TCREUR_Public/140116.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Thursday, January 16, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 11



DEXIA CREDIOP: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Viability Rating


EUROHYPO CAPITAL: Moody's Lifts Hybrid Instruments Rating to 'B1'
PROKON REGENERATIVE: Collects EUR1.4-Bil. From Investors
WINDERMERE XII: Fitch Junks Ratings on Four CMBS Note Classes


CARL SCARPA: Set to Exit Examinership Later This Month
IRISH BANK: Kennedy Wilson to Pay EUR111-Mil. for Shelbourne Debt


BANCA MONTE: Fabrizio Viola Won't Step Down as Chief Executive


LECTA SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B' & EUR200MM Notes Rating to 'B'


ROST BANK: S&P Assigns 'B-' Counterparty Rating; Outlook Stable


BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Cuts Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2'


SBAB BANK: Moody's Puts Ba1 Stock Rating on Review for Downgrade


CREATIV GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' CCR
LEMTRANS LTD: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' CCR
UKRAINIAN AGRARIAN: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'B-' Rating
UKRLANDFARMING PLC: Fitch Says Cargill Stake Buyout Positive

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Former CEO Retires From Thomas Cook Board
DMI (UK): In Administration, Cuts 27 Jobs
EDWARDS GROUP: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
GRANGE AND LINKS HOTEL: Goes Into Administration, Closes Doors
MIVAN: Administration Puts 289 Construction Jobs in Jeopardy

PUNCH TAVERNS: Publishes Final Debt Restructuring Proposals
THEMELEION IV: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class A Notes



DEXIA CREDIOP: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Viability Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Italy-based Dexia Crediop's Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB', its Short-term IDR at 'F3'
and Support Rating (SR) at '2'. Fitch has also affirmed Crediop's
Viability Rating (VR) at 'ccc' and subsequently withdrawn it.
The Outlook for the Long-term IDR is Negative.


Crediop's IDRs and SR reflect potential support from its majority
owner, Dexia (A/Stable), which controls the bank through its
subsidiary Dexia Credit Local (DCL, A/Stable).  As long as DCL
remains Crediop's majority shareholder, Fitch believes there is a
high probability that Dexia would provide support to Crediop, if
needed.  Fitch's view is that a default of Crediop would result
in high reputational risk for Dexia. Dexia's IDRs are in turn
based on support from France (AA+/Stable) and Belgium

However, that Crediop's Long-Term IDR is three notches lower than
Dexia's reflects Fitch's opinion that Crediop is of limited
strategic importance to Dexia.  The notching also reflects the
presence of minority shareholders, who control 30% of the bank,
and the fact that Crediop is up for sale.

Under Dexia's orderly resolution plan, approved by the European
Commission (EC) at end-December 2012, the French and Belgian
authorities extended a EUR85 billion guarantee to Dexia to
support the funding of the whole group, including the funding of
Crediop. However, Crediop's debt is not explicitly guaranteed by

Under the same plan, Crediop should be sold but was permitted by
the EC to generate limited new business in 2013.  Such business
could be extended only to existing clients with a view to
preserving franchise and ultimately facilitating the bank's sale.
In early 2013 a monitor trustee was appointed to supervise
Crediop's activities in line with Dexia's orderly resolution
plan.  Crediop's gross loan book has steadily declined and fell
by 8% in 1H13. Fitch expects Crediop to concentrate on reducing
its balance sheet further in 2014.

The Negative Outlook reflects that on Italy's sovereign ratings
as Crediop operates exclusively in Italy and is exposed to
Italian sovereign and local authorities risk in both its bond and
loan portfolios.


Crediop's IDRs and SR are sensitive to a change in Dexia's
ability (as measured by its ratings) or propensity to support
Crediop. Fitch believes that Dexia's propensity to provide
support depends on it maintaining a controlling stake in the
bank.  A change in Crediop's ownership structure would likely
affect its ratings.

As Dexia's IDRs are based on sovereign support from France and
Belgium, a change in Fitch's assessment of state support could
also affect Crediop's ratings.

In Fitch's view, there is a clear intention in the EU to reduce
state support for financial institutions, as demonstrated by a
series of legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives.  On 11
September and 10 December 2013, Fitch outlined its approach to
incorporating support in its bank ratings in light of evolving
support dynamics for banks worldwide, including for banks in
effective wind down like Dexia.

Crediop's IDRs and SR are also sensitive to a change in Italy's
sovereign rating as Fitch believes that Dexia's propensity to
support Crediop is linked to the Italian operating environment. A
deteriorating environment could result in a decreased propensity
to provide support.


Fitch has withdrawn Crediop's VR because the bank can no longer
be analysed in its own right.  This is because bank is over 50%
reliant on funding, both from its parent and the European Central
Bank (ECB), and its ability to determine its own growth targets
and strategy is limited.

The VR prior to its withdrawal reflects Fitch's opinion that the
bank's business model provides limited opportunities for
continuing operations without parental support.  The bank's
profitability remains weak and is not expected to improve
significantly given a high volume of low-yielding assets.
Cumulated net losses between 2010 and 1H13, however, amounted to
a modest EUR81 million which eroded only 6% of equity over the
same period.


EUROHYPO CAPITAL: Moody's Lifts Hybrid Instruments Rating to 'B1'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to B1(hyb) from Ca(hyb)
two hybrid instruments ("non-cumulative Trust Preferred
Securities"), issued by Eurohypo Capital Funding Trust I and II
(XS0169058012, DE000A0DZJZ7).

The upgrade reflects that the two entities have agreed to (1)
retroactively pay all coupons skipped over the preceding four
years; and (2) continue to service these instruments for all
future fiscal years provided that the domination and profit and
loss transfer agreement will remain in effect between Commerzbank
Inlandsbankenholding GmbH (unrated) and Hypothekenbank Frankfurt
AG (HF; deposits Baa3 stable, standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) E/baseline credit assessment (BCA) caa2, no

The outlook on the B1(hyb) ratings for the affected Tier 1
instruments is stable, in line with the outlook on HF's other
rated obligations.

All other ratings of HF group are unaffected by today's rating

Ratings Rationale

The multiple-notch upgrade of the two Trust Preferred Securities
to B1(hyb) was prompted by the announcement of Eurohypo Capital
Funding Trust I and II on November 13, 2013 that both entities
will retroactively service these instruments, which had not paid
coupons for four years, i.e., since 2010 for the financial year
2009. Moody's understands that in mid-November 2013, the two
entities retroactively paid all coupons that had been skipped for
the financial years 2009-12. Also, the two Funding Trusts, as per
their November 13, 2013 communication, agreed to pay coupons in
the future provided that HF benefits from the existing domination
and profit & loss transfer agreement. This agreement ultimately
obliges its ultimate parent Commerzbank AG (deposits Baa1 stable,
BFSR D+/BCA ba1 stable) to absorb, on an annual basis, any net
loss incurred at HF based on German accounting standards. In
effect, the new circumstances imply that the instruments will be
serviced regardless of whether HF has a fiscal year profit under
German GAAP.

As a consequence, the credit-risk profile of these instruments
resembles that of HF's existing senior subordinated and junior
subordinated debt, which Moody's currently rates B1 and B1(hyb),
respectively, i.e., two notches below HF's adjusted BCA of ba2.
However, Moody's understands that the existing documentation that
describes the coupon-skip triggers for these instruments remains
unchanged. This implies that if the profit and loss transfer
agreement is discontinued, the credit risk would increase for
holders of the Trust Preferred Securities and may cause downward
pressure on the B1(hyb) ratings.


The B1(hyb) ratings of the Tier 1 instruments depend on -- and
therefore will move in tandem with -- the ba2 adjusted BCA of HF,
which includes Moody's assumptions of parental support available
to HF, but not systemic support. An improvement in the bank's
standalone credit strength might lead to an upgrade of the Tier 1
instruments, whereas deterioration could prompt a downgrade. In
addition, a change in Moody's expectation of available support
from HF's ultimate parent, Commerzbank, could positively or
negatively affect HF's ratings for its Tier 1 instruments.

A discontinuation of the profit and loss transfer agreement would
exert downward pressure on the B1(hyb) ratings. The
discontinuation would immediately raise the risk for holders of
the Trust Preferred Securities insofar as it would make the
contractual coupon-skip trigger lanuage as outlined in the
existing documentation effective again. It may also trigger a
reduction in Moody's current assumptions of parental support
available to HF from Commerzbank.

PROKON REGENERATIVE: Collects EUR1.4-Bil. From Investors
Stefan Nicola at Bloomberg News reports that Prokon Regenerative
Energien GmbH collected EUR1.4 billion (US1.9 billion) from
investors seeking to profit from the booming wind industry.

According to Bloomberg, the company may now have to file for
protection from creditors.

Bloomberg relates that Prokon said in a statement the company
will be forced to file for insolvency this month if it doesn't
get agreement from almost all investors to delay withdrawals from
profit-participation certificates.  The company has sold
certificates to more than 75,000 investors, promising returns of
6%, Bloomberg discloses.

The company, which owns 314 wind turbines and employs about 1,300
people, has relied on the certificates to attract funding,
Bloomberg states.  Fears of a possible bankruptcy can prompt
holders of such rights to cancel their commitment, forcing the
company to pay out Bloomberg says, citing terms of the
participation agreement.

Prokon, based in Itzehoe in the northern state of Schleswig-
Holstein, said that while it's economically healthy and its wind
farms are profitable, "panic" withdrawals are forcing it to repay
money it doesn't have, Bloomberg relays.  Bloomberg notes that
the company's Jan. 10 filing shows it has asked investors to
delay withdrawals through October, and needs agreement from 95%
Jan. 20.


According to Bloomberg, as funding concerns mount, Prokon also
faces a probe in Schleswig-Holstein.  Prosecutors in the city of
Luebeck received two complaints against Prokon and have opened an
investigation into "initial suspicion of fraud and other economic
crimes," Wenke Haker-Alm, a spokeswoman for the prosecutors, as
cited by Bloomberg, said on Tuesday.

Prokon Regenerative Energien GmbH is a German clean-power

WINDERMERE XII: Fitch Junks Ratings on Four CMBS Note Classes
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Windermere XII FCC's class B and E-H
CMBS notes, as follows:

  -- EUR776m class A due July 2017: affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

  -- EUR317.4m class B due July 2017: downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'Bsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 100% assigned

  -- EUR126.6m class C due July 2017: affirmed at 'CCCsf';
     Recovery Estimate (RE) 80%

  -- EUR39.2m class D due July 2017: affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE0%

  -- EUR80.8m class E due July 2017: downgraded to 'Csf' from
     'CCsf'; RE0%

  -- EUR81.3m class F due July 2017: downgraded to 'Csf' from
     'CCsf'; RE0%

  -- EUR38.7m class G due July 2017: downgraded to 'Csf' from
     'CCsf'; RE0%

  -- EUR59m class H due July 2017: downgraded to 'Csf' from
     'CCsf'; RE0%

The affirmation of the class A notes reflects their cushion to
Fitch's estimate of the recovery value of loan collateral.  The
credit strength is underpinned by re-letting activity and some
normalization in real estate markets, although the Negative
Outlook indicates that risks remain related to both factors.  The
downgrade of the class B notes reflects that the proposed cost-
sharing to allow payment of an asset manager performance fee
would lead to a minor principal loss.  If the proposal (the goal
of which is timely liquidation) is not passed, eventual legal
resolution of the loan would run up against time pressure, which
could diminish recoveries for the class B notes.  The downgrades
of the class E to H notes reflect Fitch's view that losses at
this level are inevitable.

On December 20, 2013, a noteholder meeting was called to discuss,
among other things, a proposed resolution of the loan through an
asset sale. The proposal, authored by the borrowing group, is to
sell the Coeur Defense asset via a sale of the shares in the
borrower's holding company (Dame Luxembourg).  This offer by the
borrower (the shares are not formally part of the security
package) is premised on savings made by not being liable for
certain property transaction costs (primarily title registration
duties) being shared between creditors and the borrower

As a basic terms modification, consent is required from 75% of
investors in each class.  To obtain this, the 71% portion is
proposed to be paid to any class that (but for this saving) would
have incurred a loss (the allocation is defined formulaically).
In this event, recoveries would be in excess of the REs above.

In addition, the proposal includes a payment to Atemi, the
borrower's asset manager, of up to EUR13.9 million in fees
designed to promote performance.  Apart from the class A
noteholders' share of the fee (which is effectively paid as a
senior expense), these fee installments would be pari passu with
the various classes of notes, and levied from principal receipts.
The effect would be that investors in those classes would suffer
a corresponding loss of principal, which is reflected in the
ratings. The outcome of the noteholder meeting has yet to be

Part of the motivation for the borrower to try to expedite loan
resolution could stem from recent court rulings, which appeared
to tilt the balance of power in favor of creditors.  In March,
Fitch understands that the Court of Appeal of Versailles upheld
the validity and enforceability of the Dailly Law assignment
under which rental income is enjoyed by the lender (the FCT)
irrespective of the status of the borrower.  In this case, the
borrower is subject to drawn-out safeguard proceedings.  With
respect to the related safeguard Plan, the court decided against
a wholesale re-drafting, but did act to ensure the Plan made
provision for repayment of loan principal by rescheduling its
termination to ten days after the July 10, 2014 loan maturity

The managing agent of the issuer, Eurotitrization, and the
special servicer, CBRE Loan Servicing Limited, have lent their
support to the proposal given that if the loan is not resolved
within the term of the Plan, the borrower is likely to be placed
in judicial liquidation.  Transaction parties have indicated
their belief that this would result in an additional haircut to
recoveries.  Such an outcome is plausible, in Fitch's view.  The
42,000 sq. m office has a weighted average lease term to break of
only 3.2 years and is approximately 25% vacant already (with
little change since 12 months ago).  In addition, given the age
of the building and forthcoming new office supply in La Defense,
Fitch expects further downward pressure on income to emerge,
which could also see the class B notes facing impairment.

Fitch believes that a noteholder vote in favor of the proposal
would guarantee losses for all tranches other than the class A
notes in the event the property was sold in time.  This would
lead to negative rating action on the affected notes, although
recoveries for junior classes would be greater than currently
flagged by the REs.

Fitch's estimated 'Bsf' recovery amount is EUR1,150m-EUR1,200m.


CARL SCARPA: Set to Exit Examinership Later This Month
RTE News reports that Carl Scarpa has announced 12 redundancies
and two store closures as part of a plan that will see the
retailer exit examinership later this month.

The company, which entered examinership in October of last year,
will continue to operate 19 outlets across the country, employing
68 people in total, RTE News discloses.

According to RTE News, lease arrangements on a number of stores
will be revised as part of the agreement, which has been approved
by the High Court, while new capital will also be put into the
company by investors.

That investment will be used to support Carl Scarpa's concession
store strategy and to boost the company's online business, RTE
News says.

Carl Scarpa is a fashion retail chain in Ireland.  The chain
sells shoes and accessories.

IRISH BANK: Kennedy Wilson to Pay EUR111-Mil. for Shelbourne Debt
Donal O'Donova at reports that US investor Kennedy
Wilson says it is paying US$152 million (EUR111 million) for debt
secured on Dublin's iconic Shelbourne Hotel building.

It is understood the debt -- in the form of loan notes -- is
being acquired from Bank of Ireland and the liquidators of Irish
Bank Resolution Corp (IBRC), discloses.

Back in 2004, Bank of Ireland and the former Anglo Irish Bank
provided EUR200 million of debt to a group of businessmen and
developers to finance the acquisition of the building, recounts.

The new price is well ahead of the EUR86.5 million valuation
placed on the building at the end of 2011, in filings made to the
Companies Registration Office, says.

The Shelbourne Hotel deal is part of the total of US$700 million
that Kennedy Wilson is contracted to pay for 48 separate
property-linked investments in the United States, Ireland, the
United Kingdom and Spain, notes.

According to, in a filing with the US stock market
authority, the SEC, California-based Kennedy Wilson said it
expected half the consideration being paid for the Shelbourne
loans to come from debt, and said it would potentially bring in a
third party to help finance the equity element of the finance.

The Shelbourne deal will close on January 17,
says, citing a report on the Bloomberg newswire.

                    About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

The IBRC liquidators want the U.S. bankruptcy judge to rule that
Ireland is home to the so-called foreign main bankruptcy
proceeding.  If the judge agrees and determines that IBRC
otherwise qualifies, creditor actions in the U.S. will halt


BANCA MONTE: Fabrizio Viola Won't Step Down as Chief Executive
Sonia Sirletti, Elisa Martinuzzi and Sergio Di Pasquale at
Bloomberg News report that Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA
Chief Executive Officer Fabrizio Viola will stay at the bank,
easing concern his departure would throw the bailed-out Italian
lender into disarray.

The board unanimously backed Mr. Viola, who offered his
resignation on Tuesday after the bank's biggest shareholder
blocked the executives' plans to sell stock as soon as this
month, Bloomberg relates.  According to Bloomberg, Chairman
Alessandro Profumo told la Repubblica he's also staying to pursue
the capital increase and defend "the bank's autonomy."

Mr. Viola, 55, and Mr. Profumo, 56, are seeking to bolster the
finances of the world's oldest bank to repay a bailout and avert
the risk of nationalization, Bloomberg discloses.

Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena, which owns 33.5% of the
bank, won a battle last month to delay the EUR3 billion
(US$4.1 billion) rights offer until at least May as the
charitable foundation repairs its own finances, Bloomberg

According to Bloomberg, the bank will consider legal action after
Fondazione Monte Paschi pushed back the offering.  Bloomberg
relates that a person with knowledge of the situation said
Consob, the Italian market regulator, had requested that Monte
Paschi clarify whether it will challenge the foundation's

Messrs. Viola and Profumo, appointed in 2012 to turn around the
world's oldest bank, are trying to implement a restructuring plan
to return the firm to profit after it sought a EUR4.1 billion
state rescue, Bloomberg discloses.

Mr. Viola's reorganization also includes eliminating 8,000
employees and shrinking the balance sheet by 25% by 2017, paring
sovereign debt holdings and reducing consumer credit and leasing
portfolios, Bloomberg notes.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 18,
2013, Fitch downgraded MPS's Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc' from
'b' and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

TCR-Europe also reported on June 19, 2013, that Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its long-term counterparty credit rating
on Italy-based Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'B'
from 'BB', and affirmed the 'B' short-term rating.  S&P also
lowered its rating on MPS' Lower Tier 2 subordinated notes to
'CCC-' from 'CCC+'.  S&P affirmed the ratings on MPS' junior
subordinated debt at 'CCC-' and on its preferred stock at 'C'. At
the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where it
placed them with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2012.


LECTA SA: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B' & EUR200MM Notes Rating to 'B'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-registered paper
producer Lecta S.A. to 'B' from 'B+'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P lowered to 'B' from 'B+' its issue rating
on Lecta's EUR200 million senior secured fixed-rate notes, due
2019, and EUR390 million senior secured floating-rate notes, due
2018. The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at '4',
reflecting S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery
prospects for senior secured noteholders in an event of default.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view that Lecta's profitability has
weakened over several successive quarters, with its Standard &
Poor's-adjusted EBITDA margin now lower than S&P previously
forecast, and below average compared with that of its forest
products peers.

Lecta's weakening profitability is due primarily to challenging
trading conditions in its main market of Southern Europe, and its
exposure to volatile pulp prices and weak coated wood-free paper
selling prices, the latter owing to chronic overcapacity in the
European market.  Tax regimes on electricity cogeneration have
also played a significant part in this depressed profitability.
S&P sees a risk that Lecta's margins may not return to historic
levels over the next 12 months, and have therefore revised its
assessment of the group's business risk profile downward to
"weak" from "fair."

As a result of the lower profitability, Lecta's credit metrics
have also weakened to a level commensurate with a "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile, compared with "aggressive"

In S&P's view, Lecta's credit metrics should remain commensurate
with a 'B' rating over its rating horizon of 12 months.  S&P
anticipates that the group's EBITDA margin will stabilize as
management continues to streamline its operations and slowly
diversify to slightly higher-margin specialty paper production.

S&P could upgrade Lecta if the group were to significantly
improve its profitability and therefore its credit metrics to a
level commensurate with an "aggressive" financial risk profile.
This would happen if Lecta were to generate funds from operations
to debt of more than 12% and adjusted debt to EBITDA of less than
5x on a sustained basis.

A further downgrade is unlikely over the rating horizon.  Despite
margin erosion, which management is taking steps to address, the
group is cash flow-positive, has healthy cash balances, and no
near-term debt maturities.


ROST BANK: S&P Assigns 'B-' Counterparty Rating; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B-' long-term
and 'C' short-term counterparty credit ratings to Russia-based
Open Joint Stock Commercial Bank Rost Bank.  The outlook is
stable.  At the same time, S&P assigned a 'ruBBB-' Russia
national scale rating to the bank.

The ratings on Rost Bank factor in the inherent economic and
industry risks faced by a commercial bank operating in Russia,
which S&P incorporates into its 'bb' anchor.  They also reflect
bank's "weak" business position, "moderate" capital and earnings,
"weak" risk position, "average" funding and "adequate" liquidity
as S&P's criteria define these terms.  The stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) is 'b-'.

S&P considers Rost Bank's business position to be "weak" because
of its small market share; it ranked at 87 in terms of assets at
Nov. 1, 2013, and is a still-developing franchise in most Russian
regions.  It has grown very rapidly in the past two-to-three
years, both organically and via acquisitions, and S&P believes it
will take time to develop a cohesive strategy and process and
risk culture, potentially supporting stronger and more stable

Rost Bank is focusing on the small and midsize enterprise (SME)
segment and retail business for its development.  The bank aims
to build strong client-oriented offices in the Russian regions by
attracting prominent management teams and developing customized
products.  The target portfolio structure for 2016 is for up to
60% in SME loans and about 30% in retail loans, assuming 70%-100%
annual growth rates in these segments.  S&P views this strategy
as ambitious and aggressive at a time when the Russian economy is
slowing down.

"We assess Rost Bank's capital and earnings as "moderate".  As is
typical for small-to-midsize Russian banks, Rost Bank's earnings
are insufficient to grow capital in line with asset growth.
Therefore, our risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio before
adjustments for concentration and diversification will remain
just over 7.0% for the next 12-18 months, declining from 7.6% in
first-half 2013.  The forecast takes into account rapid asset
growth of 50%-60% annually, and our expectation of common equity
injections and issuance of hybrid capital, cumulatively, of
Russian rubles 9 billion in 2014 and 2015.  The bank's internal
capital generation capacity is likely to be moderate at about 9%-
10% on the back of a fairly high preprovision net interest margin
of 6.5%, but insufficient to support targeted growth rates," S&P

In S&P's view, Rost Bank's overall risk position is "weak" due to
the bank's aggressive growth rates resulting in high execution
risks, limited track record of operations under its current
shape, unseasoned loan portfolio, and its increasing focus on
what S&P views as the risky SME and retail segments.  This is
partially offset by levels of single-name concentrations that are
moderate, in the Russian context, at 30% of the loan book.

S&P considers Rost Bank's funding to be "average" and its
liquidity position "adequate".  Stable funding and long-term
funding ratios are 111% and 93%, indicating only minor maturity
mismatches at the one-year horizon.  Funding concentrations also
compare favorably in the domestic context, with the top-20
customers accounting for 13% of total customer deposits as of
June 30, 2013.  S&P believes that Rost Bank's liquidity cushion
is adequate, with liquid assets comprising about 17% of the
balance sheet.  Short-term wholesale funding constitutes 8% of
total funding and was almost 2.5x covered by broad liquid assets
as of June 2013.  S&P also notes that asset encumbrance (assets
pledged as collateral) is low at about 2%.

The stable outlook balances S&P's expectation of continued
adequate loan portfolio quality and a positive track record of
shareholder support against what S&P views as risky and
aggressive growth rates and related operational and execution

S&P could lower the ratings if it sees a decline in the bank's
capitalization, with the projected RAC ratio falling below 5%
because of asset quality deterioration or shareholders' inability
to keep up with planned capital injections.  If the bank's
counterparties lose confidence, leading to a deterioration in the
liquidity profile, this could also trigger a negative rating

Although a remote scenario in the next 12 months, S&P could
consider a positive rating action if Rost Bank managed to achieve
its target growth rates, while maintaining high loan portfolio
quality, and high and sustainable profitability.


BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Cuts Debt & Deposit Ratings to 'Ba2'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the debt and deposit
ratings of Banco Sabadell S.A. to Ba2/Not Prime from Ba1/Not
Prime, following the lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to ba3, equivalent to a standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) of D- (from D/ba2). All of the
bank's ratings now carry a negative outlook.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
July 4, 201, captioned "Moody's places Banco Sabadell's Ba1
ratings on review for downgrade."

The downgrade of Banco Sabadell's ratings takes into account (1)
the bank's weakened financial profile and significant challenges
ahead, which are stemming from its large amount of problematic
assets that have significantly increased in most asset classes
over the last year and may give rise to additional provisions;
and (2) some moderate signs that the Spanish economy is improving
in 2014, which should reduce the pressure on the bank's asset
quality over the medium to long-term. Moody's believes that Banco
Sabadell's asset quality has deteriorated significantly both due
to the acquisitions it has made (mainly of Banco CAM in 2012), as
well as due to the pressure on its core SME and real estate

In downgrading Banco Sabadell's ratings, Moody's has concurrently
considered the bank's recent reinforcement of its capital base in
October 2013 and improved liquidity position. However, Moody's
considers that the bank's overall cushion (shareholders equity
plus loss reserves) in relation to its deteriorating asset
quality remains weak. Today's rating action also takes into
consideration the impact on Banco Sabadell's credit profile of
its acquisitive strategy during 2013.



The one-notch downgrade of Banco Sabadell's senior debt and
deposit ratings reflects (1) the one-notch lowering of the bank's
BCA; and (2) Moody's assessment of a high probability of support
for the bank from the Spanish government (Baa3 stable), in case
of need.

The negative outlook on Banco Sabadell's standalone rating drives
the negative outlook on the bank's debt and deposit ratings.


The lowering of Banco Sabadell's standalone BCA to ba3 from ba2
reflects the bank's ongoing asset-quality deterioration across
all asset classes, particularly in the corporate loan-book. This
deterioration not only affects those exposures related to the
real-estate and construction sectors, but also loans extended to
companies related to other economic sectors. Banco Sabadell's
exposure to corporates represents the bulk of its credit
portfolio, accounting for 55% (excluding the part of the
portfolio hedged by the asset protection scheme (APS), for
further information please refer to "Banco Sabadell, S.A.:
Answers to Frequently Asked Questions" published on 18 October
2013) of total loans at end-September 2013. Given Banco
Sabadell's focus on the corporate sector and the time lag between
macroeconomic indicators and its impact on borrowers' credit
quality, Moody's expects Banco Sabadell's asset-quality
indicators to remain under pressure during 2014. However, the
pace of deterioration is likely to be slower than that registered
throughout 2013.

Banco Sabadell's non-performing loan ratio (NPL; excluding the
impact of the APS portfolio) increased to 14.9% at end-September
2013, from 11.5% at year-end 2012 and above the system's average
of 12.7% for the same period (which has increased from 10.4% at
year-end 2012). A share of the increase in NPLs both for the bank
and for the system as of September 2013, is the result of the
reclassification of performing and substandard refinanced loans
to the non-performing category as recommended by Bank of Spain,
which highlights the higher risks associated with these loan

In addition to NPLs, Banco Sabadell has other problematic
exposures related to real-estate assets the bank acquired over
recent years. If included -- and again excluding the impact of
the APS portfolio -- the NPL ratio rises to a high 20.5%.
Furthermore, Moody's notes the high percentage of refinanced
loans at the bank (13% of gross loans). The aggregation of
refinanced loans (those not captured in the non-performing loan
ratio) to the overall problem loan ratio (which then rises to
26.8% of total loans) indicates the existing balance-sheet
pressures the bank faces.

In downgrading Banco Sabadell's ratings, Moody's has taken into
account the EUR1.4 billion capital increase carried out by the
bank in October 2013, which has resulted in an improved core Tier
1 capital ratio of 11.4% at end-September 2013 compared to 9.6%
at end-June 2013. Despite this increase and the growth in
provisions, Moody's considers that the bank's overall cushion in
relation to its deteriorating asset quality remains weak, with
limited visibility of a sufficient pick-up in earnings which
could reverse this trend.

However, Moody's acknowledges Banco Sabadell's recurring earnings
power, which, albeit having benefited from the bank's acquisitive
strategy in 2013, compares favorably to those of its domestic
peers. Moody's also notes Banco Sabadell's improved liquidity
position with declining reliance on European Central Bank (ECB)
funding; lower refinancing requirements, which will be namely
addressed through the higher growth of deposits versus loans, as
well as improved market access as reflected by the secured and
unsecured market issuance made in 2013.


The negative outlook that Moody's has assigned to the BFSR
reflects the bank's vulnerability to a further weakening of its
credit profile in light of the still modest growth expected for
Spain in 2014. The negative outlook also captures the downside
risks to Moody's macroeconomic forecasts, which could exert
further credit-negative pressure, if these risks were to


Moody's has today downgraded the senior subordinated debt ratings
of Banco Sabadell to B1 from Ba3 and the preferred shares ratings
to Caa1 (hyb) from B3 (hyb), with a negative outlook, in line
with the lowering of the bank's BCA.


An upgrade of Banco Sabadell's standalone BFSR is currently
unlikely, given the negative outlook. An improvement of its BCA
could be driven by clear visibility that asset quality was
improving, together with a sustainable recovery in recurring
earnings. Any significant macroeconomic growth beyond our central
scenario of 0-1% in 2014 could underpin signs of a turnaround.

Downward pressure would be exerted on the bank's standalone BCA
if (1) operating conditions worsen beyond our current
expectations; (2) the bank's liquidity profile deteriorates
significantly; and/or (3) its franchise weakens as the
consolidation and restructuring of the banking system increases
the focus of many peers on the SME sector.

The bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the standalone
BCA, and any change to the BCA would likely also affect these


SBAB BANK: Moody's Puts Ba1 Stock Rating on Review for Downgrade
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade
SBAB Bank AB's A2 long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings,
P-1 short-term rating, A3 subordinate rating, (P)Baa2 junior
subordinate rating, and Ba1(hyb) preferred stock rating.

Rating Rationale

The review of SBAB's ratings reflects Moody's view that the
bank's standalone credit strength continues to face challenges,
particularly with regards to profitability, the success of
recently-offered new products and a capital position sensitive to
relatively small changes in asset quality. These factors are
especially important for SBAB given the Swedish government's
(SBAB's sole shareholder) much-publicized intention to sell the
bank. Moody's believes such a sale to be several years away, but
that the recent changes in the bank such as widening the product
offering are in order to increase the appeal of the bank to
potential investors.

On January 13, SBAB announced the departure of CEO Carl-Viggo
Ostlund, citing differing views between Mr. Ostlund and the
Board. Whilst Moody's review reflects some of the same concerns
surrounding profitability raised by SBAB's Board, the review is
not directly in response to the change in management.

SBAB's profitability has historically been weak as a result of
the bank's retail-orientation and lack of scale compared to the
four large Swedish banks which dominate the market.
Notwithstanding the funding advantage that the bank gains through
its government ownership, the competitive nature of the Swedish
loan market has restricted the bank's ability to grow through
loan growth and increase its profitability through economies of

The bank has also sought to diversify its product set and
earnings, for example by increasing deposit funding and offering
other banking services, which would be a credit positive if
proved to be sustainably profitable. Whilst we view increased
deposit funding positively, SBAB currently pays relatively high
deposit rates compared to other Swedish banks which casts doubt
on the long-term stickiness of such deposits, and the launch of
new products needs in Moody's view, a longer timeframe to prove
their viability

Moody's views SBAB's actions to increase the maturity profile of
its funding positively, but notes that longer duration market
funding is likely to put pressure on net interest income in the
short to medium term as long-term funding is generally more
expensive than short-term. Additionally, Moody's believes that
the uncertainty surrounding SBAB's long-term ownership reduces
the benefit from government ownership on the long-term funding
costs. Moody's does however note that continued weakness in
profitability will make the bank harder to sell and may presage
longer government involvement with the bank, which may support
the bank's long-term ratings.

Closely linked to SBAB's profitability is Moody's assessment that
despite the bank's relatively strong capital ratios (Q3 2013 Tier
1 ratio was 9.5% under Basel II with transitional floors), in a
stressed scenario the lack of profitability to support capital
levels could result in relatively fast capital depletion. Whilst
the ratings agency does not currently anticipate such a scenario
in Sweden, SBAB's sensitivity to such an event is credit

The review also includes SBAB's subordinated debt instruments.
This is partly due to the review of the bank's standalone and
supported rating, but also factors in Moody's view that systemic
support for such instruments is likely to decrease over time. The
ratings agency removed systemic support for Swedish banks'
subordinated debt ratings in March 2012 as part of a series of
wider actions. SBAB's ratings were not included in the action at
that time due to its GRI status but given the bank's continued
evolution towards becoming a full-service retail bank, such
support is in our view increasingly unlikely. These two factors
may result in a multi-notch downgrade to the bank's subordinated

The review is likely to concentrate primarily on (1) an analysis
of SBAB's likely future profitability, and; (2) the potential for
its new products to succeed in the Swedish banking market.
Additionally, the review will focus on the likelihood of systemic
support for SBAB's subordinated debt given the clear government
indications of reduced support but the difficulties in actually
achieving this in the more immediate term.


Given the review for downgrade, Moody's does not currently see
potential upside to SBAB's ratings.

The review for downgrade indicates the downwards pressure on
SBAB's ratings. This would be translated into a downgrade should
the review process suggest that the bank's weak profitability and
capital sensitivity are unlikely to improve in the near future
and that the new products are unlikely to create the
diversification intended.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Government-
Related Issuers: Methodology Update published in July 2010.

Headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden, SBAB reported total assets of
SEK324.6 billion (EUR37.3 billion)


CREATIV GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had revised to stable
from negative its outlook on Ukraine-based farming group Creativ
Group OJSC.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its long-term
corporate credit rating on Creativ at 'B-'.

The outlook revision and affirmation follow similar actions made
on Dec. 26, 2013, on Ukraine, where Creativ's core assets are
concentrated.  S&P's transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment
for Ukraine, which remains unchanged at 'B-', constrains the
rating on Creativ because the group may face repatriation
restrictions and, more generally, negative sovereign

The rating reflects S&P's assessment of Creativ's "vulnerable"
business risk profile and "aggressive" financial risk profile, as
its revised criteria define these terms.

On the one hand, S&P thinks that the sovereign credit quality
could expose Creativ to several risks that include potential
restrictions on transfer of funds outside Ukraine, more stringent
currency controls, and more delays on value-added tax (VAT)
refunds.  More generally, S&P also sees the risk of increased
fiscal pressure and lower access to financial markets for
Ukrainian corporations.  Although Creativ exports about two-
thirds of its production outside of Ukraine, S&P believes it is
not sheltered from these risks.

On the other hand, S&P notes that Creativ's operations are solid
and provide significant amounts of U.S. dollar-denominated export
revenues.  S&P also believes the group's exports may not be at
risk because they provide substantial amounts of foreign currency
reserves to the country.  The Ukrainian government already has
currency control in place, by requiring exporters to sell 50% of
all foreign-currency revenues on the domestic foreign exchange
(FX) market.  The National Bank of Ukraine recently decided to
extend the mandatory conversion of 50% of foreign-currency
proceeds from abroad at the FX market, regardless of the source
of such proceeds.  A stricter foreign currency policy could hurt
Creativ, in S&P's view.

S&P's assessment of Creativ's "vulnerable" business risk profile
factors in its "weak" competitive position, but is dragged down
by the "very high" country risk of Ukraine, according to its
criteria.  The business risk assessment reflects Creativ's
participation in the volatile agricultural industry and S&P's
view of the high risk of doing business in Ukraine.

S&P views Creativ's financial risk profile as "aggressive," owing
to aggressive leverage, negative free operating cash flow (FOCF),
dependence on short-term debt, and exposure to financial
covenants.  Debt to EBITDA reached 4.64x at year-end 2012.  S&P
expects capital expenditures (capex) to shrink to about
US$40 million for 2013 and leverage to improve due to a
significant increase in EBITDA and a decrease in debt.  S&P
anticipates net debt to EBITDA of only about 3.7x at year-end

The stable outlook on Creativ reflects that on Ukraine.  The
stable outlook on Ukraine reflects the sovereign's improved
creditworthiness, which lowers the likelihood that the government
will mandate that export companies convert their hard currencies.
This could otherwise weigh on the group's dollar-denominated debt

LEMTRANS LTD: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised to stable
from negative its outlook on Ukrainian rail freight operator
Lemtrans LLC and its holding company Lemtrans Ltd. (together,
Lemtrans).  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Lemtrans.

The outlook revision follows a similar rating action on the
sovereign on Dec. 26, 2013.  S&P believes that, following the
Russian government's decision to provide $15 billion in direct
financing to the Ukrainian government, some of the challenges
faced by Ukrainian companies have eased for the coming 12 months.
These risks include the Ukrainian government's increased currency
restrictions in an effort to secure sufficient foreign currency
to meet its elevated external financing needs, a risk of a
devaluation of the Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH), and more generally,
negative intervention by the sovereign in the near team.

Lemtrans is headquartered in Ukraine, where it generates most of
its earnings.  S&P still considers Lemtrans to be highly exposed
to country risks, which in its view remain significant and
include political turbulence, weak external liquidity, financial
sector stress, and an economic decline.  S&P also believes that
access to the international financial markets may remain
restricted for Ukrainian corporations as a result of weak
sovereign credit quality.

The stable outlook on Lemtrans reflects that on the sovereign.
It also reflects S&P's view that Lemtrans will continue to manage
its growth investments cautiously to prevent liquidity pressure,
and that its liquidity ratio will remain at least 1x.

Any rating upside potential is closely related to positive rating
actions on the sovereign.

S&P might lower the rating as a result of deterioration in
Lemtrans' liquidity such that the ratio of liquidity sources to
uses falls to significantly less than 1x.  This could happen if:

   -- 2014 EBITDA falls by more than 30% from the level S&P
      anticipates for 2013 because of the loss of a main customer
      or ongoing pricing pressure in the gondola rail market;

   -- Lemtrans faces challenges in obtaining its financial
      leasing receivables in a timely fashion;

   -- Investment in fleet expansion is higher than S&P currently
      assumes and financed with short-term debt; or

   -- The company distributes higher dividends than S&P currently

Downside pressure on the rating is also likely to result from a
negative rating action on the sovereign.

UKRAINIAN AGRARIAN: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'B-' Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Ukraine-based crop producer and trader Ukrainian Agrarian
Investments S.A. (UAI) to stable from negative.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'B-' long-term foreign and local currency
ratings on the company.

The outlook revision follows a similar action on Ukraine.  S&P
also takes into account that UAI's core assets -- its land bank,
silos, and machinery -- are concentrated in Ukraine.  S&P
believes that the improved creditworthiness of the sovereign will
reduce the likelihood of the government instructing export
companies to convert their hard currencies, which could otherwise
weigh on UAI's dollar-denominated debt service.

The rating on UAI reflects S&P's assessment of the company's
"vulnerable" business risk profile and "significant" financial
risk profile.

In S&P's opinion, UAI is exposed to sovereign credit quality
through risks of restrictions on transfer of funds from Ukraine
and more stringent currency controls.  More generally, increased
fiscal pressure and more difficult access to financial markets
for Ukrainian corporations would also be negative for UAI's
creditworthiness.  Although UAI exports a large percentage of its
production, S&P thinks that it is not immune to these risks.

However, S&P notes that UAI's operations are solid and provide
significant amounts of U.S. dollar-denominated export revenues.
Moreover, S&P thinks that UAI is only very marginally exposed to
value-added tax refunds.  Additionally, UAI holds sizable amounts
of cash in foreign currencies outside Ukraine, which could be
used to service its debt.  Equally importantly, S&P do not
believe that the company's exports are at risk, as these provide
substantial amounts of foreign currency to the country.  The
Ukrainian government already has currency controls in place -- it
requires exporters to sell 50% of all foreign currency revenues
in the domestic foreign currency market.  The National Bank of
Ukraine recently decided to extend this regulation, regardless of
the source of such proceeds.  S&P believes that a more
restrictive foreign currency policy could negatively affect UAI.
Nevertheless, S&P sees this as a more remote possibility now
given the strengthened credit quality of the sovereign.

S&P's assessment of UAI's business risk profile as "vulnerable"
reflects the company's operation in a volatile agricultural
industry and the high risk associated with doing business in
Ukraine.  S&P views the company's relatively small size in the
global agribusiness industry and limited brand recognition as the
key factors for its "weak" competitive position.  Still, S&P
believes that UAI benefits from its lease rights to high-quality
farmland, low production costs, the currently favorable trading
environment for its crops in terms of pricing and demand, and a
natural hedge against weather risk thanks to its 64 farms located
across different regions in Ukraine.

S&P's valuation of UAI's business risk profile also incorporates
its view of global agribusiness and commodity foods as an
"intermediate risk" industry.  S&P also factors in its view of
"very high" country risk in Ukraine.  UAI has 100% of its asset
base in Ukraine although a substantial amount of its revenues are
export driven.  These revenues denominated in dollars ensure debt
service and protect against foreign exchange risk.

"We assess UAI's financial risk profile as "significant."
Although we expect its debt-to-EBITDA ratio to be between 2.4x
and 2.6x over the next two years, which is relatively moderate,
its EBITDA interest cover is less conservative and constrains the
financial risk profile to significant, reflecting high funding
costs," S&P said.

S&P expects positive cash flow generation for 2013, as well as a
slight improvement of the group's financial metrics.  Cash flow
generation is highly contingent on the company's decision to sell
its crop by the end of the fiscal year (ending Dec. 31) or to
wait until the beginning of the next calendar year, depending on
expected pricing.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Better yields and higher volumes than in 2012;

   -- mitigated by A reduced price for corn in 2013 and a
      moderate rebound in 2014.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit

   -- EBITDA of about $45 million in 2013 -- a slight decrease
      compared with 2012; and

   -- Net debt to EBITDA exceeding 3x at year-end 2013.

The stable outlook on UAI reflects the outlook on Ukraine --
whose rating is a cap for this rating -- and the sovereign's
improved creditworthiness.  S&P believes that the sovereign's
stronger credit position reduces the likelihood of the government
instructing export companies to convert their hard currencies,
which could otherwise weigh on UAI's dollar-denominated debt

The company's stand-alone credit profile is 'b'.  Therefore,
according to S&P's methodology, it could raise the rating on UAI
if it raised the sovereign rating on Ukraine and S&P sees lower
operating risks in Ukraine.

S&P could lower the rating on UAI if it lowered its ratings on
Ukraine and revised down its assessment of transfer and
convertibility.  However, this would not automatically result in
a negative rating action on UAI if the company were able to show
resilience to country-specific factors, including the risk of
stricter currency restrictions.  Major operating setbacks due to
extreme weather conditions, or a steep drop in crop prices,
especially corn, could also impact current ratings.

UKRLANDFARMING PLC: Fitch Says Cargill Stake Buyout Positive
Fitch Ratings said that Cargill Inc.'s (Cargill; A/Stable)
recently announced acquisition of a 5% stake in Ukrlandfarming
PLC (ULF; B-/ Negative) is a positive development for ULF,
reflecting the interest of a large international commodity trader
in the promising Ukrainian agribusiness.  However, this
development will not lead to a change in ULF's ratings, which
remain constrained by Ukraine's sovereign rating (B-/Negative)
and a deteriorating business environment in the country.

The transaction was completed through a sale of shares owned by
Oleg Bakhmatyuk, a principal shareholder of ULF. "We believe that
Cargill will not be involved in the management of ULF's
operations and has no plans to increase its share in the company
in the near future. It is also cash- neutral for ULF as it does
not involve a fresh capital injection into the company," Fitch

"We believe the deal has little impact on ULF's creditworthiness
in view of Cargill's modest participation. However, the strategic
partnership would bring some operating benefits to ULF, including
higher grain trading volumes between parties and more grain
exports to China. At the same time, Fitch does not expect
synergies from this alliance to affect operating margins
materially for FY14," Fitch said.

While ULF's foreign currency IDR of 'B-'/Negative remains
constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling, its local currency IDR
of 'B' reflects its strong domestic position as the largest
Ukrainian agricultural company, its efficient, scalable
operations and moderate financial leverage that is partly offset
by fairly weak corporate governance.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Former CEO Retires From Thomas Cook Board
Denise Roland at The Telegraph reports that Peter Marks, former
chief executive of the Co-operative Group, is to retire from his
board position at travel company Thomas Cook.

His resignation comes after less than two and a half years on
Thomas Cook's board, which he joined in October 2011 while still
boss of the Co-op Group, The Telegraph relates.

Mr. Marks has faced questions over his role in the Co-op Bank's
doomed deal to buy 632 branches from Lloyds Banking Group for
GBP750 million, The Telegraph relays.

He was also at the helm of the group during Co-op Bank's 2009
merger with Britannia Building Society, a deal which is
considered directly responsible for creating the GBP1.5 billion
black hole in the bank's balance sheet which led to its near-
collapse last year, The Telegraph discloses.

However, he has refused to take personal responsibility for the
current crisis at the Co-op's banking arm, The Telegraph notes.
He told MPs on the Treasury Select Committee in October that as a
non-executive director for the banking arm, his role in the
Britannia and Lloyds deals was limited, and that the lender's
then-chief executive David Anderson held responsibility, The
Telegraph recounts.

                     About Co-operative Bank

Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872.  The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment.  It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people, and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 14 and 18, 2013 has
reported that Moody's Investors Service has affirmed The
Co-operative Bank's Caa1 senior unsecured debt and deposit
ratings, and changed the outlook on the rating to negative from
developing, and Fitch Ratings has downgraded the company's Issuer
Default Rating to 'B' from 'BB-' and placed it on Rating Watch

DMI (UK): In Administration, Cuts 27 Jobs
Hanna Sharpe at Business Sale Report writes that car component
maker DMI (UK) Ltd has been placed into administration with the
immediate loss of 27 jobs.

Based in North Shields, North Tyneside, the business was involved
in treating and reconditioning components for luxury car marques
such as Rolls Royce, according to Business Sale Report.  The
report relates that it had suffered a decline in work and
mounting financial losses over the past two years.

The company spokesman said the management is fairly optimistic
that the administrators can find a buyer to take over all or part
of the business, with a chance for re-employment for some of the
redundant workers, the report notes.

The staff had been kept informed of the declining work situation,
the company spokesman said, the report relays.

"We had big customers who were buying quite a lot from us but
that then fell to around 20 per cent of what we had anticipated
and budgeted for . . . . We brought some work back in but that
didn't achieve anything like we were hoping and it actually
exacerbated matters, and we stopped that a few months ago . . . .
With losses mounting we got to a point where we couldn't survive
any longer. Even with the deepest of pockets you cannot carry on
with big losses forever," the report quoted the spokesman as

The report adds that the situation has angered the GMB union,
which told bosses they were directing staff towards the
Redundancy Payments Service, implying that the taxpayer should
pick up the bill.

EDWARDS GROUP: Moody's Withdraws 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B1 corporate family
rating and B1-PD probability of default rating of Edwards Group

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings following the closing of the
acquisition of Edwards by Atlas Copco AB (rated A2, stable) and
following the repayment of all outstanding debt.

Edwards Group Limited, headquartered in Crawley/United Kingdom is
a specialized manufacturer of highly engineered vacuum and
abatement systems to a wide range of customers in the
semiconductor, flat panel, solar PV, industrial, pharmaceutical,
chemical, scientific, process, glass coating and food packaging

GRANGE AND LINKS HOTEL: Goes Into Administration, Closes Doors
Louth Leader News reports that the Grange and Links Hotel in
Sandilands has gone into administration and officially closed its
doors Thursday, January 9.

Deloitte were appointed on Wednesday, January 8, as the
administrators for the property.

The hotel itself had around 32 staff working on site and Deloitte
has confirmed that there will be a number of redundancies
following the closure of the hotel, according to Louth Leader

The report relates that in June 2013, the property was up for
sale and had been put on the market for GBP1.75 million.  The
report discloses that a buyer is still being sought out for the
premises and could be sold as a full package with both the hotel
and golf course included or there could be an option of selling
the two off separately.  The negotiations for the sale of The
Grange and Links however are still in its early stages, the
report relays.

MIVAN: Administration Puts 289 Construction Jobs in Jeopardy
------------------------------------------------------------ reports that almost 300 jobs are threatened after
one of the North's main construction firms went into

Merger talks at Antrim-based Mivan failed to reach agreement amid
intense competition in the global market for specialist fit out
and building contracts, according to

The report relates that outfitting the Scottish Parliament at
Holyrood and refurbishing the luxury QE2 liner are among
prestigious projects the company has been involved in.

The report discloses that Chief Executive Dr. Ivan McCabrey said
while the global market for specialist construction and fit-out
was recovering, competition from rivals was intense and pressure
on profit margins and cash reserves favored the largest
international companies.

Mivan No. 1 Ltd employs 289 people and is the main trading
company created from a restructuring of the group in 2012.  The
company was founded in 1975 by Dr. McCabrey while he was still an
engineering student at Queen's University Belfast.

PUNCH TAVERNS: Publishes Final Debt Restructuring Proposals
Nathalie Thomas at The Telegraph reports that Punch Taverns has
published final proposals to restructure its GBP2.3 billion debt
pile, warning that failure to secure agreement from lenders will
lead to "considerable uncertainty."

According to The Telegraph, the company said the restructuring
deal will create a "robust debt structure" that will provide
stability for the business.

The company, as cited by The Telegraph, said that Wednesday's
proposals follow 14 months of "extensive" engagement with

Punch is weighed down by two complex debt structures, which suck
up large amounts of cash from the company to avoid a default, The
Telegraph notes.

The structures, which together amount to GBP2.3 billion, are a
legacy of a debt-fuelled acquisition boom last decade, The
Telegraph states.

The company has so far faced opposition to its restructuring
plans from senior lenders, who warned in December that they would
vote against the proposals on the table at that time, The
Telegraph relates.

Punch Taverns plc is a United Kingdom-based pub company.  The
Company is engaged in the operation of public houses under either
the leased model or as directly managed by the Company.  The
Company operates in two business segments: punch partnerships, a
leased estate and punch pub company, a managed estate.

THEMELEION IV: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Rating on Class A Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has corrected by withdrawing
its 'BB+ (sf)' local currency long-term rating on Themeleion IV
Mortgage Finance PLC's class A notes.  The local currency long-
term rating had been displayed in error.  The 'B- (sf)' foreign
currency long-term rating on Themeleion IV Mortgage Finance's
class A notes remains outstanding.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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