/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/140210.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, February 10, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 28
Headlines
A U S T R I A
HYPO ALPE-ADRIA: Disorderly Insolvency May Cost Nearly EUR25-Bil.
G E R M A N Y
AUTO-TEILE UNGER: S&P Withdraws 'SD' LT Corp. Credit Rating
GROHE HOLDING: Moody's Corrects Jan. 29 Rating Release
PANTHERWERKE AG: Bielefeld Court Commences Insolvency Proceedings
G R E E C E
ATHENS: Moody's Hikes Issuer Rating to 'Caa3'; Outlook Stable
I R E L A N D
GROSVENOR PLACE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Class E Notes
SIAC CONSTRUCTION: Three Creditors Challenge Rescue Plan
I T A L Y
BANCA UBAE: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating
SNAI SPA: S&P Assigns B- CCR & Rates EUR320MM Secured Notes B-
K A Z A K H S T A N
JBC NOMAD: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws 'B/BB+' IFS Ratings
M A L T A
FIMBANK PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating
N E T H E R L A N D S
FORNAX BV: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
LEOPARD CLO III: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
LEOPARD CLO IV: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR11.25MM Notes
NXP BV: Moody's Hikes CFR to 'Ba3'; Outlook Remains Positive
POLARE: Files for Creditor Protection After Store Closures
TATA CHEMICALS: Moody's Says 3Q Results Reinforce Restructuring
N O R W A Y
NORSE ENERGY: Board Files for Bankruptcy in Oslo Court
NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
P O L A N D
COGNOR SA: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Corp. Family Rating
P O R T U G A L
BANCO BPI: S&P Lowers Preference Shares Rating to 'CCC-'
R U S S I A
CHELYABINSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
FIRST REPUBLIC: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Long-Term Deposit Ratings
FIRST REPUBLIC: Moody's Withdraws Ba2.ru National Deposit Rating
RUSSIAN GRIDS: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'Ba1' CFR to Stable
RUSSLAVBANK: Moody's Affirms B3 Deposit Rating & Sr. Debt Rating
S P A I N
CASER SA: Moody's Confirms B1 Insurance Financial Strength Rating
CODERE SA: Fails to Reach Debt Restructuring Deal
S W E D E N
STENA INT'L: Moody's Rates New $550MM Secured Notes '(P)Ba2'
T U R K E Y
TURKEY: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB+/B' Ratings
U K R A I N E
DNIPROPETROVSK CITY: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' ICR; Outlook Negative
UKRAINE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 12 Banks
UKRAINE: Moody's Confirms 'Caa1' CFRs on Five Companies
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
EUROSAIL-UK: Moody's Hikes Rating on GBP29.04MM Notes to 'Caa3'
MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
PUNCH TAVERNS: Lenders Draw Up Rival Debt Restructuring Plan
WHINSTONE CAPITAL: S&P Affirms 'B' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
X X X X X X X X
* Fitch Says Fragile CEE Bank Recovery Flags Two-Tier System
* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 3 to February 7, 2014
*********
=============
A U S T R I A
=============
HYPO ALPE-ADRIA: Disorderly Insolvency May Cost Nearly EUR25-Bil.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Shields at Reuters reports that the central bank has
warned the Austrian government that a disorderly insolvency of
nationalized Austrian lender Hypo Alpe Adria could cost nearly
EUR25 billion (US$34 billion).
According to Reuters, Der Standard reported that a letter sent in
November by the central bank and a special Hypo task force said
letting Hypo go bust may quickly cost the public sector and
subordinated creditors of Hypo up to EUR16 billion.
It added that fallout from such a move could hit the federal and
provincial governments by between EUR6 billion and EUR8 billion
more over the next three years by dragging down Hypo's home
province of Carinthia and jacking up refinancing costs, Reuters
relates.
The central bank declined to comment on the report, but has
already rejected in public the idea of letting Hypo go under for
fear it could trigger a chain reaction dragging in other banks
and ruining Austria's reputation on capital markets, Reuters
relays.
The government has said it wants healthier banks such as Erste
Group, Raiffeisen Bank International, or Bank Austria to support
a "bad bank" that would absorb toxic assets from Hypo, which
Austria had to nationalize in 2009, Reuters notes.
The government however left open the door for insolvency should
all else fail, Reuters says.
Hypo Alpe-Adria International AG is a subsidiary of BayernLB. It
is active in banking and leasing. In banking, HGAA serves both
corporate and retail customers and offers services ranging from
traditional lending through savings and deposits to complex
investment products and asset management services.
=============
G E R M A N Y
=============
AUTO-TEILE UNGER: S&P Withdraws 'SD' LT Corp. Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'SD' (selective
default) long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based auto
parts retailer and workshop operator A.T.U Auto-Teile Unger
Handels GmbH & Co. KG (ATU) after the company completed its debt-
to-equity exchange offer and at the company's request.
Also at the company's request, S&P withdrew its 'D' (default)
issue rating and '4' recovery rating on the EUR450 million senior
secured notes.
Due to insufficient information, S&P withdrew the corporate
credit rating at 'SD' level. However, at the time of the
withdrawal, S&P believed that the company's credit quality would
benefit from the substantial deleveraging achieved through the
transaction.
On Dec. 5, 2013, S&P had lowered its corporate credit rating on
ATU to 'SD' from 'CCC-' because it missed its semiannual coupon
payment due Dec. 1, 2013. S&P also lowered the issue rating on
ATU's senior secured notes to 'D' from 'CCC-'.
GROHE HOLDING: Moody's Corrects Jan. 29 Rating Release
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service issued a correction to the January 29,
2014 rating release of Grohe Holding GmbH.
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B2 corporate family
rating and B1-PD probability of default rating of Grohe Holding
GmbH.
Ratings Rationale
Moody's has withdrawn the ratings following the closing of the
acquisition of Grohe by Lixil Corporation and Development Bank of
Japan Inc. (Aa3, stable), and subsequent repayment of all
outstanding debt.
Grohe Holding GmbH is one of the world's leading single-brand
manufacturers and suppliers of sanitary fittings, offering a
broad range of products for delivering water to bathrooms and
kitchens.
PANTHERWERKE AG: Bielefeld Court Commences Insolvency Proceedings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Bike Europe reports that the Bielefeld insolvency court announced
that the Pantherwerke AG insolvency proceedings are handled by
Bielefeld-based Law and Accountancy firm Brinkmann & Partner.
Also, at the former Pantherwerke grounds, a continuation of
production is likely to take place through a new, partly Schminke
family owned company, Bike Europe notes.
Laywer Dr. Thorsten Fuest from Brinkmann & Partner has been
appointed as temporary receiver, Bike Europe relates. At this
moment, he could not say anything on the Pantherwerke insolvency
as he has to study the case, Bike Europe states.
Based in Loehne, Germany, Pantherwerke was founded in 1896 and is
one of the largest bike suppliers in Germany.
===========
G R E E C E
===========
ATHENS: Moody's Hikes Issuer Rating to 'Caa3'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the City of Athens' issuer
rating to Caa3 from C. Concurrently the rating was assigned a
stable outlook, in line with the outlook on Greece's sovereign
rating. This action concludes the review for upgrade initiated on
December 4, 2013.
The main driver of Moody's decision to upgrade Athens' rating is
the fact that Athens has cured a default on its debt obligations.
Ratings Rationale
The upgrade is primarily driven by Athens' December 2013 payment
of the remaining EUR675,000 interest on arrears requested by the
Agricultural Bank of Greece's (ATEbank) liquidation commission in
order to fully settle the EUR29.5 million loan it incurred in
2003. In September 2013, Athens had already incurred a EUR31.2
million amortizing loan from another state-owned entity, the Loan
and Consignment Fund (LCF), in order to refinance the principal
and cover a portion of the interest due to ATEbank.
The rating agency notes that the default on the ATEbank loan was
an isolated incident and that Athens has regularly made interest
and principal payments on other borrowings. Including the LCF
loan from last September, Athens' debt stock amounted to EUR167
million as of year-end 2013, equivalent to a modest 39% of pre-
closing operating revenue for the year. This debt stock is
entirely comprised of bank loans with amortizing schedule.
Athens' budgetary structure limits its fiscal flexibility to act
independently of the sovereign and its finances are exposed to
changes in the country's fragile socioeconomic and funding
environment. Athens has faced strong fiscal pressures in the past
few years, stemming from volatile government transfers and lower
own-source revenue streams. That being said, substantial
expenditure-streamlining initiatives enabled it to keep operating
costs in line with lower revenue and to record a thin pre-closing
operating surplus in 2013 (1.7% of revenue on a cash basis) and
preserve modest cash reserves.
What Could Move The Rating Up/Down
An upgrade of Athens' rating will require a similar change in
Greece's sovereign rating and improvements in the city's
financial performance and cash position.
A deterioration of the sovereign credit strength would apply
downward pressure on Athens' rating given the close financial and
operational linkages between the two. Fiscal slippage or the
emergence of significant liquidity risks would also exert
downward pressure on the rating.
Specific economic indicators as required by EU regulation are not
applicable for this entity.
On February 4, 2014, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Athens, City of. The main point raised during the
discussion was: The issuer's fiscal or financial strength,
including its debt profile, has materially increased.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.
The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.
=============
I R E L A N D
=============
GROSVENOR PLACE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Grosvenor Place CLO I:
EUR47M Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to
Aaa(sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aa3(sf) and
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
EUR19M Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Upgraded to A2(sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded
to Baa2(sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
Moody's affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued by
Grosvenor Place CLO I:
EUR173M (currently EUR46M outstanding) Class A-1 Senior
Floating Rate Delayed Draw Notes due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
GBP27.528M (currently GBP7.3M outstanding) Class A-2 Senior
Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
EUR35M (currently approx. EUR9.5M outstanding) Class A-3 Senior
Multi-Currency Revolving Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
EUR20M Class A-4 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
EUR14.5M Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to
Ba1 (sf)
EUR10M (currently EUR5.9M outstanding) Class E Deferrable
Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed Ba2 (sf);
previously on Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)
Moody's also withdrew the rating on the following Combination
Notes issued by Grosvenor Place CLO I, because the notes were
split back into their original components:
EUR3M Class Q Combination Notes due 2021, Withdrawn (sf);
previously on Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)
Grosvenor Place CLO I, issued in June 2006, is a multicurrency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by CQS
Cayman Limited Partnership. This transaction passed its
reinvestment period in July 2012. It is predominantly composed of
senior secured loans.
Ratings Rationale
The upgrade to the rating on the Class B and Class C notes is
primarily a result of the improvement in over-collateralization
ratios. Moody's had previously upgraded the ratings on 14
November 2013 of Class A-4 to Aaa (sf) from Aa1 (sf), Class B to
Aa3 (sf) from A2 (sf) and Class C to Baa2 (sf) from Baa3 (sf) and
left the ratings of Class B and Class C under review for possible
upgrade due to significant loan prepayments. The actions conclude
the rating review of the transaction.
The Class A-1, A-2 and A-3 notes amortized by approximately EUR
163m (or 72%) over the last year and by approximately EUR 171m
(or 73%) since the rating action in August 2011. As a result of
this deleveraging the overcollateralization ratios (or "OC
ratios") of the senior classes have increased. As of the trustee
report dated 31 Dec 2013, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and
Class E OC ratios are reported at 147.70%, 129.03%, 117.68%, and
113.60%, respectively, versus July 2011 levels of 125.16%,
117.76%, 112.68%, and 109.43%, respectively. All OC tests are in
compliance. These OC ratios do not reflect the January 2014
payment date report.
The rating actions are also a result of an improvement in credit
metrics of the underlying portfolio and the benefit of modelling
actual credit metrics following the expiry of the reinvestment
period in July 2012. In consideration of the reinvestment
restrictions applicable during the amortization period, and
therefore the limited ability to effect significant changes to
the current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a
higher likelihood that the collateral pool characteristics will
continue to maintain a positive buffer relative to certain
covenant requirements. In particular, the deal is assumed to
benefit from a shorter amortization profile and higher spread
levels compared to the levels assumed prior to the expiry of the
reinvestment period.
The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of approximately
EUR191.5 million, defaulted par of EUR11.2 million, a weighted
average default probability of 23.08% (consistent with a WARF of
3577 with a weighted average life of 3.5 years), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 46.92% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 16 and a weighted average
spread of 4.16%.
In its base case, Moody's addresses the exposure to obligors
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk bond
ceilings (LCCs) of A1 or lower. Given that the portfolio has
exposures to 6.5 % of obligors in Italy whose LCC is A2 and 12.6%
in Spain, whose LCC is A3, Moody's ran the model with different
par amounts depending on the target rating of each class of
notes, in accordance with Section 4.2.11 and Appendix 14 of the
methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the
rated notes, and amount to 3.64% for the Class A-1, Class A-2,
Class A-3, Class A-4 and Class B notes, 0.91% for the Class C
notes and 0% for the Class D and Class E notes.
The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 91.2% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
15%. In each case, historical and market performance and a
collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.
Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.
Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:
In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower credit quality in the portfolio to
address refinancing risk. Loans to European corporates rated B3
or lower and maturing between 2014 and 2015 make up approximately
6.1% of the portfolio, which could make refinancing difficult.
Moody's ran a model in which it raised the base case WARF to 3772
by forcing ratings on 25% of the refinancing exposures to Ca; the
model generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-
case results.
This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy and 2) the concentration of lowly- rated debt
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.
Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:
1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.
2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.
3) Foreign currency exposure: The deal has significant exposure
to GBP denominated assets. Volatility in foreign exchange rates
will have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds
available to the transaction, which can affect the expected loss
of rated tranches.
4) Around 36% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has been assessed by using credit
estimates.
In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.
SIAC CONSTRUCTION: Three Creditors Challenge Rescue Plan
--------------------------------------------------------
Barry O'Halloran at The Irish Times reports that Siac
Construction's future remains undecided after three creditors
claiming they are owed a total of more than EUR30 million on
Friday challenged a proposed rescue plan for the construction
group in the High Court.
According to The Irish Times, investors, including owners the
Feighery family, director Finn Lyden, French group Colas and
private backer Ducales, are willing to put EUR10.5 million into
the troubled group under the terms of a rescue plan proposed by
High Court-appointed examiner Michael McAteer of Grant Thornton.
But two Polish businesses -- Karmar, which says it is owed
EUR30.7 million, and Cemex Polska, which is claiming EUR1.3
million -- and former worker Costal Istrate, who has a personal
injuries judgment for EUR110,000 against the group, challenged
the plan on various grounds in the High Court on Friday, The
Irish Times relates.
Mr. Justice Peter Kelly, as cited by The Irish Times, said he
would deliver a ruling on Wednesday, meaning Siac, which has been
under High Court protection from creditors since Mr. McAteer was
appointed in late October, must wait until then to see if the
rescue plan can go ahead.
Siac Construction and eight related companies owed EUR42 million
to three banks and an estimated EUR26 million to unsecured
creditors when they sought High Court protection, The Irish Times
discloses.
SIAC Construction is an Irish building engineering company.
=========
I T A L Y
=========
BANCA UBAE: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Italy-based Banca UBAE's (UBAE) Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook.
The Viability Rating (VR) has also been affirmed at 'bb'.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs and VR
UBAE's VR and IDRs mainly reflect its risk profile as a niche
bank in the trade finance business, serving predominantly Italian
import and export activities, due to its strong relationships in
a number of emerging markets, primarily in the Mena region. The
ratings also reflect high concentration in terms of counterparty
risk and funding, which is not unusual for a trade finance bank,
combined with a fairly small equity base. The ratings also
factor in its adequate asset quality and resilient operating
profitability compared with other Fitch-rated international trade
finance banks.
Trade finance-related exposures include more volatile markets,
but credit losses have to date been small. Both on- and off-
balance sheet items bear a high degree of concentration, with the
largest exposures by country and large borrowers, representing
multiples of Fitch Core Capital ratios. However, the bank's
small size means that loan losses could be material if a large
counterparty defaults, but exposures to higher-risk
counterparties are typically collateralized. Capitalization is
only adequate given the bank's concentration risk. UBAE continues
to diversify its geographic coverage, reducing its over-reliance
on a small number of counterparties or countries.
More than half of UBAE's funding comes from its main shareholder,
Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB), which has historically supported the
bank's business. The reminder is sourced from wholesale funding
markets, and UBAE's funding sources are now more diversified with
a lower share of Libyan depositors and the new presence of
Italian institutional depositors.
The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that UBAE will
continue to operate with an unchanged strategy and to benefit
from ordinary funding support from LFB.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs and VR
The concentration of UBAE's portfolio means that the ratings are
sensitive to material deterioration in the quality of its
counterparties. The ratings could also come under pressure if
asset quality significantly weakens.
Given the bank's high reliance on funding from its parent, the
ratings are also sensitive to an unexpected material funding
withdrawal; however, Fitch does not view the partial withdrawal
of funds from LFB in the last two years as a sign of diminished
importance of the bank to its parent.
An upgrade of UBAE's ratings is unlikely given its fairly small
size and its concentrated operations in potentially volatile
markets.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - Support Rating
The bank's Support Rating of '5' reflects potential support, in
case of need, from LFB but also Fitch's view that such support
cannot be relied upon. This is because Fitch is unable to assess
LFB's ability to provide support as the bank is not rated.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - Support Rating
UBAE's Support Rating is sensitive to changes in Fitch's
assumptions regarding potential support from LFB. An upgrade of
the Support Rating would be contingent on Fitch being able to
assess LFB's ability to provide support.
The rating actions are as follows:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
SNAI SPA: S&P Assigns B- CCR & Rates EUR320MM Secured Notes B-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its 'B-'
long-term corporate credit rating to Italy-based gaming group
SNAI SpA. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P assigned these ratings:
-- An issue rating of 'B-' to the EUR320 million senior
secured notes due 2018. The recovery rating on these notes
is '3', reflecting S&P's expectation of meaningful
(50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default.
-- An issue rating of 'CCC' to the EUR160 million subordinated
unsecured notes due 2018. The recovery rating on these
notes is '6', reflecting S&P's expectation of negligible
(0%-10%) recovery in the event of a payment default.
The rating reflects S&P's assessment of SNAI's business risk
profile as "weak" and financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged," as S&P's criteria define these terms.
SNAI is the leader in the Italian sports betting segment and the
third-largest authorized concession holder of gaming and betting
products in Italy. The group provides a range of gambling
services, including physical betting, slot machines, video
lotteries, and online betting and gaming.
S&P's assessment of SNAI's financial risk profile reflects its
highly leveraged capital structure, which includes the
EUR480 million dual-tranche notes and a EUR20 million privately
placed bond. SNAI has used the proceeds of its refinancing to
repay existing debt and pay a EUR66 million settlement to the
Italian gaming regulator. SNAI is a publicly listed company, but
only 33% of the company is listed on the Italian stock exchange.
The rest is owned by private equity firms Invest Industrial IVLP
and Venice European Investment Capital.
S&P estimates that SNAI's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt
(adjusted for operating leases, pensions, and litigation) should
be about EUR520 million at year-end 2013. This implies an
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of slightly more than 6.0x. S&P
forecasts that the group's adjusted funds from operations (FFO)
to debt should be about 7.5% by the same date.
S&P's assessment of SNAI's business risk profile as "weak"
reflects SNAI's lack of geographic diversity -- the group
operates only in Italy and is exposed to the country's waning
economy and declining consumer spending. S&P also considers
SNAI's profitability to be volatile and lower than the average of
its peers both inside and outside Italy. S&P's business risk
assessment also incorporates its view of the gaming industry's
"intermediate" risk and the "moderately high" country risk in
Italy.
Partly offsetting these factors is SNAI's position as the third-
largest authorized concession holder of gaming and betting
products in Italy, the largest gaming market in Europe. SNAI
also has good product diversification, offering a wide range of
gambling products. Additionally, the group's concessions have
long maturities and the group has successfully renewed them in
the past.
S&P forecasts that SNAI's profitability and cash flow
Generation -- which were very weak in 2012 -- will continue to
recover in 2014. In particular, S&P anticipates that SNAI's
revenues will grow by low-single digits in 2014. S&P forecasts
that the group's adjusted EBITDA margin will recover to 15% in
2014.
S&P could take a positive rating action if SNAI's profitability
improves in 2014, leading to adjusted EBITDA interest coverage
consistently greater than 2x, coupled with positive free cash
flow and a reduction in leverage. This could occur if the
group's new management effectively implements its business plan,
particularly in relation to the roll-out of the new video lottery
terminals and online betting. An upgrade also depends on SNAI
maintaining its "adequate" liquidity.
S&P could consider lowering the rating if SNAI's liquidity
position weakens owing to an unforeseen cash outflow or
deterioration in operating performance leading to tightening
covenant headroom. S&P could also lower the rating if cash
interest coverage were to fall below 1.2x, or if S&P was to
assess SNAI's capital structure as unsustainable.
===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================
JBC NOMAD: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws 'B/BB+' IFS Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and withdrawn Kazakhstan-based JBC
NOMAD Insurance Company's (NOMAD) Insurer Financial Strength
(IFS) rating 'B' and its National IFS rating 'BB+(kaz)' with
Stable Outlooks.
Key Rating Drivers
Fitch has withdrawn NOMAD's ratings as the company has chosen to
stop participating in the rating process. Therefore, Fitch will
no longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings.
Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical
coverage for NOMAD.
=========
M A L T A
=========
FIMBANK PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Issuer Default Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Malta-based Fimbank Plc's (FIM)
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable
Outlook. The Viability Rating (VR) has also been affirmed at
'bb'.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs and VR
The affirmation of FIM's VR and IDRs is based on the bank's plans
to increase its capitalization significantly under its new
ownership structure and on the available, low-cost funding
expected from its new majority shareholder. These two elements
compensate for the rating pressure arising from its weaker asset
quality than peers and its volatile earnings.
The Stable Outlook reflects the capital already strengthened by
the KIPCO group, FIM's new ultimate shareholder, and the
additional capital which the bank is expected to receive by the
KIPCO group in 2014. However, the new ownership structure, with
one dominant shareholder, could result in some uncertainties
around potential changes to both the management team and current
strategic directions, although KIPCO has committed to develop the
current business model and strategy of FIM.
The ratings also reflect the bank's niche focus on trade finance,
with strong relationships in a number of emerging markets,
predominantly in the Middle East and North Africa, and its high
asset concentration.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRs and VR
FIM's ratings are sensitive to a material increase in its risk
appetite, which could result from a change of strategy under its
new ownership. Further deterioration of asset quality, higher
concentration of its exposures and failure to generate more
substantial and stable operating profits could lead to a
downgrade. An upgrade is currently unlikely as the rating
affirmation already takes into account expected improvements in
capitalization, profitability and funding.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - Support Rating and Support Rating Floor
Although the bank would first look for support from the KIPCO
group, the availability of such support cannot currently be
ascertained by Fitch and is therefore not factored into the
ratings.
The Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor'
therefore reflect possible support from the Maltese authorities
but which in Fitch's view cannot be relied upon.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - Support Rating and Support Rating Floor
Currently, the bank's Support Rating at '5' is sensitive to the
rating and propensity of Malta to provide support.
Fitch will assess the new shareholder's ability and propensity to
provide support to the bank on a timely basis as and when
required, which may result in an upgrade of the Support Rating
and withdrawal of the Support Rating Floor.
The rating actions are as follows:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
FORNAX BV: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from
'B- (sf)' and to 'D (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its credit ratings on
FORNAX (ECLIPSE 2006-2) B.V.'s class F and G notes, respectively.
The rating actions reflect S&P's opinion of the transaction's
cash flow disruptions. According to the November 2013 cash
manager's report, the class F and G notes did not receive full
interest on the November 2013 interest payment date (IPD). As of
November 2013, the cumulative amount of unpaid interest for these
classes of notes was EUR90,000.
Although the borrowers met their interest payment obligations,
the class F and G notes experienced interest shortfalls. S&P
understands that this is a result of the issuer paying certain
fees and expenses (e.g., the special servicing fee). On previous
payment dates, the additional default interest received on the
defaulted loans mitigated such fees and expenses. However, the
issuer received no such interest on the November 2013 IPD.
S&P's ratings in FORNAX (ECLIPSE 2006-2) address the timely
payment of interest and ultimate repayment of principal no later
than the February 2019 legal final maturity date.
The class G notes experienced an interest shortfall on the
November 2013 IPD and are highly vulnerable to principal losses,
in S&P's opinion.
The class G notes are subject to an available funds cap (AFC),
which addresses the risk of cash flow disruptions resulting from
loan prepayment. However, the interest shortfall did not result
from loan prepayments but from credit related issues -- mainly
fees and expenses related to defaulted loans, in S&P's view. S&P
therefore do not believe that the AFC applies to the shortfall
experienced by the class G notes, in this instance. S&P has
lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class G
notes to reflect the nonpayment of timely interest.
S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the
class F notes because this class of notes experienced an interest
shortfall on the November 2013 IPD. S&P has not lowered its
rating on this class of notes to 'D (sf)' as it believes that the
outstanding shortfall may be repaid in the near term.
FORNAX (ECLIPSE 2006-2) is a 2006-vintage true sale commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction backed by seven
senior loans secured on 78 European commercial properties. At
closing, it was backed by a pool of 19 loans secured on 118 mixed
European commercial properties. The assets were located in
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The
transaction is now backed by a pool of seven loans, five of which
are in special servicing.
LEOPARD CLO III: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Leopard CLO III B.V.:
EUR18M C1 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
EUR11M C2 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013
Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade
EUR10M (current outstanding balance of EUR6.0M) Combo W Notes,
Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2013 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)
EUR4M (current outstanding balance of EUR2.5M) Combo Z Notes,
Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2013 Affirmed Ba1 (sf)
Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Leopard CLO III B.V.:
EUR235M (current outstanding balance of EUR43.7M) A1 Notes,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 31, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa
(sf)
EUR14.5M B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013
Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
EUR16.25M D Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on May 31, 2013
Downgraded to B2 (sf)
EUR6.25M (current outstanding balance of EUR5.0M) E1 Notes,
Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2013 Downgraded to Caa3
(sf)
EUR4M (current outstanding balance of EUR3.6M) E2 Notes, Affirmed
Caa3 (sf); previously on May 31, 2013 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)
Leopard CLO III B.V., issued in April 2005, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by M&G Investment Management Limited. The reinvestment
period ended on April 21, 2010.
Ratings Rationale
The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement in over-collateralization ratios.
Moody's had previously upgraded the rating on November 14, 2013,
of Class B to Aaa (sf) from Aa1 (sf) and placed the ratings of
Class C1 and C2 notes under review for possible upgrade due to
significant loan prepayments. The actions conclude the rating
review of the transaction.
The Class A-1 notes have paid down by approximately EUR42.5M
(18.1%) since the rating action in May 2013 and EUR191.3M (81.4%)
since closing. As a result of the deleveraging, over-
collateralization has increased. As of the trustee's December
2013 report, the Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E had over-
collateralization ratios of 181.9%, 121.4%, 102.3% and 94.8%
compared with 139.0%, 111.7%, 100.6% and 96.1%, respectively, as
of the trustee's April 2013 report. Currently both Class D and E
Par Value Tests are failing and Class E, which has a Turbo
feature, is diferring interest.
The ratings on the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the
Class W and Z notes, the 'rated balance' at any time is equal to
the principal amount of the combination note on the issue date
times a rated coupon of 1.5% and 0.25% per annum respectively,
accrued on the rated balance on the preceding payment date, minus
the sum of all payments made from the issue date to such date, of
either interest or principal. The rated balance will not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.
The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR106.8M,
defaulted par of EUR7.5M, a weighted average default probability
of 24.57% (consistent with a WARF of 3,658), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.35% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 17 and a weighted average spread of
3.63%.
The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that a recovery of 50% of the 95.29% of the
portfolio exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets
upon default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.
Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.
Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:
In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analysis on key parameters for the
rated notes, which includes deteriorating credit quality of
portfolio to address the refinancing risk. Approximately 5.26% of
the portfolio is European corporate rated B3 and below and
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. Moody's considered a model run where the
base case WARF was increased to 3,783 by forcing ratings on 50%
of refinancing exposures to Ca. This run generated model outputs
that were consistent with the base-case results.
This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy 2) the concentration of lowly- rated debt
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.
Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:
Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.
Around 33.8% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.
Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.
Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the
CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on
those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction maturity, the
liquidation value of such an asset will depend on the nature of
the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity
lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values higher than
Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
ratings.
In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.
LEOPARD CLO IV: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR11.25MM Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Leopard CLO IV B.V.:
EUR26.25M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Nov 14, 2013 Aa1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade
EUR15.5M Class C1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2012
Upgraded to A2 (sf)
EUR7M Class C2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due
2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2012 Upgraded
to A2 (sf)
EUR20.65M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Upgraded Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2012
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)
EUR6M (current outstanding balance of EUR4.0M) Class W
Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
Nov 19, 2012 Upgraded to A1 (sf)
Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Leopard CLO IV B.V.:
EUR262.5M (current outstanding balance of EUR139.6M) Class A
Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Jun 27, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)
EUR11.25M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Nov 19, 2012 Upgraded
to B1 (sf)
EUR10M (current outstanding balance of EUR5.4M) Class O
Combination Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
Nov 19, 2012 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)
Leopard CLO IV B.V., issued in May 2006, is a Collateralised Loan
Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by M&G
Investment Management Limited. The reinvestment period ended in
February 2012.
Ratings Rationale
The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement in over-collateralization ratios.
Moody's had previously on November 14, 2013 placed the rating of
Class B notes under review for possible upgrade due to
significant loan prepayments. The actions conclude the rating
review of the transaction.
The Class A notes have paid down by approximately EUR53.9 M
(20.5%) since August 2013 and EUR 122.9 M (46.8%) since closing.
As a result of the deleveraging, over-collateralization has
increased. As of the trustee's December 2013 report, the Class B,
Class C, Class D and Class E had over-collateralization ratios of
137.9%, 121.5%, 109.5% and 103.9% compared with 129.4%, 117.3%,
108.1% and 103.7%, respectively, as of the trustee's August 2013
report. Currently Class E Par Value Tests is failing.
The ratings on the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the
Class W Combination Notes, the 'rated balance' at any time is
equal to the principal amount of the combination note on the
issue date times a rated coupon of 0.25% per annum, accrued on
the rated balance on the preceding payment date, minus the sum of
all payments made from the issue date to such date, of either
interest or principal. For the Class O Combination Notes, the
rated balance at any time is equal to the principal amount of the
combination note on the issue date minus the sum of all payments
made from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. The rated balance will not necessarily correspond to
the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.
Class O Combination Notes are comprised of Class B Notes
EUR6,800,000 and Subordinated Notes EUR1,200,000. EUR2,000,000
has been previously exchanged back into the component classes.
The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR233.4 M,
defaulted par of EUR6.2 M, a weighted average default probability
of 22.55% (consistent with a WARF of 3,182), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 47.87% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 28 and a weighted average spread of
3.83%.
In its base case, Moody's addresses the exposure to obligors
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk bond
ceilings (LCCs) of A1 or lower. Given that the portfolio has
exposures to 10.5% of obligors in Italy and Ireland, whose LCC is
A2 and 1.3% in Spain, whose LCC is A3, Moody's ran the model with
different par amounts depending on the target rating of each
class of notes, in accordance with Section 4.2.11 and Appendix 14
of the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the
rated notes, and amount to 0.74% for the Class A, Class B and
Combo O notes and 0.18% for the Class C1 and C2 notes.
The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that a recovery of 50% of the 93.9% of the
portfolio exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets
upon default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.
Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
November 2013.
Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:
In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analysis on key parameters for the
rated notes, which includes deteriorating credit quality of
portfolio to address the refinancing risk. Approximately 4% of
the portfolio is European corporate rated B3 and below and
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. Moody's considered a model run where the
base case WARF was increased to 3,270 by forcing ratings on 50%
of refinancing exposures to Ca. This run generated model outputs
that were consistent with the base-case results.
This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy 2) the concentration of lowly- rated debt
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.
Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:
Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.
Around 28.47% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.
Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.
In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.
NXP BV: Moody's Hikes CFR to 'Ba3'; Outlook Remains Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the corporate
family rating (CFR) and to Ba3-PD from B1-PD the probability of
default rating (PDR) of NXP B.V. At the same time, Moody's
upgraded NXP's senior secured debt ratings to Ba2 (with a loss
given default assessment (LGD) of 2, 29%) from Ba3 (LGD3, 32%)
and the senior unsecured debt ratings to B1 (LGD5, 74%) from B3
(LGD5, 76%). The rating outlook remains positive.
Upgrades:
Issuer: NXP B.V.
Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to Ba3-PD from B1-PD
Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to Ba3 from B1
Senior Secured Bank Credit Facilities, Upgraded to Ba2 with a
range of LGD2, 29 % from Ba3 with a range of LGD3, 32 %
Senior Unsecured Regular Bonds/Debentures, Upgraded to B1 with a
range of LGD5, 74 % from B3 with a range of LGD5, 76%
Assignments:
Issuer: NXP B.V.
Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility Tranche E Mar 4, 2017,
Assigned Ba2 with a range of LGD2, 29 %
Outlook Actions:
Issuer: NXP B.V.
Outlook, Remains Positive
Ratings Rationale
"The upgrade to Ba3 reflects Moody's recognition of NXP's solid
operating performance and free cash flow generation supporting a
reduction in Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA to around 3.0x in
financial year 2013", says Kathrin Heitmann, Moody's lead analyst
for NXP. "The upgrade also assumes that NXP will sustain current
leverage metrics and positive free cash flow generation through
the boom-and-bust cycles of the semiconductor industry."
The Ba3 CFR is supported by high operating margins (adjusted
operating margin around 18% in 2011-13) and good free cash flow
generation (US$593 million in 2013, US$346 million in 2012) over
the last two years due to its asset light manufacturing strategy
and strong momentum of its High-Performance Mixed Signal (HPMS)
business unit. NXP's HPMS segment has solid market positions in
the less commoditized markets of the semiconductor industry
(automotive, identification as well as portable & computing and
infrastructure & industrial). Moody's expects that recent design
wins and a broader range of products will enable NXP to sustain
its competitive position in the intermediate term.
NXP's rating is, however, constrained by the high amount of debt
in NXP's capital structure compared with similarly rated peers in
the Ba rating category (reported gross debt of US$3.3 billion and
estimated adjusted debt of US$3.9 billion per end of 2013,
debt/book capitalization around 70%).
Moody's also notes, that uncertainty remains about the pace at
which management might be willing to further reduce debt as it
has now reached its target level of reported net debt/EBITDA
below 2.0x (1.9x at December 2013). Moody's therefore expects
that the company might apply a portion of future free cash flow
generation to shareholder return or M&A activity instead of debt
reduction. However, we also anticipate that the group will
balance any returns to shareholders against operating free cash
flow generation and the business environment.
In addition, the rating reflects the high cyclicality and
technology risk inherent to the semiconductor industry, which can
result in high volatility of EBITDA and free cash flow generation
as well as NXP's fairly short track record of generating material
amounts of positive free cash flow. NXP has some headroom in its
credit metrics and financial flexibility to withstand a cyclical
downturn as a result of its balanced debt maturity profile (next
upcoming debt maturity in 2016 of US$500 million) and strong
liquidity profile (US$670 million cash balance at year-end 2013
of which US$353 million were related to its joint-wafer
fabrication facility with TSMC and might not be readily
available, and access to a EUR620 million (around US$840 million)
revolving credit facility due 2017).
The positive outlook reflects our expectation that NXP will
maintain the solid market position of its HPMS segment and
sustain solid consolidated adjusted operating margins above 15%
and positive free cash flow generation over the next 12-18
months. While positive free cash flow generation could support
further deleveraging, Moody's anticipates that shareholder
returns will limit future deleveraging and that Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA will be sustained between 2.5 and 3.0x.
Considerations
The B1 rating on NXP's senior unsecured notes, which is one notch
below the CFR of Ba3, reflects that these notes rank junior to
the company's existing senior secured term loans and its EUR620
million secured revolving credit facility due March 2017.
The Ba2 rating to NXP's senior secured debt reflects the
substantial layer of unsecured debt, which increases the cushion
supporting the ratings for NXP's remaining secured debt.
NXP's senior secured term loans share the security arrangements
with NXP's EUR620 million revolving credit facility due 2017, but
rank behind the revolving credit facility in a liquidation
scenario.
NXP's senior secured debt is secured by first-priority liens on
(1) substantially all assets except cash of the issuer and its
guarantor (material wholly owned subsidiaries); (2) the issuer's
equity interests in all material wholly owned subsidiaries; and
(3) any intercompany loans. In its LGD assessment, Moody's has
ranked trade payables pari passu with the revolving credit
facility.
What Could Change The Rating Up/Down
Upward rating pressure would require (1) sustained profitable
growth at NXP's major division, its HPMS business; and (2) that
NXP maintain or grow market shares and continue to apply positive
free cash flow generation to debt reduction. The rating could be
upgraded if this leads to debt/EBITDA of around 2.5x through the
cycle and if NXP can maintain an ample liquidity cushion to
weather any prolonged industry slowdown.
Moody's could downgrade the ratings if (1) NXP experienced
sustained erosion in its revenues; (2) the company lost market
share, as indicated by revenues growing at a lower rate than both
the industry average and its operating margins for a protracted
period; and (3) the company returned to material negative free
cash flow and /or debt/EBITDA above 4.0x. In addition, a
deterioration in liquidity could result in a rating downgrade.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Semiconductor Industry Methodology published in December 2012.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.
Headquartered in Eindhoven, Netherlands, NXP B.V. is a leading
semiconductor company in terms of revenues. Its High Performance
Mixed Signal and Standard Product solutions are used in a wide
range of applications, including automotive, identification,
wireless infrastructure, lighting, industrial, mobile, consumer
and computing. NXP generated revenues of around US$4.8 billion in
2013.
POLARE: Files for Creditor Protection After Store Closures
----------------------------------------------------------
DutchNews.nl reports that the Polare book shop chain has applied
for court protection from creditors, just over a week after
closing all its stores to work on a "strategic reorientation".
Polare has 20 shops in the Netherlands and eight in Belgium. A
number of the shops were previously owned by the Selexyz group
which went bankrupt in 2012, DutchNews.nl notes.
TATA CHEMICALS: Moody's Says 3Q Results Reinforce Restructuring
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service says that Tata Chemicals Limited (TCL,
Ba2 stable) third quarter results reinforce the case for the
restructuring of its European operations, but are overall in line
with its rating. Despite the weaker performance, TCL remains
within the parameters of its rating and Moody's takes comfort in
the company's ability to generate strong funds from operations
(FFO) from its leading market position in India and its natural
soda ash business in the USA, which are key components towards
the company's stability.
"It is not unusual for TCL to deliver the occasional quarter of
softer performance and yet still achieve adjusted EBITDA margins
of 17% to 20% in the long-term, from which the resultant cash
generated supports the Ba2 rating" says Alan Greene, a Moody's
Vice President-Senior Credit Officer.
In the third quarter ended 31 December, Tata Chemicals Europe
Holdings Limited's (TCEHL, not rated) net sales rose 40% year-on-
year, mainly driven by higher soda ash volumes and the sale of
power surplus, while also generating a net operating loss of
INR590 million. This compares to an operating profit of INR33
million a year ago.
TCL's European operations have struggled for some time, and have
forced the company to seek covenant waivers on its European bank
facility in early 2013. In May 2013, TCL wrote down
INR4.7 billion of goodwill incurred with its acquisition of
Brunner Mond in 2006. TCL has since sought to protect its margins
by purchasing British Salt to provide low-cost raw material, and
by closing its Delfzijl soda ash plant in the Netherlands. But
the cash cost of production of synthetic soda ash remains about
40% higher than that of natural soda ash because it requires more
expensive raw material and energy.
The next two quarters will be revealing for TCL's European
operations. TCL has already booked most of the charges for the
restructuring. The final closure of the Winnington soda ash
facility, completed on February 3, will also reduce the European
cost base for the rest of the 2014 fiscal year ending 31 March
2014. Energy costs in the UK are high and have been rising,
although TCL sells the surplus power from its combined heat and
power plant on the site and is looking to add to its generating
capacity. In 2014, Moody's expects the European soda ash market
to strengthen amid stronger demand from the automotive and
construction markets, the main users of flat glass obtained from
soda ash.
TCL's operating performance remains primarily driven by the
Indian operations, contributing over 57% of consolidated revenues
yearly.
"While TCL's strength is derived from its Indian and North
American operations, the poor performance of the Kenyan and
European businesses remains a challenge for management in the
near-term" adds Greene, who is also Lead Analyst for Tata
Chemicals Ltd.
In India, TCL's focus on consumer business and non-subsidized
fertilizers has yet to translate into higher operating
performance and lower working capital requirements. While net
sales rose 6% year-on-year in Q3 to INR267.2 billion, driven by
growing revenues from the consumer business and non-subsidy farm
business, TCL standalone's operating profit weakened by 6% owing
to higher costs of supply of salt. Moreover, the size of its
subsidy receivable, INR 16.8 billion at 31 December 2013, is
stable compared to INR 17.5 billion at 31 March 2013 and
continues to put pressure on TCL's net debt position.
The US business under Tata Chemicals North America (TCNA, Ba3
stable) continues to show good performance, as the demand for
soda ash continues to improve on the back of strong construction
and automotive activities. In 3Q TCNA's sales and operating
profits grew by 9% and 23% year-on-year, to INR7.6 billion and
INR2.0 billion, respectively.
===========
N O R W A Y
===========
NORSE ENERGY: Board Files for Bankruptcy in Oslo Court
------------------------------------------------------
Alastair Reed at Bloomberg News reports that Norse Energy's board
on Feb. 6 filed for bankruptcy with Oslo Bankruptcy Court.
As of Feb. 6, there are no operations and other ongoing business
in company, Bloomberg discloses.
According to Bloomberg, financial problems relate to delay of
permits to develop assets.
A Norse says talks about restructuring have not been successful,
Bloomberg relays.
Norse Energy is a petroleum and natural gas exploration and
production as well as pipeline operator. Though based in Lysaker
outside Oslo, Norway the company operates in the United States
and Brazil.
NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+'; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long-term corporate credit rating on Norwegian paper producer
Norske Skogindustrier ASA (Norske Skog) to 'CCC+' from 'CCC'.
The outlook is negative. S&P affirmed the short-term corporate
credit rating at 'C'.
At the same time, S&P raised its issue rating on Norske Skog's
senior unsecured bonds to 'CCC+' from 'CCC'. The recovery rating
on the senior unsecured notes remains '4', indicating S&P's
expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.
S&P raised its long-term corporate credit rating because it now
thinks that there is a lower likelihood that Norske Skog will
default on its debt in 2014. S&P considers the recent liquidity
injections and a forecast improvement in operational cash flow
generation to be enough for the group to meet the roughly
Norwegian krone (NOK) 1 billion (about EUR118 million) debt
maturities in 2014, of which about NOK700 million relates to bond
maturities in June.
Norske Skog has improved its liquidity profile in recent months
through asset disposals and financing arrangements. Although S&P
thinks that the risk for a near-term default has decreased, it
still views Norske Skog's capital structure as unsustainable in
the medium-to-long term. S&P considers it unlikely that the
group will be able to meet debt maturities without a long-term
financing solution in place. S&P thinks that the benefits from
newsprint price increases could be erased later if there is no
further capacity reduction or market consolidation. As a result,
S&P thinks that Norske Skog's credit quality is still very
vulnerable and dependent upon favorable business and market
conditions to meet its financial commitments.
S&P views Norske Skog's business risk profile as "vulnerable,"
due to its business model, which is completely geared toward
newsprint and magazine paper. S&P still assess Norske Skog's
financial risk profile as "highly leveraged," given a "less-than-
adequate" liquidity profile and very weak credit ratios.
Although credit ratios did improve steadily in 2011 and 2012,
they have recently worsened owing to lower EBITDA generation and
higher debt stemming from a weaker krone.
The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is a one-in-
three likelihood that it could lower the rating within the next
12 months. This would likely be the result of a weakening
liquidity profile, which could occur due to poor operational cash
flow generation or lack of additional funds to meet the NOK1.0
billion debt maturities in October 2015.
S&P would lower the rating if Norske Skog's operational
performance and liquidity profile deteriorated to such an extent
that S&P thought a default, distressed exchange, or redemption
appeared inevitable within 12 months, absent unanticipated
significant favorable improvements in Norske Skog's liquidity
profile.
S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Norske Skog secured
enough additional liquidity that it viewed the risk of a default
in 2015 as remote.
===========
P O L A N D
===========
COGNOR SA: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Corp. Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a limited default (/LD)
designation to Cognor S.A.'s Ca-PD probability of default rating
(PDR). At the same time, Moody's affirmed Cognor's Caa2 corporate
family rating (CFR) and the Ca-PD PDR. The change of the PDR to
Ca-PD/LD follows the company's failure to repay its EUR118
million senior secured notes issued by Zlomrex International
Finance S.A due February 1, 2014 and the implementation of a
distressed exchange restructuring via a Scheme of Arrangement.
Moody's expects to reassess the PDR, the outlook and possibly the
CFR shortly to reflect the new financing structure. The Caa3
ratings on Zlomrex International Finance S.A. senior secured
notes, which are exchanged have been withdrawn. The Court led
restructuring of the outstanding senior secured notes was
completed on Tuesday, February 4, 2014. Moody's expects to remove
the "/LD" suffix after approximately three business days
following the debt exchange.
The outlook on all ratings remains negative at this point.
Ratings Rationale
The change in Cognor's PDR to Ca-PD/LD follows the failure by
Cognor to repay the EUR118 million senior secured notes due
February 1, 2014, which has been solved via a distressed exchange
process. This constitutes a default under Moody's definition.
The Company have now successfully restructured the entire
existing indebtedness of EUR118 million, plus the last accrued
coupon payable on these notes of EUR7.5 million.
The restructuration has been effected pursuant to a English
scheme of arrangement which is a court supervised procedure (the
Scheme). The Scheme was sanctioned by the Court of England and
Wales on January 14, 2014, followed by the subsequent recognition
of this UK process by the US Court pursuant to an application
made by the Company. Pursuant to the scheme, the company offers
to exchange the outstanding notes by issuing new senior secured
notes representing ca. 80% of the current notes principal
outstanding plus accrued interests, and by issuing exchangeable
notes representing ca. 20%. The primary objectives of the Scheme
were to avoid the risk of any of the group companies having to
file for bankruptcy or liquidation as a result of the due
repayment of the EUR118 million senior secured notes and to
provide the company with a more sustainable long-term capital
structure.
Ratings and Outlook
The CFR nevertheless remains constrained by the substantial debt
burden which will not be reduced after the exchange offer since
Moody's views the exchangeable notes as debt. Furthermore, the
CFR will continue to reflect the overall continued weakness of
the regional steel market. On the positive side Moody's notes
that the debt restructuring will enable the company to strengthen
its balance sheet and present an improved maturity and liquidity
profile.
What Could Change The Rating - UP
A positive action on the ratings or the outlook could be
considered after completion of the debt restructuring reflecting:
1/ the improved liquidity; 2/ improvement in the regional steel
market conditions leading to higher margins; and 3/ leverage to
be reduced over time.
What Could Change The Rating - DOWN
Negative pressure might develop if market conditions deteriorate
affecting the cash generation and liquidity of the company or if
the company is not able to reduce its gross leverage.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Steel Industry published in October 2012. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.
Headquartered in Poraj, Poland, Cognor S.A. is the largest trade
of steel scrap and among the leading producers and distributors
of high grade long steel products in its domestic market. Founded
in 1990 as a pure scrap trader, the company has transformed
itself into a fully integrated producer of steel products through
a range of acquisitions mainly in the long steel production and
distribution business. Cognor S.A. is listed on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange; 65.98% of the company's shares are held by its founder
Mr. Przemyslaw Sztuczkowski.
===============
P O R T U G A L
===============
BANCO BPI: S&P Lowers Preference Shares Rating to 'CCC-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it took these rating
actions:
-- It lowered to 'CCC-' from 'CCC+' its debt rating on the
preference shares issued by BPI Capital Finance Ltd. and
guaranteed by Banco BPI S.A. (ISIN XS0174443449) and placed
the rating on CreditWatch with negative implications.
-- It affirmed its 'B-' debt rating on the dated subordinated
notes due in 2017 issued by Banco BPI S.A. (ISIN
PTBPM9OM0001).
-- It affirmed the counterparty credit rating on Banco BPI
S.A. at 'BB-/B'.
The outlook is negative.
Portugal-based Banco BPI S.A.'s (BPI) board of directors
announced on Jan. 30, 2014, that it intends to submit to the
bank's annual general meeting on April 23 a proposal to launch a
tender offer to holders of all outstanding preference shares and
subordinated debt issued or guaranteed by the bank. The offer
affects five debt instruments with an aggregate nominal amount of
about EUR127 million. Standard & Poor's rates only two of the
five instruments: a preference share and a dated subordinated
note with an outstanding total of EUR57.7 million on Jan. 30,
2014.
S&P expects the proposal will very likely be approved. If it is,
S&P would likely consider that the tender offer to holders of
preference shares constitutes a distressed exchange under S&P's
criteria because investors would receive less value than the
promise of the original securities. BPI proposes to issue shares
for the exchange (an instrument junior to the original
securities) and will value the preference shares at 75% of their
nominal value.
S&P would likely not consider the offer to be opportunistic under
its criteria. In S&P's view, the bank is making the offer to
strengthen its core capital base and, ultimately, to enable it to
repay the contingent convertible securities that the government
injected into the bank back in July 2012. By converting the
outstanding hybrids into equity, the bank would also reduce the
risk of the European Commission (EC) banning future coupon
payments on these instruments. Although the EC has not yet taken
any such action on BPI's hybrids, its general policy has been to
restrict to the extent possible coupon payments on hybrids of
European banks that received financial assistance from the state,
including some of BPI's Portuguese peers. BPI still benefits from
state aid.
S&P's lowering of the rating on the preference shares to 'CCC-'
reflects its expectation that the distressed exchange will very
likely take place during the next six months, and would
ultimately lead to what S&P considers a default under its
criteria('D' rating on the securities upon completion).
That said, S&P affirmed its 'B-' rating on the dated subordinated
notes. These notes are subject to the same offer, but S&P do not
expect to consider it as a distressed exchange under its
criteria. Although the bank is offering holders of subordinated
debt a junior instrument in exchange for their current
securities, it is valuing the debt instrument at a price that,
combined with the price at which shares will be offered, does not
suggest to S&P that investors will suffer a meaningful loss.
Furthermore, the subordinated notes are not deferrable; thus S&P
do not anticipate that the issuer would skip future coupon
payments if the exchange does not take place.
S&P also affirmed its 'BB-/B' ratings on the bank. S&P's
assessment of the bank's stand-alone credit profile remains
'bb-'. If the exchange offer takes place and is accepted by all
noteholders, the bank's capital, measured by S&P's risk-adjusted
capital ratio, could expand by as much as 27 basis points. This
strengthening, however, would not be enough on its own to make us
improve S&P's current view of the bank's "weak" capital
assessment.
The eventual default of the preference shares would not lead to
an 'SD' (selective default) rating on the bank under S&P's
criteria, given that preference shares qualify as regulatory
capital.
S&P placed its 'CCC-' rating on the preference shares guaranteed
by BPI on CreditWatch negative to reflect the likelihood that S&P
would lower this rating to 'C' when the tender offer is approved
and formally announced. S&P expects an announcement by the
beginning of May. When the tender offer completes, S&P would
lower the rating on the preference shares to 'D', reflecting that
the instrument is in default under S&P's criteria.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
CHELYABINSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' issuer
credit rating on Chelyabinsk Oblast, an industrial region in
Russia's Urals Federal District. The outlook is stable. At the
same time, S&P affirmed its Russia national scale rating on the
oblast at 'ruAA+'.
Rationale
The ratings on Chelyabinsk Oblast are constrained by S&P's view
of Russia's "developing and unbalanced" institutional framework,
which limits the oblast's budgetary flexibility, and the oblast's
moderate economic wealth levels and economic concentration on the
cyclical metallurgy industry. The ratings also reflect S&P's
view of "negative" financial management in an international
context, which is common to most of the region's Russian peers.
S&P's expectation of sound budgetary performance, a low debt
burden, positive liquidity, and low contingent liabilities
support the ratings.
In January 2014, Chelyabinsk Oblast's governor, Mikhail Yurevich,
unexpectedly left his post and was succeeded by Boris Dubrovskiy,
who was appointed acting governor and will likely run in a
September 2014 snap election. The head of regional government
retained his post, and S&P don't currently expect significant
changes to the oblast's financial management team or its
financial, debt, and liquidity management policies. S&P
understands that the acting governor aims to control the deficit
after capital accounts and debt accumulation.
S&P continues to view Chelyabinsk Oblast's financial management
as a negative factor for its creditworthiness, as S&P do for most
Russian local and regional governments (LRGs), mainly due to the
lack of reliable long-term financial planning and limited ability
to withstand external risks. At the same time, S&P thinks the
region's revenues and expenditure management compare well with
peers'.
Chelyabinsk Oblast has only modest economic wealth levels, with
gross regional product (GRP) per capita estimated at only about
US$8,000 in 2013. The local economy is also concentrated on the
cyclical ferrous metallurgy industry, which S&P estimates
accounted for about 17% of the oblast's GRP on average over
2011-2013. The region's budget revenues are also exposed to the
performance of its largest taxpayer, Magnitogorsk Metallurgical
Kombinat (MMK; not rated), which provided almost 9% of tax
revenues in 2011-2012. In 2012 and 2013 corporate profit tax
received by the oblast decreased by 5% and 11%, respectively,
mainly due to tough steel market conditions and lower payments
from MMK.
Like most of its Russian peers, Chelyabinsk Oblast has little
budgetary flexibility within Russia's developing and unbalanced
institutional framework. The federal government regulates the
national tax regime, regional revenue sources, and spending
responsibilities, and leaves regional authorities with little
leeway for managing their finances. S&P estimates that in 2014-
2016 almost 95% of Chelyabinsk Oblast's budget revenues will come
from state-regulated taxes and federal transfers, over which the
oblast has no control.
Over the next three years the oblast will be under continued
pressure from federal government mandates to raise public sector
salaries and other social spending. However, S&P believes it
still has some flexibility left, especially within its capital
expenditure (capex). In 2011-2013 it maintained its capex
program at about 20% of total spending and invested a lot into
road construction, both directly and through subsidies to its
municipalities, bringing transport infrastructure into better
shape than Russian peers'. S&P therefore expects the region to
reduce capex over 2014-2016.
S&P expects that budgetary performance over the same period will
remain sound on average, although it will likely be weaker than
the previous four years' very strong results, and will
increasingly depend on the willingness and ability of the
oblast's financial management to control spending growth.
"In our base-case scenario we forecast that the operating balance
will equal about 6% of operating revenues on average over 2014-
2016, down from over 10% over 2011-2013. At the same time, we
expect the oblast to reduce its capital program and deficit after
capital accounts, which temporarily widened to about 11% of total
revenues in 2013, to stay within 5% of total revenues as it did
over 2010-2012," S&P said.
As a result, Chelyabinsk Oblast will continue to gradually
accumulate direct debt, and tax-supported debt will be less than
30% of consolidated operating revenues until the end of 2014.
The oblast's direct debt is low and makes up about half of its
tax-supported debt. The other half of the debt burden consists
of guarantees that were mainly granted to regional agriculture
producers, and S&P don't expect new guarantees to be issued in
the next three years.
The oblast's outstanding contingent liabilities are low, in S&P's
view. The region owns shares in only a few companies, and its
municipal sector is fairly healthy financially.
Liquidity
S&P views Chelyabinsk Oblast's liquidity as "positive" because it
expects that over 2014-2015 the oblast will maintain average free
cash, exceeding its low debt service falling due in the next 12
months. At the same time, S&P views the oblast's access to
external liquidity as "limited," as it is for most Russian LRGs,
given the weaknesses of the domestic capital market.
In 2013, the oblast spent a portion of its ample cash to finance
the capital program. In S&P's base-case scenario it expects that
throughout 2014, the oblast's average free cash net of the
deficit after capital accounts will stabilize at about Russian
ruble (RUB)4 billion (about US$120 million). This will exceed
the oblast's low debt service, which S&P forecasts at only 1% of
operating revenues, by more than 3x.
Over the next few years we expect that the oblast will continue
to rely on revolving bank lines, which it actively manages
throughout the year, and to gradually extend maturities. This
should allow it to keep debt service low despite the gradual
accumulation of direct debt.
Outlook
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Chelyabinsk Oblast
will counterbalance only sluggish revenue growth by decreasing
its capex over 2014-2016, and therefore maintain sound budgetary
performance with average deficits after capital accounts of less
than 5% of total revenues. The outlook also assumes that the
oblast's gradually growing debt will remain modest, and liquidity
will be positive, thanks to a gradual repayment schedule.
S&P could take a negative rating action within the next 12 months
if, in line with its downside scenario, budgetary performance
remained weak due to a drop in tax revenues and loosened control
over expenditure, and deficits after capital accounts equaled
about 10% of total revenues over 2014-2016. In this case,
increasing borrowing needs would also likely push tax-supported
debt above 30% of consolidated operating revenues as early as
2014.
S&P could take a positive rating action if the management's
adherence to strict fiscal discipline resulted in consistently
sound budgetary performance with the balance after capital
accounts close to zero in line with S&P's upside scenario. This
could lead S&P to revise its view of management to "neutral" from
"negative" for the oblast's creditworthiness and would likely
underpin a structural consolidation of the oblast's liquidity.
However, ratings upside is unlikely for the next 12 months, in
S&P's view.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Chelyabinsk Oblast
Issuer Credit Rating BB+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAA+/--/--
FIRST REPUBLIC: Moody's Withdraws Caa1 Long-Term Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn First Republic Bank JSC's
Caa1 long-term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings, Not
Prime short-term deposit ratings and E standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR), equivalent to a caa1 baseline credit
assessment. At the time of the withdrawal all the bank's long-
term ratings and its BFSR carried a stable outlook.
Ratings Rationale
Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.
Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, First Republic Bank reported
total assets of RUB36.1 billion ($1.1 billion) and net profit of
RUB652 million (US$20 million), according to unaudited Russian
GAAP for 9M 2013.
FIRST REPUBLIC: Moody's Withdraws Ba2.ru National Deposit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has withdrawn First Republic Bank
JSC's Ba2.ru national scale deposit rating (NSR).
Ratings Rationale
Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.
Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, First Republic Bank reported
total assets of RUB36.1 billion (US$1.1 billion) and net profit
of RUB652 million (US$20 million), according to unaudited Russian
GAAP for 9M 2013.
RUSSIAN GRIDS: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'Ba1' CFR to Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to stable from developing
the outlook on Russian Grids, JSC's ratings. Concurrently,
Moody's has affirmed the Ba1 corporate family rating (CFR) and
the Ba1-PD probability of default rating (PDR) of Russian Grids,
as well as the ratings of six Russian Grids' subsidiaries. The
six subsidiaries are: FGC UES, JSC (Baa3 issuer rating), which
operates the Russian national transmission grid; and IDGC of
Center and Volga Region, JSC, IDGC of Urals, JSC, IDGC of Volga,
JSC, Lenenergo, JSC and MOESK, OJSC (all Ba2 CFR), which operate
distribution grids. The outlook on the ratings is stable.
The announcement follows Moody's consideration of (1) the
reorganization of the major part of the Russian grid sector under
management of Russian Grids which was fully completed in
September 2013 and, more importantly; (2) the potential impact on
the rated companies' credit quality of the Russian government's
decisions to freeze grid tariffs for 2014 and cap the tariff
growth at the level of inflation of the previous year in 2015-16.
Ratings Rationale
Change of outlook on Russian Grids' ratings to stable from
developing
In stabilizing the outlook on Russian Grids, Moody's recognizes
the holding company's strengthened links to the Russian
government and enhanced role as manager of the Russian grid
sector following the take-over of control over FGC UES's national
transmission business from the government. The stable outlook
also factors in Moody's expectation that the pressure on Russian
Grids' subsidiaries and consolidated profile from the
government's tariff freeze decision made in September 2013 will
likely be mitigated by a reduction in capex programs for the
majority of the company's subsidiaries. As a result, Moody's
expects Russian Grids to be able to limit deterioration of its
consolidated financial profile over the next 12-18 months to
within the current rating category, with funds from operations
(FFO)/interest coverage ratio and FFO/net debt ratio likely to
remain above 3.0x and 20%, respectively. Regulatory pressure and
uncertainty in the context of weakening economic conditions
remain currently the key rating constraints. In this environment,
Moody's positively considers Russian Grids' ongoing negotiations
with the Russian government to access government's long-term
funding to support its subsidiaries' investment needs.
Under the rating methodology for government-related issuers
(GRIs), Russian Grids' Ba1 CFR incorporates a two-notch uplift to
the company's baseline credit assessment (BCA) -- a measure of
its standalone credit quality -- of ba3, given Moody's current
assessment of "high" default dependence between the company and
the Russian government and "strong" probability of extraordinary
state support for the company in a distress situation. The CFR
also incorporates the Baa1 local-currency rating of the Russian
government.
Ratings of Russian Grids' Six Operating Subsidiaries Affirmed
Similarly to the affirmation of Russian Grids' rating, the
affirmation of the ratings with stable outlooks of its six
operating subsidiaries, FGC UES and five rated distribution grid
subsidiaries, factors in Moody's expectation that the government
will allow the subsidiaries to maintain a degree of linkage
between tariffs and investment programs. The rating agency's
expectation also takes into account compensatory measures
introduced for distribution grids exposed to revenue losses
following the cancelation of the so-called 'last-mile'
agreements.
Moody's notes that tariff decisions under the new tariff freeze
guidance have been taken for five rated distribution grids.
However, tariff decisions for FGC UES have yet to be made.
Investment programs for all grids are under review and expected
to be finally approved by April 2014. Moody's positively
considers that all the rated subsidiaries, except Lenenergo, are
discussing a reduction of investment programs with the government
to avoid a material deterioration in their financial profiles.
However, the actual reductions and their impact on the companies'
financial profiles are yet to be known and assessed.
Lenenergo may even increase investments compared to its previous
plan. However, the company should benefit from exceptional tariff
decisions made by the regulators, factoring in the strategic
importance of these investments to the regional economy.
Overall, while a linkage between tariffs and investment decisions
is an important mitigant of the low predictability of domestic
grid regulation, the linkage cannot offset the risk of
government-initiated new tariff revisions in weakening economic
conditions. The evolving regulation remains a key risk and a key
component in determining the ratings of Russian Grids and its
subsidiaries, largely suppressing differences in rated
businesses' credit profiles. As a result, the standalone credit
quality of rated grids remains concentrated in the Ba category.
However, MOESK, which services the Russian wealthiest Moscow
area, is distinguished for its relatively strong financial
profile compared to other rated distribution grid subsidiaries.
All of the rated distribution grids are not categorized as GRIs
under Moody's methodology. However, their Ba2 CFRs incorporate
one notch of uplift to their standalone credit quality, which is
seen by Moody's as being comparable to Ba3, as a result of state
support, which is available through Russian Grids.
FGC UES's Baa3 ratings continue to factor in its stronger
standalone credit quality in comparison with the distribution
grids, strategic importance for the whole country, closer links
with the state and strong state support under Moody's GRI
methodology.
What Could Change The Rating Up/Down
Positive momentum for Russian Grids' and its subsidiaries'
ratings could emerge if, in Moody's view, there were better
visibility on the mid- to long-term evolution of the
subsidiaries' and group's financial profiles against the backdrop
of the evolving regulatory environment and weak economic
conditions. In Moody's view, the approval of the companies'
investment programs and of additional government's funding for
the group or specific grids later this year could add clarity if
these positive developments were not offset by a further
weakening of the domestic economy.
Moody's could downgrade the ratings if negative pressure is
exerted on the Russian sovereign rating. Negative pressure on the
ratings could also result from (1) signs of weakening support
from the government; (2) a negative shift in the developing
regulatory regime without compensatory measures by the state
leading to significantly deteriorating margins; (3) pressured
liquidity; (4) a failure of the companies to manage their
investment programs in line with the tariff regulation and
contain deterioration of their financial profiles, with FFO
interest coverage and FFO/net debt falling materially and
persistently below 3.0x and 20%, respectively, for Russian Grids;
below 3.5x and 25% for FGC UES; below 3.0x and mid-teens for
Lenenergo and MOESK; below 3.5x and 20% for IDGC of Center and
Volga Region, IDGC of Urals, IDGC of Volga.
List of Rating Actions
Russian Grids, JSC
Ba1 CFR and Ba1-PD PDR affirmed
Outlook changed to stable from developing
FGC UES, JSC
Baa3 issuer rating affirmed
Stable outlook maintained
Federal Grid Finance Limited
(P)Baa3 senior unsecured rating of a RUB100 billion loan
participation notes (LPN) program affirmed
Baa3 senior unsecured rating of the first series of LPNs issued
under the program, affirmed
Stable outlook maintained
IDGC of Center and Volga Region, JSC
Ba2 CFR and Ba2-PD PDR affirmed
Stable outlook maintained
IDGC of Urals, JSC
Ba2 CFR and Ba2-PD PDR affirmed
Stable outlook maintained
IDGC of Volga, JSC
Ba2 CFR and Ba2-PD PDR affirmed
Stable outlook maintained
Lenenergo, JSC
Ba2 CFR and Ba2-PD PDR affirmed
Stable outlook maintained
MOESK, OJSC
Ba2 CFR and Ba2-PD PDR affirmed
Stable outlook maintained
Principal Methodologies
The principal methodologies used in rating Russian Grids, JSC and
FGC UES, JSC were Regulated Electric and Gas Networks published
in August 2009, and the Government-Related Issuers: Methodology
Update published in July 2010.
The principal methodology used in rating IDGC of Center and Volga
Region, JSC, IDGC of Urals, JSC, IDGC of Volga, JSC, Lenenergo,
JSC and MOESK, OJSC was Regulated Electric and Gas Networks
published in August 2009.
Headquartered in the city of Moscow, Russian Grids is the holding
company for FGC UES and 14 interregional and regional
distribution grid subsidiaries. The Russian government owns a
85.31% stake in Russian Grids. Russian Grids' operating grid
subsidiaries are regulated natural monopolies, whose electricity
transportation revenues accounted for around 80.8% of the group's
6M 2013 consolidated revenue of RUB348.8 billion (US$11.4
billion), with FGC UES assumed to be consolidated from the
beginning of 2013.
Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, FGC UES is the monopoly
electricity transmission system operator in the Russian
Federation. The company's revenues amounted to RUB140.3 billion
(around US$4.5 billion) in 2012 (other operating income of RUB3.5
billion, primarily from non-core activities, is not included).
FGC is 80.6% owned by Russian Grids.
Headquartered in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia, IDGC of
Center and Volga Region is an interregional electricity
distribution grid business, focused on nine regions in the
European part of Russia. IDGC of Center and Volga Region's 2012
total revenues were RUB58.4 billion (around US$1.9 billion).
Russian Grids holds 50.4% of the company's voting shares.
Headquartered in the city of Yekaterinburg, Russia, IDGC of Urals
is an interregional electricity distribution grid business,
focused on three regions in the Urals: Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk
and Perm regions. The company's 2012 total revenues were RUB59.4
billion (US$1.9 billion). Russian Grids holds 51.52% of the
company's voting shares.
Headquartered in the city of Saratov, Russia, IDGC of Volga is an
interregional electricity distribution company, focused on seven
regions in the European part of Russia. IDGC of Volga's 2012
total revenues were RUB45.9 billion (US$1.5 billion). Russian
Grids holds 67.63% of the company's voting shares.
Headquartered in the city of St. Petersburg, Lenenergo is one of
Russia's major regional electricity distribution grid companies,
focused on the St. Petersburg region. Lenenergo's 2012 total
revenues were RUB38.1 billion (before normal technological
losses), or US$1.2 billion. The largest shareholder of Lenenergo
is Russian Grids, which directly and indirectly holds 60.56% of
Lenenergo's voting shares. A blocking stake of 26.57% of voting
shares is owned by the government of the city of St. Petersburg
(Baa1 stable).
Headquartered in the city of Moscow, MOESK is Russia's largest
regional power distribution grid company servicing the Moscow
region. MOESK's 2012 total revenues amounted to RUB125.3 billion
(US$4.0 billion). The largest shareholders of MOESK are the
state-controlled Russian Grids (50.9%); other major shareholders
are entities associated with OJSC Gazprom (Baa1 stable); and the
Moscow city government (Baa1 stable).
RUSSLAVBANK: Moody's Affirms B3 Deposit Rating & Sr. Debt Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 long-term local-
and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Russlavbank (Russia), as
well as the bank's B3 senior unsecured local curency debt rating.
The ratings carry a stable outlook. Simultaneously, Moody's
affirmed Russlavbank's E+ standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR), equivalent to baseline credit assessment (BCA) of
b3, and the bank's Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings.
Moody's rating action is primarily based on Russlavbank's audited
financial statements for 2012 prepared under IFRS, as well as the
bank's unaudited financial statements for 2013 prepared in
accordance with local GAAP.
Ratings Rationale
Moody's says that Russlavbank's ratings reflect the bank's high
credit risk appetite, as demonstrated by rapid asset growth and
its focus on unsecured consumer lending, as well as the untested
asset quality of the bank's rapidly augmented loan portfolio. At
the same time, ratings are underpinned by Russlavbank's good
position in the niche individual remittances market, recently
strengthened capital base and improved profitability metrics.
The rating agency notes that -- effective from late 2012 --
Russlavbank embarked on a new strategy incorporating accelerated
development of its retail business. In the period 1 October 2012
to year-end 2013, the bank's total assets more than doubled,
while its retail loan book increased 3.3x and individual deposits
grew 3x. In Moody's view, the associated risks are partially
mitigated by the fact that this growth is from a low base and
concentrates on the bank's wide retail customer base, i.e.
clients of the CONTACT payment system. The latter represents one
of the leading individual remittances systems on the Russian and
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) markets and is operated
by Russlavbank.
Rapid growth of consumer lending led to a major shift in
Russlavbank's credit profile whereas the share of retail loans
(the bulk of which comprise high-risk, albeit also high-yielding,
unsecured consumer loans) grew to 81% of the bank's total loan
book by year-end 2013 from 67% at 1 October 2012. This growth is
accompanied by erosion in asset-quality metrics. According to
management reporting, Russlavbank's non-performing loans (NPL,
defined as loans overdue by more than 90 days) stood at 9.6% of
total gross loans as at the end of Q3 2013. Additionally,
Russlavbank reported 4.2% of gross loans that are more than 30
days delinquent and 6.4% of loans with revised payment terms,
which indicates the potential for further asset quality
deterioration. Russlavbank's relatively prudent provisioning
policies (loan loss reserves accounted for 11% of total gross
loans at year-end 2013, according to local GAAP statements) only
partially mitigate risks. Moody's considers the low quality of
Russlavbank's loan book to be among the key negative rating
drivers. Given the rapid growth of the bank's retail loan
portfolio, the rating agency expects that more problem loans are
likely to crystallise as the portfolio continues to season.
To confront the pressures placed on Russlavbank's asset quality
and ultimately its capital base, in early 2014 the bank's main
shareholder injected new capital worth RUB1.5 billion. The
resulting level of capital (with the regulatory capital adequacy
(N1) ratio estimated to stand -- after the capital increase --
4-5 percentage points higher than the 10% minimum requirement
imposed by the regulator) provides more comfortable cushion to
absorb potential credit losses. The bank's capital adequacy is
also underpinned by solid internal income generation resulting
from a greater share of high-yielding retail lending and strong
fee-and-commission contribution of the CONTACT payment system. In
2013, Russlavbank posted 27% return of average equity (ROAE)
under local GAAP. However, Moody's continues to view the bank's
capital levels as modest given the rapid pace of loan growth and
the potential level of credit losses that may materialise in the
future and thus erode both profitability and capital. Therefore,
more capital injections from shareholders will likely be required
going forward.
What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down
Russlavbank's standalone E+ BFSR has limited upside potential at
its current level. However, in the longer term, the bank's B3
deposit ratings could be upgraded if the institution contains its
credit risk appetite and improves asset quality metrics, while
also maintaining adequate capital buffer and financial
fundamentals.
Downward pressure might develop on Russlavbank's standalone E+
BFSR and B3 deposit ratings as a result of a substantial further
deterioration of the bank's asset quality, especially if this is
not matched by an adequate capital buffer, or in case of a
weakening of the bank's liquidity profile.
Principal Methodologies
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.
Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Russlavbank reported --
according to unaudited financial statements prepared under local
GAAP -- total assets of $1 billion and total equity of US$97
million as at year-end 2013. The bank's net income for 2013 stood
at around US$21 million.
=========
S P A I N
=========
CASER SA: Moody's Confirms B1 Insurance Financial Strength Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed Caser S.A.'s B1 insurance
financial strength rating (IFSR). The outlook is negative in line
with those of most of Caser's main owner banks.
This rating action concludes the review for downgrade that was
extended on June 20, 2013.
Ratings Rationale
Confirmation of Caser's B1 IFSR
The confirmation of Caser's B1 IFSR reflects 1) the average
credit quality of Caser's main owner banks following the
resolution of their corresponding reviews, and 2) our expectation
that Caser's credit fundamentals have largely stabilized
following a significant clean-up exercise through 2013 and 2012.
Caser's B1 IFSR is constrained by the ownership of its banking
owners -- whose standalone credit assessments continue to be on
average in the B range -- reflecting our view of Caser's
meaningful financial and operational linkages between the banks
and the insurer. Caser has a meaningful indirect and direct
exposure to its Spanish banking owners, namely through its
ownership, its high reliance on the banks' distribution network
to sell insurance products, and a significant exposure to the
banks' debts and deposits.
Moody's believes that Caser's large investments in its banking
owners' hybrids (YE 2012: EUR1 billion) indicate the substantial
linkages between the insurer and owner banks. A substantial
number of these hybrids were issued by banks that received
capital support from the EU and these instruments consequently
suffered sizeable losses. As a result of this, Caser made a
sizeable 2012 loss after tax of around EUR283 million mainly
driven by impairments in investments (pre-tax EUR395 million) as
well as further additional negative one-offs. Moody's believe
that Caser will have to incur further additional investment
losses in 2013, albeit smaller than those reported in 2012 and
partially offset by the group's operational earnings as well as
the compensation received in relation to the cancellation of
certain bancassurance agreements.
In addition, Caser had reasonably sufficient solvency buffers for
the rating level (YE 2012: solvency cover 1.9x, solvency margin
of EUR448 million). Although Caser's quality of capital has been
traditionally weak (with intangibles as % equity at 68% as at end
2012), Moody's expect this to improve following the
aforementioned cancellation of distribution agreements. Caser
reported a positive impact on the company's tangible capital of
EUR250m in Q1 2013 following the exit of agreements with Bankia,
S.A. and Banca Civica, S.A.
Nevertheless, the cancellation of distribution agreements weakens
Caser's market position and its franchise. The company's premiums
continued to decline by a large 17% to EUR1.3 billion at 9m 2013
as a result of the cancellation of important agreements, the
reduced banking network of existing distribution partners and the
overall continued low productivity in insurance sales through
banking channels.
Negative Outlook
The negative outlook on Caser is in line with that on most of its
main banking owners, which in themselves reflect the banks'
vulnerability to a further weakening of their credit profiles in
light of the anticipated modest recovery of the Spanish economy.
What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down
Moody's says that an upgrade of the IFSR is unlikely at the
moment given the negative outlook.
Downwards pressure on the IFSR could develop following (i)
material deterioration in capitalization following further
deterioration in Caser's investment quality beyond own estimates
and/or (ii) a downgrade in Caser's main owner banks' baseline
credit assessments (iii) significant deterioration in the group's
operating performance with a combined ratio consistently above
100% and returns on capital below 4%.
Headquartered in Madrid, Spain, CASER is the tenth largest
insurance group in Spain, with a market share of approximately
3.3% at September 2013. It offers an extensive range of life,
non-life and pension products, distributing its products mostly
through Spanish savings banks. CASER reported consolidated gross
premiums written of circa EUR2,0 billion and Shareholders' Equity
(including minority interests and valuation reserves) of
EUR906 million at year-end 2012.
Principal Methodologies
The methodologies used in this rating were Global Life Insurers
published in December 2013, and Global Property and Casualty
Insurers published in December 2013.
CODERE SA: Fails to Reach Debt Restructuring Deal
-------------------------------------------------
Carlos Ruano at Reuters reports that Codere S.A. failed to reach
an agreement with bondholders over a major debt restructuring on
Thursday, increasing pressure on the company as it battles to
avoid insolvency.
The company is struggling to keep up with debt payments because
of higher tax bills and other costs and is one of many Spanish
companies grappling with high debt levels even as the country
emerges from recession, Reuters says.
According to Reuters, Codere said that failure to agree a
restructuring deal with at least half its bondholders by
Thursday's deadline means it does not comply with conditions to
extend the deadline to repay a EUR127 million loan to April 15.
"The company continues talks with bondholders with the aim of
reaching agreement on the debt restructuring," Reuters quotes
Codere, which sought protection from creditors in January, as
saying in a separate statement.
Codere, with debts of EUR1.3 billion at end-September, warned in
January it would be unable to repay the EUR127 million loan, due
on Jan. 5, if it did not first reach an agreement with lenders,
Reuters relates.
Lenders agreed to extend the loan until Feb. 6 with the
possibility of pushing that out to April if the company reached
agreement with at least half its bondholders, Reuters relays.
On Wednesday, bondholders made a debt-for-equity swap offer to
the group, allowing them to take an 82.5% stake in the firm's
capital in return for a cut in debt, Reuters discloses.
Codere SA is a Madrid-based gaming company. It operates betting
shops and race tracks from Italy to Argentina.
===========
S W E D E N
===========
STENA INT'L: Moody's Rates New $550MM Secured Notes '(P)Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba2
senior secured rating to the proposed US$550 million secured
notes and US$550 million secured term loan to be issued by Stena
International S.a.r.l. and to be guaranteed by Stena AB. The
outlook on Stena's ratings is stable.
Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these only reflect Moody's opinions regarding
the transaction. Upon closing of the refinancing and a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings to Stena's proposed bond issuance. A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.
Ratings Rationale
Assignment of (P)Ba2 Rating to Senior Secured Instruments
The (P)Ba2 rating (LGD2-29%) assigned to both the proposed notes
and the term loan, one notch above the group's corporate family
rating (CFR) of Ba3, reflects the fact that the new debt
instruments, will be guaranteed by Stena AB and by each of the
subsidiary owning the collateral vessels. Both the notes and the
term loan will be secured on a pari passou first mortgage basis
by two drilling vessels: Stena Drillmax and Stena Carron. As a
result the new instruments will rank ahead of Stena senior
unsecured notes, including the recently issued US$600 million
notes due 2024. Proceeds of the new secured instruments will be
used to repay existing ship facilities secured on the two vessels
which will form the collateral and reduce drawings under the
group's SEK 6.6 billion unsecured revolving credit facility which
is expected to remain largely undrawn after the transaction.
Based on the indenture governing the senior notes, the
subsidiaries that conduct real estate operations, and the two
that primarily invest in securities, are designated as
unrestricted subsidiaries. As a result, they will not be bound by
the restrictive provision of the indenture. As the indenture
contains no limitation as to the amount of debt an unrestricted
subsidiary may incur, it requires that any indebtedness of
unrestricted subsidiaries incurred after offering the notes must
be non-recourse to Stena and its restricted subsidiaries.
Therefore, in our LGD assessment for the restricted subsidiaries
Moody's excluded the secured debt incurred by unrestricted
subsidiaries, taking into account that (1) no cross guarantee
links unrestricted and restricted subsidiaries (in the case of
default, neither group can claim any recourse on the asset of the
other); and (2) no cross-default clauses link the debt of
restricted and unrestricted subsidiaries related to real estate
activities.
Stena Ba3 CFR
Stena's Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR) assumes that despite a
deterioration of the credit metrics in the past couple of years,
Stena's financial profile will improve significantly over the
next 12 to 18 months strengthening the group's positioning in the
current rating category from 2014. Stena's leverage peaked in
2012 and 2013, due to the combined effect of the heavy capital
investment plan implemented during the last five years and the
impact of the 2008-09 crisis on ferry activity, which has reduced
its contribution to the consolidated results, despite the
investments made to increase its profitability. In the next few
years Stena's capital expenditure (capex) is expected to
substantially decrease, allowing the Swedish group to generate
meaningful free cash flow (FCF). Furthermore Moody's expect Stena
to utilize these internally generated cash resources to reduce
the current level of debt and reduce its financial leverage,
measured as debt to EBITDA, as adjusted by Moody's, below 6x.
Rating Outlook
The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that, despite Stena's
currently weak credit metrics for the rating category, material
improvements in financial ratios are expected in 2014 and 2015 as
Moody's understand the company is planning to use the free cash
flow that that will be generated by its operations to deleverage
its capital structure. The stable outlook also reflects our
understanding that the company will not enter in sizeable
discretionary capex or acquisitions.
What Could Change The Rating Up/Down
Upward pressure on Stena's ratings -- albeit unexpected in the
medium term -- could develop following (1) a sustainable increase
in internal cash flow generation, with consolidated RCF/net debt
approaching the high teens in percentage terms; and (2)
progressive deleveraging of the group's balance sheet, with total
consolidated debt/EBITDA below 5.0x.
Moody's could downgrade Stena's ratings if it fails to strengthen
its credit metrics. In particular Moody's could downgrade the
rating if the company fails to show progress in reducing its
consolidated debt/EBITDA towards 6.0x and in maintaining its
consolidated EBIT interest cover above 1.5x. Failure to evidence
a path for the restricted group to reduce debt/EBITDA towards
5.0x and to improve restricted group retained cash flow (RCF)/net
debt towards the mid-teens in percentage terms might also result
in a rating downgrade. Downward rating pressure could also result
from (1) Stena's developing an increased appetite for risk in its
trading activities; and (2) any significant deterioration in the
group's liquidity profile.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Shipping Industry published in December 2009. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.
Headquartered in Gothenburg, Sweden, Stena AB is one of the
largest entities within the "Stena Sphere" of companies, fully
controlled by the Olsson Family. Stena AB is a holding company
engaged in various business divisions, including ferry
operations, shipping, offshore drilling, real estate and other
investment/trading activities. At the end September 2013, the
group had last-12-months consolidated turnover of approximately
SEK29.4 billion (US$4.5 billion).
===========
T U R K E Y
===========
TURKEY: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'BB+/B' Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on the
long-term ratings on the Republic of Turkey to negative from
stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed the unsolicited 'BB+/B'
long- and short-term foreign currency sovereign credit ratings,
'BBB/A-2' long- and short-term local currency sovereign credit
ratings, and 'trAAA/trA-1' long- and short-term Turkey national
scale ratings.
Rationale
The outlook revision reflects two emerging risks to S&P's ratings
on Turkey. First, S&P believes that Turkey's fiscal and monetary
policies have exposed the country to a potential hard landing as
external conditions tighten. In particular, Turkey's external
and fiscal positions could suffer beyond S&P's base-line
forecasts published on Nov. 22, 2013, should GDP performance
worsen beyond S&P's current expectations. Versus November, S&P
has revised downward its projections for Turkey's GDP, foreign
exchange reserves, exchange rate stability, and domestic interest
rates and credit conditions. S&P has lowered its projection of
average GDP in 2014-2015 to 2.2% from 3.4%, and consider that
unfavorable exchange and interest rate dynamics would pose
further downside risks to these forecasts. Weaker growth would
almost certainly lead to poorer fiscal performance (as it did in
2009), and could also put pressure on asset quality in Turkey's
financial sector. In light of S&P's criteria, the effect of these
revisions has prompted S&P to reevaluate risks to Turkey's
sovereign creditworthiness.
Second, Turkey appears to have suffered an unanticipated erosion
of institutional checks and balances and governance standards.
For example, S&P believes that any constraints on the
independence and transparency of the Central Bank of the Republic
of Turkey (CBRT) pose a risk to an economy that has traditionally
relied on significant external financing needs. At the same
time, S&P recognizes that the Central Bank has recently
normalized its interest rate policy by reactivating the one-week
repo rate at a level above expected inflation.
During most of 2013, as private investment stagnated, GDP growth
relied on credit-driven private consumption (additionally
stimulated by an early 2013 rate cut) and an accommodative fiscal
stance to expand at an estimated pace of 3.6% (or 2.4% per
capita). Prospects for a tightening of global and domestic
monetary policy in 2014 and 2015 suggest that external funding
will become more expensive amid declining net foreign exchange
reserves. This would force Turkish aggregate demand to converge
toward aggregate production, lowering the current account deficit
(CAD) to a projected 2.9% of GDP versus 7.6% of GDP last year.
In S&P's assessment, much of the foreign-financed lending since
2007 has flowed into the domestic services sector, property
development and construction, and an untested small and midsize
enterprises (SME) loan book. Lower GDP growth is likely to
stress the creditworthiness of these recent borrowers. If the
Turkish banking system's asset quality declines, foreign lenders
could potentially make it more expensive for Turkish financial
institutions to rollover their short-term external debt. This
has increased fivefold since 2007 -- including nonresident
local and foreign-currency deposits -- to an estimated $91
billion (11.5% of GDP) as of fourth-quarter 2013.
Complicating S&P's assessment of Turkish financial sector asset
quality is the relatively high percentage of loans denominated in
foreign currencies that banks have extended to the partially
unhedged corporate sector. Moreover, the recent depreciation of
the Turkish lira by 14% on a trade weighted basis since end-2012
in nominal terms will likely strain the capacity of some Turkish
nonfinancial companies to service their loans in a rising
interest rate environment.
Added to this, S&P expects that net general government debt to
GDP will peak at just under 34% next year. Even under
alternative scenarios, S&P do not believe Turkey's general
government debt-to-GDP ratio will be pushed substantially higher
by rising real interest rates or further sustained real exchange
rate depreciation. In S&P's view, a larger shock to general
government debt to GDP would only come either from an unexpected
decline in nominal GDP or the need for the government to
recapitalize weaker components of the banking system. S&P sees
the former as low probability, while the latter would depend upon
the level of economic stress and extent of lira depreciation.
In S&P's view, Turkey's recent primary budgetary surpluses
reflect a fiscal windfall from rapid demand growth rather than a
particularly tight fiscal policy. Weaker anticipated domestic
demand for 2014 is therefore likely to weigh on government
revenues, even as public spending expands further given the busy
electoral calendar. For this reason, S&P anticipates that the
2014 general government deficit could widen to 3% of GDP.
S&P projects that export volume growth (excluding non-monetary
gold) will average 5% over the next four years. The floating
exchange rate should, in S&P's view, ultimately facilitate an
even stronger recovery of exports over the medium term.
Nevertheless, S&P still sees considerable external
vulnerabilities over and above the large current account deficit.
Standard & Poor's estimates Turkish narrow net external debt
(gross debt minus liquid financial sector and general government
assets) was 135% of current account receipts (CAR) as of end-
2013. The low coverage of net debt by CAR suggests Turkey's
private sector is vulnerable to rollover risk for its external
debt in the event of a sudden stop of nonresident lending
inflows. During 2014, S&P estimates that Turkey's current
account deficit plus external debt redemptions (including short-
term debt) will total an estimated 100% of CAR, equivalent to
one-quarter of GDP, or an estimated 1.6x Turkish estimated net
international reserves (based on the projection that the CAD will
decline by half in 2014). Excluding trade financing from this
figure, net external financing requirements for 2014 still total
85% of CAR, which is equivalent to 23% of GDP.
Turkey's moderate and mostly local currency-denominated general
government debt burden support the ratings, as does S&P's
estimation of the country's still resilient long-term growth
potential.
The CBRT has increased its reported gross foreign exchange
reserves by encouraging banks to meet local currency reserve
requirements with foreign exchange deposits. Although these
operations put more gross resources at the CBRT's disposal, S&P
views only net reserves as available to meet net financing needs
or to finance exchange rate intervention.
The CBRT has also responded to continued pressure on capital
outflows by increasing interest rates, most recently at its
Jan. 28 Monetary Policy Committee, both raising and reactivating
the one-week repo rate to 10%. The weakened lira contributes to
S&P's expectations that the central bank is likely to miss its 5%
inflation target in 2014 for the fourth year running.
OUTLOOK
The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is at least a
one-in-three likelihood that it will lower its ratings on Turkey
within the next 12 months. The triggers could be a weakening of
the country's external profile, S&P's view that institutional and
governance standards have weakened further, or a larger balance
of payments and growth shock. If such a shock were severe, it
could affect financial sector stability through exchange rate
volatility and weaker growth, potentially leading to contingent
liabilities crystallizing on the sovereign balance sheet.
S&P believes downward pressure on the ratings on Turkey could
recede if fiscal and monetary policies supported more balanced
economic growth that depended less heavily on external borrowing.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
Turkey (Republic of)
(Unsolicited Ratings)
Sovereign Credit Rating
Foreign Currency BB+/Negative/B BB+/Stable/B
Local Currency BBB/Negative/A-2 BBB/Stable/A-2
Turkey National Scale trAAA/--/trA-1
Transfer & Convertibility
Assessment BBB
=============
U K R A I N E
=============
DNIPROPETROVSK CITY: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' ICR; Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term
issuer credit rating on the city of Dnipropetrovsk. The outlook
is negative.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'uaBB' long-term Ukraine
national scale rating on Dnipropetrovsk.
Rationale
The long-term rating on the city of Dnipropetrovsk primarily
reflects S&P's long-term foreign currency sovereign rating on
Ukraine (CCC+/Negative/C; Ukraine national scale 'uaBB+').
The rating on Dnipropetrovsk is capped at 'CCC+' by S&P's
sovereign foreign currency rating on Ukraine. Under S&P's
methodology, a local or regional government (LRG) can be rated
higher than its sovereign only if it considers that it exhibits
certain characteristics. These include:
-- The ability to maintain stronger credit characteristics
than the sovereign in a stress scenario. This includes,
among other factors, lack of dependence on the sovereign
for any applicable share of its revenues and a wealthier
and more diversified economy than the sovereign as a whole;
-- An institutional framework that limits the risk of negative
sovereign intervention; and
-- The ability to mitigate negative sovereign intervention
through financial flexibility and independent treasury
management.
S&P do not currently believe that Ukrainian LRGs, including
Dnipropetrovsk, meet these conditions, because the state
regulates most local revenues, the vast majority of financial
decisions are taken solely by the central government, and there
is universal execution of budgets by the state treasury.
"We assess Dnipropetrovsk's indicative credit level (ICL) at 'b'.
The ICL is not a rating. It is a means of assessing an LRG's
intrinsic creditworthiness under the assumption that there is no
sovereign rating cap. The ICL results from the combination of
our assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the
effects we see of the institutional framework in which it
operates," S&P said.
The 'b' ICL on Dnipropetrovsk incorporates Ukraine's "volatile
and underfunded" public finance system, which results in the
city's low financial flexibility and predictability, and what S&P
regards as "negative" financial management, material contingent
liabilities related to municipal utilities, and a poor and
concentrated economy. These constraints are mitigated by
Dnipropetrovsk's low debt burden, a strong budgetary performance,
and a "neutral" liquidity position.
The central government's almost full control over the city's
revenues and expenditures, and what S&P considers as Ukraine's
"volatile and underfunded" system of public finance significantly
reduce Dnipropetrovsk's financial predictability and flexibility.
Dnipropetrovsk's wealth levels are somewhat above the Ukrainian
average, but low by international standards, and the city's
economy is concentrated in the steel and machine-building
industries. After a post-crisis recovery, S&P expects the city's
economic growth in 2014-2015 to be in line with the national
economy.
As a result of the slowdown of the national economy and tax
revenues, in addition to existing spending pressure, S&P expects
Dnipropetrovsk's operating performance to weaken somewhat after
very solid results of more than 11% of operating revenues on
average in 2011-2012. However, because of Dnipropetrovsk's
adherence to cautious spending policies, evident in 2011-2012,
the city's operating surplus will fluctuate at about 4% of
operating revenues on average in 2013-2016, according to S&P's
base-case scenario. The recent experiment under which the city
delegated its health care responsibilities to the central
government and saw its share of personal income tax reduced to
50% from 75% has so far had a neutral effect on financial
performance, in S&P's view.
Only moderate infrastructure support from Ukraine's central
government and a containment of the city's own capital program
are likely to maintain the city's deficits after capital accounts
at about 2% of total revenues on average in 2013-2016, following
an average 3% deficit in 2011-2012.
Since Dnipropetrovsk's borrowing plans are very modest, the
city's tax-supported debt is unlikely to exceed 30% of
consolidated operating revenues, according to S&P's base-case
scenario. The city's debt burden will consist of minor direct
obligations (a small bank loan) and the commercial debt of
municipal companies, some of which are guaranteed by the city
budget.
In 2012, the central government guaranteed a EUR152 million
15-year loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and a EUR152 million 25-year loan from the
European Investment Bank (EIB) to the city subway company. The
city is responsible for interest payments only and not the
principal. S&P do not include this loan in its calculations of
the city's tax-supported debt, and factor only the interest
payments into S&P's debt-service assumptions.
However, the city's currently low debt burden is counterbalanced
by material overdue payables of its municipal enterprises, which
continue to represent one of the key rating constraints.
Dnipropetrovsk's municipal heating, water, and transport
companies account for the major part of accumulated payables, the
size of which has not decreased over the last few years. In
2011-2012, total payables of these companies exceeded 30% of
total budget revenues. The city is not directly responsible for
the obligations of these companies, as it is the central
government that regulates municipal tariffs (which continue to be
artificially low). Nevertheless, in the event of stress, the
city might need to provide some help by increasing subsidies or
capital.
S&P's existing assessment of the city's management is "negative,"
which is in line with other Ukrainian LRGs and implies S&P's view
that they exhibit only emerging long-term planning, weak debt and
liquidity, and taking into account as well S&P's view of the
management of their government-related entities. However, a lot
of management components are constrained by Ukraine's weak public
finance system, which undermines long-term financial planning.
S&P might lower its assessment of the ICL if it observes weaker
budgetary performance, with operating surpluses dipping into the
red already in 2014, and increasing short-term borrowing, which
would undermine the city's liquidity position. However, such a
scenario is unlikely, in S&P's view.
Liquidity
Dnipropetrovsk's liquidity position is "neutral" according to
S&P's criteria.
In S&P's view, in the next 12 months, the city's average free
cash on accounts will exceed its very low debt service by more
than 5x. The debt service consists of repayment of minor bank
loans and interest, in particular on the EBRD and EIB loans.
However, according to S&P's methodology, it adjusts the
assessment of the city's liquidity position for the city's
"uncertain" access to external liquidity. This is due to what
S&P regards as Ukraine's undeveloped domestic capital markets and
weak banking system.
The weaknesses of Ukraine's banking sector are reflected in S&P's
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA), which
classifies Ukraine in group '10'. S&P's BICRA ranks risk
relating to banking systems on a scale of '1' to '10', with '1'
being the lowest risk and '10' being the highest risk.
Outlook
The negative outlook on Dnipropetrovsk reflects that on Ukraine.
Because the rating on the city is capped at the sovereign rating,
any rating action on Ukraine would likely lead to a similar
action on Dnipropetrovsk, all else being equal. S&P currently do
not see a viable scenario in which it would revise its assessment
of Dnipropetrovsk's ICL to below 'ccc+'.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Dnipropetrovsk (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating CCC+/Negative/--
Ukraine National Scale uaBB/--/--
Senior Unsecured CCC+
Senior Unsecured uaBB
UKRAINE: Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 12 Banks
-------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating actions:
(1) lowered the baseline credit assessments (BCAs) of 10
Ukrainian banks
(2) downgraded the local-currency deposit ratings and local and
foreign-currency debt ratings of six Ukrainian banks;
(3) confirmed the local-currency deposit ratings and local and
foreign-currency debt ratings of five banks and one leasing
company in Ukraine; and
(4) downgraded the National Scale Ratings (NSR) of five banks
and confirmed the NSRs of four banks and one leasing company
in Ukraine.
At the same time, the rating agency has downgraded the foreign-
currency deposit rating of 12 Ukrainian banks due to the lowering
of the country ceiling on foreign-currency deposit ratings.
Negative outlooks have been assigned to all affected banks'
ratings.
The actions follow Moody's recent downgrade on 31 January 2014 of
the Ukrainian government bond rating to Caa2 (negative) from Caa1
(on review for downgrade); and the related adjustments to the
foreign-currency deposit ceiling to Caa3 from Caa2. The other
country ceilings remained unchanged, namely (1) the local-
currency bank deposit and bond ceiling at Caa1; and (2) the
foreign-currency bond ceiling at Caa1. These ceilings cap the
maximum ratings that can be assigned to banks and other issuers
domiciled in the country.
Ratings Rationale
BCAs
Moody's says the downward revision of the BCAs of ten of the 11
Ukrainian banks takes into account (1) their direct or indirect
exposures to domestic sovereign debt relative to their capital
cushions; (2) the degree to which their businesses depend on the
domestic macroeconomic and financial environment; and (3) the
extent of their reliance on market-based funding, which is
typically more confidence-sensitive.
Due to these factors, Moody's lowered the BCAs of these banks by
one notch to caa2 from caa1. These banks' BCAs are now in line
with Ukraine's government debt rating, reflecting Moody's view
that the banks' creditworthiness -- for the three factors listed
above -- is highly correlated to that of their national
government.
Privatbank's BCA remains unchanged at caa1, which is one notch
higher than Ukraine's government rating. Moody's says that this
exception reflects factors that help mitigate the credit risk
correlations with the domestic government, including the bank's
low exposure to sovereign debt, limited reliance on market
funding and a moderate level of business diversification outside
of Ukraine.
Foreign-Currency Debt And Local Currency Deposit And Debt Ratings
The local-currency deposit and debt ratings, as well as foreign-
currency debt ratings of six of the nine Ukrainian banks (whose
BCAs were lowered) were consequently downgraded by one notch, in
line with the downgrade of their BCAs. Five more banks' local-
currency debt and deposit and foreign-currency debt ratings --
which receive notching uplift from parental support or for which
the BCA is higher than the sovereign rating -- were confirmed at
Caa1 level. All of these banks' local-currency deposits and debt
as well as their foreign-currency debt ratings carry a negative
outlook, in line with the sovereign rating outlook.
Foreign-Currency Deposit Ratings
The lowering of Ukraine's foreign-currency deposit ceiling to
Caa3 led to the downgrade of 12 banks' foreign-currency deposit
ratings to the same level. All the banks' foreign-currency
deposit ratings carry a negative outlook, in line with the
sovereign rating outlook.
What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down
Moody's considers that upward rating pressure is unlikely in the
near term, because the key drivers of the actions are related to
the downgrade of the government rating to Caa2, which carries a
negative outlook. In the long term, a combination of an improving
operating environment, declining sovereign-risk exposures and
increasing cross-border diversification may exert upward pressure
on the Ukrainian banks' ratings. An improvement in Ukraine's
credit-risk profile could also have positive rating implications.
Conversely, deterioration in the banks' operating environments,
further deterioration in Ukraine's credit risk profile and/or a
weakening of the banks' standalone financial fundamentals could
exert downward pressure on the ratings.
The following rating actions were taken:
Privatbank
BFSR of E affirmed with the equivalent to a caa1 BCA
Long-term local-currency deposit rating of Caa1 confirmed
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating of Caa1
and long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt rating of Caa2
confirmed
Stable outlook maintained on the BFSR; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
OTP Bank (Ukraine)
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating of Caa1 confirmed
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
NSR of Ba3.ua confirmed
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Ukreximbank
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating
downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1
Long-term foreign-currency subordinated debt rating downgraded
to Caa3 from Caa2
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Raiffeisen Bank Aval
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating of Caa1 confirmed
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
NSR of Ba3.ua confirmed
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Subsidiary Bank Sberbank Of Russia
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating of Caa1 confirmed
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
NSR of Ba3.ua confirmed
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
First Ukrainian International Bank, Pjsc
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating
downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1
NSR downgraded to B3.ua from Ba3.ua
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Pivdennyi Bank, Jscb
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
Long-term local-currency senior unsecured debt rating downgraded
to (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1
NSR Deposit rating and MTN program downgraded to B3.ua from
Ba3.ua
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Savings Bank Of Ukraine
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
Long-term local-currency senior unsecured debt rating downgraded
to Caa2 from Caa1
Long-term foreign-currency senior unsecured debt rating
downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1
NSR downgraded to B3.ua from Ba3.ua
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Credit Dnepr Bank
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
NSR downgraded to B3.ua from Ba3.ua
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Prominvestbank
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating of Caa1 confirmed
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
Long-term local-currency senior unsecured debt rating of Caa1
confirmed
NSR of Ba3.ua confirmed
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Vab Bank
BFSR of E affirmed, now equivalent to a caa2 BCA (formerly caa1)
Long-term local-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
Long-term foreign-currency debt rating downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1
NSR downgraded to B3.ua from Ba3.ua
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; all the other long-term
global-scale ratings carry a negative outlook
Bank Finance and Credit Jsc
BFSR of E with equivalent to a ca BCA unaffected
Long-term local-currency deposit rating of Caa2 (on review for
downgrade) unaffected
Long-term foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded to Caa3
from Caa2
NSR of B3.ua unaffected
The BFSR carries a stable outlook; the long-term foreign
currency deposit ratings carries a negative outlook, all the
other long-term global-scale ratings and NSR remain on review
for downgrade
Raiffeisen Leasing Aval
Long-term national scale issuer rating of Ba3.ua confirmed
Long-term national scale corporate family rating of Ba3.ua
confirmed
UKRAINE: Moody's Confirms 'Caa1' CFRs on Five Companies
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed at Caa1 the corporate
family ratings (CFR) and Caa1-PD the probability of default
ratings (PDR) of five companies operating in Ukraine, namely:
Metinvest B.V., Fintest Trading Co Limited (Donetsksteel), MHP
S.A., Lemtrans LLC and Ferrexpo Plc. Moody's has also confirmed
the national scale ratings (NSR) of Metinvest B.V., Fintest
Trading Co Limited (Donetsksteel), MHP S.A. and Lemtrans LLC at
Ba3.ua. In addition, Moody's has confirmed at Caa1/(P)Caa1 senior
unsecured ratings of notes issued by Metinvest B.V., Ferrexpo
Finance plc and MHP S.A.. Concurrently, the rating agency
assigned a negative outlook to all the above ratings.
This concludes the review initiated by Moody's on Sept. 24, 2013.
The rating action follows Moody's action to downgrade Ukraine's
sovereign (government bond) rating to Caa2 from Caa1 with a
negative outlook, and maintenance of the country's foreign-
currency bond country ceiling at Caa1, on 31 January 2014.
Ratings Rationale
The affected companies' business profiles and financial metrics
are strong for a Caa1 rating. However, their ratings are
constrained by that of the sovereign, because the companies are
exposed to Ukraine's political, legal, fiscal and regulatory
environment, given that most or all of their assets are located
within the country. The companies' capacity to serve foreign
currency debt could be negatively affected by the potential
actions taken by Ukrainian government to preserve the country's
foreign-exchange reserves. In addition, the companies' revenues
and cash flows generated in the country are exposed to foreign-
currency transfer and convertibility risks, which are reflected
in the Caa1 foreign-currency bond country ceiling for Ukraine.
Negative outlook on the companies' ratings is in line with the
negative outlook on sovereign rating of Ukraine and reflects the
fact that a potential further downgrade of Ukraine's sovereign
rating may result in the further lowering of Ukraine's foreign
and/or local currency bond country ceiling. In addition to
considerations related to the sovereign rating, Moody's will also
be monitoring the companies' individual ability to address
increasing country and foreign exchange risks.
What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down
The companies' ratings will be ultimately dependent on further
developments at the sovereign level. The ratings are likely to be
downgraded if there is a further downgrade of Ukraine's sovereign
rating and/or lowering of the foreign-currency bond country
ceiling.
Conversely, positive pressure could be exerted on the ratings if
Moody's were to raise Ukraine's foreign-currency bond country
ceiling, provided there is no material deterioration in the
company-specific factors, including their operating and financial
performance, market positions and liquidity.
Principal Methodologies
The principal methodologies used in rating Fintest Trading Co
Limited (Donetsksteel) was Global Mining Industry published in
May 2009. The principal methodologies used in rating Ferrexpo Plc
and Ferrexpo Finance plc were Global Mining Industry published in
May 2009, and Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009. The principal methodologies used in rating Metinvest
B.V. were Global Steel Industry published in October 2012, and
Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies
in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. The
principal methodology used in rating Lemtrans LLC was Global
Surface Transportation and Logistics Companies published in April
2013. The principal methodologies used in rating MHP S.A. were
Global Protein and Agriculture Industry published in May 2013,
and Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".mx" for Mexico. For
further information on Moody's approach to national scale credit
ratings, please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology
published in October 2012 entitled "Mapping Moody's National
Scale Credit Ratings to Global Scale Credit Ratings.
Metinvest B.V., registered in the Netherlands, is the holding
company of a vertically integrated group, which is one of the
largest steelmakers and iron ore producers in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). The company has three iron and steel
plants with the capacity to produce approximately 15 million
tonnes (mt) of crude steel annually, equivalent to approximately
45% of all steel cast in Ukraine in 2012, a rolling mill and a
large diameter pipe mill in Ukraine, and also has rolling mills
in Italy, Bulgaria and the UK. The company produces finished
flat- and long-steel products, large diameter pipes and semi-
finished steel products (pig iron, slabs and billets). In the
first nine months of 2013, around 29% (2012: 33%) of company's
external sales were in Ukraine with the remainder generated in
Europe, the CIS, the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia,
and North America. Metinvest is vertically integrated, with its
iron ore mines located entirely in Ukraine and its coal mines
located in Ukraine and the US. In 2013, Metinvest produced
approximately 12.4 mt (2012: 12.5 mt) of crude steel and 36.9 mt
(2012: 36.2 mt) of iron ore concentrate, and mined 11.4 mt (2012:
11.6 mt) of coking coal. In the first nine months of 2013,
Metinvest reported revenue of US$9.8 billion (2012: US$12.6
billion) and EBITDA of US$1.8 billion (2012: US$2.0 billion). The
company is privately owned: the major shareholders of the group
are a Ukrainian investment holding company, System Capital
Management (SCM), with a 71.25% share in Metinvest, and Smart
group, which owns 23.75%.
Headquartered in Donetsk, Ukraine, and incorporated in Cyprus,
Donetsksteel is one of the leading Ukrainian coking coal mining
companies. The company has a significant reserve base of highest
quality coal (grade K as per local classification) and is
vertically integrated into coke and steel production. In 1H 2013,
Donetsksteel mined approximately 4.3 million metric tonnes (mmt)
of raw coal, produced 2.4 mmt of coal concentrate, 1.3 mmt of
coke, 0.7 mmt of pig iron and 10 thousand tons of steel products
(sections). The company's major external purchases are iron ore
for steel products and modest amounts of coal of various grades
to complement its own grades for coke production. In 1H 2013, the
company had revenues of US$863 million (2012: US$2.0 billion). In
1H 2013, approximately 53% of Donetsksteel's revenues were
generated in Asia, with the remainder generated in Ukraine (38%),
Europe (5%), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
Baltic countries and North America.
MHP S.A. is one of Ukraine's leading agro-industrial groups. The
company's operations include the production of poultry and
sunflower oil, as well as the production and sale of convenience
foods. In addition, MHP is vertically integrated into grain and
fodder production, and operates one of the largest land banks in
Ukraine. The holding company, MHP SA, is domiciled in Luxembourg,
while all of MHP's production assets are located in Ukraine. In
the last 12 months to September 2013, the company's dollar-
denominated total revenue and adjusted EBITDA amounted to around
US$1.4 billion and US$423 million, respectively.
Lemtrans is the largest private freight rail transportation
company in Ukraine. In 2012, the company derived 79% of its
revenues from freight transportation and other related services,
17% from trading freight railcars and producing railway
equipment, and 4% from financial leasing of railway equipment.
Lemtrans is fully controlled by System Capital Management Limited
(SCM).
Ferrexpo Plc, headquartered in Switzerland and incorporated in
the UK, is a mid-sized iron ore pellet producer with mining and
processing assets located in Ukraine. The group has total Joint
Ore Reserves Committee Code (JORC) classified resources of 6.7
billion tonnes, around 1.5 billion tonnes of which are proved and
probable reserves. The average grade of Ferrexpo's ore is
approximately 31% Fe. In last 12 months to June 2013, the group
generated sales of US$1.47 billion.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
EUROSAIL-UK: Moody's Hikes Rating on GBP29.04MM Notes to 'Caa3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the class A1a, A1c and B1c
and affirmed the class C1c and D1c notes ratings in Eurosail-UK
2007-5NP PLC. The rating actions reflect the effects of the
transaction's restructuring in November 2013.
Issuer: Eurosail-UK 2007-5NP PLC
GBP626.3M Class A1a Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
Nov 25, 2008 Downgraded to B1 (sf)
GBP75M Class A1c Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
Nov 25, 2008 Downgraded to B1 (sf)
GBP29.04M Class B1c Notes, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
Dec 21, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)
GBP18.69M Class C1c Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on
Dec 21, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)
GBP13.22M Class D1c Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on
Dec 21, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)
Ratings Rationale
The restructuring, implemented in November 2013, included the
redenomination of the class A1a notes, the application of cash
receipts relating to the claims against the original swap
counterparties and the partial write-down of the mezzanine and
junior notes. For additional restructuring items, please refer to
the end of this press release.
The restructuring aims to mitigate the deal's exposure to
interest-rate and foreign-exchange risk, present since the event
of default on the swap agreement that the bankruptcy filing of
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. triggered in 2008.
Rating Drivers For Class A Notes
The rating upgrades of the class A1a and A1c notes reflect the
redenomination of the class A1a note and repayment of the senior
notes through the application of cash receipts.
Moody's does not consider the redenomination of the class A1a
notes to be a Distressed Exchange. The class A1a notes have been
redenominated to British pound sterling (GBP) from euro (EUR) at
a conversion rate of 1.1933 EUR/GBP, thereby eliminating the
cross-currency risk and the potential for future build-up of
under-collateralization that the depreciation of GBP to EUR could
cause.
The cash receipts relating to the claims against the swap
counterparties have been applied towards the repayment of the
outstanding notes, and together with the termination of the swap
replacement obligation resulted in faster repayment of the notes.
Rating Drivers For Class B, C And D Notes
The B1c notes benefit from the restructuring of the transaction,
which eliminates the potential for future build-up of under-
collateralization caused by the transaction being un-hedged.
Moody's upgrade of the class B1c and affirmation of the classes
C1c and D1c notes take into consideration the losses resulting
from the tranche write-down as well as any future losses to be
incurred due to collateral performance. Class B1c, C1c and D1c
notes suffered write-downs of 28% of their original principal
balance following the restructuring. Moody's believes that the
expected recovery rate on the Class B1c, C1c and D1c notes is
consistent with the revised ratings. Moody's determined that the
ratings of the class B1c, C1c and D1c notes are compliant with
its publication "Moody's Approach to Rating Structured Finance
Securities in Default" dated November 2009.
Other Considerations
Moody's review of transaction's collateral indicated stable
performance, and as such, it did not revise any of its key
collateral assumptions.
Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
of the notes to the issuer account bank Danske Bank A/S
(Danske -- deposits positive Baa1/P-2), acting through its London
branch. Moody's has assessed that the revised ratings are
compliant with that risk of the probability and effect of a
default of Danske on the issuer's ability to meet its obligations
under the transaction.
List of Additional Restructuring Items
Amendment to the Margin of the Notes:
The margins of the class A1a and A1c notes were amended to 77 bps
and of class B1c, C1c and D1c notes to 202 bps.
Amendment of Reserve Fund Level and Required Target Amount:
The reserve fund required amount was reduced to GBP4 million from
GBP16 million. The reserve fund will be allowed to amortize to
the lower of (1) GBP 4 million; or (2) 1.5% of the outstanding
note balance, subject to certain conditions. The conditions are:
the reserve fund being at its required target and delinquencies
which are 90 days or more overdue not exceeding 20% of the
outstanding mortgage balance.
Waiver of Account Bank Trigger Breach:
The noteholders agreed to waive the trigger breach of Danske
acting as the transaction's account bank. As a result, Danske
will continue to act as the transaction's account bank, even
though it has a short-term rating of Prime-2, below the Prime-1
rating originally required for the issuer account bank.
Termination of the PECO:
The relevant parties agreed to terminate the Post Enforcement
Call Option agreement (PECO).
The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in
November 2013.
Factors That Would Lead To An Upgrade Or Downgrade Of The Rating
Upward pressure could develop on the ratings following (1)
stronger underlying asset performance, beyond Moody's
expectations; (2) further deleveraging with a build-up of credit
enhancement; or (3) the improvement of the creditworthiness of
the transaction's main counterparties.
Downward pressure could develop on the ratings following (1)
underlying collateral performance that is worse than Moody's
expects; or (2) deterioration in the creditworthiness of the
transaction's main counterparties.
MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its long-
term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based visitor attractions
operator Merlin Entertainments PLC by two notches to 'BB' from
'B+'. At the same time, S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch,
where it had placed it with positive implications on Oct. 24,
2013.
In addition, S&P raised to 'BB+' from 'BB-' our issue rating on
the GBP1.2 billion-equivalent senior secured multi-currency
facilities issued by Merlin Entertainments PLC and related
entities. The recovery rating on these facilities is unchanged
at '2', reflecting S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%)
recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.
The upgrades follow Merlin's successful IPO and subsequent debt
reduction. The company received proceeds of GBP200 million from
the IPO, of which it used GBP130 million to partly pay down its
existing term loans.
Following the IPO, private equity financial sponsors Blackstone
Group LP and CVC Capital Partners reduced their equity positions
in Merlin to 21.1% and 11.6%, respectively. S&P understands that
Merlin's private equity sponsors may continue to reduce their
equity holdings. The reduction of the private equity sponsors'
shareholdings, debt reduction, and the appointment of four
nonexecutive directors to Merlin's board should in S&P's opinion
lead the company to pursue a more moderate and predictable
financial policy, particularly with respect to shareholder
returns.
S&P views further releveraging as unlikely because of Merlin's
reduced private equity ownership and broader oversight and
fiduciary responsibility as a public firm. Furthermore, S&P
estimates Merlin's pro forma Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage
at about 4.5x, down from more than 5x before the IPO. As a
result of Merlin's improved credit measures and S&P's belief that
Merlin will pursue a more moderate financial policy, it has
revised its assessment of Merlin's financial risk profile upward
to "aggressive" from "highly leveraged."
Over 2014, S&P forecasts Merlin's funds from operations (FFO) to
debt at more than 15% alongside a modest drop in leverage thanks
to sustained free cash flow generation. S&P estimates Merlin's
adjusted EBITDA at about GBP450 million and positive adjusted
discretionary cash flow (adjusted free operating cash flow after
dividend payments) of more than GBP100 million in the financial
year ending Dec. 31, 2014.
S&P now assess Merlin's business risk profile as "satisfactory,"
reflecting Merlin's track record of above-average profitability.
In S&P's view, Merlin's "satisfactory" business risk profile is
also supported by the company's diversification in terms of
geography and operations, as well as its above-average market
zosition as a leading visitor attractions operator. Merlin's
business risk profile is also strengthened by S&P's view of the
company's robust earnings record and market share with industry-
leading margins.
In S&P's view, the company's revenues and profitability will
continue to improve, enabling it to sustain the enhancement in
its financial metrics. S&P bases this view on Merlin's
resilience to ongoing pressure on consumer spending, recent debt
reduction, and our belief that the company will adopt a more
moderate financial policy as a public company. S&P anticipates
that the company will be able to maintain FFO to debt in excess
of 15% and debt to EBITDA of about 4x.
Rating downside could arise due to adverse operating developments
or signs of Merlin adopting a looser financial policy,
potentially due to a large debt-financed acquisition.
Specifically, the ratings could come under pressure if adjusted
gross debt to EBITDA exceeds 5x or if there is a material decline
in Merlin's free cash flow generation.
S&P could raise the ratings if Merlin's credit measures improve
further, with debt to EBITDA of less than 4x, coupled with
adjusted free operating cash flow to debt exceeding 10% on a
sustainable basis. That said, any further rating upside depends
on Merlin demonstrating a track record of a moderate financial
policy as a public company.
PUNCH TAVERNS: Lenders Draw Up Rival Debt Restructuring Plan
------------------------------------------------------------
Nathalie Thomas at The Telegraph reports that lenders to
Punch Taverns are working on a rival plan to restructure the pub
group's GBP2.3 billion debt pile.
According to The Telegraph, it is understood that advisers to
several groups of creditors are putting together an alternative
solution to the company's debt woes ahead of a crunch vote this
week.
Proposals drawn up by Punch's management, led by executive
chairman Stephen Billingham, will be put to the vote on Friday
but several bondholders with blocking votes have already said
they will not support the deal as it currently stands, The
Telegraph relates.
It has now emerged that Rothschild, which is advising an
Association of British Insurers' committee representing senior
bondholders, is putting together alternative restructuring
proposals along with advisers at Moelis & Company and Lazard, The
Telegraph discloses.
It is understood that elements of the rival plan were presented
to Punch, which has 4,000 pubs in the UK, on Jan. 13 -- two days
before it published its final proposals, The Telegraph notes.
According to The Telegraph, a source said the alternative deal
has a "broad base of support from senior and junior lender groups
across the different classes of debt".
The source added that the deal could be implemented even if Punch
decides to stop supporting the debt vehicles -- dubbed Punch A
and Punch B -- and one or both of them go into default, The
Telegraph relays.
Tensions between Punch and its creditors reached a fresh high on
Wednesday after Mr. Billingham made a last ditch plea to lenders
to back the proposals currently on the table and warned that
there are no alternatives which are "realistic or simple", The
Telegraph recounts.
Punch Taverns plc is a United Kingdom-based pub company. The
Company is engaged in the operation of public houses under either
the leased model or as directly managed by the Company. The
Company operates in two business segments: punch partnerships, a
leased estate and punch pub company, a managed estate.
WHINSTONE CAPITAL: S&P Affirms 'B' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Whinstone Capital Management Ltd. and
Whinstone 2 Capital Management Ltd.
On Jan. 23, 2014, S&P affirmed its ratings on all classes of
notes in all series of the Granite U.K. residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) master trust, which houses the reference
portfolios for Whinstone and Whinstone 2. The rating actions
follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the most recent
transaction information that S&P has received on the Granite
master trust.
Whinstone and Whinstone 2 are synthetic transactions where the
issuers have each entered into a credit-default swap (CDS) with
Northern Rock (Asset Management) PLC. Under these CDSs, the
respective issuers sell protection on portfolios referenced to
the Granite U.K. RMBS master trust, which comprises five
"capitalist" issuers (Granite Mortgages 03-2, 03-3, 04-1, 04-2,
and 04-3), and a "socialist" issuer (Granite Master Issuer PLC
[GMI]) where nine issuances remain outstanding.
In Whinstone, the issuer sells protection for the issuer reserve
funds in Granite Mortgages 03-2, 03-3, 04-1, 04-2, and 04-3,
while in Whinstone 2, it sells protection for the program reserve
fund in GMI for series 2005-1, 2005-2, 2005-4, and 2006-1.
Northern Rock (Asset Management), as protection buyer, makes
quarterly payments to the respective issuers. In return, the
issuers make credit protection payments to Northern Rock (Asset
Management), if a credit event occurs.
A credit event occurs if the balance in the relevant reserve fund
is lower than the target reserve amount (as defined under the CDS
agreement) on the final distribution date of the referenced
Granite master trust notes. This is after all payment
obligations ranking higher than the reference obligations have
been fully discharged.
In S&P's analysis, it considered the Granite master trust's
stable performance. Delinquencies have been decreasing since May
2012. Both transactions also exhibit healthy levels of excess
spread of 0.36% (Funding-Granite's capitalist funding vehicle)
and 0.86% (Funding 2-Granite's socialist funding vehicle), with
all the reserve funds at their required amounts. With Granite's
high 15% conditional prepayment rate in the last quarter, S&P
considers the trust's deleveraging to have a positive impact on
Whinstone and Whinstone 2's performance.
In S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the Granite master
trust, it analyzed the reserve draws in different rating
scenarios, to establish rating levels that are commensurate with
the available credit enhancement to mitigate any losses resulting
from a credit event.
Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis and the trust's stable performance, it has affirmed its
ratings on all classes of notes in Whinstone and Whinstone 2.
S&P do not consider Whinstone's bank agreement to be in line with
its current counterparty criteria. The highest potential rating
on the notes in this transaction is therefore equal to the long-
term issuer credit rating (ICR) on the bank account provider--
Northern Rock (Asset Management).
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
Ratings Affirmed
Whinstone Capital Management Ltd.
EUR308.6 Million, GBP129.96 Million, And US$147 Million Floating-
Rate Credit-Linked
Notes
B1 A (sf)
B2 A (sf)
B3 A (sf)
C1 B (sf)
C2 B (sf)
C3 B (sf)
Whinstone 2 Capital Management Ltd.
EUR129 Million And GBP80 Million Floating-Rate Credit-Linked
Notes
C1 BBB- (sf)
C2 BBB- (sf)
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* Fitch Says Fragile CEE Bank Recovery Flags Two-Tier System
------------------------------------------------------------
The fragile recovery for banks in central and eastern Europe
highlights the gap between the region's banking systems, Fitch
Ratings says. Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia are
outperforming weaker markets in profitability and asset quality.
The gap is widest in asset-quality trends. Non-performing loans
(NPLs) in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia plateaued at just
under 6%, but have risen quickly in five weaker markets
(Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) to 15%-25% at
end-3Q13. Slovenia has the highest level of bad debt, but this
should improve after the transfer of problem assets to the
country's "bad bank". "We also expect some deceleration in NPL
growth in other weaker markets as their economies slowly
recover," Fitch Says.
Foreign-currency loans are common in the region and can be more
vulnerable to deterioration. The strongest three countries are
less exposed to this risk. The proportion of foreign-currency
loans within their portfolios is 27% or below, compared with over
60% in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The currency peg
in Bulgaria partly offsets risks related to foreign-currency
lending.
Low interest rates, limited growth opportunities and deleveraging
have constrained revenue across the region. Nevertheless, there
is also a profitability gap between stronger and weaker
countries, largely reflecting loan impairment trends. Polish,
Czech and Slovak banks generate the highest returns on average
assets, at or above 1%. "We expect the moderate pick-up in
lending growth in these countries to continue and for them to
continue to outperform regional peers in 2014," Fitch Says.
Polish banks have been resilient, with loan growth almost
reaching 5% in the first nine months of 2013. "The impaired
loans ratio peaked in 1Q13, earlier than we expected. NPLs are
likely to be broadly stable or marginally improve in 2014,
continuing the trend from the latter part of last year. Polish
banks managed pressures from interest rates falling quickly to
historically low levels better than we expected," Fitch said.
But there is limited scope for upgrades of Polish Banks'
Viability Ratings over the short to medium term. Long-Term IDRs
driven by support from foreign banks remain vulnerable to parent
rating downgrades. However, three Polish banks have VR-driven
Long-Term IDRs at the same level as or higher than those of their
western European parents.
Fitch discussed the outlook for CEE banks with a focus on Polish
banks at its Emerging Europe Sovereign & Bank Outlook in Warsaw
on Tuesday 4 February. For more details see our presentation "CEE
& Polish Banking Sector Outlook".
* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 3 to February 7, 2014
-----------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
IMMOFINANZ AG 4.25 3/8/2018 EUR 4.70
Alpine Holding Gmb 6.00 5/22/2017 EUR 0.25
Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 7/1/2015 EUR 0.25
Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 6/10/2016 EUR 0.25
A-TEC Industries A 8.75 10/27/2014 EUR 1.63
A-TEC Industries A 2.75 5/10/2014 EUR 2.00
A-TEC Industries A 5.75 11/2/2010 EUR 1.88
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.79 11/29/2032 EUR 70.93
Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.68 12/18/2030 EUR 72.49
Investkredit Bank 4.63 4/12/2022 EUR 74.70
KA Finanz AG 4.90 6/23/2031 EUR 67.75
KA Finanz AG 4.44 12/20/2030 EUR 65.13
Oberoesterreichisc 0.63 11/6/2030 EUR 72.60
Oberoesterreichisc 0.52 4/25/2042 EUR 65.26
Oesterreichische V 1.06 7/29/2018 EUR 25.00
Oesterreichische V 5.27 2/8/2027 EUR 63.00
Raiffeisen Centrob 14.40 3/6/2014 EUR 73.77
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.75 8/20/2033 EUR 73.41
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.70 12/27/2031 EUR 71.81
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.57 1/25/2031 EUR 73.50
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.61 1/24/2031 EUR 73.64
UniCredit Bank Aus 0.72 1/22/2031 EUR 73.74
BELGIUM
-------
Econocom Group 4.00 6/1/2016 EUR 27.70
Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 72.33
Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 73.13
BULGARIA
--------
Petrol AD 8.38 1/26/2017 EUR 57.66
Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 75.05
Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 74.63
OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 12.03
OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 12.03
OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 11.88
OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 11.88
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 5.25 8/6/2014 CHF 65.59
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.50 8/13/2014 CHF 62.47
Credit Suisse/Nass 7.25 4/4/2014 USD 64.87
Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.52 9/10/2014 CHF 65.99
CYPRUS
------
Cyprus Government 4.63 2/3/2020 EUR 73.86
Cyprus Government 6.00 7/1/2023 EUR 73.75
Cyprus Government 4.75 7/1/2020 EUR 73.13
Cyprus Government 5.25 7/1/2022 EUR 71.00
Cyprus Government 5.00 7/1/2021 EUR 71.75
CZECH REPUBLIC
--------------
Sazka AS 9.00 7/12/2021 EUR 10.13
DENMARK
-------
Kommunekredit 0.50 7/30/2027 TRY 26.38
Kommunekredit 0.50 9/19/2019 BRL 53.55
Kommunekredit 0.50 2/20/2020 BRL 51.34
Kommunekredit 0.50 5/11/2029 CAD 50.52
Kommunekredit 0.50 10/22/2019 BRL 53.10
Kommunekredit 0.50 12/14/2020 ZAR 60.44
FINLAND
-------
Municipality Finan 0.50 10/27/2016 BRL 73.96
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/30/2016 BRL 73.14
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/16/2017 TRY 71.26
Municipality Finan 0.50 6/19/2024 ZAR 37.00
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/17/2017 BRL 71.34
Municipality Finan 0.50 4/27/2018 ZAR 70.77
Municipality Finan 0.50 5/31/2022 ZAR 45.84
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/17/2016 BRL 73.90
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/10/2021 NZD 67.05
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 ZAR 67.19
Municipality Finan 0.50 4/26/2022 ZAR 46.35
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/20/2018 ZAR 66.70
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/28/2018 BRL 62.02
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/14/2018 TRY 64.02
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/7/2018 BRL 68.42
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/16/2017 BRL 71.42
Municipality Finan 0.50 2/22/2019 IDR 65.22
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 TRY 64.13
Municipality Finan 0.50 1/10/2018 BRL 64.01
Municipality Finan 0.50 6/22/2017 IDR 74.39
Municipality Finan 0.50 1/23/2018 BRL 64.50
Municipality Finan 0.25 6/28/2040 CAD 23.91
Municipality Finan 0.50 12/21/2021 NZD 66.64
Municipality Finan 0.50 11/25/2020 ZAR 54.11
Municipality Finan 0.50 3/17/2025 CAD 61.50
Talvivaara Mining 4.00 12/16/2015 EUR 17.99
FRANCE
------
Air France-KLM 4.97 4/1/2015 EUR 12.75
Air France-KLM 2.03 2/15/2023 EUR 10.59
Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 4.25 7/1/2018 EUR 3.12
Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 5.00 1/1/2015 EUR 3.36
Assystem 4.00 1/1/2017 EUR 24.27
AtoS 2.50 1/1/2016 EUR 61.09
AtoS 1.50 7/1/2016 EUR 60.87
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 1/31/2018 RUB 73.33
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 11/16/2032 MXN 39.68
BNP Paribas SA 0.50 5/6/2021 MXN 71.71
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/16/2014 EUR 53.03
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/18/2015 EUR 9.08
Caisse Centrale du 7.00 9/10/2015 EUR 15.35
Cap Gemini SA 3.50 1/1/2014 EUR 48.05
CGG SA 1.75 1/1/2016 EUR 28.39
CGG SA 1.25 1/1/2019 EUR 31.31
Club Mediterranee 6.11 11/1/2015 EUR 19.71
Credit Agricole Co 0.50 2/28/2018 RUB 73.06
Credit Agricole Co 0.50 3/6/2023 RUB 48.05
Dexia Credit Local 0.88 7/10/2017 EUR 74.75
Dexia Credit Local 4.38 2/12/2019 EUR 71.75
Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2014 EUR 16.90
Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2015 EUR 15.67
Faurecia 4.50 1/1/2015 EUR 24.46
Faurecia 3.25 1/1/2018 EUR 27.55
GFI Informatique S 5.25 1/1/2017 EUR 5.30
Ingenico 2.75 1/1/2017 EUR 57.77
Le Noble Age 4.88 1/3/2016 EUR 19.50
Nexans SA 2.50 1/1/2019 EUR 72.92
Nexans SA 4.00 1/1/2016 EUR 58.43
Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50
Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50
OL Groupe 7.00 12/28/2015 EUR 6.53
Orpea 1.75 1/1/2020 EUR 48.99
Orpea 3.88 1/1/2016 EUR 51.28
Peugeot SA 4.45 1/1/2016 EUR 26.65
Publicis Groupe SA 1.00 1/18/2018 EUR 60.32
SG Option Europe S 8.00 9/29/2015 USD 62.49
SG Option Europe S 7.00 5/5/2017 EUR 52.35
SG Option Europe S 7.00 9/22/2017 EUR 68.73
SG Option Europe S 8.00 12/18/2014 USD 40.49
SG Option Europe S 7.50 12/24/2014 EUR 38.00
SG Option Europe S 7.25 8/5/2014 EUR 62.59
Societe Air France 2.75 4/1/2020 EUR 21.03
Societe Generale S 0.50 6/12/2023 RUB 45.95
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/3/2023 RUB 46.79
Societe Generale S 0.50 11/29/2022 AUD 63.45
Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 USD 71.63
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 USD 72.50
Societe Generale S 0.50 12/21/2022 AUD 63.21
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/30/2023 RUB 46.47
Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 AUD 64.99
Societe Generale S 0.50 12/6/2021 AUD 67.38
Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 AUD 65.81
Societe Generale S 0.50 9/7/2021 AUD 69.04
SOITEC 6.75 9/18/2018 EUR 2.50
SOITEC 6.25 9/9/2014 EUR 8.61
Tem SAS 4.25 1/1/2015 EUR 55.58
Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00
Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00
GEORGIA
-------
Bank J Safra Saras 13.60 2/17/2014 CHF 71.13
Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/15/2014 CHF 63.95
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 12/13/2013 USD 67.65
Bank Julius Baer & 14.00 5/23/2014 USD 55.80
Bank Julius Baer & 8.50 12/13/2013 USD 56.05
Bank Julius Baer & 9.50 12/13/2013 USD 61.50
Bank Julius Baer & 12.60 12/13/2013 USD 52.65
Bank Julius Baer & 7.25 4/10/2014 USD 64.50
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 1/29/2014 CHF 71.40
Bank Julius Baer & 6.10 4/17/2014 CHF 65.15
Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/17/2014 EUR 65.45
Bank Julius Baer & 5.00 12/23/2013 CHF 67.05
Bank Julius Baer & 10.20 11/29/2013 USD 52.45
Bank Julius Baer & 11.50 3/18/2014 USD 61.85
Bank Julius Baer & 6.80 4/11/2014 USD 70.15
Bank Julius Baer & 6.50 4/11/2014 USD 71.25
Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 4/11/2014 USD 71.05
Bank Julius Baer & 7.80 2/14/2014 USD 70.35
Bank Julius Baer & 7.50 2/14/2014 CHF 69.75
Bank Julius Baer & 10.00 4/4/2014 USD 62.75
Bank Julius Baer & 6.90 3/21/2014 USD 70.45
Banque Cantonale V 4.90 9/9/2014 CHF 73.73
EFG International 6.00 11/30/2017 EUR 39.45
EFG International 13.40 11/14/2013 CHF 58.64
EFG International 6.82 6/4/2014 CHF 70.01
EFG International 12.86 10/30/2017 EUR 35.40
EFG International 12.10 3/10/2014 USD 50.04
EFG International 4.50 2/20/2014 USD 58.50
EFG International 5.85 10/14/2014 CHF 72.75
EFG International 10.00 12/17/2013 USD 66.27
Leonteq Securities 11.90 1/15/2014 EUR 50.01
Leonteq Securities 17.00 11/21/2013 CAD 40.23
Leonteq Securities 9.25 11/5/2013 USD 36.80
Leonteq Securities 12.65 12/10/2013 EUR 50.06
Leonteq Securities 7.80 8/26/2014 CHF 55.40
Leonteq Securities 15.00 2/13/2014 CHF 55.94
Leonteq Securities 12.00 11/15/2013 CHF 54.70
Leonteq Securities 17.05 2/14/2014 CHF 42.69
Leonteq Securities 10.03 10/25/2013 CHF 48.39
Leonteq Securities 5.06 5/26/2014 CHF 74.49
Leonteq Securities 18.00 12/6/2013 CHF 58.34
Leonteq Securities 8.40 11/27/2013 CHF 69.11
Leonteq Securities 8.80 12/6/2013 EUR 66.34
Leonteq Securities 20.00 12/12/2013 CHF 59.36
Leonteq Securities 12.80 12/12/2013 CHF 56.01
Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/12/2013 CHF 67.47
Leonteq Securities 8.10 12/13/2013 CHF 56.63
Leonteq Securities 9.20 11/15/2013 CHF 72.96
Leonteq Securities 7.21 11/14/2013 CHF 72.00
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/21/2013 CHF 48.23
Leonteq Securities 13.60 12/6/2013 CHF 53.15
Leonteq Securities 8.75 6/6/2014 GBP 71.26
Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/6/2013 USD 65.15
Leonteq Securities 12.89 12/10/2013 GBP 52.10
Leonteq Securities 10.20 11/14/2013 CHF 56.32
Leonteq Securities 8.01 11/15/2013 CHF 44.99
Leonteq Securities 21.75 5/22/2014 USD 45.78
Leonteq Securities 20.00 5/27/2014 CHF 71.16
Leonteq Securities 12.00 2/24/2014 CHF 69.73
Leonteq Securities 9.46 6/3/2014 AUD 61.68
Leonteq Securities 24.40 2/25/2014 USD 44.15
Leonteq Securities 22.75 2/4/2014 USD 68.91
Leonteq Securities 15.60 2/6/2014 CHF 55.74
Leonteq Securities 12.25 1/30/2014 CHF 49.87
Leonteq Securities 20.52 3/25/2014 USD 50.23
Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/17/2014 CHF 54.64
Leonteq Securities 21.50 3/21/2014 USD 57.05
Leonteq Securities 8.90 3/28/2014 EUR 63.16
Leonteq Securities 14.25 2/13/2015 USD 62.34
Leonteq Securities 11.50 2/11/2014 USD 70.57
Leonteq Securities 20.50 2/13/2014 CHF 65.24
Leonteq Securities 5.80 8/20/2014 USD 70.34
Leonteq Securities 13.25 2/14/2014 USD 60.87
Leonteq Securities 10.00 7/29/2014 USD 58.84
Leonteq Securities 29.61 10/26/2017 EUR 39.70
Leonteq Securities 9.00 10/31/2013 CHF 43.77
Leonteq Securities 12.00 3/5/2014 CHF 60.81
Leonteq Securities 8.50 12/24/2013 USD 54.18
Leonteq Securities 14.06 12/18/2013 USD 52.76
Leonteq Securities 5.76 12/20/2013 GBP 67.92
Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/23/2014 CHF 54.82
Leonteq Securities 8.00 6/19/2014 CHF 73.01
Leonteq Securities 6.80 12/19/2014 USD 71.84
Leonteq Securities 14.05 12/27/2013 CHF 55.88
Leonteq Securities 6.00 5/20/2014 CHF 66.65
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/27/2013 CHF 74.15
Leonteq Securities 20.00 11/27/2013 CHF 57.98
Leonteq Securities 11.95 11/29/2013 EUR 54.01
Leonteq Securities 8.35 1/3/2014 AUD 70.38
Leonteq Securities 9.20 12/27/2013 CHF 70.21
Leonteq Securities 9.60 1/8/2014 USD 47.95
Leonteq Securities 8.40 1/15/2014 CHF 74.30
Leonteq Securities 14.00 9/22/2014 CHF 66.90
Leonteq Securities 10.80 1/15/2014 CHF 54.68
Leonteq Securities 5.50 1/25/2016 EUR 64.28
Leonteq Securities 12.00 12/6/2013 GBP 52.45
Leonteq Securities 20.14 4/9/2014 USD 55.40
Leonteq Securities 5.50 8/19/2014 USD 72.76
Leonteq Securities 20.07 2/19/2014 USD 41.82
Leonteq Securities 10.00 2/6/2014 USD 57.48
Leonteq Securities 23.90 1/24/2014 USD 43.75
Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/5/2013 USD 71.34
Leonteq Securities 25.70 1/24/2014 USD 50.45
Mare Baltic PCC Lt 2.00 11/1/2015 DKK 0.00
Zurcher Kantonalba 12.35 11/13/2013 CHF 56.78
Zurcher Kantonalba 8.22 11/15/2013 CHF 56.56
Zurcher Kantonalba 6.05 12/19/2013 EUR 65.62
Zurcher Kantonalba 9.00 12/31/2013 CHF 58.57
Zurcher Kantonalba 10.40 12/5/2013 EUR 60.48
Zurcher Kantonalba 10.65 12/6/2013 CHF 57.99
GERMANY
-------
ATU Auto-Teile-Ung 7.47 10/1/2014 EUR 18.67
BDT Media Automati 8.13 10/9/2017 EUR 65.75
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 72.21
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 58.40
BNP Paribas Emissi 7.00 12/30/2013 EUR 60.64
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 60.09
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 60.05
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.50 12/30/2013 EUR 59.53
BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 68.77
BNP Paribas Emissi 4.50 11/21/2013 EUR 72.24
BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 74.37
Bremer Landesbank 0.69 3/21/2031 EUR 67.09
Bremer Landesbank 0.72 4/5/2041 EUR 54.49
Centrosolar Group 7.00 2/15/2016 EUR 13.75
Commerzbank AG 8.40 12/30/2013 EUR 2.56
Commerzbank AG 5.05 12/24/2013 EUR 67.54
DekaBank Deutsche 2.21 9/22/2021 EUR 13.92
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 56.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 65.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 64.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 61.70
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 6/24/2014 EUR 61.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 6/24/2014 EUR 66.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 6/24/2014 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 3/25/2014 EUR 61.50
Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 3/25/2014 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.10
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 61.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 56.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 62.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 57.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 70.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 66.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 63.20
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.70
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.24
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.20
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.10
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 4/24/2014 EUR 68.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 4/24/2014 EUR 65.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 4/24/2014 EUR 62.10
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 7/22/2014 EUR 72.10
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 62.10
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.60
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.20
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.30
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 9/23/2014 EUR 74.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 9/23/2014 EUR 73.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 63.80
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 64.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.40
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 60.00
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 60.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 3/25/2014 EUR 61.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 3/25/2014 EUR 62.80
Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 53.80
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 63.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 72.80
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 2/28/2014 EUR 60.60
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 55.80
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 67.30
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 11/29/2013 EUR 54.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 10/31/2013 EUR 58.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 63.20
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.60
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 53.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.30
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 67.10
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 58.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 11/29/2013 EUR 73.50
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 11/29/2013 EUR 62.90
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.80
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.10
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.90
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.00
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.60
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.20
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.60
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.50
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.50
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.95
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.90
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 70.59
Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40
Deutsche Bank AG 12.00 12/20/2013 EUR 51.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40
Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/24/2014 EUR 71.70
Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 3/25/2014 EUR 75.00
Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/25/2014 EUR 72.70
Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 1/31/2014 EUR 62.00
Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 1/31/2014 EUR 60.40
Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.30
Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.80
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.60
Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.90
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.90
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.70
Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.30
Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.20
Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 1/31/2014 EUR 65.80
Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 6/24/2014 EUR 73.70
Dresdner Bank AG 0.89 11/19/2029 EUR 51.13
Dresdner Bank AG 5.45 2/22/2029 EUR 65.92
Dresdner Bank AG 1.08 12/31/2021 EUR 72.13
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 12.00 10/25/2013 EUR 73.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 2.35 3/24/2023 EUR 70.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 10/25/2013 EUR 70.93
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.50 10/25/2013 EUR 72.67
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 10/25/2013 EUR 50.42
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 12/31/2013 EUR 55.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 12/31/2013 EUR 72.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.75 11/8/2013 EUR 54.90
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 10/25/2013 EUR 73.66
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 12/31/2013 EUR 51.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/13/2013 EUR 62.43
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 11/22/2013 EUR 74.95
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 11/22/2013 EUR 49.33
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 11/8/2013 EUR 56.39
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/31/2013 EUR 64.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.40 12/31/2013 EUR 58.13
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.50 10/25/2013 EUR 48.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 15.75 11/22/2013 EUR 4.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.75 12/31/2013 EUR 56.51
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.25 3/28/2014 EUR 58.18
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 6/27/2014 EUR 60.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.50 9/26/2014 EUR 59.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.00 4/7/2014 EUR 62.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/13/2014 EUR 63.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 10/25/2013 EUR 58.00
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 68.68
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.50 1/10/2014 EUR 65.98
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 12.25 1/10/2014 EUR 68.31
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.75 7/11/2014 EUR 74.40
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.30 7/11/2014 EUR 69.50
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.50 12/13/2013 EUR 55.94
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 3.50 12/31/2013 EUR 64.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/13/2014 EUR 66.92
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 2.50 12/13/2013 EUR 68.49
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 53.91
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.40 7/11/2014 EUR 68.63
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.75 12/13/2013 EUR 59.73
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 1/15/2014 EUR 74.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 11/11/2013 EUR 49.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.00 12/13/2013 EUR 59.41
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.25 3/7/2014 EUR 58.45
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.50 2/14/2014 EUR 56.46
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 10.00 12/31/2013 EUR 63.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.25 6/27/2014 EUR 69.05
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 8.75 9/26/2014 EUR 66.80
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.25 3/28/2014 EUR 65.56
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.38
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 12/13/2013 EUR 60.82
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.25 10/25/2013 EUR 54.26
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 12/13/2013 EUR 72.70
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 6/27/2014 EUR 64.75
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 6/27/2014 EUR 63.09
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 6/13/2014 EUR 64.24
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.50 12/31/2013 EUR 62.28
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.50 3/14/2014 EUR 52.87
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 1/17/2014 EUR 58.65
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 57.78
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 4.00 12/20/2013 EUR 68.55
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 5.75 11/22/2013 EUR 58.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 9.75 11/22/2013 EUR 53.48
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 7.50 1/10/2014 EUR 70.79
DZ Bank AG Deutsch 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.96
EDOB Abwicklungs A 7.50 3/29/2049 EUR 3.25
EDOB Abwicklungs A 7.50 3/29/2049 EUR 3.25
Estavis AG 7.75 6/25/2017 EUR 2.29
getgoods.de AG 7.75 10/2/2017 EUR 68.50
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 10/23/2013 EUR 60.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.86
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.38
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 12/27/2013 EUR 44.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 43.09
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 61.82
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.51
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 44.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.51
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.08
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 10/23/2013 EUR 69.75
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.11
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.69
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 10/23/2013 EUR 68.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.42
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 57.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 47.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 43.70
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 74.24
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 11/20/2013 EUR 72.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 46.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 3/26/2014 EUR 50.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 72.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.79
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/24/2014 EUR 72.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/24/2014 EUR 61.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.38
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 46.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.01
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.73
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.56
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.04
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 67.36
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.49
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.92
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.10
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 67.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 65.56
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 58.88
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.78
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 60.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.92
Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 3/26/2014 EUR 56.61
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.52
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 62.76
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 9/24/2014 EUR 61.79
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 65.32
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 63.62
Goldman Sachs & Co 19.00 6/25/2014 EUR 57.83
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 9/24/2014 EUR 67.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 9/24/2014 EUR 58.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.59
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 10/23/2013 EUR 62.52
Goldman Sachs & Co 5.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.58
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.99
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.96
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 58.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 64.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 49.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.50 12/27/2013 EUR 43.13
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 37.67
Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 12/24/2014 EUR 68.05
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 2/26/2014 EUR 74.27
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.43
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 59.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 3/26/2014 EUR 55.75
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 1/22/2014 EUR 61.77
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 61.74
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 1/22/2014 EUR 72.86
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 12/27/2013 EUR 52.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 2/26/2014 EUR 52.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 1/22/2014 EUR 58.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 1/22/2014 EUR 56.41
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 1/22/2014 EUR 55.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 12/27/2013 EUR 70.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/24/2014 EUR 58.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 50.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 72.82
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.54
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 73.11
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 73.16
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 70.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 66.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 61.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 63.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.42
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 63.94
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 11/20/2013 EUR 50.98
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.39
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 3/26/2014 EUR 49.64
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 11/20/2013 EUR 45.17
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 42.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 11/20/2013 EUR 41.31
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.25
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 3/26/2014 EUR 73.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 67.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 3/26/2014 EUR 69.70
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.89
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 12/27/2013 EUR 52.01
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 54.90
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 2/26/2014 EUR 55.73
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.19
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 11/20/2013 EUR 73.14
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 68.12
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 3/26/2014 EUR 51.20
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 10/23/2013 EUR 74.87
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 66.31
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 71.91
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 11/20/2013 EUR 52.23
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 48.85
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 45.57
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 10/23/2013 EUR 74.03
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.22
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 11/20/2013 EUR 49.88
Goldman Sachs & Co 18.00 10/23/2013 EUR 42.71
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 47.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 10/23/2013 EUR 70.26
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 11/20/2013 EUR 70.55
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 54.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 65.08
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.50
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 61.48
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 56.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 12/27/2013 EUR 57.30
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 12/27/2013 EUR 68.63
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.78
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.65
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 11/20/2013 EUR 64.83
Goldman Sachs & Co 14.00 11/20/2013 EUR 51.46
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 11/20/2013 EUR 50.28
Goldman Sachs & Co 15.00 3/26/2014 EUR 52.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 16.00 12/27/2013 EUR 48.06
Goldman Sachs & Co 12.00 10/23/2013 EUR 49.43
Goldman Sachs & Co 17.00 10/23/2013 EUR 50.76
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 3/26/2014 EUR 53.69
Goldman Sachs & Co 11.00 12/27/2013 EUR 47.15
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 12/27/2013 EUR 71.84
Goldman Sachs & Co 10.00 12/27/2013 EUR 55.02
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 12/27/2013 EUR 59.61
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 12/27/2013 EUR 60.59
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 12/27/2013 EUR 69.44
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 3/26/2014 EUR 57.47
Goldman Sachs & Co 3.00 3/26/2014 EUR 64.72
Goldman Sachs & Co 8.00 9/24/2014 EUR 59.95
Goldman Sachs & Co 13.00 2/26/2014 EUR 48.40
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 10/23/2013 EUR 52.85
Goldman Sachs & Co 6.00 10/23/2013 EUR 64.68
Goldman Sachs & Co 7.00 12/27/2013 EUR 63.13
Goldman Sachs & Co 4.00 3/26/2014 EUR 74.62
Goldman Sachs & Co 9.00 6/25/2014 EUR 60.40
Gunther Zamek Prod 7.75 5/15/2017 EUR 55.50
Hamburgische Lande 0.60 1/22/2041 EUR 68.03
Hamburgische Lande 0.61 10/30/2040 EUR 68.07
Hamburgische Lande 0.61 11/28/2030 EUR 74.77
Hamburgische Lande 0.60 10/25/2030 EUR 75.00
Hamburgische Lande 0.56 10/30/2030 EUR 74.24
Hamburgische Lande 0.64 7/18/2031 EUR 74.20
Hamburgische Lande 0.69 11/8/2030 EUR 74.82
Hamburgische Lande 0.59 2/5/2031 EUR 73.86
Hamburgische Lande 0.58 10/25/2030 EUR 74.61
Hamburgische Lande 0.59 12/1/2030 EUR 73.55
Hanwha Q-CELLS Gmb 6.75 10/21/2015 EUR 1.32
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 10.50 12/30/2013 EUR 73.80
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 12.50 12/30/2013 EUR 70.21
HSBC Trinkaus & Bu 11.00 12/30/2013 EUR 73.68
HSH Nordbank AG 1.03 2/14/2017 EUR 68.24
HSH Nordbank AG 1.07 2/14/2017 EUR 68.16
IKB Deutsche Indus 1.12 9/13/2016 EUR 74.66
IKB Deutsche Indus 0.97 1/23/2017 EUR 71.62
KFW 0.25 10/6/2036 CAD 33.42
Landesbank Berlin 4.80 11/7/2014 EUR 58.28
Landesbank Berlin 7.25 6/27/2014 EUR 58.30
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 12/30/2013 EUR 63.19
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 64.20
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 12/30/2014 EUR 68.24
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 12/30/2014 EUR 64.80
Landesbank Berlin 4.75 12/30/2014 EUR 65.47
Landesbank Berlin 8.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.32
Landesbank Berlin 4.75 3/28/2014 EUR 70.71
Landesbank Berlin 8.50 3/28/2014 EUR 65.88
Landesbank Berlin 11.00 12/30/2013 EUR 7.94
Landesbank Berlin 5.50 6/27/2014 EUR 62.69
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 61.97
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 8/8/2014 EUR 58.13
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.58
Landesbank Berlin 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 65.28
Landesbank Berlin 3.00 3/28/2014 EUR 72.82
Landesbank Berlin 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 68.83
Landesbank Berlin 5.00 12/30/2013 EUR 59.52
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 65.95
Landesbank Berlin 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.17
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 58.72
Landesbank Berlin 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 14.56
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 65.46
Landesbank Berlin 5.50 12/23/2013 EUR 60.90
Landesbank Berlin 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 68.01
Landesbank Berlin 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 62.46
Landesbank Hessen- 0.85 7/18/2031 EUR 63.96
Landesbank Hessen- 4.00 6/20/2014 EUR 59.10
Landeskreditbank B 0.25 10/13/2037 CAD 29.38
Landeskreditbank B 0.50 5/10/2027 CAD 57.81
Landwirtschaftlich 0.50 4/19/2017 TRY 74.97
LBBW 0.62 10/4/2030 EUR 71.11
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 74.51
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.31
LBBW 5.00 3/28/2014 EUR 57.49
LBBW 3.00 11/22/2013 EUR 66.79
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 62.53
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 65.79
LBBW 4.00 7/25/2014 EUR 64.82
LBBW 3.00 2/28/2014 EUR 67.30
LBBW 5.00 2/28/2014 EUR 58.88
LBBW 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.10
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 58.10
LBBW 3.00 11/22/2013 EUR 63.63
LBBW 4.00 11/22/2013 EUR 60.83
LBBW 3.00 6/27/2014 EUR 64.58
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 61.78
LBBW 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.62
LBBW 3.00 8/22/2014 EUR 67.39
LBBW 4.00 8/22/2014 EUR 65.35
LBBW 5.00 8/22/2014 EUR 63.72
LBBW 3.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.90
LBBW 5.00 2/28/2014 EUR 61.60
LBBW 5.00 9/26/2014 EUR 61.16
LBBW 4.00 10/25/2013 EUR 58.36
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 61.06
LBBW 3.00 3/28/2014 EUR 64.74
LBBW 4.00 1/24/2014 EUR 67.54
LBBW 6.00 1/24/2014 EUR 60.58
LBBW 7.00 1/24/2014 EUR 58.00
LBBW 7.00 11/22/2013 EUR 69.09
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.66
LBBW 6.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.62
LBBW 6.00 7/25/2014 EUR 61.69
LBBW 4.00 3/28/2014 EUR 60.09
LBBW 5.10 1/15/2014 EUR 68.01
LBBW 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 58.31
LBBW 4.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.42
LBBW 3.00 6/27/2014 EUR 61.09
LBBW 3.00 9/26/2014 EUR 64.39
LBBW 4.00 9/26/2014 EUR 62.54
LBBW 7.00 9/26/2014 EUR 59.20
LBBW 5.00 11/22/2013 EUR 63.58
LBBW 6.00 11/22/2013 EUR 64.98
LBBW 8.00 11/22/2013 EUR 58.71
Norddeutsche Lande 0.69 10/21/2030 EUR 74.42
Praktiker AG 5.88 2/10/2016 EUR 1.50
Qimonda Finance LL 6.75 3/22/2013 USD 3.44
SiC Processing Gmb 7.13 3/1/2016 EUR 5.50
Solarwatt GmbH 7.00 11/1/2015 EUR 14.75
Solarworld AG 6.13 1/21/2017 EUR 37.25
Solarworld AG 6.38 7/13/2016 EUR 33.00
Solon SE 1.38 12/6/2012 EUR 0.63
Sparkasse KoelnBon 0.68 5/7/2031 EUR 71.54
Sparkasse KoelnBon 0.74 9/29/2034 EUR 68.26
TAG Immobilien AG 6.50 12/10/2015 EUR 9.45
TUI AG 2.75 3/24/2016 EUR 64.09
UniCredit Bank AG 0.92 11/19/2029 EUR 65.48
Vontobel Financial 5.45 12/31/2013 EUR 59.48
Vontobel Financial 5.47 3/17/2014 EUR 35.50
Vontobel Financial 4.30 12/31/2013 EUR 63.20
Vontobel Financial 7.70 12/31/2013 EUR 54.94
Vontobel Financial 5.30 6/27/2014 EUR 60.94
Vontobel Financial 4.25 12/31/2013 EUR 63.14
Vontobel Financial 5.30 12/31/2013 EUR 59.38
Vontobel Financial 9.85 12/31/2013 EUR 73.66
Vontobel Financial 4.20 12/31/2013 EUR 63.14
Vontobel Financial 5.35 12/31/2013 EUR 59.50
Vontobel Financial 7.40 12/31/2013 EUR 54.84
Vontobel Financial 9.85 12/31/2013 EUR 51.06
Vontobel Financial 6.10 12/31/2013 EUR 59.66
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 59.56
Vontobel Financial 6.85 12/31/2013 EUR 54.78
Vontobel Financial 7.15 12/31/2013 EUR 54.82
Vontobel Financial 9.10 12/31/2013 EUR 50.96
Vontobel Financial 5.10 4/14/2014 EUR 30.60
Vontobel Financial 17.15 12/31/2013 EUR 52.48
Vontobel Financial 4.25 12/31/2013 EUR 63.20
Vontobel Financial 8.65 12/31/2013 EUR 56.66
Vontobel Financial 6.30 12/31/2013 EUR 59.72
Vontobel Financial 8.70 12/31/2013 EUR 73.44
Vontobel Financial 7.85 12/31/2013 EUR 50.72
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 54.52
Vontobel Financial 5.10 6/27/2014 EUR 60.50
Vontobel Financial 8.00 12/31/2013 EUR 55.02
Vontobel Financial 7.35 6/27/2014 EUR 57.28
Vontobel Financial 4.60 3/28/2014 EUR 60.20
Vontobel Financial 4.75 12/31/2013 EUR 59.42
Vontobel Financial 7.20 3/28/2014 EUR 56.40
Vontobel Financial 7.45 12/31/2013 EUR 59.94
Vontobel Financial 10.20 12/31/2013 EUR 56.98
Vontobel Financial 4.80 12/31/2013 EUR 56.58
Vontobel Financial 5.50 12/31/2013 EUR 56.38
Vontobel Financial 8.85 12/31/2013 EUR 54.96
Vontobel Financial 8.35 12/31/2013 EUR 56.92
Vontobel Financial 7.70 12/31/2013 EUR 54.74
Vontobel Financial 7.40 12/31/2013 EUR 59.92
Vontobel Financial 5.40 6/27/2014 EUR 57.68
Vontobel Financial 5.05 3/28/2014 EUR 57.46
Vontobel Financial 7.60 3/28/2014 EUR 58.24
Vontobel Financial 5.65 3/28/2014 EUR 57.40
Vontobel Financial 4.35 12/31/2013 EUR 63.26
Vontobel Financial 8.65 12/31/2013 EUR 60.16
Vontobel Financial 7.75 12/31/2013 EUR 54.72
Vontobel Financial 8.15 12/31/2013 EUR 56.38
Vontobel Financial 15.75 12/31/2013 EUR 52.14
Vontobel Financial 10.45 12/31/2013 EUR 55.40
Vontobel Financial 6.35 12/31/2013 EUR 54.68
Vontobel Financial 8.00 12/31/2013 EUR 54.98
Vontobel Financial 5.25 12/31/2013 EUR 59.50
Vontobel Financial 6.45 12/31/2013 EUR 74.82
Vontobel Financial 5.00 1/24/2014 EUR 61.50
Vontobel Financial 7.39 11/25/2013 EUR 62.60
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 2.50 12/23/2013 EUR 68.43
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 1/30/2014 EUR 69.85
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 1/30/2014 EUR 65.48
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 1/30/2014 EUR 63.64
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 12/18/2013 EUR 52.92
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 12/18/2013 EUR 59.07
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 12/18/2013 EUR 55.81
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 7.50 12/18/2013 EUR 50.43
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 3/27/2014 EUR 66.20
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 6/25/2014 EUR 61.31
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.50 6/25/2014 EUR 56.15
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 6/25/2014 EUR 58.30
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 7.00 6/25/2014 EUR 54.32
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 1/30/2014 EUR 61.94
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 3/11/2014 EUR 54.62
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 4.00 9/30/2014 EUR 74.98
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 9/30/2014 EUR 73.89
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 9/30/2014 EUR 73.00
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 3.00 3/27/2014 EUR 68.09
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 5.00 3/27/2014 EUR 64.45
WGZ-Bank AG Westde 6.00 3/27/2014 EUR 62.91
Windreich GmbH 6.50 7/15/2016 EUR 11.13
Windreich GmbH 6.50 3/1/2015 EUR 9.88
Windreich GmbH 6.75 3/1/2015 EUR 11.13
Windreich GmbH 6.25 3/1/2015 EUR 11.13
GREECE
------
Yioula Glassworks 9.00 12/1/2015 EUR 74.00
Yioula Glassworks 9.00 12/1/2015 EUR 74.00
ICELAND
-------
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.13 5/19/2016 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.75 10/4/2011 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.75 10/4/2011 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.63 2/28/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.50 2/3/2045 EUR 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 3.00 2/12/2010 CHF 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.70 2/15/2010 CAD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.13 10/4/2016 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.65 2/19/2013 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.13 10/4/2016 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 2/1/2045 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.99 7/5/2012 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 9.75 9/10/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.13 5/19/2016 USD 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.50 2/2/2009 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.80 10/20/2009 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.80 9/7/2012 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.63 2/28/2015 USD 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.80 2/15/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 12/5/2014 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 3.75 2/15/2024 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 4/28/2012 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.25 7/18/2017 BGN 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.65 7/5/2010 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.90 2/1/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.95 5/6/2009 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 8.00 6/22/2011 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.70 10/2/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.50 1/17/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.69 5/21/2011 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 7/24/2009 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.20 7/12/2009 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.00 11/8/2013 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 4/2/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.50 10/2/2010 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.00 1/3/2011 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.47 10/27/2010 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 0.95 10/20/2010 JPY 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.00 1/4/2027 SKK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 4.90 5/29/2017 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.50 10/8/2010 ISK 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 5.40 3/22/2014 ISK 0.13
Kaupthing Bank Hf 7.90 4/28/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 1.75 6/7/2016 EUR 22.88
Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.40 12/15/2015 EUR 22.88
LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00
LBI HF 3.20 5/10/2010 SKK 8.00
LBI HF 2.25 2/14/2011 CHF 8.00
LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00
LBI HF 3.00 12/7/2010 CHF 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 1/18/2010 CAD 8.00
LBI HF 4.38 10/20/2008 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.75 5/31/2013 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.25 4/2/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 8.65 5/1/2011 ISK 8.00
LBI HF 4.08 3/16/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 6.75 8/18/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 11/3/2009 CZK 8.00
LBI HF 6.00 6/6/2017 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 5.44 9/3/2018 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 4.28 11/19/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 2.14 2/3/2020 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.32 1/31/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.40 11/30/2035 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 5.25 6/5/2023 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 5.08 3/1/2013 ISK 8.00
LBI HF 7.00 4/2/2010 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.00 10/22/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 1.68 12/22/2014 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.00 9/23/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.45 12/18/2033 JPY 0.13
LBI HF 2.22 10/15/2019 JPY 8.00
LBI HF 4.34 3/1/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.34 5/11/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.75 2/22/2016 USD 8.00
LBI HF 2.75 3/16/2011 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.36 8/17/2012 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 7.20 4/27/2026 EUR 0.13
LBI HF 6.75 2/18/2015 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 3.11 11/10/2008 EUR 8.00
LBI HF 4.34 12/22/2025 EUR 8.00
IRELAND
-------
Corsicanto Ltd 3.50 1/15/2032 USD 74.94
Depfa ACS Bank 4.90 8/24/2035 CAD 69.73
Depfa ACS Bank 0.50 3/3/2025 CAD 46.53
Kalvebod PLC 2.00 5/1/2106 DKK 40.00
ITALY
-------
Banca delle Marche 1.18 6/1/2017 EUR 42.39
A2A SpA 3.20 8/10/2036 EUR 62.44
Banca delle Marche 5.50 9/16/2030 EUR 69.25
Banca di Cividale 0.34 10/2/2036 EUR 57.63
Banca Monte dei Pa 1.23 1/15/2018 EUR 74.60
Cassa Depositi e P 0.29 10/31/2029 EUR 61.70
Cirio Finanziaria 8.00 12/21/2005 EUR 0.63
City of Lecco Ital 0.46 6/30/2026 EUR 67.27
Comune di Andrano 3.92 12/31/2035 EUR 71.20
Comune di Fiumicin 0.49 12/31/2026 EUR 66.65
Comune di Grontard 4.10 12/31/2035 EUR 73.36
Comune di Marcheno 4.23 12/31/2036 EUR 74.59
Comune di Marscian 4.03 12/31/2035 EUR 72.47
Comune di Mercato 3.97 12/31/2035 EUR 71.83
Comune di Piadena 4.05 12/31/2035 EUR 72.74
Comune di San Ferd 0.53 12/27/2026 EUR 67.26
Comune di Santa Ma 0.60 5/31/2026 EUR 69.00
Comune di Seminara 0.72 10/31/2026 EUR 69.14
Comune di Verona 0.43 12/1/2026 EUR 64.53
Enel SpA 0.96 10/20/2032 EUR 63.62
Intesa Sanpaolo Sp 1.06 3/20/2023 EUR 74.70
Italy Government I 1.85 9/15/2057 EUR 65.06
Italy Government I 2.00 9/15/2062 EUR 67.03
Italy Government I 2.20 9/15/2058 EUR 72.77
Italy Government I 2.87 5/19/2036 JPY 69.43
Province of Bresci 0.73 12/22/2036 EUR 57.22
Province of Bresci 0.72 6/30/2036 EUR 57.58
Province of Chieti 0.65 12/29/2023 EUR 74.35
Province of Milan 0.59 12/22/2033 EUR 63.54
Province of Rovigo 0.59 12/28/2035 EUR 58.80
Province of Teramo 0.44 12/30/2030 EUR 60.80
Province of Teramo 0.47 12/30/2025 EUR 68.61
Province of Trevis 0.47 12/31/2034 EUR 58.04
Province of Trevis 0.57 12/31/2034 EUR 59.52
Province of Trevis 0.34 12/31/2034 EUR 56.82
Region of Abruzzo 0.68 11/7/2036 EUR 63.64
Region of Abruzzo 0.52 11/7/2031 EUR 61.27
Region of Abruzzo 4.45 3/1/2037 EUR 70.52
Region of Aosta Va 0.45 5/28/2021 EUR 73.65
Region of Molise I 0.72 12/15/2033 EUR 64.40
Region of Piemont 0.45 11/27/2036 EUR 55.47
Region of Puglia I 0.74 2/6/2023 EUR 69.69
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 23.00
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.75
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13
Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63
LUXEMBOURG
----------
3W Power SA 9.25 12/1/2015 EUR 55.75
ArcelorMittal 7.25 4/1/2014 EUR 20.83
Bank of New York M 4.48 12/30/2099 EUR 18.04
Bank of New York M 4.73 12/15/2050 EUR 52.00
Cerruti Finance SA 6.50 7/26/2004 EUR 3.00
Cirio Finance Luxe 7.50 11/3/2002 EUR 1.25
Cirio Holding Luxe 6.25 2/16/2004 EUR 0.13
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 52.02
Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.50
Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.98
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 51.75
Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75
Del Monte Finance 6.63 5/24/2006 EUR 13.63
ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38
ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38
Erste Europaeische 0.27 2/1/2037 USD 55.57
European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00
European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00
Finmek Internation 7.00 12/3/2004 EUR 0.13
Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13
Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13
Hypothekenbank Fra 0.25 12/20/2029 USD 67.37
International Indu 9.00 7/6/2011 EUR 1.00
International Indu 11.00 2/19/2013 USD 0.88
IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13
IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13
La Veggia Finance 7.13 11/14/2004 EUR 0.25
Teksid Aluminum Lu 11.38 7/15/2011 EUR 0.75
NETHERLANDS
-----------
Astana Finance BV 7.88 6/8/2010 EUR 4.00
Astana Finance BV 9.00 11/16/2011 USD 3.50
Astana Finance BV 14.50 7/2/2013 USD 3.75
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/10/2017 TRY 73.62
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2022 ZAR 52.90
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2017 TRY 72.46
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/7/2022 ZAR 53.32
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/12/2017 TRY 73.13
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2017 TRY 72.30
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/22/2021 ZAR 57.64
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/29/2021 NZD 70.64
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/15/2022 ZAR 52.50
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2022 MXN 64.98
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/3/2021 NZD 64.80
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 2/24/2025 CAD 65.15
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/12/2021 ZAR 58.17
Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 9/20/2022 ZAR 52.08
BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.01
BLT Finance BV 12.00 2/10/2015 USD 10.25
BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.63
Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38
Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38
Cirio Del Monte NV 7.75 3/14/2005 EUR 3.38
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/26/2021 ZAR 48.95
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/30/2043 MXN 23.60
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 8/21/2028 MXN 46.15
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 7/30/2043 MXN 23.80
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 1/31/2033 MXN 36.68
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/29/2027 MXN 48.35
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/30/2027 MXN 48.11
Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 12/29/2027 MXN 47.89
Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.77
Cooperatieve Centr 8.60 3/13/2014 CHF 60.50
Cooperatieve Centr 8.15 3/5/2014 CHF 58.60
Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.43
JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/7/2014 USD 69.19
JP Morgan Structur 5.00 12/3/2013 CHF 64.32
JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/25/2014 EUR 73.83
JP Morgan Structur 12.30 11/29/2013 USD 48.32
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 10.00 3/15/2012 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.13 6/1/2009 USD 0.38
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25
KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/5/2035 EUR 9.75
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 11/2/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 3/16/2035 EUR 14.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/15/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 5/17/2035 EUR 10.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.88 3/14/2013 CHF 2.13
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/22/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/16/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 5/8/2017 HKD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/26/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/14/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/27/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/5/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/16/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 9/15/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/18/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.03 1/31/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/24/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 5/9/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 5/26/2026 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 12/3/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/18/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 6/6/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 12/2/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.46 2/19/2012 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/23/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.75 2/7/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/20/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/17/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 10/22/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/27/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.44 11/22/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/16/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.22 11/21/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/13/2010 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 6/10/2014 SGD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 4/20/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.86 9/21/2011 SGD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 12/20/2027 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/12/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/1/2025 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.55 3/12/2015 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.05 4/8/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 9/5/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 23.30 9/16/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/17/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.88 1/28/2011 HKD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 11/21/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 2/19/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/3/2012 BRL 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 6/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 8/7/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/21/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 11/28/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/11/2038 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/19/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 4/23/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/22/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 2/16/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 3/10/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/13/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/7/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 1/31/2013 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 11/9/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.75 6/22/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.12 4/30/2027 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/28/2032 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 7/6/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 6/22/2046 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.65 8/24/2011 AUD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 12/26/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 12/15/2011 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.68 12/12/2045 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.06 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/28/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/4/2015 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.69 2/19/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.59 11/22/2009 MXN 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.28 11/6/2010 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/9/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 6/2/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.38 2/4/2014 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.30 12/21/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2010 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.20 5/14/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 10/11/2017 ILS 2.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 3/30/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 10/24/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 8/3/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.60 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 7/2/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 7/8/2014 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 5/16/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 11/16/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.72 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 6/4/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 18.25 10/2/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/31/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.80 3/19/2018 JPY 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 11/16/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/6/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 11/22/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.25 6/20/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 5/21/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.01 9/20/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/19/2023 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.60 4/22/2014 MXN 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 12/3/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/23/2012 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.37 7/15/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.87 10/8/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.75 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/24/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.38 9/20/2008 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/15/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/29/2017 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/8/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 2/3/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.43 1/8/2009 ILS 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/8/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/13/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 4/1/2023 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.63 7/22/2011 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.80 3/31/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/2/2022 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 5/15/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.28 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.35 8/8/2016 SGD 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/6/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.50 8/9/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 7/11/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.82 12/18/2036 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.20 12/3/2008 HKD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/3/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.40 6/12/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/4/2011 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 7/8/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.30 12/21/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 12/31/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 2/8/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/19/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.50 4/1/2018 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.15 3/21/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 11/30/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 2/26/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 6/20/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 2/14/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/22/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.45 2/20/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 8/1/2013 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 3/4/2010 NZD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.63 3/2/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 2/21/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.80 12/27/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.75 3/29/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 12/6/2011 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 1/4/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.75 3/1/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.82 10/20/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/13/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.80 11/16/2012 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/12/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 9/20/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.40 9/21/2009 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 4/28/2014 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 6/15/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/30/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 5/20/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 5/17/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 7/25/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 8/2/2037 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/12/2010 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 8/23/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 11/9/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/14/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2012 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/12/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/22/2012 EUR 1.13
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.20 3/19/2018 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.95 11/4/2013 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/19/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 3/27/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 10/24/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 4/14/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/30/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 7/21/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.95 10/25/2036 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 6/29/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/25/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.75 4/5/2012 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 4/24/2017 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.39 5/4/2017 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.35 10/13/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.80 12/30/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/23/2018 CZK 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/30/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/17/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.48 5/12/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.25 5/12/2009 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/27/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/24/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 10/19/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.68 3/5/2015 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/15/2022 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.32 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 9/13/2009 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 7/24/2026 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 8/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 2/16/2009 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 3/13/2021 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/17/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/6/2016 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/1/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.70 6/6/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/6/2013 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/24/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 6/13/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 3/17/2009 GBP 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/28/2008 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.85 4/24/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 7/24/2014 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 12/30/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/3/2012 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.10 6/4/2010 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/15/2012 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.15 10/30/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 8/1/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 14.10 11/12/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 8/11/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/13/2037 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 8/1/2035 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.90 7/28/2020 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.15 8/25/2020 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/30/2010 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 5/9/2020 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.30 6/4/2012 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 6/5/2011 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/6/2013 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/4/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 17.00 6/2/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.80 8/21/2009 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.22 3/1/2024 EUR 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 5/23/2012 AUD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.45 5/23/2013 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/28/2008 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/15/2018 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/6/2011 CHF 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.75 10/28/2009 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 11/30/2012 CZK 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 11/9/2011 CHF 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 11/24/2016 EUR 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 USD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/12/2036 JPY 2.50
Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 12/14/2012 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 2.40 6/20/2011 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 1.60 6/21/2010 JPY 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 8.05 12/20/2010 HKD 1.38
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 6/20/2010 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 9/20/2011 USD 6.00
Lehman Brothers Tr 6.70 4/21/2011 USD 6.00
Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 45.04
Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 44.63
Morgan Stanley BV 9.00 4/16/2015 EUR 71.90
Nederlandse Waters 0.50 3/11/2025 CAD 65.79
New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.24
New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.78
New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.25
New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.47
NIBC Bank NV 25.98 5/7/2029 EUR 50.62
Nutritek Internati 8.75 12/11/2008 USD 2.00
Q-Cells Internatio 1.38 4/30/2012 EUR 32.45
Q-Cells Internatio 5.75 5/26/2014 EUR 32.09
Sairgroup Finance 4.38 6/8/2006 EUR 10.50
Sairgroup Finance 6.63 10/6/2010 EUR 12.13
Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.25
Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.00
SNS Bank NV 6.25 10/26/2020 EUR 2.13
SNS Bank NV 6.63 5/14/2018 EUR 4.13
WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.90
WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.38
NORWAY
------
Eksportfinans ASA 0.25 7/14/2033 CAD 8.50
Eksportfinans ASA 0.50 5/9/2030 CAD 14.25
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/7/2017 BRL 69.77
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/10/2017 BRL 68.32
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/29/2017 BRL 66.85
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/25/2018 ZAR 70.89
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/26/2017 BRL 65.80
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/28/2017 BRL 68.91
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/28/2017 BRL 67.67
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/20/2018 BRL 64.71
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/2/2018 BRL 62.66
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/1/2017 BRL 68.22
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/15/2018 BRL 67.16
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/29/2017 BRL 70.51
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/16/2016 BRL 73.83
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/27/2022 ZAR 47.60
Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 7/28/2016 BRL 74.11
Norske Skogindustr 7.00 6/26/2017 EUR 60.59
Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 74.02
Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 72.75
Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 69.53
Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 51.63
Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 73.50
Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 50.08
Petromena ASA 9.75 5/24/2014 NOK 6.75
Petromena ASA 10.85 11/19/2010 USD 6.75
PORTUGAL
--------
AdP - Aguas de Por 0.33 1/23/2023 EUR 63.88
Banco Espirito San 3.50 1/2/2043 EUR 50.13
Caixa Geral de Dep 5.98 3/3/2028 EUR 57.00
CP - Comboios de P 5.70 2/5/2030 EUR 60.31
Empresa de Desenvo 0.33 11/21/2018 EUR 66.63
Metropolitano de L 4.80 12/7/2027 EUR 73.38
Metropolitano de L 4.06 12/4/2026 EUR 71.93
Parpublica - Parti 4.20 11/16/2026 EUR 68.25
Portugal Obrigacoe 4.10 4/15/2037 EUR 72.12
Rede Ferroviaria N 4.25 12/13/2021 EUR 70.38
Rede Ferroviaria N 4.05 11/16/2026 EUR 71.78
ROMANIA
-------
City of Iasi Roman 4.45 11/15/2028 RON 71.23
RUSSIA
------
Arizk 3.00 12/20/2030 RUB 46.44
Kuzbassenergo-Fina 8.70 4/15/2021 RUB 72.01
Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.02
Mechel 8.40 6/1/2021 RUB 70.13
Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.21
Mobile Telesystems 5.00 6/29/2021 RUB 74.25
MORTGAGE AGENT AHM 3.00 9/9/2045 RUB 9.17
Novosibirsk TIN Pl 12.50 8/26/2014 RUB 5.00
RBC OJSC 3.27 4/19/2018 RUB 51.50
Russian Railways J 8.40 6/8/2028 RUB 100.00
Saturn Research & 8.50 6/6/2014 RUB 1.01
TGC-2 12.00 10/10/2018 RUB 75.00
World of Building 4.20 6/25/2019 RUB 3.60
SPAIN
-----
Autonomous Communi 4.25 10/31/2036 EUR 65.75
Autonomous Communi 4.22 4/26/2035 EUR 64.14
Autonomous Communi 4.69 10/28/2034 EUR 68.88
Autonomous Communi 2.97 9/8/2039 JPY 59.88
Autonomous Communi 0.48 10/17/2022 EUR 70.50
Autonomous Communi 2.10 5/20/2024 EUR 73.97
Autonomous Communi 0.27 11/29/2021 EUR 74.92
Banco de Castilla 1.50 6/23/2021 EUR 65.00
Bankinter SA 6.00 12/18/2028 EUR 65.13
City of Madrid Spa 0.34 10/10/2022 EUR 66.37
City of Madrid Spa 4.55 6/16/2036 EUR 73.57
Comunidad Autonoma 3.90 11/30/2035 EUR 63.84
Comunidad Autonoma 4.20 10/25/2036 EUR 66.58
Comunidad Autonoma 4.06 11/23/2035 EUR 63.94
Diputacion Foral d 4.32 12/29/2023 EUR 61.41
Ibercaja Banco SAU 1.09 4/20/2018 EUR 70.93
Junta Comunidades 0.41 12/5/2023 EUR 54.38
Junta Comunidades 3.88 1/31/2036 EUR 60.38
Junta de Extremadu 0.95 6/10/2024 EUR 72.31
Pescanova SA 5.13 4/20/2017 EUR 18.74
Pescanova SA 8.75 2/17/2019 EUR 17.79
Pescanova SA 6.75 3/5/2015 EUR 17.96
Spain Government I 2.92 12/2/2030 JPY 69.99
SWEDEN
------
Dannemora Mineral 11.75 3/22/2016 USD 41.50
Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 USD 6.63
Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 NOK 7.00
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/14/2016 BRL 74.58
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/22/2022 ZAR 46.97
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/29/2017 IDR 73.20
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/31/2022 ZAR 47.32
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/28/2022 ZAR 45.13
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/19/2018 IDR 68.74
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2018 BRL 59.21
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/15/2022 ZAR 46.66
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/26/2021 AUD 68.36
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/17/2027 USD 60.33
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/14/2016 BRL 72.32
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/28/2017 IDR 71.27
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/3/2017 BRL 70.83
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 7/21/2017 BRL 67.44
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/21/2016 BRL 72.17
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/20/2017 TRY 71.95
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/22/2016 BRL 72.19
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2020 TRY 54.02
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/5/2017 IDR 71.10
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/10/2017 BRL 70.65
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/26/2017 BRL 71.31
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/30/2017 BRL 67.86
Svensk Exportkredi 1.00 11/15/2021 AUD 72.00
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/21/2017 BRL 68.05
Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/25/2021 ZAR 56.85
SWITZERLAND
-----------
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.60
Banque Cantonale V 11.80 1/29/2014 CHF 63.63
Banque Cantonale V 6.50 10/5/2015 CHF 72.74
Banque Cantonale V 2.00 7/8/2014 CHF 61.29
SAir Group 6.25 10/27/2002 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 4.25 2/2/2007 CHF 11.63
SAir Group 2.13 11/4/2004 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 0.13 7/7/2005 CHF 11.25
SAir Group 5.50 7/23/2003 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.00
SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.13
SAir Group 6.25 4/12/2005 CHF 10.88
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 53.44
UBS AG 23.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.46
UBS AG 8.87 4/15/2014 USD 10.17
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.67
UBS AG 24.25 1/3/2014 EUR 60.63
UBS AG 18.45 10/24/2013 USD 8.73
UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 56.56
UBS AG 7.25 7/29/2014 USD 31.57
UBS AG 6.03 5/14/2014 USD 54.95
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 7.50 1/3/2014 EUR 64.51
UBS AG 12.70 4/22/2014 USD 66.71
UBS AG 8.94 2/13/2014 USD 14.64
UBS AG 6.29 2/26/2014 USD 32.99
UBS AG 6.22 2/26/2014 USD 38.93
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 72.58
UBS AG 16.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02
UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.41
UBS AG 17.25 1/3/2014 EUR 42.91
UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 52.05
UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.73
UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 61.74
UBS AG 17.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.54
UBS AG 6.04 8/29/2014 USD 35.75
UBS AG 10.46 1/2/2014 USD 35.35
UBS AG 8.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50
UBS AG 15.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.26
UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.94
UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 62.75
UBS AG 19.00 1/3/2014 EUR 53.05
UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 70.59
UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50
UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.72
UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.30
UBS AG 22.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.98
UBS AG 9.53 12/17/2013 USD 48.94
UBS AG 6.49 5/23/2014 USD 21.20
UBS AG 6.53 5/27/2014 USD 21.09
UBS AG 6.33 5/12/2014 USD 19.48
UBS AG 9.25 4/30/2014 USD 9.78
UBS AG 14.00 6/27/2014 EUR 55.27
UBS AG 11.75 6/27/2014 EUR 48.70
UBS AG 8.29 1/14/2014 USD 19.98
UBS AG 5.22 1/28/2014 USD 11.48
UBS AG 7.86 1/31/2014 USD 20.24
UBS AG 9.17 6/30/2014 USD 67.70
UBS AG 7.25 8/8/2014 USD 45.54
UBS AG 8.35 10/24/2013 USD 50.89
UBS AG 9.45 10/22/2013 USD 20.95
UBS AG 9.00 1/3/2014 EUR 48.64
UBS AG 14.75 1/3/2014 EUR 44.63
UBS AG 7.15 2/26/2014 USD 32.50
UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 55.72
UBS AG 5.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.46
UBS AG 8.21 2/26/2014 USD 50.39
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 43.67
UBS AG 13.50 1/3/2014 EUR 56.28
UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 56.97
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 8.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.15
UBS AG 23.00 1/3/2014 EUR 69.99
UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.15
UBS AG 7.25 1/3/2014 EUR 69.51
UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.61
UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.35
UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.38
UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 68.73
UBS AG 14.50 1/3/2014 EUR 74.99
UBS AG 16.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.69
UBS AG 21.00 1/3/2014 EUR 38.60
UBS AG 6.19 1/8/2014 USD 19.82
UBS AG 9.93 6/18/2014 USD 50.46
UBS AG 9.89 11/22/2013 EUR 71.22
UBS AG 8.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.16
UBS AG 4.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.04
UBS AG 4.50 6/27/2014 EUR 48.72
UBS AG 8.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.09
UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.83
UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.76
UBS AG 5.50 3/28/2014 EUR 55.86
UBS AG 9.50 3/28/2014 EUR 50.93
UBS AG 13.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.47
UBS AG 12.00 3/28/2014 EUR 42.70
UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 39.79
UBS AG 14.00 3/28/2014 EUR 52.93
UBS AG 7.75 6/27/2014 EUR 45.94
UBS AG 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 49.43
UBS AG 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 50.45
UBS AG 11.00 3/28/2014 EUR 46.42
UBS AG 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.64
UBS AG 13.00 6/27/2014 EUR 45.50
UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 59.17
UBS AG 10.75 3/28/2014 EUR 58.16
UBS AG 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 10.50 6/27/2014 EUR 52.89
UBS AG 12.25 6/27/2014 EUR 71.08
UBS AG 6.25 6/27/2014 EUR 56.36
UBS AG 11.25 3/28/2014 EUR 72.74
UBS AG 11.00 1/3/2014 EUR 70.06
UBS AG 12.25 3/28/2014 EUR 68.98
UBS AG 12.00 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02
UBS AG 13.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 67.22
UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 59.05
UBS AG 21.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.98
UBS AG 12.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.20
UBS AG 18.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.61
UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.63
UBS AG 19.25 1/3/2014 EUR 71.52
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.60
UBS AG 18.50 1/3/2014 EUR 71.37
UBS AG 6.50 1/3/2014 EUR 63.77
UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 49.48
UBS AG 5.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.70
UBS AG 4.25 1/3/2014 EUR 54.36
UBS AG 6.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.11
UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.93
UBS AG 14.41 11/21/2013 USD 40.01
UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 65.06
UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 45.13
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.49
UBS AG 6.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.80
UBS AG 20.75 1/3/2014 EUR 70.05
UBS AG 16.25 1/3/2014 EUR 72.22
UBS AG 19.75 1/3/2014 EUR 64.89
UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.96
UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 47.78
UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 49.77
UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 60.73
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 36.11
UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.75
UBS AG 19.50 1/3/2014 EUR 65.22
UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 70.00
UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.55
UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 72.66
UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19
UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.80
UBS AG 7.98 3/17/2014 USD 10.60
UBS AG 14.75 3/28/2014 EUR 71.70
UBS AG 11.50 6/27/2014 EUR 74.62
UBS AG 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 64.14
UBS AG 6.50 3/28/2014 EUR 44.45
UBS AG 7.30 7/7/2014 USD 28.53
TURKEY
------
APP International 11.75 10/1/2005 USD 5.00
Yuksel Insaat AS 9.50 11/10/2015 USD 72.64
UKRAINE
-------
Agroton Public Ltd 12.50 7/14/2014 USD 50.00
UNITED KINGDOM
--------------
Alpha Credit Group 0.73 2/21/2021 EUR 52.38
Alpha Credit Group 6.00 7/29/2020 EUR 72.88
Barclays Bank PLC 0.61 12/28/2040 EUR 64.00
Barclays Bank PLC 8.00 5/23/2014 USD 10.81
Barclays Bank PLC 2.20 11/30/2025 USD 21.86
Barclays Bank PLC 0.50 3/13/2023 RUB 47.04
Barclays Bank PLC 6.75 10/16/2015 GBP 1.15
Barclays Bank PLC 7.40 2/13/2014 GBP 1.04
Barclays Bank PLC 2.50 3/7/2017 EUR 35.67
Barclays Bank PLC 8.25 1/26/2015 USD 1.13
Barclays Bank PLC 1.99 12/1/2040 USD 71.38
Barclays Bank PLC 1.64 6/3/2041 USD 66.57
Barclays Bank PLC 7.50 4/29/2014 GBP 1.06
Barclays Bank PLC 2.33 1/2/2041 USD 73.08
Cattles Ltd 6.88 1/17/2014 GBP 2.50
Cattles Ltd 7.13 7/5/2017 GBP 2.50
Commercial Bank Pr 5.80 2/9/2016 USD 69.01
Co-Operative Bank 9.25 4/28/2021 GBP 72.74
Co-Operative Bank 5.75 12/2/2024 GBP 68.46
Co-Operative Bank 7.88 12/19/2022 GBP 70.52
Co-Operative Bank 5.88 3/28/2033 GBP 69.57
Co-Operative Bank 5.63 11/16/2021 GBP 55.13
Co-Operative Bank 1.01 5/18/2016 EUR 69.71
Credit Suisse AG/L 11.50 4/4/2014 CHF 70.01
Credit Suisse AG/L 8.50 11/5/2013 CHF 45.66
Credit Suisse AG/L 6.50 1/14/2014 CHF 55.22
Credit Suisse AG/L 9.00 11/14/2013 CHF 51.41
Credit Suisse AG/L 1.64 6/1/2042 USD 46.62
Credit Suisse AG/L 8.00 1/14/2014 USD 55.38
Credit Suisse AG/L 6.85 8/8/2014 USD 57.36
Credit Suisse AG/L 10.50 11/15/2013 USD 51.48
Credit Suisse Inte 4.40 10/24/2013 EUR 57.10
Credit Suisse Inte 4.45 12/13/2013 EUR 53.20
Dunfermline Buildi 6.00 3/31/2015 GBP 1.38
Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 2/24/2022 EUR 60.75
Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 12/2/2021 EUR 61.13
Emporiki Group Fin 5.10 12/9/2021 EUR 62.13
ERB Hellas PLC 0.52 9/3/2014 EUR 72.13
Goldman Sachs Inte 2.50 8/17/2018 EUR 20.40
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/3/2023 AUD 62.86
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/2/2022 AUD 64.19
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2023 AUD 63.27
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/25/2021 AUD 68.62
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/30/2021 NZD 65.52
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/20/2018 RUB 69.82
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 6/30/2021 NZD 67.16
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/2/2023 AUD 63.51
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2022 AUD 63.89
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/5/2018 RUB 74.86
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 3/1/2018 RUB 74.48
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/27/2027 NZD 47.02
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/22/2021 AUD 68.35
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 7/30/2027 NZD 46.29
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 1/29/2027 NZD 47.70
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/30/2026 NZD 48.42
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2026 AUD 50.10
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/8/2026 AUD 50.28
HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2027 NZD 47.50
Royal Bank of Scot 1.69 11/14/2016 GBP 1.10
RSL Communications 10.50 11/15/2008 USD 1.20
RSL Communications 10.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 9.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 9.88 11/15/2009 USD 1.25
RSL Communications 12.00 11/1/2008 USD 1.25
UBS AG/London 25.00 3/20/2014 CHF 62.25
UBS AG/London 7.63 9/30/2015 USD 16.71
UBS AG/London 20.25 4/17/2014 CHF 66.13
UBS AG/London 6.88 8/31/2015 USD 15.37
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.
Copyright 2014. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *