/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/140203.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, February 3, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 23
Headlines
F R A N C E
MORY-DUCROS: Unions' Deal with Arcole Saves 2,150 Jobs
G E R M A N Y
CE ENERGY: Moody's Assigns (P)B1 Rating to EUR500MM Senior Notes
GATE SME: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCsf'
PHOENIX PHARMAHANDEL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT IDR; Outlook Stable
PROKON REGENERATIVE: Improved Regulation Needed After Insolvency
SAFARI HOLDING: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corp. Family Rating
SAFARI HOLDING: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
STRAUSS INNOVATION: Seeks Creditor Protection After Sales Decline
I C E L A N D
LANDSVIRKJUN: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB' CCR
I R E L A N D
BACCHUS 2006-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
BACCHUS 2007-1: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class D Notes to Caa1
I T A L Y
ALITALIA SPA: Etihad Has 30 Days to Decide on Investment
CHRYSLER GROUP: Fiat Plan Takes Advantage of Finance Benefits
CHRYSLER GROUP: Fiat Scraps Dividend
N E T H E R L A N D S
E-MAC NL 2006-III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on EUR40.7MM Notes
HARBOURMASTER CLO 5: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC
P O L A N D
LOT POLISH: Says Cost-Cutting Drive Pares Losses Amid EU Probe
S L O V E N I A
NOVA LJUBJANSKA: Moody's Upgrades Rating to Caa1; Outlook Stable
S P A I N
FONCAIXA AUTONOMOS: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Class B Notes
U K R A I N E
CRIMEA CITY: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
DNIPROPETROVSK CITY: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
IVANO-FRANKIVSK: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
KYIV CITY: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
LVIV CITY: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'CCC+' CCR
PRIVATBANK: S&P Cuts LT Counterparty Credit Rating to 'CCC+'
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Downgrades Deposit Rating to 'B1'
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Board Aware of Ex-Chair's Indiscretions
F&C ASSET: S&P Puts 'BB+' Counterparty Rating on CreditWatch Pos.
HIBU INC: Seeks U.S. Recognition of UK Restructuring
KENDAL RIVERSIDE: KMPG Refers Directors to Disqualification Unit
LIBERTY GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR Following Bid Announcement
LOVELL HILL: High Court Winds Up Legal Firm
SCOTTISH COAL: Faces Probe Over Opencast Mines
X X X X X X X X
* EUROPE: Reforms to Restrain Banks' Trading Risks, Fitch Says
* JVs, Pensions Most Affected by New Accounting Rules, Fitch Says
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 27 to January 31, 2014
*********
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F R A N C E
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MORY-DUCROS: Unions' Deal with Arcole Saves 2,150 Jobs
------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Vinocur at Reuters reports that unions at Mory-Ducros
have agreed to a deal that saves 2,150 jobs but offers little
solace to French President Francois Hollande's efforts to reduce
unemployment.
Workers at Mory-Ducros had been locked in dispute with majority
shareholder Arcole Industries for weeks, occupying several
company sites after the courier business filed for bankruptcy in
November and launched a restructuring program that put 5,200 jobs
in jeopardy, Reuters relates.
According to Reuters, the deal with unlisted industrial holding
group Arcole protects 2,150 jobs and improves severance terms for
the more than 3,000 employees who still face redundancy.
In a statement, six unions said they had agreed to lift their
blockade and signed off on the new deal, in which Arcole promises
to raise its total payout for redundancies to EUR30 million
(US$40.93 million) from EUR21 million, Reuters relays.
Industry Minister Arnaud Montebourg, who participated in all-
night talks to defuse the Mory-Ducros dispute, said that laid-off
workers would be offered several options, including training and
jobs with a public transport firm, Reuters notes.
Mory-Ducros is France's second biggest courier business.
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G E R M A N Y
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CE ENERGY: Moody's Assigns (P)B1 Rating to EUR500MM Senior Notes
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Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional '(P)B1'
rating to the EUR500 million of senior notes due 2021 to be
issued by CE Energy, a.s. The corporate family rating (CFR) of
CE Energy is Ba2 and the probability of default rating (PDR) is
Ba2-PD. The outlook on the ratings is stable.
Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the facilities. A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating.
Ratings Rationale
The assigned CFR of Ba2 with stable outlook is supported by (i)
the low business risk profile and stable cash flow generation of
the CE Energy group's German lignite coal mining activities that
are supported by long-term off-take contracts, (ii) the low
business risk profile and stable cash flow generation of the
fully regulated monopoly heating activities, (iii) the moderate
risk profile of power generation activities, considering that the
existing plants are well positioned in the merit order, (iv) the
low business risk profile of regulated electricity distribution
activities, which extend CE Energy's value chain and diversify
its business mix, (v) relatively low capex requirements enabled
by well invested and efficient mining assets and the good
technical shape of the heating distribution infrastructure and
(vi) management's current intention to refrain from further major
acquisitions.
The rating is, however, constrained by (i) CE Energy group's
relatively small size compared to the wider group of European
peers, (ii) the nature of the group's vertical integration with
high exposure to lignite as a single dominant fuel, (iii) a short
track record of financial consolidation, following the past
aggressive acquisition strategy, (iv) a lack of history of stable
and predictable performance of the group in its current form
given it has been created through acquisitions in the relatively
recent past, (v) a history of re-leveraging activities and
dividend distributions to shareholders.
The CFR is an opinion of the CE Energy group's ability to honor
its financial obligations and is assigned to CE Energy as if it
had a single class of debt and a single consolidated legal
structure. The (P)B1 / LGD-6 rating of the CE Energy notes
reflects the structural subordination of the notes in the CE
Energy group structure. More particularly, CE Energy is the
holding company for a group of companies owned by EP Energy,
a.s., (EPE), which is financed by a mixture of notes and bank
debt.
CE Energy has a solid position in its respective business
segments. It is the largest heating supplier and the second-
largest electricity generator in the Czech Republic, the third-
largest lignite producer in Germany, and the second largest
electricity distributor in the Slovak Republic. However, any
potential growth in the heating segment is technically and
geographically limited due to specifics of the central heating
sector. Moreover, CE Energy is relatively small compared to the
wider group of European utilities. Furthermore, the company has
limited price-setting ability, as (i) coal production sales are
based on long-term contracts, (ii) heating sales in the CR and
electricity distribution and retail supply in Slovakia are fully
regulated and (iii) electricity production is predominantly sold
on an energy exchange.
Management's aim to reduce financial leverage over the next few
years, including the Net Debt / EBITDA target of 2.5x for EPE and
3.5x for CE Energy on a consolidated basis, is credit positive,
but lacks a track-record. Moreover, CE Energy's dividend payout
targets suggest a bias towards shareholders. The future
development of CE Energy's financial profile is also exposed to
the credit quality of the wider group that owns CE Energy (EP
Holding), and its appetite for extracting dividends from CE
Energy - while still maintaining compliance with existing
financial covenants -- could finally constrain financial ratios
of CE Energy.
Following the raising of the bond and recapitalization of the CE
Energy group, CE Energy's standalone liquidity profile is
considered to be adequate. It will be based on (i) the expected
retention of only modest cash balances on an ongoing basis given
the expected payment of dividends to EP Holding and, (ii) cash
flow generation driven solely by periodic dividends up-streamed
from EPE, which are themselves dependent on EPE's ability to make
payments in accordance with its financial documentation. The EPE
debt documentation contains restrictions on payment of dividends
if certain financial ratios are not met. This will leave the debt
service prospects of the CE Energy bond largely dependent on the
availability and timely payment of dividends to CE Energy,
although there is expected to be sufficient covenant headroom at
the EPE level.
GATE SME: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings downgraded GATE SME CLO 2006-1 Ltd's (GATE) and
affirmed CART 1 Ltd's (CART) notes.
The transactions are partially-funded synthetic CDOs referencing
a portfolio of loans, revolving credit facilities and other
payment claims to SMEs and larger companies based predominantly
in Germany. The debt instruments were originated by Deutsche
Bank AG (rated A+/Stable/F1+).
Key Rating Drivers
Gate
The downgrade reflects reduced credit protection of the notes
following losses in the underlying portfolio. For example, the
most senior note can only survive 5.1% of losses. This risk is
particularly significant given the high portfolio concentration -
the largest obligor group accounts for 1.8% of the pool, while
the top 10 obligor groups amount to 14.7%. The class A note
would only be able to withstand the default of the four largest
obligor groups.
Additional losses of EUR15.9 million (or 0.7% of the initial
portfolio balance) were realised over the past 12 months,
following liquidations. These losses were allocated to the
equity, thus further eroding the credit enhancement of the other
notes. Since the deal is replenishing until January 2015, no
additional credit enhancement will build up through amortization.
As of the last reporting period (October 2013), the cumulative
recovery rate achieved after liquidations was 20%, while it had
equalled on average 27% in previous periods. This reduction was
due to low recoveries obtained in the last period. Since closing
in November 2006, total recoveries received from 19 liquidations
have amounted to EUR9.9 million.
Cumulative defaults since closing have totaled EUR94.6 million or
4.5% of the initial balance.
CART 1
The performance of CART 1 has worsened over the last 12 months.
Additional defaults amount to EUR49 million, which corresponds to
2.9% of the initial portfolio notional. Cumulative defaults
since closing in June 2007 have amounted to EUR167.8 million, or
9.9% of the pool at closing.
At the same time, the credit enhancement levels of CART have
remained constant, as no additional losses were realised. In
Fitch's view, the notes' credit enhancement is still commensurate
with the current ratings, which led to their affirmation. The
recovery rate achieved after liquidation equals 36%. Fitch notes
that the liquidation process is fairly long -- out of 20
defaulted loans since closing, only four have been liquidated so
far. This deal is replenishing until June 2014, after which
Fitch expects credit enhancement to start building up through
amortization.
For both transactions, overcollateralization via subordination is
the only source of credit enhancement. Given the lack of
additional protection layers (e.g. synthetic excess spread),
realised losses are immediately written against the notes in
reverse order of seniority, thus reducing the subordination.
To analyze the portfolio credit quality of the transactions, the
agency used its Portfolio Credit Model, which derives rating-
dependent default and recovery rates.
Rating Sensitivities
The transactions are sensitive to the default of a few large
obligors (event risk). The current levels of credit protection
in both transactions are fairly low (although CART benefits from
higher credit enhancement than GATE). At the same time, the
portfolios are concentrated, so that the available credit
enhancement can absorb the default of only a few large obligors.
For example, after taking into account expected recoveries the
class A+ notes in CART 1 and the class A notes in GATE could
survive the default of only seven and four of the largest obligor
groups, respectively. The high vulnerability to event risk is
reflected in the notes' Negative Outlook.
Fitch assigns Recovery Estimates (RE) to all notes rated 'CCCsf'
or below. REs are forward-looking recovery estimates, taking
into account Fitch's expectations for principal repayments on a
distressed structured finance security. The REs assigned to the
transactions' notes are given at the end of this press release.
CART 1
-- EUR17 million class A+ notes (ISIN: XS0306449488): affirmed
at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR8.5 million class A notes (ISIN: XS0295190721): affirmed
at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR51 million class B notes (ISIN: XS0295192263): affirmed at
'Bsf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR17 million class C notes (ISIN: XS0295192420): affirmed at
'Bsf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR38.25 million class D notes (ISIN: XS0295192776): affirmed
at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) of 'RE50%'
-- EUR48.45 million class E notes (ISIN: XS0295193311): affirmed
at 'CCsf'; 'RE0%'
GATE
-- EUR42 million class A notes (ISIN: XS0271959388): downgraded
to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR26.5 million class B notes (ISIN: XS0271960048):
downgraded to 'B-sf' from 'B+sf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR7.5 million class C notes (ISIN: XS0271960550): downgraded
to 'B-sf' from 'B+sf'; Outlook Negative
-- EUR20 million class D notes (ISIN: XS0271961012): downgraded
to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; 'RE0%'
-- EUR15.5 million class E notes (ISIN: XS0271961103):
downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'; 'RE0%'
PHOENIX PHARMAHANDEL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT IDR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Germany-based pharmaceuticals
wholesaler Phoenix Pharmahandel GmbH & Co. KG's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating at 'BB'. It has
also affirmed the EUR506 million bond due 2014 issued by Phoenix
PIB Finance BV and the EUR300 million bond due 2020 issued by
Phoenix PIB Dutch Finance BV at 'BB'. The Outlook is Stable.
The affirmation reflects Phoenix's resilient credit metrics
despite an intense competitive environment, its ability to gain
back market share in its core market and the company's commitment
to a prudent financial policy. Fitch expects Phoenix's free cash
flow (FCF) to remain positive and net leverage to remain
consistent with its ratings, in spite of margin pressure. Fitch
projects that net adjusted (lease and ABS/factoring) debt/EBITDAR
will in FY14 increase to the threshold for negative rating
trigger, from 3.74x in FY13, before falling back to 3.5x in FY16.
Key Rating Drivers
Sector Pressures, Bottoming Out
Phoenix, like all of its sector peers, operates with fairly low
profitability compared with pharmaceuticals producers (in FY13
Phoenix's EBITDAR margin was 3.2%). In 2013 the German wholesale
market (where Phoenix generates around 31% of revenue) faced
intense price pressure due to price wars. As a result Fitch
projects EBITDAR margin will decline by 50bps to 2.7% in FY14.
We believe that the price war in Germany is unsustainable given
the low margins in the sector and therefore do not expect to see
any further significant decline in Phoenix's profitability.
Recovering Market Share
In FY14 Phoenix was able to win back the market share that it
previously lost to competitors at the expense of EBITDAR margins.
For the next two years, we project that the company's market
share in Germany will remain stable. We do not, however, expect
any material improvement in profitability despite the
implementation of cost-saving initiatives. This is because the
company will be focused on retaining its current market share
amid challenging competition, particularly in light of the
announced merger between Celesio and US-based McKesson (A-/RWN).
Deleveraging Slows in FY14
Overall net adjusted (lease and ABS/factoring) debt /EBITDAR
decreased to 3.7x in FY13 from 4.3x in FY11. Fitch expects this
ratio to deteriorate to slightly above 4x in FY14 due to an
estimated 18% drop in EBITDAR, before falling to 3.5x in FY16.
The reduction in leverage will be driven by expected positive
free cash flow and further declines in net debt.
Phoenix Forward Programme
The Phoenix Forward Programme will support EBITDAR margins over
the next three years. Phoenix estimates that the program will
provide sustainable savings of at least EUR100 million till FY16.
The program focuses on improving efficiencies, including bundling
of administrative functions to increase operational focus and
refinement of warehouse efficiency which we believe is a sensible
approach. However, Fitch expects some of these cost savings to
be reinvested to maintain competitive pricing.
Wholesale Pharmaceuticals Leader
Phoenix is one of the largest European players in the
pharmaceuticals wholesale market. The rating reflects its
geographical diversification, which helps strengthen its market
position with pharmaceutical manufacturers and makes it fairly
resilient to healthcare policy changes in single countries.
Integrated Business Model
Phoenix's leading position in the European wholesale market is
complemented by retail and supplier service activities. Phoenix
owns pharmacies in most countries it operates in and where
multiple pharmacy ownership is possible such as the UK.
Integrating supplier services and retail activities has enabled
Phoenix to achieve synergies and to fully capture the available
margin between pharmaceutical manufacturers and end-customers.
We expect retail margins to remain stable for the next four
years.
Resilient Positive Free Cash Flow
Despite the expected reduction in profitability in FY14 Fitch
expects continuing positive free cash flow (FCF), although it may
be tempered in the near term due to investments in working
capital to support sales growth initiatives. Fitch expects
EBITDAR to FCF conversion to average 30% by January 2017.
Although this is lower than the average 54% over the past three
years, it should translate into annual positive FCF of EUR150
million which is comfortable in relation to its future debt
maturities.
Pressure for Pharmacy Acquisitions; No Dividends
As its competitors are acquiring pharmacies, Phoenix could be at
risk of losing customers, particularly if pharmacy markets in
Europe liberalize. Therefore our forecasts assume some annual
acquisition spending on retail pharmacies, but only with a small
budget of EUR20 million, reflecting management's commitment to
limited M&A activity. The adverse credit impact arising from
acquisitions is balanced by Phoenix's commitment to maintain a
conservative financial policy with no plans for dividends.
Average Recoveries for Bondholders
Fitch rates Phoenix's bonds at the same level as the IDR,
reflecting limited subordination from the group's prior-ranking
on-balance sheet ABS and factoring lines and Italian credit lines
that together represented EUR473m at end-FY13. Prior-ranking
debt/EBITDA was at 0.8x in FY13 and is expected by Fitch to
remain below 1.5x in FY14. This is well below the 2x threshold
that Fitch typically applies under its generic recovery approach
to assess subordination issues for unsecured bondholders who are
protected by guarantees from material subsidiaries representing
at least 75% of the group's consolidated revenues and EBITDA.
Rating Sensitivities
Positive: Future developments that could lead to the positive
rating action include:
-- Stabilization in operating performance and conservative
financial policy driving net (lease, factoring and ABS)
adjusted debt / EBITDAR to below 3x (FY13: 3.7x). This would
be equivalent to FFO adjusted net leverage below 3.5x (FY13:
3.7x)
-- Operating EBITDAR net fixed charge cover above 3.5x (FY13:
2.9x) on a sustained basis. This would be equivalent to FFO
fixed charge coverage above 3x (FY13: 2.7x)
-- FCF/EBITDAR sustainably above 40% (FY13: 47%)
-- Slowing competitive pressure in Phoenix's major markets
Negative: Future developments that could lead to a negative
rating action include:
-- Net (lease, factoring and ABS) adjusted debt / EBITDAR above
4x (equivalent to FFO adjusted net leverage above 4.5x)
-- Operating EBITDAR net fixed charge cover below 3x on a
sustained basis (equivalent to FFO fixed charge coverage
below 2.2x)
-- FCF/EBITDAR falling below 25% on a sustained basis
Liquidity and Debt Structure
The group has a diversified financial structure and adequate
internal liquidity following its EUR300 million bond issue in May
2013 and the refinancing of its Italian credit lines with a new
EUR400 million revolving credit facility that will slightly
improve the company's debt maturity profile. At end-9MFY14
Phoenix had headroom of around EUR2 billion under its committed
facilities and a cash position of EUR334 million, which was more
than enough to cover its short-term financial liabilities of
EUR1,324 million (including a EUR506 million bond due in July
2014). In September and November 2013 the group paid back its
EUR300 million term loan (due in 2016) in full from existing
cash.
PROKON REGENERATIVE: Improved Regulation Needed After Insolvency
----------------------------------------------------------------
Annika Breidthardt at Reuters reports that German Finance
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble has said the country needs to improve
regulation and supervision of financial markets in order to
protect investors, including those who have been affected by last
month's insolvency of Prokon.
According to Reuters, Mr. Schaeuble was quoted as saying in an
advance release from an interview being published in Friday's
Handelsblatt newspaper, "It remains the goal of the German
government to better regulate and supervise the grey zones of the
financial market."
"We keep pushing for regulatory measures on the level of the
(Group of) 20 and we remain active at the national level too.
That also includes dealing consistently with the Prokon case."
Germany has long pushed for stronger financial market regulation
internationally -- and Mr. Schaeuble, as cited by Reuters, said
his ministry had asked the German financial regulator Bafin to
look into improving investor security.
Prokon had raised EUR1.4 billion (US$1.9 billion) mainly from
retail investors, Reuters discloses.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 22,
2014, Reuters related that Prokon had won mainly retail investors
through TV advertising campaigns on German prime-time television,
but last week warned it may have to file for insolvency if it was
unable to strike a deal with investors. More and more investors
have requested their money back following several reports in
German media that have questioned whether Prokon's payouts are
backed by actual profits, Reuters disclosed. The company, as
cited by Reuters, said that to avert insolvency, at least 95% of
investors' capital would have to remain with the company until
the end of October, urging investors not to cancel their
securities. Financial reports posted by Prokon on its website
showed that as of October 2013, it had paid out EUR330 million in
interest, even though it had made a loss of EUR210 million
(US$287 million), Reuters noted.
Prokon Regenerative Energien GmbH is a German wind park operator.
SAFARI HOLDING: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corp. Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 CFR and a B1-PD
Probability of Default rating to Safari Holding GmbH, the parent
company of the Lowen Play Group and guarantor of the notes. At
the same time, Moody's assigned a provisional (P)B2 rating to
Safari Holding Verwaltungs GmbH's (Lowen Play) proposed senior
secured guaranteed EUR265 million notes. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.
The (P)B2 rating assigned to the notes is based on a review of
draft documentation. Definitive ratings will be assigned upon a
satisfactory review of final documentation and upon the
successful close of the transaction.
Ratings Rationale
The B2 CFR primarily reflects (1) Lowen Play's small size and
lack of international diversification; (2) the material
regulatory risk following the regulatory overhaul of the German
gaming industry, which could have a material negative effect on
Lowen Play's business model from July 2017 onwards; and (3) the
key personal risk especially in the context of the regulatory
threat.
However, the rating benefits from (1) Lowen Play's leading market
position in the fragmented German gaming arcades market,
supported by a strong network of arcades in affluent states
(mainly Bavaria and Baden Wrttemberg); (2) the group's strong
profitability in the context of the European gaming universe
(based on EBIT margins); (3) the strong demand prospects for the
German gaming market supported by sound macroeconomic conditions,
especially in Lowen Play's key local states; (4) Lowen Play's
good cash conversion supported by strong operating margins, a
negative working capital consumption (players pay cash while
Lowen Play pays its suppliers within 180 days on average) and an
acceptable leverage pro-forma of the refinancing with adjusted
debt/EBITDA of around 4.0x; (5) the group's very experienced
management, which is critical at a time when the German gaming
industry is undergoing a material regulatory overhaul; and (6)
the company's ability to reduce costs in case of a credit
negative regulatory change by July 2017 thanks to short-term
gaming machines rental contracts (3 years) and around two-thirds
of the group's real estate lease contracts open for renegotiation
before 2017.
Liquidity
The liquidity profile of Lowen Play pro-forma of the transaction
will be adequate. The company is expected to have around EUR40
million of cash on balance sheet at closing of the transaction.
Given the cash flow generative nature of the business and the
negative working capital consumption (customers pay immediately
whilst suppliers are paid within 180 days), Moody's expect that
the company will rapidly build up a comfortable cash buffer. The
group will also have access to a three-year, EUR15 million
facility, provided by Ardian. At close, the facility will be
fully drawn to cover EUR4.7 million of guarantees and EUR10.3
million as available liquidity for working capital and general
corporate purposes. The company intends to put in place bilateral
lines which would be used repay the facility.
Lowen Play will not face any material debt maturities over the
next three years before the EUR15 million credit facility from
its shareholder will come due. The proposed EUR265 million of
senior secured guaranteed notes will mature in 2020.
Lowen Play will not need to comply with any maintenance covenants
neither in the proposed senior secured guaranteed notes nor in
the EUR15 million credit facility from its shareholder.
Under the notes indenture, Lowen Play will not be allowed to pay
out a dividend until 2017. At that time, the company will only be
allowed to pay a dividend if leverage is equal to or less than
1.5x. Further the company has committed to making a mandatory
offer for up to 10% of its originally issued notes subject to
maintaining adequate cash liquidity.
Structural Considerations
The capital structure of Lowen Play post successful placement of
the notes will be straightforward. There will be only three
financial instruments in the capital structure:
-- EUR265 million senior secured guaranteed notes
-- EUR15 million 3-year term loan provided by Ardian, the owner
of Lowen Play
From a contractual and structural point of view the senior
secured guaranteed notes will have priority over the Ardian loan.
The security package of the notes will consist of a pledge of
shares of the guarantors and a security interest over receivables
of the parent guarantor and the issuer, including receivables
arising under the Profit and Loss Pooling Agreements and other
intercompany receivables.
The differentiation between the probability of default rating and
the corporate family rating reflects the all bond capital
structure where Moody's assumes a lower recovery rate of 35%.
Rating Outlook
The stable outlook assumes an adjusted pro forma leverage of
around 4.0x at the closing of the transaction with a gradual
deleveraging on a net basis. The current rating also assumes that
Lowen Play will maintain conservative financial policies,
especially in light of the regulatory risk the company faces from
July 2017 onwards.
What Could Change the Rating -- Up and Down
Positive rating pressure is not anticipated in the short to
medium term due to the pending regulatory risk. Positive rating
pressure would however build if (i) Net debt / EBITDA would drop
sustainably and well below 3.0x; (ii)EBIT/Net interest expense
would increase sustainably and well above 3.0x, (iii) Lowen Play
would generate consistent positive free cash flow. A more benign
change in the regulatory environment could also lead to upward
rating pressure.
Negative rating pressure would be exerted on the rating if (i)
Net debt / EBITDA moves sustainably above 4.5x, (ii) EBIT/Net
interest expense drops sustainably below 2.0x, (iii) Lowen Play
generates negative free cash flow. A more aggressive regulatory
change than currently anticipated by management (especially the
non availability of hardship clauses) could also lead to negative
pressure on the rating.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Gaming published in December 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Safari Holding GmbH is the parent entity of the Lowen Play Group
and the guarantor of the proposed new notes. The Lowen Play Group
is majority owned by AXA LBO Funds. The remaining shares are
owned by management and Cofima, a Luxembourg-based holding
company controlled by a Dutch entrepreneur.
Lowen Play is Germany's largest operator of coin gaming arcades
by number of arcades, in a very fragmented market. The company
operates 316 amusement arcades and 20 single sites/pubs. Lowen
Play operates 8502 slot machines and 1124 amusement machines.
Lowen Play reported revenues of EUR222 million and EBITDA of
EUR92 million (41% margin) notwithstanding that the company
capitalizes its gaming machines rental costs (approximately 32%
EBITDA margin when adjusted for the machines' rental costs).
SAFARI HOLDING: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had assigned its
preliminary 'B' long-term corporate credit rating to Safari
Holding GmbH, the owner of the German gaming company Lowen Play
GmbH. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary 'B' long-term
issue rating to the EUR265 million proposed senior secured notes
due 2021 to be issued by Safari Holding Verwaltungs GmbH. The
preliminary recovery rating on the notes is '4', indicating S&P's
expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.
The preliminary rating on Safari Holding reflects S&P's view of
Lowen Play's "weak" business risk profile and "aggressive"
financial risk profile, as S&P's criteria define these terms.
Lowen Play is among the largest operators of gaming arcades in
Germany. Within its 316 arcades, Lowen Play currently offers
about 8,500 coin-operated electronic gaming machines.
Lowen Play's "weak" business risk profile reflects the company's
earnings concentration on German gaming arcades, which face
significant regulatory risk. Because Lowen Play is not present
in other gaming products, it is particularly vulnerable to
regulatory changes: The Interstate Treaty on Games of Chance
(Erster Glucksspielanderungsstaatsvertrag - Erster GluandStV),
which restricts the number of gaming machines per arcade, was
passed in July 2012, and as of Feb. 9, 2013, is effective in all
16 German states. Compliance with this treaty may force Lowen
Play and other operators to shut down a substantial share of
their arcades and dramatically reduce the number of gaming
machines. However, existing gaming arcades are protected against
complying with most of the new provisions until July 1, 2017, and
S&P anticipates Lowen Play's operations will be somewhat stable
until then.
S&P's business risk assessment also incorporates the risk of
increasing amusement taxes and changing consumer trends. German
municipalities have periodically raised taxes in the past and S&P
expects this will continue. Lowen Play's offer is limited to
gaming machines and is therefore exposed to competing offers, in
particular to online gaming, in S&P's view.
These risks are partly moderated by the company's above-average
profitability and healthy free cash flow generation. Under S&P's
base-case scenario, it estimates that the cumulative free cash
flow available for debt repayment between 2014 and 2017 should
add up to about EUR100 million.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that in the short term,
the company's operations will not be affected by the new
regulation. S&P anticipates 2014 revenues to increase by about
1%-2%, broadly in line with its forecast 1.8% GDP growth for
Germany. Adjusted EBITDA margins should remain at about 50% over
2014, translating into adjusted EBITDA interest cover of more
than 3.0x.
STRAUSS INNOVATION: Seeks Creditor Protection After Sales Decline
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Matthias Inverardi at Reuters reports that Strauss Innovation
said on Thursday it was seeking protection from creditors to try
and rescue its business which has 96 shops across the country.
According to Reuters, industry sources said that Strauss, owned
by U.S. private equity firm Sun Capital Partners, has suffered
from a mild winter hurting sales of cold weather clothing.
Strauss Innovation is a German chain of small department stores.
It was founded in 1902 in the western city of Duesseldorf and
employs 1,400 staff.
=============
I C E L A N D
=============
LANDSVIRKJUN: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB' CCR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had revised its
outlook on Iceland-based electricity generation and transmission
company Landsvirkjun to stable from negative. At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'BB' long-term and 'B' short-term corporate
credit ratings on Landsvirkjun.
The outlook revision follows S&P's similar action on the Republic
of Iceland.
"We base our ratings on Landsvirkjun on the company's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP), which we assess at 'b+', reflecting its
"fair" business risk profile, "highly leveraged" financial risk
profile, and a one-notch upward adjustment for our "positive"
comparable rating analysis, according to our criteria. The long-
term rating further includes two notches of uplift based on our
opinion that there is a "very high" likelihood that the
government of the Republic of Iceland would provide timely and
sufficient extraordinary support to Landsvirkjun in the event of
financial distress," S&P said.
In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities
(GREs), its view that there is a "very high" likelihood of
extraordinary government support is based on its assessment of
Landsvirkjun's:
-- "Very important" role for the Icelandic government, given
its dominant position as the incumbent power company and
64.7% owner of the national transmission grid; strategic
importance to the Icelandic economy; and central role in
the promotion of power-intensive industries.
-- "Very strong" link with the Icelandic state, given the
state's 100% ownership and our expectation that the company
will not be privatized in the medium term; and the risk to
the sovereign's reputation if Landsvirkjun were to default.
S&P's assessment of Landsvirkjun's financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged" reflects the company's high debt due to
significant debt-funded capital investments in recent years,
resulting in weak cash-flow coverage ratios.
Landsvirkjun's "fair" business risk profile reflects the
"moderately high" country risk of Iceland, "moderately high"
industry risk of unregulated power and gas companies, and the
company's "fair" competitive position.
S&P applies an upward adjustment of one notch, reflecting its
"positive" comparable rating analysis for the company. This is
based on S&P's view that Landsvirkjun's FFO-to-debt ratio is at
the upper end of its "highly leveraged" category; that interest
coverage is strong for the financial risk profile; and that there
is ongoing support from the owner, the Icelandic government,
which for example has requested very modest dividends from
Landsvirkjun over the past few years.
The stable outlook reflects that on Iceland, and S&P's assumption
of an unchanged SACP for Landsvirkjun in the near term. Despite
pressure from low aluminum prices, S&P assumes that
Landsvirkjun's FFO will be well in excess of its committed
investments in the near term, and that dividend payments will be
modest. Although S&P anticipates this to result in positive free
cash flow, it believes that any improvement in credit measures
would be minor in the next year, including FFO to debt of about
9%-10%.
=============
I R E L A N D
=============
BACCHUS 2006-1: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Bacchus 2006-1 PLC:
EUR34M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022 Notes,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aa2
(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
EUR25.54M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022 Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013
Upgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
EUR19.66M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022 Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2013
Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
EUR10M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
2022 Notes, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2013
Upgraded to B3 (sf)
EUR5M (current outstanding balance EUR3.4M) Class W Combination
Notes Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2013
Upgraded to A2 (sf)
EUR69M (current outstanding balance EUR35.9M) Class Y Combination
Notes Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2013
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the ratings on the following
notes issued by Bacchus 2006-1 PLC:
EUR195.8M (current outstanding balance EUR59.1M) Class A-1 Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022 , Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Jul 19, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
EUR67.5M (current outstanding balance EUR15.1M) Class A-2A Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Jul 19, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)
EUR7.5M Class A-2B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 19, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)
Bacchus 2006-1 PLC, issued in March 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European and US loans. The portfolio is managed by
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2012.
Ratings Rationale
The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
significant deleveraging of the Class A notes and subsequent
improvement of the overcollateralization ratios following the
amortization of the underlying portfolio since the rating action
in July 2013. Moody's had previously upgraded the ratings on 14
November 2013 of Class B to Aa2 (sf) from Aa3 (sf) and Class C to
A3 (sf) from Baa2 (sf) and left them on review for upgrade due to
significant loan prepayments. Today's actions conclude the rating
review of the transaction.
As a result of deleveraging, the overcollaterlization ratios have
increased. Class A notes have paid down by approximately EUR86.8
million (32.1%) since the rating action in July 2013 and EUR189.0
million (70%) since closing. As of the trustee's November 2013
report, the Class A,B, C, D and E had an overcollateralization
ratio of 158.3%, 129.7%, 113.9% and 107.2% compared with 132.7%,
117.8%, 108.5% and 104.3% since the rating action in July 2013.
The ratings of the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. The rated
balance at any time is equal to the principal amount of the
combination note on the issue date minus the sum of all payments
made from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. The rated balance will not necessarily correspond to
the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.
The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR82.0 million,
defaulted par of EUR4.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 30.3% (consistent with a WARF of 3975), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.3% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 22.5 and a weighted average
spread of 3.9%.
The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that a recovery of 50% of the 95.1% of the
portfolio exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets
upon default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.
Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.
Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:
In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower credit quality in the portfolio to
address refinancing risk. Loans to European corporates rated B3
or lower and maturing between 2014 and 2015 make up approximately
8.16% of the portfolio, which could make refinancing difficult.
Moody's ran a model in which it raised the base case WARF to 4173
by forcing ratings on 50% of the refinancing exposures to Ca; the
model generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-
case results.
This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted either
positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment strategy
and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties due to because
of embedded ambiguities.
Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:
1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.
2) Around 57.6% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009 and
available at https://www.moodys.com/research/Updated-Approach-to-
the-Usage-of-Credit-Estimates-in-Rated--PBC_120461.
3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.
In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.
BACCHUS 2007-1: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class D Notes to Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Bacchus 2007-1 PLC:
EUR88M (current outstanding balance EUR48.4M) Revolving Credit
Facility due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14,
2013 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
EUR218.2M (current outstanding balance EUR120.0M) Class A Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf);
previously on Nov 14, 2013 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade
EUR35.4M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed Baa2
(sf)
EUR25.5M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013
Affirmed Ba3 (sf)
EUR25M (current outstanding balance EUR27.2M) Class D Senior
Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Caa1
(sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)
Moody's Investors Service also affirmed the ratings on the
following notes issued by Bacchus 2007-1 PLC:
EUR12.2M (current outstanding balance EUR14.9M) Class E Senior
Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Ca
(sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013 Affirmed Ca (sf)
EUR3M (current outstanding balance EUR2.6M) Class Y Combination
Notes due 2023, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 12, 2013
Affirmed Ca (sf)
Bacchus 2007-1 PLC, issued in April 2007, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European and US loans. The portfolio is managed by
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in April 2013.
Ratings Rationale
The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
significant deleveraging of the Class A notes and subsequent
improvement of the overcollateralization ratios as well as
modelling of the current weighted average spread since the rating
action in March 2013. On November 14, 2013 Moody's placed on
review for possible upgrade the Aa2(sf) ratings of the Revolving
Credit Facility and Class A notes due to significant loan
prepayments. The actions conclude the rating review of the
transaction.
As a result of deleveraging, the overcollaterlization ratios have
increased. Class A notes and Revolving Credit Facility have paid
down by approximately EUR69.4 million (31.0%) since the rating
action in March 2013 and EUR137.8 million (45%) since closing. As
of the trustee's December 2013 report, the Class AB, C, D and E
had an overcollateralization ratio of 128.0%, 113.2%, 100.8% and
95.1% compared with 120.1%, 110.3%, 101.6% and 97.4% since the
rating action in March 2013.
In light of reinvestment restrictions during the amortization
period, and therefore the limited ability to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics would maintain an adequate buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed
that the deal will benefit from a shorter amortization profile
and higher spread levels than it had assumed at the rating action
in March 2013.
The ratings of the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. The rated
balance at any time is equal to the principal amount of the
combination note on the issue date minus the sum of all payments
made from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. The rated balance will not necessarily correspond to
the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.
The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR24.4 million,
defaulted par of EUR16.9 million, a weighted average default
probability of 27.5% (consistent with a WARF of 3708), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 48.5% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 28.35 and a weighted average
spread of 4.3%.
The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that a recovery of 50% of the 95.6% of the
portfolio exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets
upon default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.
Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.
Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:
In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower credit quality in the portfolio to
address refinancing risk. Loans to European corporates rated B3
or lower and maturing between 2014 and 2015 make up approximately
9.69% of the portfolio, which could make refinancing difficult.
Moody's ran a model in which it raised the base case WARF to 3996
by forcing ratings on 50% of the refinancing exposures to Ca; the
model generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-
case results.
This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted either
positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment strategy
and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties due to because
of embedded ambiguities.
Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:
1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.
2) Around 57.6% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009 and
available at https://www.moodys.com/research/Updated-Approach-to-
the-Usage-of-Credit-Estimates-in-Rated--PBC_120461.
3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.
In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.
=========
I T A L Y
=========
ALITALIA SPA: Etihad Has 30 Days to Decide on Investment
--------------------------------------------------------
Deena Kamel Yousef at Bloomberg News report that Etihad Airways
PJSC, the third-largest Middle Eastern airline, will decide
within 30 days whether to purchase a stake in ailing Italian
carrier Alitalia SpA to extend its strategy of funneling traffic
through Abu Dhabi.
Etihad said in a statement on Sunday that it has entered the
final stage of due diligence on a possible investment in
Alitalia, citing Chief Executive Officer James Hogan and Alitalia
counterpart Gabriele Del Torchio. The airlines and advisers are
working on a joint strategy, Bloomberg says, citing the
statement.
Etihad, which made a series of minority investments in carriers
spanning Ireland to Australia as part of its growth strategy,
said it was in talks with Alitalia, declining to give more
details, Bloomberg relays.
According to Bloomberg, people familiar with the talks have said
Etihad is considering a cash contribution of about EUR300 million
(US$405 million) to unprofitable Alitalia.
About Alitalia
Alitalia-Compagnia Aerea Italiana has navigated its way through
a successful restructuring. After filing for bankruptcy
protection in 2008, Alitalia found additional investors, acquired
rival airline Air One, and re-emerged as Italy's leading airline
in early 2009. Operating a fleet of about 150 aircraft, the
airline now serves more than 75 national and international
destinations from hubs in Fiumicino (Rome), Milan, Turin, Venice,
Naples, and Catania. Alitalia extends its network as a member of
the SkyTeam code-sharing and marketing alliance, which also
includes Air France, Delta Air Lines, and KLM. An Italian
investor group owns a majority of the company, while Air France-
KLM owns 25%.
CHRYSLER GROUP: Fiat Plan Takes Advantage of Finance Benefits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Christina Rogers and Gilles Castonguay, writing for The Wall
Street Journal, reported that Sergio Marchionne's vision to
create a global auto maker out of Fiat SpA and Chrysler Group LLC
appears to be about global finance and taxes as well as sharing
chassis and powertrain technology.
According to the report, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV, the new
holding company that will control the operations of Italy's Fiat
and No. 3 U.S. auto maker Chrysler, will be based in the
Netherlands, with a U.K. tax domicile and a New York stock
listing.
The structure crossing national boundaries isn't accidental. Each
geography affords the new entity access to something: generous
tax policy, a favorable board structure or deep financial
markets, the report related. Fiat said the moves won't affect
the taxes paid by the group's companies in the jurisdictions in
which they operate.
"We have succeeded in creating solid foundations for a global
auto maker," Mr. Marchionne said in a written statement, the
report cited. "An international governance structure and
listings will complete this vision and improve the group's access
to global markets bringing obvious financial benefits."
The move comes five years after the U.S. government committed to
a US$12.5 billion bailout to save Chrysler from collapse, an
arrangement in which Fiat arrived as the white knight, bringing
management and technical expertise without paying any cash at the
time to gain operational control, the report said. Chrysler has
paid back the federal loans, and Fiat announced this month that
it would gain full control of Chrysler in a US$4.35 billion deal.
About Chrysler Group
Chrysler Group LLC, formed in 2009 from a global strategic
alliance with Fiat Group, produces Chrysler, Jeep(R), Dodge, Ram
Truck, Mopar(R) and Global Electric Motorcars (GEM) brand
vehicles and products. Headquartered in Auburn Hills, Michigan,
Chrysler Group LLC's product lineup features some of the world's
most recognizable vehicles, including the Chrysler 300, Jeep
Wrangler and Ram Truck. Fiat will contribute world-class
technology, platforms and powertrains for small- and medium-sized
cars, allowing Chrysler Group to offer an expanded product line
including environmentally friendly vehicles.
Chrysler LLC and 24 affiliates on April 30, 2009, sought Chapter
11 protection from creditors (Bankr. S.D.N.Y (Mega-case), Lead
Case No. 09-50002). The U.S. and Canadian governments provided
Chrysler LLC with US$4.5 billion to finance its bankruptcy case.
In connection with the bankruptcy filing, Chrysler reached an
agreement to sell all assets to an alliance between Chrysler and
Italian automobile manufacturer Fiat. Under the terms approved
by the Bankruptcy Court, the company formerly known as Chrysler
LLC in June 2009, formally sold substantially all of its assets
to the new company, named Chrysler Group LLC.
* * *
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on U.S.-
based auto manufacturer Chrysler Group LLC, including the
corporate credit rating to 'BB-' from 'B+' in mid-January 2014.
The outlook is stable.
CHRYSLER GROUP: Fiat Scraps Dividend
------------------------------------
Gilles Castonguay and Christina Rogers, writing for The Wall
Street Journal, reported that the newly combined Fiat SpA and
Chrysler Group LLC rolled out a new name, a new logo and plans
for a new corporate structure, but fourth-quarter results and a
glum outlook for 2014 showed the challenges ahead for the world's
seventh largest auto maker.
According to the report, the company, now known as Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles NV, reported higher fourth-quarter net profit largely
because of a Chrysler tax benefit. Its operations showed growing
strains as losses in Europe and an earnings decline in South
America offset gains from higher truck and sport-utility vehicle
sales in North America. The company's profit forecast for this
year was below analysts' expectations.
Fiat Chrysler suspended its dividend to save cash in the wake of
its US$4.35 billion deal to purchase the rest of Chrysler it
didn't already own, the report related. The company also said it
would seek to raise US$4.7 billion in fresh debt to pay off a
note held by a United Auto Workers union health-care trust.
The focus now shifts to May, when Chief Executive Sergio
Marchionne is expected to lay out a plan for building a single
company strong enough to compete with Volkswagen AG, General
Motors Co. and Toyota Motor Corp., rivals that are as much as
twice its size, the report said. Toyota's volume last year
passed the 10-million vehicle mark for the first time. Fiat and
Chrysler sold a combined 4.4 million vehicles last year.
In comments on Jan. 29, Mr. Marchionne acknowledged concerns
about Fiat Chrysler's EUR29.9 billion (US$40.88 billion) in debt,
saying the company will take a deeper look at its capital needs
after it completes a U.S. share listing and its incorporation in
the Netherlands, the report further related. The combined
company will have its tax domicile in the U.K., where the main
tax corporate rate is expected to decline to 21% effective
April 1.
About Chrysler Group
Chrysler Group LLC, formed in 2009 from a global strategic
alliance with Fiat Group, produces Chrysler, Jeep(R), Dodge, Ram
Truck, Mopar(R) and Global Electric Motorcars (GEM) brand
vehicles and products. Headquartered in Auburn Hills, Michigan,
Chrysler Group LLC's product lineup features some of the world's
most recognizable vehicles, including the Chrysler 300, Jeep
Wrangler and Ram Truck. Fiat will contribute world-class
technology, platforms and powertrains for small- and medium-sized
cars, allowing Chrysler Group to offer an expanded product line
including environmentally friendly vehicles.
Chrysler LLC and 24 affiliates on April 30, 2009, sought Chapter
11 protection from creditors (Bankr. S.D.N.Y (Mega-case), Lead
Case No. 09-50002). The U.S. and Canadian governments provided
Chrysler LLC with US$4.5 billion to finance its bankruptcy case.
In connection with the bankruptcy filing, Chrysler reached an
agreement to sell all assets to an alliance between Chrysler and
Italian automobile manufacturer Fiat. Under the terms approved
by the Bankruptcy Court, the company formerly known as Chrysler
LLC in June 2009, formally sold substantially all of its assets
to the new company, named Chrysler Group LLC.
* * *
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on U.S.-
based auto manufacturer Chrysler Group LLC, including the
corporate credit rating to 'BB-' from 'B+' in mid-January 2014.
The outlook is stable.
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
E-MAC NL 2006-III: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on EUR40.7MM Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the rating of one junior
note in the residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transaction E-MAC Program B.V./Compartment NL 2006-III and
confirmed the ratings of two mezzanine notes in HOLLAND MORTGAGE
BACKED SERIES (HERMES) XII B.V. Sufficient protection of the
notes ratings from swap counterparty exposure has prompted the
action. At the same time, Moody's affirmed the ratings of all
tranches in these two transactions which were not on review for
possible downgrade.
The rating action concludes the review of the ratings in these
two Dutch RMBS transactions, which Moody's placed on review on
Nov. 14, 2013, in relation to swap counterparty exposure
following the introduction of the rating agency's updated
approach to assessing swap counterparty linkage in structured
finance transactions.
Ratings Rationale
The rating action reflects the impact on the two transactions of
their exposure to their respective swap counterparties which are
Credit Suisse International (A1/P-1) in the case of E-MAC NL
2006-III and Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch (A2/(P)P-1) in the
case of HERMES XII, following the introduction of the rating
agency's updated approach to assessing swap counterparty linkage
in structured finance cash flow transactions. The two
transactions include swap agreements with their respective swap
counterparties to hedge the risk arising from the mismatch of the
interest received on the underlying assets (which includes both
floating and fixed rate loans in the case of HERMES XII and fixed
rate loans only in the case of E-MAC NL 2006-III) and the
interest due on the outstanding notes which is based on 3month
EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate). Net swap payments in
recent periods were in favor of the swap counterparty in the two
transactions, given the current interest rate environment.
However, net swap payments could be in favor of the issuer in
future.
Detailed review of the swap documentation in HERMES XII has shown
that the collateral and replacement provisions of the swap are
sufficiently strong to reduce the probability of the notes
becoming unhedged following a swap counterparty default to a
level consistent with the ratings of the notes.
As part of its review of E-MAC NL 2006-III Moody's has re-
assessed loan-by-loan information to determine the MILAN Aaa CE.
As a result, Moody's has increased its MILAN Aaa CE assumption to
12% from 5.9% previously assumed. This increase is mainly driven
by higher delinquency levels for a relatively smaller outstanding
portfolio compared to closing as well as by declining house
prices in the Netherlands. Moody's then incorporated the risk of
additional losses on the notes in the event of them becoming
unhedged following a swap counterparty default. The credit
enhancement available for Classes A and B of E-MAC NL 2006-III
sufficiently protects the note ratings against the risk of
suffering a loss in the event of the interest rate risk becoming
unhedged following a swap counterparty default, notwithstanding
the increase in the MILAN Aaa CE assumption.
FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING
Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings affected by the action would be the worse-than-expected
performance of the underlying collateral and deterioration in the
credit quality of the counterparties.
Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings affected by today's action would be the better-than-
expected performance of the underlying assets, and a decline in
counterparty risk.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
November 2013.
LIST OF AFFECTED SECURITIES
Issuer: E-MAC Program B.V./Compartment NL 2006-III
EUR604.8M A2 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 10,
2009 Confirmed at Aaa (sf)
EUR21.6M B Notes, Confirmed at Aa3 (sf); previously on Nov 14,
2013 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: HOLLAND MORTGAGE BACKED SERIES (HERMES) XII B.V.
EUR2095.5M A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 26,
2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)
EUR44M B Notes, Confirmed at Aa2 (sf); previously on Nov 14,
2013 Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR31.9M C Notes, Confirmed at A2 (sf); previously on Nov 14,
2013 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR28.6M D Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 3,
2013 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)
EUR40.7M E Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 3,
2013 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
HARBOURMASTER CLO 5: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Harbourmaster CLO 5 B.V.'s class B2E
and B2F notes, upgraded class A2E and A2F notes and affirmed the
rest as follows:
-- Class A1 (XS0223502005): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
-- Class A2E (XS0223490235): upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'Asf';
Outlook Stable
-- Class A2F (XS0223502856): upgraded to 'A+sf' from 'Asf';
Outlook Stable
-- Class A3 (XS0223503078): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
-- Class A4E (XS0223503151): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative
-- Class A4F (XS0223503581): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative
-- Class B1E (XS0223503664): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook
Negative
-- Class B1F (XS0223503748): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook
Negative
-- Class B2E (XS0223503821): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf';
Recovery Estimate (RE) 30%
-- Class B2F (XS0223504043): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'B-sf';
RE 30%
Key Rating Drivers
The downgrade of the junior notes reflects the transaction's
mixed performance over the last 11 months. Defaulted assets as a
percentage of the total collateral balance (including performing
and defaulted assets) have increased to 4.5% from 3.2%; however,
the outstanding balance of such defaulted assets has slightly
decreased to EUR13.2 million from EUR14.4 million. The reported
Fitch weighted average recovery rate has decreased to 66.4% from
74%, below its threshold level of 71%. The market value of
defaulted assets is currently 17.3%, down from 46.3%. The class
B2 notes are also exposed to assets rated 'CCC*' or below, of
which 70% of them will mature within the next three years.
The upgrade of class A2E and A2F, the affirmation of the rest
reflect adequate credit enhancement levels for the current
ratings. The class A1 notes have paid down EUR166.9 million over
the past 11 months. All principal proceeds are used to amortize
liabilities as the portfolio's manager's ability to reinvest
unscheduled principal proceeds ended in September 2012. The
Outlook revision to Stable on class A4E and A4F is driven by an
increase in credit enhancement available for these classes (to
16.6% from 11.8%), mitigating risks over amend- and-extend
activity on the underlying loans.
Obligors rated 'CCC*' or below by Fitch account for 14.7% of the
collateral portfolio balance (broadly in line with their share of
14.4% at end-March 2013), whereas the percentage of the portfolio
consisting of exposures towards borrowers domiciled in Ireland
and Spain increased to 12% from 10.8%.
Several assets in the collateral portfolio (accounting for 11% of
the portfolio balance) have extended their maturity over the last
11 months. This resulted in the absence of a reduction in the
portfolio weighted average life (WAL, 3.6 years) in spite of a
reduction of the outstanding portfolio balance due to
amortization (in the absence of any amend and extend activity the
portfolio WAL would be 3.3 years instead).
Rating Sensitivities
A 25% increase in the default probability would lead to a
downgrade of one notch for class B1 notes and would likely lead
to a default for class B2 notes.
A 25% reduction in the recovery rates would lead to a downgrade
of one notch for class A2 and A3 notes and to a downgrade of two
or more notches for class A4, B1 and B2 notes.
===========
P O L A N D
===========
LOT POLISH: Says Cost-Cutting Drive Pares Losses Amid EU Probe
--------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Jasper and Maciej Martewicz at Bloomberg News report that
LOT Polish Airlines SA said a cost-cutting drive is successfully
paring losses and stressed the benefits of rebuilding its fleet
around Boeing Co.'s 787, even as the European Commission cast
doubt on the strategy.
According to Bloomberg, LOT on Saturday said that the company
ended 2013 with a "slight loss" of PLN20 million (US$6.3 million)
or less and is on course to match or better a predicted profit of
as much as PLN78 million for the current year.
Poland's biggest airline was responding to the publication this
month of European Commission documents saying the recovery plan
may fail to restore long-term viability and that the 787's lower
operating costs will boost only a small part of the network,
Bloomberg notes. LOT may also struggle to fill all eight jets
ordered, Bloomberg states.
"Such results confirm that we were right about our assumptions
and increase the credibility of our plan," Bloomberg quotes LOT
Chief Executive Officer Sebastian Mikosz as saying in a
statement. "We should bear in mind that the document published
by the commission includes only the plan filed in June and
doesn't refer to all the progress in its implementation since
then."
The European Union regulator's publication of its decision to
initiate scrutiny of an PLN804 million aid application from LOT
makes public the body's emerging views after it said Nov. 6 that
a probe would go ahead, Bloomberg relays.
"The assumption that LOT's long-standing structural problems will
be largely solved by the introduction of a new aircraft appears
doubtful," the commission, as cited by Bloomberg, said. "It will
have a direct impact on only one of the market segments.
Secondly, it is far from certain that there will be sufficient
demand in the future to ensure efficient utilization."
The commission said that long-haul flights contributed less than
25% of LOT's revenue from scheduled flights in 2012, Bloomberg
notes.
According to Bloomberg, the regulator added that LOT has made
several restructuring efforts in the past, including a number of
measures in the three years from 2009 after which it still posted
a record net loss. Claims that the current plan will deliver a
permanent turnaround are therefore viewed with "skepticism," the
commission, as cited by Bloomberg, said.
The commission said that LOT may not remain liquid even if aid is
granted, could struggle to make paid-for cabin services stick and
has assumed unrealistic earnings forecasts and deviations from
projections, Bloomberg relates.
Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, Polskie Linie Lotnicze LOT, or
LOT Polish Airlines -- http://www.lot.com-- serves about a dozen
cities in Poland and about 120 destinations across Europe and
North America. Subsidiaries include regional carrier EuroLOT and
charter operator Centralwings. Overall, LOT and its affiliates
maintain a fleet of about 55 aircraft, consisting of Embraer
regional jets, Boeing 767s and 737s, and ATR turboprops. The
airline is a member of the Star Alliance marketing group, and LOT
serves many of its North American destinations through code-
sharing with Star partners United Airlines and Air Canada.
(Code-sharing allows airlines to sell tickets on one another's
flights and thus extend their networks.) The Polish government
owns 68% of the company.
===============
S L O V E N I A
===============
NOVA LJUBJANSKA: Moody's Upgrades Rating to Caa1; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the long-term deposit
ratings of Nova Ljubjanska banka d.d. (NLB) and Nova Kreditna
banka Maribor d.d.'s (NKBM) to Caa1 from Caa2, and Abanka Vipa
d.d.'s (Abanka) to Caa2 from Caa3. The outlook on the ratings of
NLB and NKBM has been changed to stable, while the outlook on
Abanka's long-term deposit ratings is positive.
Concurrently, Moody's has raised the banks' baseline credit
assessments (BCAs) within the 'E' BFSR category to caa2 from ca
for NLB, caa2 from caa3 for NKBM and to caa3 from ca for Abanka.
Each banks' E BFSR was affirmed.
The upgrade of the long-term ratings reflects the higher BCAs.
The raising of the banks' standalone BCAs follows a bank
recapitalization program launched by the Slovenian government
(Ba1 stable) in December 2013. As part of the recapitalization
program, NLB and NKBM completed the transfer of a large portion
of their non-performing loans to a government-owned Bad Asset
Management Company (BAMC). For Abanka, this process is expected
to be completed by end-Q1 2014.
Following these state-aid measures the banks were fully
nationalized.
Ratings rationale
Long-term deposit ratings
Moody's continues to incorporate one notch of uplift in the
supported long-term deposit ratings for NLB and NKBM at Caa1, and
for Abanka at Caa2, from their current BCAs. This is based on
Moody's assessment that some degree of systemic support will be
available to each bank on an on-going basis after the
recapitalization and balance-sheet clean-up.
However, at the same time, Moody's notes that any future large-
scale state-aid will be significantly constrained by (1) the
Slovenian government's more limited capacity to use its balance
sheet to absorb further losses; and (2) increasing regulatory
pressure at the European level, restricting the use of taxpayers'
money to resolve failing banks.
As a result, Moody's considers that the current one-notch of
uplift for each bank's long-term rating reflects these medium-
term uncertainties and constraints. The uplift also takes into
account the planned privatization of these banks, which was
announced by the Slovenian government as part of the bail-out
conditions.
Standalone BCAs of NLB and NKBM
Moody's says that the raising of NLB's and NKBM's BCAs to caa2
reflects (1) the completion of the government-led balance-sheet
clean up from an unsustainable burden of non-performing loans;
and (2) recapitalization through a combination of cash capital
injections and a transfer of assets to the BAMC. In addition, as
part of the process, all the hybrid capital and subordinated debt
instruments of the banks were bailed-in to aid the
recapitalization. These instruments have therefore been fully
written-down and cancelled.
Following these measures, Moody's expects that NLB and NKBM will
report substantially improved year-end Tier 1 capital ratios in
the range of above 15% and 16%, respectively. Before the
recapitalization, the ratios were below the regulatory minimum
guidelines.
As the result of the clean-up, both banks' asset-quality ratio
has improved substantially, with net non-performing loans (non-
performing loans adjusted for provisions) reduced to low single-
digit levels. Similarly, funding positions have also improved,
with loan-to-deposit ratios below 100%, from around 116% before
the recapitalization.
However, at the same time Moody's notes that these banks
recurring profitability remains weak, with the average cost-to-
income ratio of 70%-80% and average net interest margin at 1.7%
and with medium probability of them remaining loss-making in 2014
and slow recovery thereafter. In addition, Moody's notes that the
corporate sector in Slovenia remains highly indebted and its
deleverage and recovery may take some time to emerge.
Therefore, the likelihood of these banks achieving a sustainable
recurring profitability remains low during 2014, in light of the
limited growth opportunities and ongoing recessionary environment
in Slovenia. These considerations constrain the BCAs in the caa
range until more clarity emerges regarding the operating
environment, lending opportunities improve accordingly and
internal bank restructuring challenges are addressed.
Standalone BCA of Abanka
Due to the still-pending transfer of its non-performing loan
portfolio, Abanka has so far benefited only from the capital
injection, with its Tier 1 ratio at 9% by year-end 2013. Abanka
expects to complete the clean-up by April 2014, by which point
its capital and asset-quality ratios would be similar to the
other two banks. This explains the positioning of Abanka's
standalone BCA, at one notch below its peers, with a positive
outlook at this stage.
What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down
Upward pressure could develop on the ratings in the short to
medium-term if the banks show (1) signs of returning to a
sustainable business model, with reasonable growth opportunities
and comparable profitability; and (2) the maintenance of
sufficient capital buffers and robust asset-quality trends.
Downward pressure is unlikely to develop in the near term, given
(1) the current already low BCA levels and limited uplift in the
long-term ratings; and (2) substantially improved capital and
asset quality ratios which can absorb further moderate volatility
in the banks' performance.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in May 2013
=========
S P A I N
=========
FONCAIXA AUTONOMOS: Moody's Confirms Ba1 Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba1(sf) rating on the
class B notes in Foncaixa Autonomos 1, FTA. The transaction is a
Spanish asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction backed
primarily by loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
originated by Caixabank (deposits Baa3 negative, standalone bank
financial strength rating D+/ baseline credit assessment ba1).
The rating incorporates a strong level of credit linkage to
Caixabank as sole provider of the credit enhancement. The
confirmation therefore reflects the exposure to Caixabank acting
as swap counterparty, which had no impact on the rating because
the credit enhancement that the reserve fund provides to the
junior notes (19.5%) is commensurate with the rating level.
The rating action concludes the review of the rating on the Class
B notes in this transaction, which Moody's placed on review on 14
November 2013. The rating on the class A notes in this deal,
which were not on review for downgrade, has been affirmed.
Ratings Rationale
Moody's initially placed the class B notes on review on
November 14, 2013 because of the linkage between the swap
counterparty (Caixabank) and the credit quality of the notes.
The rating action reflects the availability of sufficient credit
enhancement to address the notes' exposure to the issuer account
bank and swap counterparty, Caixabank. Credit enhancement below
the class B tranche stands at 19.5% and is in the form of a cash
reserve that Caixabank holds.
As part of its review, Moody's has incorporated the risk of
additional losses on the notes, in case the notes become unhedged
following a swap counterparty default. Assets backing the notes
in this deal are both fixed-rate assets (3.7% of the total pool
amount as of December 2013) and floating-rate assets (96.3% as of
December 2013) indexed to various indices, while the notes are
referenced to three-month EURIBOR. The transaction includes a
swap agreement with Caixabank to hedge the interest rate risk.
The swap also provides 0.75% excess spread to the transaction.
Net swap payments in recent periods were in favor of the swap
counterparty, given the current interest-rate environment;
however, future net swap payments could be in favor of the
issuer. The issuer does not need to post collateral according to
the most recent collateral-posting computations made by the
valuation agent.
Moody's has not updated its key modelling assumptions for this
deal, because the deal's performance is in line with the rating
agency's expectations.
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitisations"
published in May 2013.
Factors That Would Lead To An Upgrade Or Downgrade Of The Rating
Factors that could lead to a downgrade of the rating include (1)
worse-than-expected performance of the underlying collateral; (2)
deterioration in the credit quality of the counterparties; and
(3) an increase in Spain's sovereign risk.
Factors that could lead to an upgrade of the rating include
better-than-expected performance of the underlying assets, and a
decline in both counterparty and Spain's sovereign risk.
THE LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS
Issuer: FONCAIXA AUTONOMOS 1, FTA
EUR960.5M Class A notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on May 23,
2013 Confirmed at A3 (sf)
EUR169.5M Class B Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov
14, 2013 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
=============
U K R A I N E
=============
CRIMEA CITY: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea to
'CCC+' from 'B-'. The outlook is negative.
At the same time, S&P lowered the Ukraine national scale rating
to 'uaBB' from 'uaBBB-'.
As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 [EU CRA Regulation]),
the ratings on Crimea are subject to certain publication
restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation,
including publication in accordance with a pre-established
calendar. Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the
announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and
must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for
the deviation. In this case, the deviation has been caused by
the events described in the following Rationale.
Rationale
The downgrade follows the downgrade of Ukraine on Jan. 28, 2014.
"We assess Crimea's indicative credit level (ICL) at 'b'. The
ICL is not a rating. It is a means of assessing a local or
regional government's (LRG's) intrinsic creditworthiness under
the assumption that there is no sovereign rating cap. The ICL
results from the combination of our assessment of an LRG's
individual credit profile and the effects we see of the
institutional framework in which it operates," S&P said.
"Our view also incorporates our assessments of the republic's low
debt, conservative debt policies, and sound financial performance
in recent years. We also factor in our view that Crimea lacks
revenue predictability and has very low budgetary flexibility in
terms of revenues and expenditures. Crimea relies heavily on
subsidies and excise tax revenues and has high expenditure needs,
due in our view to the "volatile and underfunded" Ukrainian
institutional framework. Crimea has low wealth levels, weak
financial management practices, negative liquidity, and
contingent liabilities related to its municipalities and
companies," S&P added.
Under S&P's methodology, an LRG can be rated higher than its
sovereign only if it considers that it exhibits certain
characteristics. S&P do not currently believes that Ukrainian
LRGs, including Crimea, meet these conditions. S&P consequently
caps the long-term rating on Crimea at the level of the long-term
foreign currency rating on Ukraine.
Outlook
The negative outlook on Crimea reflects the negative outlook on
Ukraine. S&P would take positive rating actions on Crimea if it
took positive actions on Ukraine and if other rating factors
developed in line with its base-case scenario.
S&P might lower the ratings on Crimea if it lowered the ratings
on Ukraine.
Even if the sovereign ratings remain unchanged, S&P could
consider a negative rating action on Crimea in the unlikely case
that its performance and liquidity substantially weakened ahead
of its June 2014 bond repayment, for example because of setbacks
in revenue performance.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
Crimea (Autonomous Republic of)
Issuer Credit Rating CCC+/Negative/-- B-/Stable/--
Ukraine National Scale uaBB/--/-- uaBBB-/--/--
DNIPROPETROVSK CITY: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on the Ukrainian City of Dnipropetrovsk to 'CCC+'
from 'B-'. The outlook is negative.
At the same time, S&P lowered the Ukraine national scale rating
to 'uaBB' from 'uaBBB-'.
As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 [EU CRA Regulation]),
the ratings on Dnipropetrovsk are subject to certain publication
restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation,
including publication in accordance with a pre-established
calendar. Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the
announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and
must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for
the deviation. In this case, the deviation has been caused by
the events described in the following Rationale.
Rationale
The downgrade follows the downgrade of Ukraine on Jan. 28, 2014.
Under S&P's methodology, an LRG can be rated higher than its
sovereign only if it considers that it exhibits certain
characteristics. S&P do not currently believe that Ukrainian
LRGs, including Dnipropetrovsk, meet these conditions.
The long-term rating on Dnipropetrovsk is therefore capped at
'CCC+' by the Ukrainian sovereign foreign currency rating.
However, in accordance with S&P's criteria, it assess
Dnipropetrovsk's indicative credit level (ICL) at 'b'. The ICL
is not a rating, but a means of assessing an LRG's intrinsic
creditworthiness under the assumption that there is no sovereign
rating cap. The ICL results from the combination of S&P's
assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the effects
it sees of the institutional framework in which it operates.
S&P's view also reflects Ukraine's "volatile and underfunded"
public finance system, resulting in Dnipropetrovsk's low
financial flexibility and predictability, what S&P regards as
"negative" financial management, significant contingent
liabilities related to municipal utilities, and a poor and
concentrated economy. These constraints are mitigated by the
city's low debt burden, strong financial support from the central
government, moderate budgetary performance, and "neutral"
liquidity.
Outlook
The negative outlook on Dnipropetrovsk reflects that on Ukraine.
Because the rating on the city is capped at the sovereign rating,
any rating action on Ukraine would likely lead to a similar
action on Dnipropetrovsk, all else being equal. S&P currently do
not see a viable scenario in which it would revise down its
assessment of Dnipropetrovsk's ICL to below 'ccc+'.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
Dnipropetrovsk (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating CCC+/Negative/-- B-/Stable/--
Ukraine National Scale uaBB/--/-- uaBBB-/--/--
Senior Unsecured uaBB uaBBB-
Senior Unsecured CCC+ B-
IVANO-FRANKIVSK: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on the Ukrainian City of Ivano-Frankivsk to 'CCC+'
from 'B-'. The outlook is negative.
At the same time, S&P lowered the Ukraine national scale rating
on Ivano-Frankivsk to 'uaBB' from 'uaBBB-'.
As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 (EU CRA Regulation),
the ratings on Ivano-Frankivsk are subject to certain publication
restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation,
including publication in accordance with a pre-established
calendar. Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the
announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and
must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for
the deviation. In this case, the deviation has been caused by
the events described in the following Rationale.
Rationale
The downgrade follows the downgrade of Ukraine on Jan. 28, 2014.
Under S&P's methodology, a local and regional government (LRG)
can be rated higher than its sovereign if it believes that it
exhibits certain characteristics, as described in "Methodology:
Rating A Regional Or Local Government Higher Than Its Sovereign,"
published Sept. 9, 2009. S&P currently do not believe that
Ukrainian LRGs, including Ivano-Frankivsk, meet these conditions.
S&P consequently caps the rating on Ivano-Frankivsk at the level
of the long-term rating on Ukraine.
"Additionally, in accordance with our criteria, we assess the
city's indicative credit level (ICL) at 'b'. The ICL is not a
rating, but a means of assessing an LRG's intrinsic
creditworthiness under the assumption that there is no sovereign
rating cap. The ICL results from the combination of our
assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the effects
we see from the institutional framework in which it operates,"
S&P said.
Furthermore, S&P's rating reflects Ukraine's "volatile and
underfunded" institutional framework resulting in the city's
relatively low wealth levels, "negative" management quality, low
budgetary flexibility, "negative" liquidity, and moderate
contingent risks related to the weak financial position of the
city's government-related entities. However, the city's low debt
and moderate budgetary performance offset these weaknesses.
Outlook
The negative outlook on Ivano-Frankivsk reflects the negative
outlook on Ukraine. Because the rating on the city is capped at
the level of the sovereign rating, any rating action on Ukraine
would likely lead to a similar action on Ivano-Frankivsk, all
else being equal.
S&P would consider a positive rating action on Ivano-Frankivsk if
it took a positive action on Ukraine.
S&P currently do not see a viable downside scenario for the
city's ICL going below 'CCC+'.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Downgraded; Outlook Action
To From
Ivano-Frankivsk (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating CCC+/Negative/-- B-/Stable/--
Ukraine National Scale uaBB/--/-- uaBBB-/--/--
KYIV CITY: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on Ukraine's capital City of Kyiv to 'CCC+' from
'B-'. The outlook is negative.
As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 [EU CRA Regulation]),
the ratings on Kyiv are subject to certain publication
restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation,
including publication in accordance with a pre-established
calendar. Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the
announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and
must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for
the deviation. In this case, the deviation has been caused by
the events described in the following Rationale.
Rationale
The rating action follows S&P's downgrade of Ukraine on Jan. 28,
2014.
Under S&P's methodology, a local and regional government (LRG)
can be rated higher than its sovereign only if it considers that
it exhibits certain characteristics as described in "Methodology:
Rating A Regional Or Local Government Higher Than Its Sovereign,"
published Sept. 9, 2009, and "Ratings Above The Sovereign--
Corporate And Government Ratings: Methodology And Assumptions,"
published Nov. 19, 2013. S&P do not currently believe that
Ukrainian LRGs, including the city of Kyiv, meet these
conditions.
The long-term rating on Kyiv is therefore capped at 'CCC+' by the
Ukrainian sovereign foreign currency rating. However, in
accordance with S&P's criteria, it assess Kyiv's indicative
credit level (ICL) at 'b-'.
The ICL is not a rating, but a means of assessing an LRG's
intrinsic creditworthiness under the assumption that there is no
sovereign rating cap. The ICL results from the combination of
S&P's assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the
effects S&P sees of the institutional framework in which it
operates.
S&P's view also reflects Ukraine's "volatile and underfunded"
public finance system, which results in the city's low financial
flexibility and predictability, weak budgetary performance,
"negative" financial management, "very negative" liquidity,
material debt burden with associated foreign-exchange risks, and
high contingent liabilities.
The rating is supported by the city's position as the
administrative and economic center of Ukraine, its fairly
diversified economy, and wealth levels exceeding the national
average severalfold.
Outlook
The negative outlook on the city of Kyiv reflects that on
Ukraine.
S&P would revise the outlook to stable only if it took the
similar action on Ukraine and if other rating factors developed
in line with its base-case scenario.
A negative rating action on Kyiv would follow a negative action
on Ukraine. S&P could also take a negative rating action on the
city even if the sovereign ratings remain unchanged if the
central government's support for Kyiv diminished, leading to a
weaker debt repayment capacity for the city. This would likely
result in worse budgetary performance than S&P currently expects
in its base-case scenario, and take the form of restricted access
to state banks' and the treasury's liquidity.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Downgraded; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
Kyiv (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating CCC+/Negative/-- B-/Stable/--
Senior Unsecured CCC+ B-
Kyiv Finance PLC
Senior Unsecured CCC+
LVIV CITY: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'CCC+' CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on the
Ukrainian City of Lviv to negative from positive. At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term issuer credit rating and
'uaBB' Ukraine national scale rating on Lviv.
As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 (EU CRA Regulation),
the ratings on Lviv are subject to certain publication
restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation,
including publication in accordance with a pre-established
calendar. Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the
announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and
must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for
the deviation. In this case, the deviation has been caused by
the events described in the following Rationale.
Rationale
The outlook revision follows our rating action on Ukraine.
The ratings on Lviv are constrained by S&P's view of Ukraine's
volatile and underfunded intergovernmental system and low wealth
levels, and Lviv's limited financial flexibility on revenue and
expenditure. They also reflect S&P's view of the city's
liquidity as "very negative." Lviv has repeatedly missed
repayments on a loan from Ukraine's Ministry of Finance that it
guaranteed. Although the city is trying to resolve the problem,
the situation weighs on S&P's assessment of financial management,
which it views as "very negative" in an international context.
Material contingent liabilities related to municipal utilities
also constrain the ratings.
On the positive side, the ratings on Lviv reflect its fairly
sound financial performance and modest debt.
Outlook
The negative outlook reflects the negative outlook on Ukraine.
Under S&P's methodology, a local or regional government (LRG) can
be rated higher than its sovereign only if it consider that it
exhibits certain characteristics. S&P do not currently believe
that Ukrainian LRGs, including Lviv, meet these conditions.
Consequently, S&P would lower the ratings on Lviv if it lowered
the long-term rating on Ukraine.
S&P might revise its outlook on Lviv to stable if it took a
positive rating or outlook action on Ukraine and if Lviv's other
rating factors developed in line with its base-case scenario.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
Lviv (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating CCC+/Negative/-- CCC+/Positive/--
Ukraine National Scale uaBB/--/-- uaBB/--/--
Ratings Affirmed
Lviv (City of)
Senior Unsecured CCC+
Senior Unsecured uaBB
PRIVATBANK: S&P Cuts LT Counterparty Credit Rating to 'CCC+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
counterparty credit ratings on three Ukraine-based banks --
PrivatBank, Alfa-Bank Ukraine, and PJSC KREDOBANK -- to 'CCC+'
from 'B-'. The outlooks on the three banks are negative. S&P
also affirmed its 'C' short-term counterparty credit ratings on
these banks. At the same time, S&P lowered the Ukraine national
scale ratings on Kredobank and Alfa-Bank Ukraine to 'uaBB-' from
'uaBBB-'.
S&P's downgrades of the three banks follow a similar action on
Ukraine.
S&P views the sovereign's creditworthiness as the major risk
factor for Ukrainian banks because of their high operational,
funding, and asset exposure to the domestic economy. The
escalation of the political turmoil in Ukraine makes the expected
financial support package from Russia less certain, in S&P's
opinion, if the government of President Yanukovych falls. S&P
believes Ukraine is currently vulnerable to, and dependent on,
favorable political and economic developments to service its debt
obligations.
This political instability, coupled with very weak economic
prospects, increases risks for the banking sector, which is by
nature confidence-sensitive. Still, under S&P's base case
scenario, it expects that the Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) will
gradually stabilize against the dollar at a rate of about
UAH8.5:US$1. A sharper devaluation would likely hurt the banks'
already fragile asset quality and capital. S&P understands that
the political turmoil so far hasn't had a pronounced impact on
the banks' funding and liquidity positions. However, S&P don't
rule out deposit withdrawals from or runs on the banks,
disruptions to the banks' payment systems, and liquidity
shortages, if protestors' clashes with the government escalate
and continue.
Alfa-Bank Ukraine and Kredobank are subsidiaries of large foreign
groups, whose creditworthiness is substantially superior to that
of Ukraine. S&P thinks these foreign parents would provide
extraordinary support to their affiliates in Ukraine. Kredobank
is a subsidiary of Poland-based Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank
Polski S.A. and Alfa-Bank Ukraine is ultimately owned by Russian
financial-industrial group Alfa Group Consortium, whose main
banking arm is Alfa-Bank OJSC. S&P believes this foreign
ownership provides benefits to both banks, notably in risk
management and the sustainability of their commercial franchises.
S&P regards the two banks as "moderately strategic" subsidiaries
for their respective parents. S&P believes the foreign parents
would inject liquidity into their Alfa-Bank Ukraine and Kredobank
if needed. However, S&P do not include notches of uplift in the
ratings on the two banks from their 'ccc+' stand-alone credit
profiles (SACPs) to reflect parental support.
S&P views PrivatBank as having higher stand-alone
creditworthiness than Alfa-Bank Ukraine and Kredobank. S&P's
'b+' assessment of PrivatBank's SACP reflects its stronger
franchise, competitiveness, and risk position than the other two
banks.
Still, the long-term ratings on PrivatBank, Alfa-Bank Ukraine,
and Kredobank are constrained by the foreign currency long-term
sovereign rating on Ukraine. In S&P's view, these three banks do
not meet the criteria under which it would rate them higher than
Ukraine, given that they are predominantly exposed to their
domestic market. Although S&P acknowledges that the banks have
low exposure to Ukraine sovereign debt and state-related
enterprises, it believes the banks would likely be hit hard by a
sovereign default, if one were to occur, and the ensuing toll on
the economy. In S&P's hypothetical default scenario, the
National Bank of Ukraine might be unable to provide local
currency liquidity to the banking sector, and borrowers'
creditworthiness would deteriorate due to the hryvnia's
devaluation. S&P also foresees potential deposit outflows and
closed access to capital markets.
The negative outlooks on PrivatBank, Alfa-Bank Ukraine, and
Kredobank primarily reflect S&P's outlook on the sovereign. S&P
considers that sovereign-related risks will continue to be the
largest risks for these banks' financial profiles, especially
their capital and liquidity, if Ukraine's political landscape
remains unstable and economic prospects deteriorate further. Any
lowering of the foreign currency long-term rating on Ukraine
would trigger a similar lowering of the long-term ratings on
these three banks.
S&P could consider revising the outlooks to stable if it saw
signs that political tensions were abating and Ukraine was
securing external funding for its high gross external financing
requirement. S&P would also seek signs that PrivatBank, Alfa-
Bank Ukraine, and Kredobank are able to stabilize their financial
and business profiles--especially their liquidity,
capitalization, and asset quality--despite the prolonged
uncertainty and weak economic environment in Ukraine.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
BANK OF IRELAND: Moody's Downgrades Deposit Rating to 'B1'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the deposit ratings of
Bank of Ireland UK plc to B1 from Ba1 and lowered the bank's
baseline credit assessment (BCA) by two notches to b1 from ba2
(E+ from D BFSR). The action follows the lowering of Bank of
Ireland's (BoI) BCA to b1 from ba2 (E+ from D BFSR).
Moody's has maintained the BCAs of both entities aligned given
the high level of integration between BoI and BoI UK. As a
result, the deposit rating of BOI UK does not benefit from any
parental uplift and given the uncertainty regarding any potential
support coming from the Irish government to the UK based entity,
the ratings of BoI UK do not benefit from any systemic uplift.
Moody's has changed the outlook on the deposit rating to stable
from negative underpinned by the bank's stable asset quality
ratios, sound funding profile and improving profitability trend.
Ratings Rationale
The lowering of the BCA of BoI UK in line with the BCA of its
parent BoI reflects the high level of integration between the
subsidiary, a standalone legal entity with limited track record
(the bank was incorporated in November 2010), and its parent.
Moreover, the balance sheet of BoI UK has continued to evolve,
driven by intra-group transfers of UK based assets from BOI to
the UK subsidiary over the last four years, in line with BOI UK's
strategy.
The stable outlook on the deposit ratings of BoI UK reflects the
bank's (1) sound funding profile, supported by a deposit base
sourced largely from the Post Office brand in addition to
deposits from Northern Ireland and GB Business banking (high
level of FSCS coverage: 94% of total deposits with the Post
Office brand and 82% of total deposits); (2) stable albeit
relatively weak asset quality ratios (compared to other UK
banks), a result of the deterioration of the asset quality on the
commercial lending book being partially offset with the
satisfactory asset quality on its mortgage retail portfolio; and
(3) improving profitability levels, which will provide shock
absorbers to BoI UK depositors and contribute positively to the
group's profitability metrics.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP
The BCA of BoI UK will likely move in line with the rating of its
parent. However, positive pressure on BoI UK's ratings could
develop if the bank establishes a longer track record of
independence with its funding and capital profile along with
sustainable profitability metrics.
WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN
The BCA could be lowered if BoI UK's capitalization was to
decline either through higher than expected losses or through
dividend payments to its parent. A material increase in the
bank's risk profile could also lead to negative rating pressure.
Given the level of integration with BOI, a downgrade of the
parent could also have negative rating implications.
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Board Aware of Ex-Chair's Indiscretions
----------------------------------------------------------
The Telegraph reports that an investigation has found multiple
members of the Co-operative Group board were aware of the
Rev. Paul Flowers' past indiscretions dating back a number of
years.
The Telegraph has learnt that evidence proving a small number of
members of the 20-man board knew of Mr. Flowers' previous issue
with expenses and other inappropriate behavior has been
uncovered.
It is believed the documentary evidence, which dates back several
years, was found as part of Sir Christopher Kelly's review into
what went wrong at the mutual, The Telegraph discloses.
"There is prima facie evidence that a small group of people knew
about Flowers' weaknesses," The Telegraph quotes a source with
knowledge of the investigation as saying.
According to The Telegraph, the information has since been passed
to the two City regulators -- the Financial Conduct Authority and
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) -- as part of their
investigations into the downfall of the Co-op Bank, of which he
was chairman.
Mr. Flowers became the focal point of the Co-op's problems last
November when he was photographed allegedly buying and using
Class A drugs, following which revelations about other
improprieties emerged, The Telegraph notes.
About Co-operative Bank
Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872. The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment. It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.
Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people, and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.
* * *
The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 14 and 18, 2013 has
reported that Moody's Investors Service has affirmed The
Co-operative Bank's Caa1 senior unsecured debt and deposit
ratings, and changed the outlook on the rating to negative from
developing, and Fitch Ratings has downgraded the company's Issuer
Default Rating to 'B' from 'BB-' and placed it on Rating Watch
Negative.
F&C ASSET: S&P Puts 'BB+' Counterparty Rating on CreditWatch Pos.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it placed its
'BB+/B' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on F&C
Asset Management PLC (F&C) on CreditWatch with positive
implications.
The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement that the
higher-rated Bank of Montreal (BMO; A+/Stable/A-1) plans to
acquire F&C through its wholly owned subsidiary, BMO Global Asset
Management (Europe) Ltd. The all-cash consideration values F&C's
ordinary share capital at approximately GBP708 million. The
transaction is subject to customary shareholder and regulatory
approvals and S&P expects it to close by May this year. BMO has
not announced any immediate intention to buy back F&C's
outstanding debt.
"We believe that F&C's acquisition by a financially stronger
entity would likely be positive for F&C's creditworthiness. All
else being equal, the rating on F&C would likely benefit from our
view of potential extraordinary group support. In resolving the
CreditWatch, we will review F&C's longer-term strategic
importance to the group and the extent and timeliness of any
extraordinary support that the group could offer to its
subsidiary, if it were needed. We note that BMO has a track
record of support for its subsidiaries. If we saw a clear
prospect that BMO would extend this support to F&C in case of
need, we would likely designate F&C as a "moderately strategic"
or potentially a "strategically important" subsidiary, as our
criteria define these terms," S&P said. This would translate to
one or three notches of uplift respectively over F&C's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) of 'bb+'.
F&C's interim trading statement indicated that assets under
management (AUM) declined to GBP82.1 billion at year-end 2013
from GBP90.3 billion at the end of the third quarter of 2013.
The reduction was primarily the result of previously announced
strategic partner withdrawals. However, F&C has shown improving
momentum in attracting third-party assets, with GBP1,255 million
of net inflows from consumer and institutional clients in full-
year 2013. S&P also understands that F&C's cost reduction
program remains on track.
The CreditWatch positive reflects the at least one-in-two
probability that S&P would raise F&C's rating following
completion of the acquisition. The upgrade would depend on S&P's
view of the likelihood of potential extraordinary support for F&C
from its parent.
S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch upon completion of the
transaction, which is likely to be in May 2014.
HIBU INC: Seeks U.S. Recognition of UK Restructuring
----------------------------------------------------
hibu Inc. and related entities commenced Chapter 15 bankruptcy
proceedings in the United States to seek recognition of their UK
restructuring that would reduce debt by about GBP800 million
(US$1.29 billion).
hibu is subject to two primary secured debt facilities, each
governed by English law: (a) a secured credit facility, dated
July 27, 2006, that matured Oct. 29, 2012, and retired with the
exception of an intercompany obligation, and (b) a credit
agreement, dated November 30, 2009, of which:
GBP584,940,917,
US$1,909,491,989, and
EUR679,409,640
were outstanding as of Dec. 31, 2013.
Over the last 18 months, hibu and the coordinating committee of
its 2009 Facility lenders have engaged in extensive, good faith,
arm's-length negotiations regarding a financial restructuring of
hibu's funded debt aimed at right-sizing hibu's balance sheet.
Ultimately hibu and the CoCom have reached a comprehensive
agreement, the terms of which are serving as the foundation for
the English Proceedings and the chapter 15 cases.
Beginning in September 2012, the Debtors commenced negotiations
with lenders to both the 2006 and 2009 Facilities in an effort to
reduce their debt burden. In December 2012, hibu reached an
agreement with each of the 2006 External Lenders, whereby those
lenders agreed to receive a payment in cash equal to 39% of the
total amount outstanding to them in full and final settlement of
all amounts due. This payment was made on December 11, 2012.
Despite the settlement at a discount of all amounts due under the
2006 Facility to the 2006 External Lenders, the Debtors remained
significantly overleveraged. As of Dec. 31, 2013, approximately
GBP2.3 billion remained outstanding under the 2009 Facility.
Portions of the 2009 Facility are set to mature on March 31,
2014, and April 30, 2014, with the remaining amount due on
July 31, 2014. hibu has not made any payments under the 2009
Facility since October 25, 2012.
After months of negotiations, hibu and the CoCom announced the
principal terms of the Restructuring on July 25, 2013. Under the
Restructuring, among other things, indebtedness will be reduced
by approximately GBP800 million. In addition, the 2009 Facility
lenders will acquire (directly or indirectly) 100% of the equity
of the key hibu entities through a newly created holding company
structure.
To effectuate the restructuring, hibu commenced the English
Proceedings and the chapter 15 cases.
As of Jan. 17, 2014, all of the members of the CoCom representing
approximately 29.54% of the total loans outstanding under the
2009 Facility had executed a Lock-Up and Restructuring Framework
Agreement binding them to, among other things, execute and take
all action reasonably necessary in order to support and
facilitate the Restructuring. Other than the restructuring of
the 2009 Facility, the Restructuring does not impact hibu's other
creditors, including employees, trade vendors, customers, or
others except as otherwise agreed; rather, it serves to benefit
all of hibu's stakeholders by allowing hibu to emerge a stronger
and healthier company.
The foreign representative requests the entry of an order
(a) recognizing the English Proceedings as "foreign nonmain
proceedings" under section 1517 of the Bankruptcy Code,
(b) finding that the foreign representative is a person who
meets the definitional requirements of Section 101(24) of the
Bankruptcy Code, (c) finding that the Chapter 15 petition meets
the requirements of section 1515 of the Bankruptcy Code and
(d) granting additional relief under Sections 1521 and 1507 of
the Bankruptcy Code.
hibu seeks a Feb. 27 hearing on its motion to recognize its
scheme of arrangement in the UK.
About hibu Inc.
hibu is one of the largest multinational providers of print and
digital directories and digital services connecting local
consumers and merchants. While headquartered in Reading, U.K.,
hibu has approximately one million small and medium-sized
business ("SMB") customers located around the world. hibu's main
operations are located in the U.K., U.S., and Spain, with
operations also in Argentina, Chile, and Peru along with shared
service functions in India and the Philippines. hibu seeks to
transform itself from being a leading supplier of print and
online advertising for SMBs to becoming a leader in providing a
portfolio of print and digital marketing solutions for SMBs to
reach consumers.
hibu Inc. and related entities commenced restructuring
proceedings under Part 26 of the United Kingdom Companies Act
2006 before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales
(Chancery Division) on Jan. 17, 2014.
hibu Inc. and related entities filed Chapter 15 bankruptcy
petitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 14-70323) in Central
Islip, New York on Jan. 28, 2014, to seek recognition of
reorganization proceedings in the United Kingdom.
Christian Henry Wells, the foreign representative, is represented
by attorneys at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, in Chicago, Illinois.
hibu estimated at least US$1 billion in assets and liabilities in
its Chapter 15 petition.
KENDAL RIVERSIDE: KMPG Refers Directors to Disqualification Unit
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Westmorland Gazette reports that accountants handling the
administration of Kendal Riverside Ltd -- owner of K Village --
have reported the company's directors to the Insolvency Service's
Directors' Disqualification Unit.
The Westmorland Gazette relates that a report by KPMG
administrators John Hansen and Stuart Irwin revealed that
directors Dr Francis Jennings and Thomas Jennings had both been
referred to the unit, which has the power to determine whether a
person should be banned from acting as a company director.
"We have completed our investigations into the failure of the
company and the conduct of the directors and have filed our
report with the Directors' Disqualification Unit," the KPMG
report, as cited by The Westmorland Gazette, said.
In the same report, the administrators revealed they have drawn
fees of GBP117,189 since Kendal Riverside went into
administration in December 2012 with debts of GBP68 million, The
Westmorland Gazette relays.
Kendal Riverside Limited owns English shopping center K Village.
John Hansen and Stuart Irwin of KPMG were appointed joint
administrators of Kendal Riverside Ltd. on Dec. 28, 2012.
LIBERTY GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR Following Bid Announcement
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB-' foreign- and local-currency corporate credit ratings on
Liberty Global PLC (LGP) and two of its indirect subsidiaries:
Liberty Global Europe Inc. and UnitedGlobalCom Inc. The outlook
on all of these companies remains stable.
LGP is a U.S.-listed, U.K.-domiciled international cable TV and
broadband services provider. The affirmation follows LGP's
Jan. 27, 2014, announcement that it had made a EUR4.9 billion
cash and stock offer for the 71.5% of Ziggo N.V.'s shares that it
does not already own, valuing Ziggo at approximately EUR10.0
billion on an enterprise basis. According to LGP, it will fund
about EUR3.4 billion of the bid by issuing new shares. The
remaining EUR1.6 billion, which excludes transaction costs, will
principally come from about EUR1.5 billion of incremental debt to
be raised at the Ziggo level, as well as from LGP's existing
cash. The acquisition is subject to regulatory and other
approvals, though Ziggo's supervisory and management boards have
recommended accepting the offer.
In S&P's view, the Ziggo acquisition would strengthen LGP's
already strong competitive position by completing its geographic
footprint in the Netherlands. This would help LGP compete as a
national player, enhance its product offerings, improve
profitability, and realize potential operating synergies.
However, S&P don't believe the potential benefits are significant
enough to warrant S&P's revising its assessment of LGP's business
risk profile to "excellent" (it is already "strong").
S&P expects that the group's financial risk profile will remain
"highly leveraged." This is because S&P believes that the large
equity component of LGP's bid and Ziggo's meaningful EBITDA
contribution (S&P expects about 14% on a consolidated basis)
offset the increase in consolidated debt from the acquisition and
the extra $1 billion in share repurchases through 2015.
Including Ziggo, S&P expects LGP will generate more than
US$2.5 billion of free operating cash flow (FOCF) annually, which
is enough to finance the additional stock repurchases. In
addition, S&P expects that LGP's gross debt to EBITDA, which
includes lease adjustments, will remain at 5.0x-5.5x for 2014-
2015.
Under S&P's Group Rating Methodology (GRM), upon the completion
of the acquisition it will likely revise its assessment of
Ziggo's strategic importance to LGP to "highly strategic" from
"non-strategic".
S&P's base case forecast for LGP is pro forma for annualized
Ziggo contributions and assumes:
-- Annual average revenue growth of 4%-5% for 2014 and 2015
across LGP's main subsidiaries, led by LGP's German (fully
owned) and Belgian (majority-owned) subsidiaries; this
projection is in line with recent growth trends.
-- An EBITDA margin of about 46% in 2014 and 2015, supported
by Ziggo's above-average profitability.
-- A somewhat declining ratio of capital spending to sales,
which is consistent with the slower revenue growth.
-- No gross debt reduction.
-- That through 2015, FOCF will be distributed largely via
LGP's US$4.5 billion share repurchase program.
Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
projections for 2014:
-- Standard & Poor's adjusted net debt to EBITDA of about
5.2x.
-- Standard & Poor's adjusted FOCF to debt of approximately
5.4%.
-- Standard & Poor's adjusted EBITDA to interest of about
3.3x.
LOVELL HILL: High Court Winds Up Legal Firm
-------------------------------------------
Hull-based legal firm Lovell Hill & Co LLP was wound up by the
High Court in Manchester for abusing the UK insolvency regime by
offering bankruptcy relocation services to Germans seeking to
take advantage of the shorter bankruptcy discharge periods in the
UK-bankruptcy tourism.
The company, previously known as Law Partners LLP, was wound up
on Jan. 20, 2014, following an investigation by the Insolvency
Service.
LHC acted as bankruptcy relocation advisers to German nationals
who wished to wrongly claim their Centre of Main Interest (COMI)
was in England and Wales for bankruptcy purposes.
COMI determines which area a person or company is most closely
associated for the purposes of cross-border insolvency
proceedings, and people made bankrupt in the UK are discharged
after one year while it takes seven years in Germany.
Commenting on the case, Scott Crighton, an Investigation
Supervisor at the Insolvency Service, said:
"LHC enabled bankrupts living outside the UK to mislead British
courts by claiming they were UK residents, to take advantage of
the shorter bankruptcy discharge periods.
"The company also filed misleading accounts and those in charge
failed to cooperate with the investigation.
"Those who would conduct business in the UK in such a manner
should understand that the Insolvency Service will take firm and
decisive action to protect the public and the wider international
marketplace against their objectionable practices."
Investigators discovered that, in one particular instance, a
bankrupt had never occupied the property in Hull given to the
court as his main residence but instead had flown in for
appointments, staying in a local hotel.
Properties connected to LHC were also supposedly occupied by
several German-speaking bankrupts at the same time. The occupants
were rarely on the voters' roll and did not normally pay any
bills.
The occupants were also allegedly employed by companies that
turned out to be dormant and which were also controlled by the
same people as LHC. The jobs themselves were terminated as soon
as the bankrupts were required to make payments towards their
creditors.
LHC also arranged for post delivered to the bankrupts at the Hull
addresses to be collected, scanned and forwarded to them abroad,
as well as arranging to open English bank accounts for them,
which were largely used for foreign transactions.
Further, LHC filed accounts showing that it wasn't trading
whereas records found by investigators showed that it had issued
invoices to the value of GBP2 million.
Lovell Hill & Co LLP was ostensibly under the control of a Belize
and a Malaysian company, but investigators found that it was
initially run by two German nationals, respectively based in Hull
and Malaysia and later by a Swiss-based foreign national, none of
whom co-operated fully with the investigation.
SCOTTISH COAL: Faces Probe Over Opencast Mines
----------------------------------------------
Martin Williams at Herald Scotland reports that the conduct of
failed companies at the centre of a row over "environmental
devastation" caused by opencast mines is to come under the
scrutiny of insolvency investigators.
According to the report, the role played by board directors of
Scottish Coal and ATH Resources, two of the major mining
operators, in the years before the companies became insolvent
last year is to be looked at.
Herald Scotland relates that a damning review of failures in the
restoration of abandoned opencast mines in East Ayrshire, the
main problem area in Scotland, highlights the actions of mine
operators. The report has been forwarded to the Investigation and
Enforcement Section of the Insolvency Service, the report relays.
"I want them to consider it with a view to further action, given
the apparent culpability alleged in the report," the report
quotes Sandra Osborne, MP for Ayr Carrick & Cumnock, who
forwarded the report, as saying.
Herald Scotland notes that across Scotland it is estimated
councils are missing GBP200 million from the funds they need to
clean up the mess made by dozens of opencast coal mines because
insurance policies intended to pay for restoration work were
inadequate.
Jo Swinson, UK Government minister for employment relations and
consumer affairs, confirmed in a letter that the Insolvency
Service was "monitoring the situation" regarding ATH and other
firms in each group, including Scottish Coal, which had become
insolvent, according to Herald Scotland.
She said the review would consider the extent to which directors
complied with statutory obligations, the report adds.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, BBC News related that liquidators for Scottish Coal named
Hargreaves Services as preferred bidder for some of its assets.
KPMG, as cited by BBC, said it had chosen County Durham-based
Hargreaves Services as the best way of resuming operations and
bringing mining jobs back to the coal fields. Scottish Coal,
which operated six open cast mines across Scotland, folded in
April with the loss of 600 jobs, BBC recounted.
Scottish Coal is an open cast mining firm.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* EUROPE: Reforms to Restrain Banks' Trading Risks, Fitch Says
--------------------------------------------------------------
A ban on proprietary trading and the threat of having to split
other risky trading activities into separate subsidiaries
outlined in the European Commission's proposed structural reforms
would further restrain banks' trading risks, Fitch Ratings says.
Trading banks are already withdrawing from selected businesses as
they realign their strategy with the evolving regulatory
landscape and revenue prospects.
The proposed ban on proprietary trading would add additional
constraints to banks' activities and involve implementation and
compliance costs, even though the securities operations that the
proposal deals with are a relatively small part of the EU banking
system. However, the proposed ban is likely to have less impact
than the US Volcker rule because it has a narrower definition for
restricted trading activities and will only apply to European
banks deemed to be of global systemic importance - around 30
banks.
The potential for supervisors to require other high-risk trading
activities, such as market-making, complex derivatives and
securitization businesses, to be placed into separate
subsidiaries could also limit trading activities. Some banks may
choose to reduce trading rather than risk incurring the costs of
a separation. These could be significant since strict rules
would be in place to ensure the trading entity remains
economically and operationally separate, including funding
arrangements.
If risky trading activities are subsidiarized, this could lead to
greater ratings differentiation between legal entities in the
same banking group. The extent to which separation could widen
the gap would depend on the degree to which funding and capital
are separated and the types of activities and risks in each
subsidiary.
Splitting off a trading subsidiary would likely be neutral to
slightly positive for the credit profiles of the deposit-taking
bank. It could reduce downside risk as the bank would not be
obliged to support its trading operations in case of problems,
although some may still do so to avoid damaging their reputation.
Overall, the ban on proprietary trading and separation would have
minimal impact at the consolidated group level.
The structures of banking groups are already changing,
particularly with resolution planning in mind. Much will depend
on how the European Central Bank, when it takes up its role as
single supervisor in November, requires banks and their
subsidiaries to be capitalized and uses the proposed separation
powers. Most of the European banks covered by these structural
reforms will come under its supervision.
Plans are underway to place proprietary trading activities into
separate subsidiaries in France and Germany, so the ban will mean
exiting or selling these operations instead. UK banks have
already begun steps to ring-fence their retail arms. They may
have to contend with separating more than one part of their
business, if these proposals are agreed by the European
Parliament and Council.
Banks will have time to adjust as the proprietary trading ban
would apply from January 1, 2017 and the potential separation of
other trading activities from July 1, 2018.
* JVs, Pensions Most Affected by New Accounting Rules, Fitch Says
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Joint ventures and defined-benefit pensions will be most affected
by new accounting rules in upcoming 2013 financial statements,
Fitch Ratings says. Fresh disclosures on pension liabilities and
group structure could be relevant to credit analysis and may
affect ratings.
Enhanced disclosure is a core part of the revised standards, so
2013 annual reports are likely to have fresh details that could
be relevant to our ratings analyses, for example new details of
groups' interests in other entities, including risks from
structured vehicles and the transferability of cash flows.
Incremental information on future cash flows and a sensitivity
analysis should give a clearer picture of the likely future cash
contributions necessary to meet the pension obligation.
There will be substantial changes in group accounting in 2013
annual results. Rules have been overhauled regarding the
entities that have to be included in group accounts and those
that can remain off balance sheet. The new rules also deal with
interests in joint arrangements, where control is shared with
another party. These arrangements are split into ones where the
parties have rights to the net assets of an investment (joint
venture) and ones where the parties have specific rights to
assets or obligations for liabilities (joint operations).
The greatest change is the prohibition of proportionate
consolidation for "joint ventures". Instead of the income
statement and balance sheet reflecting the entity's share in the
joint venture line by line, its share of profits and net assets
will be shown as a single line item under the equity method.
Revenue, expenses, gross assets and liabilities are likely to
reduce, even though there may be little impact on net profit or
assets. Conversely, for entities with interests in "joint
operations", a method similar to proportionate consolidation will
now have to be applied. This might increase revenue, expenses,
gross assets and liabilities where these interests were
previously accounted for under the equity method.
We expect many large European companies to adopt these group
accounting changes in their 2013 financial statements, even
though the effective date in the EU was extended by one year to
end-2014. The revisions to the scope of consolidation are likely
to be more material for financial institutions that hold
interests in structured entities held off balance sheet. For
other corporates, it is likely to have an effect in isolated
cases only.
Defined-benefit pension liabilities will also rise for some
entities that previously took advantage of an option to keep some
actuarial losses off balance sheet to reduce volatility. The
revised standard removes the choice to use this "corridor"
method. Some large corporates in Germany and the UK, where
defined-benefit pension schemes are common, had previously taken
advantage of this option. Many companies will also have a modest
increase in pension costs because they will now have to use the
'AA' bond yield to calculate asset returns instead of their own
assumptions. We expect the increases to be relatively small for
most.
* BOND PRICING: For the Week January 27 to January 31, 2014
-----------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
IMMOFINANZ AG 4.25 3/8/2018 EUR 4.70
Alpine Holding Gmb 6.00 5/22/2017 EUR 0.25
Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 7/1/2015 EUR 0.25
Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 6/10/2016 EUR 0.25
A-TEC Industries A 8.75 10/27/2014 EUR 1.63
A-TEC Industries A 2.75 5/10/2014 EUR 2.00
A-TEC Industries A 5.75 11/2/2010 EUR 1.88
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.79 11/29/2032 EUR 70.93
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.68 12/18/2030 EUR 72.49
Investkredit Bank 4.63 4/12/2022 EUR 74.70
KA Finanz AG 4.90 6/23/2031 EUR 67.75
KA Finanz AG 4.44 12/20/2030 EUR 65.13
Oberoesterreichisc 0.63 11/6/2030 EUR 72.60
Oberoesterreichisc 0.52 4/25/2042 EUR 65.26
Oesterreichische V 1.06 7/29/2018 EUR 25.00
Oesterreichische V 5.27 2/8/2027 EUR 63.00
Raiffeisen Centrob 14.40 3/6/2014 EUR 73.77
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.75 8/20/2033 EUR 73.41
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.70 12/27/2031 EUR 71.81
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.57 1/25/2031 EUR 73.50
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.61 1/24/2031 EUR 73.64
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.72 1/22/2031 EUR 73.74
BELGIUM
-------
Econocom Group 4.00 6/1/2016 EUR 27.70
Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 72.33
Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 73.13
BULGARIA
--------
Petrol AD 8.38 1/26/2017 EUR 57.66
Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 75.05
Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 74.63
OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 12.03
OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 12.03
OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 11.88
OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 11.88
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 5.25 8/6/2014 CHF 65.59
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.50 8/13/2014 CHF 62.47
Credit Suisse/Nass 7.25 4/4/2014 USD 64.87
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.52 9/10/2014 CHF 65.99
CYPRUS
------
Cyprus Government 4.63 2/3/2020 EUR 73.86
Cyprus Government 6.00 7/1/2023 EUR 73.75
Cyprus Government 4.75 7/1/2020 EUR 73.13
Cyprus Government 5.25 7/1/2022 EUR 71.00
Cyprus Government 5.00 7/1/2021 EUR 71.75
CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
Sazka AS 9.00 7/12/2021 EUR 10.13
DENMARK
-------
Kommunekredit 0.50 7/30/2027 TRY 26.38
Kommunekredit 0.50 9/19/2019 BRL 53.55
Kommunekredit 0.50 2/20/2020 BRL 51.34
Kommunekredit 0.50 5/11/2029 CAD 50.52
Kommunekredit 0.50 10/22/2019 BRL 53.10
Kommunekredit 0.50 12/14/2020 ZAR 60.44
FINLAND
-------
Municipality Finan 0.50 10/27/2016 BRL 73.96
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/30/2016 BRL 73.14
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/16/2017 TRY 71.26
Municipality Finan 0.50 6/19/2024 ZAR 37.00
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/17/2017 BRL 71.34
Municipality Finan 0.50 4/27/2018 ZAR 70.77
Municipality Finan 0.50 5/31/2022 ZAR 45.84
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/17/2016 BRL 73.90
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/10/2021 NZD 67.05
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 ZAR 67.19
Municipality Finan 0.50 4/26/2022 ZAR 46.35
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/20/2018 ZAR 66.70
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/28/2018 BRL 62.02
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/14/2018 TRY 64.02
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/7/2018 BRL 68.42
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/16/2017 BRL 71.42
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/22/2019 IDR 65.22
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 TRY 64.13
Municipality Finan 0.50 1/10/2018 BRL 64.01
Municipality Finan 0.50 6/22/2017 IDR 74.39
Municipality Finan 0.50 1/23/2018 BRL 64.50
Municipality Finan 0.25 6/28/2040 CAD 23.91
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/21/2021 NZD 66.64
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/25/2020 ZAR 54.11
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/17/2025 CAD 61.50
Talvivaara Mining 4.00 12/16/2015 EUR 17.99
FRANCE
------
Air France-KLM 4.97 4/1/2015 EUR 12.75
Air France-KLM 2.03 2/15/2023 EUR 10.59
Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 4.25 7/1/2018 EUR 3.12
Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 5.00 1/1/2015 EUR 3.36
Assystem 4.00 1/1/2017 EUR 24.27
AtoS 2.50 1/1/2016 EUR 61.09
AtoS 1.50 7/1/2016 EUR 60.87
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 1/31/2018 RUB 73.33
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 11/16/2032 MXN 39.68
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 5/6/2021 MXN 71.71
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/16/2014 EUR 53.03
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/18/2015 EUR 9.08
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 9/10/2015 EUR 15.35
Cap Gemini SA 3.50 1/1/2014 EUR 48.05
CGG SA 1.75 1/1/2016 EUR 28.39
CGG SA 1.25 1/1/2019 EUR 31.31
Club Mediterranee 6.11 11/1/2015 EUR 19.71
Credit Agricole Co 0.50 2/28/2018 RUB 73.06
Credit Agricole Co 0.50 3/6/2023 RUB 48.05
Dexia Credit Local 0.88 7/10/2017 EUR 74.75
Dexia Credit Local 4.38 2/12/2019 EUR 71.75
Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2014 EUR 16.90
Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2015 EUR 15.67
Faurecia 4.50 1/1/2015 EUR 24.46
Faurecia 3.25 1/1/2018 EUR 27.55
GFI Informatique S 5.25 1/1/2017 EUR 5.30
Ingenico 2.75 1/1/2017 EUR 57.77
Le Noble Age 4.88 1/3/2016 EUR 19.50
Nexans SA 2.50 1/1/2019 EUR 72.92
Nexans SA 4.00 1/1/2016 EUR 58.43
Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50
Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50
OL Groupe 7.00 12/28/2015 EUR 6.53
Orpea 1.75 1/1/2020 EUR 48.99
Orpea 3.88 1/1/2016 EUR 51.28
Peugeot SA 4.45 1/1/2016 EUR 26.65
Publicis Groupe SA 1.00 1/18/2018 EUR 60.32
SG Option Europe S 8.00 9/29/2015 USD 62.49
SG Option Europe S 7.00 5/5/2017 EUR 52.35
SG Option Europe S 7.00 9/22/2017 EUR 68.73
SG Option Europe S 8.00 12/18/2014 USD 40.49
SG Option Europe S 7.50 12/24/2014 EUR 38.00
SG Option Europe S 7.25 8/5/2014 EUR 62.59
Societe Air France 2.75 4/1/2020 EUR 21.03
Societe Generale S 0.50 6/12/2023 RUB 45.95
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/3/2023 RUB 46.79
Societe Generale S 0.50 11/29/2022 AUD 63.45
Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 USD 71.63
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 USD 72.50
Societe Generale S 0.50 12/21/2022 AUD 63.21
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/30/2023 RUB 46.47
Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 AUD 64.99
Societe Generale S 0.50 12/6/2021 AUD 67.38
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 AUD 65.81
Societe Generale S 0.50 9/7/2021 AUD 69.04
SOITEC 6.75 9/18/2018 EUR 2.50
SOITEC 6.25 9/9/2014 EUR 8.61
Tem SAS 4.25 1/1/2015 EUR 55.58
Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00
Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00
GEORGIA
-------
Bank J Safra Saras 13.60 2/17/2014 CHF 71.13
Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/15/2014 CHF 63.95
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 12/13/2013 USD 67.65
Bank Julius Baer & 14.00 5/23/2014 USD 55.80
Bank Julius Baer & 8.50 12/13/2013 USD 56.05
Bank Julius Baer & 9.50 12/13/2013 USD 61.50
Bank Julius Baer & 12.60 12/13/2013 USD 52.65
Bank Julius Baer & 7.25 4/10/2014 USD 64.50
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 1/29/2014 CHF 71.40
Bank Julius Baer & 6.10 4/17/2014 CHF 65.15
Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/17/2014 EUR 65.45
Bank Julius Baer & 5.00 12/23/2013 CHF 67.05
Bank Julius Baer & 10.20 11/29/2013 USD 52.45
Bank Julius Baer & 11.50 3/18/2014 USD 61.85
Bank Julius Baer & 6.80 4/11/2014 USD 70.15
Bank Julius Baer & 6.50 4/11/2014 USD 71.25
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 4/11/2014 USD 71.05
Bank Julius Baer & 7.80 2/14/2014 USD 70.35
Bank Julius Baer & 7.50 2/14/2014 CHF 69.75
Bank Julius Baer & 10.00 4/4/2014 USD 62.75
Bank Julius Baer & 6.90 3/21/2014 USD 70.45
Banque Cantonale V 4.90 9/9/2014 CHF 73.73
EFG International 6.00 11/30/2017 EUR 39.45
EFG International 13.40 11/14/2013 CHF 58.64
EFG International 6.82 6/4/2014 CHF 70.01
EFG International 12.86 10/30/2017 EUR 35.40
EFG International 12.10 3/10/2014 USD 50.04
EFG International 4.50 2/20/2014 USD 58.50
EFG International 5.85 10/14/2014 CHF 72.75
EFG International 10.00 12/17/2013 USD 66.27
Leonteq Securities 11.90 1/15/2014 EUR 50.01
Leonteq Securities 17.00 11/21/2013 CAD 40.23
Leonteq Securities 9.25 11/5/2013 USD 36.80
Leonteq Securities 12.65 12/10/2013 EUR 50.06
Leonteq Securities 7.80 8/26/2014 CHF 55.40
Leonteq Securities 15.00 2/13/2014 CHF 55.94
Leonteq Securities 12.00 11/15/2013 CHF 54.70
Leonteq Securities 17.05 2/14/2014 CHF 42.69
Leonteq Securities 10.03 10/25/2013 CHF 48.39
Leonteq Securities 5.06 5/26/2014 CHF 74.49
Leonteq Securities 18.00 12/6/2013 CHF 58.34
Leonteq Securities 8.40 11/27/2013 CHF 69.11
Leonteq Securities 8.80 12/6/2013 EUR 66.34
Leonteq Securities 20.00 12/12/2013 CHF 59.36
Leonteq Securities 12.80 12/12/2013 CHF 56.01
Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/12/2013 CHF 67.47
Leonteq Securities 8.10 12/13/2013 CHF 56.63
Leonteq Securities 9.20 11/15/2013 CHF 72.96
Leonteq Securities 7.21 11/14/2013 CHF 72.00
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/21/2013 CHF 48.23
Leonteq Securities 13.60 12/6/2013 CHF 53.15
Leonteq Securities 8.75 6/6/2014 GBP 71.26
Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/6/2013 USD 65.15
Leonteq Securities 12.89 12/10/2013 GBP 52.10
Leonteq Securities 10.20 11/14/2013 CHF 56.32
Leonteq Securities 8.01 11/15/2013 CHF 44.99
Leonteq Securities 21.75 5/22/2014 USD 45.78
Leonteq Securities 20.00 5/27/2014 CHF 71.16
Leonteq Securities 12.00 2/24/2014 CHF 69.73
Leonteq Securities 9.46 6/3/2014 AUD 61.68
Leonteq Securities 24.40 2/25/2014 USD 44.15
Leonteq Securities 22.75 2/4/2014 USD 68.91
Leonteq Securities 15.60 2/6/2014 CHF 55.74
Leonteq Securities 12.25 1/30/2014 CHF 49.87
Leonteq Securities 20.52 3/25/2014 USD 50.23
Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/17/2014 CHF 54.64
Leonteq Securities 21.50 3/21/2014 USD 57.05
Leonteq Securities 8.90 3/28/2014 EUR 63.16
Leonteq Securities 14.25 2/13/2015 USD 62.34
Leonteq Securities 11.50 2/11/2014 USD 70.57
Leonteq Securities 20.50 2/13/2014 CHF 65.24
Leonteq Securities 5.80 8/20/2014 USD 70.34
Leonteq Securities 13.25 2/14/2014 USD 60.87
Leonteq Securities 10.00 7/29/2014 USD 58.84
Leonteq Securities 29.61 10/26/2017 EUR 39.70
Leonteq Securities 9.00 10/31/2013 CHF 43.77
Leonteq Securities 12.00 3/5/2014 CHF 60.81
Leonteq Securities 8.50 12/24/2013 USD 54.18
Leonteq Securities 14.06 12/18/2013 USD 52.76
Leonteq Securities 5.76 12/20/2013 GBP 67.92
Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/23/2014 CHF 54.82
Leonteq Securities 8.00 6/19/2014 CHF 73.01
Leonteq Securities 6.80 12/19/2014 USD 71.84
Leonteq Securities 14.05 12/27/2013 CHF 55.88
Leonteq Securities 6.00 5/20/2014 CHF 66.65
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/27/2013 CHF 74.15
Leonteq Securities 20.00 11/27/2013 CHF 57.98
Leonteq Securities 11.95 11/29/2013 EUR 54.01
Leonteq Securities 8.35 1/3/2014 AUD 70.38
Leonteq Securities 9.20 12/27/2013 CHF 70.21
Leonteq Securities 9.60 1/8/2014 USD 47.95
Leonteq Securities 8.40 1/15/2014 CHF 74.30
Leonteq Securities 14.00 9/22/2014 CHF 66.90
Leonteq Securities 10.80 1/15/2014 CHF 54.68
Leonteq Securities 5.50 1/25/2016 EUR 64.28
Leonteq Securities 12.00 12/6/2013 GBP 52.45
Leonteq Securities 20.14 4/9/2014 USD 55.40
Leonteq Securities 5.50 8/19/2014 USD 72.76
Leonteq Securities 20.07 2/19/2014 USD 41.82
Leonteq Securities 10.00 2/6/2014 USD 57.48
Leonteq Securities 23.90 1/24/2014 USD 43.75
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/5/2013 USD 71.34
Leonteq Securities 25.70 1/24/2014 USD 50.45
Mare Baltic PCC Lt 2.00 11/1/2015 DKK 0.00
Zurcher Kantonalba 12.35 11/13/2013 CHF 56.78
Zurcher Kantonalba 8.22 11/15/2013 CHF 56.56
Zurcher Kantonalba 6.05 12/19/2013 EUR 65.62
Zurcher Kantonalba 9.00 12/31/2013 CHF 58.57
Zurcher Kantonalba 10.40 12/5/2013 EUR 60.48
Zurcher Kantonalba 10.65 12/6/2013 CHF 57.99
GERMANY
-------
ATU Auto-Teile-Ung 7.47 10/1/2014 EUR 18.67
BDT Media Automati 8.13 10/9/2017 EUR 65.75
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 72.21
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 58.40
BNP Paribas Emissi 7.00 12/30/2013 EUR 60.64
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 60.09
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 60.05
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.50 12/30/2013 EUR 59.53
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 68.77
BNP Paribas Emissi 4.50 11/21/2013 EUR 72.24
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 74.37
Bremer Landesbank 0.69 3/21/2031 EUR 67.09
Bremer Landesbank 0.72 4/5/2041 EUR 54.49
Centrosolar Group 7.00 2/15/2016 EUR 13.75
Commerzbank AG 8.40 12/30/2013 EUR 2.56
Commerzbank AG 5.05 12/24/2013 EUR 67.54
DekaBank Deutsche 2.21 9/22/2021 EUR 13.92
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 56.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 65.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 64.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 61.70
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 6/24/2014 EUR 61.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 6/24/2014 EUR 66.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 6/24/2014 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 3/25/2014 EUR 61.50
Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 3/25/2014 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.10
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 61.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 56.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 62.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 57.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 70.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 66.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 63.20
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.70
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.24
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.20
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.10
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 4/24/2014 EUR 68.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 4/24/2014 EUR 65.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 4/24/2014 EUR 62.10
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 7/22/2014 EUR 72.10
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 62.10
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.60
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 9/23/2014 EUR 74.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 9/23/2014 EUR 73.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 63.80
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 64.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.40
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 60.00
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 60.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 3/25/2014 EUR 61.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 3/25/2014 EUR 62.80
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 53.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 63.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 72.80
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 2/28/2014 EUR 60.60
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 55.80
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 67.30
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 11/29/2013 EUR 54.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 10/31/2013 EUR 58.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 63.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.60
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 53.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 67.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 58.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 11/29/2013 EUR 73.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 11/29/2013 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.10
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.60
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.20
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.95
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 70.59
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40
Deutsche Bank AG 12.00 12/20/2013 EUR 51.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/24/2014 EUR 71.70
Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 3/25/2014 EUR 75.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/25/2014 EUR 72.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 1/31/2014 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 1/31/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.30
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 1/31/2014 EUR 65.80
Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 6/24/2014 EUR 73.70
Dresdner Bank AG 0.89 11/19/2029 EUR 51.13
Dresdner Bank AG 5.45 2/22/2029 EUR 65.92
Dresdner Bank AG 1.08 12/31/2021 EUR 72.13
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 12.00 10/25/2013 EUR 73.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 2.35 3/24/2023 EUR 70.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 10/25/2013 EUR 70.93
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.50 10/25/2013 EUR 72.67
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 10/25/2013 EUR 50.42
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 12/31/2013 EUR 55.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 12/31/2013 EUR 72.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.75 11/8/2013 EUR 54.90
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 10/25/2013 EUR 73.66
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 12/31/2013 EUR 51.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/13/2013 EUR 62.43
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 11/22/2013 EUR 74.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 11/22/2013 EUR 49.33
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 11/8/2013 EUR 56.39
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/31/2013 EUR 64.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.40 12/31/2013 EUR 58.13
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.50 10/25/2013 EUR 48.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 15.75 11/22/2013 EUR 4.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.75 12/31/2013 EUR 56.51
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.25 3/28/2014 EUR 58.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 6/27/2014 EUR 60.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.50 9/26/2014 EUR 59.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 4/7/2014 EUR 62.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/13/2014 EUR 63.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 10/25/2013 EUR 58.00
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 68.68
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.50 1/10/2014 EUR 65.98
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 12.25 1/10/2014 EUR 68.31
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.75 7/11/2014 EUR 74.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.30 7/11/2014 EUR 69.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.50 12/13/2013 EUR 55.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 3.50 12/31/2013 EUR 64.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/13/2014 EUR 66.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 2.50 12/13/2013 EUR 68.49
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 53.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.40 7/11/2014 EUR 68.63
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.75 12/13/2013 EUR 59.73
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 1/15/2014 EUR 74.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 11/11/2013 EUR 49.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/13/2013 EUR 59.41
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 3/7/2014 EUR 58.45
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.50 2/14/2014 EUR 56.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.00 12/31/2013 EUR 63.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.25 6/27/2014 EUR 69.05
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.75 9/26/2014 EUR 66.80
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.25 3/28/2014 EUR 65.56
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.38
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 12/13/2013 EUR 60.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.25 10/25/2013 EUR 54.26
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 12/13/2013 EUR 72.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 6/27/2014 EUR 64.75
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/27/2014 EUR 63.09
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/13/2014 EUR 64.24
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.50 12/31/2013 EUR 62.28
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 3/14/2014 EUR 52.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 1/17/2014 EUR 58.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 57.78
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 12/20/2013 EUR 68.55
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 11/22/2013 EUR 58.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 11/22/2013 EUR 53.48
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 1/10/2014 EUR 70.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.96
EDOB Abwicklungs A 7.50 3/29/2049 EUR 3.25
EDOB Abwicklungs A 7.50 3/29/2049 EUR 3.25
Estavis AG 7.75 6/25/2017 EUR 2.29
getgoods.de AG 7.75 10/2/2017 EUR 68.50
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 10/23/2013 EUR 60.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.86
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.38
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 12/27/2013 EUR 44.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 43.09
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 61.82
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.51
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 44.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.51
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.08
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 69.75
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.11
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.69
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.42
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 57.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 43.70
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 74.24
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 46.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 50.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.79
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/24/2014 EUR 72.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/24/2014 EUR 61.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.38
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 46.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.01
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.73
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.56
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.04
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.36
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.49
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.92
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.10
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 67.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 65.56
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 58.88
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.78
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 60.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.92
Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.61
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.52
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 62.76
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 9/24/2014 EUR 61.79
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 65.32
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 63.62
Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 6/25/2014 EUR 57.83
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 9/24/2014 EUR 67.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 9/24/2014 EUR 58.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.59
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 10/23/2013 EUR 62.52
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.99
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 58.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 64.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.50 12/27/2013 EUR 43.13
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 37.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 12/24/2014 EUR 68.05
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 2/26/2014 EUR 74.27
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.43
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 59.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 3/26/2014 EUR 55.75
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 1/22/2014 EUR 61.77
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 61.74
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 1/22/2014 EUR 72.86
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 12/27/2013 EUR 52.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 2/26/2014 EUR 52.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 1/22/2014 EUR 58.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 1/22/2014 EUR 56.41
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 1/22/2014 EUR 55.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 12/27/2013 EUR 70.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/24/2014 EUR 58.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.82
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 73.11
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 73.16
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 70.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 61.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 63.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.42
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 50.98
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.39
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 49.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 11/20/2013 EUR 45.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 42.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 11/20/2013 EUR 41.31
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.25
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 67.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.70
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.89
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 12/27/2013 EUR 52.01
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 2/26/2014 EUR 55.73
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.19
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 73.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 68.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 51.20
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 10/23/2013 EUR 74.87
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 66.31
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.91
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 11/20/2013 EUR 52.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 48.85
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 45.57
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 10/23/2013 EUR 74.03
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 11/20/2013 EUR 49.88
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 42.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 47.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 65.08
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.50
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.48
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.63
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.78
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 11/20/2013 EUR 64.83
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 51.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 50.28
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 52.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.43
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 50.76
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.69
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.61
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.59
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.44
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 3/26/2014 EUR 64.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 2/26/2014 EUR 48.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.85
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 64.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 63.13
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.62
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 6/25/2014 EUR 60.40
Gunther Zamek Prod 7.75 5/15/2017 EUR 55.50
Hamburgische Lande 0.60 1/22/2041 EUR 68.03
Hamburgische Lande 0.61 10/30/2040 EUR 68.07
Hamburgische Lande 0.61 11/28/2030 EUR 74.77
Hamburgische Lande 0.60 10/25/2030 EUR 75.00
Hamburgische Lande 0.56 10/30/2030 EUR 74.24
Hamburgische Lande 0.64 7/18/2031 EUR 74.20
Hamburgische Lande 0.69 11/8/2030 EUR 74.82
Hamburgische Lande 0.59 2/5/2031 EUR 73.86
Hamburgische Lande 0.58 10/25/2030 EUR 74.61
Hamburgische Lande 0.59 12/1/2030 EUR 73.55
Hanwha Q-CELLS Gmb 6.75 10/21/2015 EUR 1.32
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 10.50 12/30/2013 EUR 73.80
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 12.50 12/30/2013 EUR 70.21
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 11.00 12/30/2013 EUR 73.68
HSH Nordbank AG 1.03 2/14/2017 EUR 68.24
HSH Nordbank AG 1.07 2/14/2017 EUR 68.16
IKB Deutsche Indus 1.12 9/13/2016 EUR 74.66
IKB Deutsche Indus 0.97 1/23/2017 EUR 71.62
KFW 0.25 10/6/2036 CAD 33.42
Landesbank Berlin 4.80 11/7/2014 EUR 58.28
Landesbank Berlin 7.25 6/27/2014 EUR 58.30
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 12/30/2013 EUR 63.19
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 64.20
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 12/30/2014 EUR 68.24
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 12/30/2014 EUR 64.80
Landesbank Berlin 4.75 12/30/2014 EUR 65.47
Landesbank Berlin 8.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.32
Landesbank Berlin 4.75 3/28/2014 EUR 70.71
Landesbank Berlin 8.50 3/28/2014 EUR 65.88
Landesbank Berlin 11.00 12/30/2013 EUR 7.94
Landesbank Berlin 5.50 6/27/2014 EUR 62.69
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 61.97
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 8/8/2014 EUR 58.13
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.58
Landesbank Berlin 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 65.28
Landesbank Berlin 3.00 3/28/2014 EUR 72.82
Landesbank Berlin 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 68.83
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 12/30/2013 EUR 59.52
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 65.95
Landesbank Berlin 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.17
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 58.72
Landesbank Berlin 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 14.56
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 65.46
Landesbank Berlin 5.50 12/23/2013 EUR 60.90
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 68.01
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 62.46
Landesbank Hessen- 0.85 7/18/2031 EUR 63.96
Landesbank Hessen- 4.00 6/20/2014 EUR 59.10
Landeskreditbank B 0.25 10/13/2037 CAD 29.38
Landeskreditbank B 0.50 5/10/2027 CAD 57.81
Landwirtschaftlich 0.50 4/19/2017 TRY 74.97
LBBW 0.62 10/4/2030 EUR 71.11
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 74.51
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.31
LBBW 5.00 3/28/2014 EUR 57.49
LBBW 3.00 11/22/2013 EUR 66.79
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 62.53
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 65.79
LBBW 4.00 7/25/2014 EUR 64.82
LBBW 3.00 2/28/2014 EUR 67.30
LBBW 5.00 2/28/2014 EUR 58.88
LBBW 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.10
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 58.10
LBBW 3.00 11/22/2013 EUR 63.63
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 60.83
LBBW 3.00 6/27/2014 EUR 64.58
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 61.78
LBBW 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.62
LBBW 3.00 8/22/2014 EUR 67.39
LBBW 4.00 8/22/2014 EUR 65.35
LBBW 5.00 8/22/2014 EUR 63.72
LBBW 3.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.90
LBBW 5.00 2/28/2014 EUR 61.60
LBBW 5.00 9/26/2014 EUR 61.16
LBBW 4.00 10/25/2013 EUR 58.36
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 61.06
LBBW 3.00 3/28/2014 EUR 64.74
LBBW 4.00 1/24/2014 EUR 67.54
LBBW 6.00 1/24/2014 EUR 60.58
LBBW 7.00 1/24/2014 EUR 58.00
LBBW 7.00 11/22/2013 EUR 69.09
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.66
LBBW 6.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.62
LBBW 6.00 7/25/2014 EUR 61.69
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.09
LBBW 5.10 1/15/2014 EUR 68.01
LBBW 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 58.31
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.42
LBBW 3.00 6/27/2014 EUR 61.09
LBBW 3.00 9/26/2014 EUR 64.39
LBBW 4.00 9/26/2014 EUR 62.54
LBBW 7.00 9/26/2014 EUR 59.20
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 63.58
LBBW 6.00 11/22/2013 EUR 64.98
LBBW 8.00 11/22/2013 EUR 58.71
Norddeutsche Lande 0.69 10/21/2030 EUR 74.42
Praktiker AG 5.88 2/10/2016 EUR 1.50
Qimonda Finance LL 6.75 3/22/2013 USD 3.44
SiC Processing Gmb 7.13 3/1/2016 EUR 5.50
Solarwatt GmbH 7.00 11/1/2015 EUR 14.75
Solarworld AG 6.13 1/21/2017 EUR 37.25
Solarworld AG 6.38 7/13/2016 EUR 33.00
Solon SE 1.38 12/6/2012 EUR 0.63
Sparkasse KoelnBon 0.68 5/7/2031 EUR 71.54
Sparkasse KoelnBon 0.74 9/29/2034 EUR 68.26
TAG Immobilien AG 6.50 12/10/2015 EUR 9.45
TUI AG 2.75 3/24/2016 EUR 64.09
UniCredit Bank AG 0.92 11/19/2029 EUR 65.48
Vontobel Financial 5.45 12/31/2013 EUR 59.48
Vontobel Financial 5.47 3/17/2014 EUR 35.50
Vontobel Financial 4.30 12/31/2013 EUR 63.20
Vontobel Financial 7.70 12/31/2013 EUR 54.94
Vontobel Financial 5.30 6/27/2014 EUR 60.94
Vontobel Financial 4.25 12/31/2013 EUR 63.14
Vontobel Financial 5.30 12/31/2013 EUR 59.38
Vontobel Financial 9.85 12/31/2013 EUR 73.66
Vontobel Financial 4.20 12/31/2013 EUR 63.14
Vontobel Financial 5.35 12/31/2013 EUR 59.50
Vontobel Financial 7.40 12/31/2013 EUR 54.84
Vontobel Financial 9.85 12/31/2013 EUR 51.06
Vontobel Financial 6.10 12/31/2013 EUR 59.66
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 59.56
Vontobel Financial 6.85 12/31/2013 EUR 54.78
Vontobel Financial 7.15 12/31/2013 EUR 54.82
Vontobel Financial 9.10 12/31/2013 EUR 50.96
Vontobel Financial 5.10 4/14/2014 EUR 30.60
Vontobel Financial 17.15 12/31/2013 EUR 52.48
Vontobel Financial 4.25 12/31/2013 EUR 63.20
Vontobel Financial 8.65 12/31/2013 EUR 56.66
Vontobel Financial 6.30 12/31/2013 EUR 59.72
Vontobel Financial 8.70 12/31/2013 EUR 73.44
Vontobel Financial 7.85 12/31/2013 EUR 50.72
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 54.52
Vontobel Financial 5.10 6/27/2014 EUR 60.50
Vontobel Financial 8.00 12/31/2013 EUR 55.02
Vontobel Financial 7.35 6/27/2014 EUR 57.28
Vontobel Financial 4.60 3/28/2014 EUR 60.20
Vontobel Financial 4.75 12/31/2013 EUR 59.42
Vontobel Financial 7.20 3/28/2014 EUR 56.40
Vontobel Financial 7.45 12/31/2013 EUR 59.94
Vontobel Financial 10.20 12/31/2013 EUR 56.98
Vontobel Financial 4.80 12/31/2013 EUR 56.58
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 56.38
Vontobel Financial 8.85 12/31/2013 EUR 54.96
Vontobel Financial 8.35 12/31/2013 EUR 56.92
Vontobel Financial 7.70 12/31/2013 EUR 54.74
Vontobel Financial 7.40 12/31/2013 EUR 59.92
Vontobel Financial 5.40 6/27/2014 EUR 57.68
Vontobel Financial 5.05 3/28/2014 EUR 57.46
Vontobel Financial 7.60 3/28/2014 EUR 58.24
Vontobel Financial 5.65 3/28/2014 EUR 57.40
Vontobel Financial 4.35 12/31/2013 EUR 63.26
Vontobel Financial 8.65 12/31/2013 EUR 60.16
Vontobel Financial 7.75 12/31/2013 EUR 54.72
Vontobel Financial 8.15 12/31/2013 EUR 56.38
Vontobel Financial 15.75 12/31/2013 EUR 52.14
Vontobel Financial 10.45 12/31/2013 EUR 55.40
Vontobel Financial 6.35 12/31/2013 EUR 54.68
Vontobel Financial 8.00 12/31/2013 EUR 54.98
Vontobel Financial 5.25 12/31/2013 EUR 59.50
Vontobel Financial 6.45 12/31/2013 EUR 74.82
Vontobel Financial 5.00 1/24/2014 EUR 61.50
Vontobel Financial 7.39 11/25/2013 EUR 62.60
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 2.50 12/23/2013 EUR 68.43
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 1/30/2014 EUR 69.85
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 1/30/2014 EUR 65.48
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 1/30/2014 EUR 63.64
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 12/18/2013 EUR 52.92
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 12/18/2013 EUR 59.07
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 12/18/2013 EUR 55.81
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 7.50 12/18/2013 EUR 50.43
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 3/27/2014 EUR 66.20
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.31
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.50 6/25/2014 EUR 56.15
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 58.30
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 7.00 6/25/2014 EUR 54.32
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 1/30/2014 EUR 61.94
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 3/11/2014 EUR 54.62
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 9/30/2014 EUR 74.98
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 9/30/2014 EUR 73.89
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 9/30/2014 EUR 73.00
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 3/27/2014 EUR 68.09
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 3/27/2014 EUR 64.45
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 3/27/2014 EUR 62.91
Windreich GmbH 6.50 7/15/2016 EUR 11.13
Windreich GmbH 6.50 3/1/2015 EUR 9.88
Windreich GmbH 6.75 3/1/2015 EUR 11.13
Windreich GmbH 6.25 3/1/2015 EUR 11.13
GREECE
------
Yioula Glassworks 9.00 12/1/2015 EUR 74.00
Yioula Glassworks 9.00 12/1/2015 EUR 74.00
ICELAND
-------
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.13 5/19/2016 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.75 10/4/2011 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.75 10/4/2011 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.63 2/28/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.50 2/3/2045 EUR 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 3.00 2/12/2010 CHF 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.70 2/15/2010 CAD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.13 10/4/2016 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.65 2/19/2013 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.13 10/4/2016 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 2/1/2045 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.99 7/5/2012 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 9.75 9/10/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.13 5/19/2016 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.50 2/2/2009 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.80 10/20/2009 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.80 9/7/2012 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.63 2/28/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.80 2/15/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 12/5/2014 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 3.75 2/15/2024 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 4/28/2012 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.25 7/18/2017 BGN 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.65 7/5/2010 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.90 2/1/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.95 5/6/2009 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 8.00 6/22/2011 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.70 10/2/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.50 1/17/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.69 5/21/2011 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 7/24/2009 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.20 7/12/2009 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.00 11/8/2013 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 4/2/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 10/2/2010 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 1/3/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.47 10/27/2010 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.95 10/20/2010 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.00 1/4/2027 SKK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.90 5/29/2017 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.50 10/8/2010 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.40 3/22/2014 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.90 4/28/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.75 6/7/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.40 12/15/2015 EUR 22.88
LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00
LBI HF 3.20 5/10/2010 SKK 8.00
LBI HF 2.25 2/14/2011 CHF 8.00
LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00
LBI HF 3.00 12/7/2010 CHF 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 1/18/2010 CAD 8.00
LBI HF 4.38 10/20/2008 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.75 5/31/2013 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.25 4/2/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 8.65 5/1/2011 ISK 8.00
LBI HF 4.08 3/16/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 6.75 8/18/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 11/3/2009 CZK 8.00
LBI HF 6.00 6/6/2017 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 5.44 9/3/2018 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 4.28 11/19/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 2.14 2/3/2020 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.32 1/31/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 11/30/2035 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 5.25 6/5/2023 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 5.08 3/1/2013 ISK 8.00
LBI HF 7.00 4/2/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.00 10/22/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 1.68 12/22/2014 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.00 9/23/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.45 12/18/2033 JPY 0.13
LBI HF 2.22 10/15/2019 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.34 3/1/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.34 5/11/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.75 2/22/2016 USD 8.00
LBI HF 2.75 3/16/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.36 8/17/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.20 4/27/2026 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 6.75 2/18/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.11 11/10/2008 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.34 12/22/2025 EUR 8.00
IRELAND
-------
Corsicanto Ltd 3.50 1/15/2032 USD 74.94
Depfa ACS Bank 4.90 8/24/2035 CAD 69.73
Depfa ACS Bank 0.50 3/3/2025 CAD 46.53
Kalvebod PLC 2.00 5/1/2106 DKK 40.00
ITALY
-------
Banca delle Marche 1.18 6/1/2017 EUR 42.39
A2A SpA 3.20 8/10/2036 EUR 62.44
Banca delle Marche 5.50 9/16/2030 EUR 69.25
Banca di Cividale 0.34 10/2/2036 EUR 57.63
Banca Monte dei Pa 1.23 1/15/2018 EUR 74.60
Cassa Depositi e P 0.29 10/31/2029 EUR 61.70
Cirio Finanziaria 8.00 12/21/2005 EUR 0.63
City of Lecco Ital 0.46 6/30/2026 EUR 67.27
Comune di Andrano 3.92 12/31/2035 EUR 71.20
Comune di Fiumicin 0.49 12/31/2026 EUR 66.65
Comune di Grontard 4.10 12/31/2035 EUR 73.36
Comune di Marcheno 4.23 12/31/2036 EUR 74.59
Comune di Marscian 4.03 12/31/2035 EUR 72.47
Comune di Mercato 3.97 12/31/2035 EUR 71.83
Comune di Piadena 4.05 12/31/2035 EUR 72.74
Comune di San Ferd 0.53 12/27/2026 EUR 67.26
Comune di Santa Ma 0.60 5/31/2026 EUR 69.00
Comune di Seminara 0.72 10/31/2026 EUR 69.14
Comune di Verona 0.43 12/1/2026 EUR 64.53
Enel SpA 0.96 10/20/2032 EUR 63.62
Intesa Sanpaolo Sp 1.06 3/20/2023 EUR 74.70
Italy Government I 1.85 9/15/2057 EUR 65.06
Italy Government I 2.00 9/15/2062 EUR 67.03
Italy Government I 2.20 9/15/2058 EUR 72.77
Italy Government I 2.87 5/19/2036 JPY 69.43
Province of Bresci 0.73 12/22/2036 EUR 57.22
Province of Bresci 0.72 6/30/2036 EUR 57.58
Province of Chieti 0.65 12/29/2023 EUR 74.35
Province of Milan 0.59 12/22/2033 EUR 63.54
Province of Rovigo 0.59 12/28/2035 EUR 58.80
Province of Teramo 0.44 12/30/2030 EUR 60.80
Province of Teramo 0.47 12/30/2025 EUR 68.61
Province of Trevis 0.47 12/31/2034 EUR 58.04
Province of Trevis 0.57 12/31/2034 EUR 59.52
Province of Trevis 0.34 12/31/2034 EUR 56.82
Region of Abruzzo 0.68 11/7/2036 EUR 63.64
Region of Abruzzo 0.52 11/7/2031 EUR 61.27
Region of Abruzzo 4.45 3/1/2037 EUR 70.52
Region of Aosta Va 0.45 5/28/2021 EUR 73.65
Region of Molise I 0.72 12/15/2033 EUR 64.40
Region of Piemont 0.45 11/27/2036 EUR 55.47
Region of Puglia I 0.74 2/6/2023 EUR 69.69
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 23.00
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.75
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63
LUXEMBOURG
----------
3W Power SA 9.25 12/1/2015 EUR 55.75
ArcelorMittal 7.25 4/1/2014 EUR 20.83
Bank of New York M 4.48 12/30/2099 EUR 18.04
Bank of New York M 4.73 12/15/2050 EUR 52.00
Cerruti Finance SA 6.50 7/26/2004 EUR 3.00
Cirio Finance Luxe 7.50 11/3/2002 EUR 1.25
Cirio Holding Luxe 6.25 2/16/2004 EUR 0.13
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 52.02
Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.50
Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.98
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 51.75
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75
Del Monte Finance 6.63 5/24/2006 EUR 13.63
ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38
ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38
Erste Europaeische 0.27 2/1/2037 USD 55.57
European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00
European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00
Finmek Internation 7.00 12/3/2004 EUR 0.13
Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13
Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13
Hypothekenbank Fra 0.25 12/20/2029 USD 67.37
International Indu 9.00 7/6/2011 EUR 1.00
International Indu 11.00 2/19/2013 USD 0.88
IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13
IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13
La Veggia Finance 7.13 11/14/2004 EUR 0.25
Teksid Aluminum Lu 11.38 7/15/2011 EUR 0.75
NETHERLANDS
-----------
Astana Finance BV 7.88 6/8/2010 EUR 4.00
Astana Finance BV 9.00 11/16/2011 USD 3.50
Astana Finance BV 14.50 7/2/2013 USD 3.75
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/10/2017 TRY 73.62
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2022 ZAR 52.90
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2017 TRY 72.46
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/7/2022 ZAR 53.32
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/12/2017 TRY 73.13
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2017 TRY 72.30
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/22/2021 ZAR 57.64
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/29/2021 NZD 70.64
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/15/2022 ZAR 52.50
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2022 MXN 64.98
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/3/2021 NZD 64.80
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 2/24/2025 CAD 65.15
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/12/2021 ZAR 58.17
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 9/20/2022 ZAR 52.08
BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.01
BLT Finance BV 12.00 2/10/2015 USD 10.25
BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.63
Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38
Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38
Cirio Del Monte NV 7.75 3/14/2005 EUR 3.38
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/26/2021 ZAR 48.95
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/30/2043 MXN 23.60
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 8/21/2028 MXN 46.15
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 7/30/2043 MXN 23.80
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 1/31/2033 MXN 36.68
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/29/2027 MXN 48.35
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/30/2027 MXN 48.11
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 12/29/2027 MXN 47.89
Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.77
Cooperatieve Centr 8.60 3/13/2014 CHF 60.50
Cooperatieve Centr 8.15 3/5/2014 CHF 58.60
Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.43
JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/7/2014 USD 69.19
JP Morgan Structur 5.00 12/3/2013 CHF 64.32
JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/25/2014 EUR 73.83
JP Morgan Structur 12.30 11/29/2013 USD 48.32
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 10.00 3/15/2012 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.13 6/1/2009 USD 0.38
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/5/2035 EUR 9.75
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 11/2/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 3/16/2035 EUR 14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/15/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 5/17/2035 EUR 10.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.88 3/14/2013 CHF 2.13
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/22/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/16/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 5/8/2017 HKD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/26/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/14/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/27/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/5/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/16/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 9/15/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/18/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.03 1/31/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/24/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 5/9/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 5/26/2026 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 12/3/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/18/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 6/6/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 12/2/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.46 2/19/2012 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/23/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.75 2/7/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/20/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/17/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 10/22/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/27/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.44 11/22/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/16/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.22 11/21/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/13/2010 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 6/10/2014 SGD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 4/20/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.86 9/21/2011 SGD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 12/20/2027 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/12/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/1/2025 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.55 3/12/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.05 4/8/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 9/5/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 23.30 9/16/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/17/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.88 1/28/2011 HKD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 11/21/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 2/19/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/3/2012 BRL 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 6/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 8/7/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/21/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 11/28/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/11/2038 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/19/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 4/23/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/22/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 2/16/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 3/10/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/13/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/7/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 1/31/2013 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 11/9/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.75 6/22/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.12 4/30/2027 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/28/2032 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 7/6/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 6/22/2046 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.65 8/24/2011 AUD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 12/26/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 12/15/2011 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.68 12/12/2045 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.06 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/28/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/4/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.69 2/19/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.59 11/22/2009 MXN 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.28 11/6/2010 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/9/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 6/2/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.38 2/4/2014 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.30 12/21/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2010 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.20 5/14/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 10/11/2017 ILS 2.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 3/30/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 10/24/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 8/3/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.60 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 7/2/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 7/8/2014 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 5/16/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 11/16/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.72 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 6/4/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 18.25 10/2/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/31/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.80 3/19/2018 JPY 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 11/16/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/6/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 11/22/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.25 6/20/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 5/21/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.01 9/20/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/19/2023 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.60 4/22/2014 MXN 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 12/3/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/23/2012 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.37 7/15/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.87 10/8/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.75 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/24/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.38 9/20/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/15/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/29/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/8/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 2/3/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.43 1/8/2009 ILS 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/8/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/13/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 4/1/2023 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.63 7/22/2011 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.80 3/31/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/2/2022 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 5/15/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.28 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.35 8/8/2016 SGD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/6/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.50 8/9/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 7/11/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.82 12/18/2036 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.20 12/3/2008 HKD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/3/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.40 6/12/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/4/2011 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 7/8/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.30 12/21/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 12/31/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 2/8/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/19/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.50 4/1/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.15 3/21/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 11/30/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 2/26/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 6/20/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 2/14/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/22/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.45 2/20/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 8/1/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 3/4/2010 NZD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.63 3/2/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 2/21/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.80 12/27/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.75 3/29/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 12/6/2011 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 1/4/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.75 3/1/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.82 10/20/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/13/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.80 11/16/2012 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/12/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 9/20/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.40 9/21/2009 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 4/28/2014 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 6/15/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/30/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 5/20/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 5/17/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 7/25/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 8/2/2037 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/12/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 8/23/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 11/9/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/14/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/12/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/22/2012 EUR 1.13
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.20 3/19/2018 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.95 11/4/2013 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/19/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 3/27/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 10/24/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 4/14/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/30/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 7/21/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.95 10/25/2036 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 6/29/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/25/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.75 4/5/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 4/24/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.39 5/4/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.35 10/13/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.80 12/30/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/23/2018 CZK 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/30/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/17/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.48 5/12/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.25 5/12/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/27/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/24/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 10/19/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.68 3/5/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/15/2022 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.32 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 9/13/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 7/24/2026 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 8/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 2/16/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 3/13/2021 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/17/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/6/2016 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/1/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.70 6/6/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/6/2013 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/24/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 6/13/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 3/17/2009 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/28/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.85 4/24/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 7/24/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 12/30/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/3/2012 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.10 6/4/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/15/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.15 10/30/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 8/1/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.10 11/12/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 8/11/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/13/2037 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 8/1/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.90 7/28/2020 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.15 8/25/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/30/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 5/9/2020 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.30 6/4/2012 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 6/5/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/6/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/4/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 17.00 6/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.80 8/21/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.22 3/1/2024 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 5/23/2012 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.45 5/23/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/28/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/15/2018 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/6/2011 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.75 10/28/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 11/30/2012 CZK 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 11/9/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 11/24/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/12/2036 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 12/14/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.40 6/20/2011 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.60 6/21/2010 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.05 12/20/2010 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 6/20/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 9/20/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.70 4/21/2011 USD 6.00
Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 45.04
Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 44.63
Morgan Stanley BV 9.00 4/16/2015 EUR 71.90
Nederlandse Waters 0.50 3/11/2025 CAD 65.79
New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.24
New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.78
New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.25
New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.47
NIBC Bank NV 25.98 5/7/2029 EUR 50.62
Nutritek Internati 8.75 12/11/2008 USD 2.00
Q-Cells Internatio 1.38 4/30/2012 EUR 32.45
Q-Cells Internatio 5.75 5/26/2014 EUR 32.09
Sairgroup Finance 4.38 6/8/2006 EUR 10.50
Sairgroup Finance 6.63 10/6/2010 EUR 12.13
Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.25
Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.00
SNS Bank NV 6.25 10/26/2020 EUR 2.13
SNS Bank NV 6.63 5/14/2018 EUR 4.13
WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.90
WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.38
NORWAY
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Eksportfinans ASA 0.25 7/14/2033 CAD 8.50
Eksportfinans ASA 0.50 5/9/2030 CAD 14.25
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/7/2017 BRL 69.77
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/10/2017 BRL 68.32
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/29/2017 BRL 66.85
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/25/2018 ZAR 70.89
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/26/2017 BRL 65.80
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/28/2017 BRL 68.91
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/28/2017 BRL 67.67
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/20/2018 BRL 64.71
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/2/2018 BRL 62.66
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/1/2017 BRL 68.22
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/15/2018 BRL 67.16
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/29/2017 BRL 70.51
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/16/2016 BRL 73.83
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/27/2022 ZAR 47.60
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 7/28/2016 BRL 74.11
Norske Skogindustr 7.00 6/26/2017 EUR 60.59
Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 74.02
Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 72.75
Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 69.53
Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 51.63
Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 73.50
Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 50.08
Petromena ASA 9.75 5/24/2014 NOK 6.75
Petromena ASA 10.85 11/19/2010 USD 6.75
PORTUGAL
--------
AdP - Aguas de Por 0.33 1/23/2023 EUR 63.88
Banco Espirito San 3.50 1/2/2043 EUR 50.13
Caixa Geral de Dep 5.98 3/3/2028 EUR 57.00
CP - Comboios de P 5.70 2/5/2030 EUR 60.31
Empresa de Desenvo 0.33 11/21/2018 EUR 66.63
Metropolitano de L 4.80 12/7/2027 EUR 73.38
Metropolitano de L 4.06 12/4/2026 EUR 71.93
Parpublica - Parti 4.20 11/16/2026 EUR 68.25
Portugal Obrigacoe 4.10 4/15/2037 EUR 72.12
Rede Ferroviaria N 4.25 12/13/2021 EUR 70.38
Rede Ferroviaria N 4.05 11/16/2026 EUR 71.78
ROMANIA
-------
City of Iasi Roman 4.45 11/15/2028 RON 71.23
RUSSIA
------
Arizk 3.00 12/20/2030 RUB 46.44
Kuzbassenergo-Fina 8.70 4/15/2021 RUB 72.01
Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.02
Mechel 8.40 6/1/2021 RUB 70.13
Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.21
Mobile Telesystems 5.00 6/29/2021 RUB 74.25
MORTGAGE AGENT AHM 3.00 9/9/2045 RUB 9.17
Novosibirsk TIN Pl 12.50 8/26/2014 RUB 5.00
RBC OJSC 3.27 4/19/2018 RUB 51.50
Russian Railways J 8.40 6/8/2028 RUB 100.00
Saturn Research & 8.50 6/6/2014 RUB 1.01
TGC-2 12.00 10/10/2018 RUB 75.00
World of Building 4.20 6/25/2019 RUB 3.60
SPAIN
-----
Autonomous Communi 4.25 10/31/2036 EUR 65.75
Autonomous Communi 4.22 4/26/2035 EUR 64.14
Autonomous Communi 4.69 10/28/2034 EUR 68.88
Autonomous Communi 2.97 9/8/2039 JPY 59.88
Autonomous Communi 0.48 10/17/2022 EUR 70.50
Autonomous Communi 2.10 5/20/2024 EUR 73.97
Autonomous Communi 0.27 11/29/2021 EUR 74.92
Banco de Castilla 1.50 6/23/2021 EUR 65.00
Bankinter SA 6.00 12/18/2028 EUR 65.13
City of Madrid Spa 0.34 10/10/2022 EUR 66.37
City of Madrid Spa 4.55 6/16/2036 EUR 73.57
Comunidad Autonoma 3.90 11/30/2035 EUR 63.84
Comunidad Autonoma 4.20 10/25/2036 EUR 66.58
Comunidad Autonoma 4.06 11/23/2035 EUR 63.94
Diputacion Foral d 4.32 12/29/2023 EUR 61.41
Ibercaja Banco SAU 1.09 4/20/2018 EUR 70.93
Junta Comunidades 0.41 12/5/2023 EUR 54.38
Junta Comunidades 3.88 1/31/2036 EUR 60.38
Junta de Extremadu 0.95 6/10/2024 EUR 72.31
Pescanova SA 5.13 4/20/2017 EUR 18.74
Pescanova SA 8.75 2/17/2019 EUR 17.79
Pescanova SA 6.75 3/5/2015 EUR 17.96
Spain Government I 2.92 12/2/2030 JPY 69.99
SWEDEN
------
Dannemora Mineral 11.75 3/22/2016 USD 41.50
Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 USD 6.63
Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 NOK 7.00
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/14/2016 BRL 74.58
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/22/2022 ZAR 46.97
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/29/2017 IDR 73.20
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/31/2022 ZAR 47.32
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/28/2022 ZAR 45.13
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/19/2018 IDR 68.74
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2018 BRL 59.21
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/15/2022 ZAR 46.66
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/26/2021 AUD 68.36
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/17/2027 USD 60.33
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/14/2016 BRL 72.32
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/28/2017 IDR 71.27
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/3/2017 BRL 70.83
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 7/21/2017 BRL 67.44
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/21/2016 BRL 72.17
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/20/2017 TRY 71.95
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/22/2016 BRL 72.19
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2020 TRY 54.02
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/5/2017 IDR 71.10
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/10/2017 BRL 70.65
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/26/2017 BRL 71.31
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/30/2017 BRL 67.86
Svensk Exportkredi 1.00 11/15/2021 AUD 72.00
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/21/2017 BRL 68.05
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/25/2021 ZAR 56.85
SWITZERLAND
-----------
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.60
Banque Cantonale V 11.80 1/29/2014 CHF 63.63
Banque Cantonale V 6.50 10/5/2015 CHF 72.74
Banque Cantonale V 2.00 7/8/2014 CHF 61.29
SAir Group 6.25 10/27/2002 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 4.25 2/2/2007 CHF 11.63
SAir Group 2.13 11/4/2004 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 0.13 7/7/2005 CHF 11.25
SAir Group 5.50 7/23/2003 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.13
SAir Group 6.25 4/12/2005 CHF 10.88
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 53.44
UBS AG 23.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.46
UBS AG 8.87 4/15/2014 USD 10.17
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.67
UBS AG 24.25 1/3/2014 EUR 60.63
UBS AG 18.45 10/24/2013 USD 8.73
UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 56.56
UBS AG 7.25 7/29/2014 USD 31.57
UBS AG 6.03 5/14/2014 USD 54.95
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 7.50 1/3/2014 EUR 64.51
UBS AG 12.70 4/22/2014 USD 66.71
UBS AG 8.94 2/13/2014 USD 14.64
UBS AG 6.29 2/26/2014 USD 32.99
UBS AG 6.22 2/26/2014 USD 38.93
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 72.58
UBS AG 16.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02
UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.41
UBS AG 17.25 1/3/2014 EUR 42.91
UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 52.05
UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.73
UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 61.74
UBS AG 17.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.54
UBS AG 6.04 8/29/2014 USD 35.75
UBS AG 10.46 1/2/2014 USD 35.35
UBS AG 8.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50
UBS AG 15.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.26
UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.94
UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 62.75
UBS AG 19.00 1/3/2014 EUR 53.05
UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 70.59
UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50
UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.72
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.30
UBS AG 22.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.98
UBS AG 9.53 12/17/2013 USD 48.94
UBS AG 6.49 5/23/2014 USD 21.20
UBS AG 6.53 5/27/2014 USD 21.09
UBS AG 6.33 5/12/2014 USD 19.48
UBS AG 9.25 4/30/2014 USD 9.78
UBS AG 14.00 6/27/2014 EUR 55.27
UBS AG 11.75 6/27/2014 EUR 48.70
UBS AG 8.29 1/14/2014 USD 19.98
UBS AG 5.22 1/28/2014 USD 11.48
UBS AG 7.86 1/31/2014 USD 20.24
UBS AG 9.17 6/30/2014 USD 67.70
UBS AG 7.25 8/8/2014 USD 45.54
UBS AG 8.35 10/24/2013 USD 50.89
UBS AG 9.45 10/22/2013 USD 20.95
UBS AG 9.00 1/3/2014 EUR 48.64
UBS AG 14.75 1/3/2014 EUR 44.63
UBS AG 7.15 2/26/2014 USD 32.50
UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 55.72
UBS AG 5.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.46
UBS AG 8.21 2/26/2014 USD 50.39
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 43.67
UBS AG 13.50 1/3/2014 EUR 56.28
UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 56.97
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 8.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.15
UBS AG 23.00 1/3/2014 EUR 69.99
UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.15
UBS AG 7.25 1/3/2014 EUR 69.51
UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.61
UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.35
UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.38
UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 68.73
UBS AG 14.50 1/3/2014 EUR 74.99
UBS AG 16.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.69
UBS AG 21.00 1/3/2014 EUR 38.60
UBS AG 6.19 1/8/2014 USD 19.82
UBS AG 9.93 6/18/2014 USD 50.46
UBS AG 9.89 11/22/2013 EUR 71.22
UBS AG 8.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.16
UBS AG 4.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.04
UBS AG 4.50 6/27/2014 EUR 48.72
UBS AG 8.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.09
UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.83
UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.76
UBS AG 5.50 3/28/2014 EUR 55.86
UBS AG 9.50 3/28/2014 EUR 50.93
UBS AG 13.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.47
UBS AG 12.00 3/28/2014 EUR 42.70
UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 39.79
UBS AG 14.00 3/28/2014 EUR 52.93
UBS AG 7.75 6/27/2014 EUR 45.94
UBS AG 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 49.43
UBS AG 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 50.45
UBS AG 11.00 3/28/2014 EUR 46.42
UBS AG 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.64
UBS AG 13.00 6/27/2014 EUR 45.50
UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 59.17
UBS AG 10.75 3/28/2014 EUR 58.16
UBS AG 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 10.50 6/27/2014 EUR 52.89
UBS AG 12.25 6/27/2014 EUR 71.08
UBS AG 6.25 6/27/2014 EUR 56.36
UBS AG 11.25 3/28/2014 EUR 72.74
UBS AG 11.00 1/3/2014 EUR 70.06
UBS AG 12.25 3/28/2014 EUR 68.98
UBS AG 12.00 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02
UBS AG 13.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 67.22
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 59.05
UBS AG 21.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.98
UBS AG 12.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.20
UBS AG 18.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.61
UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.63
UBS AG 19.25 1/3/2014 EUR 71.52
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.60
UBS AG 18.50 1/3/2014 EUR 71.37
UBS AG 6.50 1/3/2014 EUR 63.77
UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 49.48
UBS AG 5.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.70
UBS AG 4.25 1/3/2014 EUR 54.36
UBS AG 6.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.11
UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.93
UBS AG 14.41 11/21/2013 USD 40.01
UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 65.06
UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 45.13
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.49
UBS AG 6.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.80
UBS AG 20.75 1/3/2014 EUR 70.05
UBS AG 16.25 1/3/2014 EUR 72.22
UBS AG 19.75 1/3/2014 EUR 64.89
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.96
UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 47.78
UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 49.77
UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 60.73
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 36.11
UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.75
UBS AG 19.50 1/3/2014 EUR 65.22
UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 70.00
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.55
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 72.66
UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19
UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.80
UBS AG 7.98 3/17/2014 USD 10.60
UBS AG 14.75 3/28/2014 EUR 71.70
UBS AG 11.50 6/27/2014 EUR 74.62
UBS AG 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 64.14
UBS AG 6.50 3/28/2014 EUR 44.45
UBS AG 7.30 7/7/2014 USD 28.53
TURKEY
------
APP International 11.75 10/1/2005 USD 5.00
Yuksel Insaat AS 9.50 11/10/2015 USD 72.64
UKRAINE
-------
Agroton Public Ltd 12.50 7/14/2014 USD 50.00
UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
Alpha Credit Group 0.73 2/21/2021 EUR 52.38
Alpha Credit Group 6.00 7/29/2020 EUR 72.88
Barclays Bank PLC 0.61 12/28/2040 EUR 64.00
Barclays Bank PLC 8.00 5/23/2014 USD 10.81
Barclays Bank PLC 2.20 11/30/2025 USD 21.86
Barclays Bank PLC 0.50 3/13/2023 RUB 47.04
Barclays Bank PLC 6.75 10/16/2015 GBP 1.15
Barclays Bank PLC 7.40 2/13/2014 GBP 1.04
Barclays Bank PLC 2.50 3/7/2017 EUR 35.67
Barclays Bank PLC 8.25 1/26/2015 USD 1.13
Barclays Bank PLC 1.99 12/1/2040 USD 71.38
Barclays Bank PLC 1.64 6/3/2041 USD 66.57
Barclays Bank PLC 7.50 4/29/2014 GBP 1.06
Barclays Bank PLC 2.33 1/2/2041 USD 73.08
Cattles Ltd 6.88 1/17/2014 GBP 2.50
Cattles Ltd 7.13 7/5/2017 GBP 2.50
Commercial Bank Pr 5.80 2/9/2016 USD 69.01
Co-Operative Bank 9.25 4/28/2021 GBP 72.74
Co-Operative Bank 5.75 12/2/2024 GBP 68.46
Co-Operative Bank 7.88 12/19/2022 GBP 70.52
Co-Operative Bank 5.88 3/28/2033 GBP 69.57
Co-Operative Bank 5.63 11/16/2021 GBP 55.13
Co-Operative Bank 1.01 5/18/2016 EUR 69.71
Credit Suisse AG/L 11.50 4/4/2014 CHF 70.01
Credit Suisse AG/L 8.50 11/5/2013 CHF 45.66
Credit Suisse AG/L 6.50 1/14/2014 CHF 55.22
Credit Suisse AG/L 9.00 11/14/2013 CHF 51.41
Credit Suisse AG/L 1.64 6/1/2042 USD 46.62
Credit Suisse AG/L 8.00 1/14/2014 USD 55.38
Credit Suisse AG/L 6.85 8/8/2014 USD 57.36
Credit Suisse AG/L 10.50 11/15/2013 USD 51.48
Credit Suisse Inte 4.40 10/24/2013 EUR 57.10
Credit Suisse Inte 4.45 12/13/2013 EUR 53.20
Dunfermline Buildi 6.00 3/31/2015 GBP 1.38
Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 2/24/2022 EUR 60.75
Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 12/2/2021 EUR 61.13
Emporiki Group Fin 5.10 12/9/2021 EUR 62.13
ERB Hellas PLC 0.52 9/3/2014 EUR 72.13
Goldman Sachs Inte 2.50 8/17/2018 EUR 20.40
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/3/2023 AUD 62.86
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/2/2022 AUD 64.19
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2023 AUD 63.27
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/25/2021 AUD 68.62
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/30/2021 NZD 65.52
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/20/2018 RUB 69.82
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 6/30/2021 NZD 67.16
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/2/2023 AUD 63.51
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2022 AUD 63.89
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/5/2018 RUB 74.86
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 3/1/2018 RUB 74.48
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/27/2027 NZD 47.02
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/22/2021 AUD 68.35
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 7/30/2027 NZD 46.29
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 1/29/2027 NZD 47.70
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/30/2026 NZD 48.42
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2026 AUD 50.10
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/8/2026 AUD 50.28
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2027 NZD 47.50
Royal Bank of Scot 1.69 11/14/2016 GBP 1.10
RSL Communications 10.50 11/15/2008 USD 1.20
RSL Communications 10.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 9.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 9.88 11/15/2009 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 12.00 11/1/2008 USD 1.25
UBS AG/London 25.00 3/20/2014 CHF 62.25
UBS AG/London 7.63 9/30/2015 USD 16.71
UBS AG/London 20.25 4/17/2014 CHF 66.13
UBS AG/London 6.88 8/31/2015 USD 15.37
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.
Copyright 2014. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *