/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/140331.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Monday, March 31, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 63 Headlines A U S T R I A OESTERREICHISCHE VOLKSBANKEN: Moody's Cuts Sr. Debt Rating to Ba1 B O S N I A BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating; Outlook Stable C R O A T I A CROATIAN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Issuer Rating; Outlook Neg. F R A N C E WINDERMERE XII: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'CC' G E R M A N Y ENTERPRISE NETWORKS: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR; Outlook Stable TAKKO FASHION: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'B' CCR VOLVO AUTO: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Deposit Rating & 'E+' BFSR H U N G A R Y HUNGARY: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB' Rating I R E L A N D AMEY LAGAN: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Positive BLOXHAM: Appeals Ruling on ISE Membership Termination CARLYLE GLOBAL: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes CB MEZZCAP: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'D(sf)' CVC CORDATUS: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)sf' Rating to Class F Notes HARVEST CLO VIII: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Notes HARVEST CLO VIII: Fitch Puts 'Bsf' Rating to EUR10MM Cl. F Notes MARQUETTE US: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'B-' PERMANENT TSB: DBRS Assigns 'BB(low)' LT Debt & Deposit Ratings ST. PAUL'S CLO IV: Fitch Assigns 'B-(sf)' Rating to Class E Notes ST. PAUL'S CLO IV: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class E Notes ULSTER BANK: RBS Mulls Sale of Irish Hotel Assets I T A L Y BORMIOLI ROCCO: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+' on Weaker Credit Metrics K A Z A K H S T A N ALLIANCE BANK: S&P Lowers Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to 'D' L U X E M B O U R G ALLNEX LUXEMBOURG: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating N E T H E R L A N D S AI AVOCADO: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable CEVA HOLDINGS: S&P Raises CCR to 'B-' on Completed Refinancing GRESHAM CAPITAL V: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to CCC RHODIUM 1: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class D Notes R O M A N I A * ROMANIA: Banks See Improvement in Liquidated Asset Sales R U S S I A INTERREGIONAL DISTRIBUTIVE: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative MOSCOW UNITED: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB' CCR ROSTELECOM OJSC: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Stable RUSHYDRO: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB+' CCR VODOKANAL ST PETERSBURG: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Positive S P A I N CABLEUROPA SAU: S&P Puts 'B+' CCR on CreditWatch Positive S W I T Z E R L A N D UBS AG: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR25MM Term Notes to 'Ba3' U K R A I N E UKRAINE: On Brink of Financial Bankruptcy, PM Says U N I T E D K I N G D O M AES CORPORATION: Fitch Affirms 'B' ST Issuer Default Rating CVC CORDATUS: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to EUR13.5MM Notes DEVIX MIDCO: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corporate Family Rating REDIRACK: RGF Unlikely to Recover Almost GBP4-Mil. Claims X X X X X X X X * Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 19 CSO Tranches * BOND PRICING: For the Week March 24 to March 28, 2014 ********* ============= A U S T R I A ============= OESTERREICHISCHE VOLKSBANKEN: Moody's Cuts Sr. Debt Rating to Ba1 ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings of Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG (VBAG) to Ba1 from Baa3 and placed the ratings on review for further downgrade. The rating agency has also downgraded the short-term rating to Not Prime from Prime-3 and affirmed the standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) at E, equivalent to a caa1 baseline credit assessment (BCA). During the review period Moody's will also assess the potential for downward adjustment for the bank's BCA. The downgrade of VBAG's debt and deposit ratings reflects Moody's assessment of weakened willingness of the Austrian government for further capital support for VBAG as evidenced by statements of government officials. The potential for downward adjustments of the bank's BCA and, as a consequence, of the long-term debt and deposit ratings results from a potential need for additional capital measures driven by VBAG's weak credit profile and follows a projected loss in excess of EUR200 million at the single entity level for VBAG for the fiscal year 2013, as announced by VBAG on 19 December 2013. The performance of VBAG's run-down portfolios and its Romanian operations create further uncertainties around the bank's future capital needs. The ratings are placed on review for downgrade to allow Moody's to further assess the Austrian government's preparedness to continue extending support to VBAG and the entire sector as a key shareholder of VBAG. In addition, Moody's will assess (1) VBAG's 2013 financial performance and potential further capital needs based on the annual accounts to be published by April 2014; and (2) the ability of the Austrian Volksbanken sector (unrated) to provide support, if needed. These factors will determine any downward adjustment of VBAG's caa1 BCA. Moody's also downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 and placed on review for further downgrade the senior unsecured ratings of VBAG's former subsidiary Investkredit Bank AG (which VBAG assumed in September 2012). The Caa2 ratings of the subordinate and senior subordinate debt of VBAG and its former subsidiary Investkredit Bank AG (Investkredit) were also placed on review for downgrade. Hybrid capital instruments of VBAG, Investkredit or other issuing entities of the group continue to be rated on an expected loss basis and remain unaffected by the rating action. Rating Rationale Downgrade of Debt and Deposit Ratings Reflect Uncertainty About the Provision of External Support Recently, the officials of the Austrian government has stated publicly that it is no longer willing to step in to fill any further capital shortfalls at VBAG following those in 2009 and 2012. Instead, the sector as the bank's majority owner would need to provide the additional capital if needed. While Moody's does not infer from these statements that the probability of government support is zero, the rating agency has lowered its support assumptions for VBAG and reduced the support uplift incorporated in the rating to six notches from seven. In addition, the ratings remain on review for further downgrade to assess the Austrian government's intentions and likelihood of providing support in case of need. Previously, VBAG's ratings reflected Moody's expectation of a very high probability of systemic support from Austria (Aaa, stable) being forthcoming in the event of need. The government owns around 43% of VBAG. Austria evidenced its commitment in the past through repeated support measures for VBAG since the onset of the financial crisis including a EUR1 billion injection of participation capital in 2009 and EUR250 million of equity provided in 2012. In March 2013, VBAG received a EUR100 million asset guarantee until 2015. Potential Additional Capital Needs to Ensure Ongoing Compliance with Capital Requirements at the Level of the Volksbanken Sector A potential remapping of VBAG's E BFSR could result from additional capital needs that may necessitate a capital injection at the level of the sector. According to a draft report on the Joint Risk Assessment and Decision-Process (JRAD), the Austrian regulator requires a 13.6% minimum total capitalization of the Volksbanken sector under Basel III. Despite a 15% capitalization under Basel II.5 as of October 2013, Moody's believes that there is a reasonable likelihood that additional capital will be needed at the level of the sector in the medium term because of (1) VBAG's continued weak operating performance and profitability, and (2) the need to replace the government's EUR300 million participation capital at the end of 2017 when it will lose its regulatory recognition. Further provisioning needs may arise from the European Central Bank's Comprehensive Assessment which the sector is subject to. In Moody's central scenario, the sector continues to be able to address capital needs on its own, which may include additional capital raising at the level of the sector. In addition, Moody's expects that VBAG's deleveraging will also be a crucial element for the sector to comply with minimum capitalization needs from the Austrian regulator. VBAG continued to downsize its non-core operations to EUR8.2 billion assets in September 2013, down from EUR10.7 billion at year-end 2012. This has resulted in significantly stronger capital ratios of 13.0% Tier 1 and 17.5% total capitalization under Basel II.5, up from 10.9% and 15.7% at year end. Vbag Remains Vulnerable Given Its Continued Weak Fundamentals and Further Tail Risk From Romanian Operations VBAG continues to show (1) weak fundamentals given the poor operating performance, (2) asset quality weaknesses concentrated in its EUR8.2 billion non-core portfolio and its Romanian operations. As a result, visibility of VBAG's core earnings remains low. VBAG showed moderate provisioning levels of 52% as of September 2013, against non-performing loans of 19.2% or EUR2.4 billion in VBAG's loan book. The bank's Romanian operations pose particular credit risks. VBAG holds 51% in VB Romania (unrated), which is accounted for at equity since September 2011, having been fully consolidated before. Apart from EUR1.1 billion impaired loans there is significant additional risk for further impairments in VB Romania's EUR3.8 billion loan portfolio, in Moody's view. In October 2013, VB Romania needed a capital injection of EUR120 million, of which VBAG provided EUR61 million on their pro-rata ownership basis. As of September 2013, VBAG continued to provide EUR1 billion funding to VB Romania. What Could Move The Rating -- Up / Down Downward pressure on VBAG's standalone BCA would emerge if Moody's believes that the sector does not have the capacity to support VBAG, in case of need. Capital shortfalls at the level of VBAG might be one issue that would trigger the need for this support. Further pressure would arise if VBAG's funding profile and liquidity comes under pressure; any delay in the bank's ability to offload its substantial run-down portfolio would likely trigger this extra pressure. VBAG's debt and deposit ratings could suffer from downward pressure as a result of (1) pressure on its BCA; and/or (2) if Moody's further revises its assumptions regarding the likelihood of the Austrian government being willing to provide systemic support to VBAG. Upward pressure on VBAG's BFSR would result from a successful recapitalization and/or asset disposals that would allow VBAG to execute its restructuring plan. In particular, a successful deleveraging and de-risking of its balance sheet, which will support the preservation of an adequate liquidity position. Upward pressure on the bank's debt and deposit rating would require substantial improvements in the bank's standalone BCA. Moody's believes that these improvements are currently unlikely given the high level of support already incorporated into the bank's ratings. List of Affected Ratings The following ratings of VBAG were downgraded: Long-term senior debt and deposit ratings and issuer rating to Ba1, review for downgrade, from Baa3, stable; Short-term debt and deposit ratings to Not Prime from Prime-3. The following rating of VBAG was affirmed: E BFSR, equivalent to a BCA of caa1. The following ratings of VBAG and Investkredit Bank AG were placed on review for downgrade: Subordinate and senior subordinate debt ratings at Caa2. The following ratings of Investkredit Bank AG were downgraded: Long-term senior unsecured debt ratings to Ba1, review for downgrade, from Baa3, stable. =========== B O S N I A =========== BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating; Outlook Stable -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B/B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The outlook is stable. Rationale The ratings on Bosnia and Herzegovina are constrained by S&P's view of its fragile, overlapping government institutions, its weak fiscal management framework, and external vulnerabilities arising from persistent current account deficits and funding challenges. The ratings are supported by S&P's expectation of continued and significant international support. S&P believes that the domestic political environment will likely remain divided along ethnic lines and entity boundaries, structured under the 1995 Dayton Accord that concluded the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. Under this structure, Bosnia is divided into two political entities -- the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with a predominantly Bosnian Muslim [Bosniak] and Croat population) and the Republika Srpska (predominantly Serbian Orthodox Christian and Bosniak). In addition, the multi-ethnic, self-governing Brcko District was created in 2000 from both entities. Under the Agreement, both the Federation and the Republika Srpska have their own parliament, which has executive legislative powers over the respective entity. The Federation is further subdivided into 10 cantonal governments. Among other responsibilities, foreign policy, judicial powers, and monetary policy belong to the state and are exercised by state-level institutions. Tensions exist between the entities and the state-level institutions and, increasingly, between the combined authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community. In S&P's view, periodic events undermine confidence that political cohesion is developing. For instance, the dismissal of the Federation's finance minister by the Federation's president in January this year put at risk the entity's ability to make operational payments, such as wages, and to service debt obligations. The crisis was averted when the constitutional court temporarily reinstated the finance minister. In S&P's view, such frequent events in the political landscape detract from important issues and weigh on growth prospects by slowing down the reform process. The current parliamentary term has been characterized by lengthy government reshuffles within the entities. Meanwhile, entity governments have been unable to agree on a coordination mechanism to allocate EU funds. Further, progress on a key constitutional amendment, a prerequisite for EU candidacy, has been pending since a 2009 ruling by the European Court for Human Rights. As a result of this stalemate, the EU has halved funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) for 2013 to EUR40 million (0.3% of 2013 GDP). In S&P's opinion, Bosnia and Herzegovina could risk losing more IPA funds if an effective coordination mechanism is not implemented. However, recent civil unrest reduces the possibility of a complete suspension of funds. The protests, which started in Tuzla in February by workers of privatized companies over unpaid wages, spread to other parts of the country and widened to general discontent against the political class, high unemployment, and low living standards. This has prompted the EU to announce a new approach to Bosnia and Herzegovina by which it will focus more on economic and social challenges, rather than political issues. Parliamentary elections will be held in October this year. S&P expects a further slowing of reform momentum coupled with an increase in inter- and intra-entity tensions in the run-up to the elections. S&P also do not exclude the possibility of renewed political uncertainty related to the formation of governments following the elections. S&P do not believe that the recent protests will significantly influence election outcomes given that no new alternatives have yet emerged. The authorities' continued progress under the IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA or the program) allowed them to successfully apply for an extension until June 2015. In S&P's view, the program extension will help to tide over the election period and to meet higher external debt servicing obligations this year. By tying disbursements to progress under program stipulations, the IMF SBA has been an important policy anchor since it was secured in September 2012. That said, S&P believes risks to IMF program implementation and delays to reforms may persist given the complex institutional set-up and potential political disruptions. "We estimate that the Bosnian economy expanded by 1% in 2013 driven by net exports, particularly electricity. At the same time, continued weak domestic demand suppressed import growth. We expect that an improvement in external demand will sustain export growth over 2014-2017. In our opinion, domestic demand will improve gradually from the second half of 2015, spurred in part by a slight relaxation in fiscal policy post program completion. We expect investment will remain constrained by low credit growth and will not return to its 2008 peak of 28% of GDP over the 2014-2017 forecast horizon. We forecast real GDP to grow on average by 2.6% annually, a pace that will not significantly bring down the unemployment rate," S&P said. "We believe that the need to secure ongoing financing from the IMF will sufficiently motivate the entities to keep fiscal consolidation on track until the completion of the program. This, coupled with both entities' strained finances, reduces the likelihood of significant pre-election expenditure overruns, in our opinion. However, we expect upward pressure on wages will slow fiscal consolidation from the second half of next year assuming that the authorities do not enter a fresh program with the IMF," S&P added. "We expect the general government fiscal deficit to be entirely financed by borrowings, with an increased reliance on domestic borrowings. Accordingly, we expect general government debt to increase by an average of 1.5% of GDP over 2014-2017, bringing net general government debt to just under 40% of GDP in 2017. Risks to this forecast could arise from expenditure overruns from lower levels of government or weaker-than-anticipated economic growth. About 60% of total general government debt is denominated in foreign currency and held externally. This is predominantly concessional debt and has kept interest rates fairly low. We estimate general government interest at about 2% of general government revenues in 2014," S&P said. In S&P's opinion, the banking system represents a limited contingent liability for the government. It is largely owned by foreign parent banks and has a moderate degree of financial intermediation (S&P estimates claims on the resident nongovernment sector at 55% of 2013 GDP). Though the banking system appears well-capitalized -- with reported Tier 1 capital equal to 14.6% of risk-weighted assets at September 2013 -- non-performing loans (NPLs) have continued to increase steadily since early 2012. NPLs reached 14.9% of total loans at the end of September 2013, from 5.9% at the end of 2009, and may rise further. As a result, S&P expects that banks (mostly owned by Austrian and Italian parents) will continue to be cautious in extending credit even when the demand for loans starts to pick up. External vulnerabilities have arisen from persistent current account deficits (estimated at 7% of GDP in 2013), though financing from the IMF and other multilateral lending institutions has somewhat reduced external funding challenges. While the large trade deficit (estimated at 32% of 2014 GDP) is offset partially by net remittances (S&P estimates net transfers flow of nearly 14% of 2014 GDP), S&P expects the current account deficit to remain above 5% of GDP over 2014-2017. S&P anticipates that direct investment inflows will continue to amount to about one-third of the current account deficit, and therefore forecast an increase in external indebtedness over the forecast horizon. External deficit financing is likely to become more uncertain with the conclusion of the program in 2015 and will represent a key vulnerability. S&P believes that Bosnia and Herzegovina's large current account deficit, along with its external repayments, will keep its gross external financing needs high at an average of 155% of current account receipts and usable reserves from 2014-2017. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a currency board regime and the convertible marka is pegged to the euro. While the currency board provides stability, it limits monetary flexibility in S&P's opinion. S&P believes that the central bank has limited ability to act as a lender of last resort. The coverage of monetary liabilities by reserves was 1.07x at the end of January 2014. Bosnia and Herzegovina, like other regional peers, has a high level of euroization; nearly two-thirds of all loans are in or indexed to a foreign currency, mostly euros. Outlook The stable outlook balances S&P's view of the risks to program implementation posed by the complex institutional set-up, the general elections later this year, and the country's external vulnerabilities against the program's role in guiding policy direction and providing financing, as well as S&P's expectation of continued international support. S&P could lower the ratings if it sees a significant deterioration in Bosnia and Herzegovina's external position or if the government fails to meet IMF conditions and thereby jeopardizes disbursements. If S&P sees delays in payments to official creditors -- as happened in January 2012 amid ambiguity over the extension of temporary financing -- S&P could lower the ratings by more than one notch. In S&P's opinion, if tensions between the two entities abate, and if their relations with state institutions improve, this would gradually enable autonomous reform implementation that does not rely on international pressure and policy conditionality. S&P believes this would strengthen the business environment and pave the way for more sustainable growth and better external performance. This could lead us to consider raising the ratings. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed Bosnia and Herzegovina Sovereign Credit Rating B/Stable/B Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB- ============= C R O A T I A ============= CROATIAN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Issuer Rating; Outlook Neg. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (known as Hrvatska banka za obnovu i razvitak or HBOR) Ba1 foreign-currency issuer rating and (P)Ba1 foreign-currency backed senior unsecured medium-term note programme rating and changed the corresponding outlook to negative from stable. The rating action follows Moody's change to negative from stable of the outlook on Croatia's Ba1 sovereign bond rating on March 21, 2014. Ratings Rationale The change in the rating outlook on HBOR, a 100% government-owned development bank, is driven by the weakening credit profile of the government, as indicated by the assignment of a negative outlook to Croatia's ratings. As HBOR's obligations benefit from an unconditional, explicit and irrevocable state guarantee, Moody's aligns the bank's issuer and debt ratings with Croatia's local-currency bond rating. The change in outlook also takes into account the prolonged weakness in Croatia's operating environment, which has remained in recession since 2009 and for which Moody's expects only a weak recovery in 2014. Although HBOR's capital buffers (with an equity-to-assets ratio of 31.8% as at end-September 2013) provide the bank with a substantial cushion against unforeseen credit losses, the sustained weakness in the operating environment increases downsides risks to the bank's asset quality and profitability. What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down As indicated by the negative outlook, there is currently limited upward pressure on HBOR's ratings. A weakening in the creditworthiness of the government of Croatia, as signaled by a downgrade of Croatia's local-currency bond rating, would exert downward pressure on HBOR's ratings. The principal methodology used in this rating was Government- Related Issuers: Methodology Update Published in July 2010. As of the end of September 2013, HBOR had total assets of HRK26.9 billion (US$4.8 billion). HBOR is headquartered in Zagreb, Croatia. =========== F R A N C E =========== WINDERMERE XII: S&P Lowers Rating on 3 Note Classes to 'CC' ----------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CC (sf)' its credit ratings on Windermere XII FCC's class E, F, and G notes. The downgrades reflect S&P's view that the class E, F, and G notes will experience principal losses on the April 2014 interest payment date (IPD). The notes are secured by "Coeur Defense," a trophy asset in Paris, La Defense (France). The loan was transferred to special servicing in December 2008 following the Paris Commercial Court's decision to place the borrower under the protection of French "procedure de sauvegarde" (safeguard proceedings) -- a form of pre-insolvency, Chapter 11-style proceeding available in France for distressed companies. The safeguard plan of the borrower provides for the repayment of the principal amount by July 2014. On March 7, 2014, an affiliate of Lone Star Real Estate Fund III acquired the entire share capital of LB Dame Sarl & Partners SCA, after receiving antitrust clearance. LB Dame Sarl & Partners is the parent company of Dame, which is in turn the parent company of Heart of La Defense SAS (HOLD), the owner of Coeur Defense. On the same day, the issuer received a letter from HOLD with a proposal for the noteholders. Under the proposal, the issuer would receive a total principal amount of EUR1.3 billion, and a total interest amount of EUR3,941,674.75, which corresponds to the loan interest due on April 5, 2014. On March 21, 2014, the noteholders approved this proposal, which includes the termination of the loan by March 28, 2014. On the April 2014 IPD, the issuer will use the EUR1.3 billion to repay principal on the notes. As a result, the class A, B, C, and D notes will fully repay. However, the class E, F, and G notes will experience principal losses. As S&P anticipates that these notes will experience principal losses, it has lowered to 'CC (sf)' its ratings on these classes of notes, in line with its criteria for assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', and 'CC' ratings. RATINGS LIST Windermere XII FCC EUR1.519 Billion Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Class Rating Rating To From Ratings Lowered E CC (sf) B- (sf) F CC (sf) CCC+ (sf) G CC (sf) CCC (sf) ============= G E R M A N Y ============= ENTERPRISE NETWORKS: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' CCR; Outlook Stable ----------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit rating on Enterprise Networks Holdings B.V. (ENH), a Germany-headquartered provider of enterprise communications-related technology and solutions. The outlook is stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' issue rating on the senior secured notes, issued by ENH's subsidiary Unify Germany Holdings B.V. The recovery rating on these notes is '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the case of a payment default. All the ratings were removed from CreditWatch, where they were originally placed with positive implications on Sept. 27, 2013. The affirmation and removal from CreditWatch primarily reflect S&P's view that the positive short-term liquidity impact from the disposal of the wholly owned subsidiary, Enterasys Networks Inc., for EUR115 million in cash, to U.S.-based Extreme Networks is being offset by currently weak revenue trends and near-term prospects, as well as continued very high restructuring cash outflows. In addition, S&P considers that the disposal of Enterasys has weakened the group's business risk profile because the subsidiary was significantly more profitable and cash generative than the group's remaining business segments. As a result, S&P has revised its business risk profile assessment on ENH to "vulnerable" from "weak." ENH's business risk profile is constrained, in S&P's view, by the company's relatively weak operating margins, high restructuring costs, volatile customer demand, and significant competitive pressures from larger industry players in the dynamic and volatile enterprise communications market. These factors are partly offset by ENH's diverse customers and its position as a established provider of communications systems, applications, and services for enterprise customers, with leading market shares in Europe (particularly Germany) and Brazil. S&P's assessment of ENH's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged" primarily reflects its anticipation of continued very negative free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation in fiscal 2014 (ends Sept. 30), as well as its weak credit metrics, based on Standard & Poor's-adjusted gross debt figures. ENH is a joint venture between the former enterprise communications business of Siemens AG (A+/Stable/A-1+; 49% ownership) and private equity investor The Gores Group (not rated; 51% ownership). S&P do not factor into ENH's stand-alone credit profile additional support from Siemens, primarily because it assess ENH as a non-strategic subsidiary for Siemens under its criteria. This is primarily because don't think ENH is important to Siemens' long-term strategy and will likely be sold in the near to medium term. The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that ENH will gradually stabilize its revenues, improve its operating margins, and trend toward breakeven FOCF generation in the next 12 months. In particular, S&P expects cash balances in excess of EUR140 million at year-end fiscal 2014, coupled with prospects of about breakeven FOCF in fiscal 2015. S&P could raise the ratings if the group is able to achieve EBITDA margins (after restructuring costs) of at least 7% supported by the current cost cuts and improving industry demand, demonstrates about breakeven FOCF generation, and maintains an "adequate" liquidity profile. S&P could lower the ratings if ENH's revenues didn't stabilize year on year by the end of fiscal 2014, coupled with prospects of continued large restructuring costs and negative FOCF in excess of EUR10 million. In addition, S&P could lower the ratings if the group did not address the refinancing of its senior secured notes by year-end 2014. TAKKO FASHION: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'B' CCR ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has revised its outlook on German apparel retailer Takko Fashion S.a.r.l. to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on the company. S&P also affirmed the issue rating of 'B-' on Takko Fashion's EUR525 million senior secured notes. The recovery rating of '5' on these notes remains unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation of modest (10%-30%) recovery in the event of a payment default. Takko Fashion's profitability at mid-year (Oct. 31, 2013) showed a material 8.5% year-on-year deterioration in reported EBITDA, partially driven by adverse weather effects. At the same time, the group's EBITDA margin declined to 11.5% from 12.9%. The outlook revision reflects this weak performance and uncertainty about the company's ability to recover in the second half of fiscal 2014 and full-year 2015. S&P continues to regard Takko Fashion's business risk profile as "fair" under its criteria. This reflects the company's reliance on discretionary consumer spending from mid- to lower-income families and its positioning in the price-competitive value retail clothing market. The company competes against high-street fashion retailers as well as hard discounters. The negative outlook reflects S&P's expectation that credit measures could further deteriorate over the next 12 months if weak trading trends continue. If the company was unable to raise group EBITDA in fiscal 2015, S&P sees a risk that cash flow generation could be insufficient to fully cover planned capital expenditures. Since around one-third of the RCF has already been drawn, both a rise in EBITDA and operating cash flow therefore remain crucial in S&P's view. S&P could consider a downgrade in the coming 12 months, if market circumstances or other factors prevented a significant recovery in EBITDA. Although S&P still considers headroom under the revised financial covenants as "adequate," a series of weak quarters could quickly lead to a severe tightening of the financial situation. S&P could also lower the rating if it became apparent that the company's operating cash flow would be insufficient to cover capital expenditures. S&P could revise its outlook to stable if the company improved its operating performance, with a continued positive EBITDA growth trajectory over the next few quarters, demonstrating that management's strategic initiatives are successful and that they can turn around the recent performance erosion. Under this scenario, EBITDA would need to grow by around 10% year on year in fiscal 2015 and the company would need to tightly control additional working capital needs and capital expenditures. This would lead to neutral free operating cash flow and operating lease-adjusted total debt to EBITDA of around 7x. VOLVO AUTO: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Deposit Rating & 'E+' BFSR -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Volvo Auto Bank Deutschland GmbH's (VAB) long- and short-term bank deposit ratings at Ba3/Not-Prime. Moody's has also withdrawn VAB's stand- alone bank financial strength rating of E+ (equivalent to a b2 baseline credit assessment). The ratings had a stable outlook at the time of withdrawal. VAB will cease to exist as of March 31, 2014 and any remaining activities will be merged into Volvo Car Holding Germany GmbH (unrated), VAB's sole and direct owner. As a consequence, VAB will also return its banking license in due course. Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons. The following ratings were withdrawn at the current rating level: Bank Financial Strength Rating: E+, stable Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings: Ba3, stable Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings: Not-Prime VAB had no outstanding debt affected by the rating withdrawal. ============= H U N G A R Y ============= HUNGARY: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB' Rating ------------------------------------------------------------ Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook to stable from negative on the long-term sovereign credit ratings on Hungary. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'BB/B' long- and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings. S&P also affirmed its 'BB' long-term issuer credit rating on the National Bank of Hungary. Rationale The outlook revision reflects the rebalancing of Hungary's open economy, and what S&P views as steadying economic prospects. The ratings are supported by S&P's assessment of Hungary's comparatively advanced economy, highly skilled labor force, and relatively well-diversified economic and export structures. The Hungarian government's success in maintaining general government borrowing needs within EU limits also supports the rating, as does its commitment to denominating all net general government financing in local currency. The ratings remain constrained by declining but still-high stocks of external debt, as well as substantial general government liabilities. S&P now projects average GDP growth of 1.8% annually over the 2014-2016 forecast horizon versus the 1.3% S&P projected last October. While GDP growth in 2013 (1.1%) was driven primarily by a strong agricultural sector and EU-financed public investment spending, S&P believes that private-sector demand should recover further in 2014 as credit conditions start to normalize. S&P also notes progress on increasing participation in the labor market. In S&P's view, Hungary's long-term growth prospects are still constrained by what it sees as a large and encroaching public sector, and less predictable policies toward foreign investors. Given the openness of the Hungarian economy -- with exports of just less than 100% of GDP this year versus around 80% in 2008 -- economic performance will also be sensitive to eurozone demand, and in particular to global demand for German exports. S&P also notes that Hungary imports the majority of gas consumed domestically from the Russian Federation; in S&P's view, this supply could be subject to future interruption, though S&P expects that Hungary would find alternative supplies (as it did in 2009). General elections are scheduled for April 6, 2014, with most polls indicating victory for the current governing party, Fidesz, and its much smaller coalition partner, the Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP). As a result of electoral reform passed in 2011, on April 6 there will be only one round of elections (previously it was a two-round system). In addition, the number of seats in the next parliament will decline to 199, from 386. In S&P's view, the hallmark of Prime Minister Viktor Orban's governing style has been his willingness to re-purpose the legislative framework (as well as electoral districts) to his party's advantage, particularly by re-codifying the charters of key institutions including the National Bank of Hungary, the Fiscal Council, and the Constitutional Court. S&P believes that these institutional changes have weakened the checks and balances between branches of government. The government has, on the other hand, made a concerted effort to achieve below the 3% of GDP headline fiscal targets so as to remain one of 11 EU member states not subject to the European Council's Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The government exited the EDP in June 2013, after nine years of related actions. Hungary continues to receive its full allotment of EU structural cohesion funds -- totaling an estimated US$6.7 billion (5% of GDP) during 2013 -- via the net transfers and capital account components of its balance of payments. One of the government's key economic policies has been to support recovery by channeling these transfers into public-sector capital expenditure, while alleviating the impact of a credit crunch on households by increasing tax and regulatory pressures on key services providers (largely foreign) in the financial and utility sectors. Measures to increase voters' disposable incomes are no longer being funded from the general government budget; instead they are financed via EU inflows, tariff cuts, and loan restructurings (funded by declining profitability of foreign corporations and banks). Cuts to residential energy tariffs have, for example, generated savings for households, at the cost of weakened profitability of foreign-owned utilities and a higher cost of energy for the nonresidential private sector. While headline fiscal performance has improved, S&P notes a step- up in quasi-fiscal activity via state-owned enterprises' increased energy-sector acquisitions, state-owned banks' expanded balance sheets, and recurrent state transfers to public sector companies, particularly in the transport sector. The Hungarian economy's gross external financing needs (maturing debt plus current account payments) are high but declining. S&P estimates these at 102% of current account receipts (CARs; equivalent to 143% of GDP) for 2014 versus 135% in 2008 (when Hungary was provided with an emergency credit line of US$25 billion from the EU/IMF/World Bank). Since 2012, the economy as a whole has paid down an estimated 18.4% of GDP of net external debt -- nearly all net financial sector debt. Last year the government also paid back the final tranche of its loan from the IMF, ahead of schedule. Such rapid external deleveraging has come at a price. Up until second-quarter 2013, domestic demand had contracted for eight consecutive quarters. Between 2008 and end-2013, household debt declined by an estimated 5% of GDP to 24% of GDP. While S&P views external risks as having somewhat diminished since 2008, it still sees material refinancing risks for Hungary's government and banks should the external environment deteriorate. "We classify Hungary's banking sector in group '8' under our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) methodology ('1' being the lowest risk; '10' the highest). Our BICRA assessment reflects Hungary's weak financial sector profitability, high embedded credit risk in the economy, and a lingering high reliance on external financing. We estimate nonperforming loans at a still substantial 17%. We view capital and liquidity levels as adequate and do not anticipate the need for substantial state support as a consequence of the upcoming European Banking Authority stress tests," S&P said. Non-debt financing has come primarily via EU funds into the current and capital accounts. For 2013, Hungary's capital account recorded a surplus of more than 3% of GDP and S&P expects it will do so again in 2014 and 2015. In net terms, FDI was close to zero last year, partly reflecting the government's decision to spend 0.8% of GDP on the renationalization of the domestic gas distribution business of German utility company E.ON SE. This was purchased by the state-owned Hungarian Electricity Works. Meanwhile, the general government primary budgetary position improved somewhat to a surplus of 1.0% of GDP in 2013, from close to 0% of GDP in 2009. S&P expects the 2013 result will be repeated in 2014. S&P estimates the 2013 general government deficit will come in just under 3% of GDP; S&P has treated the government's capital injection of Hungarian forint 136 billion (0.45% of GDP) into the savings bank system as an expenditure item, not an acquisition of liquid assets. Excluding this, S&P estimates the deficit for last year at about 2.5% of GDP. S&P understands this differs from Eurostat's expected accounting treatment of the transaction. Budgetary consolidation since 2008 has been roughly balanced between general government revenue and expenditure items; the process has not materially lowered Hungary's already-high tax burden on the private sector, while it has increased tax pressure on banks and utilities. At 46% and 49% of GDP, respectively, Hungary's general government revenues and expenditures are comparable to 2008 levels. Social transfers remain considerably higher than Central Eastern European peers'. Recent state acquisitions in the utility and financial sectors -- which must be financed in the market -- suggest a growing rather than receding public sector. Absent further budgetary consolidation, S&P expects net general government debt levels to remain close to 74% of GDP between now and 2017. About 41% of the central government debt stock is foreign-currency denominated; this means a 10% depreciation of the forint would imply an increase of nearly 3% of GDP in the central government debt burden. Nevertheless, S&P notes that real effective exchange rate data since 2004 suggests that the forint is close to its fair long-term value. A relatively weak monetary transmission channel remains a challenge for the central bank. This reflects an estimated 54% of loans to households and corporations being denominated in foreign currency, and Hungarian households and businesses having been funded historically via interbank lending from foreign parent banks. Efforts to reduce foreign currency lending are understandable, in this context. Between end-2012 and March 25, 2014, the central bank had cut its rate by 315 basis points to a historic low of 2.60%. If the external environment were to worsen and the forint to weaken, S&P expects the bank would reverse these cuts. About 36% of commercial general government local-currency debt is held by nonresidents. While S&P views this as positive in terms of diversified funding, the financial crisis in late 2008 illustrated the rapidity with which local currency bonds held by nonresidents can be sold if investor confidence falters. Outlook The stable outlook balances S&P's assessment of Hungary's stabilizing economy and relatively steady headline fiscal performance against still-high stocks of foreign debt amid generally less-predictable policymaking. S&P could raise the ratings if the government were to establish policies that encourage investment, while implementing its structural reform program. Similarly, S&P could consider an upgrade if it saw a sustained reduction in external debt net of liquid assets, even as economic growth strengthens. Conversely, S&P could lower the ratings if Hungary's economic recovery weakens significantly more than it currently expects; if banks accelerate their withdrawal of credit; or if external or public finances weaken materially. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. RATINGS LIST Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action To From Hungary Sovereign Credit Rating BB/Stable/B BB/Negative/B Hungary (National Bank of) Issuer Credit Rating BB/Stable/-- BB/Negative/-- Ratings Affirmed Hungary Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BBB- Senior Unsecured BB Short-Term Debt B Hungary (National Bank of) Senior Unsecured BB ============= I R E L A N D ============= AMEY LAGAN: S&P Puts 'BB' Rating on CreditWatch Positive -------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch with positive implications its 'BB' long-term issue ratings on an index-linked senior secured bond and a European Investment Bank (EIB) loan, issued by Northern Ireland-based special-purpose vehicle Amey Lagan Roads Financial PLC (ProjectCo). The CreditWatch placement follows ProjectCo's stated intention to carry out a financial restructuring, with the aim of improving its forecast debt service coverage ratios (DSCRs). S&P understands that the plan to do so has been approved in principle by ProjectCo's shareholders. Details of the intended restructuring are yet to be confirmed. However, in S&P's view, it is likely that its terms will constitute an "opportunistic" offer according to the terms of S&P's criteria. Consequently, the nature of the intended restructuring would have no rating implications. The current ratings reflect S&P's view of the relatively weak financial profile of the project, driven by the step-up margin payments being made to the EIB. Following the restructuring, if successfully implemented as currently envisaged, S&P understands that ProjectCo aims to increase the forecast DSCRs of the project. The debt comprises GBP144.963 million in index-linked guaranteed secured bonds, including GBP24 million in variation bonds, due 2037, and GBP120.963 million in index-linked guaranteed loan facilities from the EIB, due 2035. The proceeds of both the bonds and the loan were onlent to the concession company and used to design, build, finance, and operate three contiguous upgrading, widening, and new construction highway schemes to the south and west of Belfast in Northern Ireland. By employing an availability-based payment mechanism, ProjectCo is insulated from traffic risk. The project includes a high proportion of existing roads and structures which, in S&P's view, increase lifecycle risk above that of a pure new-build road. The bonds and EIB loan retain an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee provided by monoline insurer Ambac of payment of scheduled interest and principal. According to S&P's criteria, the rating on a monoline-insured debt issue should reflect the higher of the rating on the monoline (where such a rating exists) or the Standard & Poor's Underlying Rating (SPUR). In this case, the rating on the bonds reflects the SPUR as Ambac is not rated. The CreditWatch positive placement reflects the impending financial restructuring of the project, and S&P's view of the likely improvement in its forecast financial ratios that this will bring. S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch once the final structure is known and has been implemented by all parties. S&P could affirm the current ratings, and remove the CreditWatch, if the planned financial restructuring is not implemented as it currently expects. Alternatively, S&P could raise the ratings, possibly by more than one notch, if the planned financial restructuring is implemented and, as a result, the forecast DSCRs of the project improve, with no adverse impact on operations. BLOXHAM: Appeals Ruling on ISE Membership Termination ----------------------------------------------------- Joe Brennan at Bloomberg News reports that Bloxham's liquidator appealed a High Court ruling last month upholding the Irish Stock Exchange's decision in 2012 to remove the stockbroking firm as a member of the bourse. According to Bloomberg, Paddy Hughes, spokesman for liquidator Kieran Wallace of KPMG, said Mr. Wallace lodged an appeal with the country's supreme court, which may take two to five years. As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 14, 2014, The Irish Times related that the High Court's Mr. Justice Peter Charleton on Feb. 13 ruled there was "no reliable evidence" the December 2012 decision to terminate Bloxham's membership arose from a conspiracy or was engineered so as to financially benefit other member firms of the Irish Stock Exchange Ltd. as opposed to being made for the benefit of the ISE as a whole. The revocation of Bloxham's membership of the exchange arose after the Central Bank suspended Bloxham in late May 2012 from trading as a result of concerns about its financial position, The Irish Times recounted. Bloxham is one of Ireland's oldest stockbrokers. CARLYLE GLOBAL: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes ------------------------------------------------------------ Fitch Ratings has assigned Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro CLO 2014-1 Limited's notes ratings, as follows: EUR218.25 million class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR40.0 million class B: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR19.35 million class C: 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable EUR17.0 million class D: 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable EUR31.6 million class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable EUR10.9 million class F: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable EUR37.9 million subordinated notes: not rated Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro CLO 2014-1 Limited (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes will be used to purchase a EUR363.8 million portfolio of European leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio will be managed by CELF Advisors LLP (part of The Carlyle Group LP). The reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2018. Key Rating Drivers Payment Frequency Switch The notes pay quarterly, while the portfolio assets can reset to semi-annual. The transaction has an interest-smoothing account, but no liquidity facility. A liquidity stress for the non- deferrable class A and B notes, stemming from a large proportion of assets resetting to semi-annual in any one quarter, is addressed by switching the payment frequency on the notes to semi-annual, subject to certain conditions. Portfolio Credit Quality Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the 'B' category. Fitch has public ratings or credit opinions on all 66 obligors in the indicative portfolio. Above-Average Recoveries At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured obligations. Recovery prospects for these assets are typically more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured, and mezzanine assets. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 63 of the 66 assets in the indicative portfolio. Limited Interest Rate Risk Interest rate risk is naturally hedged for most of the portfolio, as all the notes are floating rate, and fixed-rate assets can account for no more than 10% of the portfolio. Fitch modeled a 10% fixed-rate bucket in its analysis and the rated notes can withstand the excess spread compression in a rising interest rate environment. Limited FX Risk The transaction is allowed to invest up to 20% of the portfolio non-euro-denominated assets, provided suitable asset swaps can be entered into. Rating Sensitivities -- A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would lead to a downgrade of one to three notches for the rated notes. A 25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of one to four notches for the rated notes. Document Amendments The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency confirmation or noteholder approval. Where rating agency confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyses the proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the change has a negative impact on the then current ratings. Such amendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final maturity. If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a rating perspective, Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to be given if Fitch declines to comment. CB MEZZCAP: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'D(sf)' --------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D(sf)' from 'CC(sf)' its credit rating on CB MezzCAP Limited Partnership's class A notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D(sf)' ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes. The rating actions follow the class A notes' interest shortfall as a result of insufficient funds on the January 2014 interest payment date (IPD). S&P has reviewed the transaction, including the latest available investor report dated Jan. 27, 2014. The transaction reached its scheduled maturity on Jan. 27, 2013, and contains only profit participation agreements, which have had a principal deficiency event. S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' its rating on the class A notes as a result of the interest shortfall. The class B, C, D, and E notes are already in default on their respective interest payments as of the January 2013 IPD. S&P has therefore affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on these classes of notes. CB MezzCAP Limited Partnership is a German small and midsize enterprise (SME) collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes a static portfolio of profit participation agreements. RATINGS LIST CB MezzCAP Limited Partnership EUR199.5 Million Floating-Rate Notes Class Rating Rating To From Rating Lowered A D (sf) CC (sf) Ratings Affirmed B D (sf) C D (sf) D D (sf) E D (sf) CVC CORDATUS: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)sf' Rating to Class F Notes --------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned CVC Cordatus Loan Fund III Ltd's notes expected ratings, as follows: Class A-1 Notes: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable Class A-2 Notes: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable Class B-1 Notes: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable Class B-2 Notes: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable Class C-1 Notes: 'A+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable Class C-2 Notes: 'A+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable Class D Notes: 'BBB+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable Class E Notes: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable Class F Notes: 'B-(EXP)sf; Outlook Stable Subordinated Notes: Not Rated Key Rating Drivers Average Portfolio Credit Quality Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the 'B' category. Fitch has credit opinions on all obligors in the indicative portfolio. The covenanted minimum Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) for assigning expected ratings is 34.0. The WARF of the indicative portfolio is 33.1. Above-Average Recoveries At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured obligations. Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets as more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings (RR) to all assets in the indicative portfolio. The covenanted minimum weighted average recovery rate (WARR) for assigning expected ratings is 68.0%. The WARR of the indicative portfolio is 68.7%. Exposure to Unhedged Non-Euro-Denominated Assets The transaction is allowed to invest up to 5% of the portfolio in non-euro-denominated assets. Unhedged non-euro-denominated assets are limited to a maximum exposure of 2.5% of the portfolio subject to principal haircuts, and any other non-euro-denominated asset will be hedged with FX forward agreements from settlement date up to 90 days. The manager can only invest in unhedged or forward hedged assets if after the applicable haircuts, the aggregate balance of the assets is above the reinvestment target par balance. Investment in non-euro-denominated assets hedged with perfect asset swaps as of the settlement date is allowed up to 20% of the portfolio. Partial Interest Rate Hedge Between 5% and 15% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed rate assets, while fixed rate liabilities account for 10% of the target par amount. Therefore, the transaction is partially hedged against rising interest rates. Rating Sensitivities -- A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would lead to a downgrade of one to two notches for the rated notes. -- A 25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of one to five notches for the rated notes. In addition, in line with its Exposure Draft - Criteria for Sovereign Risk in Developed Markets for Structured Finance and Covered Bonds dated January 2014, Fitch analyzed a sensitivity of a 50% devaluation haircut to recovery rates for assets in these jurisdictions, assuming that recovery rates may be realized in non-euro currencies. This sensitivity would not result in the downgrade of the class A-1 or A-2 notes. This was done to assess transfer and convertibility risk if a country was to leave the currency union and it is consistent with the proposals of the Exposure Draft. Transaction Summary CVC Cordatus Loan Fund is an arbitrage cash flow CLO. Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes will be used to purchase a EUR436.5 million portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio is managed by CVC Credit Partners Group Ltd and the sub-manager CVC Credit Partners Investment Management Ltd. The reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2018. The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency confirmation or note holder approval. Where rating agency confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the proposed change and may provide a comment if the change would not have a negative impact on the then current ratings. Such amendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final maturity. If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from the perspective of the rating Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to be given in the case where Fitch declines to comment. HARVEST CLO VIII: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class F Notes --------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned credit ratings to Harvest CLO VIII Ltd.'s class A, B, C, D, E, and F senior secured floating-rate notes. At closing, Harvest CLO VIII also issued unrated subordinated notes. Under the transaction documents, the rated notes pay quarterly interest up to the earlier of the liquidity facility's expiry or termination date. Following this, the notes switch to semi- annual payment. The liquidity facility expires at the end of the reinvestment period, subject to renewal of one or two additional years. At the end of the ramp-up period, S&P understands that the portfolio will represent a well-diversified pool of corporate credits, with a fairly uniform exposure to all of the credits. Therefore, S&P has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by applying its 2009 corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligation criteria. "In our cash flow analysis, we used a portfolio target par amount of EUR412.0, assuming that 10% of the portfolio comprises fixed- rate assets, using the covenanted weighted-average spread and weighted-average coupon (4.2% and 5.0%, respectively), and the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates at each rating level," S&P said. The portfolio's replenishment period ends 4.1 years after closing, and the portfolio's maximum average maturity date is 7.6 years. Deutsche Bank AG (London Branch) (A/Stable/A-1) is the bank account provider, custodian, and liquidity facility provider. The participants' downgrade remedies, as of closing, are in line with S&P's current counterparty criteria. The issuer is in line with our bankruptcy-remoteness criteria under S&P's European legal criteria. Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty, operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its ratings are commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class of notes. Harvest CLO VIII is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior secured loans made to speculative-grade European corporates. 3i Debt Management Investments Ltd. manages the transaction. RATINGS LIST Ratings Assigned Harvest CLO VIII Ltd. EUR425.0 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate and Subordinated Notes Class Rating Amount (mil. EUR) A AAA (sf) 243.0 B AA (sf) 47.0 C A (sf) 27.0 D BBB (sf) 21.0 E BB (sf) 31.0 F B (sf) 10.0 Subordinated NR 46.0 NR-Not rated. HARVEST CLO VIII: Fitch Puts 'Bsf' Rating to EUR10MM Cl. F Notes ---------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned Harvest CLO VIII Limited notes final ratings, as follows: EUR243.0 million Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR47.0 million Class B: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR27.0 million Class C: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable EUR21.0 million Class D: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable EUR31.0 million Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable EUR10.0 million Class F: 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable EUR46.0 million Subordinated Notes: not rated Harvest CLO VIII Ltd (the issuer) is an arbitrage cash flow CLO. Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes will be used to purchase a EUR412 million portfolio of European leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio is managed by 3i Debt Management Investments Limited. The reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2018. Key Rating Drivers 'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the 'B'/'B-' range. Fitch has credit opinions on 94% of the indicative portfolio and a public rating on the remaining entities. Above-Average Recoveries At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured loans and senior secured bonds. Recovery prospects for these assets are typically more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured, and mezzanine assets. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 84% of the indicative portfolio. Lower Weighted Average Life The covenanted weighted average life is 7.6 years, lower than the average for Fitch-rated CLOs 2.0. Limited FX Risk All non-euro-denominated assets have to be hedged using suitable asset swaps and are limited to 30% of the portfolio. Limited Interest Rate Risk Fixed rate assets can account for no more than 10% of the portfolio. Limited Basis/Reset Risk A liquidity facility (LF) and an interest smoothing account are used to mitigate reset risk from assets switching to semi-annual while the notes are paying quarterly. If the LF expires or is terminated, the notes will switch to semi-annually. The spread on the LF is linked to the outstanding rating on the senior notes. In addition, if Fitch withdraws its rating on the senior notes, or downgrades them below 'BBsf', the LF provider may terminate the LF. Fitch believes that ratings should not be used in this way in transaction documents and has highlighted this to the manager. Trading Gain Release The portfolio manager may designate trading gains as interest proceeds if the portfolio balance remains above the reinvestment target par balance and the class E overcollateralization test stays above its value at the effective date. Rating Sensitivities -- A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would lead to a downgrade of one to three notches for the rated notes. -- A 25% reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of one to three notches for the rated notes. Transaction Summary The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency confirmation or note holder approval. Where rating agency confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyses the proposed change and may provide a comment if the change has a negative impact on the then current ratings. Such amendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final maturity. If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from the perspective of the rating Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to be given in the case where Fitch declines to comment. MARQUETTE US: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'B-' ---------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its ratings on the class A-1B, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2 notes from Marquette US/European CLO PLC. At the same time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class A-1A, E-1, and E-2 notes. S&P also removed its ratings on the class A-1B, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D-1, D-2, E-1, and E-2 notes from CreditWatch, where S&P had placed them with positive implications on Jan. 22, 2014. Marquette US/European CLO PLC is a multicurrency collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction managed by Neuberger Berman Inc. The portfolio primarily consists of senior secured leverage loans denominated in U.S. dollars and euros. According to the February 2014 trustee report, the portfolio holds about US$57 million U.S. dollar-denominated assets and about EUR61 million euro-denominated assets. The class A-1A, A-1B, B-1, C-1, D-1, and E-1 notes are U.S. dollar-denominated, and have a current total outstanding balance of about US$62 million. The class A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, and E-2 notes are euro-denominated and have a current total outstanding balance of about EUR53 million. The U.S. dollar-denominated assets prepaid faster than the euro- denominated assets, which resulted in an imbalance between the U.S. dollar-denominated assets and liabilities. The transaction may convert euro proceeds at the spot rate to pay down the U.S. dollar-denominated notes. The upgrades mainly reflect paydowns to the class A-1A and A-2 notes. The class A-1A notes received US$42.0 million in principal paydowns and the class A-2 notes received EUR31.5 million in principal paydowns since S&P's June 2013 rating actions. As of February 2014, the class A-1A and A-2 outstanding balances were about 25% and 32% of their respective original balances. S&P observed increased overcollateralization (O/C) available to support the rated notes according to the February 2014 monthly trustee report: -- The A/B O/C ratio was 167.94%, up from 135.74% in May 2013; -- The C O/C ratio was 135.80%, up from 121.15% in May 2013; -- The E O/C ratio was 114.91%, up from 109.92% in May 2013; and -- The E O/C ratio was 109.59%, up from 106.80% in May 2013. The ratings on the class D-1 and D-2 notes are driven by S&P's largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test it introduced as part of its 2009 corporate criteria update. The affirmations on the class A-1A, E-1, and E-2 notes reflect adequate credit support available to the notes at their current rating levels. S&P affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on the class E-1 and E-2 notes although the largest obligor default test indicated a limitation at 'CCC+ (sf)'. In S&P's analysis, it considered the increased overcollateralization, low levels of defaults in the portfolio, and cash flow results. Consequently, S&P believes that the class E-1 and E-2 notes' credit support is commensurate with a 'B-' rating level. S&P will continue to review whether, in its view, the ratings currently assigned to the notes remain consistent with the credit enhancement available to support them, and S&P will take further rating actions as it deems necessary. CASH FLOW RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS Marquette US/European CLO PLC Cash flow Previous implied Cash flow Final Class rating rating cushion(i) rating A-1A AAA (sf) AAA (sf) 35.73% AAA (sf) A-1B AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos AAA (sf) 32.21% AAA (sf) A-2 AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos AAA (sf) 32.21% AAA (sf) B-1 AA (sf)/Watch Pos AAA (sf) 14.80% AAA (sf) B-2 AA (sf)/Watch Pos AAA (sf) 14.80% AAA (sf) C-1 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos AA+ (sf) 2.50% AA+ (sf) C-2 BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos AA+ (sf) 2.50% AA+ (sf) D-1 BB (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf) 2.03% BB+ (sf) D-2 BB (sf)/Watch Pos BBB- (sf) 2.03% BB+ (sf) E-1 B- (sf)/Watch Pos B+ (sf) 7.51% B- (sf) E-2 B- (sf)/Watch Pos B+ (sf) 7.51% B- (sf) (i) The cash flow cushion is the excess of the tranche break- even default rate above the scenario default rate at the cash flow implied rating for a given class of rated notes. RECOVERY RATE AND CORRELATION SENSITIVITY In addition to S&P's base-case analysis, it generated additional scenarios in which it made negative adjustments of 10% to the current collateral pool's recovery rates relative to each tranche's weighted average recovery rate. S&P also generated other scenarios by adjusting the intra- and inter-industry correlations to assess the current portfolio's sensitivity to different correlation assumptions assuming the correlation scenarios outlined below. Correlation Scenario Within industry (%) Between industries (%) Below base case 15.0 5.0 Base case 20.0 7.5 Above base case 25.0 10.0 Recovery Correlation Correlation Cash flow decrease increase decrease implied implied implied implied Final Class rating rating rating rating rating A-1A AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) A-1B AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) A-2 AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) B-1 AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) B-2 AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) AAA (sf) C-1 AA+ (sf) AA (sf) AA (sf) AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf) C-2 AA+ (sf) AA (sf) AA (sf) AA+ (sf) AA+ (sf) D-1 BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf) BBB- (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) D-2 BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf) BBB- (sf) BBB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) E-1 B+ (sf) B+ (sf) B+ (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) E-2 B+ (sf) B+ (sf) B+ (sf) BB- (sf) B- (sf) RATING AND CREDITWATCH ACTIONS Marquette US/European CLO PLC Rating Class To From A-1A AAA (sf) AAA (sf) A-1B AAA (sf) AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos A-2 AAA (sf) AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos B-1 AAA (sf) AA (sf)/Watch Pos B-2 AAA (sf) AA (sf)/Watch Pos C-1 AA+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos C-2 AA+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos D-1 BB+ (sf) BB (sf)/Watch Pos D-2 BB+ (sf) BB (sf)/Watch Pos E-1 B- (sf) B- (sf)/Watch Pos E-2 B- (sf) B- (sf)/Watch Pos PERMANENT TSB: DBRS Assigns 'BB(low)' LT Debt & Deposit Ratings --------------------------------------------------------------- DBRS Ratings Limited considers the 2013 results for Permanent tsb Group Holdings plc (PTSB or the Bank) as reflecting the significant challenges the Bank is still facing. For the full- year, PTSB reported an underlying loss before impairment charges and exceptional items of EUR48 million, a slight improvement on the EUR86 million underlying loss in 2012. The lower loss primarily reflects the expiry of the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee scheme (ELG) in March 2013 as the fees related to this have reduced considerably. Positively, the Bank reported a 10 basis points (bps) year-on-year improvement in net interest margin (NIM), excluding ELG fees, to 0.82% in 2013. In the core retail bank, referred to as permanent tsb Strategic Business Unit, NIM also improved, standing at 1.03%. However, the Bank reported an underlying loss of EUR977 million in 2013 due to an increased impairment charge of EUR929 million, although this was mitigated to a certain degree by exceptional items that totalled EUR309 million and an exceptional tax credit of EUR414 million that led to a net loss after tax of EUR261 million. DBRS notes that the impairment charge incorporates approximately EUR300 million as a result of the balance sheet assessment conducted by the Central Bank of Ireland in 4Q13. From DBRS's perspective, part of the challenge facing the Bank is to reinvigorate the franchise while completing its restructuring. Therefore DBRS views positively the business growth that the Bank has seen in 2013 in certain product lines. Over 58,000 new current accounts have been opened since the Bank launched a fee-free product in April 2013, and customer deposits (excluding deposits from the government) have shown good growth, up 5% on 2012. The level of impaired loans further increased in 2013, mainly driven by the domestic mortgage portfolios. Nonetheless, the investment in arrears management is beginning to have a positive impact with total arrears now declining. In particular, the performance of the buy-to-let book has improved with loans over 90 days in arrears reducing to a still high 16.5% at end-2013 from 21% at end-2012. The increased impairment provisions taken by the Bank in 2013 has led to a slight improvement in the coverage ratio to 47% at end-2013. Nevertheless, asset quality remains weak with non-performing loans (defined as loans which are greater than 90 days in arrears, or impaired) accounting for 26% of the EUR33.3 billion total loan book. The Bank's Core Tier 1 ratio under Basel II at end-2013 was 13.1%, down from 18% at end-2012. The reduction reflects the loss in 2013, as well as an increase in risk weighted assets as a result of the balance sheet assessment. Under the transitional rules that became effective as of January 1, 2014, the fully loaded Basel III Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio would have been 13.4% at end-2013. Although the capital level ratios are relatively high at the moment DBRS anticipates further reduction in capital due to the Bank's ongoing restructuring, thus highlighting the need for the Bank to return to profitability in order to be able to generate capital through earnings retention. DBRS rates PTSB at BB (low), with a Negative trend, for Non- Guaranteed Long-Term Debt & Deposits. ST. PAUL'S CLO IV: Fitch Assigns 'B-(sf)' Rating to Class E Notes ----------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned St. Paul's CLO IV Limited's notes final ratings as follows: EUR248.25 million class A-1: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR55.75 million class A-2: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable EUR23.50 million class B: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable EUR21.00 million class C: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable EUR29.00 million class D: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable EUR14.00 million class E: 'B- sf'; Outlook Stable EUR43.41 million subordinated notes: not rated St. Paul's CLO IV Limited is an arbitrage cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the notes will be used to purchase a EUR425 million portfolio of European leveraged loans and bonds (60% of which has already been purchased as of the closing date). The portfolio is managed by Intermediate Capital Managers Limited. The transaction has a four-year re-investment period scheduled to end in 2018. Key Rating Drivers Frequency Switch Period Interest on the notes will be payable quarterly while the portfolio assets can pay semi-annually or less frequently (although in the latter case they would not account for more than 5% of the aggregate collateral balance and would not pay less frequently than annually). In order to mitigate the risk of interest shortfalls, the transaction envisages both an amortizing liquidity facility and an interest smoothing account. As soon as the class A-1 notes are redeemed in full or the liquidity facility is otherwise terminated, the payment frequency on the notes will switch to semi-annual and no further payment will be made to the interest smoothing account. Portfolio Credit Quality The covenanted minimum weighted average Fitch rating factor communicated to us before pricing is 33.0%. Fitch therefore expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the 'B'/ 'B-' range. Fitch has public ratings or credit opinions on all assets in the initial pool. Above Average Recoveries The percentage limitations ensure that at least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured loans and senior secured floating rate notes/bonds (with senior secured notes accounting for no more than 35%). Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets as more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets. The covenanted minimum weighted average Fitch recovery rate communicated to us before pricing was 68.50%. Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to all assets in the initial portfolio. Limited Interest Rate Risk While interest due on the rated notes is based on a floating index, fixed-rate assets can account for up to 10% of the portfolio balance. Fitch factored a 10% fixed-rate bucket in its cash flow analysis and the rated notes can withstand the excess spread compression in a rising interest rate environment. Limited FX Risk Asset swaps are used to mitigate any currency risk on non-euro- denominated assets. The transaction is allowed to invest up to 30% of the portfolio in non-euro-denominated assets, provided that suitable asset swaps can be entered into. Rating Sensitivities Rating sensitivities are described in the accompanying new issue report, which will be published in the coming days. Amendments to Documents The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency confirmation or note-holder approval. Where rating agency confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyses the proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the change has a negative impact on the then current ratings. Such amendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final maturity. If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a rating perspective, Fitch may decline to comment. Noteholders should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to be given if Fitch declines to comment. ST. PAUL'S CLO IV: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating to Class E Notes ---------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned credit ratings to St. Paul's CLO IV Ltd.'s class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E notes. At closing, St. Paul's CLO IV issued an unrated subordinated class of notes. St. Paul's CLO IV is a European cash flow corporate loan collateralized loan obligation (CLO) securitization of a revolving pool, comprising primarily euro-denominated senior secured loans and bonds issued mainly by European borrowers. Intermediate Capital Managers Ltd. acts as the collateral manager. S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the collateral portfolio's credit quality. The portfolio at closing is diversified, comprising primarily broadly syndicated speculative- grade euro-denominated senior secured loans and bonds issued mainly by European borrowers. S&P has determined the available credit enhancement for the rated notes through the subordination of payable cash flow. S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes. To determine the BDR for each rated class, S&P used the target par amount, the covenanted weighted-average spread, the covenanted weighted-average coupon, and the covenanted weighted- average recovery rates. S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using four different default patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate stress scenarios for each liability rating category. "Our ratings are commensurate with our assessment of available credit enhancement following our credit and cash flow analysis. Our analysis shows that the available credit enhancement for each class of notes was sufficient to withstand the defaults that we applied in our supplemental tests (not counting excess spread) outlined in our corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria," S&P said. "Following the application of our nonsovereign ratings criteria, we consider that the transaction's exposure to country risk is sufficiently mitigated at the assigned rating levels. This is because the concentration of the pool comprising assets in countries rated lower than 'A-' is limited to 10% of the aggregate collateral balance," S&P added. The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy-remote, in accordance with S&P's European legal criteria. Ratings Assigned St. Paul's CLO IV Ltd. EUR434.91 Million Secured And Secured Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes And Subordinated Notes Class Rating Amount (mil. EUR) A-1 AAA (sf) 248.25 A-2 AA (sf) 55.75 B A (sf) 23.50 C BBB (sf) 21.00 D BB (sf) 29.00 E B (sf) 14.00 Subordinated NR 43.41 NR--Not rated. ULSTER BANK: RBS Mulls Sale of Irish Hotel Assets ------------------------------------------------- Irish Examiner reports that Royal Bank of Scotland Group is weighing up the sale of over EUR400 million of Irish hotel assets. According to Irish Examiner, sources said the lender's Irish unit, Ulster Bank, would sell loans and lodgings in portions to generate more income. The people said that the bank is also considering selling development land, in tranches, Irish Examiner relates. Ulster Bank chief executive Jim Brown said in January his division has to wind down GBP9 billion of assets being put into a bad bank by the end of 2016, Irish Examiner recounts. The bank hired investment bank Eastdil Secured LLC last month to advise on a separate potential sale of EUR1bn of commercial- property assets, Irish Examiner relays. Ulster Bank's assets include a stake in three lodgings in Dublin's Ballsbridge embassy district, Irish Examiner notes. Ulster is the biggest bank in Northern Ireland and the third biggest in the Republic of Ireland. ========= I T A L Y ========= BORMIOLI ROCCO: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+' on Weaker Credit Metrics --------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term corporate credit rating on Italy-based glass and plastic packaging company Bormioli Rocco Holdings S.A. to 'B+' from 'BB-'. The outlook is stable. In addition, S&P lowered its issue rating on Bormioli Rocco's EUR250 million senior secured notes to 'B+' from 'BB-'. The recovery rating on the notes is unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default. The downgrade reflects S&P's view that Bormioli's credit metrics will remain weaker than its guidelines for the 'BB-' rating for a prolonged period. The ratio of funds from operations (FFO) to debt for the 12 months ended Sept. 30, 2013, declined to 12.3% from 13.1% for the full year of 2012. This was due to lower top- line profit and production problems in the glass, pharmaceuticals, and food and beverage businesses. During the same period, the group's debt to EBITDA weakened to 4.1x from 3.9x. S&P don't foresee a significant recovery of Bormioli's credit metrics in the near term. Rather, S&P forecasts Bormioli's FFO to debt to be 10%-12% and debt to EBITDA to average 4.0x-4.5x in 2014-2015, in line with its estimates for 2013. These projections also reflect S&P's expectation that free cash flow will be negative over 2014 and 2015 as the group ramps up capital expenditure to refurbish its furnaces and improve productivity and efficiency. That said, the EBITDA margin should improve over 2014 because the group sold its loss-making perfumery division in December 2013. S&P views Bormioli's business risk profile as "fair," reflecting the group's relatively small scope of operations, weaker-than- average margins for the industry, sensitivity to volatile input costs, and relatively high capital intensity. Bormioli also lacks significant geographic diversification; Italy and France represent about 60% of sales. Nevertheless, Bormioli has a leading niche position in the mature and consolidated Italian and French markets and long-standing relationships with customers in relatively stable end markets of pharmaceutical and food and beverage. S&P continues to view the group's financial risk profile as "aggressive." The group has the potential to deleverage over the medium term, but is currently reinvesting free cash into the business, mainly to finance the refurbishment of furnaces nearing the end of their technical life, increase production capacity, and improve operating flexibility. These factors will likely result in negative free cash flow over 2014 and 2015. S&P applies a one-notch downward adjustment based on its comparable ratings analysis. This stems from S&P's expectation that Bormioli's key ratio of FFO to debt will likely remain at about 12%, at the higher end of the range for S&P's "aggressive" category, over 2014-2015; and that its free cash flow will likely be negative. In S&P's base case, it assumes: -- Flat revenue growth in 2013 declining by high single digits in 2014 as result of the sale of the perfumery business; -- Reported EBITDA in 2013 and 2014 close to that of 2012. In particular, for 2014 S&P assumes that volumes will not increase significantly because of still difficult operating conditions, production stoppages to refurbish furnaces, and no cost increases, thanks to energy cost management; -- Capital expenditure to increase to refurbish furnaces and improve productivity and efficiency; and -- No dividends or acquisitions. Based on these assumptions, S&P forecasts the following key credit metrics: -- FFO to debt in the 10%-12% range in 2013 and 2014, compared with 13% for 2012; -- Debt to EBITDA of 4.0x-4.5x, against 3.9x in 2012; and -- Negative free cash flow in 2014 and 2015. The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Bormioli's key credit metrics will not weaken over the next 12-18 months. S&P forecasts FFO to debt to stay at about 12% and debt to EBITDA at 4.0x-4.5x over this period. In S&P's view, Bormioli's continued investment in improving production capacity and efficiency, and its ability to largely neutralize the effect of raw material price increases, should enable it to sustain an EBITDA margin slightly above 13% in 2014. This is higher than in 2013, when the loss-making perfumery business was included. S&P might consider a positive rating action if Bormioli's credit metrics were to strengthen significantly. Particularly, an increase in the FFO-to-debt ratio to above 14% over a sustained period might lead to an upgrade. This would likely happen if operating conditions improved, resulting in higher profitability margins and positive free cash flow generation. S&P views such a scenario as rather unlikely over the next 12 months, however. "We might take a negative rating action if the group's adjusted credit metrics weakened further over the next 12-18 months and were well below those in our base case. Specifically, we would lower the ratings if adjusted debt to EBITDA rose to almost 5x or the adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio fell to less than 10%, without sufficient potential for a swift return to stronger levels. In such a scenario, we would revise our assessment of the financial risk profile down to "highly leveraged." We consider production problems, specifically unexpected furnace stoppages or breakdowns, as one of the key risks to Bormioli's current metrics," S&P said. The ratings could also come under pressure if liquidity weakened or if Bormioli's shareholders adopted a more aggressive financial policy, resulting in weaker credit measures than S&P considers commensurate with the rating. =================== K A Z A K H S T A N =================== ALLIANCE BANK: S&P Lowers Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to 'D' ---------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its issue ratings on Kazakhstan-based Alliance Bank JSC's senior unsecured debt to 'D' from 'CC' and the ratings on the subordinated debt to 'D' from 'C'. The ratings on the bank remain at 'D/D' (default). The rating actions follow Alliance Bank's non-payment on March 26, 2014, of a coupon payment on its senior discount Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) and U.S. dollar notes, due in 2017; the senior par KZT and U.S. dollar notes, due 2020; and the subordinated KZT notes, due in 2030, in line with S&P's expectations. As a result, S&P lowered its ratings on the bank's senior unsecured and subordinated debt to 'D' (default). Alliance Bank had already missed a payment due to noteholders on Dec. 26, 2013. Then on Jan. 23, 2014, the bank announced its intention to restructure its outstanding senior and subordinated bonds. A week later, on Jan. 31, 2014, Alliance Bank announced the Board of Directors' decision to start restructuring the bank. S&P subsequently lowered its counterparty credit ratings on the bank to 'D'. S&P expects to review the ratings on the bank and its debt instruments after the bank completes its restructuring and publishes quarterly financial results. According to the bank, it plans to complete the restructuring by the middle of this year. =================== L U X E M B O U R G =================== ALLNEX LUXEMBOURG: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating ------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-registered, Brussels-based coating resins and additives producer Allnex (Luxembourg) & Cy SCA. The outlook remains stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on the group's first lien secured debt, including its $120 million revolving credit facility (RCF) and US$687 million term loan. The recovery rating is '3'. S&P also affirmed its 'B-' issue rating on the group's US$150 million second lien secured term loan. The recovery rating is '6'. The affirmation reflects Allnex's overall resilient operating performance, with adjusted EBITDA likely to end up at $190 million in 2013, in line with S&P's expectations. S&P forecasts similar or slightly higher profit in 2014. S&P's assessment of Allnex's business risk profile has improved to "fair" from "weak" previously. These factors in the group's prolonged track record of resilient profits, supported by its fair geographic reach, strong product portfolio across different types of coating resins -- including liquid, powder, radcure and cross-linkers -- and the cost savings realized since its takeover by private equity company Advent from previous owner Cytec. At the same time, S&P continues to assess Allnex's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged," according to its criteria, capturing its full private equity ownership and fairly high debt since the closing of the transaction. The anchor is unchanged at 'b' and S&P continues to adjust it upwards by one notch for comparable rating analysis. This takes into account S&P's expectation that Allnex's financial ratios and free cash flows are stronger than most other highly leveraged peers. S&P's assessment of Allnex's business risk profile as fair captures its expectation that the group should continue to deliver stable, or even slightly rising, adjusted EBITDA of about $190 million-$200 million in 2014-2015. "We assess Allnex's financial risk profile as highly leveraged under our corporate criteria because we believe it is constrained by the group's full private equity ownership. Leverage is therefore substantial -- according to our base case for 2013 and 2014, adjusted debt to EBITDA will be 5x and 4.5x when excluding the US$271 million preferred equity certificates held by Advent, or 6.3x and 6.1x when including these in our adjusted debt," S&P said. "We adjust the rating upwards by one notch for comparable rating analysis, reflecting our view of Allnex's positive free cash flows in 2013 and thereafter, with cash balances rising to $100 million at year-end 2013. This is supported by the group's operating resilience, the fairly limited capital intensity of the business, and the moderate capital expenditures we assume under our base case. Nevertheless, the accompanying deleveraging trend will depend on the use of excess cash flows, depending eventually on investments, acquisitions, and dividends policy". The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectations that Allnex will continue to deliver resilient EBITDA and free cash flow in 2014 and 2015, supported by its recent good performance and boosted by good global geographic diversity and product mix. S&P views an adjusted ratio of debt to EBITDA of about 4.5-5x as commensurate with the rating when excluding the preferred equity certificates, and 6x or slightly above when including them. S&P might consider a negative rating action if it saw a more aggressive financial policy than we currently factor in, including any releveraging above 5x. Another risk factor would be greater cyclical downside for Allnex's industrial coating resins than S&P current assumes. Rating upside is limited for now given Allnex's private equity ownership, and related aggressive financial policies. Limited diversity beyond coating resins and the cyclical nature of its main end markets are also constraints on S&P's assessment of Allnex's business risk profile. ===================== N E T H E R L A N D S ===================== AI AVOCADO: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable --------------------------------------------------------------- Standard and Poor's ratings services said that it assigned its 'B' corporate credit rating to AI Avocado Holding B.V. (AI Avocado). The outlook is stable. At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the EUR440 million senior secured term loan and revolving credit facility (RCF) of up to EUR50 million to be borrowed by AI Avocado B.V. and its subsidiaries, including Netherlands-based software company Unit4 N.V. Private equity firm Advent International, through AI Avocado, has acquired Unit 4 in a public-to-private leveraged buyout. The ratings on AI Avocado reflect S&P's assessment of Unit 4's business risk profile as "fair" and its financial risk profile as "highly leveraged." S&P's assessment of Unit4's business risk profile is underpinned by the company's resilient enterprise resource planning (ERP) software revenue base, including during downturns. The company has a high customer retention rate (above 95% on average), due in part to meaningful switching costs and the recurring revenues generated by the maintenance agreements and some of the services contracts. In addition, S&P views the recent change of business model toward "software as a service" (SaaS), instead of the legacy license-maintenance model, as potentially improving the predictability of revenues and allowing the company to be more profitable in the medium term. However, the company has a narrow offering compared with the broader software and services sector, and competes with much larger, more diversified, and financially stronger software companies -- Oracle, SAP, and Microsoft. Also, Unit4's adjusted EBITDA margin of about 17% is below average for the software sector. "We assess Unit4's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged." We estimate that at year-end 2014, the company's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be about 11.5x (including the subordinated shareholder loan and adjusting EBITDA for capitalized software development costs; excluding the shareholder loan, leverage will be about 7x). We see the likelihood of deleveraging as limited due to the capitalized nature of the subordinated loan's interest rate, which is likely to offset any EBITDA increase. Over time, senior leverage could decrease if the company uses free cash flow to prepay debt under its cash flow sweep mechanism," S&P said. S&P's base-case scenario assumes: -- Modest annual top-line increases of 2%, slightly below its expected nominal GDP growth in Unit4's countries of operation in Western and Northern Europe, partly constrained by the change of business model toward SaaS. -- Modest adjusted EBITDA margin expansion (expensing capitalized software development costs) toward 18% in 2017 from 17% in 2014, thanks to operating leverage. -- Relatively small capital expenditure (capex) of about EUR9 million-EUR10 million per year (as capitalized software development costs are expensed). Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit measures: -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 11.5x (about 7x excluding the shareholder loan); -- Adjusted free operating cash flow (FOCF) to debt of about 1% (2% excluding the shareholder loan); -- A modest buildup of cash as the company faces no near-term debt amortization requirements; and -- Adjusted EBITDA to interest of about 1.3x (EBITDA to cash interest of about 2x). The stable outlook reflects S&P's anticipation of modest revenue growth and gradual improvement in the EBITDA margin slightly above 17%. The outlook also reflects S&P's anticipation that AI Avocado will remain highly leveraged, but with "adequate" liquidity and EBITDA to cash interest coverage of at least 2.0x. S&P sees the likelihood of an upgrade as limited over the next 12 months, given Unit4's high leverage. S&P forecasts adjusted leverage to remain above 11.5x (7x excluding the shareholder loan). S&P could consider raising the rating if Unit4 improves its adjusted EBITDA margin toward the sector standard of above 20%, coupled with a cash-interest coverage ratio comfortably above 2.0x. S&P believes that the likelihood of a downgrade is currently limited, as Unit4 has modest debt amortization requirements and it do not currently anticipate revising downward its assessment of its "fair" business risk profile. S&P could consider lowering the rating if it revises downward its assessment of the group's business risk profile, possibly due to increased customer turnover and the loss of key contracts to competitors, leading to a drop in EBITDA cash interest coverage toward 1.5x. CEVA HOLDINGS: S&P Raises CCR to 'B-' on Completed Refinancing -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had raised its long- term corporate credit ratings on Netherlands-based integrated logistics services provider CEVA Group PLC and its holding company CEVA Holding LLC to 'B-' from 'CCC+'. The outlook is stable. At the same time, S&P raised its issue rating on CEVA's US$390 million first-lien notes to 'B-' from 'CCC+'. The recovery rating is '4', reflecting S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of default. S&P also raised the issue rating on the z43 million 12.75% senior notes, maturing 2020, to 'CCC' from 'CCC-'. The recovery rating is '6', reflecting S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery after a default. S&P removed all the ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with positive implications on March 5, 2014. The rating actions follow the completion of CEVA's debt refinancing, announced on March 5, 2014, and reflect its impact on zEVA's credit metrics. The corporate credit ratings reflect S&P's assessment of CEVA's "weak" business risk profile and "highly leveraged" financial risk profile. The business risk profile incorporates S&P's view of "low" risk in the railroad/package express industry -- which includes logistics providers -- and CEVA's exposure to "low" country risk, based on its globally diversified operations. S&P's assessment of business risk also takes into consideration CEVA's weak absolute profitability compared with peers', and S&P's view that difficult market conditions in the freight-management business, particularly the airfreight segment, has led to declining volumes and profitability. S&P assess the financial risk profile as "highly leveraged," based on certain key metrics, including funds from operations (FFO) to debt, which stands at 6.0%, and debt to EBITDA of 7.6x. In addition, CEVA's ownership by a financial sponsor caps its financial risk profile. This is indicated by S&P's assessment of financial policy as FS-6, as defined in its criteria. In S&P's view, the recent refinancing has improved CEVA's liquidity position and debt maturity profile because no material amounts of debt will mature until May 2018. In S&P's view, this affords CEVA additional time to implement measures to sustainably improve its absolute profitability, which should support its current capital structure. CEVA's reported free cash flow has also improved, despite a reduction in reported EBITDA, mainly because working capital has decreased while capital expenditure (capex) has fallen. Working capital management will remain an important area of focus in S&P's analysis. The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, over the next 12 months, CEVA's financial risk profile will remain highly leveraged and, following the recent refinancing, liquidity will be sufficient to meet its financing needs. S&P considers an upgrade to be unlikely in the near term, based on its forecast that adjusted FFO to debt will remain materially below 12%, the level S&P would regard as commensurate with a positive rating action. S&P believes that rating downside could arise if liquidity weakened materially, for example, because of greater negative free operating cash flow than S&P currently forecasts. This could stem from further deterioration in the global supply chain industry or higher capex than S&P expects. S&P could also lower the rating if it considered CEVA's capital structure to be unsustainable. GRESHAM CAPITAL V: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to CCC ------------------------------------------------------------ Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on Gresham Capital CLO V B.V.'s class A to D notes. The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 20, 2014 and the application of S&P's relevant criteria. S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes. The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults, based on its stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the noteholders. S&P used the portfolio balance that it considers to be performing, the reported weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered to be appropriate. S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using its standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios as outlined in our criteria. "Our review of the transaction highlights that the class A notes have amortized by nearly 74% of the outstanding balance since our previous review. This has resulted in double the available credit enhancement for the class A notes compared with our last review. Our cash flow analysis indicates that the notes are able to sustain defaults at a rating level that is higher than the current one. Our cash flow results show that the available credit enhancement for the class A notes is commensurate with a 'AAA (sf)' rating. We have therefore raised to 'AAA (sf') from 'AA- (sf)' our rating on the class A notes," S&P said. "The latest trustee report indicates that there is about EUR78 million of cash in the principal collection account. We understand that the collateral manager does not intend to reinvest any of these proceeds, and is likely to use these proceeds on the next payment date to pay the notes sequentially. With only EUR51.875 million class A notes outstanding, it is likely that these notes will be fully repaid on the June 2014 payment date," S&P said. "Our analysis highlights that the available credit enhancement for the class B notes is commensurate with a higher rating than previously assigned. This is mainly due to the class A notes' amortization and the available principal cash proceeds. We have therefore raised to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' our rating on the class B notes," S&P added. "Our cash flow results indicate that the available credit enhancement for the class C notes is commensurate with a 'A (sf) rating. The largest obligor test constrains our rating on this class of notes at a 'BB+' rating level. We have therefore raised to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' our rating on the class C notes," S&P noted. "Under our cash flow analysis, the class D note BDRs pass their scenario default rates (SDRs) at a 'B' rating level. The SDR is the minimum level of portfolio defaults that we expect each CDO tranche to be able to support the specific rating level using CDO Evaluator. However, the application of the largest obligor default test constrains our rating on this class of notes. We have therefore raised to 'CCC (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' our rating on the class D notes. This test measures the risk of several of the largest obligors within the portfolio defaulting simultaneously. We introduced this supplemental stress test in our 2009 criteria update for corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)," S&P added. Gresham Capital CLO V is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms. The transaction closed in June 2008. The transaction's reinvestment period will end in June 2014. RATINGS LIST Class Rating Rating To From Gresham Capital CLO V B.V. EUR518.825 Million Floating-Rate And Subordinated Deferrable Secured Floating-Rate Notes (Including A Tap Issuance Of EUR176.5635 Million Floating-Rate Notes And EUR15.0495 Million Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes) Ratings Raised A AAA (sf) AA- (sf) B AA+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) C BB+ (sf) B+ (sf) D CCC (sf) CCC- (sf) RHODIUM 1: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class D Notes ----------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its credit rating on Rhodium 1 B.V.'s class B notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its credit ratings on the class C and D notes. The rating actions follow S&P's performance review, which included its credit and cash flow analysis and the application of its relevant criteria. S&P used data from the February 2014 payment date report and took into account recent transaction developments. As the transaction amortizes, the percentage of the pool's speculative-grade assets has increased, as well as the percentage of assets that S&P considers to be in the 'CCC' category (assets rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-'). Since S&P's previous review on Aug. 23, 2013, the transaction's class A/B/C and class D overcollateralization par value ratios have increased following the class B notes' deleveraging. These ratios are above the transaction's documented trigger level for the overcollateralization tests. S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rates (BDRs) at each rating level by applying its corporate cash flow criteria and its criteria for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of asset-backed securities (ABS). In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used the reported portfolio balance that it considered to be performing, the principal cash balance, the current weighted-average spread, and the weighted- average recovery rates that S&P considered to be appropriate. S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using various default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest rate stress scenarios. S&P based its credit analysis on its updated assumptions to determine the scenario default rates at each rating level, which we then compared with the notes' respective BDRs. "Since our previous review, the available credit enhancement for the class B notes has increased mainly due to deleveraging in the transaction. Taking into account the results of our credit and cash flow analysis and the increase in available credit enhancement, we have raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' our rating on the class B notes. We have affirmed our ratings on the class C and D notes as their available credit enhancement and the results of our credit and cash flow analysis are commensurate with our currently assigned rating levels," S&P said. Rhodium 1 is a static cash flow CDO of a portfolio of mainly mortgage-backed securities. RATINGS LIST Class Rating Rating To From Rhodium 1 B.V. EUR304.4 Million Asset Backed Floating-Rate Notes Rating Raised B A- (sf) BBB+ (sf) Ratings Affirmed C CCC+ (sf) D CCC- (sf) ============= R O M A N I A ============= * ROMANIA: Banks See Improvement in Liquidated Asset Sales ---------------------------------------------------------- Oana Gavrila at Property Investor Europe reports that banks see improvement in asset liquidation sales and support company restructuring outside of insolvency procedures, which they consider simpler and less costly than insolvency. =========== R U S S I A =========== INTERREGIONAL DISTRIBUTIVE: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative ----------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Russian government-owned electricity company Interregional Distributive Grid Company of Center JSC (IDGC of Center) to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB/B' long- and short-term corporate credit ratings and 'ruAA' Russia national scale rating on the company. The outlook revision follows a similar action on the Russian Federation on March 20, 2014. All else remaining equal, a downgrade of Russia could trigger a downgrade of IDGC of Center, owing to S&P's view of Russia's weakened capacity to provide extraordinary support to the company if needed. According to S&P's criteria for rating government-related entities, it continues to apply one notch of uplift to its long- term rating on IDGC of Center to reflect S&P's view that there's a "moderate" likelihood that the Russian government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to IDGC of Center in the event of financial distress. S&P's view is based on its assessment of IDGC of Center's: -- "Important" role for the federal government (at least for several regional governments) as a provider of essential infrastructure services in its areas of operation; and "Limited" link to the federal government, given its indirect majority ownership of the company and the existence of a number of minority shareholders, which increases uncertainty about the timeliness and mechanism of any extraordinary support. The ratings also incorporate S&P's assessment of IDGC of Center's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'bb-', based on its view of the company's "fair" business risk profile and "aggressive" financial risk profile. In S&P's view, the main constraints on the ratings on IDGC of Center include: -- The company's aging operating assets; -- Untested results under the new tariff regime and past governments' attempts to manually control tariffs; -- An aggressive financial profile; -- Heavy reliance on new debt to finance its investments; and -- A concentrated customer base. Moreover, the economies of the regions that the company serves are relatively weak, which has led to an increased amount of customer nonpayments. The transitional features of Russia's economy, including a somewhat volatile funding environment, also constrain the ratings. These constraints are mitigated by IDGC of Center's role as the major distribution grid operator in its service areas, its 82% market share, and its relatively stable cash flows from regulated power distribution. S&P thinks that the company's well-spread debt maturity profile and management's prudent approach to liquidity management are also supportive for the ratings. The negative outlook mirrors that on Russia, which reflects S&P's view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that it could reassess the risks to Russia's creditworthiness based on its deteriorating external profile and reduced monetary policy flexibility and, as a result, could lower its ratings on Russia within the next 24 months. S&P's negative outlook on Russia also indicates a probability that it could equalize the local and foreign currency ratings on Russia in case of a downgrade. This, all else remaining equal, could trigger a downgrade of IDGC of Center, owing to S&P's view of Russia's weakened capacity to provide extraordinary support to the company if needed. Given the SACP of 'bb-', S&P expects IDGC of Center will maintain a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of less than 3.0x with very temporary deviations of up to 3.5x. S&P could lower the rating on IDGC of Center if there is a two- notch downgrade of the local currency sovereign rating on Russia, all else being equal. However, a one-notch downgrade of the sovereign, all else remaining equal, is unlikely to result in a similar rating action on IDGC of Center. S&P might consider a negative rating action if it observes that IDGC of Center takes on a more aggressive financial policy or if regulatory actions result in higher-than-expected debt levels. S&P might also consider a downgrade if the company starts to rely excessively on short-term financing, if its liquidity deteriorates to less-than-adequate levels, or if its profitability materially decreases, weakening financial metrics. S&P might lower the long-term rating to the level of the SACP if it revises the likelihood of extraordinary government support to "limited" from "moderate." This would likely happen if S&P observed that IDGC of Center's role for the government had diminished, with weakening control and focus on the company as a result of government-owned stake privatization, for example. S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it revises the outlook on the Russian Federation to stable and the SACP for IDGC of Center remains unchanged. Upside potential for the SACP might arise if the company maintains its debt-to-EBITDA ratio at less than 2x while maintaining adequate liquidity and maturity profiles. In addition, evidence that the system of regulatory tariffs is operating without material changes or political intervention could lead to an upward revision of the SACP. A one-notch upward revision of the SACP would lead to a positive rating action, all else being equal. MOSCOW UNITED: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB' CCR ----------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its outlook on Russian state-owned electricity company Moscow United Electric Grid Co. JSC (MOESK) to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'BB' long-term corporate credit rating and the 'ruAA' Russia national scale rating on MOESK. The outlook revision follows a similar action on the Russian Federation. According to S&P's criteria for rating government- related entities, the ratings on MOESK reflect its unchanged view that there's a "moderate" likelihood that the Russian government, MOESK's ultimate owner, would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to MOESK in the event of financial distress. "Our assessment of MOESK's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'bb-' is based on our assessments of its business risk profile as "fair" and its financial risk profile as "aggressive." The main constraining factors include MOESK's aged operating assets and ambitious grid-development plans, which result in a heavy medium- term investment program and negative projected generation of free operating cash flow (FOCF). Other key constraining factors are political interference in regulatory remuneration, a somewhat concentrated customer base, and above-industry-average losses in the grids, owing to large transit volumes through the area. The main supportive factors for the SACP are the company's dominant position as the major distribution grid operator in the City of Moscow and the Moscow Oblast, with an 80% market share in Moscow and 65% market share in the oblast. MOESK's relatively stable cash flows from electricity power distribution and a favorable long-term debt maturity profile also support our assessment of MOESK's SACP," S&P said. "The negative outlook mirrors that on Russia and reflects our view that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could reassess the risks to Russia's creditworthiness based on its deteriorating external profile and reduced monetary policy flexibility and, as a result, could lower our ratings on Russia within the next 24 months. Our negative outlook on Russia also mentions a probability that we could equalize the local and foreign currency ratings on Russia in case of a downgrade, which, all else remaining equal, could trigger a downgrade of MOESK owing to our view of Russia's weakened capacity to provide extraordinary support to the company in case of need," S&P added. To be in line with an SACP of 'bb-', S&P expects MOESK's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio to be less than 3x on a sustainable basis, with very temporary deviations of up to 3.5x. S&P could downgrade MOESK if it lowers the local currency rating on Russia by two notches, all else being equal. A one-notch downgrade of the sovereign is unlikely to result in a similar rating action on MOESK, all else being equal. S&P could consider a negative rating action if it observed a more aggressive financial policy by MOESK or regulatory actions that would result in higher debt levels for MOESK than S&P currently anticipates. S&P might also consider such an action if the company starts to rely excessively on short-term financing, if its liquidity deteriorates to "less than adequate," or if its profitability significantly decreases, which would weaken its financial metrics. S&P might lower the long-term rating to the level of the SACP if we revise the likelihood of extraordinary state support to "limited." That would likely happen if S&P saw signs that MOESK's role for the government had diminished, with weakening control and focus on the company, for example, as a result of the privatization of a state-owned stake. S&P could revise its outlook on MOESK to stable if it revises the outlook on Russia to stable and MOESK's SACP remains unchanged. Upside potential for the SACP could result if the company manages to keep its leverage under 2x consistently while maintaining "adequate" liquidity and maturity profiles. S&P would also need to see evidence that the system of regulatory tariffs is operating without significant changes or political intervention. If S&P revised the SACP up by one notch, it would lead to an upgrade of MOESK, all else being equal. ROSTELECOM OJSC: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Stable ------------------------------------------------------ Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' long-term corporate credit rating on Russia's largest fixed-line telecommunications operator Rostelecom OJSC. The outlook is stable. The affirmation follows S&P's review of Rostelecom's stand-alone credit profile (SACP), which we revised upward to 'bb+' from 'bb'. Therefore, in accordance with S&P's methodology for government-related entities (GREs), the rating on Rostelecom no longer incorporates notches of uplift from the rating on Russia and is unaffected by the outlook revision on the sovereign to negative from stable. The upward revision of the SACP reflects the improvement in the company's liquidity, which S&P now views as "adequate," versus its previous assessment of "less than adequate." In the past 12 months, Rostelecom has taken steps to increase the maturity profile of its debt, which improves the ratio of liquidity sources to liquidity uses to above 1.2x. S&P's 'BB+' rating on Rostelecom is derived from its anchor of 'bb+', which reflects its assessments of its "fair" business risk profile and its "intermediate" financial risk profile. S&P's modifiers have no impact on the anchor. In S&P's opinion, Rostelecom's "fair" business risk profile primarily reflects its currently "weak" competitive position in Russia's lucrative and competitive mobile telephony market. The business risk profile is supported by the company's solid position in the fixed-line segment, due to its former incumbent status. Although revenues from traditional fixed-line services are declining, largely due to fixed-to-mobile substitution, the company's extensive network has allowed for growth in related segments, such as broadband internet and pay-TV. S&P's assessment of Rostelecom's "intermediate" financial risk profile reflects its assumption that its Standard & Poor's- adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will remain below 2.5x following the ongoing spin-off of its mobile assets. It also reflects S&P's expectation that the company will generate positive free operating cash flow with reduced capital expenditure requirements. Under S&P's base-case scenario for 2014 and 2015, it assumes: -- Flat revenue growth, as S&P believes the developments in broadband and related services will fully offset the decline in traditional voice. -- Stable profitability, although the reported EBITDA margin will likely improve as deconsolidated mobile business had materially weaker profitability. -- A decline in capital expenditures, given that a significant portion of capital expenditures over the past few years was mobile-related. Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit measures in 2014 and 2015: -- Debt to EBITDA of about 1.9x. -- Funds from operations to debt of close to 40%. S&P continues to believe there is a "moderate" likelihood that the Russian government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to Rostelecom in the event of financial distress. Although S&P notes that Rostelecom could be privatized in the medium term, it has not observed the government take any steps in that direction. The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Rostelecom should generate free operating cash flow following the spin-off of its mobile assets because it will focus on organic growth in existing segments. S&P anticipates a ratio of debt to EBITDA lower than 2.5x, in line with the current rating. S&P could lower the ratings on Rostelecom if its Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to EBITDA ratio exceeded 2.5x due to financial policy decisions or underperformance. However, S&P views the latter scenario as unlikely. The upside potential for the rating is remote, in S&P's view, as it would require a meaningfully stronger diversification to mobile telephony. This could be achieved, in the long term, if the mobile joint venture improves its market position and starts paying meaningful dividends. However, S&P believes this would take more than three years to happen. RUSHYDRO: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB+' CCR ------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its outlook on Russian state-owned electricity generation company, RusHydro (OJSC) to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' long-term and 'B' short- term corporate credit ratings and 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating on the company. The outlook revision follows a similar action on the Russian Federation on March 20, 2014. According to S&P's criteria for rating government-related entities (GREs), the long-term rating on RusHydro includes one notch of uplift to reflect its unchanged view that there's a "moderately high" likelihood that the Russian government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to RusHydro in the event of financial distress. This view is based on S&P's assessment of the group's: -- "Important" role for the government, given its status as a mainly profit-oriented enterprise in a competitive environment, its dominant position in the energy sector, key support of power-intensive industries, and capacity regulation reserve function; and -- "Strong" link with the Russian government, which owns a 66.8% stake in RusHydro. S&P also factors in its expectation that the government's stake will not fall to less than 50% plus one share over the medium term (supported by the government's decision to include RusHydro in the list of strategic entities), ongoing state support in the form of asset and capital injections, the state's intention to continue providing support on a temporary and exceptional basis, and the risk to the sovereign's reputation if RusHydro were to default. The ratings also take into account S&P's assessment of RusHydro's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'bb', based on a "fair" business risk profile and "significant" financial risk profile. S&P's assessment incorporates RusHydro's aging operating assets and its exposure to fluctuating water levels for its largely hydro-powered generation fleet, the deregulated and inherently volatile local electricity market, and the developing regulatory environment. In addition, RusHydro has a sizable investment program, resulting in S&P's projection of materially negative free operating cash flow for at least the next two years; and the company relies heavily on external funding to finance its investments. These weaknesses are mitigated by the company's solid market position; low cost base; geographically diverse asset fleet, which somewhat reduces the volatility of hydro-resources; ongoing and potential extraordinary support from the Russian government, the majority shareholder; and good access to capital markets. The negative outlook on RusHydro mirrors that on the long-term sovereign rating. Given the SACP of 'bb', S&P expects RusHydro to maintain a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of less than 3.0x over the next two years, as well as adequate liquidity and some flexibility in its investment program. Downside scenario S&P could lower the ratings on RusHydro if it lowered the long- term local currency sovereign credit rating on Russia by two or more notches, all else being equal. A one-notch downgrade of the sovereign is unlikely to result in a similar rating action on RusHydro, all else being equal, in accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs. In S&P's view, pressure on RusHydro's credit profile could result from more aggressive financial policies than S&P currently anticipates, including greater capital spending and a leverage ratio (debt to EBITDA) exceeding 3.0x. In addition, S&P could take a negative rating action if the company started to rely more heavily on short-term financing, its liquidity deteriorated to "less-than-adequate" levels, or profitability dropped significantly, which could weaken the financial metrics. Any negative intervention from the government would likely prompt S&P to reassess RusHydro's business risk profile to "weak," which could lead S&P to revise RusHydro's SACP downward and lower the ratings. In addition, if S&P was to revise its view of the likelihood of extraordinary government support to "low" from "moderately high," S&P would remove the notch of uplift in the long-term rating on RusHydro, resulting in a downgrade. Upside scenario S&P could revise the outlook on RusHydro to stable if the outlook on Russia were revised to stable and its SACP assessment remained unchanged. If S&P believed that the regulatory environment and RusHydro's operating performance were improving, and it saw a track record of prudent financial strategies and a sustainably better financial position than S&P currently forecasts, it might revise its assessment of the SACP upward. In particular, S&P could revise the SACP if it believed the group capable of maintaining a debt-to-EBITDA ratio sustainably lower than 2.0x. This might ultimately lead S&P to raise the long-term rating on RusHydro, assuming that the local currency long-term sovereign credit rating remained at 'BBB+'. VODOKANAL ST PETERSBURG: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR; Outlook Positive ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on Russian regional water utility Vodokanal St. Petersburg (VKSPB). The outlook remains positive. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating on VKSPB. "We affirmed the ratings and kept the outlook positive, even though our outlook on VKSPB's owner, Russian City of St. Petersburg, is negative. This reflects our view that we could raise our long-term rating on VKSPB if we deem the company's credit metrics to be sustainable at least over the next 24 months. We will review our opinion after we have reviewed the long-term strategic development plan for the company, which we expect to be approved by the city government by mid-2014. We think that the new strategies might enhance the visibility of VKPSB's investment needs in the coming years. We assume, however, that the city's budget will at least partly cover these investment needs (as in the past), resulting in sustained modest debt leverage for VKSPB," S&P said. "We think that VKSPB's stable cash flow generation capacity, coupled with manageable levels of debt and capital expenditures, should allow the company to post 2013 adjusted debt to EBITDA below 2x and adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt above 50%. If achieved and deemed sustainable at these levels over the medium term, both measures could support our assessment of an improved financial risk profile," S&P added. The ratings on VKSPB reflect S&P's opinion that there is a "very high" likelihood that the company's 100% owner, St. Petersburg, would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to VKSPB in the event of financial distress. S&P assess VKSPB's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'b+', based on its assessment of its business risk profile as "weak" and financial risk profile as "intermediate." VKSPB's business risk profile continues to reflect S&P's view of the company's aged asset base and resulting sizable medium-term investment needs, a politicized and short-term tariff regulation regime, and operating risk stemming from deteriorating water quality. These weaknesses are partly offset by VKSPB's monopoly position in its franchise area, its relatively stable earnings and cash flows derived primarily from regulated activities, a fairly diverse customer base, and strategic importance to St. Petersburg, which is evidenced by the strong ongoing financial support VKSPB receives for its investments. S&P's view of VKSPB's financial risk profile is constrained by the utility's aggressive liquidity management, pronounced exposure to foreign currency risk, and the lack of clear and long-term financial policies. S&P considers these weaknesses to be mitigated by modest financial leverage and a satisfactory debt maturity profile. In accordance with S&P's criteria for rating government-related entities (GREs), its current view of a "very high" likelihood of extraordinary government support is based on S&P's assessment of VKSPB's "very important" role for and "very strong" link with the city's government. "The positive outlook reflects our view that we could raise the ratings if we deem VKSPB's solid credit metrics to be sustainable and the company increases covenant headroom and enhances transparency and clarity around its long-term financial policies. We expect that continued ongoing financial support from the city will alleviate VKSPB's need for external financing and help keep the company's debt leverage moderate," S&P added. "We might consider a positive rating action if our assessment of VKSPB's financial risk profile improved to "modest" from "intermediate" under our criteria, that is if FFO to debt were consistently above 45% and debt to EBITDA remained below 2x within all of the rating horizon (2014-2016). An upgrade also might be triggered by our revising our view of the company's liquidity to "adequate" following increased covenant headroom, more transparent and granular financial policies, as well as a cautious approach to liquidity management, S&P noted". If S&P do not observe improvements in the company's financial policies and liquidity management, or if the company relies on external debt above its expectations, which would lead to S&P not seeing upside potential anymore, S&P would most likely revise the outlook to negative, mirroring the outlook on the owner. Any lowering of the long-term local currency credit rating on St. Petersburg would likely prompt S&P to lower its corporate credit rating on VKSPB, provided that at that time S&P continued to assess VKSPB's SACP at 'b+' and the likelihood of extraordinary government support at "very high." In line with S&P's criteria for GREs, it would lower the rating by one notch if it was to see a two-notch drop in the company's SACP, assuming the likelihood of extraordinary support and its long-term local currency rating on St. Petersburg remained unchanged. If S&P was to reassess its view of the likelihood of extraordinary government support to least "high" from the existing "very high," we could lower the rating by one notch if the SACP remained at 'b+'. ========= S P A I N ========= CABLEUROPA SAU: S&P Puts 'B+' CCR on CreditWatch Positive --------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'B+' long- term corporate credit rating on Spain-based cable TV, telephony, and broadband services provider Cableuropa S.A.U. and all issue ratings on the group's debt on CreditWatch with positive implications. The CreditWatch placement follows the March 17, 2014, announcement by Vodafone Group PLC (Vodafone) that it has agreed to acquire Cableuropa, subject to regulatory approval. The placement reflects the high likelihood that S&P could raise the rating on Cableuropa by a maximum of several notches, in line with the rating on Vodafone, if the transaction closes successfully. S&P believes that Cableuropa's credit quality after the acquisition will benefit from potentially closer operational and legal integration into the Vodafone group, including access to Vodafone's Spanish mobile network. In addition, given Vodafone's track record of not maintaining debt at the subsidiary level, S&P expects that it could refinance Cableuropa's debt, either as part of a change of control tender offer, or in the year following the acquisition, with timing driven by redemption premiums. The current rating on Cableuropa reflects S&P's view of the group's business risk profile as "satisfactory" and its financial risk profile as "highly leveraged." "Our assessment of the business risk profile as satisfactory reflects Cableuropa's position as one of Spain's leading facility-based providers of triple-play services (telephony, broadband, and pay-TV), quad-play bundles as a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO), and its strong proprietary network. These strengths are offset by fierce competition in the Spanish telecoms market, notably with the dominant incumbent Telefonica. This has presented Cableuropa with difficulty in retaining its subscriber base, especially in the pay-TV segment, because of tough macroeconomic conditions that have heightened customer price sensitivity," S&P said. Cableuropa's highly leveraged financial risk profile reflects its significant adjusted leverage of about 5.2x at year-end 2013, its private equity ownership which S&P views as financially aggressive, and its moderate free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation. ===================== S W I T Z E R L A N D ===================== UBS AG: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR25MM Term Notes to 'Ba3' ------------------------------------------------------------ Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating on the following credit linked notes issued by UBS AG: Ser 174, EUR25m FIX Credit-Linked Step-Up Euro Medium Term Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 25, 2013 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) Ratings Rationale Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of a rating action on UniCredit Bank Austria AG, whose subordinated rating was downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 on 21 March 2014. The transaction is a credit linked note issued by UBS AG referencing the subordinated debt of UniCredit Bank Austria AG. In addition to the expected loss calculation described below in "Loss and Cash Flow Analysis", Moody's also applied stresses on the default probability and severity of the UniCredit Bank Austria AG subordinated debt in order to take into account the widely defined credit event definitions and deliverable obligations. Methodology Underlying the Rating Action: The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April 2010. Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating: Given the nature of the structure, noteholders are mainly exposed to the credit risk of the issuer and the reference entity. A downgrade or upgrade of either the issuer or the reference entity could trigger a downgrade or upgrade on the Notes. Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) more specifically, any uncertainty associated with the underlying credits in the transaction could have a direct impact on the repackaged transaction. Loss and Cash Flow Analysis: Moody's quantitative analysis of Repacks is designed to estimate the expected loss "EL" borne by the repack investor, given the transaction structure, the collateral and any other credit risks arising under the transaction. To this end, Moody's relies on an EL analysis in which Moody's identify and attach probabilities to events that might give rise to losses to repack noteholders. Moody's EL calculation assesses the probability and severity of each possible loss-inducing event happening at discrete (typically one-year) intervals through the life of the transaction. The EL for each of these time points can then be aggregated to provide a weighted-average EL for the rated notes. ============= U K R A I N E ============= UKRAINE: On Brink of Financial Bankruptcy, PM Says -------------------------------------------------- FOCUS News Agency reports that Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said Ukraine's total fiscal deficit amounts to UAH289 billion. "The country is on the brink of economic and financial bankruptcy," FOCUS News quotes the Prime Minister as saying. =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== AES CORPORATION: Fitch Affirms 'B' ST Issuer Default Rating ----------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of AES Corporation (AES) at 'BB-'. Fitch has also affirmed the following ratings: -- Short-term IDR at 'B' ; -- Senior secured debt at 'BB+' ; -- Unsecured debt at 'BB' ; -- Trust preferred stock issued by AES Trust III at 'B+' . The Rating Outlook is Stable. The rating affirmation reflects the diversity and stability of AES' cash flows and a reduction in risk with the continuous sale of assets in non-core regions and the exit from certain high-risk countries. The majority of parent cash flows are derived from utilities and generating assets with long-term contracts in various parts of the world. The large number of projects provide geographic diversity and substantial upstream dividends to support AES' financial obligations. Going forward the ratings are supported by management's strategy to continue to invest in regulated electricity utility businesses, and long-term contracted generating assets in countries that have a strong credit profile. Historical credit protection measures have been stronger than the guidelines for its current ratings, but the company faces headwinds in Brazil and higher capex in the U.S. and Chile over the early part of the rating horizon (2014-2016). Key Rating Drivers Cash-flow Diversity Drives Credit Profile: AES owns a portfolio of electric utilities and power generating assets across five continents. Historically, its cash flow included distributions from over 50 projects in any given year. Investment diversity shields the company from the macro and micro economic environment adversity affecting a local domestic electricity sector. Additionally, growth through investment in contracted assets improves cash flow quality. Growth Investments: Fitch expects that organic growth investments in select assets, including Indianapolis Power & Light (IPL) and internationally, Chilean and Asian projects, will increase cash flow beginning in 2016. In the interim, however, lower distributions from these subsidiaries in 2014 and 2015 and downstream equity contributions will stress credit metrics during the construction period. Overall, Fitch believes the construction spending will remain manageable. Exit from Non-Core Markets: Fitch expects AES to continue to improve its credit and business risk profile by exiting non-core markets, narrowing its investment focus in terms of geographical diversity, and to use sale proceeds to proportionally reduce debt. Since 2011, AES has received about US$1.4 billion in proceeds from the sale of non-core assets and a large portion of proceeds was used to fund its share buyback program. Deleveraging is Critical: As AES exits non-core markets, Fitch expects a proportional reduction in absolute debt to maintain or improve existing leverage. Any increase in leverage due to incremental shareholder distributions from sale proceeds will be negative for AES' credit profile. Further, a rising interest rate environment will require lower leverage in the future to maintain its current credit profile. Quality of Cash flow: Distribution from utilities and contracted generating assets improve the overall cash flow quality as these utility businesses provide long-term cash flow visibility and stability. Fitch expects at least 70% of AES' future cash flow over the rating horizon (2014-2016) to be from investments in operating utilities and contracted generation facilities. The average remaining life of its power sale contracts is about seven years. Higher Capital Spending: Fitch believes large capital expenditure at its U.S.-based utility, IPL, and its Chilean and Asian subsidiaries to be adverse for AES' financial metrics through 2015. Fitch expects AES to supplement the combination of subsidiary level operating cash flow and debt with equity contributions to alleviate funding needs for these subsidiaries and is reflected in current ratings. Stress on credit metrics during the construction period is manageable with the given liquidity position at AES and subsidiaries, diversity of cash distributions, and current return on its environmental capex at IPL. Geopolitical Risks Affect Credit Profile: AES owns and operates electricity utility businesses in more than 20 countries that are subject to foreign exchange rate volatility and adverse global macro-economic conditions. In addition, governmental policy in these countries regarding electricity tariffs, sector growth, currency controls, and foreign direct investment also increase its business risk profile. These risks are reflected in the credit profile for its current IDR. High Counterparty Credit Risks: AES continuously faces high default risk in sub-investment grade countries, adversely affecting its subsidiary level cash flow. These risks are common in emerging economies where state finances and property rights are weak. Fitch's forecast is adjusted for these uncertainties and they are reflected in its IDR. Aggressive Shareholder Distribution Policy: The potential for a continuation of a share buyback program without an absolute reduction in leverage remains a rating concern. The company has spent about $1 billion on share buybacks since 2010. Over the next two years the company plans average annual shareholder distributions of about $160 million. Liquidity AES has sufficient liquidity to meet its short-term obligations at least through 2015. The company had US$132 million in cash and cash equivalents at the end of December 2013. In addition, US$799 million was available under its revolving bank credit facilities maturing in 2018. With the refinancing of 2017 debt maturities in March 2014, the remainder of AES' debt maturities through 2017 are manageable given the company's liquidity and cash flow profile. Adjusted Parent-Only Cash Flow Fitch analyzes AES as a holding company owning a portfolio of assets and investments in a global electricity sector given its somewhat unique corporate profile and structure. Financially, this represents a deconsolidated approach with respect to AES' cash flows and debt levels . Fitch uses adjusted parent operating cash flows (APOCF), a non-GAAP measure, with its emphasis on dividends received and return on capital, to analyze AES' credit metrics. This approach, similar to the method used by AES' lenders in financial covenants, recognizes that the subsidiaries are encumbered by individual debt that is structurally superior to the debt of the corporate parent. The residual subsidiary cash flow available for upstream dividends and distributions has greater volatility than the direct cash flow of the operating subsidiaries, and may be subject to payment restrictions under subsidiary debt covenants, corporate by-laws, or national laws. Trends in Credit Metrics In 2013, the company benefited from lower corporate overheads, low interest rate environment, and higher free cash flow at its Philippines and UK based businesses, but upstream dividends were tempered by lower tariffs at its Brazilian electricity distribution utility (Eletropaulo) and higher capex at IPL and Gener subsidiaries. Financial ratios for 2013 are slightly stronger than Fitch's guidelines for the 'BB-' IDR. Fitch expects AES' 2016 recourse debt-to-APOCF and APOCF-to- interest ratios to be over 5.5x and around 3x, respectively. These ratios are moderately below Fitch's guideline metrics for the 'BB-' IDR. Stable Rating Outlook: The Stable Outlook reflects adequate liquidity and no significant debt maturities until 2017. Over 70% of total distributions received by AES in any given year are from utilities and contracted electricity-generating assets, limiting exposure to merchant risk. It is Fitch's expectation that management will fund new project investments using parent- level free cash flow, including proceeds from the sale of noncore assets. Rating Sensitivities Positive: An upgrade of AES is considered unlikely given its credit risk profile, a business model that subordinates the parent-level debt to the non-recourse debt and is subject to the financing documentation covenants. However, Fitch will consider an upgrade if Debt/APOCF ratio remains below 4.5x and APOCF/interest ratio improves to 3.5x on a sustainable basis. Negative: Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead to negative rating action include: -- An adverse event leading to decline in APOCF/interest to below 2.5x and Debt/APOCF ratio increases to 6x, on a sustainable basis; -- Leveraged acquisition; -- Material reduction in dividends received on a sustainable basis. CVC CORDATUS: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to EUR13.5MM Notes ------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by CVC Cordatus Loan Fund III Limited (the "Issuer"): EUR235,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf) EUR21,100,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf) EUR38,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf) EUR14,500,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf) EUR14,700,000 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate due 2027, Assigned (P)A2 (sf) EUR9,400,000 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)A2 (sf) EUR21,600,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf) EUR33,800,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf) EUR13,500,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)B2 (sf) Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may differ from a provisional rating. Ratings Rationale Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the notes in 2027. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's is of the opinion that the collateral manager, CVC Credit Partners Group Limited ("CVC"), has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO. CVC Cordatus Loan Fund III Limited is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured obligations and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of senior unsecured obligations, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be 60% ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will be acquired during the [six] month ramp-up period in compliance with the portfolio guidelines. CVC will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions. In addition to the nine classes of notes rated by Moody's, the Issuer will issue EUR 47,900,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's has not assigned rating to this class of notes. The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to pay down the notes in order of seniority. Loss and Cash Flow Analysis: Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in February 2014. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for each tranche. Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions: Par Amount: EUR 436,500,000 Diversity Score: 35 Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2700 Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.10% Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00% Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41.00% Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years. Moody's has analyzed the potential impact associated with sovereign related risk of countries with non-Aaa ceilings As part of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk ceiling of A1 or below. Following the effective date, and given the portfolio constraints and the current sovereign ratings of eligible countries, such exposure may not exceed 15% of the total portfolio. Exposures to countries with a local currency country risk ceiling between A1 and A3 may not exceed 10% of the total portfolio and exposures to countries with a local currency country risk ceiling between Baa1 and Baa3 cannot exceed 5% (with none allowed below Baa3). Given this portfolio composition, the model was run with different target par amounts depending on the target rating of each class of notes as further described in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the rated notes and amount to 0.75% for the class A notes, 0.50% for the Class B notes, 0.38% for the Class C notes and 0% for Classes D, E and F. Stress Scenarios: Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal. Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3105 from 2700) Ratings Impact in Rating Notches: Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-2 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0 Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3510 from 2700) Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3 Class B-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3 Class C-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-4 Class C-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes:-4 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2 Methodology Underlying the Rating Action: The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in February 2014. Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating: The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and credit conditions that may change. CVC's investment decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the notes' performance. DEVIX MIDCO: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corporate Family Rating --------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time B2 corporate family rating (CFR) and B2-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Devix Midco S.A. (Devix), the holding company for the former Rexam Healthcare devices and prescription retail businesses. REXAM PLC (Baa3 stable) sold these businesses to Montagu Private Equity in February 2014. At the same time, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B1 rating with loss given default (LGD) 3 to the proposed senior secured USD380 million first lien term loans due 2021 and to the USD65 million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) due 2019; and a (P)Caa1 (LGD) 5 to the USD175 million second lien term loans due 2022 to be borrowed at various entities within the group. "The assigned B2 corporate family rating reflects both the fairly aggressive capital structure and concentrated nature of Devix's businesses in terms of products" says Richard Morawetz, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for Devix. "However we do not expect that the metrics will change substantially in coming quarters, resulting in our stable outlook." The outlook on all ratings is stable. Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale of securities and these ratings reflect the rating agency's preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavour to assign a definitive rating to the loan facilities. A definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating. Ratings Rationale Corporate Family Rating And Probability Of Default Rating In Moody's view, the company's capital structure will be fairly leveraged, with gross adjusted leverage estimated at 5.4x pro forma for the transaction and based on 2013 earnings results. In addition, while the company is a leading supplier of its products in a consolidated market, its product range and client base remain quite concentrated. In both segments the top five clients make up over half of segmental sales, while sales in the prescription retail segment are fairly evenly split between wholesale and retail. Whilst Moody's recognizes the long-term relationships and low probability of a client shifting supplier, the loss of a single client could affect the company's earnings significantly. Similarly, in the devices segment, the key products are exposed to price negotiations and contract renewals. Other business risks include technological obsolescence of products over time and the loss of patent protection. In 2012 the decline in earnings was partly attributed to a key devices contract being renegotiated with lower pricing as a product came off patent, although profits grew again in 2013. Supporting factors for the rating include the company's strong market shares in its key categories for devices (insulin pens; nasal devices; dermal pumps and dry powder inhalers). This is also reflected in the company's high EBITDA margins and the company's ability to generate free cash flows. In our view, despite the potential for short-term volatility, Devix's products will see sustainable long-term growth, underpinned by both the non-discretionary nature of many products, as well as rising demand, in particular in emerging markets. Moody's also expects that demand in the prescription retail segment will remain stable, with moderate growth, albeit potentially benefitting from healthcare reform in the US, as the segment focuses nearly exclusively on the North American market. Finally, Moody's notes the company's long-term relationships with key retail clients, which is credit positive. Provisional (P)B1 And (P)Caa1 Ratings Of The Secured Credit Facilities The B2 CFR and B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) are assigned at Devix Midco S.A., the holding company for the group's US and European operating companies. The company is being acquired for USD805 million, including USD555 million in term loans, and USD305 million in equity. The equity component includes a shareholder loan of USD100 million, which is deemed equity for the purpose of our metrics. The term loans include a first lien term loan (USD380 million) due 2021 and a second lien term loan (USD175 million) due 2022, which will be fully drawn at closing. The first lien credit agreement will also include the RCF (USD65 million) due 2019. The term loans will be guaranteed and secured on all material assets of the subsidiaries in the restricted group. The first and second lien loans will be secured on the same assets; while under the terms of an intercreditor agreement, the first lien loans retain priority in repayment in case of an enforcement on collateral. In light of this, the first lien instruments are rated (P)B1, and the second lien loans are rated (P)Caa1 to reflect their ranking in the debt capital structure. In terms of liquidity, the company expects to have no cash at transaction close, with any cash thereafter accruing from free cash flows. Initially, therefore, Moody's believes that some drawing on the RCF may be required to manage working capital flows. There is limited seasonality in the business, given that demand is driven by healthcare spending, and as such Moody's expects that the development of the quarterly cash balance will depend on capex and general earnings trends. The company will have virtually no short-term debt; the First Lien Term Loan will amortize at 1% per year until final repayment; while the Second Lien Term Loan is a bullet repayment. The RCF will be undrawn at closing. It will contain one covenant for total net leverage, but this will only be applicable when the RCF is at least 30% drawn. In light of the lack of cash at the outset, loss of access to the RCF would have credit negative implications. Moody's believes this to be a weak covenant structure that would limit ability to call the loans in case of underperformance. Rationale For The Stable Outlook The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that metrics are unlikely to change substantially in coming quarters. Although Moody's recognizes the growth potential as well as the ability to generate positive free cash flows to reduce net debt, market uncertainties, including trends in illnesses, can result in short-term variations in earnings, while growth targets or financial policies could also delay deleveraging in the medium term. What Could Change The Rating Up/Down Moody's believes that the company is adequately positioned in the current rating category, with no near-term pressure expected, depending on the company's own financial policy. Moody's would consider upward pressure on the rating or outlook if adjusted gross leverage were to fall sustainably below 5x with a solid liquidity profile. If the leverage metric were to trend above 6x or if free cash flows turn negative, or if there were liquidity concerns, this could be negative for the rating or outlook. Principal Methodology The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global Packaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containers published in June 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009. Devix Midco S.A., formerly the devices and prescription retail business of Rexam PLC, has leading positions in the global niche market for the manufacturing and delivery of healthcare packaging and delivery solutions. Nearly two thirds of sales are generated from devices and the remainder from prescription retail. In 2013, the company reported sales and operating profits of about USD467 million and USD58 million, respectively. REDIRACK: RGF Unlikely to Recover Almost GBP4-Mil. Claims --------------------------------------------------------- Laurence Kilgannon at Insider Media reports that a flagship government economic stimulus program is among creditors expected to lose out to the tune of almost GBP4 million after the collapse of an GBP11 million-turnover manufacturer. The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills told Insider Media that RediRack is one of only two companies to have received Regional Growth Fund money and subsequently fallen into administration. The company failed in January with the loss of 87 jobs, but administrators from PwC have since tied up a GBP150,000 deal with West Midlands-based Stakapal, Insider Media recounts. Lyn Vardy and Toby Underwood of PwC were appointed as joint administrators of RediRack Ltd on Jan. 15, Insider Media relates. Following the appointment the company ceased to trade and almost all of the workforce was made redundant, Insider Media notes. According to Insider Media, PwC said that delays associated with two major contracts, a general downturn in business and a reduced profit margin on certain existing contracts had led to the administration. At the time of its collapse, RediRack was primarily financed through an invoice discounting facility of up to GBP1.25 million with Yorkshire Bank, Insider Media states. The business had also secured RGF funding in 2012, Insider Media relays. Administrators, as cited by Insider Media, said at the date of their report the bank had been paid GBP367,412, but there was not likely to be enough cash to pay unsecured creditor claims estimated at GBP3.8 million. Those unsecured creditors include the RGF which made payments of GBP667,000 to RediRack, Insider Media notes. According to Insider Media, a spokesman for BIS said the department had written to the administrators seeking recovery from the company's remaining assets. RediRack was a Yorkshire-based pallet-racking and mezzanine floor manufacturer. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * Moody's Takes Rating Actions on 19 CSO Tranches ------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 12 tranches of Corporate Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations (CSOs), totalling approximately EUR321 million of outstanding rated balance. The magnitude of these downgrades range between 1 to 3 notches. Moody's had previously on November 21, 2013 placed the transactions on review for downgrade following the revision of the CSO methodology; the actions conclude the rating reviews. Issuer: ARLO VII LIMITED Series 2007-CSTON-10A-2 USD31,000,000 Secured Limited Recourse Credit-Linked Notes due 2017, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Issuer: ELM B.V. Series 42 NOK606,000,000 Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2016, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Series 81 Morro Bay Class JSSEUR10,000,000 due 2016, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Issuer: LANDESBANK BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG EUR14M Credit-Linked Portfolio Schuldschein Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade EUR2M Credit-Linked Portfolio Schuldschein Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Issuer: ILIAD INVESTMENTS P.L.C. EUR40M Class A Series 8 Secured Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade EUR30M Class B Series 8 Secured Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade EUR30M Class C Series 8 Secured Floating Rate Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade EUR40M Class A Series 14 Bond, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade EUR30M Class B Series 14 Bond, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade EUR30M Class C Series 14 Bond, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Issuer: NATIXIS STRUCTURED PRODUCTS LIMITED EUR50M Series 83 Floating Rate Credit-Linked Notes due 2016, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Moody's also confirmed the ratings of the following notes: Issuer: CORSAIR (JERSEY) NO. 4 LIMITED USD40,000,000 Partial Credit Loss Protected Step-Down Portfolio Credit-Linked Notes due 2027, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Issuer: ELM B.V. Series 67 Class J Morro Bay USD2,000,000 due 2016, Confirmed at Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Series 75 Class G Morro Bay USD9,500,000 due 2016, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Series 83 Class L Morro Bay USD10,000,000 Short Strategy Linked due 2016, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Series 139 Cadenza EUR15,000,000 Secured Tranched Portfolio Credit Linked Notes due 2015, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Series 142 Cadenza EUR7,000,000 Secured Tranched Portfolio Credit Linked Notes due 2015, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 21, 2013 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade Moody's also affirmed the rating of the following notes: Issuer: ELM B.V. Series Class H Morro Bay USD18,000,000 due 2016, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 19, 2009 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf) Ratings Rationale The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions, which incorporate (1) removal of the 30% macro default probability stress for corporate credits (2) lowering the average recovery rate assumptions for most types of debt (3) modifying the modelling framework for corporate asset correlations (4) introducing an adverse selection adjustment on default probabilities where relevant, and (5) simplifying the cheapest- to-deliver haircut that applies to recoveries. Full details of these changes may be found in the methodology listed below. The rating actions also incorporate current performance of the credit quality of the reference portfolios since the last rating actions. Moody's notes that these transactions are sensitive to the adjustment for adverse selection. All transactions have large concentrations in the Banking, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sectors, ranging from 18% to 30% percent. On average, the Market Implied Ratings (MIRs) for entities belonging to these sectors are at least one notch lower than Moody's public ratings. Methodology Underlying the Rating Action: The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations" published in November 2013. Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings: Moody's notes that these transactions are subject to a high level of uncertainties, the primary sources of which are (1) unexpected volatility in the credit environment and the general economy, (2) divergence in legal interpretation of documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities, and (3) unexpected changes in portfolio composition as a result of certain transaction parties actions. For CSOs, the credit default swaps' performance may be affected either positively or negatively by (1) variations over time in default rates for instruments with a given rating, (2) variations in recovery rates for instruments with particular seniority/security characteristics, and (3) uncertainty about the default and recovery correlations characteristics of the reference pool. Given the tranched nature of CSO liabilities, rating transitions in the reference pool may amplify rating movements of the CSO liabilities, thus leading to high rating volatility. All else being equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more junior or thinner liabilities. Moody's performed sensitivity analyses, discussed in the scenario below. Results are given in terms of the number of notches' difference versus the base case, where higher notches correspond to lower expected losses, and vice-versa. Moody's ran scenarios in which it removed the adjustments for forward-looking measures of reference credits that are on review for upgrade or downgrade, or with a negative outlook. The results of these runs are within one notch on average of the base case results. In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features, and the portfolio manager's track record. All information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the final rating decision. * BOND PRICING: For the Week March 24 to March 28, 2014 ------------------------------------------------------- Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price ------ ------ -------- -------- ----- AUSTRIA ------- IMMOFINANZ AG 4.25 3/8/2018 EUR 4.70 Alpine Holding Gmb 6.00 5/22/2017 EUR 0.25 Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 7/1/2015 EUR 0.25 Alpine Holding Gmb 5.25 6/10/2016 EUR 0.25 A-TEC Industries A 8.75 10/27/2014 EUR 1.63 A-TEC Industries A 2.75 5/10/2014 EUR 2.00 A-TEC Industries A 5.75 11/2/2010 EUR 1.88 Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.79 11/29/2032 EUR 70.93 Hypo Alpe-Adria-Ba 0.68 12/18/2030 EUR 72.49 Investkredit Bank 4.63 4/12/2022 EUR 74.70 KA Finanz AG 4.90 6/23/2031 EUR 67.75 KA Finanz AG 4.44 12/20/2030 EUR 65.13 Oberoesterreichisc 0.63 11/6/2030 EUR 72.60 Oberoesterreichisc 0.52 4/25/2042 EUR 65.26 Oesterreichische V 1.06 7/29/2018 EUR 25.00 Oesterreichische V 5.27 2/8/2027 EUR 63.00 Raiffeisen Centrob 14.40 3/6/2014 EUR 73.77 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.75 8/20/2033 EUR 73.41 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.70 12/27/2031 EUR 71.81 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.57 1/25/2031 EUR 73.50 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.61 1/24/2031 EUR 73.64 UniCredit Bank Aus 0.72 1/22/2031 EUR 73.74 BELGIUM ------- Econocom Group 4.00 6/1/2016 EUR 27.70 Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 72.33 Ideal Standard Int 11.75 5/1/2018 EUR 73.13 BULGARIA -------- Petrol AD 8.38 1/26/2017 EUR 57.66 Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 75.05 Aralco Finance SA 10.13 5/7/2020 USD 74.63 OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 12.03 OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 12.03 OGX Austria GmbH 8.50 6/1/2018 USD 11.88 OGX Austria GmbH 8.38 4/1/2022 USD 11.88 Clariden Leu Ltd/N 5.25 8/6/2014 CHF 65.59 Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.50 8/13/2014 CHF 62.47 Credit Suisse/Nass 7.25 4/4/2014 USD 64.87 Clariden Leu Ltd/N 4.52 9/10/2014 CHF 65.99 CYPRUS ------ Cyprus Government 4.63 2/3/2020 EUR 73.86 Cyprus Government 6.00 7/1/2023 EUR 73.75 Cyprus Government 4.75 7/1/2020 EUR 73.13 Cyprus Government 5.25 7/1/2022 EUR 71.00 Cyprus Government 5.00 7/1/2021 EUR 71.75 CZECH REPUBLIC -------------- Sazka AS 9.00 7/12/2021 EUR 10.13 DENMARK ------- Kommunekredit 0.50 7/30/2027 TRY 26.38 Kommunekredit 0.50 9/19/2019 BRL 53.55 Kommunekredit 0.50 2/20/2020 BRL 51.34 Kommunekredit 0.50 5/11/2029 CAD 50.52 Kommunekredit 0.50 10/22/2019 BRL 53.10 Kommunekredit 0.50 12/14/2020 ZAR 60.44 FINLAND ------- Municipality Finan 0.50 10/27/2016 BRL 73.96 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/30/2016 BRL 73.14 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/16/2017 TRY 71.26 Municipality Finan 0.50 6/19/2024 ZAR 37.00 Municipality Finan 0.50 2/17/2017 BRL 71.34 Municipality Finan 0.50 4/27/2018 ZAR 70.77 Municipality Finan 0.50 5/31/2022 ZAR 45.84 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/17/2016 BRL 73.90 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/10/2021 NZD 67.05 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 ZAR 67.19 Municipality Finan 0.50 4/26/2022 ZAR 46.35 Municipality Finan 0.50 12/20/2018 ZAR 66.70 Municipality Finan 0.50 3/28/2018 BRL 62.02 Municipality Finan 0.50 12/14/2018 TRY 64.02 Municipality Finan 0.50 2/7/2018 BRL 68.42 Municipality Finan 0.50 3/16/2017 BRL 71.42 Municipality Finan 0.50 2/22/2019 IDR 65.22 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/21/2018 TRY 64.13 Municipality Finan 0.50 1/10/2018 BRL 64.01 Municipality Finan 0.50 6/22/2017 IDR 74.39 Municipality Finan 0.50 1/23/2018 BRL 64.50 Municipality Finan 0.25 6/28/2040 CAD 23.91 Municipality Finan 0.50 12/21/2021 NZD 66.64 Municipality Finan 0.50 11/25/2020 ZAR 54.11 Municipality Finan 0.50 3/17/2025 CAD 61.50 Talvivaara Mining 4.00 12/16/2015 EUR 17.99 FRANCE ------ Air France-KLM 4.97 4/1/2015 EUR 12.75 Air France-KLM 2.03 2/15/2023 EUR 10.59 Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 4.25 7/1/2018 EUR 3.12 Alcatel-Lucent/Fra 5.00 1/1/2015 EUR 3.36 Assystem 4.00 1/1/2017 EUR 24.27 AtoS 2.50 1/1/2016 EUR 61.09 AtoS 1.50 7/1/2016 EUR 60.87 BNP Paribas SA 0.50 1/31/2018 RUB 73.33 BNP Paribas SA 0.50 11/16/2032 MXN 39.68 BNP Paribas SA 0.50 5/6/2021 MXN 71.71 Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/16/2014 EUR 53.03 Caisse Centrale du 7.00 5/18/2015 EUR 9.08 Caisse Centrale du 7.00 9/10/2015 EUR 15.35 Cap Gemini SA 3.50 1/1/2014 EUR 48.05 CGG SA 1.75 1/1/2016 EUR 28.39 CGG SA 1.25 1/1/2019 EUR 31.31 Club Mediterranee 6.11 11/1/2015 EUR 19.71 Credit Agricole Co 0.50 2/28/2018 RUB 73.06 Credit Agricole Co 0.50 3/6/2023 RUB 48.05 Dexia Credit Local 0.88 7/10/2017 EUR 74.75 Dexia Credit Local 4.38 2/12/2019 EUR 71.75 Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2014 EUR 16.90 Etablissements Mau 7.13 7/31/2015 EUR 15.67 Faurecia 4.50 1/1/2015 EUR 24.46 Faurecia 3.25 1/1/2018 EUR 27.55 GFI Informatique S 5.25 1/1/2017 EUR 5.30 Ingenico 2.75 1/1/2017 EUR 57.77 Le Noble Age 4.88 1/3/2016 EUR 19.50 Nexans SA 2.50 1/1/2019 EUR 72.92 Nexans SA 4.00 1/1/2016 EUR 58.43 Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50 Novasep Holding SA 9.75 12/15/2016 USD 49.50 OL Groupe 7.00 12/28/2015 EUR 6.53 Orpea 1.75 1/1/2020 EUR 48.99 Orpea 3.88 1/1/2016 EUR 51.28 Peugeot SA 4.45 1/1/2016 EUR 26.65 Publicis Groupe SA 1.00 1/18/2018 EUR 60.32 SG Option Europe S 8.00 9/29/2015 USD 62.49 SG Option Europe S 7.00 5/5/2017 EUR 52.35 SG Option Europe S 7.00 9/22/2017 EUR 68.73 SG Option Europe S 8.00 12/18/2014 USD 40.49 SG Option Europe S 7.50 12/24/2014 EUR 38.00 SG Option Europe S 7.25 8/5/2014 EUR 62.59 Societe Air France 2.75 4/1/2020 EUR 21.03 Societe Generale S 0.50 6/12/2023 RUB 45.95 Societe Generale S 0.50 4/3/2023 RUB 46.79 Societe Generale S 0.50 11/29/2022 AUD 63.45 Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 USD 71.63 Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 USD 72.50 Societe Generale S 0.50 12/21/2022 AUD 63.21 Societe Generale S 0.50 4/30/2023 RUB 46.47 Societe Generale S 0.50 7/11/2022 AUD 64.99 Societe Generale S 0.50 12/6/2021 AUD 67.38 Societe Generale S 0.50 4/27/2022 AUD 65.81 Societe Generale S 0.50 9/7/2021 AUD 69.04 SOITEC 6.75 9/18/2018 EUR 2.50 SOITEC 6.25 9/9/2014 EUR 8.61 Tem SAS 4.25 1/1/2015 EUR 55.58 Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00 Zlomrex Internatio 8.50 2/1/2014 EUR 62.00 GEORGIA ------- Bank J Safra Saras 13.60 2/17/2014 CHF 71.13 Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/15/2014 CHF 63.95 Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 12/13/2013 USD 67.65 Bank Julius Baer & 14.00 5/23/2014 USD 55.80 Bank Julius Baer & 8.50 12/13/2013 USD 56.05 Bank Julius Baer & 9.50 12/13/2013 USD 61.50 Bank Julius Baer & 12.60 12/13/2013 USD 52.65 Bank Julius Baer & 7.25 4/10/2014 USD 64.50 Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 1/29/2014 CHF 71.40 Bank Julius Baer & 6.10 4/17/2014 CHF 65.15 Bank Julius Baer & 6.20 4/17/2014 EUR 65.45 Bank Julius Baer & 5.00 12/23/2013 CHF 67.05 Bank Julius Baer & 10.20 11/29/2013 USD 52.45 Bank Julius Baer & 11.50 3/18/2014 USD 61.85 Bank Julius Baer & 6.80 4/11/2014 USD 70.15 Bank Julius Baer & 6.50 4/11/2014 USD 71.25 Bank Julius Baer & 9.00 4/11/2014 USD 71.05 Bank Julius Baer & 7.80 2/14/2014 USD 70.35 Bank Julius Baer & 7.50 2/14/2014 CHF 69.75 Bank Julius Baer & 10.00 4/4/2014 USD 62.75 Bank Julius Baer & 6.90 3/21/2014 USD 70.45 Banque Cantonale V 4.90 9/9/2014 CHF 73.73 EFG International 6.00 11/30/2017 EUR 39.45 EFG International 13.40 11/14/2013 CHF 58.64 EFG International 6.82 6/4/2014 CHF 70.01 EFG International 12.86 10/30/2017 EUR 35.40 EFG International 12.10 3/10/2014 USD 50.04 EFG International 4.50 2/20/2014 USD 58.50 EFG International 5.85 10/14/2014 CHF 72.75 EFG International 10.00 12/17/2013 USD 66.27 Leonteq Securities 11.90 1/15/2014 EUR 50.01 Leonteq Securities 17.00 11/21/2013 CAD 40.23 Leonteq Securities 9.25 11/5/2013 USD 36.80 Leonteq Securities 12.65 12/10/2013 EUR 50.06 Leonteq Securities 7.80 8/26/2014 CHF 55.40 Leonteq Securities 15.00 2/13/2014 CHF 55.94 Leonteq Securities 12.00 11/15/2013 CHF 54.70 Leonteq Securities 17.05 2/14/2014 CHF 42.69 Leonteq Securities 10.03 10/25/2013 CHF 48.39 Leonteq Securities 5.06 5/26/2014 CHF 74.49 Leonteq Securities 18.00 12/6/2013 CHF 58.34 Leonteq Securities 8.40 11/27/2013 CHF 69.11 Leonteq Securities 8.80 12/6/2013 EUR 66.34 Leonteq Securities 20.00 12/12/2013 CHF 59.36 Leonteq Securities 12.80 12/12/2013 CHF 56.01 Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/12/2013 CHF 67.47 Leonteq Securities 8.10 12/13/2013 CHF 56.63 Leonteq Securities 9.20 11/15/2013 CHF 72.96 Leonteq Securities 7.21 11/14/2013 CHF 72.00 Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/21/2013 CHF 48.23 Leonteq Securities 13.60 12/6/2013 CHF 53.15 Leonteq Securities 8.75 6/6/2014 GBP 71.26 Leonteq Securities 8.00 12/6/2013 USD 65.15 Leonteq Securities 12.89 12/10/2013 GBP 52.10 Leonteq Securities 10.20 11/14/2013 CHF 56.32 Leonteq Securities 8.01 11/15/2013 CHF 44.99 Leonteq Securities 21.75 5/22/2014 USD 45.78 Leonteq Securities 20.00 5/27/2014 CHF 71.16 Leonteq Securities 12.00 2/24/2014 CHF 69.73 Leonteq Securities 9.46 6/3/2014 AUD 61.68 Leonteq Securities 24.40 2/25/2014 USD 44.15 Leonteq Securities 22.75 2/4/2014 USD 68.91 Leonteq Securities 15.60 2/6/2014 CHF 55.74 Leonteq Securities 12.25 1/30/2014 CHF 49.87 Leonteq Securities 20.52 3/25/2014 USD 50.23 Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/17/2014 CHF 54.64 Leonteq Securities 21.50 3/21/2014 USD 57.05 Leonteq Securities 8.90 3/28/2014 EUR 63.16 Leonteq Securities 14.25 2/13/2015 USD 62.34 Leonteq Securities 11.50 2/11/2014 USD 70.57 Leonteq Securities 20.50 2/13/2014 CHF 65.24 Leonteq Securities 5.80 8/20/2014 USD 70.34 Leonteq Securities 13.25 2/14/2014 USD 60.87 Leonteq Securities 10.00 7/29/2014 USD 58.84 Leonteq Securities 29.61 10/26/2017 EUR 39.70 Leonteq Securities 9.00 10/31/2013 CHF 43.77 Leonteq Securities 12.00 3/5/2014 CHF 60.81 Leonteq Securities 8.50 12/24/2013 USD 54.18 Leonteq Securities 14.06 12/18/2013 USD 52.76 Leonteq Securities 5.76 12/20/2013 GBP 67.92 Leonteq Securities 10.00 1/23/2014 CHF 54.82 Leonteq Securities 8.00 6/19/2014 CHF 73.01 Leonteq Securities 6.80 12/19/2014 USD 71.84 Leonteq Securities 14.05 12/27/2013 CHF 55.88 Leonteq Securities 6.00 5/20/2014 CHF 66.65 Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/27/2013 CHF 74.15 Leonteq Securities 20.00 11/27/2013 CHF 57.98 Leonteq Securities 11.95 11/29/2013 EUR 54.01 Leonteq Securities 8.35 1/3/2014 AUD 70.38 Leonteq Securities 9.20 12/27/2013 CHF 70.21 Leonteq Securities 9.60 1/8/2014 USD 47.95 Leonteq Securities 8.40 1/15/2014 CHF 74.30 Leonteq Securities 14.00 9/22/2014 CHF 66.90 Leonteq Securities 10.80 1/15/2014 CHF 54.68 Leonteq Securities 5.50 1/25/2016 EUR 64.28 Leonteq Securities 12.00 12/6/2013 GBP 52.45 Leonteq Securities 20.14 4/9/2014 USD 55.40 Leonteq Securities 5.50 8/19/2014 USD 72.76 Leonteq Securities 20.07 2/19/2014 USD 41.82 Leonteq Securities 10.00 2/6/2014 USD 57.48 Leonteq Securities 23.90 1/24/2014 USD 43.75 Leonteq Securities 10.00 11/5/2013 USD 71.34 Leonteq Securities 25.70 1/24/2014 USD 50.45 Mare Baltic PCC Lt 2.00 11/1/2015 DKK 0.00 Zurcher Kantonalba 12.35 11/13/2013 CHF 56.78 Zurcher Kantonalba 8.22 11/15/2013 CHF 56.56 Zurcher Kantonalba 6.05 12/19/2013 EUR 65.62 Zurcher Kantonalba 9.00 12/31/2013 CHF 58.57 Zurcher Kantonalba 10.40 12/5/2013 EUR 60.48 Zurcher Kantonalba 10.65 12/6/2013 CHF 57.99 GERMANY ------- ATU Auto-Teile-Ung 7.47 10/1/2014 EUR 18.67 BDT Media Automati 8.13 10/9/2017 EUR 65.75 BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 72.21 BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 58.40 BNP Paribas Emissi 7.00 12/30/2013 EUR 60.64 BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 60.09 BNP Paribas Emissi 5.00 11/21/2013 EUR 60.05 BNP Paribas Emissi 6.50 12/30/2013 EUR 59.53 BNP Paribas Emissi 5.50 11/21/2013 EUR 68.77 BNP Paribas Emissi 4.50 11/21/2013 EUR 72.24 BNP Paribas Emissi 6.00 11/21/2013 EUR 74.37 Bremer Landesbank 0.69 3/21/2031 EUR 67.09 Bremer Landesbank 0.72 4/5/2041 EUR 54.49 Centrosolar Group 7.00 2/15/2016 EUR 13.75 Commerzbank AG 8.40 12/30/2013 EUR 2.56 Commerzbank AG 5.05 12/24/2013 EUR 67.54 DekaBank Deutsche 2.21 9/22/2021 EUR 13.92 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 56.20 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 65.00 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 64.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 61.70 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 62.00 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 56.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 6/24/2014 EUR 61.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 6/24/2014 EUR 66.00 Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 6/24/2014 EUR 62.90 Deutsche Bank AG 6.20 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40 Deutsche Bank AG 8.20 3/25/2014 EUR 61.50 Deutsche Bank AG 7.20 3/25/2014 EUR 62.90 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.00 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.10 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 61.50 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 8/20/2014 EUR 56.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 69.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 65.90 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 62.30 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 8/20/2014 EUR 57.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 70.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 66.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 63.20 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 8/20/2014 EUR 58.50 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 6/25/2014 EUR 66.70 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/25/2014 EUR 59.24 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.50 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.20 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.20 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.20 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 51.90 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 52.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.30 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.90 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.00 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.30 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.00 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 62.70 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.30 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.00 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.70 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 60.40 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 61.00 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.40 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.10 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.80 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 59.50 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 55.90 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 6/24/2014 EUR 56.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 6/24/2014 EUR 57.30 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 6/24/2014 EUR 58.00 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 6/24/2014 EUR 53.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 6/24/2014 EUR 54.50 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 4/24/2014 EUR 68.90 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 4/24/2014 EUR 65.30 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 4/24/2014 EUR 62.10 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 7/22/2014 EUR 72.10 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 62.10 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.60 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.10 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.50 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.40 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.30 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.90 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.30 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 56.80 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.20 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.00 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.30 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 55.70 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.90 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.70 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 9/23/2014 EUR 74.80 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 9/23/2014 EUR 73.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.70 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 63.80 Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 64.10 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.20 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.40 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.40 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.90 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.00 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 53.50 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 51.30 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.70 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 60.00 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00 Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 60.20 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/25/2014 EUR 66.40 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 3/25/2014 EUR 61.40 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 3/25/2014 EUR 62.80 Deutsche Bank AG 11.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.20 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 53.80 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 11/29/2013 EUR 63.00 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 10/31/2013 EUR 72.80 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 2/28/2014 EUR 60.60 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 12/20/2013 EUR 63.10 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.10 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 55.80 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 11/29/2013 EUR 67.30 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 11/29/2013 EUR 54.30 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 2/28/2014 EUR 64.00 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 2/28/2014 EUR 56.00 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.20 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 10/31/2013 EUR 58.90 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 10/31/2013 EUR 62.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 11/29/2013 EUR 63.20 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 11/29/2013 EUR 59.40 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.60 Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 53.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.30 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40 Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 54.90 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 10/31/2013 EUR 67.10 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 10/31/2013 EUR 58.80 Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 11/29/2013 EUR 73.50 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 11/29/2013 EUR 62.90 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.80 Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.10 Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 58.30 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.90 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.00 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.60 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.80 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.20 Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.60 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.50 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 12/20/2013 EUR 56.50 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 3/26/2014 EUR 66.95 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 12/20/2013 EUR 57.90 Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 59.90 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/26/2014 EUR 70.59 Deutsche Bank AG 9.00 12/20/2013 EUR 56.40 Deutsche Bank AG 12.00 12/20/2013 EUR 51.20 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 12/20/2013 EUR 59.40 Deutsche Bank AG 10.00 12/20/2013 EUR 55.00 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 6/24/2014 EUR 71.70 Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 3/25/2014 EUR 75.00 Deutsche Bank AG 5.00 3/25/2014 EUR 72.70 Deutsche Bank AG 7.00 1/31/2014 EUR 62.00 Deutsche Bank AG 8.00 1/31/2014 EUR 60.40 Deutsche Bank AG 5.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.30 Deutsche Bank AG 6.50 3/25/2014 EUR 60.80 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 61.60 Deutsche Bank AG 8.50 3/25/2014 EUR 59.90 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 57.90 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 58.70 Deutsche Bank AG 9.50 3/25/2014 EUR 54.30 Deutsche Bank AG 7.50 3/25/2014 EUR 52.20 Deutsche Bank AG 6.00 1/31/2014 EUR 65.80 Deutsche Bank AG 4.50 6/24/2014 EUR 73.70 Dresdner Bank AG 0.89 11/19/2029 EUR 51.13 Dresdner Bank AG 5.45 2/22/2029 EUR 65.92 Dresdner Bank AG 1.08 12/31/2021 EUR 72.13 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Kaupthing Bank Hf 6.40 12/15/2015 EUR 22.88 LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00 LBI HF 3.20 5/10/2010 SKK 8.00 LBI HF 2.25 2/14/2011 CHF 8.00 LBI HF 6.10 8/25/2011 USD 8.00 LBI HF 3.00 12/7/2010 CHF 8.00 LBI HF 4.40 1/18/2010 CAD 8.00 LBI HF 4.38 10/20/2008 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 4.75 5/31/2013 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 4.53 4/24/2012 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 7.25 4/2/2011 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 8.65 5/1/2011 ISK 8.00 LBI HF 4.08 3/16/2015 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 6.75 8/18/2015 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 4.40 11/3/2009 CZK 8.00 LBI HF 6.00 6/6/2017 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 5.44 9/3/2018 EUR 0.13 LBI HF 4.28 11/19/2010 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 2.14 2/3/2020 JPY 8.00 LBI HF 4.32 1/31/2010 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 4.40 11/30/2035 EUR 0.13 LBI HF 5.25 6/5/2023 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 5.08 3/1/2013 ISK 8.00 LBI HF 7.00 4/2/2010 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 3.00 10/22/2015 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 1.68 12/22/2014 JPY 8.00 LBI HF 4.00 9/23/2015 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 3.45 12/18/2033 JPY 0.13 LBI HF 2.22 10/15/2019 JPY 8.00 LBI HF 4.34 3/1/2011 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 3.34 5/11/2012 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 7.75 2/22/2016 USD 8.00 LBI HF 2.75 3/16/2011 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 3.36 8/17/2012 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 7.20 4/27/2026 EUR 0.13 LBI HF 6.75 2/18/2015 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 3.11 11/10/2008 EUR 8.00 LBI HF 4.34 12/22/2025 EUR 8.00 IRELAND ------- Corsicanto Ltd 3.50 1/15/2032 USD 74.94 Depfa ACS Bank 4.90 8/24/2035 CAD 69.73 Depfa ACS Bank 0.50 3/3/2025 CAD 46.53 Kalvebod PLC 2.00 5/1/2106 DKK 40.00 ITALY ------- Banca delle Marche 1.18 6/1/2017 EUR 42.39 A2A SpA 3.20 8/10/2036 EUR 62.44 Banca delle Marche 5.50 9/16/2030 EUR 69.25 Banca di Cividale 0.34 10/2/2036 EUR 57.63 Banca Monte dei Pa 1.23 1/15/2018 EUR 74.60 Cassa Depositi e P 0.29 10/31/2029 EUR 61.70 Cirio Finanziaria 8.00 12/21/2005 EUR 0.63 City of Lecco Ital 0.46 6/30/2026 EUR 67.27 Comune di Andrano 3.92 12/31/2035 EUR 71.20 Comune di Fiumicin 0.49 12/31/2026 EUR 66.65 Comune di Grontard 4.10 12/31/2035 EUR 73.36 Comune di Marcheno 4.23 12/31/2036 EUR 74.59 Comune di Marscian 4.03 12/31/2035 EUR 72.47 Comune di Mercato 3.97 12/31/2035 EUR 71.83 Comune di Piadena 4.05 12/31/2035 EUR 72.74 Comune di San Ferd 0.53 12/27/2026 EUR 67.26 Comune di Santa Ma 0.60 5/31/2026 EUR 69.00 Comune di Seminara 0.72 10/31/2026 EUR 69.14 Comune di Verona 0.43 12/1/2026 EUR 64.53 Enel SpA 0.96 10/20/2032 EUR 63.62 Intesa Sanpaolo Sp 1.06 3/20/2023 EUR 74.70 Italy Government I 1.85 9/15/2057 EUR 65.06 Italy Government I 2.00 9/15/2062 EUR 67.03 Italy Government I 2.20 9/15/2058 EUR 72.77 Italy Government I 2.87 5/19/2036 JPY 69.43 Province of Bresci 0.73 12/22/2036 EUR 57.22 Province of Bresci 0.72 6/30/2036 EUR 57.58 Province of Chieti 0.65 12/29/2023 EUR 74.35 Province of Milan 0.59 12/22/2033 EUR 63.54 Province of Rovigo 0.59 12/28/2035 EUR 58.80 Province of Teramo 0.44 12/30/2030 EUR 60.80 Province of Teramo 0.47 12/30/2025 EUR 68.61 Province of Trevis 0.47 12/31/2034 EUR 58.04 Province of Trevis 0.57 12/31/2034 EUR 59.52 Province of Trevis 0.34 12/31/2034 EUR 56.82 Region of Abruzzo 0.68 11/7/2036 EUR 63.64 Region of Abruzzo 0.52 11/7/2031 EUR 61.27 Region of Abruzzo 4.45 3/1/2037 EUR 70.52 Region of Aosta Va 0.45 5/28/2021 EUR 73.65 Region of Molise I 0.72 12/15/2033 EUR 64.40 Region of Piemont 0.45 11/27/2036 EUR 55.47 Region of Puglia I 0.74 2/6/2023 EUR 69.69 Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 23.00 Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13 Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63 Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.75 Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.13 Seat Pagine Gialle 10.50 1/31/2017 EUR 22.63 LUXEMBOURG ---------- 3W Power SA 9.25 12/1/2015 EUR 55.75 ArcelorMittal 7.25 4/1/2014 EUR 20.83 Bank of New York M 4.48 12/30/2099 EUR 18.04 Bank of New York M 4.73 12/15/2050 EUR 52.00 Cerruti Finance SA 6.50 7/26/2004 EUR 3.00 Cirio Finance Luxe 7.50 11/3/2002 EUR 1.25 Cirio Holding Luxe 6.25 2/16/2004 EUR 0.13 Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 52.02 Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.50 Codere Finance Lux 9.25 2/15/2019 USD 50.98 Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75 Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 51.75 Codere Finance Lux 8.25 6/15/2015 EUR 50.75 Del Monte Finance 6.63 5/24/2006 EUR 13.63 ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38 ECM Real Estate In 5.00 10/9/2011 EUR 10.38 Erste Europaeische 0.27 2/1/2037 USD 55.57 European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00 European Media Cap 10.00 2/1/2015 USD 75.00 Finmek Internation 7.00 12/3/2004 EUR 0.13 Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13 Hellas Telecommuni 8.50 10/15/2013 EUR 0.13 Hypothekenbank Fra 0.25 12/20/2029 USD 67.37 International Indu 9.00 7/6/2011 EUR 1.00 International Indu 11.00 2/19/2013 USD 0.88 IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13 IT Holding Finance 9.88 11/15/2012 EUR 0.13 La Veggia Finance 7.13 11/14/2004 EUR 0.25 Teksid Aluminum Lu 11.38 7/15/2011 EUR 0.75 NETHERLANDS ----------- Astana Finance BV 7.88 6/8/2010 EUR 4.00 Astana Finance BV 9.00 11/16/2011 USD 3.50 Astana Finance BV 14.50 7/2/2013 USD 3.75 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/10/2017 TRY 73.62 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2022 ZAR 52.90 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 7/12/2017 TRY 72.46 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/7/2022 ZAR 53.32 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/12/2017 TRY 73.13 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2017 TRY 72.30 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 6/22/2021 ZAR 57.64 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/29/2021 NZD 70.64 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/15/2022 ZAR 52.50 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 8/9/2022 MXN 64.98 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 3/3/2021 NZD 64.80 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 2/24/2025 CAD 65.15 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 5/12/2021 ZAR 58.17 Bank Nederlandse G 0.50 9/20/2022 ZAR 52.08 BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.01 BLT Finance BV 12.00 2/10/2015 USD 10.25 BLT Finance BV 7.50 5/15/2014 USD 9.63 Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38 Bulgaria Steel Fin 12.00 5/4/2013 EUR 0.38 Cirio Del Monte NV 7.75 3/14/2005 EUR 3.38 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/26/2021 ZAR 48.95 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/30/2043 MXN 23.60 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 8/21/2028 MXN 46.15 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 7/30/2043 MXN 23.80 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 1/31/2033 MXN 36.68 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 10/29/2027 MXN 48.35 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 11/30/2027 MXN 48.11 Cooperatieve Centr 0.50 12/29/2027 MXN 47.89 Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.77 Cooperatieve Centr 8.60 3/13/2014 CHF 60.50 Cooperatieve Centr 8.15 3/5/2014 CHF 58.60 Cooperatieve Centr 9.20 3/13/2014 USD 60.43 JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/7/2014 USD 69.19 JP Morgan Structur 5.00 12/3/2013 CHF 64.32 JP Morgan Structur 6.00 2/25/2014 EUR 73.83 JP Morgan Structur 12.30 11/29/2013 USD 48.32 KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 10.00 3/15/2012 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 8.13 6/1/2009 USD 0.38 KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 8.88 2/1/2008 EUR 0.25 KPNQwest NV 7.13 6/1/2009 EUR 0.25 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/5/2035 EUR 9.75 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 11/2/2035 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 3/16/2035 EUR 14.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/15/2035 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 5/17/2035 EUR 10.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.88 3/14/2013 CHF 2.13 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/22/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/16/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 5/8/2017 HKD 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/26/2013 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/14/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/27/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/5/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/16/2017 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 9/15/2008 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/18/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.03 1/31/2015 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/24/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 5/9/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 5/26/2026 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 12/3/2015 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/18/2015 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 6/6/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 12/2/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.46 2/19/2012 JPY 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/23/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.75 2/7/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 2/28/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/20/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/17/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 10/22/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 7/27/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.44 11/22/2008 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/16/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 12.22 11/21/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/13/2010 JPY 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 6/10/2014 SGD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 4/20/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.86 9/21/2011 SGD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 12/20/2027 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/12/2011 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 8/1/2025 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.55 3/12/2015 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.05 4/8/2015 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 9/5/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 23.30 9/16/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/17/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.88 1/28/2011 HKD 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 11/21/2009 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 2/19/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/3/2012 BRL 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 6/2/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 8/7/2013 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/21/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.50 11/28/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 6/11/2038 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/19/2017 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 4/23/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/22/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 2/16/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 3/10/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/13/2011 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/7/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 1/31/2013 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 11/9/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.75 6/22/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.12 4/30/2027 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/2/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/28/2032 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 7/6/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.10 6/22/2046 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.65 8/24/2011 AUD 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 12/26/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 12/15/2011 GBP 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.68 12/12/2045 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.06 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.05 9/16/2008 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/28/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.70 3/4/2015 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.69 2/19/2017 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.59 11/22/2009 MXN 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.28 11/6/2010 JPY 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/9/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 6/2/2020 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.38 2/4/2014 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.30 12/21/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2010 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.20 5/14/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 10/11/2017 ILS 2.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 3/30/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 10/24/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 8/3/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.60 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 7/2/2020 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 7/8/2014 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 5/16/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 14.90 11/16/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.72 12/29/2008 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 15.00 6/4/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 18.25 10/2/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/31/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.80 3/19/2018 JPY 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 11/16/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 10/6/2008 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 11/22/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.25 6/20/2012 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 5/21/2013 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.01 9/20/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/19/2023 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.60 4/22/2014 MXN 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 12/3/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/23/2012 GBP 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.37 7/15/2013 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.87 10/8/2013 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.75 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/24/2008 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.38 9/20/2008 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/15/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 9/29/2017 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/8/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.25 2/3/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.43 1/8/2009 ILS 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/8/2008 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 3/13/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.25 4/1/2023 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.63 7/22/2011 HKD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.80 3/31/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 5/2/2022 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 5/15/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.28 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.35 8/8/2016 SGD 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.50 7/6/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.50 8/9/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 7/11/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.82 12/18/2036 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.20 12/3/2008 HKD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 6/3/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 12.40 6/12/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 7/4/2011 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/4/2011 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 7/8/2013 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.30 12/21/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 12/31/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 2/8/2012 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 12/20/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 2/16/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 3/19/2012 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.50 4/1/2018 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.15 3/21/2013 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.25 11/30/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.00 2/26/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 6/20/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 2/14/2010 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 10/22/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.45 2/20/2010 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 8/1/2013 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.60 3/4/2010 NZD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.63 3/2/2012 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 2/21/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.80 12/27/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.75 3/29/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 12/6/2011 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/20/2017 AUD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 1/4/2011 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.75 3/1/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.82 10/20/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 8/13/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.80 11/16/2012 HKD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 10/12/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 10/23/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 9/20/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.40 9/21/2009 HKD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 4/28/2014 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 6/15/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/30/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 5/20/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 5/17/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 7/25/2012 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 8/2/2037 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/12/2010 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.10 8/23/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.60 11/9/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 2/14/2012 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 2/15/2012 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/12/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 2/22/2012 EUR 1.13 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.20 3/19/2018 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.95 11/4/2013 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 12/19/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 3/27/2009 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 10/24/2008 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 4/14/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/30/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 7/21/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.95 10/25/2036 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 6/29/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 6/15/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.50 10/25/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.75 4/5/2012 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 4/24/2017 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.39 5/4/2017 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.35 10/13/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.80 12/30/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 5/23/2018 CZK 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/30/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 5/17/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.48 5/12/2009 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.25 5/12/2009 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/27/2013 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.50 10/24/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.25 10/19/2012 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.68 3/5/2015 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/15/2022 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.32 7/31/2013 GBP 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 9/13/2009 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.50 7/24/2026 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 8/2/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 2/16/2009 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.25 3/13/2021 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 3/17/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.70 3/23/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 12/6/2016 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 9/1/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.70 6/6/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 3/6/2013 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 4/24/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 6/13/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 3/17/2009 GBP 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 11/28/2008 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.85 4/24/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.00 5/22/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 7/24/2014 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.50 12/30/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.75 1/3/2012 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.10 6/4/2010 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 8/15/2012 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.15 10/30/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 0.50 8/1/2020 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 14.10 11/12/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 8/11/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 12.00 7/13/2037 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 7/28/2010 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 8/1/2035 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.90 7/28/2020 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.15 8/25/2020 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.50 5/30/2010 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 11.00 5/9/2020 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.30 6/4/2012 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 6/5/2011 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.30 6/6/2013 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.00 6/21/2011 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 10.00 1/4/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 17.00 6/2/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.80 8/21/2009 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.22 3/1/2024 EUR 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.60 5/23/2012 AUD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.45 5/23/2013 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 16.00 10/28/2008 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.00 2/15/2018 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 9.00 5/6/2011 CHF 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.75 10/28/2009 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 5.50 11/30/2012 CZK 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.50 11/9/2011 CHF 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 4.00 11/24/2016 EUR 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.00 10/30/2012 USD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 3.00 9/12/2036 JPY 2.50 Lehman Brothers Tr 13.00 12/14/2012 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 2.40 6/20/2011 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 1.60 6/21/2010 JPY 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 8.05 12/20/2010 HKD 1.38 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.25 6/20/2010 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 7.00 9/20/2011 USD 6.00 Lehman Brothers Tr 6.70 4/21/2011 USD 6.00 Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 45.04 Magyar Telecom BV 9.50 12/15/2016 EUR 44.63 Morgan Stanley BV 9.00 4/16/2015 EUR 71.90 Nederlandse Waters 0.50 3/11/2025 CAD 65.79 New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.24 New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.78 New World Resource 7.88 1/15/2021 EUR 36.25 New World Resource 7.88 5/1/2018 EUR 68.47 NIBC Bank NV 25.98 5/7/2029 EUR 50.62 Nutritek Internati 8.75 12/11/2008 USD 2.00 Q-Cells Internatio 1.38 4/30/2012 EUR 32.45 Q-Cells Internatio 5.75 5/26/2014 EUR 32.09 Sairgroup Finance 4.38 6/8/2006 EUR 10.50 Sairgroup Finance 6.63 10/6/2010 EUR 12.13 Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.25 Sidetur Finance BV 10.00 4/20/2016 USD 55.00 SNS Bank NV 6.25 10/26/2020 EUR 2.13 SNS Bank NV 6.63 5/14/2018 EUR 4.13 WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.90 WPE International 10.38 9/30/2020 USD 59.38 NORWAY ------ Eksportfinans ASA 0.25 7/14/2033 CAD 8.50 Eksportfinans ASA 0.50 5/9/2030 CAD 14.25 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/7/2017 BRL 69.77 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/10/2017 BRL 68.32 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/29/2017 BRL 66.85 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/25/2018 ZAR 70.89 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/26/2017 BRL 65.80 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/28/2017 BRL 68.91 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/28/2017 BRL 67.67 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 9/20/2018 BRL 64.71 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/2/2018 BRL 62.66 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 6/1/2017 BRL 68.22 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/15/2018 BRL 67.16 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 3/29/2017 BRL 70.51 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 8/16/2016 BRL 73.83 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 5/27/2022 ZAR 47.60 Kommunalbanken AS 0.50 7/28/2016 BRL 74.11 Norske Skogindustr 7.00 6/26/2017 EUR 60.59 Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 74.02 Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 72.75 Norske Skogindustr 6.13 10/15/2015 USD 69.53 Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 51.63 Norske Skogindustr 11.75 6/15/2016 EUR 73.50 Norske Skogindustr 7.13 10/15/2033 USD 50.08 Petromena ASA 9.75 5/24/2014 NOK 6.75 Petromena ASA 10.85 11/19/2010 USD 6.75 PORTUGAL -------- AdP - Aguas de Por 0.33 1/23/2023 EUR 63.88 Banco Espirito San 3.50 1/2/2043 EUR 50.13 Caixa Geral de Dep 5.98 3/3/2028 EUR 57.00 CP - Comboios de P 5.70 2/5/2030 EUR 60.31 Empresa de Desenvo 0.33 11/21/2018 EUR 66.63 Metropolitano de L 4.80 12/7/2027 EUR 73.38 Metropolitano de L 4.06 12/4/2026 EUR 71.93 Parpublica - Parti 4.20 11/16/2026 EUR 68.25 Portugal Obrigacoe 4.10 4/15/2037 EUR 72.12 Rede Ferroviaria N 4.25 12/13/2021 EUR 70.38 Rede Ferroviaria N 4.05 11/16/2026 EUR 71.78 ROMANIA ------- City of Iasi Roman 4.45 11/15/2028 RON 71.23 RUSSIA ------ Arizk 3.00 12/20/2030 RUB 46.44 Kuzbassenergo-Fina 8.70 4/15/2021 RUB 72.01 Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.02 Mechel 8.40 6/1/2021 RUB 70.13 Mechel 8.40 5/27/2021 RUB 70.21 Mobile Telesystems 5.00 6/29/2021 RUB 74.25 MORTGAGE AGENT AHM 3.00 9/9/2045 RUB 9.17 Novosibirsk TIN Pl 12.50 8/26/2014 RUB 5.00 RBC OJSC 3.27 4/19/2018 RUB 51.50 Russian Railways J 8.40 6/8/2028 RUB 100.00 Saturn Research & 8.50 6/6/2014 RUB 1.01 TGC-2 12.00 10/10/2018 RUB 75.00 World of Building 4.20 6/25/2019 RUB 3.60 SPAIN ----- Autonomous Communi 4.25 10/31/2036 EUR 65.75 Autonomous Communi 4.22 4/26/2035 EUR 64.14 Autonomous Communi 4.69 10/28/2034 EUR 68.88 Autonomous Communi 2.97 9/8/2039 JPY 59.88 Autonomous Communi 0.48 10/17/2022 EUR 70.50 Autonomous Communi 2.10 5/20/2024 EUR 73.97 Autonomous Communi 0.27 11/29/2021 EUR 74.92 Banco de Castilla 1.50 6/23/2021 EUR 65.00 Bankinter SA 6.00 12/18/2028 EUR 65.13 City of Madrid Spa 0.34 10/10/2022 EUR 66.37 City of Madrid Spa 4.55 6/16/2036 EUR 73.57 Comunidad Autonoma 3.90 11/30/2035 EUR 63.84 Comunidad Autonoma 4.20 10/25/2036 EUR 66.58 Comunidad Autonoma 4.06 11/23/2035 EUR 63.94 Diputacion Foral d 4.32 12/29/2023 EUR 61.41 Ibercaja Banco SAU 1.09 4/20/2018 EUR 70.93 Junta Comunidades 0.41 12/5/2023 EUR 54.38 Junta Comunidades 3.88 1/31/2036 EUR 60.38 Junta de Extremadu 0.95 6/10/2024 EUR 72.31 Pescanova SA 5.13 4/20/2017 EUR 18.74 Pescanova SA 8.75 2/17/2019 EUR 17.79 Pescanova SA 6.75 3/5/2015 EUR 17.96 Spain Government I 2.92 12/2/2030 JPY 69.99 SWEDEN ------ Dannemora Mineral 11.75 3/22/2016 USD 41.50 Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 USD 6.63 Northland Resource 4.00 10/15/2020 NOK 7.00 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/14/2016 BRL 74.58 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/22/2022 ZAR 46.97 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/29/2017 IDR 73.20 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/31/2022 ZAR 47.32 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/28/2022 ZAR 45.13 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/19/2018 IDR 68.74 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2018 BRL 59.21 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/15/2022 ZAR 46.66 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/26/2021 AUD 68.36 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/17/2027 USD 60.33 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/14/2016 BRL 72.32 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/28/2017 IDR 71.27 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 2/3/2017 BRL 70.83 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 7/21/2017 BRL 67.44 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/21/2016 BRL 72.17 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/20/2017 TRY 71.95 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 12/22/2016 BRL 72.19 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/28/2020 TRY 54.02 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 9/5/2017 IDR 71.10 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 3/10/2017 BRL 70.65 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 1/26/2017 BRL 71.31 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/30/2017 BRL 67.86 Svensk Exportkredi 1.00 11/15/2021 AUD 72.00 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 6/21/2017 BRL 68.05 Svensk Exportkredi 0.50 8/25/2021 ZAR 56.85 SWITZERLAND ----------- UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.60 Banque Cantonale V 11.80 1/29/2014 CHF 63.63 Banque Cantonale V 6.50 10/5/2015 CHF 72.74 Banque Cantonale V 2.00 7/8/2014 CHF 61.29 SAir Group 6.25 10/27/2002 CHF 11.00 SAir Group 4.25 2/2/2007 CHF 11.63 SAir Group 2.13 11/4/2004 CHF 11.00 SAir Group 0.13 7/7/2005 CHF 11.25 SAir Group 5.50 7/23/2003 CHF 11.00 SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.00 SAir Group 2.75 7/30/2004 CHF 11.13 SAir Group 6.25 4/12/2005 CHF 10.88 UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 53.44 UBS AG 23.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.46 UBS AG 8.87 4/15/2014 USD 10.17 UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.67 UBS AG 24.25 1/3/2014 EUR 60.63 UBS AG 18.45 10/24/2013 USD 8.73 UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.30 UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 56.56 UBS AG 7.25 7/29/2014 USD 31.57 UBS AG 6.03 5/14/2014 USD 54.95 UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 67.05 UBS AG 7.50 1/3/2014 EUR 64.51 UBS AG 12.70 4/22/2014 USD 66.71 UBS AG 8.94 2/13/2014 USD 14.64 UBS AG 6.29 2/26/2014 USD 32.99 UBS AG 6.22 2/26/2014 USD 38.93 UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 72.58 UBS AG 16.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19 UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22 UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02 UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.41 UBS AG 17.25 1/3/2014 EUR 42.91 UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 52.05 UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.73 UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 61.74 UBS AG 17.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.54 UBS AG 6.04 8/29/2014 USD 35.75 UBS AG 10.46 1/2/2014 USD 35.35 UBS AG 8.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50 UBS AG 15.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.26 UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.94 UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 62.75 UBS AG 19.00 1/3/2014 EUR 53.05 UBS AG 14.25 1/3/2014 EUR 70.59 UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.50 UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.72 UBS AG 24.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.30 UBS AG 22.25 1/3/2014 EUR 63.98 UBS AG 9.53 12/17/2013 USD 48.94 UBS AG 6.49 5/23/2014 USD 21.20 UBS AG 6.53 5/27/2014 USD 21.09 UBS AG 6.33 5/12/2014 USD 19.48 UBS AG 9.25 4/30/2014 USD 9.78 UBS AG 14.00 6/27/2014 EUR 55.27 UBS AG 11.75 6/27/2014 EUR 48.70 UBS AG 8.29 1/14/2014 USD 19.98 UBS AG 5.22 1/28/2014 USD 11.48 UBS AG 7.86 1/31/2014 USD 20.24 UBS AG 9.17 6/30/2014 USD 67.70 UBS AG 7.25 8/8/2014 USD 45.54 UBS AG 8.35 10/24/2013 USD 50.89 UBS AG 9.45 10/22/2013 USD 20.95 UBS AG 9.00 1/3/2014 EUR 48.64 UBS AG 14.75 1/3/2014 EUR 44.63 UBS AG 7.15 2/26/2014 USD 32.50 UBS AG 10.75 1/3/2014 EUR 55.72 UBS AG 5.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.46 UBS AG 8.21 2/26/2014 USD 50.39 UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 43.67 UBS AG 13.50 1/3/2014 EUR 56.28 UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 56.97 UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 62.22 UBS AG 8.25 1/3/2014 EUR 62.15 UBS AG 23.00 1/3/2014 EUR 69.99 UBS AG 18.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.15 UBS AG 7.25 1/3/2014 EUR 69.51 UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.61 UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.35 UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.38 UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 68.73 UBS AG 14.50 1/3/2014 EUR 74.99 UBS AG 16.00 1/3/2014 EUR 71.69 UBS AG 21.00 1/3/2014 EUR 38.60 UBS AG 6.19 1/8/2014 USD 19.82 UBS AG 9.93 6/18/2014 USD 50.46 UBS AG 9.89 11/22/2013 EUR 71.22 UBS AG 8.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.16 UBS AG 4.75 1/3/2014 EUR 69.04 UBS AG 4.50 6/27/2014 EUR 48.72 UBS AG 8.75 6/27/2014 EUR 58.09 UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.83 UBS AG 6.80 2/20/2014 USD 27.76 UBS AG 5.50 3/28/2014 EUR 55.86 UBS AG 9.50 3/28/2014 EUR 50.93 UBS AG 13.50 3/28/2014 EUR 62.47 UBS AG 12.00 3/28/2014 EUR 42.70 UBS AG 11.50 1/3/2014 EUR 39.79 UBS AG 14.00 3/28/2014 EUR 52.93 UBS AG 7.75 6/27/2014 EUR 45.94 UBS AG 6.00 3/28/2014 EUR 49.43 UBS AG 7.00 6/27/2014 EUR 50.45 UBS AG 11.00 3/28/2014 EUR 46.42 UBS AG 11.00 6/27/2014 EUR 59.64 UBS AG 13.00 6/27/2014 EUR 45.50 UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 59.17 UBS AG 10.75 3/28/2014 EUR 58.16 UBS AG 5.00 6/27/2014 EUR 63.87 UBS AG 10.50 6/27/2014 EUR 52.89 UBS AG 12.25 6/27/2014 EUR 71.08 UBS AG 6.25 6/27/2014 EUR 56.36 UBS AG 11.25 3/28/2014 EUR 72.74 UBS AG 11.00 1/3/2014 EUR 70.06 UBS AG 12.25 3/28/2014 EUR 68.98 UBS AG 12.00 1/3/2014 EUR 66.02 UBS AG 13.75 6/27/2014 EUR 65.24 UBS AG 8.00 3/28/2014 EUR 56.96 UBS AG 20.25 1/3/2014 EUR 67.22 UBS AG 24.50 1/3/2014 EUR 59.05 UBS AG 21.75 1/3/2014 EUR 58.98 UBS AG 12.25 1/3/2014 EUR 52.20 UBS AG 18.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.27 UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.61 UBS AG 22.00 1/3/2014 EUR 63.63 UBS AG 19.25 1/3/2014 EUR 71.52 UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.60 UBS AG 18.50 1/3/2014 EUR 71.37 UBS AG 6.50 1/3/2014 EUR 63.77 UBS AG 13.00 1/3/2014 EUR 49.48 UBS AG 5.75 1/3/2014 EUR 54.70 UBS AG 4.25 1/3/2014 EUR 54.36 UBS AG 6.25 1/3/2014 EUR 48.11 UBS AG 20.00 1/3/2014 EUR 64.93 UBS AG 14.41 11/21/2013 USD 40.01 UBS AG 23.25 1/3/2014 EUR 65.06 UBS AG 15.50 1/3/2014 EUR 45.13 UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.49 UBS AG 6.75 1/3/2014 EUR 68.80 UBS AG 20.75 1/3/2014 EUR 70.05 UBS AG 16.25 1/3/2014 EUR 72.22 UBS AG 19.75 1/3/2014 EUR 64.89 UBS AG 10.00 1/3/2014 EUR 55.96 UBS AG 13.75 1/3/2014 EUR 47.78 UBS AG 12.50 1/3/2014 EUR 49.77 UBS AG 8.50 1/3/2014 EUR 60.73 UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 36.11 UBS AG 22.75 1/3/2014 EUR 59.75 UBS AG 19.50 1/3/2014 EUR 65.22 UBS AG 20.50 1/3/2014 EUR 70.00 UBS AG 23.50 1/3/2014 EUR 72.59 UBS AG 18.25 1/3/2014 EUR 41.55 UBS AG 24.75 1/3/2014 EUR 72.66 UBS AG 17.50 1/3/2014 EUR 69.19 UBS AG 21.50 1/3/2014 EUR 61.80 UBS AG 7.98 3/17/2014 USD 10.60 UBS AG 14.75 3/28/2014 EUR 71.70 UBS AG 11.50 6/27/2014 EUR 74.62 UBS AG 4.50 3/28/2014 EUR 64.14 UBS AG 6.50 3/28/2014 EUR 44.45 UBS AG 7.30 7/7/2014 USD 28.53 TURKEY ------ APP International 11.75 10/1/2005 USD 5.00 Yuksel Insaat AS 9.50 11/10/2015 USD 72.64 UKRAINE ------- Agroton Public Ltd 12.50 7/14/2014 USD 50.00 UNITED KINGDOM -------------- Alpha Credit Group 0.73 2/21/2021 EUR 52.38 Alpha Credit Group 6.00 7/29/2020 EUR 72.88 Barclays Bank PLC 0.61 12/28/2040 EUR 64.00 Barclays Bank PLC 8.00 5/23/2014 USD 10.81 Barclays Bank PLC 2.20 11/30/2025 USD 21.86 Barclays Bank PLC 0.50 3/13/2023 RUB 47.04 Barclays Bank PLC 6.75 10/16/2015 GBP 1.15 Barclays Bank PLC 7.40 2/13/2014 GBP 1.04 Barclays Bank PLC 2.50 3/7/2017 EUR 35.67 Barclays Bank PLC 8.25 1/26/2015 USD 1.13 Barclays Bank PLC 1.99 12/1/2040 USD 71.38 Barclays Bank PLC 1.64 6/3/2041 USD 66.57 Barclays Bank PLC 7.50 4/29/2014 GBP 1.06 Barclays Bank PLC 2.33 1/2/2041 USD 73.08 Cattles Ltd 6.88 1/17/2014 GBP 2.50 Cattles Ltd 7.13 7/5/2017 GBP 2.50 Commercial Bank Pr 5.80 2/9/2016 USD 69.01 Co-Operative Bank 9.25 4/28/2021 GBP 72.74 Co-Operative Bank 5.75 12/2/2024 GBP 68.46 Co-Operative Bank 7.88 12/19/2022 GBP 70.52 Co-Operative Bank 5.88 3/28/2033 GBP 69.57 Co-Operative Bank 5.63 11/16/2021 GBP 55.13 Co-Operative Bank 1.01 5/18/2016 EUR 69.71 Credit Suisse AG/L 11.50 4/4/2014 CHF 70.01 Credit Suisse AG/L 8.50 11/5/2013 CHF 45.66 Credit Suisse AG/L 6.50 1/14/2014 CHF 55.22 Credit Suisse AG/L 9.00 11/14/2013 CHF 51.41 Credit Suisse AG/L 1.64 6/1/2042 USD 46.62 Credit Suisse AG/L 8.00 1/14/2014 USD 55.38 Credit Suisse AG/L 6.85 8/8/2014 USD 57.36 Credit Suisse AG/L 10.50 11/15/2013 USD 51.48 Credit Suisse Inte 4.40 10/24/2013 EUR 57.10 Credit Suisse Inte 4.45 12/13/2013 EUR 53.20 Dunfermline Buildi 6.00 3/31/2015 GBP 1.38 Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 2/24/2022 EUR 60.75 Emporiki Group Fin 5.00 12/2/2021 EUR 61.13 Emporiki Group Fin 5.10 12/9/2021 EUR 62.13 ERB Hellas PLC 0.52 9/3/2014 EUR 72.13 Goldman Sachs Inte 2.50 8/17/2018 EUR 20.40 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/3/2023 AUD 62.86 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/2/2022 AUD 64.19 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2023 AUD 63.27 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/25/2021 AUD 68.62 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/30/2021 NZD 65.52 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/20/2018 RUB 69.82 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 6/30/2021 NZD 67.16 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/2/2023 AUD 63.51 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2022 AUD 63.89 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/5/2018 RUB 74.86 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 3/1/2018 RUB 74.48 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 4/27/2027 NZD 47.02 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 11/22/2021 AUD 68.35 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 7/30/2027 NZD 46.29 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 1/29/2027 NZD 47.70 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 10/30/2026 NZD 48.42 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/29/2026 AUD 50.10 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 12/8/2026 AUD 50.28 HSBC Bank PLC 0.50 2/24/2027 NZD 47.50 Royal Bank of Scot 1.69 11/14/2016 GBP 1.10 RSL Communications 10.50 11/15/2008 USD 1.20 RSL Communications 10.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25 RSL Communications 9.13 3/1/2008 USD 1.25 RSL Communications 9.88 11/15/2009 USD 1.25 RSL Communications 12.00 11/1/2008 USD 1.25 UBS AG/London 25.00 3/20/2014 CHF 62.25 UBS AG/London 7.63 9/30/2015 USD 16.71 UBS AG/London 20.25 4/17/2014 CHF 66.13 UBS AG/London 6.88 8/31/2015 USD 15.37 ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2014. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-241-8200. * * * End of Transmission * * *