA's liquidity position Fitch also takes moderate
comfort from the stickiness of IBA's customer funding and
potential liquidity support from the authorities in case of need.

Key Rating Drivers: BT

The upgrade of BT's IDR and VR reflects considerable progress in
work-outs of impaired loans, resulting in significant improvement
in the capital position, and currently comfortable liquidity.
However, the ratings still reflect weak asset quality and tightly
managed capital.

BT's new controlling private shareholder provided AZN10 million
of equity in 1H13 and US$10 million of subordinated debt in
December 2013, as a result of which Fitch expects the bank to be
compliant with the minimum 12% regulatory capital ratio
requirement by end-2013. However, BT's capital will still be
insufficient to absorb all legacy loan impairment problems given
still sizable unreserved NPLs and moderate reported pre-
impairment profit (equal to 16%, annualized, of average equity in
1H13).

BT's NPLs net of reserves amounted to AZN67 million (1.7x FCC) at
end-1H13, a decrease of AZN84 million compared with end-2012.
However, foreclosed assets and investment property comprised a
further 57% of FCC at end-1H13. Management expects further NPL
work outs of AZN60 million by end-2014, which Fitch estimates
would reduce net NPLs to about 75% of FCC. About half of the
planned recoveries relate to the largest group of interconnected
problem exposures, where Fitch views recovery prospects as
reasonable, given healthy collateral quality and management's
track record to date.

Key Rating Drivers: AB

AB's IDRs and Support Rating are underpinned by the moderate
probability of support from its international financial
institution (IFI) shareholders, in particular KfW (AAA/Stable;
20% stake), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(AAA/Stable; 20%) and the International Finance Corporation
(20%). At the same time, AB's Support Rating of '3' and Long-term
IDR of 'BB+' reflect some uncertainty with respect to timely
support always being provided if needed, given the fragmented
nature of the shareholder structure and the limited strategic
importance of the bank for its IFI owners.

The upgrade of AB's VR to 'bb-' from 'b+' reflects the bank's
extended track record of sound performance in a challenging
operating environment, its sound financial metrics in terms of
profitability, asset quality and capitalization, and strong
governance and management.

At end-1H13 AB reported 0.3% NPLs, while restructured loans and
write-offs during the period were equal to a further 0.6% and
0.3% of the portfolio, respectively. Capitalization remains a
credit strength, with the regulatory ratio standing at 19.7% at
end-1H13, although this is likely to decrease moderately due to
continued loan growth and dividend payments. Loss absorption
capacity through the income statement is also significant, with
pre-impairment profit equal to 6.5% of average loans in 3Q13 (not
annualized). AB's reliance on wholesale funding is high, with a
loans/deposits ratio of 306% at end-3Q13. However, Fitch views
refinancing risks as moderate given the role of development
institutions as suppliers of funding and the cash-generative loan
book.

Key Rating Drivers: KB

KB's IDRs, Support Rating and Support Rating Floor are driven by
potential support from the Azerbaijan authorities in case of
need. This view is based on (i) KB's systemic importance,
resulting from its social role in distributing pensions and other
budget payments through the largest branch network in the
country; (ii) KB's active involvement in state-funded
infrastructure development projects; and (iii) the close informal
relationships between KB and/or its shareholders with the
authorities. At the same time, Fitch continues to view the
support propensity as only limited given KB's currently modest,
albeit growing, commercial franchise and its private ownership.

KB's VR reflects the track record of weak performance and asset
quality and high balance sheet concentrations. At the same time,
the rating also considers the bank's improving capitalization
(regulatory CAR of 22% at end-3Q13) -- supported by the recent
AZN30 million and further planned equity injections and stronger
profit generation (annualized ROAE of 19% in 3Q13) -- the absence
of material non-government wholesale borrowings and the healthy
liquidity position.

At end-1H13, KB's reported NPLs were equal to around 15% of gross
commercial loans (end-2012: 22%) and were 79% covered by
reserves. Asset quality is further undermined by significant
related party lending (around 1.7x of FCC at end-1H13) and two
lumpy, high risk unsecured loans (combined equal to 1.6x of FCC)
to commercial construction projects, underscoring deficiencies in
KB's risk management. KB also acts as a pass-through vehicle for
some large state-financed loans to strategically important
companies. These are booked off balance sheet due to sovereign
guarantees that should prevent KB from bearing any credit losses
on these exposures.

Key Rating Drivers: PB's IDRS and VR

The affirmation of PB's ratings reflects the bank's limited
franchise and short track record; potential contingent risks
arising from the construction business of the broader group;
considerable political risk and uncertainty with respect to the
long-term sustainability of the bank's sizeable related party
funding (50% of end-H113 liabilities); and significant balance
sheet concentrations. On the positive side, the ratings consider
PB's currently solid financial metrics, reflected in a sizable
capital buffer, considerable liquidity cushion (46% of end-1H13
liabilities) and reasonable performance. PB's credit profile has
also benefited to date from the bank's powerful shareholder in
terms of capital injections and access to funding.

Reported NPLs increased sharply to 28% of loans at end-H113 (on a
net basis, equal to 48% of FCC) from 11% at end-2012. Fitch views
the largest NPL (equal to 20% of FCC) as highly risky, as it
represents a long-term exposure to a project at the initial stage
of completion. However, other NPLs have either since been
repaid/refinanced or benefit from credit enhancement. Additional
comfort stems from PB's significant loss absorption capacity,
reflected by its high 35% FCC ratio at end-1H13, and adequate
pre-impairment profitability (annualized pre-impairment ROAE of
17% in 1H13).

Rating Sensitivities - IBA'S, KB'S and AB'S Support-Driven
Ratings:

IBA's and KB's support-driven IDRs could be downgraded if the
sovereign is downgraded, their systemic importance markedly
decreases or the banks fail to receive timely support, when
needed. A multi-notch sovereign downgrade or a marked weakening
of shareholder support could result in a lowering of AB's
ratings. However, these scenarios are currently regarded as
unlikely by Fitch. Upside potential for the three banks' support-
driven ratings is limited.

Rating Sensitivities - All Banks' VRS, BT's and PB's IDRS

Upgrades of the banks' VRs and BT and PB's IDRs could be driven
by a significant improvement in the operating environment,
improved track records of managing asset quality and stronger
capitalization. Downward pressure on the ratings could result
from negative developments in these areas.

Key Rating Drivers and Rating Sensitivities - BT's and PB's SRS
and SRFS:

BT's and PB's SRFs of 'No Floor' and '5' Support Rating reflects
their relatively limited systemic importance, as a result of
which extraordinary support from the Azerbaijan authorities
cannot be relied upon, in Fitch's view. Although support from the
banks' private shareholders is possible, it cannot be reliably
assessed. Fitch does not expect any revision of the bank's SRFs
or Support Ratings in the foreseeable future.

The rating actions are as follows:

IBA
Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB', Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB'

AB
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb-' from 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

KB
Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+', Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '4'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B+'

PB
Long-term foreign-currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign-currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

BT
Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'B-' from 'CC'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'C'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b-' from 'cc'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


ENTERPRISE NETWORKS: S&P Keeps 'CCC+' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it is keeping on
CreditWatch with positive implications its 'CCC+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Enterprise Networks Holdings B.V., a
Germany-headquartered provider of enterprise communications-
related technology and solutions.  S&P originally placed the
ratings on CreditWatch positive on Sept. 27, 2013.

At the same time, S&P's 'CCC+' issue rating on ENH's senior
secured notes also remains on CreditWatch with positive
implications.

The ratings remain on CreditWatch primarily because S&P is still
lacking clarity on the progress of ENH's cost-cutting program
currently underway and its impact on the revenue, margin, and
cash flow generation prospects of the company's remaining
operations. S&P expects to discuss these factors with ENH's
management in the next two months.

In addition, on Oct. 31, 2013, ENH completed the sale of its
wholly owned subsidiary, Enterasys Networks Inc., for US$180
million in cash, to U.S.-based Extreme Networks.  ENH has not yet
announced its plans for the sale proceeds or commented on the
financial impact of the disposal on its operating results.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch in the next three months
after it has discussed with ENH's management the prospects for
profitability, free cash flow generation, capital structure, and
liquidity.  In addition, S&P aims to discuss the progress and
impact of the cost-cutting program currently underway on the
group's financial results.

At this stage, S&P sees an equal likelihood for either an
affirmation or a one-notch raise of the long-term rating on ENH.
This is primarily because the positive impact from the expected
US$180 million in disposal proceeds on the group's credit ratios
and liquidity could be offset by the weakening of the group's
profitability and cash flow generation that S&P expects after the
Enterasys disposal.  Moreover, S&P still needs further details to
form its assumptions regarding the potential for debt reduction
from the disposal and further covenant headroom.

                          Upside Scenario

The following factors could prompt an upgrade of ENH:

   -- An unchanged business risk profile assessment, despite the
      Enterasys disposal;

   -- Prospects of a 6%-8% EBITDA margin after restructuring
      costs and about break-even FOCF generation, supported by
      the current cost cuts or improving industry demand;

   -- Use of disposal proceeds mainly to reduce debt and to
      bolster liquidity to cover expected cash flow losses; and

   -- Covenant headroom of at least 20% after the disposal.

S&P could raise its issue rating on the senior secured notes by
one notch if it raised the long-term rating on ENH and it saw
sufficient value remaining in the group to result in recovery
prospects for noteholders of at least 30% under a stressed
scenario.

                         Downside Scenario

A scenario where S&P affirmed the long-term rating on ENH and, at
the same time, recovery prospects declined to less than 30% seems
highly unlikely at this point, in S&P's view, primarily because
it expects at least moderate debt repayment from the disposal
proceeds closing of the transaction.



=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


MOL HUNGARIAN: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB' & Removes Rating from Watch
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'BB'
from 'BB+' its long-term corporate credit ratings on MOL
Hungarian Oil and Gas PLC (MOL) and related entities.  At the
same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where it
placed them with negative implications on Oct. 11, 2013.  The
outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P lowered its issue ratings on MOL's senior
unsecured debt instruments to 'BB' from 'BB+', and its issue
ratings on the group's junior subordinated debt to 'B' from 'B+'.
S&P also removed these ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed
them with negative implications on Oct. 11, 2013.

The downgrade reflects continued uncertainty relating to the
ongoing disagreement between the Croatian government and MOL
regarding strategic issues at Croatia-based oil company INA, in
which MOL has a 49% stake and management control.  S&P
understands that negotiations continue regarding MOL's stake.
The downgrade reflects S&P's view that the lack of resolution of
MOL's disagreement with the Croatian government is negative for
MOL's creditworthiness.

INA constitutes roughly 36%-38% of MOL's combined reserves and
production and also owns two refineries.  S&P understands that
the Hungarian government has asked MOL to consider selling its
stake in INA, and that the Croatian authorities have issued an
international arrest warrant for MOL's chairman and CEO, which
remains outstanding.

Although S&P's 'BB' corporate credit rating on MOL is now in line
with its rating on Hungary, it believes that MOL could maintain
sufficient liquidity to cover its commitments in the event of
extreme stress on the sovereign.  MOL's international operations
provide a buffer for the group against potential weakness in its
domestic operations.  However, S&P would not rate MOL more than
two notches above Hungary because it assess MOL's country risk
sensitivity as "high," notably due to MOL's direct government
ownership, its classification of MOL as a government-related
entity, and its exposure to domestic economic cycles.

In S&P's view, over its rating horizon of the next 18 months, the
group's operating performance will continue to be supported by
upstream prices, which will allow the group to maintain adjusted
funds from operations (FFO) to debt of more than 25%.  In
addition, S&P forecasts that the group will maintain an
"adequate" liquidity position, and prudent financial policies,
including cash flow-funded capex.

Rating pressure could arise if MOL were unable to maintain
"adequate" liquidity or if S&P considered MOL unlikely to be able
to repay its financial obligations under its sovereign default
scenario stress test.  In addition, a downgrade could result if
discretionary cash flow (FOCF minus dividends) turned sharply
negative, and S&P forecasts FFO to debt of less than 25% for a
sustained period.

S&P would consider a downgrade if MOL's access to banks or
capital markets were to decline.  Major acquisitions above S&P's
base-case forecasts or significant dividends would also put
pressure on the ratings.

If S&P downgraded Hungary by one or two notches, this may not
necessarily directly affect its ratings on MOL, because its
criteria allow for a rating differential of up to two notches
between MOL and the sovereign.  In the event of a downgrade of
Hungary, S&P would look at the effect of domestic economic
developments on MOL's profits and liquidity.

A downgrade of Hungary by more than two notches, or a downgrade
of S&P's transfer and convertibility assessment on Hungary to
below 'BB' from 'BBB-' currently, would likely result in a
downgrade of MOL.

S&P believes there are certain scenarios that could result in it
upgrading MOL.  For example, an upgrade could occur if MOL were
to sell INA and invest the cash from the disposal in new
producing assets--potentially in areas with lower country risk
than Hungary. Likewise, if MOL retains its stake in INA but
continues to diversify its assets to improve its competitive
position, an upgrade could be warranted in the medium term.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ELY PROPERTIES: Records Were Shredded, Liquidators Say
------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that the liquidator of the Ely Properties
Ltd (EPL), an apartment management company owned by businessman
Philip Marley, has said that most of firm's books and records
were "shredded" just prior to his appointment.

Aidan Garcia, the liquidator of EPL, also alleged in an affidavit
that he had been forced to report Mr. Marley to the Garda for
"threatening and abusive communications, including threats on my
life since the commencement of the liquidation," according to The
Irish Times.

The report notes that Mr. Marley also dismissed claims that he
had ordered his company's files to be shredded.  Mr. Garcia's
affidavit states that an employee of the company told him this
and Mr. Marley had "not been able to provide me with a single
piece of paper in relation to the company's affairs," the report
relates.

This had, Mr. Garcia said, "severely hindered the liquidation,"
the report notes.

"From my investigations, it seems clear to me that Philip Marley
and others, including Mr. Marley's partner, Dana Wilkey, have
diverted company funds to their own benefit in the months prior
to the liquidation.  This has resulted in landlords not receiving
funds," the liquidator's affidavit also stated, the report
relays.

Ms. Wilkey is Marley's girlfriend and a guest star on the Real
Housewives of Beverly Hills.

The liquidator's affidavit relating to EPL was opened in the High
Court on Dec. 17, as part of a case relating to properties in the
Steelworks on Foley Street.

Various landlords owned the properties which Ely was supposed to
manage and collect rents on from the Catholic Housing Aid
Society, which placed aged or vulnerable people there as tenants,
the report discloses.

In an affidavit, the report relays that Maurice Ginty, an
administrator working for the Catholic Housing Aid Society, said
that from August 29, 2012, the owners of the apartments in the
Steelworks on Foley Street in Dublin began to complain that "Ely
had apparently been failing to discharge rents to them".

Justice Peter Charleton said the "true origin" of the problems
for the landlords was not its liquidator or the housing aid
society but the former ownership of EPL, the report adds.


IRELAND: ECB President Raises Concerns About Banks' Health
-----------------------------------------------------------
InsolvencyJournal.ie reports that addressing the European
Parliament last week Mario Draghi, European Central Bank
President, raised concerns about the health of Irish banks,
calling for "decisive" action on issues revealed by the balance-
sheet assessments undertaken by the Irish Central Bank recently.

Irish banks agreed to carry out a balance-sheet assessment last
month before the Government exited the three year EU/IMF bailout,
InsolvencyJournal.ie relates.  The three banks involved, Bank of
Ireland, AIB and Permanent TSB each said they did not need more
capital, InsolvencyJournal.ie relays.

Mr. Draghi, as cited by InsolvencyJournal.ie, said that while the
balance-sheet assessments of the Irish banks had identified no
capital shortfall, there were needs for adjustments for
provisions and risk-weighted assets prior to the European stress
tests due to take place next year.

According to InsolvencyJournal.ie, it was reported that
Mr. Draghi highlighted that the balance-sheet assessments by the
Irish Central Bank were "not forward-looking" and fall short of
the "stringent" stress tests that the bank are required to
undergo in 2014.


LIGHTPOINT PAN-EUROPEAN: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised all of its credit
ratings in Lightpoint Pan-European CLO 2007-1 PLC.

The upgrades follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the
transaction, using data from the Oct. 31, 2013 trustee report.
S&P has taken into account recent developments in the transaction
and reviewed it under its relevant criteria for transactions of
this type.

S&P has observed a number of positive developments in the
transaction.  The proportion of assets rated in the 'CCC'
category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') has decreased to 4.01% from
4.61% since S&P's previous review on March 20, 2012 has decreased
to zero from 2.20% as of S&P's previous review.

The class A notes' outstanding balance has decreased to
EUR253.57 million from EUR254.73 million.  The class E notes'
outstanding balance has decreased to EUR10.81 million from
EUR12.65 million.  At the same time, the portfolio's aggregate
collateral balance has increased since S&P's previous review.
Following these developments, the available credit enhancement
for all of the rated classes of notes has increased.

The transaction now benefits from a higher weighted-average
spread earned on the collateral pool of 3.72%, up from 3.09% as
of S&P's previous review.  The transaction's weighted-average
life is 4.70 years.

S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rates for each
rated class.  In S&P's analysis, it used the performing portfolio
balance (EUR318.35 million), the reported weighted-average
spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates calculated in
line with S&P's 2009 cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) criteria.  S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios
using its standard default patterns for each rating category
assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction with different
interest rate scenarios.

Of the portfolio's assets, 16.7% are non-euro-denominated.  The
issuer has hedged 16.4% of these assets under derivative
agreements with a single counterparty, Credit Suisse
International (A/Stable/A-1).  S&P considers that the
documentation for these derivative agreements is not fully in
line with its current counterparty criteria.  S&P has therefore
applied additional foreign-exchange stresses in our cash flow
analysis for scenarios above 'A+'.

S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that all of the rated classes
of notes can now withstand stresses at higher rating levels.  S&P
has therefore raised its ratings on the class A, B, C, D, and E
notes.

Lightpoint Pan-European CLO 2007-1 is a cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to
primarily speculative-grade corporate firms.  The reinvestment
period ends in February 2014.  Neuberger Berman Fixed Income LLC
is the collateral manager.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised

Lightpoint Pan-European CLO 2007-1 PLC
EUR352 Million Senior Secured Deferrable and Floating-Rate Notes

Class       Rating              Rating
            To                  From

A           AA (sf)             A+ (sf)
B           A+ (sf)             A (sf)
C           A- (sf)             BBB- (sf)
D           BBB- (sf)           BB (sf)
E           BB (sf)             B (sf)



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


NURBANK JSC: Moody's Affirms B3 Deposit & Unsecured Debt Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed JSC Nurbank's B3 long-term
and Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-currency deposit
ratings, B3 local currency senior unsecured debt ratings and its
E+ standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), which is
equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b3. The
outlook on the bank's BFSR and long-term ratings remains stable.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects Moody's assessment of the overall
stability in Nurbank's credit profile, which incorporates the
following aspects:

1) Nurbank's enhanced capital position counterbalances weak asset
quality. The bank's capital adequacy improved significantly
following a capital injection in late-2010 coupled with the gain
from the sale of problem loans in Q4 2012. Nurbank's equity-to-
assets ratio stood at 25.9% at end-Q3 2013, according to the
bank's unaudited IFRS statement. However, the bank's
capitalization will likely remain under pressure and decline to
more modest levels as higher loan loss reserves are recognized on
its weak loan portfolio. According to the bank's regulatory
reports as of end-Q3 2013, non-performing loans (defined as 90+
days overdue) accounted for 50.9% of gross loans. The bank's loan
loss reserves amounted to 26.1% of gross loans as of the same
date (according to the unaudited IFRS statement), which Moody's
believes is not sufficient to cover all expected credit losses.

2) Nurbank's deposits concentration is high, albeit declining,
with the 10 largest depositors representing 31% of the total
customer funds at year-end 2012, down from 37% at year-end 2011.
The refinancing risk arising from funding concentration is partly
mitigated by the liquidity cushion of 29% of total assets as at
end-Q3 2013, according to the bank's unaudited IFRS statement.

3) Weak revenue generation constrains Nurbank's profitability.
The sizeable non-performing loan portfolio results in low
revenues and net income with a return on assets (RoA) of 0.5% for
the first nine months of 2013, according to the bank's unaudited
IFRS statement. Moody's understands, that a substantial portion
of the bank's accrued interest income was recognized on problem
loans as this income was not received in cash. Without such
accruals the bank would be loss making for that period. The
rating agency expects a slow work-out of the problem loans and
limited credit growth, which will continue to constrain Nurbank's
profitability at least in the next12-18 months.

Nurbank's B3 global deposit ratings do not incorporate any
probability of systemic support, given the bank's relatively
small size and limited importance to Kazakhstan's banking system.
Consequently, the deposit ratings are in line with the b3 BCA.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:

A notable improvement in Nurbank's asset quality and
profitability could have positive rating implications.

Negative pressure could be exerted on Nurbank's ratings as a
result of a significant decline in liquidity or a substantial
deterioration of the bank's asset quality. Considerably higher
levels of related-party lending may also lead to a downward
revision of the bank's ratings.

Headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Nurbank reported total
assets of US$1.7 billion, shareholders' equity of US$476 million,
and net income of US$13 million at year-end 2012, according to
the bank's audited IFRS statements.



=========
M A L T A
=========


ARRIVA: Paramount Coaches Shows Interest in Buying Assets
---------------------------------------------------------
timesofmalta.com, citing The Sunday Times of Malta, reports that
one of the leading private bus and coach operators in Malta would
be interested in taking over the public transport service should
the long drawn-out negotiations between government and Arriva
fail.

Sources said that in recent weeks, word spread among Arriva
employees that Paramount Coaches was keen to take over the
business from Arriva by setting up a consortium which would
include a number of locally-based companies, according to
timesofmalta.com.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DALRADIAN EUROPEAN: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to CCC+
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised all of its credit
ratings in Dalradian European CLO IV B.V.

Since S&P's previous review on April 5, 2012, the transaction has
benefitted from a number of positive developments.  These
developments include:

   -- The senior notes (the variable funding notes and the class
      A notes) have amortized to 68% of their original balance;

   -- Overcollateralization has increased for all of the rated
      notes;

   -- The portfolio's weighted-average spread has increased to
      3.94% from 3.21%;

   -- The issuer has repaid the class E notes' deferred interest;

   -- The class C and D notes' overcollateralization tests have
      been cured; and

   -- The transaction has entered its amortization period.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE
                 Notional               OC
        Current     as of Current    as of
       notional  Apr.2012      OC Apr.2012
Class (mil.EUR) (mil.EUR)     (%)      (%)        Interest Def
VFN        60.3      78.3      44       31       6mE+26bps  No
A         119.8     140.6      44       31     6mE+23.5bps  No
B          32.0      32.0      31       21       6mE+50bps  No
C          24.0      24.0      22       13       6mE+80bps Yes
D          25.0      25.0      12        6      6mE+220bps Yes
E          15.0      17.8       7        0      6mE+425bps Yes
F Sub.     40.0      40.0       0        0              AF N/A

OC--Overcollateralization.
VFN--Variable funding notes.
6mE--Six-month EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate).
Bps--Basis points.
F Sub.--Subordinated notes.
AF--Available funds.
N/A--Not applicable.
Note: S&P converted British pound sterling and U.S. dollar
amounts to euro at the prevailing spot rates.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used a total collateral size
equivalent to EUR293.2 million, a weighted-average spread of
3.94%, and weighted-average recovery rates at each rating level
as calculated under S&P's criteria for rating cash flow and
synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions
backed by corporate debt.

The issuer entered into currency options with Deutsche Bank AG,
London Branch to hedge the foreign exchange risk arising from
non-euro-denominated assets.  The documented downgrade provisions
are not in line with S&P's current counterparty criteria.
Therefore, in scenarios above 'A+', S&P assumed nonperformance of
the options provider.

Following S&P's analysis of the transaction's exposure to credit,
cash flow, and counterparty risks, as well as the transaction's
increased overcollateralization, S&P believes that the available
credit enhancement for all of the rated notes is commensurate
with higher ratings.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on all
of the classes of notes in this transaction.

Dalradian European CLO IV is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans granted to
mainly speculative-grade corporate firms.  Elgin Capital LLP is
the transaction manager.  The transaction closed in August 2007
and entered its amortization period in August 2013.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Raised

Dalradian European CLO IV B.V.
EUR400 Million Floating-Rate Notes

            Rating        Rating
Class       To            From

VFN         AA+ (sf)       AA- (sf)
A           AA+ (sf)       AA- (sf)
B           AA (sf)        A- (sf)
C           A (sf)         B+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)       CCC+ (sf)
E           CCC+ (sf)      CCC- (sf)


ENDEMOL BV: Buys 33% Stake in Reshet Amid Restructuring
-------------------------------------------------------
Henry Mance at The Financial Times reports that Endemol has
bought a 33% stake in Israeli broadcaster Reshet in the latest
sign of closer links between television producers and channels.

The investment, understood to total about US$28.5 million, will
allow Endemol to test new formats in Israel before seeking to
sell them globally, the FT says.

It comes as the company faces increasing competition from
broadcasters, which are seeking to make more productions
themselves, the FT notes.

Last month, Endemol said it would invest EUR30 million in YouTube
channels and other internet platforms, a move that would also
decrease its reliance on TV broadcasters, the FT recounts.

Reshet, which is based in Tel Aviv, is one of Israeli's biggest
commercial channels by audience, the FT discloses.

The company is in the middle of a restructuring process,
following a EUR2.6 billion buyout on the eve of the financial
crisis, the FT states.

According to the FT, lenders, including Apollo Global Management
and Cyrte, are due to take control of Endemol, after a EUR1
billion takeover bid from Time Warner was rebuffed two years ago.

The restructuring has not stopped Endemol from investing in new
content and establishing new lines of business, the FT notes.

The Netherlands-based Endemol -- http://www.endemol.com/-- is
one of the world's leading producers of TV programs best known
for its output of hit reality-based programming and game shows
such as Deal or No Deal, Big Brother, and Extreme Makeover: Home
Edition.  The production company also creates scripted dramas and
soap operas, and develops digital content for online
distribution.  It has more than 2,000 programming formats in its
library and exports shows to more than 25 countries around the
world.  Formed in 1994, Endemol is owned by a consortium led by
private equity firm Goldman Sachs and Italian television company
Mediaset.


HOLLAND HOMES 2000-1: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Holland Homes MBS 2000-1 B.V., Holland
Homes MBS 2003-1 B.V. and Stichting Holland Homes III.

The mortgages in the transactions were originated by DBV
Levensverzekeringsmaatschappij N.V., which is now part of SNS
Bank N.V. (BBB+/Stable/F2), and are serviced by Stater Nederland
(RPS1-). A full list of rating actions is at the end of this
commentary.

Key Rating Drivers:

Stable Performance of Low Risk Pool
The affirmation reflects the performance of the underlying assets
and the sufficient credit enhancement available to the rated
tranches. The stable performance is due to the low weighted
average current loan to market value ratio, which ranges from 50%
to 65%, and the high weighted average seasoning (95 to 146
months) of the loans in the pool.

Loans in arrears by more than three months remain low, ranging
from 0% (Holland Homes 2000 and Holland Homes III) to 0.20%
(Holland Homes 2003) of the current portfolio as of the latest
interest payment dates (IPD) in November (Holland Homes 2000 and
Holland Homes 2003) and September 2013 (Holland Homes III),
compared with 0% to 0.27% in September 2012. In comparison with
other non-NHG backed transactions, the arrears are significantly
lower (with the non-NHG three months plus index at 0.92%).

Cumulative realised losses to date also remain low at 2bps of the
initial pool balance for Holland Homes III, while Holland Homes
2000 and Holland Homes 2003 have not recorded any losses since
closing.

Holland Homes III's Uncollateralized Class D notes
At close, the proceeds of the Holland Homes III class D notes
were used to fund the initial balance of the reserve fund. Unlike
Holland Homes 2003, the reserve fund balance was further
increased through an excess spread trapping mechanism which was
possible due to the pre-funding period running from closing until
March 2006. As of the September 2013 IPD, the amortizing reserve
fund amount was EUR6.2 million compared with the EUR4.5 million
class D outstanding amount. The difference in the two increases
the likelihood of the repayment of the class D notes at maturity,
provided losses remain limited.

Rating Sensitivities:

Home price declines beyond Fitch's peak to trough expectations of
25% could have a negative effect on the junior notes' ratings as
this would limit recoveries and put additional stress on
portfolio cash flows.

The rating actions are as follows:

Holland Homes MBS 2000-1 B.V.
Class A (ISIN XS0119750031) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0119750114) affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0119750460) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

Holland Homes MBS 2003-1 B.V.
Class A1 (ISIN XS0182739853) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2 (ISIN XS0182741164) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0182741594) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0182741750) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0182740430) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

Stichting Holland Homes III
Class A (ISIN XS0233450138) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0233451615) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0233452936) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0233453660) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


PORTUGAL: May Need 10 Years to Tackle Structural Challenges
-----------------------------------------------------------
Peter Wise at The Financial Times reports that a digital clock
inaugurated by Paulo Portas, Portugal's deputy prime minister,
has begun marking the six-month countdown to Lisbon's planned
exit from its EUR78 billion bailout program.  But a senior
International Monetary Fund official has warned that it could
take at least another 10 years to address the country's deep-
rooted structural challenges, the FT relates.

"Distortions in the economy have built up over decades and it's
unrealistic to expect that they could be removed in the three
years of an adjustment program or that the reform process could
be externally imposed," Subir Lall, head of the IMF mission to
Portugal, told the FT in an interview.

"The transformations that the economy needs will have to go on
for another 10 to 15 years and they will have to be home grown,"
the FT quotes Mr. Lall as saying.  "Changing how the economy
responds and overcoming inertia requires an ongoing effort and
will have to be done regardless of which political party is in
power."

His sobering message of tough years of reform ahead comes as the
center-right government braces itself for an immediate risk to
its hopes of regaining full access to capital markets before the
rescue program ends in June, the FT discloses.

Mr. Lall, as cited by the FT, said it was still too early to say
whether Lisbon would ask for additional support after its
bailout.  He said that early next year, when the public debt
agency is expected to begin trying to tap long-term debt markets
again, would be "a good point to see what investors are saying",
the FT relays.

Lisbon's bailout exit strategy also faces political risks, the FT
notes.

According to the FT, Mr. Lall said that tackling excessive
corporate leverage, high energy and port costs, an inefficient
civil service and a slow judiciary system, as well as creating
more flexible labor markets, were among the "deep-rooted
challenges" Portugal would need to address for years after its
bailout clock reaches zero in June.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


IRKUTSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' long-term
issuer credit rating on Irkutsk Oblast, a Russian region in
Eastern Siberia.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'ruAA+' Russia national scale
rating on the oblast.

Rationale
The ratings on Irkutsk Oblast are based on S&P's view of Russia's
"developing and unbalanced" institutional framework, as well as
the oblast's relatively low economic wealth levels in an
international context and its high infrastructure spending needs.
All this translates into very limited budgetary flexibility.

"We assess the oblast's financial management as "negative" in an
international comparison, because of the lack of reliable long-
term planning and a constrained capacity to withstand federal
pressure to raise expenditures.  Weakening budgetary performance
and modest contingent liabilities will likely be neutral for the
oblast's credit quality in the next three years, in our view,"
S&P said.

The ratings are supported by the oblast's low debt burden and
"positive" liquidity.

Under Russia's "developing and unbalanced" institutional
framework, the oblast has very limited revenue flexibility.  The
federal government sets the national tax regime and distributes
transfers, and S&P estimates that, in 2014-2016, more than 90% of
the oblast's operating revenues will be unmodifiable.  At the
same time, the oblast's budget revenues are affected by moderate
economic concentration in the mining industry because the region
is rich in natural resources, especially oil, gas, and coal.  The
oblast's revenues therefore depend on world oil prices and the
performance of the region's few largest taxpayers, oil producer
Rosneft and its subsidiaries and oil transporter Transneft.

The oblast's expenditure flexibility is also very limited, in
S&P's view, due to the large infrastructure needs that the vast
region and its municipalities are facing, and because of the
federal government's pressure to increase social spending.  In
2012 the federal government imposed additional mandates on all
Russian regions, requiring significant increases in public sector
salaries and construction of social and housing infrastructure.
The oblast estimates that this will cost about 7%-11% of
additional operating expenditures in 2014-2015.

"We expect that in 2013-2016, Irkutsk Oblast will post only
moderate budgetary performance on average because of a
combination of weaker tax revenues and growing social and capital
expenditures.  In our base-case scenario, we forecast the
oblast's tax revenues will decrease by 7% in 2013 compared with
2012 year on year.  This is because we expect a 25% drop in
corporate profit tax due to smaller payments from the leading
taxpayers.  New legislation on consolidated taxpayer groups has
led to reported lower taxable profits.  We expect tax revenues to
recover only modestly in 2014-2016 following relatively low
annual growth in the gross regional product, stabilization of the
volume of oil production, and our forecast of gradually subsiding
oil prices," S&P said.

"The oblast's budgetary performance will also hinge on the
financial management's willingness and ability to constrain
spending growth.  In November 2013, a key member of the financial
management team, vice governor in charge of economy and finance,
who had been implementing a very conservative approach to
expenditures and borrowing in the oblast since 2008, left his
post.  In our view it remains to be seen whether the new
management will stick to the strict financial discipline that has
underpinned the improvement of the oblast's creditworthiness over
the past several years.  The draft budget for 2014-2016 assumes
wider deficits than we previously forecast.  However, we expect
some delays in the implementation of the oblast's capital
spending program that might result in lower-than-budgeted
expenditures," S&P added.

S&P's base-case scenario therefore assumes an operating balance
of about 2% of operating revenues on average in 2014-2016 after a
temporary deficit in 2013, which is down from 10% of operating
revenues in 2010-2012.  The deficit after capital accounts will
likely widen to a large 15% of revenues in 2013 and then might
gradually improve to about 4% in 2014-2016.

Consequently, S&P expects the oblast to cover a portion of its
deficit in 2013 with cash and to accumulate direct debt in 2014-
2016.  Nevertheless, S&P forecasts tax-supported debt to reach a
still low 15% of consolidated operating revenues by year-end
2016.

In S&P's view, contingent liabilities stemming from overdue
municipal payables and the need to maintain and develop
infrastructure across the region's vast territory will remain
modest and neutral for the oblast's creditworthiness.

                             Liquidity

"We view Irkutsk Oblast's liquidity as "positive," as defined in
our criteria.  In our view, in 2014, the oblast's average free
cash on accounts will exceed its very low debt service by more
than 10x.  At the same time, we view the oblast's access to
external liquidity as "limited," due to the weaknesses of the
Russian capital market and its banking sector," S&P noted.

In line with S&P's base-case scenario, in 2013, it expects that,
the oblast will draw down its cash reserves to cover the deficit
after capital accounts.  However, S&P forecasts average free cash
to equal more than Russian ruble (RUB) 12 billion throughout
2014, which is approximately US$380 million, or 12% of the
operating revenues that we forecast.

S&P therefore anticipates that the oblast will be able to repay
its minor debt service of about 1% of operating revenues without
recourse to refinancing.

S&P forecasts that debt service will increase to about 3%-5% in
2015-2016, because the oblast will gradually accumulate direct
debt in 2013-2016.  By year-end 2013, it will likely borrow up to
RUB2.5 billion in two-year bank loans.  S&P also expects it to
tap capital markets in 2014 for the first time since 2009 and to
issue medium-term amortizing bonds with three or five year
maturities in 2014-2016.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, in 2013-2016,
Irkutsk Oblast will stabilize its budgetary performance at
moderate levels, despite weaker tax revenues and the need to
increase social spending.  S&P's base-case scenario also assumes
that the oblast will maintain positive liquidity by relying on
medium-term borrowing and keeping debt service low.

S&P could take a negative rating action within the next 12 months
if, in line with its downside scenario, the oblast's financial
policy were to substantially weaken, leading to a widening of
deficits after capital accounts to about 8% of total revenues in
2014-2016.  This would likely be accompanied by a more rapid debt
accumulation and cash depletion.

S&P could take a positive rating action over the next 12 months
if it considered the supportiveness and predictability of
Russia's institutional framework to have improved.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Irkutsk Oblast
Issuer Credit Rating                   BB+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale                  ruAA+/--/--



=========
S P A I N
=========


FONDO DE TITULIZACION: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to CCC-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC-(sf)' from
'B-(sf)' its credit rating on Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
UCI 18's class C notes.

The downgrade follows the class C notes' breach of its interest
deferral trigger on the Dec. 16, 2013 interest payment date
(IPD).

The trustee's data for the December 2013 IPD show that cumulative
defaults account for 4.40% of the closing portfolio balance,
which is above the class C notes' 4.09% interest deferral
trigger. Cumulative defaults have increased considerably since
the previous IPD (September 2013), when they represented 3.90% of
the closing portfolio balance.

Following the breach of the interest deferral trigger, the class
C notes did not default on its interest payment on the December
2013 IPD.  However, the risk of default has increased
considerably since the breach, as the payment of interest for the
class C notes has (as a consequence of the breach) been deferred
to a more junior place in the priority of payments.  Interest on
the class C notes will now be paid after the principal
amortization of the notes.  Consequently, S&P has lowered to
'CCC- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.  The
other classes of notes in this transaction are unaffected by the
rating action.

Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos UCI 18 is a Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction, backed by first-
ranking mortgages secured on owner-occupied residential
properties in Spain, which closed in February 2008.  The
originator and servicer of the loans is Union de Creditos
Inmobiliarios Establecimiento Financiero de Credito.


NH HOTELES: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR250MM Sr. Sec. Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned NH Hoteles, S.A.'s (NHH; B-/Stable)
EUR250 million senior secured notes a final 'B+' rating with a
Recovery Rating of 'RR2'.

The rating action follows the review of the final terms of the
bond which principally conform to information already received by
Fitch.

The senior notes are rated two notches above NHH's IDR to reflect
above-average recovery prospects.

As expected, the proceeds have been combined with a new
syndicated term loan and convertible bond issue to repay all debt
under a previous senior facilities agreement. NHH's 'B-' IDR
reflects high leverage and expected additional free cash outflows
over the next two to three years. The rating also acknowledges
the initial success NHH has had in implementing several strategic
initiatives aimed at strengthening its long-term brand
positioning and the market share of the group.

Key Rating Drivers:

Pricing Power Improvement
In recent years, capital expenditure has been scaled back to
preserve liquidity. This has resulted in considerable under-
investment in NHH's hotel portfolio, which has negatively
impacted the company's ability to justify price increases. Annual
capital expenditure has been, on average, at around 54% of
depreciation over the past three years. As proceeds from asset
sales are reinvested in remaining owned properties, NHH's product
offering should allow for steady price increases.

Further Transition to Asset-Light
Management is focused on shifting the overall portfolio toward a
"managed" format rather than the "owned" structure currently in
place. NHH opened four new hotels in 2012 under the management
structure. Furthermore, the company executed several sale and
manage-back transactions in recent quarters to further facilitate
this transition and have identified EUR140 million of assets it
plans to sell in 2014.

On-going Execution Risk
As part of the expected operational improvements, NHH is
restructuring or cancelling leases (54% of rooms) and management
contracts (21% of rooms) which have become unprofitable due to a
combination of increased costs and/or low occupancy rates. While
execution risk remains high, the weak performance in recent
periods provides NHH with negotiating leverage as hotel owners do
not have many branded hotel alternatives to replace the
incumbents. As such, renegotiating terms is viewed to be a more
affordable option than pursuing litigation.

Improved Financial Flexibility
Asset sales and operational restructuring are the primary drivers
of the company's expected turnaround in FY13 and FY14. The
refinancing of the existing term loans with a loan-senior note
structure are viewed by Fitch as benefiting the company by
extending NHH's maturity profile and unlocking additional cash
resources that can be allocated toward property refurbishment and
brand improvements. As Fitch does not expect material debt
repayment over the next two to three years, NHH's credit metrics
are likely to be a constraining factor on the ratings. NHH's
expected lease-adjusted net leverage of around 7.9x at FYE13
compares poorly with other higher-rated hotel and leisure peers
such as Accor (BBB-/Stable) and Whitbread (BBB/Stable).

Strong Expected Recoveries
The majority of NHH's properties are in or around major European
and Latin American cities. As a result, the portfolio's valuation
has proven resilient and become a primary source of liquidity in
recent years. NHH's 'RR2' reflects Fitch's expectations that the
valuation of the company -- and resulting recovery for its
creditors -- will be maximized in a liquidation, rather than in a
restructuring, due to the significant value of the company's
owned real estate portfolio. The expected distribution of
recovery proceeds should provide above-average recovery for
potential senior secured creditors due to significant real estate
collateral coverage relative to the drawn debt under the new
capital structure.

Rating Sensitivities:

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

   -- Lease adjusted net debt/ EBITDAR below 6.5x, EBITDAR/ gross
      interest + rent above 1.5x (FY14 projection: 1.2x), EBITDA
      margin (excluding one-time gains) sustained at or above 10%
      (FY14 projection: 9.1%), as well as a demonstrated path to
      sustained positive FCF generation

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Continued free cash outflows resulting in strained
      liquidity, lease-adjusted net leverage above 9.0x, EBITDA
      margin, excluding capital gain, below 6% and
      EBITDAR/(rent+interest) below 1.1x



===========
S W E D E N
===========


DOMETIC GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'CCC+' CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Sweden-based leisure product manufacturer Dometic
Group AB to stable from negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed
its 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit rating on Dometic.

The outlook revision reflects improvement in the company's
liquidity position, stemming from a combination of factors,
including the refinancing package signed in June of this year,
the zquity injections made by the financial sponsor, EQT, and
improvements in operating performance.  In total, a cash equity
injection totaling Swedish krona (SEK) 400 million has now
materialized, which Dometic has used for debt reduction.  This
has led to improved liquidity and a somewhat less aggressive
capital structure.

The refinancing implied a looser amortization schedule in 2014
and thereafter also more headroom under the covenants.  There was
a slight improvement in EBITDA in the last quarter, and S&P
expects overall further stabilization of margins.  Although S&P
expects liquidity to remain "adequate," unexpected reversals in
the company's improving operating environment remain a key risk,
especially given the company's exposure to the European
recreational vehicles market.

S&P's assessment of Dometic's business risk profile as "weak"
reflects the company's modest scale by global standards, along
with a relative dependency on the weak European market.

S&P views Dometic's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged,"
as its criteria define the term.  This primarily reflects the
company's high debt burden.  On Sept. 30, 2013, Dometic's total
senior debt amounted to about SEK4.4 billion.  In addition, the
company has EUR202 million payment in kind notes maturing in
2019. The stable outlook reflects S&P's assessment that Dometic's
liquidity position will remain "adequate" at least through 2014.
The stable outlook furthermore assumes a slight improvement in
EBITDA over 2014 to about SEK1.05 billion-SEK1.15 billion,
supporting S&P's expectations of positive FOCF.

S&P could revise the outlook to positive or raise the ratings in
2014 if the company's EBITDA improves faster than it expects, so
that further deleveraging would be possible under the current
debt structure.  This would imply EBITDA margins of above 15% and
debt to EBITDA of below 7x.

S&P could revise the outlook to negative if operating performance
does not improve at least in line with its expectations in 2014,
as this could lead to new covenant pressure and also
deterioration of cash flows.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SRLEV NV: S&P Cuts Rating on CHF105MM Hybrid Debt Issue to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has lowered its
rating on the CHF105 million junior subordinated perpetual hybrid
debt issue from Dutch life insurer SRLEV N.V. to 'D' from 'CC'.
At the same time, S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch
negative, where it was placed on March 29, 2013.

The rating action follows SRLEV's deferral of the annual coupon
on this issue, which was due for payment on Dec. 19, 2013.  S&P's
treatment is in line with its criteria published on RatingsDirect
on Oct. 24, 2013: "Use Of 'C' And 'D' Issue Credit Ratings For
Hybrid Capital And Payment-In-Kind Instruments", and the related
criteria "Principles For Rating Debt Issues Based On Imputed
Promises."

In line with the criteria in the above-mentioned articles, the
issuer credit rating (ICRs) on SRLEV is not affected by the
rating action taken on this hybrid security.  S&P would not lower
the ICR if the payment default is in accordance with the
instrument's terms and conditions, as it is in this case.

The coupon has been deferred as a condition set down by the
European Commission for the receipt of state-aid by the SNS Reaal
bancassurance group, which was nationalized by the Dutch state in
February 2013.  The coupon will remain deferred until the
insurance group is returned to public ownership.

The 'D' rating reflects SRLEV's missed coupon payment on the
instrument as S&P sees this suspension as a breach of the promise
it imputes to rate the instrument.  Under S&P's criteria, even if
the terms of cumulative and noncumulative instruments allow for
nonpayment of interest, the occurrence of a coupon suspension is
a breach of the terms of the promise that we impute to rate the
instrument, which is to pay cash on the originally scheduled due
date.  For securities that allow for cumulative coupon deferrals,
S&P imputes a ratable promise of repayment of the deferred amount
within one year of the deferral date.

S&P will continue to conduct ratings surveillance on this issue.
S&P could raise the rating on the issue in the coming quarters
from 'D' currently if it believes that SRLEV is likely to resume
payments in the future.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


CRIMEA REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'B-' ICR; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-' long-term
issuer credit rating on Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'uaBBB-' long-term Ukraine
national scale rating on Crimea.

Rationale

The long-term rating on Crimea mainly reflects S&P's long-term
sovereign rating on Ukraine (B-/Negative/B, Ukraine national
scale uaBBB-).  The rating on Crimea also incorporates S&P's
assessments of its low debt, conservative debt policies, and
sound financial performance in recent years.  In addition, S&P
factors in its view that Crimea lacks revenue predictability and
has very low budgetary flexibility in terms of revenues and
expenditures. Crimea relies heavily on subsidies and excise tax
revenues and has high expenditure needs, due to the "volatile and
underfunded" Ukrainian institutional framework, in S&P's view.
Rating weaknesses are Crimea's low wealth levels, weak financial
management practices, negative liquidity, and contingent
liabilities related to its municipalities and utilities.

Under S&P's methodology, a local and regional government (LRG)
can be rated higher than its sovereign if it believes that it
exhibits certain characteristics.  S&P do not currently believe
that Ukrainian LRGs, including Crimea, meet these conditions.
S&P consequently caps the long-term rating on Crimea at the level
of that on Ukraine.

"We assess Crimea's indicative credit level (ICL) at 'b'.  The
ICL is not a rating.  It is a means of assessing an LRG's
intrinsic creditworthiness under the assumption that there is no
sovereign rating cap.  The ICL results from the combination of
our assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the
effects we see of the institutional framework in which it
operates," S&P added.

Under the "volatile and underfunded" Ukrainian institutional
framework, Crimea's budgetary flexibility is very low.
Modifiable revenues accounted for less than 10% of the republic's
total operating revenues in 2012.  Reliance on alcohol excise
taxes and on a single taxpayer who provided about 15%-20% of
operating revenues in 2012 further constrains revenue flexibility
and predictability.  S&P thinks alcohol excise tax revenues will
grow by only a very modest 1% in 2013 in our base-case scenario,
after a very weak first-quarter 2013 compared with first-quarter
2012, due to legal disputes involving the largest single
taxpayer.

Although it has little budgetary flexibility, Crimea posted a
strong operating surplus of 5% of operating revenues in 2012,
mostly owing to additional revenues from excise taxes and
subsidies.  Over 2011-2012, Crimea's average operating margin
stood at 3.3%, and S&P expects it to narrow to 1%-3% in 2013-
2016.

S&P regards Crimea's capital spending policy as conservative.  In
S&P's base-case scenario, it expects the republic to report minor
deficits after capital accounts over 2013-2016, following an
average 1.3% surplus after capital accounts over 2011-2012.  It
has reiterated its commitment to keep spending under control and
consequently to refrain from borrowing in the period.  The
republic already cut its capital spending in 2012-2013, following
a decrease in capital subsidies, which were much larger in 2010-
2011.

Still, S&P considers that Crimea's financial management has a
negative impact on the rating in an international context.  This
is because of the republic's need to develop long-term planning,
its only modest financial transparency, with disclosure generally
limited to budgetary activities, and the weak performances of its
municipalities and utilities.

Crimea's debt policy is conservative, in S&P's opinion.  In 2009-
2012, its tax-supported debt grew to a still-moderate 4% of
revenues from zero, and S&P understands the republic has no plans
to increase its debt burden.  In S&P's base-case scenario,
Crimea's tax-supported debt will remain below a modest 10% of
revenues until 2015.  The republic issued a Ukrainian hryvnia
(UAH) 133 million bond in 2011 to finance waste-recycling
projects, but has indicated no plans to borrow in 2013-2015.
Consequently, S&P expects its debt service to be limited to the
UAH133 million bond maturing in June 2014.

Crimea's wealth levels are low, in S&P's opinion, with gross
regional product per capita of only $2,600 in 2012, by S&P's
estimates.  In S&P's view, the republic's infrastructure
investment needs are large.  The most urgent areas are water,
sewerage, transport, and roads.  The estimated cost for these
works exceeds Crimea's annual budget several times.  Although the
central government provided Crimea with large capital subsidies
in 2010-2011, which enabled heavy investment in public
transportation, the republic's investment needs remain very high.
These needs also push up contingent liabilities related to the
republic's municipalities and its infrastructure utilities,
especially those in water and sewerage.

                             Liquidity

S&P considers Crimea's liquidity position to be "negative," as
defined by its criteria.  S&P's assessment encompasses the
republic's ratio of average debt service coverage over the past
12 months, which S&P estimates at more than 130% including the
June 2014 bond maturity.  S&P also factors in the volatility and
decrease it expects in this ratio over the next 12 months.  S&P
also incorporates its view of Ukrainian LRGs' access to external
liquidity as "uncertain."

As of Oct. 1, 2013, Crimea reported cash in both the general and
special fund accounts and deposits exceeding UAH97 million (about
$11 million).  However, the cash position is volatile, as Crimea
reported weaker cash levels and started to use state treasury
loans for operating spending earlier this year.  These loans can
be also used to secure timely interest payments, if necessary.

To repay its June 2014 bond, Crimea has indicated it plans to
start accumulating cash in late 2013.

S&P views Crimea's access to external liquidity as "uncertain"
given the volatility in Ukraine's capital market.  The weaknesses
of Ukraine's banking sector are reflected in S&P's Banking
Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA), which classifies
Ukraine in group '10'.  S&P's BICRA ranks risk relating to
banking systems on a scale of '1' to '10', with '1' being the
lowest risk and '10' being the highest risk.

Outlook

The negative outlook on Crimea reflects S&P's negative outlook on
Ukraine.  S&P would revise the outlook on Crimea to stable if it
revised its outlook on Ukraine to stable.

S&P might lower the ratings on Crimea if it lowered the ratings
on Ukraine, all other things being equal.

S&P could also consider a negative rating action on Crimea in the
unlikely case that its performance and liquidity substantially
weakened ahead of its June 2014 bond repayment, for example
because of setbacks in revenue performance.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Crimea (Autonomous Republic of)
Issuer Credit Rating                   B-/Negative/--
Ukraine National Scale Rating          uaBBB-/--/--


KYIV CITY: S&P Affirms 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating; Outlook Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-' long-term
issuer credit rating on the city of Kyiv.  The outlook is
negative.

Rationale

The rating on Ukraine's capital, Kyiv, reflects S&P's view of
Ukraine's institutional framework as "volatile and underfunded."
Rating weaknesses are the city's severely constrained financial
flexibility; weak budgetary performance; "negative" financial
management; "very negative" liquidity; material debt burden, with
associated foreign-exchange risks; and high contingent
liabilities.  The rating is supported by the city's position as
the administrative and economic center of Ukraine, it's fairly
diversified economy, and wealth levels exceeding the national
average several-fold.

The city's fiscal flexibility remains severely constrained
because of very limited discretion over revenue sources and
spending policies, and S&P's view of Ukraine's weak public
finance system. By investing in the city's transport and energy
infrastructure under the Euro 2012 soccer cup preparation
program, the central government has eased some of Kyiv's urgent
capital needs.  However, the city's substantial investment
requirements continue to restrict its spending flexibility.

In S&P's 2013-2015 forecast period, it expects only modest tax
revenue growth, fuelled mostly by the inflation rate, and some
modest central government grants.  However, the city's
consolidation efforts will likely support operating performance
at some 2.5%-3.0% of operating revenues on average in 2013-2015,
which is close to the 2.7% recorded in 2010-2012.  After a peak
in investments related to the Euro 2012 event, S&P thinks the
city will likely slow its investment program and post deficits
after capital accounts at less than 5% of total revenues in 2013-
2015.

"In our base-case scenario, we assume Kyiv will implement some
cost containment measures although we continue to regard the
city's financial management as "negative" under our criteria.
This assessment is in line with our view of other Ukrainian local
and regional governments and implies only emerging long-term
planning, and weak management of debt, liquidity, and the city's
government-related entities.  We have already factored in the low
political strength of the city's government and the volatility of
the political environment.  Consequently, the recent removal of
the city's head of administration by Ukraine's president has not
fundamentally changed our view of the city's management and its
policy plans," S&P said.

"Under our base-case scenario, Kyiv's tax-supported debt will
continue to be exposed to foreign exchange risks and stay above
60% of operating revenues over our 2013-2014 outlook horizon.
Our calculation of tax-supported debt includes direct debt, and
debt at Kyiv's government-related entities (including loans from
multilateral lending institutions).  About 20% of direct debt
during the same period will continue to consist of central
government loans that will come due only if the city's revenues
outperform the central government's targets.  The state has not
yet written off these loans, however.  In our view, the city's
new borrowing will mostly be to tackle refinancing needs," S&P
added.

Kyiv's diversified economy, in a domestic context, is Ukraine's
wealthiest.  The city's personal income levels are likely to
remain twice as high as the national average, by S&P's estimates.
S&P also thinks the unemployment rate will continue to be the
lowest in Ukraine.

After Kyiv's efforts to evaluate and settle its payables to
utility companies, which provide services at artificially low
tariffs, and the provision of strong earmarked grants from the
central government, the payables have somewhat diminished and
stabilized.  The central government is responsible for setting
utility and transport tariffs.  However, the still-material size
of the city's payables represent a significant contingent
liability on its budget.

Liquidity

S&P regards Kyiv's liquidity position as "very negative" under
its criteria.  In S&P's opinion, the city's cash position will
likely remain volatile and its access to external liquidity
"uncertain" against its continuous exposure to material
refinancing risks in late 2014 and in 2015.

Kyiv's reported cash stood at Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) 524 million
on Oct. 1, 2013.

The city's liquidity position is severely undermined by large
refinancing risks.  It faces bullet repayments in late 2014 and
2015, with debt service hitting 20% of operating revenues in 2014
and some 30% in 2015.  The refinancing plan for the 2014 domestic
bond maturity is not clear at the moment.  In S&P's current base-
case scenario, it envisage refinancing similar to that conducted
in 2012.

S&P regards Kyiv's access to external liquidity as "uncertain."
However, S&P notes that the city's liquidity has so far derived
some support from uninterrupted and timely access to short-term
liquidity loans from the state treasury, available for interest
payments (but not principal).

The weaknesses of Ukraine's banking sector are reflected in S&P's
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA), which
classifies Ukraine in group '10'.  S&P's BICRA ranks risk
relating to banking systems on a scale of '1' to '10', with '1'
being the lowest risk and '10' being the highest risk.

Outlook

The negative outlook on Kyiv mirrors that on Ukraine.  S&P could
lower its ratings on Kyiv should it lower its ratings on Ukraine.

S&P could also take a negative rating action if the central
government's support to Kyiv diminished, leading to weaker debt
repayment capacity for the city.  This would likely result in a
worse budgetary performance than S&P currently expects in its
base-case scenario and take the form of restricted access to
state banks' and treasury liquidity.

S&P might consider revising the outlook on Kyiv to stable if it
took a similar action on Ukraine.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Kyiv (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating                   B-/Negative/--
Senior Unsecured                       B-

Kyiv Finance PLC
Senior Unsecured                       B-



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ABSOLUTE RETURN: To Make 1st Interim Liquidation Distribution
-------------------------------------------------------------
At an extraordinary general meeting of Absolute Return Trust Ltd.
held on Nov. 20, 2013, shareholders passed resolutions to wind-up
the Company and appointed Ashley Paxton and Linda Johnson of KPMG
Channel Islands Limited as joint liquidators.

The Liquidators announce their intention to make a first interim
liquidation distribution of:

-- GBP0.603876 per Sterling Redeemable Participating Preference
    Share issued; and

-- EUR 0.434480 per Euro Redeemable Participating Preference
    Share issued

The First Interim Distribution was to be effected pro rata to the
holdings of Sterling and Euro Redeemable Participating Preference
Shares on the register at the close of business on Dec. 13, 2013.

The distribution was to be paid on Dec. 19, 2013.  Payment was by
way of Sterling and Euro cheques drawn upon a UK clearing bank
posted to the Shareholder's registered address as at the Record
Date.

The Liquidators can be reached at:

         Ashley Paxton
         Linda Johnson
         20 New Street
         St. Peter Port
         Guernsey
         GY1 4AN
         Tel: 01481 741898
         Fax: 01481 722373
         E-mail: restructuring@kpmg.guernsey.gg


GREAT HALL 2006-1: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the senior note ratings
and affirmed all other outstanding note ratings in Great Hall
Mortgages No. 1 Plc Series 2006-1, 2007-1 and 2007-2. Rating
action reflects the exposure to operational risk because of a
weak servicer, in addition to there being no back-up servicer in
case of a servicer disruption.

For a detailed list of affected ratings, see towards the end of
the ratings rationale section.

Ratings Rationale:

Downgrade of the senior note ratings in Great Hall Mortgages
No. 1 Plc Series 2006-1, 2007-1 and 2007-2 has been triggered by
a correction to the identity of the servicer and its linkage to
Co-Operative Bank Plc (Caa1/NP) and lack of any back-up servicer
arrangements.

Western Mortgage Services Limited (NR), a subsidiary of Co-
Operative Bank Plc acts as servicer in the three transactions,
with the Co-Operative Bank Plc itself acting as master servicer.
Moody's considers that the transactions are exposed to servicer
disruption risk as there is no back-up servicing arrangements in
case of servicer disruption.

The Bank of New York Mellon (Aa2/P-1) acts as cash manager,
investment and issuer account bank in the three transactions. The
transactions benefit from a liquidity facility and reserve funds
which partially offset the lack of back-up servicing arrangement.
In case of a payment disruption, Bank of New York Mellon can use
the available liquidity held in the transactions' investment
accounts to make interest payments due under the notes.

Moody's estimates that the available liquidity would prevent the
issuer from missing an interest payment or payment under the swap
agreements for at least two quarters. Moody's notes that this is
a positive element as it reduces the likelihood of a potential
default under the current swap agreements which could have an
adverse impact for noteholders.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings are performance of the underlying collateral that is
worse than Moody's expected, deterioration in the credit of the
transactions main counterparties and the other factors Moody's
outlines in this press release.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings are better performance of the underlying assets than
Moody's expects, a decline in counterparty risk and other factors
Moody's describes in this press release.

Issuer: Great Hall Mortgages No. 1 Plc Series 2006-01

GBP216.3M A2a Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec
13, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR175M A2b Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13,
2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

GBP25.8M Ba Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

EUR7.5M Bb Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2006
Assigned Aa3 (sf)

GBP11.5M Ca Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned A3 (sf)

EUR8M Cb Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2006
Assigned A3 (sf)

GBP5.6M Ea Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

GBP6M Da Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2006
Definitive Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

EUR11.5M Db Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Dec 13, 2006
Assigned Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Great Hall Mortgages No. 1 Plc Series 2007-01

GBP264M A2a Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24,
2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

EUR396M A2b Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24,
2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)

GBP47.1M Ba Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

EUR55.6M Bb Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

GBP19M Da Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

GBP14.5M Ea Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

EUR22.9M Db Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

GBP14M Ca Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

EUR33.4M Cb Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Issuer: Great Hall Mortgages No. 1 Plc Series 2007-02

US$600M Ac Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24,
2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

GBP278.8M Aa Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24,
2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

EUR30M Ab Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 24,
2009 Downgraded to Aa1 (sf)

GBP75.2M Ba Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to A3 (sf)

GBP7.5M Ea Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

EUR10M Eb Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Ca (sf)

GBP9M Ca Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

EUR42.1M Cb Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

GBP2M Da Notes, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

EUR28M Db Notes, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 24, 2009
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)


KDJ SLADE: Goes Into Liquidation, Closes Doors
----------------------------------------------
thisisthewestcountry.co.uk reports that a liquidator has been
appointed for Winsham-based building firm KDJ Slade & Sons after
a creditors' meeting on December 11.

Lameys will look after the liquidation of the company, which
closed its doors on November 26 after 67 years of trading,
according to thisisthewestcountry.co.uk.

The report relates that the closure affected four directors and
29 other staff who are all submitting claims to the Government's
redundancy payments office in a bid to regain more than œ300,000
which they say is owed to them in total.

Lameys said the company's records show there is in the region of
just over GBP1million in unsecured creditors, but the exact
amount will be confirmed as part of the liquidators'
investigations, which also include statutory duties, such as
looking at the conduct of directors, the report notes.

The main part of the process should take six to nine months, but
it could take up to two years to complete the whole liquidation
process, including collecting any outstanding debt, the report
adds.


NORTH WEST ELECTRICITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' LT Corp. Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long-term
corporate credit rating on North West Electricity Networks
(Holdings) (NWENH) at 'BB+'.

At the same time, S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch, where
it placed it with positive implications on Nov. 26, 2013.  The
outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P affirmed all other related group ratings.

"We base our rating affirmation on NWENH on our assessment of the
group comprising all of the Electricity North West entities as a
complex group, under our revised corporate criteria.  Within this
group, we believe that the operating company, Electricity North
West (ENW; opco) and its intermediary holding company, North West
Electricity Networks (NWEN; midco) form an insulated subgroup
from the ultimate holding company (holdco), NWENH," S&P said.

"On a consolidated group basis (holdco, midco, and opco), we
assess the business risk profile as "excellent" and the financial
risk profile as "significant," leading to an anchor of 'a-'.  We
assess the stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of the group at
'bbb+', however, because we believe that there is some
uncertainty surrounding opco's financial risk profile and
dividend payments in the next regulatory period.  This leads us
to apply a negative financial policy modifier," S&P added.

The issuer credit rating (ICR) on midco is the same as the
subgroup's group credit profile (GCP; 'bbb').  S&P has adjusted
down the subgroup's GCP to 'bbb', from what the group would have
otherwise been assessed at if determined on a fully consolidated
basis.  This reflects midco's cash flow subordination owing to
S&P's view of regulatory insulation of the opco, which holds the
regulated utility concession and most of the group's assets.

Because opco qualifies as an insulated subsidiary within the
subgroup, S&P rates it at 'BBB+', one notch above the subgroup's
'bbb' GCP, as S&P believes its SACP supports a higher rating.

The ICR on the holdco is the same as the GCP, which S&P assess at
'bb+', two notches below the subgroup's 'bbb' GCP.  This reflects
potential risk to the holdco of cash flow restrictions from the
subgroup.

S&P's assessment of the insulation within the group is based on
the following rationale:

   -- S&P assess opco as an insulated subsidiary within the
      subgroup because it benefits from regulatory protection.
      Under license conditions, the regulator might restrict
      upward payments from the regulated opco to a holdco under
      certain perceived circumstances of weakening credit
      quality.

   -- This protection leads S&P to believe that midco's access to
      Topco's cash flow could be restricted.  S&P reflects this
      potential risk by lowering its assessment of the subgroup's
      GCP to 'bbb', one notch below the consolidated credit
      quality assessment.

   -- S&P adjusts the GCP by only one notch, because it believes
      that cash lock-up risk would be somewhat mitigated by
      NWEN's access to independent credit facilities.

   -- Furthermore, based on S&P's group methodology criteria, it
      believes the protections around the subgroup lead to a
      separation of two notches between the GCP of the subgroup
      ('bbb') and that of the holding company ('bb+').

   -- Structural financial features based on leverage and
      interest covenants reinforce at midco level the regulatory
      protections around opco.  Such lock-up events include
      leverage exceeding 85% in terms of net debt to regulatory
      capital value (RCV) and adjusted interest coverage of less
      than 1.1x.  The need to comply with covenant tests means
      that cash outflows from NWEN to NWENH are less predictable
      and could be volatile.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- ENW performing in line with its regulatory requirements;

   -- Some risks linked to the future regulatory price
      determination starting in 2015, which constrain current
      ratings; and

   -- Stable profitability.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt well within the
      "significant" financial profile range of 9%-13%;

   -- Maintenance of fairly high leverage compared with peers,
      with debt to risk-adjusted value (RAV) of around 90%; and

   -- Neutral to negative free operating cash flows and negative
      discretionary cash flows.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that the consolidated
group will maintain its focus on low-risk regulated electricity
distribution.  S&P believes that ENW's financial risk profile may
weaken in the next regulatory period depending on the next
regulatory outcome and the group's dividend payment policy.  The
stable outlook also assumes that NWENH will maintain "adequate"
stand-alone liquidity and sufficient bank arrangements to cover
its interest charges for 12 months.  The outlook is underpinned
by our base-case forecasts, which indicate a low risk of lock-up
events under NWEN's covenants.

S&P could raise the rating on NWENH if it considers it highly
likely that the consolidated group will maintain a "significant"
financial risk profile.  This could occur, for example, if the
owners adopt more moderate financial policies in terms of
leverage and dividends.  Furthermore, if S&P raises the rating on
ENW, it would likely raise the rating on NWENH.

The ratings on NWENH could come under pressure if the group's
consolidated financial risk profile weakens, in particular, if
S&P no longer assess it as "significant."  This could occur as a
result of additional leverage, the adoption of a more aggressive
dividend policy than S&P currently anticipates, or adverse
regulatory developments.  S&P do not consider these scenarios as
likely, however.

If S&P revises its assessment of the consolidated group's credit
quality downward, it would likely lower the rating on NWENH.  S&P
could also increase the notching differential applicable to NWENH
if it considers that there is a higher risk that the regulatory
ring fence will be put in place.  At the same time, S&P will
assess the risk of triggering NWEN's lock-up covenant, which
could further constrain the rating on NWENH.

Finally, S&P could lower the ratings on NWENH by one notch if
NWENH fails to maintain sufficient liquidity arrangements to
cover its interest charges for 12 months.

The issue rating on the GBP180 million guaranteed secured notes
to be issued by NWEN Finance is 'BB+', in line with the corporate
credit rating on NWENH.  The recovery rating on the notes is '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.  The recovery rating on the notes
reflects the notes' subordination to the debt at both ENW and
NWEN and the noteholders' reliance on the equity value of NWENH's
ownership in the financial ring-fenced group, including ENW and
NWEN.

To determine recovery prospects, S&P simulates a hypothetical
default scenario.  S&P's default scenario assumes that sufficient
stress at the ENW and NWEN levels would lead to a lock-up of cash
flows that S&P anticipates will occur in 2016, with the debt-to-
RAV ratio reaching 85%.  S&P then forecasts a payment default at
the NWENH level about 12 months after the lock-up, assuming that
the liquidity reserve to be put in place at NWENH would allow
servicing of the bond interests during that period.

S&P assumes a distressed sale of the regulated electricity
business via an enforcement of holding company share pledges at a
10% discount to the RAV.  Allowing for debt-to-RAV of 85% at the
ENW and NWEN levels, this leads to about GBP85 million being
available for holders of the guaranteed secured debt at NWEN
Finance.  From this, S&P deducts enforcement costs of about
GBP10 million.  On this basis, S&P sees recovery in the 30%-50%
range for the GBP180 million notes.


RADIO THEATRE: Goes Into Liquidation on Economic Pressures
----------------------------------------------------------
Insolvency News reports that The Radio Theatre Company Ltd has
entered liquidation, cancelling the show midway through its 2013
tour.

The Radio Theatre Company Ltd had produced the smash hit UK tour
in 2012 but had "been subject to extreme economic pressures" this
year, according to the report.

Myles Jacobson from Streets SPW Plc, was appointed liquidator to
the company on December 2, 2013.

"Hitchhiker's Live has been subject to the same extreme economic
pressures as many productions touring the UK this autumn. Ticket
sales across the board have been lower than average and have not
escaped this trend," the report quoted Mr. Jacobson as saying.

"A difficult financial environment for such a large and technical
show means that covering operating costs has become impossible.
As a result the decision was taken in October to cancel the
remaining dates of the tour," Mr. Jacobson added, the report
relays.


RANGERS FOOTBALL: May Need GBP10MM Cash Injection to Stay Afloat
----------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Smith at The Scotsman reports that Rangers former chairman
Malcolm Murray said the club will need a GBP10 million cash
injection to stay afloat in the next 18 months.

According to The Scotsman, the club's complex ownership
structure, as well as the discontent from supporters at the
continued presence of finance director Brian Stockbridge on the
board, also has Mr. Murray concerned about the ability to attract
such investment.

The businessman was one of the four "requisitioners" who failed
to be voted on to the Ibrox board at Thursday's annual general
meeting, but Mr. Murray believes the outcome of that event, which
witnessed loud booing of any contribution from Stockbridge, will
not be "the line in the sand" hoped for by new club chief
executive Graham Wallace, who has also admitted Rangers need
"external funds" in the medium term, The Scotsman relates.

Mr. Murray claimed that 40 million 25p shares would be required
to raise that sum, The Scotsman discloses.

However, issuing such a large number of shares would dilute the
existing shareholding of current investors and Mr. Murray
insisted that would be "terrible" for the financial institutions
who have already put money into the club, The Scotsman notes.

South Africa-based businessman Dave King has claimed that he was
the only person he felt would be willing to invest in Rangers at
present but chief executive Wallace presented a different
picture, The Scotsman relays.

Mr. Wallace, The Scotsman says, is not planning talks with
Mr. King but neither does he rule him out.  "I've never met Dave
King or had any conversations with him," The Scotsman quotes Mr.
Wallace as saying.  "When we have developed the plan to determine
the level of funding we need, we'll engage with a wide
constituency.  I wouldn't rule anybody out.  If that includes Mr
King, we'll deal with that at the time."

                  About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


RSA INSURANCE: Shareholders Raise Concerns Over Executives' Pay
---------------------------------------------------------------
Alistair Gray and David Oakley at The Financial Times report that
leading shareholders of RSA Insurance Group plc have raised fresh
concerns about the executive pay practices of the FTSE 100
insurer after they endured heavy losses from a string of profit
warnings.

According to the FT, a week after Simon Lee quit as chief
executive, big investors in Britain's largest non-life insurer by
market capitalization said worries about pay policies they raised
earlier in the year had deepened since the group ran into recent
difficulties.

One top 15 investor said the board should do everything it could
to try to recoup bonuses paid to Mr. Lee, who recently stood
aside, the FT relates.  Another called on the group to conduct a
review of how regional managers are remunerated, the FT says.

RSA handed Mr. Lee a pay package of GBP2 million for 2012, the FT
relays.  On top of a GBP800,000 salary, he received a GBP480,000
cash bonus and GBP470,000 of share awards, the FT discloses.

Despite discontent over pay that shareholders raised last year,
RSA avoided a full-scale revolt, the FT notes.

However, one leading investor said on Dec. 19 the board should
revisit the subject given the group has since discovered
accounting irregularities at its Irish business that have left it
needing to raise hundreds of millions of pounds to firm its
balance sheet, the FT relates.

RSA Insurance Group plc is a multinational general insurance
company headquartered in London, United Kingdom.  It has over 17
million customers in 140 countries across the World.



===================
U Z B E K I S T A N
===================


SAMARKAND BANK: S&P Withdraws 'CCC' Counterparty Credit Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it withdrew its long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on Uzbekistan-based
Samarkand Bank, which S&P had previously suspended.

The rating withdrawal reflects that S&P has no sufficient and
reliant financial information to continue surveillance.  S&P had
previously suspended the ratings on Samarkand Bank on June 12,
2013, owing to a lack of satisfactory and timely information.
S&P still believes it do not have enough qualitative and
quantitative information to reinstate the ratings and resume
appropriate surveillance.  The ratings were 'CCC/C' before
suspension, and the outlook on the long-term rating was stable.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *