TCREUR_Public/140307.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, March 7, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 47

                            Headlines

B U L G A R I A

CHIMCO: Assets Put Up for Sale at Nearly BGN29MM Starting Price
UNIONBANK EAD: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Confirms 'Caa1' CFR; Outlook Negative


F I N L A N D

METSA BOARD: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR200MM Unsecured Notes


G E R M A N Y

ABENDZEITUNG: Files for Insolvency; Owes EUR70 Million


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: In Talks to Write Off EUR3.5-Bil. of Bailout
CLOVERIE PLC: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on EUR25MM Class A Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

BRIT INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
CEVA GROUP: S&P Assigns 'CCC+' Corporate Credit Rating


R U S S I A

MOSKOMPRIVATBANK: Put Under Temporary Administration


S P A I N

AUTOVIA DE LA MANCHA: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR110M Debt to B2
AUTOVIA DE LOS VINEDOS: Moody's Affirms Caa1 EUR103M Loan Rating
OBRASCON HUARTE: Moody's Rates EUR300MM Senior Notes '(P)Ba3'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

MACOB: Enters Administration; 145 Jobs Affected


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: A Legal History of Money in the United States


                            *********


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B U L G A R I A
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CHIMCO: Assets Put Up for Sale at Nearly BGN29MM Starting Price
---------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that the assets of Chimco have been put up for
sale at a starting price of nearly BGN29 million (US$20.3
million/EUR14.8 million).

According to SeeNews, Sofia-based TV channel bTV reported that
Chimco's land, buildings, production and engineering facilities,
equipment and vehicles will be auctioned on March 19.

The TV channel added the tender procedure started at the request
of Chimco's trustee after a decision from the Vratsa regional
court, SeeNews relates.

Chimco, which halted operations in 2003, used to be Bulgaria's
biggest urea producer.  The plant produced ammonia, carbon
dioxide, argon and various types of catalysts, as well.  It was
declared bankrupt in 2004.



UNIONBANK EAD: Fitch Withdraws 'BB-' LT Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Bulgaria-based Unionbank EAD's
ratings.  Fitch has withdrawn the ratings as Unionbank has been
merged into First Investment Bank (FIBank; BB-/Stable) as of
March 4, 2014 and ceased to exist as a legal entity.

Fitch previously highlighted that a legal merger of Unionbank
with FIBank was expected to be completed within a year of its
acquisition.  Fitch has been informed by FIBank that the merger
of Unionbank into FIBank was registered with the Commercial
Register in Bulgaria on March 4, 2014.

The ratings actions are as follows:

-- Long-term IDR: 'BB-', Outlook Stable; withdrawn
-- Short-term IDR: 'B'; withdrawn
-- Viability Rating: 'b-'; withdrawn
-- Support Rating: '3'; withdrawn



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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
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CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Confirms 'Caa1' CFR; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's confirms the ratings of Central European Media
Enterprises Ltd. (CME) -- CFR at Caa1; PDR at Caa1-PD, and the B1
senior secured notes due 2017 (issued by CET 21 spol. s r.o.).
The outlook is negative.

Ratings Rationale

The confirmation of CME's ratings comes as a result of the fund
raising transactions announced by the company last Friday. As
part of the proposed plans, CME would raise approximately US$400
million in a rights offering as well as a US$115 million
revolving credit facility and a US$30 million term loan lent to
the company by its largest shareholder Time Warner Inc. (Baa2
stable). The rights offering will consist of a number of warrants
and a new note, which will pay PIK interest at an accrued rate of
15% and will be used to redeem and cancel CME's outstanding 2016
notes which carry a cash coupon of 11.625%. The direct result of
this debt swap is an annualized saving of around US$45 million in
cash.

While the proposed transaction is subject to execution risk -- as
it requires the consent of CME's 2017 noteholders -- Moody's sees
the announcement as sufficient momentum to conclude the review
for downgrade that had been initiated at the time of CME's Q3
2013 results announcement, last November. The rating agency takes
comfort from Time Warner's continued support and from the fact
the announced transaction offer a medium term solution to CME's
lack of liquidity which would have otherwise seen the company run
out of funds by the middle of 2014.

The negative outlook reflects the continued pressures on CME's
performance which is not expected to show material improvement in
2014 as the company continues to recover from its value-
destructive previous pricing strategy. In addition, the negative
outlook reflects expectations that the company will report a
large cash burn in 2014 as it will need to unwind the large
amount of accounts payable built up over the last few years.
While it is not Moody's central scenario, should the 2017
noteholders consent not be granted for the above transactions to
be successfully implemented, CME's ratings are likely to be
downgraded to a level commensurate with the imminent liquidity
shortfall that the company will be expected to face at that time.

Positive pressure on the ratings is limited in the short term. A
return to a stable outlook could be considered once the fund
raising transactions have successfully closed and following
continued evidence of recovery in CME's underlying advertising
revenues, especially in the Czech Republic.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Broadcast and Advertising Related Industries published in May
2012. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.



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F I N L A N D
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METSA BOARD: S&P Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR200MM Unsecured Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'B+' issue rating and its '4' recovery rating to the proposed
EUR200 million senior unsecured notes due 2019, to be issued by
Finland-based forest products company Metsa Board Corp.
(B+/Stable/B).

At the same time, S&P has assigned its 'B+' issue rating and '4'
recovery rating to the new EUR250 million senior unsecured term
loan and revolving credit facilities due 2018.

S&P understands that Metsa Board will use the proceeds from the
roposed notes and the bank facilities to refinance existing debt
and for general corporate purposes.

The recovery ratings on the proposed notes and facilities reflect
their unsecured nature and are constrained at '4' by the
substantial level of prior-ranking debt obligations, which
dilutes recovery prospects.

RECOVERY ANALYSIS

The notes and the term facilities are unsecured and unguaranteed
obligations of the parent company and rank pari passu with each
other and with all of the group's other senior unsecured debt.

"We understand that the documentation governing Metsa Board's
unsecured notes will include typical features such as negative
pledge and limitation on new indebtedness.  Raising new debt will
be subject to a maximum net leverage ratio of 4.5x, but the group
will be able to incur additional debt under material debt
baskets. In particular, the documentation will allow the raising
of loans from Finnish pension insurance companies if related
asset encumbrances do not exceed EUR250 million.  As the pension
loans benefit from a security, we view them as prior ranking in
the waterfall," S&P said.

The company will also be permitted to incur debt arising under a
securitization of receivables on a recourse or nonrecourse basis
for up to EUR50 million.  Even if the receivables are incurred on
a nonrecourse basis, S&P would consider them to be prior ranking
in the waterfall.

To determine recoveries, S&P simulates a default scenario.  S&P
assumes that a default would primarily be triggered by Metsa
Board's high financial leverage, combined with weaker operating
performance, due to difficult market conditions affecting
packaging and uncoated fine paper.  S&P's hypothetical default
scenario projects a payment default in 2017.

"Under our default scenario, we anticipate that EBITDA would have
declined to about EUR127 million at the point of default.
Assuming a stressed multiple of 5.0x, we calculate a stressed
enterprise value of about EUR637 million at the hypothetical
point of default. After deducting priority liabilities of about
EUR352 million, comprising mainly enforcement costs, 50% of
pension deficits and secured pension loans, about EUR285 million
remains for the senior unsecured debtholders," S&P noted.

S&P assumes that about EUR576 million will be outstanding at
default (including six months of prepetition interest), assuming
a full drawing under the EUR100 million revolving credit
facility, resulting in average (30%-50%) recovery prospects,
albeit at the high end of the range.  This translates into a
recovery rating of '4'.

S&P values Metsa Board as a going concern, underpinned by its
view of the group's strong market positions and its modern asset
base.



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G E R M A N Y
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ABENDZEITUNG: Files for Insolvency; Owes EUR70 Million
------------------------------------------------------
Xinhua reports that The Abendzeitung ("Evening Paper"), a
traditional local newspaper in south German city of Munich, files
for insolvency at the city's local court on Wednesday.

The debt of "Evening Paper", which appears six times a week, has
accumulated to EUR70 million (US$96.13 million) since 2001,
Xinhua discloses.  According to Xinhua, local media Bavarian
Radio cited the publisher as reporting the deficit for 2013 alone
came to EUR10 million.

The owner of the tabloid newspaper Family Friedmann announced
that the prospect for 2014 is also bleak, Xinhua relays.

The publisher and its employees hope that an investor could be
found in the course of insolvency proceedings, Xinhua says.

"Evening Paper", with its headquarters in Munich, was first
founded in June 1948.  Based on 2006 figures, it has an estimated
weekday readership of 320,000, according to Xinhua.



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I R E L A N D
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ALLIED IRISH: In Talks to Write Off EUR3.5-Bil. of Bailout
----------------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Independent.ie reports that Allied Irish Banks
is in talks with the Irish Government that could see a EUR3.5
billion portion of the bank's bailout loans effectively written
off this year.

According to Independent.ie, Chief executive David Duffy said the
state-owned bank has begun discussions with the Department of
Finance that could see EUR3.5 billion of so-called preference
shares, a type of debt the bank owes taxpayers, swapped for
shares in AIB.

Mr. Duffy, as cited by Independent.ie, said that the bank will
return to profit in 2014.

With the Government already owning more than 99% of the bank, the
debt for equity swap wouldn't significantly change the
shareholding, Independent.ie discloses.

However, management at the bank said that a potential conversion
of preference shares into true equity is considered a step
towards simplifying the bank's balance sheet ahead of potentially
bringing in outside investment, Independent.ie notes.

It would also boost the State-owned lender's financial position
in advance of tighter banking rules, dubbed Basel III, that come
into force towards the end of the decade, Independent.ie states.

In better news for taxpayers, he said the bank could be in a
position to repay a share of a separate EUR1.6 billion slice of
its government bailout by the end of the year, Independent.ie
relays.

If AIB passes so-called European stress tests, it could look to
tap private investors for fresh loans and use the proceeds to
repay some of the EUR1.6 billion of contingent capital-
convertible debt it owes the State, Independent.ie states.

It would be the first repayment of any of the EUR21 billion in
bailout capital received by the bank, according to
Independent.ie.

                    About Allied Irish Banks

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- http://www.aibgroup.com/-- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary
shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at
shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-
voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On
April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount
of CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby
increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

The Company reported a loss of EUR2.29 billion in 2011, a loss of
EUR10.16 billion in 2010, and a loss of EUR2.33 billion in 2009.

Allied Irish's consolidated statement of financial position for
the year ended Dec. 31, 2011, showed EUR136.65 billion in total
assets, EUR122.18 billion in total liabilities and EUR14.46
billion in shareholders' equity.

Allied Irish's balance sheet at June 30, 2012, showed EUR129.85
billion in total assets, EUR116.59 billion in total liabilities
and EUR13.26 billion in total shareholders' equity.


CLOVERIE PLC: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on EUR25MM Class A Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the rating on the
following notes issued by CLOVERIE PLC, Series No: 2005-56:

Series 2005-56 EUR25,000,000 Class A Secured Floating Rate
Portfolio Credit Linked Notes due 2025, Affirmed Ba1 (sf);
previously on Mar 13, 2013 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's as affirmed the rating on the transaction because its key
transaction metrics are commensurate with existing ratings. The
affirmation is the result of Moody's on-going surveillance of
commercial real estate collateralized debt obligation (CRE CDO
Synthetic) transactions.

Cloverie 2005-56 is a static synthetic transaction backed by a
portfolio of credit default swaps referencing 100% commercial
mortgage backed securities (CMBS). The CMBS reference obligations
were securitized in 2004 (55.7%) and 2005 (44.3%). As of this
review, all of the reference obligations are rated by Moody's.

Moody's has identified the following as key indicators of the
expected loss in CRE CDO transactions: the weighted average
rating factor (WARF), the weighted average life (WAL), the
weighted average recovery rate (WARR), and Moody's asset
correlation (MAC). Moody's typically models these as actual
parameters for static deals and as covenants for managed deals.

WARF is a primary measure of the credit quality of a CRE CDO
pool. Moody's has updated its assessments for the reference
obligations it does not rate. The rating agency modeled a bottom-
dollar WARF of 77, compared to 58 at last review. The current
ratings on the Moody's-rated reference obligations and the
assessments of the non-Moody's rated reference obligations
follow: Aaa-Aa3 and 89.0% compared to 91.8% at last review; Baa1-
Baa3 and 5.5% compared to 4.1% at last review; and Ba1-Ba3 and
5.5% compared to 4.1% at last review.

Moody's modeled a WAL of 1.0 years, compared to 1.6 at last
review. The WAL is based on assumptions about extensions on the
underlying reference obligations.

Moody's modeled a variable WARR of 67.6%, compared to 65.0% at
last review.

Moody's modeled a MAC of 51.5%, compared to 27.3% at last review.

Methodologies Underlying the Rating Action

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in May 2012.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty, because
it is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio,
which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that are
subject to change. The servicing decisions of the master and
special servicer and surveillance by the operating advisor with
respect to the collateral interests and oversight of the
transaction will also affect the performance of the rated notes.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Changes to any one or more of
the key parameters could have rating implications for some of the
rated notes, although a change in one key parameter assumption
could be offset by a change in one or more of the other key
parameter assumptions. The rated notes are particularly sensitive
to changes in the ratings of the reference obligations and credit
assessments Holding all other key parameters static, notching
down the reference obligations by -1 notches would result in two
notches downward rating movement (eg. 1 notch downward implies
Baa3 to Ba1). Holding all other key parameters static, notching
up the reference obligations by +1 notches would result in one
notch rating movement.

The primary sources of uncertainty in Moody's assumptions are the
extent of growth in the current macroeconomic environment given
the weak recovery and commercial real estate property markets.
Commercial real estate property values continue to improve
modestly, along with a rise in investment activity and
stabilization in core property type performance. Limited new
construction and moderate job growth have aided this improvement.
However, sustained growth will not be possible until investment
increases steadily for a significant period, non-performing
properties are cleared from the pipeline and fears of a
euro area recession abate.



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BRIT INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brit Insurance Holdings B.V.'s Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB+' with a Stable Outlook
and its subordinated notes at 'BB+'.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation is in response to the announcement made on
March 4, 2014 of the intention to float the Brit group (Brit) on
the London Stock Exchange.  The affirmations and Stable Outlook
reflect the agency's view that the initial public offering (IPO)
of a 25% minimum free float is a marginal credit positive.  The
agency recognizes the improvements that have been made to Brit's
underwriting performance since the company was taken into private
ownership and views the announcement of the IPO as a natural
progression for the insurer, which removes some uncertainty
around the possibility and nature of a return to public
ownership.

Fitch will closely monitor Brit's post-IPO profile, specifically
in relation to the size and timing of any further share sales,
dividend strategy and overall capitalization.  Fitch also notes
the shareholder lock-up arrangements which prevent any further
sales by the majority shareholders, Apollo and CVC, for 180 days
and by management and other employees for 365 days following
completion of the IPO.

The affirmations also reflect the solid financial profile of
Brit, which is supported by a strong level of risk-adjusted
capitalization and underlying earnings.  The group reported an
overall profit after tax for 2013 of GBP101.7 million (2012:
GBP84.7 million). The reported combined ratio, excluding FX
effects, was 85.2% (2012: 93.2%), which was assisted by the
continued benign catastrophe environment.

Brit will continue to be majority owned by Achilles Netherlands
Holdings B.V, a holding company majority owned by funds managed
by Apollo Management VII, L.P. and funds advised by CVC Capital
Partners Ltd.

Rating Sensitivities

Key rating triggers for a downgrade include failure by Brit to
maintain financial leverage and capitalization at levels at least
commensurate with the current ratings.  Any marked shift towards
a more risky investment portfolio could lead to negative rating
pressure.

Fitch views a rating upgrade as unlikely in the near term. Over
the longer term, key triggers for a rating upgrade would be an
increase in the size and scale of the company, as well as
maintenance of current underwriting performance, coupled with
capitalization commensurate with a better-than-current rating
level.


CEVA GROUP: S&P Assigns 'CCC+' Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned a 'CCC+'
corporate credit rating to CEVA Holding LLC, the holding company
for Netherlands-based integrated logistics services provider CEVA
Group PLC.  S&P then equalized the corporate credit rating on
CEVA Group PLC with that on CEVA Holding LLC.  Both ratings were
then placed on CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P also assigned a 'B-' issue rating to the proposed US$600
million first-lien term loan; the proposed US$250 million
revolving credit facility; and the proposed US$400 million first-
lien secured notes. S&P's issue ratings on the proposed first-
lien facilities are in line with the expected post-transaction
corporate credit rating on CEVA Group.  S&P assigned a recovery
rating of '4' to the notes.

In addition, S&P assigned its 'CCC' issue rating to the proposed
junior secured (first and a half lien) notes, with a recovery
rating of '6'.  The issue rating on these proposed notes is two
notches lower than the expected post-transaction corporate credit
rating on CEVA Group.

S&P's existing issue rating on the US$390 million first-lien
notes and the US$43 million 12.75% senior notes maturing 2020
will be placed on CreditWatch with positive implications.  The
recovery ratings on these notes are unchanged at '4' and '6',
respectively.

Once CEVA Group has successfully completed the transaction, S&P
expects to withdraw the issue and recovery ratings on the
refinanced debt instruments, which include the US$536 million
first-lien term loan; US$562 million first-lien notes; US$210
million first and a half lien notes; and the outstanding senior
notes.  The issue ratings on these notes are unchanged.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of CEVA Group's business
and financial risk profiles following the refinancing the company
has announced and the year-end 2013 results it released on
Feb. 28, 2014.

The rating reflects S&P's assessment of CEVA Group's "weak"
business risk profile and "highly leveraged" financial risk
profile.

The business risk profile incorporates S&P's view of the
railroad/package express industry's "low" risk and CEVA Group's
exposure to "intermediate" country risk, based on its globally
diversified operations.  S&P's assessment of business risk also
takes into consideration CEVA Group's weak absolute profitability
compared with peers, and its view that difficult market
conditions in the freight management business, particularly the
airfreight segment, has led to declining volumes and
profitability.

S&P assess the financial risk profile as "highly leveraged" based
on certain key metrics, including funds from operations (FFO) to
debt, which stands at 6.0%, and debt to EBITDA at 7.6x.  In
addition, CEVA Group's ownership by a financial sponsor caps its
financial risk profile.  This is indicated by S&P's assessment of
financial policy as FS-6.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view that after the
refinancing, CEVA Group will have no material maturities in the
next 24 months.  In S&P's view, this affords CEVA Group
additional time to implement measures aimed at sustainably
improving its absolute profitability, which should make the
current capital structure sustainable.  The transaction will also
improve its liquidity position, a key concern given that the
rating was lowered to 'CCC+' with a stable outlook in May 2013.

CEVA Group's reported cash flow has also improved, despite a
reduction in reported EBITDA, mainly because working capital has
improved while capital expenditure (capex) has fallen.  Working
capital management will continue to be an important area of focus
in S&P's analysis.

S&P's base-case scenario assumes:

   -- CEVA's revenues will grow by about 1.5% in 2014;

   -- Adjusted EBITDA margin will improve slightly to between
      6.5% and 7%; and

   -- In view of the lack of amortizing debt in the capital
      structure, deleveraging will not be significant in the
      short term.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

   -- FFO to debt of about 6% in 2014; and

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 7.6x by year-end 2014.



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R U S S I A
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MOSKOMPRIVATBANK: Put Under Temporary Administration
----------------------------------------------------
Katya Golubkova and Natalia Zinets at Reuters report that the
Russian central bank said on Thursday it was putting the Moscow
subsidiary of Ukraine's Privatbank into temporary administration,
but that it would not revoke the bank's license.

According to Reuters, the central bank said in a statement the
decision to appoint an interim administration for
Moskomprivatbank, Russia's No.95 by assets according to Interfax
data, was effective immediately.

"The role of the temporary administration is to oversee the
lending institution and to control the disposal of its property,"
Reuters quotes the central bank as saying in a statement.

Moskomprivatbank, with assets of RUR50 billion (US$1.4 billion),
has capital requirement ratios above the levels required by the
Russian central bank to keep a banking license, Reuters
discloses.

According to the central bank's data for January, the latest
available, it had no violations of capital requirements, Reuters
notes.

Reuters relates that Dmitry Barbayanov, chairman of
Moskomprivatbank, said in a statement on Thursday interim
administration -- a rare move by the Russian central bank --
would last 10 days.  Mr. Barbayanov, as cited by Reuters, said
that it had "no economic grounds" and aimed to help the bank to
meet "high clients' demand" if it arises.

Privatbank, founded in 1992, is Ukraine's largest.  According to
public information, Igor Kolomoisky owns a 33.9% stake in the
bank and his business partner Gennady Bogolyubov 34.2.



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S P A I N
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AUTOVIA DE LA MANCHA: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR110M Debt to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has announced multiple rating actions
on the following issuers domiciled in Spain: Autovia de la Mancha
S.A. (Aumancha) and Autovia de Los Vinedos S.A. (Auvisa).

Autovia De La Mancha S.A.

Moody's has upgraded the underlying rating to B2 from Caa1 of the
EUR110 million guaranteed senior secured loan, due 2031 raised by
Aumancha. The outlook remains positive. Concurrently, the rating
on the loan, taking into account the benefit of a guarantee of
scheduled payments of principal and interest provided by Assured
Guaranty (Europe) Ltd. (A2 stable, the Insured Rating), has been
upgraded to A2 from A3.

Aumancha is a special purpose company that in June 2003 entered
into a 30-year concession agreement with Junta de Comunidades,
Castilla-La Mancha (Castilla-La Mancha, Ba2 positive) to build,
operate and maintain a 52.3 km shadow toll road, the Toledo to
Consuegra section of the Autovia de los Vinedos motorway linking
the cities of Toledo and Tomelloso in central Spain.

Autovia De Los Vinedos S.A.

Moody's has affirmed the Caa1 rating on the EUR103 million loan
facility provided by the European Investment Bank (the EIB Loan)
to Auvisa and the EUR64.1 million of bonds raised by Auvisa. The
outlook remains negative.

Auvisa is a special purpose company, which in December 2003,
entered into a 30-year concession agreement with Castilla-La
Mancha to build, operate and maintain a 74.5km shadow toll road,
the Consuegra to Tomelloso section of the Autovia de los Vinedos
motorway linking the cities of Toledo and Tomelloso in central
Spain.

Ratings Rationale

Autovia De La Mancha S.A.

The upgrade of the underlying rating reflects the improving
credit quality of the Castilla-La Mancha (payer under the
concession agreement), as captured by Moody's upgrade of Castilla
La-Mancha to Ba2 from Ba3, and change in outlook to positive from
stable, on 27 February 2014 and improving traffic volumes on the
project road in the six-months to January 2014. The upgrade of
the Insured Rating follows Moody's rating action of 21 February
2014 where the rating agency upgraded Spain's government bond
rating to Baa2 from Baa3 and raised Spain's local and foreign
currency bond and deposit ceilings to A1 from A3. The Insured
Rating has previously been constrained by the country ceiling.

The B2 rating on the underlying loan is constrained by (1)
Aumancha's exposure to declining traffic, although volumes have
recently shown modest growth; (2) the credit quality of Castilla-
La Mancha as payer under the concession agreement; (3) the
history of late payments by Castilla-La Mancha, to the detriment
of Aumancha's capacity to meet debt service payments, although
the recent payment history has been in line with contractual
terms; and (4) high leverage. However, these risks are mitigated
by Aumancha's satisfactory debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs),
even under downside traffic cases, and its strong liquidity which
would allow the project to withstand more than 12 months of
payment delays. Moody's also notes the protection afforded to
Aumancha by the compensation on termination regime in the event
of a default under the concession agreement.

Observed traffic on the road has been volatile over the past
three years. Traffic volumes for light vehicles (LVs) fell in
2011 and 2012 by 4% and 7%, respectively, whereas the fall in
heavy vehicles (HVs) has been more pronounced, with a fall of 7%,
and 13%, respectively. In 2013, LV and HV volumes also declined,
by 0.1% and 5% respectively, albeit the rate of decline in
traffic volumes on the project road is showing signs of easing
and LV traffic volumes were positive for the six-months to
January 2014. Moody's has run a conservative scenario (Moody's
Case) whereby it assumes a fall in LVs and HVs in 2014 and 2015
of 0.1% and 5%, respectively (in line with actual traffic 2013),
flat growth in 2016 and 1.2% growth thereafter. Under this
scenario, Moody's forecasts that Aumancha's minimum and average
DSCR will be 1.21x (occurs in 2015) and 1.52x, respectively.

The Insured Rating is positioned in line with the rating of the
Assured Guarantee. The Insured Rating had previously been
constrained at the country ceiling to reflect the risk, most
specifically in the event of a currency redenomination, that the
guarantee will not reliably or effectively mitigate the risks
embedded in the ceiling.

Autovia De Los Vinedos S.A.

The affirmation of Auvisa's Caa1 ratings reflects the company's
weak financial metrics, exposure to downside traffic scenarios
and weaknesses in the financial structure. Auvisa's ratings are
not directly constrained by Castila La-Mancha's ratings, and so
are unaffected by Moody's rating action of February 27, 2014,
where the rating agency changed the outlook on Castilla La-
Mancha's ratings to Ba2 from Ba3.

The Caa1 ratings are constrained by (1) Auvisa's weak DSCRs; (2)
Auvisa's exposure to declining traffic volumes although LVs grew
by 0.5% in 2013; (3) the history of late payments by Castilla-La
Mancha, to the detriment of Auvisa's capacity to meet debt
service payments, although the recent payment history has been in
line with contractual terms; (4) the ineffectiveness of the lock-
up mechanism in protecting debtholders under downside scenarios;
and (5) high leverage. These risks are to some extent mitigated
by Auvisa's liquidity and Moody's also notes the protection
afforded by the compensation on termination regime in the event
of a default under the concession agreement.

Observed traffic on the project road has been volatile over the
past three years. LV traffic volumes fell in 2011 and 2012 by 2%
and 7%, respectively, and those for HVs fell by 1% and 11%,
respectively. While LVs recovered slightly by 0.5% in 2013, HVs
fell by 4%. Moody's has run a conservative scenario (Moody's
Case), which assumes an increase in LVs of 0.5% and a 4% fall in
HVs (as per 2013 actual rates) for 2014 and 2015, and a return to
modest growth of 1.2% in 2016 and 2017 for LVs and HVs,
respectively. Under this scenario, Moody's forecasts a minimum
and average DSCR, which is different from Auvisa's DSCR in that
it includes transfers to the maintenance reserve account (MRA),
of 0.74x and 1.03x, respectively. Under this scenario Auvisa
would be able to continue to pay principal and interest using the
debt service reserve account. Moody's Case assumes that Auvisa
does not pay any dividends during the concession period even
though they may be entitled to under the terms of the finance
documentation.

As per the financing documents, Auvisa's DSCR calculation
includes transfers from, but not to, the MRA. This means that
there is a material difference between Moody's DSCR and Auvisa's
DSCR -- under Moody's Case, above, Auvisa's minimum and average
DSCR are 1.06x and 1.28x, respectively, significantly higher than
Moody's minimum and average DSCR of 0.74x and 1.03x,
respectively. The distribution lock-up criteria allows for
dividends to be paid if the projected DSCR and historical DSCR
are greater than 1.2x. Under Moody's Case, Auvisa satisfies this
criteria from 2020 onwards. While the controlling creditors (EIB
and Syncora Guarantee (U.K.) Ltd., jointly) can block a dividend
payment, this covenant is weakly drafted, which Moody's views as
a material weakness in the structure.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Autovia De La Mancha S.A.

Moody's could consider upgrading the underlying rating if traffic
volumes maintain their recent recovery, supporting an improved
DSCR and Castilla-La Mancha continues to make timely payments to
the company in accordance with the terms of the concession
agreement. Further improvement in the credit quality of Castilla-
La Mancha would support upward ratings pressure. Conversely,
Moody's could consider downgrading the ratings if there were a
deterioration in traffic volumes and DSCRs and/or the project
experiences further payment delays; (2) operating, maintenance
and lifecycle cost assumptions prove inadequate; or (3) the
rating of Castilla-La Mancha is downgraded.

Autovia De Los Vinedos S.A.

Moody's could consider upgrading the ratings if Auvisa's traffic
and DSCR profiles improve and there are no ongoing payment
delays. Conversely, Moody's could consider downgrading the
ratings if (1) there was a deterioration in traffic volumes and
DSCRs and/or the project experiences further payment delays; or
(2) operating, maintenance and lifecycle cost assumptions were to
prove inadequate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Operational
Toll Roads published in December 2006.


AUTOVIA DE LOS VINEDOS: Moody's Affirms Caa1 EUR103M Loan Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has announced multiple rating actions
on the following issuers domiciled in Spain: Autovia de la Mancha
S.A. (Aumancha) and Autovia de Los Vinedos S.A. (Auvisa).

Autovia De La Mancha S.A.

Moody's has upgraded the underlying rating to B2 from Caa1 of the
EUR110 million guaranteed senior secured loan, due 2031 raised by
Aumancha. The outlook remains positive. Concurrently, the rating
on the loan, taking into account the benefit of a guarantee of
scheduled payments of principal and interest provided by Assured
Guaranty (Europe) Ltd. (A2 stable, the Insured Rating), has been
upgraded to A2 from A3.

Aumancha is a special purpose company that in June 2003 entered
into a 30-year concession agreement with Junta de Comunidades,
Castilla-La Mancha (Castilla-La Mancha, Ba2 positive) to build,
operate and maintain a 52.3 km shadow toll road, the Toledo to
Consuegra section of the Autovia de los Vinedos motorway linking
the cities of Toledo and Tomelloso in central Spain.

Autovia De Los Vinedos S.A.

Moody's has affirmed the Caa1 rating on the EUR103 million loan
facility provided by the European Investment Bank (the EIB Loan)
to Auvisa and the EUR64.1 million of bonds raised by Auvisa. The
outlook remains negative.

Auvisa is a special purpose company, which in December 2003,
entered into a 30-year concession agreement with Castilla-La
Mancha to build, operate and maintain a 74.5km shadow toll road,
the Consuegra to Tomelloso section of the Autovia de los Vinedos
motorway linking the cities of Toledo and Tomelloso in central
Spain.

Ratings Rationale

Autovia De La Mancha S.A.

The upgrade of the underlying rating reflects the improving
credit quality of the Castilla-La Mancha (payer under the
concession agreement), as captured by Moody's upgrade of Castilla
La-Mancha to Ba2 from Ba3, and change in outlook to positive from
stable, on 27 February 2014 and improving traffic volumes on the
project road in the six-months to January 2014. The upgrade of
the Insured Rating follows Moody's rating action of 21 February
2014 where the rating agency upgraded Spain's government bond
rating to Baa2 from Baa3 and raised Spain's local and foreign
currency bond and deposit ceilings to A1 from A3. The Insured
Rating has previously been constrained by the country ceiling.

The B2 rating on the underlying loan is constrained by (1)
Aumancha's exposure to declining traffic, although volumes have
recently shown modest growth; (2) the credit quality of Castilla-
La Mancha as payer under the concession agreement; (3) the
history of late payments by Castilla-La Mancha, to the detriment
of Aumancha's capacity to meet debt service payments, although
the recent payment history has been in line with contractual
terms; and (4) high leverage. However, these risks are mitigated
by Aumancha's satisfactory debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs),
even under downside traffic cases, and its strong liquidity which
would allow the project to withstand more than 12 months of
payment delays. Moody's also notes the protection afforded to
Aumancha by the compensation on termination regime in the event
of a default under the concession agreement.

Observed traffic on the road has been volatile over the past
three years. Traffic volumes for light vehicles (LVs) fell in
2011 and 2012 by 4% and 7%, respectively, whereas the fall in
heavy vehicles (HVs) has been more pronounced, with a fall of 7%,
and 13%, respectively. In 2013, LV and HV volumes also declined,
by 0.1% and 5% respectively, albeit the rate of decline in
traffic volumes on the project road is showing signs of easing
and LV traffic volumes were positive for the six-months to
January 2014. Moody's has run a conservative scenario (Moody's
Case) whereby it assumes a fall in LVs and HVs in 2014 and 2015
of 0.1% and 5%, respectively (in line with actual traffic 2013),
flat growth in 2016 and 1.2% growth thereafter. Under this
scenario, Moody's forecasts that Aumancha's minimum and average
DSCR will be 1.21x (occurs in 2015) and 1.52x, respectively.

The Insured Rating is positioned in line with the rating of the
Assured Guarantee. The Insured Rating had previously been
constrained at the country ceiling to reflect the risk, most
specifically in the event of a currency redenomination, that the
guarantee will not reliably or effectively mitigate the risks
embedded in the ceiling.

Autovia De Los Vinedos S.A.

The affirmation of Auvisa's Caa1 ratings reflects the company's
weak financial metrics, exposure to downside traffic scenarios
and weaknesses in the financial structure. Auvisa's ratings are
not directly constrained by Castila La-Mancha's ratings, and so
are unaffected by Moody's rating action of February 27, 2014,
where the rating agency changed the outlook on Castilla La-
Mancha's ratings to Ba2 from Ba3.

The Caa1 ratings are constrained by (1) Auvisa's weak DSCRs; (2)
Auvisa's exposure to declining traffic volumes although LVs grew
by 0.5% in 2013; (3) the history of late payments by Castilla-La
Mancha, to the detriment of Auvisa's capacity to meet debt
service payments, although the recent payment history has been in
line with contractual terms; (4) the ineffectiveness of the lock-
up mechanism in protecting debtholders under downside scenarios;
and (5) high leverage. These risks are to some extent mitigated
by Auvisa's liquidity and Moody's also notes the protection
afforded by the compensation on termination regime in the event
of a default under the concession agreement.

Observed traffic on the project road has been volatile over the
past three years. LV traffic volumes fell in 2011 and 2012 by 2%
and 7%, respectively, and those for HVs fell by 1% and 11%,
respectively. While LVs recovered slightly by 0.5% in 2013, HVs
fell by 4%. Moody's has run a conservative scenario (Moody's
Case), which assumes an increase in LVs of 0.5% and a 4% fall in
HVs (as per 2013 actual rates) for 2014 and 2015, and a return to
modest growth of 1.2% in 2016 and 2017 for LVs and HVs,
respectively. Under this scenario, Moody's forecasts a minimum
and average DSCR, which is different from Auvisa's DSCR in that
it includes transfers to the maintenance reserve account (MRA),
of 0.74x and 1.03x, respectively. Under this scenario Auvisa
would be able to continue to pay principal and interest using the
debt service reserve account. Moody's Case assumes that Auvisa
does not pay any dividends during the concession period even
though they may be entitled to under the terms of the finance
documentation.

As per the financing documents, Auvisa's DSCR calculation
includes transfers from, but not to, the MRA. This means that
there is a material difference between Moody's DSCR and Auvisa's
DSCR -- under Moody's Case, above, Auvisa's minimum and average
DSCR are 1.06x and 1.28x, respectively, significantly higher than
Moody's minimum and average DSCR of 0.74x and 1.03x,
respectively. The distribution lock-up criteria allows for
dividends to be paid if the projected DSCR and historical DSCR
are greater than 1.2x. Under Moody's Case, Auvisa satisfies this
criteria from 2020 onwards. While the controlling creditors (EIB
and Syncora Guarantee (U.K.) Ltd., jointly) can block a dividend
payment, this covenant is weakly drafted, which Moody's views as
a material weakness in the structure.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Autovia De La Mancha S.A.

Moody's could consider upgrading the underlying rating if traffic
volumes maintain their recent recovery, supporting an improved
DSCR and Castilla-La Mancha continues to make timely payments to
the company in accordance with the terms of the concession
agreement. Further improvement in the credit quality of Castilla-
La Mancha would support upward ratings pressure. Conversely,
Moody's could consider downgrading the ratings if there were a
deterioration in traffic volumes and DSCRs and/or the project
experiences further payment delays; (2) operating, maintenance
and lifecycle cost assumptions prove inadequate; or (3) the
rating of Castilla-La Mancha is downgraded.

Autovia De Los Vinedos S.A.

Moody's could consider upgrading the ratings if Auvisa's traffic
and DSCR profiles improve and there are no ongoing payment
delays. Conversely, Moody's could consider downgrading the
ratings if (1) there was a deterioration in traffic volumes and
DSCRs and/or the project experiences further payment delays; or
(2) operating, maintenance and lifecycle cost assumptions were to
prove inadequate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Operational
Toll Roads published in December 2006.


OBRASCON HUARTE: Moody's Rates EUR300MM Senior Notes '(P)Ba3'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba3
rating with a Loss Given Default assessment of 4 (LGD4) to the
proposed issuance of EUR300 million worth of senior notes due
2022 by Obrascon Huarte Lain S.A. (OHL). The company's Ba3
corporate family rating (CFR), Ba3-PD probability of default
rating (PDR), as well as the Ba3 ratings on its existing senior
unsecured debt instruments, remain unchanged. The outlook on all
ratings is stable.

OHL will use the proceeds from this offering to refinance an
equivalent amount of its outstanding EUR524 million worth of
senior notes due 2015. The new notes will rank pari passu with
OHL's existing senior unsecured notes.

"The (P)Ba3 instrument ratings for the proposed senior notes
reflect their senior unsecured status and pari-passu ranking with
OHL's existing senior unsecured notes," says Iv n Palacios, a
Moody's Vice President, Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst
for OHL.

"The company's ratings and outlook remain unchanged after this
offering, given that the transaction is leverage-neutral.
However, we note positively that the proposed transaction will
improve OHL's debt maturity profile, as the company is pushing
most of its 2015 debt maturities to 2022," adds Mr. Palacios.

Moody's issues provisional instrument ratings in advance of the
final sale of securities, and these ratings reflect the rating
agency's preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction
only. Upon a conclusive review of the final documentation,
Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the notes.
The definitive rating may differ from the provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

OHL's Ba3 CFR takes into account (1) OHL's high leverage, both on
a recourse and consolidated basis; (2) its sustained negative
free cash flow generation; (3) the macroeconomic situation
affecting its business in Spain and the fact that the company has
a degree of reliance on the domestic banking sector; (4) the
group's complex debt structure, with margin loans used
extensively at intermediate holding companies; and (5) that the
company's order backlog has a degree of concentration on large
contracts.

However, this is also partially offset by OHL's (1) position as
one of Spain's leading construction companies and one of the
world's largest concessions operators; (2) portfolio of
businesses, through which it balances cyclical construction
activities with more predictable concession-generated revenues;
(3) exposure to multiple geographies, with a growing portfolio of
international construction projects; (4) large order backlog,
which supports the high visibility of the company's construction
activities; and (5) value embedded in its equity stakes in
Abertis and OHL Mexico.

The stable rating outlook incorporates our expectation that OHL's
credit metrics will likely improve in 2014, supported by the
initial cash flows from some of the company's large projects, for
which the design phase will soon finish and the construction
phase begin. The outlook also reflects the embedded value in
OHL's portfolio of listed concession assets.

In addition, the outlook assumes that the company will continue
to have strong access to bank financing for working capital
funding.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward rating pressure could develop if OHL's credit metrics
improve on a sustainable basis such that (1) net consolidated
debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) falls below 4.5x; (2) gross
recourse debt/recourse EBITDA drops below 4.0x; and (3) net
recourse debt/recourse EBITDA falls well below 3.0x. Upward
rating pressure would also need to be supported by a solid
liquidity profile.

Moody's could downgrade the Ba3 rating if OHL's credit metrics
weaken on a sustained basis such that the company's (1) net
consolidated debt/EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) increases above
5.5x; (2) gross recourse debt/recourse EBITDA rises above 5.0x;
and (3) net recourse debt/recourse EBITDA stays above 3.5x. The
rating could also come under downward pressure if the LTV ratio
of OHL's equity stakes in Abertis and OHL Mexico approaches 50%.
In addition, downward pressure could be exerted on the rating if
there are signs that the group's liquidity is becoming
constrained, including, but not limited to, a further reduction
in covenant headroom.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Construction Methodology published in November 2010. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Madrid, OHL is one of Spain's leading
construction companies and one of the largest concessions
operators in the world, with a significant concessions business
in Mexico and a 18.9% equity stake in Spanish infrastructure
operator Abertis. In 2013, OHL reported sales of EUR3.7 billion
and EBITDA of EUR1.2 billion.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


MACOB: Enters Administration; 145 Jobs Affected
-----------------------------------------------
Brian Meechan at BBC News reports that about 145 staff at Macob
in Cardiff have been made redundant.

A number of Macob firms have entered administration and have
closed with immediate effect, BBC relates.

According to BBC, the firm said the closures were a sign of tough
trading conditions.

Macob is a property and construction group.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: A Legal History of Money in the United States
------------------------------------------------------------
Author: James Willard Hurst
Publisher: Beard Books
Paperback: US$34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today and one for a colleague at
http://is.gd/x8Gesf

This book chronicles the legal elements of the history of the
system of money in the United States from 1774 to 1970. It
originated as a series of lectures given by James Hurst at the
University of Nebraska in 1973. Mr. Hurst is quick to say that
he , as a historian of the law, took care in this book not to
make his own judgments on matters outside the law. Rather, he
conducted an exhaustive literature review of economics, economic
history, and banking to recount the development of law over the
operations of money. He attempted to "borrow the opinions of
qualified specialists outside the law in order to provide a
meaningful context in which to appraise what the law has done or
162failed to do."

Mr. Hurst define money, for the purposes of this books, as "a
distinct institutional instrument employed primarily in
allocating scarce economic resources, mainly through government
and market processes," and not shorthand for economic, social,
or political power held through command of economic assets."
From the beginning, public and legal policy in the U.S. centered
on the definition of legitimate uses of both law affecting
money, and allocation of power over money among official
agencies, both federal and state. The foundations of monetary
policy were laid between 1774 and 1788. Initially, individual
state legislatures and the Continental Congress issued paper
currency in the form of bills of credit. The Constitutional
Convention later determined that ultimate control of the money
supply should be at the federal level. Other issues were not
clearly defined and were left to be determined by events.

The author describes how law was used to create and maintain a
system of money capable of servicing the flow of resource
allocations in an economy of broadly dispersed public and
private decision making. Law defined standard money units and
made those units acceptable for use in conducting transactions.
Over time, adjustment of the money supply was recognized as a
legitimate concern of law. Private banks were delegated
expansive monetary action powers throughout the 1900s and
private markets for gold and silver were allowed to affect the
money supply until 1933-34. Although the Federal Reserve Act
was not aimed clearly at managing money for goals of major
economic adjustment, it set precedents by devaluing the dollar
and restricting the use of gold.

Mr. Hurst devotes a large part of his book to key issues of
monetary policy involving the distribution of power over money
between the nation and the states, between legal and market
processes, and among major agencies of the government. Until
about 1860, all major branches of government shared in making
monetary policy, with states playing a large role. Between 1908
and 1970, monetary policy became firmly centralized at the
national level, and separation of powers questions arose between
the Federal Reserve Board, the White House (The Council of
Economic Advisors), and the Treasury.

The book was an enormous undertaking and its research
exhaustive. It includes 18 pages of sources cited and 90 pages
of footnotes. Each era of American legal history is treated
comprehensively. The book makes fascinating reading for those
interested in the cause and effect relationship between legal
processes and economic processes and t hose concerned with
public administration and the separation of powers.

James Willard Hurst (1910-1997) is widely regarded as the
grandfather of American legal history. He graduated from
Harvard Law School in 1935 and taught at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison for 44 years.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *