TCREUR_Public/140530.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, May 30, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 106

                            Headlines

C R O A T I A

CROATIA: Recession No Impact on Moody's 'Ba1' Sovereign Rating


F R A N C E

RIVOLI PAN EUROPE: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B-'


G E R M A N Y

ALISON MIDCO: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: Moody's Changes Ba1 Rating Outlook to Pos.
STABILUS SA: Moody's Raises Corporate Family Rating to 'B2'
VOERDE ALUMINIUM: Biz Has Been Bought by Trimet Aluminium


I R E L A N D

EUROCREDIT CDO V: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
PIERSE CONTRACTING: Liquidator Seeks Director Restriction Orders
SMURFIT KAPPA: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to EUR500MM Sr. Notes


I T A L Y

SUNRISE SRL: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Note Ratings for Upgrade


N E T H E R L A N D S

HALCYON STRUCTURED 2007-1: S&P Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to B-


R O M A N I A

HIDROELECTRICA: Likely to Exit Insolvency in May or June 2015
ROMAVIA: May Face Insolvency in Third Quarter 2014


R U S S I A

SOVCOMBANK: Moody's Withdraws B2 Deposit Ratings; Outlook Neg.


S W E D E N

COM HEM: S&P Puts 'B' Corp. Credit Rating on CreditWatch Positive


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ECO-SYNERGIES LTD: High Court Winds Up Carbon Credit Companies
WINDERMERE XI: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'D'


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: American Economic History


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C R O A T I A
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CROATIA: Recession No Impact on Moody's 'Ba1' Sovereign Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
In a report dated May 28, 2014, Moody's Investor Service said
Croatia's Ba1 sovereign rating remains constrained by the impact
of the country's long recession on its government's finances, but
the country's EU entry could revive exports and investment.

The rating agency's report is an update to the markets and does
not constitute a rating action.

Moody's assigned a negative outlook to Croatia's Ba1 sovereign
rating in March 2014, reflecting the continued slow pace of
Croatia's recovery from several years of recession, which has
been exacerbated by competitiveness challenges and deleveraging.
Moody's expects this delayed recovery to impede fiscal
consolidation efforts, keeping Croatia's debt metrics weaker than
in Ba-rated peers over the outlook horizon.

Moreover, Croatia's high external debt, estimated at over 100% of
GDP, increases its vulnerability to event risk. This risk,
however, is somewhat mitigated by the improvement in Croatia's
current account balance to a surplus of 1.2% of GDP in 2013 from
a deficit of 8.7% in 2008 and its foreign-exchange reserves of
around $17 billion, which provide a buffer against global
financial volatility.

Croatia's Ba1 rating is supported by its high institutional
strength, as indicated by its performance on World Bank
governance indicators. It also benefits from the country's high
per capita incomes, relative to similarly rated peers, which are
reflected in its domestic savings rate, which is also higher than
the Ba-peer median. High domestic savings have supported the
sovereign credit profile by providing a domestic market for
government debt.

Croatia's exports and growth have suffered due to the loss of the
Central European Free Trade Agreement markets upon EU entry in
2013. However, based on the experience of prior EU entrants,
Moody's expects Croatia to gain market share within the EU in the
future. In addition, if access to EU structural funds leads to
increased public and private investment, it would help revive
growth over the next two to three years. Moreover, should the
institutional mechanisms of the EU's Excessive Deficit Procedure
facilitate fiscal consolidation, government debt ratios could
improve from current levels over the next three to five years.

The rating outlook could return to stable upon signs that a
sustained economic recovery was on the horizon, and would be
accompanied by materially narrower fiscal deficits and falling
government debt ratios.

On the other hand, a downgrade could follow from an assessment
that Croatia's fiscal, growth and external vulnerability metrics
will deteriorate over the rating horizon and remain significantly
weaker than those of Ba1-rated-peers.



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F R A N C E
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RIVOLI PAN EUROPE: S&P Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
RIVOLI Pan Europe 1 PLC's class A and B notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its rating on the class C notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the underlying loans'
credit quality by applying its criteria for rating European
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transactions.

The transaction is now backed by three loans secured on nine
commercial properties in Spain, France, and the Netherlands.

SANTA HORTENSIA LOAN (44% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan had an outstanding balance of EUR103.8
million in February 2014.  It is secured on an office in Madrid.
It failed to repay at loan maturity in January 2013.  It is now
in standstill to facilitate the property's disposal.

The borrower recently agreed a new 10-year lease with IBM, which
includes a break option after seven years.  The new lease would
facilitate an underlying property's disposal, in S&P's opinion.
S&P has considered this in its analysis.

The December 2013 property valuation of EUR120 million reflects a
securitized loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 87%.

RIVE DEFENSE LOAN (30% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan had an outstanding balance of EUR69.8
million in February 2014.  It is secured on an office in
Nanterre, near La Defense (France).  The issuer holds 50% of the
whole loan.  The remaining 50% ranks pari passu and is not part
of this securitization.

The loan failed to repay on its scheduled maturity date in July
2012 and is now in special servicing.  As part of a safeguard
plan agreed between the parties in July 2013, the loan maturity
date is now July 2016.  S&P understands that the special servicer
is working closely with the borrower regarding an exit strategy
to maximize recoveries.

SFR currently occupies 94% of the underlying property, which has
a weighted-average unexpired lease term of 4.6 years.  The lease
ends 1.9 years after the extended loan maturity date.  The March
2013 valuation of EUR181.7 million reflects a whole loan LTV
ratio of 77%.

S&P considers the loan to be vulnerable to losses because the
property market value is likely to decline if SFR decides to
vacate at lease maturity.

BLUE YONDER LOAN (26% OF THE POOL)

The loan has an outstanding securitized balance of
EUR60.5 million.  It is secured on a portfolio of five offices,
as well as one industrial and one mixed-use property in Schiphol
Airport, Amsterdam.  The loan has scheduled amortization and will
mature in August 2015.  KLM occupies all seven properties on a
single lease, which expires in August 2018.

In February 2014, the servicer reported a securitized LTV ratio
of 40% (based on a December 2012 valuation).  S&P has not assumed
any losses in its expected-case scenario.

S&P's ratings address the timely payment of interest and the full
repayment of principal no later than the legal final maturity
date in August 2018.

Following S&P's review, it considers the available credit
enhancement for the class A notes to be sufficient to mitigate
the risk of losses from the underlying loans in a 'A-' rating
stress scenario.  S&P has therefore raised to'A- (sf)' from 'BBB-
(sf)' its rating on the class A notes.

S&P's analysis shows that the available credit enhancement for
the class B notes is sufficient to mitigate the risk of losses
from the underlying loans in a 'BB-' rating stress scenario.  S&P
has therefore raised to 'BB- (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on
the class B notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on the class C notes, as it
believes this class of notes continues to be exposed to principal
losses.

RATINGS LIST

RIVOLI Pan Europe 1 PLC
EUR479.8 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes
                               Rating
Class       Identifier         To              From
A           XS0278734644       A- (sf)         BBB- (sf)
B           XS0278739874       BB- (sf)        B (sf)
C           XS0278741771       B- (sf)         B- (sf)



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G E R M A N Y
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ALISON MIDCO: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has assigned a B3 Corporate Family
Rating ("CFR") and a B3-PD Probability of Default Rating to
Alison Midco S.a.r.l., an entity fully owned by Triton funds, and
the holding company holding the shares of the air preheater
business of Alstom which was recently spun off. Concurrently,
Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B2 rating to EUR310 million
of first lien senior secured term loans, a provisional (P)B2
rating to a EUR40 million revolving credit facility and a
provisional (P)Caa2 rating to EUR120 million of second lien
senior secured loans borrowed by Alison Bidco S.a.r.l., Alison
German Holding GmbH and Alison US LLC. The outlook on all ratings
is positive. This is the first time that Moody's has rated Alison
Midco S.a.r.l..

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavour to assign a definitive rating to the company's proposed
senior secured and senior unsecured notes. The definitive rating
may differ from the provisional rating.

Assignments:

Issuer: Alison Midco S.ar.l.

Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B3-PD

Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B3

Issuer: Alison BidCo S.a.r.l.

Senior Secured First Lien Term Loan, Assigned (P)B2

Senior Secured First Lien Term Loan, Assigned a range of LGD3,
36 %

Senior Secured Revolving Credit Facility, Assigned (P)B2

Senior Secured Revolving Credit Facility, Assigned a range of
LGD3, 36 %

Senior Secured Second Lien Term Loan, Assigned (P)Caa2

Senior Secured Second Lien Term Loan, Assigned a range of LGD5,
87 %

Ratings Rationale

The B3 CFR is constrained by (1) the group's small scale compared
with other rated global heavy and general manufacturers; (2)
limited operating history, as the group in its current form has
not yet operated as a standalone entity; (3) high financial
leverage as evidenced by Debt/EBITDA of above 6x proforma for the
new capital structure, as adjusted by Moody's and taking into
account expected profitability for the current financial year;
(4) limited product diversification as 60% of revenues are
generated with the Air Preheaters ('APH') division; (5) the
cyclicality of demand for its products which depends mostly on
the demand environment in the end-markets of its customers in the
power, petrochemical and broader industrial sectors. While its
products typically represent a small cost factor for the
customer, these are typically installed in a larger power plant
or petrochemical facility. Alison is exposed to customers
delaying investments in case of deteriorating demand prospects or
limited financing ability notwithstanding that Alison has more
than 50% exposure to aftermarket sales, which have more stable
demand patterns. In addition, the group's operating performance
is vulnerable to cost overruns or delays in project execution
given the fixed price nature of most of its contracts.

However, these negatives are partially offset by the group's (1)
strong competitive position in certain niche areas of the global
steam auxiliary components market with a broad product portfolio,
global production capability and reasonable end-market and
geographic diversification, with some concentration on the power
market and the US, Japan and Germany; (2) competitive position in
a mature industry being supported by long-standing customer
relationships, as well as existing technological know-how; (3) a
sizeable aftermarket business (accounts for more than 50% of
group turnover), which offers more revenues and earnings
stability than the new equipment business and might bring further
growth opportunities in emerging markets like China; (4)
historically good profitability as indicated by an EBITDA margin
of around 16% per financial year ending March 2014, which can be
seen as a reflection of its strong competitive position, and (5)
ability to generate modest amounts of positive free cash flow
after interest payments and taxes as result of low maintenance
capital expenditure and limited working capital needs.

In 2013 Alison has received orders worth EUR 552 million, as
compared to EUR 396 million in the previous year. This is
expected to lead to strong growth in turnover in the current and
next financial year. The rating incorporates the expectation that
this will not lead to a deterioration in operating margins going
forward, and that the turnover level, which is expected to be
achieved in the current financial year will be sustained.

Liquidity

Moody's consider Alison's liquidity profile as adequate. The
group will have EUR27 million of cash on balance sheet at closing
of the transaction and access to an undrawn revolver of EUR40
million and to a EUR160 million LCs facility. Moody's expect
Alison to be free cash flow generative at least in the next two
years, which will support a build in cash on balance sheet and a
reduction in gross debt through the legally binding cash sweep.
Debt amortization under the group's lending facilities will be
manageable.

The financial covenant under the new facilities will be benign.
There will be a net First lien leverage covenant whereby Net
First Lien leverage needs to be below 6.0x when drawings under
the revolving credit facility exceed 30% of the commitments. With
Net First Lien debt of around EUR280 million (assuming
approximately EUR30 million of cash on balance sheet at closing)
EBITDA would have to drop to below EUR46 million for the covenant
to be triggered (assuming that the revolver is 30% drawn), which
is a very unlikely scenario.

Structural Considerations

The proposed financing package foresees an all bank secured first
lien / second lien debt structure (EUR310 million / EUR120
million respectively). In addition Alison will also get access to
a EUR40 million revolver and to a EUR160 million LCs facility. At
least 80% of all non US entities will guarantee the debt issued
by European borrowers. US entities will guarantee debt issued in
US Dollars. Moody's also note that one Japanese entity (AKK
Japan), which is currently not fully owned (99.9% ownership
currently) will not guarantee the debt at closing. Triton will
have to ensure that they get 100% ownership in AKK and that this
entity becomes a guarantor to European borrowers. The group's
Japanese operations accounted for 37% of non-current assets and
10% of group turnover for the fiscal year ended 31st March 2014.
Despite the fact that AKK Japan will not be a guarantor from day
1 Moody's have decided to treat the debt structure as an all
asset pledge structure as there is an obligation from Triton to
have AKK Japan become a guarantor and to ensure that guarantors
account for 80% of group assets and earnings.

Under the terms of the First lien / Second lien legal
documentation, Alison can increase indebtedness, make investments
and restricted payments (several baskets of approximately 2.5% to
4% of consolidated assets) as long as total net leverage will
remain below 6.25x (after such payments are made). Pro-forma
reported net leverage at closing will be around 5.8x.

Outlook

The positive outlook assigned incorporates Moody's expectation
that the company's strong order backlog and a solid aftermarket
business will support revenue growth and EBITDA expansion in
financial year 2015 and 2016 (ending March 31 2015 and March 31
2016 respectively). In addition, it also assumes that the group
will generate positive free cash flow, which will be applied to
debt reduction. Overall Moody's would expect leverage as measured
by adjusted Debt/EBITDA to drop towards 5.5x over the next 12 to
18 months from a pro-forma level of above 6.0x paving the way for
an upgrade to B2.

What Could Change The Rating Up

An upgrade would require improvement in financial leverage as
measured by adjusted debt/EBITDA moving towards 5.5x with
FCF/Debt maintained in the mid single digits.

What Could Change The Rating Down

Downgrade pressure could be exerted on the rating in the event of
weaker operating performance leading to Debt/EBITDA to above 6.5x
for an extended period of time and to negative free cash flow
generation.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Manufacturing Industry published in December 2010. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Company profile

Alison Midco Sarl is an auxiliary power equipment provider
operating in new equipment and aftermarkets through three
business units: Air Preheaters (APH) including air preheaters and
gas-gas heaters for thermal power generation facilities; Heat
Transfer Solutions (HTS) for a wide range industrial processes
mainly in the petrochemical industry (Transfer Line Exchangers --
TLE, Waste Heat Steam Generators -- WHSG, High Temperature
Products (HTP); Mills for minerals used in industrial
applications. In FY 2014 Alison generated EUR406.5 million of
normalized sales and a transaction scope adjusted EBITDA (as
defined by the company) of EUR69 million (16.7% EBITDA margin).
Alison is a carve-out from Alstom and is fully owned by Triton
funds.


DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: Moody's Changes Ba1 Rating Outlook to Pos.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive from stable the
outlook of Deutsche Lufthansa AG and subsidiaries. Concurrently,
Moody's has affirmed all ratings.

"We have changed Lufthansa's rating outlook to positive on the
back of improvements to the company's credit metrics over the
past year. Such improvements reflect Lufthansa's reduced
leverage, as a result of lower reported debt, as well as a EUR1.1
billion reduction in the company's pension deficit," says Sven
Reinke, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead
analyst for Lufthansa. "In addition, Moody's expect that
Lufthansa's credit profile will benefit from an improving
operating performance driven by the SCORE program and
significantly lower exceptional items over the next couple of
years."

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects significant improvements to
Lufthansa's key credit metrics in 2013, despite a reduction in
reported operating profit to EUR697 million from EUR839 million
in 2012. Moody's notes that, excluding exceptional costs of
EUR345 million (mainly driven by the SCORE restructuring costs),
Lufthansa's normalized operating result improved significantly by
62% in 2013. However, the rating agency does not necessarily
adjust for such exceptional costs in its credit metrics.

The improvement in Lufthansa's credit metrics was driven by a
reduction in reported gross- and net debt. More importantly,
however, it reflected a EUR1.1 billion decrease in the company's
pension deficit. This reduction was driven by a further cash
injection into the pension fund of EUR700 million, a good return
on pension fund assets and an increase in the discount factor.
Overall, adjusted gross debt lowered from EUR16.1 billion in 2012
to EUR14.6 billion in 2013. Debt/EBITDA reduced to 4.7x at fiscal
year-end (FYE) 2013 from 5.5x at FYE2012 and retained cash flow
(RCF)/net debt improved to 25.4% in 2013 from 21.0% in 2012.
Lufthansa is now considered to be solidly positioned in the Ba1
rating category.

Lufthansa's current ratings reflect, in part, its diversified
route network, the diversity of its business segments and its
solid liquidity position. However, the ratings also reflect the
weakening in its credit metrics in fiscal year (FY) 2011 and
FY2012 on account of higher fuel prices, as well as the increase
in the pension deficit and relatively high earnings volatility
that is characteristic for passenger airlines industry. However,
Moody's expects that the recent stability in fuel prices,
alongside its forecast of slightly falling oil prices, will
support industry profitability.

Lufthansa's metrics deteriorated in 2011 and 2012, partly as a
result of significantly higher fuel costs, as well as the
increase in the pension deficit. The company's reported operating
result fell from EUR1.02 billion in 2010 to EUR820 million in
2011 and remained largely flat at EUR839 million in 2012. On an
adjusted basis, gross leverage deteriorated to 5.5x at FYE2012,
which the rating agency considered high for the rating.

Moody's notes that Lufthansa has forecast that (1) its operating
results will improve significantly in 2014, to between EUR1.3
billion and EUR1.5 billion; (2) normalized operating profit will
rise to between EUR1.68 billion and EUR1.88 billion on the back
of the SCORE project, which aims to lower unit costs (i.e., CASK
ex currency, ex fuel) by approximately 4%; and (3) fuel expense
will fall by EUR400 million. In Q1 2014, Lufthansa reported a
reduced seasonal operating loss of EUR 245 million versus a loss
EUR 359 million in Q1 2013 despite a 2.5% revenue decline that
was largely driven by negative currency effects. Lufthansa
confirmed the operating profit target for FY2014 but also stated
that the negative impact in earnings from strike effects are yet
to be compensated in the course of the financial year.

For FY2015, Lufthansa has set an operating profit target of
EUR2.65 billion, which includes EUR350 million from changes to
the aircraft depreciation policy. Moody's considers Lufthansa's
targets to be ambitious and notes that its ability to achieve
such targets is subject to prevailing market conditions,
including the oil price. Lufthansa's credit profile could
strengthen materially over the next 12-18 months should Lufthansa
achieve its profit targets.

The company's liquidity remains solid, based on cash and
equivalents of EUR3.7 billion, undrawn committed short-term
credit lines of EUR755 million and short-term debt of EUR556
million as at the end of Q1 2014. Moody's notes that Lufthansa
retains a minimum liquidity target of EUR2.3 billion.

Rationale For Positive Outlook

The positive rating outlook reflects improved credit metrics in
2013, improved operating profitability in Q1 2014 and Moody's
current expectation that the SCORE project will continue to
underpin Lufthansa's earnings growth and could improve its
financial profile over time to levels commensurate with a Baa3
rating. The company has indicated that SCORE will contribute
EUR1.2 billion to earning in the current fiscal year and further
EUR0.9 billion in 2015, which could result in sustainable
improvements in operating performance and leverage.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure could be exerted on the rating if Lufthansa
delivers the intended operating profit targets for the next
couple of years. Quantitatively, for positive pressure on the
rating, Moody's would expect to see gross leverage to lower close
to or below 4.0x with RCF/net debt remaining at least at 25%.

Although not expected in light of the action, the rating could
come under negative pressure if gross adjusted leverage were to
trend back to above 5.0x on a continued basis. Given the
company's current strategy, Moody's believes that a deterioration
in metrics would likely be the result of external competition or
significantly higher fuel costs.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Passenger Airlines published in May 2012. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Deutsche Lufthansa AG, headquartered in Cologne, Germany, is the
leading European airline in terms of revenues. In FY2013 it
reported revenues and an operating result of EUR30.0 billion and
EUR697 million, respectively.


STABILUS SA: Moody's Raises Corporate Family Rating to 'B2'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, upgraded the Corporate Family Rating
(CFR) of Stabilus S.A. (formerly known as Servus HoldCo S.a.r.l)
to B2 from B3. At the same time the rating agency affirmed the
Probability of Default Rating at B2-PD and the instrument rating
assigned to the Senior Secured Notes issued by Servus Luxembourg
Holding S.C.A. on 7 June 2013 at B2 and changed to positive from
stable the outlook on all ratings.

List of affected ratings

Upgrades:

Issuer: Stabilus S.A.

Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to B2 from B3

Issuer: Servus Luxembourg Holding S.C.A.

Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Jun 15, 2018, Upgraded to
a range of LGD3, 48 % from a range of LGD4, 50 %

Affirmations:

Issuer: Stabilus S.A.

Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B2-PD

Issuer: Servus Luxembourg Holding S.C.A.

Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture Jun 15, 2018, Affirmed B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Stabilus S.A.

Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Issuer: Servus Luxembourg Holding S.C.A.

Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Ratings Rationale

The rating action was prompted by the reorganization of the group
structure alongside the initial public offering of the shares of
Stabilus and the early redemption of around EUR60 million of the
Senior Secured Notes. As a result of this reorganization, which
consisted of a number of complex internal transactions, Stabilus'
total debt position (as adjusted by Moody's) was significantly
reduced to EUR330 million (pro-forma March 31, 2014) compared to
EUR664 million prior to IPO through the elimination of
subordinated profit participation loans, thereby reducing Moody's
adjusted leverage from around 10x to 4.4x.

The rating is mainly supported by (i) Stabilus' very strong
market position for gas springs across most geographical regions
and end market applications in a very consolidated market
environment, (ii) the high barriers to entry to Stabilus' markets
through (a) the capital intensity of the business, which would
require sizeable investments to replicate the company's business
model, (b) the long standing customer relationships of Stabilus
with major auto OEMs and industrial customers, (c) the very
consolidated nature of the gas spring market, which would leave
very little market space for new entrants, and (d) the economies
of scale required to be able to be profitable in a price
competitive market, which would make it difficult for new
entrants to penetrate the market on a small scale and which is
reflected by the high profitability with an EBITDA margin of
16.2% per March 2014, (iii) the group's geographically
diversified and large scale production base with a high level of
automation in high labor countries, and (iv) its exposure to non-
automotive related applications accounting for around 35% of
total turnover, which should help reducing somewhat the
dependency on the automotive industry for Stabilus.

The rating of Stabilus remains constrained by (i) the group's
relatively small size with revenues of EUR487 million during the
last twelve month period ended 31 March 2014, and the limited
product diversification, (ii) a geographical concentration on
developed economies with Europe and the Americas accounting for
83% of turnover notwithstanding some of the turnover realized in
Europe is ultimately exported by customers of Stabilus to
emerging markets, (iii) the group's exposure to cyclical end
industries, and (iv) its capital intensity due to the high
automation level of its production asset base notwithstanding
that Stabilus' capital expenditures have been significantly above
depreciation levels over the last four years to 30 September
2013. The increased market share of various designs of automatic
tailgate opening system is a threat to core gas spring
applications. Stabilus has entered the market of automatic
tailgate systems already back in 2002 and since refined the
product offering and is selling these systems under the product
name Powerise. However, the appearance of automatic tailgate
systems has also opened the market to new competitors, which are
not competing with Stabilus in gas springs. This is also
highlighted by the lower market share of Stabilus in the Powerise
market. The rating incorporates the expectation that Stabilus
will grow its market share in Powerise going forward. Stabilus'
leverage of 4.4x proforma for the recent IPO positions the
company strongly in the B2 rating category.

Stabilus' liquidity profile for the twelve months period ending
in March 2015 is considered to be adequate. Estimated liquidity
needs of EUR75 million, primarily comprising of Capital
expenditures, transaction costs for the IPO and the
reorganization measures, working capital needs and working cash
required to run the business, are well covered by approximately
EUR66 million funds from operations, EUR33 million cash on hand,
and full availability under the company's EUR25 million super
senior revolving credit facility.

The positive outlook incorporates Moody's expectation that
Stabilus' operating performance and cash flow generation will be
sustained at levels seen in H1 of financial year 2013/14. The
positive outlook also assumes that the capital structure of the
group will gradually improve from current levels assuming limited
external growth activities and taking into account the announced
dividend policy with a 20-40% payout ratio. Finally the positive
outlook assumes that the company will maintain an adequate
liquidity profile going forward.

Moody's would consider upgrading Stabilus in case the company is
able to reduce leverage sustainably towards 4.0x Debt / EBITDA,
to maintain EBITA margin sustainably above 10% and to maintain
FCF/Debt in the mid single digits. Negative pressure on the
rating would build if leverage would materially exceed 5.0x Debt
/ EBITDA, if EBITA margin would drop below 8% or if Stabilus
would generate negative free cash flow leading to a deterioration
of the liquidity position of the group.

Moody's understand that operating entities representing at least
80% of consolidated EBITDA provide upstream guarantees and that
noteholders and lenders benefit from share pledges over entities
also accounting for at least 80% of consolidated EBITDA.
Therefore Moody's have positioned these instruments ahead of
pension obligations and future minimum lease payments.
Considering the preferred access to collateral the super senior
revolving credit facility has been given the highest rank in the
waterfall of debt. Given the relatively small size of the
revolving credit facility compared to the overall indebtedness of
the group pro-forma of the refinancing Moody's has ranked the
trade payable at the same level as the senior secured guaranteed
notes in line with standard practice.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Automotive Supplier Industry published in May 2013. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Established in 1934, Stabilus S.A. (formerly known as Servus
HoldCo S.a.r.l) is a leading manufacturer of gas springs,
hydraulic vibration dampers and electromechanical opening and
closing systems for the automotive industry and other industrial
/ consumer products applications. Stabilus operates 11
manufacturing plants in nine countries, employs around 4,160
people, generated revenues of EUR486.6 million and reported an
EBITDA of EUR91 million (adjusted by the company for one-time
effects) for the twelve month period ended March 31, 2014.


VOERDE ALUMINIUM: Biz Has Been Bought by Trimet Aluminium
---------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Germany's Trimet Aluminium said on May 28 it
had purchased Voerde Aluminium.

Trimet said it would continue production at Voerde and retain the
plant's 280 personnel, Reuters relates. The takeover talks
involving Trimet had been reported on May 26.

Financial terms of the deal were not disclosed, Reuters notes.

Voerde, which produces 115,000 tonnes of aluminium annually, went
insolvent in 2012, blaming high German electricity prices.

According to the news agency, Trimet owner and supervisory board
chairman Heinz-Peter Schlueter said the German government's
recent decision to continue to give financial relief for high
energy prices to power-intensive industries had been a key
enabling the takeover.

Trimet expected continued strong aluminium demand in Europe,
Mr. Schlueter, as cited by Reuters, added.

"With the Voerde location, we will be able to serve the rising
demand," the report quotes Mr. Schlueter as saying.

Voerde creditors had voted to continue production at the plant
until the end of 2014 while a search for a buyer continued, adds
Reuters.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


EUROCREDIT CDO V: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Eurocredit CDO V PLC's class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, and C notes.  At
the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on class D and E
notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the March 12, 2014 trustee report.

Eurocredit CDO V has been amortizing since the end of its
reinvestment period in September 2012.  Since S&P's previous
review on Nov. 13, 2012, the aggregate collateral balance has
decreased by 39.69% to EUR317.5 million from EUR526.5 million.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
at each rating level.  The BDR represents our estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on our stress assumptions,
that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the
noteholders.  In our analysis, we used the portfolio balance that
we consider to be performing (EUR317,517,495), the current and
covenanted weighted-average spread (2.65% and 3.87%,
respectively), and the weighted-average recovery rates calculated
in line with our corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
criteria.  We applied various cash flow stresses, using our
standard default patterns, in conjunction with different interest
rate and currency stress scenarios," S&P said.

S&P has observed that EUR193.57 million of the class A-1 and A-2
notes have paid down since its previous review.  In S&P's view,
this has increased the available credit enhancement for the class
A-1, A-2, A-3, B, and C notes.  The weighted-average spread has
increased to 387 basis points (bps) from 363 bps over the same
period.

S&P has observed that the non-euro-denominated assets currently
make up 14.13% of the total performing assets.  These assets are
hedged by drawing in the same currency from the multicurrency
revolving liabilities to create a natural hedge.  The transaction
has American-style currency call options, which hedge any
currency mismatches.

"We have also applied our non-sovereign ratings criteria.  We
have considered the transaction's exposure to sovereign risk
because some of the portfolio's assets -- 12.18% of the
transaction's total collateral balance -- are based in Spain and
Italy.  In 'AAA' and 'AA+' rating scenarios, we have limited
credit to 10% of the transaction's collateral balance, to
correspond to assets based in these sovereigns in our calculation
of the aggregate collateral balance," S&P noted.

In S&P's opinion, the available credit enhancement for the class
A-1, A-2, A-3, B, and C notes is commensurate with higher ratings
than previously assigned.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings
on the class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, and C notes.

S&P's ratings on the class D and E notes are constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test that S&P introduced in its 2009 corporate CDOs
criteria.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)'
its rating on the class D notes, and lowered to 'B-(sf)' from 'B+
(sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

Eurocredit CDO V is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
September 2006 and is managed by Intermediate Capital Group PLC.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating         Rating
            To             From

Eurocredit CDO V PLC
EUR606 Million Senior Secured Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1         AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
A-2         AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
A-3         AAA (sf)       AA+ (sf)
B           AA+ (sf)       A+ (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)      BBB (sf)

Ratings Lowered

D           B+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)
E           B- (sf)        B+ (sf)


PIERSE CONTRACTING: Liquidator Seeks Director Restriction Orders
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Lyons at The Irish Times reports that the liquidator of
Pierse Contracting began a High Court action seeking restriction
orders against nine of its former directors under section 150 of
the Companies Act, 1990, on Wednesday.

Pierse went bust in 2010 leaving a deficit of EUR212 million,
making it one of the biggest collapses of the bust, The Irish
Times recounts.  About EUR50 million was owed by Pierse to
unsecured creditors, including subcontractors, The Irish Times
states.

The directors at the time of the company's collapse included
founder Ged Pierse, former chief executive Charles Norbert
"Nobbie" O'Reilly and finance director Fearghal O'Nolan, The
Irish Times notes.

Its other directors were Kieran Duggan, a former banker with
Anglo Irish Bank, Martin Murphy, Michael O'Reilly, Michael
McNamara, Matthew Duggan and Brendan Cahalin, according to the
report.

According to The Irish Times, liquidator Simon Coyle, an
accountant from Mazars, said in an affidavit on Wednesday he was
applying for restriction orders because he believed Pierse's
directors should have realised sooner it "should cease trading
and taken appropriate action to liquidate the company".

"Instead, the company continued to trade for a further 12 months,
incurring fresh liabilities without ultimately clearing the
creditor backlog, bank borrowings or establishing a clear plan to
deal with property loans."

In his affidavit, Mr. Coyle, as cited by The Irish Times, said
that if the firm's directors had ordered the company to cease
trading in April 2009, then "the group would not have incurred
losses of EUR24.5 million in the year to April 30th, 2010, when
the group's actual turnover was EUR144 million compared to the
budget of EUR259.6 million".

He said Pierse lost another EUR1.9 million in the three months to
July 2010, when the company unsuccessfully tried to restructure
itself via examinership, The Irish Times relays.

Directors who are contesting the move by Mr. Coyle, are yet to
set out their position in full in the ongoing case, The Irish
Times notes.

Pierse Contracting was once Ireland's second biggest construction
company.


SMURFIT KAPPA: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to EUR500MM Sr. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba2 rating to the proposed
issuance of EUR500 million senior notes by Smurfit Kappa
Acquisitions, an indirect subsidiary of Smurfit Kappa Group plc.
The group's Ba2 corporate family rating remains unchanged. The
outlook on all ratings is positive.

The proceeds from the proposed issuance and existing cash on
balance sheet will be used for a prepayment of the outstanding
EUR500 million senior notes maturing in 2019 as they become
callable in November 2014 at 103.875%.

Assignments:

Issuer: Smurfit Kappa Acquisitions

Senior Notes, Assigned Ba2

Senior Notes, Assigned a range of LGD4, 50%

Ratings Rationale

The assignment of the Ba2 instrument rating to the proposed
senior notes mirrors the pari passu ranking with existing debt
instruments that carry the same rating. The group's existing and
proposed senior notes rank also pari passu with the senior credit
facility.

SKG's Ba2 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) takes into account the
group's (i) leading market positions for paper-based packaging in
Europe and Latin America, reflected in its size with revenues of
about EUR8.0 billion generated in the last twelve months ending
March 2014; (ii) its good geographic diversification with
operations both in Western Europe and the Americas (composing the
US and certain Latin American countries); (iii) strong and
relatively stable operating margins through the cycle, supported
by its integrated containerboard and corrugated operations; (iv)
track record of solid free cash flow generation and the
application of FCF to debt reduction, as well as (v) solid
financial flexibility including a well spread maturity profile
with no major near term debt maturities.

At the same time, the rating is constrained by (i) the cyclical
and highly competitive nature of the industry, which leaves
little room for differentiation and the resulting commodity
character of large parts of SKG's product portfolio; (ii) the
group's low segmental diversification as a result of its focus on
kraftliner, testliner and corrugated packaging products; and
(iii) leverage in terms of Debt/EBITDA on a Moody's adjusted
basis with about 3.9x point in time per March 2014.

The positive outlook reflects Moody's assumption of Smurfit Kappa
being able to improve profitability levels in 2014 on the back of
higher box prices, continued volume growth and good cost control.
This, coupled with lower debt levels and interest cost savings
following recent refinancing exercises should allow SKG to
achieve credit metrics over the next couple of quarters that are
commensurate with a Ba1 rating, such as Debt/EBITDA improving
towards 3.5x and retained cash flow/debt improving towards 20%.

SKG's rating could be upgraded if it were to realize improvements
in leverage (as adjusted by Moody's) falling towards 3.5x
Debt/EBITDA on a sustained basis with RCF/ debt improving towards
20%.

Negative rating pressure could build if leverage (as adjusted by
Moody's) moves to materially above 4x Debt/EBITDA on a
sustainable basis or RCF/ debt falls to the low teens, or if SKG
would be unable to generate positive free cash flows. Also, a
large debt-financed acquisition or material increases in
shareholder distributions could negatively impact the company's
rating given current macroeconomic uncertainties.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Paper and Forest Products Industry published in October 2013.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Smurfit Kappa Group plc is Europe's leading manufacturer of
containerboard and corrugated containers as well as specialty
packaging, The group holds also the leading position for its
major product lines in Latin America. SKG generated revenues of
EUR 8.0 billion in the last twelve months ending March 2014.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


SUNRISE SRL: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Note Ratings for Upgrade
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
upgrade the ratings of six notes in three Italian asset-backed
securities (ABS) consumer transactions due to deleveraging.

The affected notes are Class B of Golden Bar (Securitisation)
S.r.l. Series 2011-2, Class B-2012-1 of Golden Bar
(Securitisation) S.r.l. Series 2012-1 and Series 1B, Series 2B,
Series 1C and Series 2C of Sunrise S.r.l.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action primarily reflects (1) the deleveraging in the
Italian ABS transactions and the resulting high level of credit
enhancement; (2) the fact that performance is still in line with
expectations although deteriorating in Golden Bar
(Securitisation) S.r.l Series 2012-1 and (3) the fact that other
risk factors have either stabilized or improved since the last
review e.g., Italy's Baa2 government bond rating outlook was
changed to stable in February 2014 and the servicer's parent,
Santander Consumer Finance S.A., had its senior unsecured rating
upgraded to Baa1 in March 2014 in the two Golden Bar
transactions.

The rapid amortization in the three transactions has prompted a
significant deleveraging in their capital structures. This is the
key driver for placing on review the ratings of these
transactions.

The credit enhancement under Class B in Golden Bar
(Securitisation) S.r.l Series 2011-2 increased to 61% from 36.5%
on the closing date.

The credit enhancement under Class B-2012-1 in Golden Bar
(Securitisation) S.r.l Series 2012-1 increased to 40.8% from 25%
on the closing date.

In Sunrise S.r.l, the credit enhancement under Series 1 B, Series
1 C, Series 2 B and Series 2 C increased to 20.5% from 3.7% on
the closing date, to 7.1% from 1%, to 20.5% from 3.7% and to 7.1%
from 1% respectively.

The performance of the three transactions is in line with Moody's
expectations.

90+ delinquency on the current pool stands at very similar levels
in all three deals, respectively 2.42% for Golden Bar
(Securitisation) S.r.l Series 2011-2, 2.54% in Golden Bar
(Securitisation) S.r.l Series 2012-1 and 2.53% in Sunrise Srl.
The cumulative defaults on original pool plus replenishments for
the two Golden Bar transactions currently stand at 5.14% and
6.75% respectively. The Sunrise Srl transaction cumulative
default rate is more stable with current levels at 2.58%.
Recently, both Golden Bar transactions benefitted from the
support of Santander Consumer Bank S.p.A through the repurchase
of defaulted loans (the aforementioned cumulative default rates
include the repurchased defaulted loans).

For Golden Bar (Securitisation) S.r.l Series 2011-2, the current
default rate assumption is 10% of the current portfolio balance,
the fixed recovery rate is 10% and the coefficient of variation
(CoV) is 43% which, combined with the key collateral assumptions,
corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of 24%.

For Golden Bar (Securitisation) S.r.l Series 2012-1, the current
default rate assumption is 16% of the current portfolio balance,
the fixed recovery rate is 10% and the CoV is 35% which, combined
with the key collateral assumptions, corresponds to a portfolio
credit enhancement of 39.9%.

For Sunrise Srl, the current default rate assumption is 4.5% of
the current portfolio balance, the fixed recovery rate is 15% and
the CoV is 62.2% which, combined with the key collateral
assumptions, corresponds to a portfolio credit enhancement of
18%.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings affected by the action would be (1) worse-than-expected
performance of the underlying collateral; (2) deterioration in
the credit quality of the counterparties; and (3) an increase in
Italy's sovereign risk.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings affected by the action would be the better-than-expected
performance of the underlying assets, further deleveraging and a
decline in both counterparty and sovereign risk.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions" published in
May 2013.

List of affected ratings:

Issuer: Golden Bar (Securitisation) S.r.l. Series 2011-2

EUR95M Class B Notes, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 13, 2011 Assigned Baa1 (sf)

Issuer: Golden Bar (Securitisation) S.r.l. Series 2012-1

EUR56.5M Class B - 2012-1 Notes, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review
for Possible Upgrade; previously on Jul 23, 2012 Assigned Baa3
(sf)

Issuer: Sunrise Srl

EUR60.2M Series 1 B Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 12, 2013 Confirmed at Ba1
(sf)

EUR28.7M Series 1 C Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 12, 2013 Confirmed at B3 (sf)

EUR30.25M Series 2 B Notes, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 12, 2013 Confirmed at Ba1
(sf)

EUR12.25M Series 2 C Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Jun 12, 2013 Confirmed at B3 (sf)



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


HALCYON STRUCTURED 2007-1: S&P Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to B-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions in
Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2007-1 B.V.

Specifically S&P has:

   -- Raised its ratings on the class A2 and C notes;
   -- Lowered its rating on the class E notes; and
   -- Affirmed its ratings on the class A1, B, D, and variable
      funding notes (VFN).

The rating actions follow S&P's performance review of the
transaction, in which it conducted its credit and cash flow
analysis using data from the trustee report dated Feb. 28, 2014
and applied its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's previous review on Feb 24, 2012, the transaction has
benefited from various developments.  The VFN and the class A
notes partially amortized after the end of the reinvestment
period in July 2013.  The portfolio's weighted-average spread has
increased to 4.52% from 3.41% since S&P's previous review.  The
scenario default rates (SDRs) are also lower now, due to the
portfolio's shorter time to maturity.

The class A1 to D notes are now passing their
overcollateralization tests.  In S&P's previous review, all of
the tranches passed this test.

A deterioration in credit enhancement and the portfolio's credit
quality have subdued the transaction's positive developments.
Since S&P's previous review, the available credit enhancement for
all tranches has decreased, mainly due to losses on defaulted
assets.  The portfolio's credit quality has deteriorated
slightly, as the portfolio's percentage of assets in the 'CCC'
category (debt obligations of obligors rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or
'CCC-') has increased to 8.19% from 4.32%.  The portfolio's
defaulted assets have also increased over the same period to
2.96% from 1.45%.  The largest obligor accounts for 2.91% of the
portfolio.  The portfolio has 81 obligors, with an average
exposure of 1.27%.

The transaction's exposure to assets domiciled in Ireland, Italy,
and Spain amounts to 16.33% of the portfolio's aggregate balance.
S&P applied its nonsovereign ratings criteria when considering
ratings on the notes at six notches above the rating on the
relevant sovereign.

As of February 2014, 13.66% of the portfolio is non-euro-
denominated, down from 20.61% as of S&P's previous review.  The
issuer funded these assets by issuing the VFN at closing.  The
Issuer also entered into an option with Deutsche Bank AG to
mitigate the related foreign exchange exposure.  As the option
agreement's downgrade provisions are not in line with S&P's
current counterparty criteria, its current counterparty criteria
constrain S&P's ratings on the tranches at one notch above its
long-term 'A' issuer credit rating on the option provider.  For
rating scenarios above this level, S&P's cash flow analysis would
have to show that the available credit enhancement for the notes
is sufficient to withstand losses, if the counterparty fails to
perform and the transaction is exposed to foreign currency risk.

"We conducted our cash flow analysis to determine the break even
default rate (BDR) for each class of notes at each rating level.
We used the portfolio balance that we consider to be performing,
the reported weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average
recovery rates calculated in accordance with our 2009 criteria
for corporate collateralized debt obligations.  We applied
various cash flow stress scenarios using our standard default
patterns and timings for each rating category assumed for each
class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios
as outlined in our criteria," S&P said.

"In addition to our cash flow analysis, we applied our
supplemental tests, which address event and model risk.  These
tests are in addition to the credit and cash analyses.  Our
supplemental tests assess whether a CDO tranche is projected to
have sufficient credit enhancement to pass the applicable
thresholds at different liability rating levels," S&P added.

S&P also tested the sensitivity of all classes of notes by
applying high and low correlation and lower recovery sensitivity
tests at each rating level.

Since the transaction entered its amortization phase in July
2013, S&P believes the portfolio is exposed to the risk of a
weighted-average spread reduction.  Therefore, in scenarios above
S&P's original ratings on the notes, it assumed the portfolio of
assets paid a covenanted weighted-average spread of 2.80%,
instead of the current weighted-average spread of 4.52%.

S&P's ratings on the class A1 and A2 notes and the VFN address
the timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment of
principal. S&P's ratings on the class B to E notes address the
ultimate payment of principal and interest.

Based on the factors above, S&P's cash flow analysis indicates
that the available credit enhancement for class A2 and C notes is
commensurate with higher ratings than previously assigned.  S&P
has therefore raised its ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P's cash flow analysis indicate that the available credit
enhancement for the class A1, B, D notes, and the VFN to be
commensurate with our currently assigned ratings.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its ratings on these classes of notes.

Although S&P's cash flow analysis indicates a higher rating on
the class E notes, its supplemental test showed that they passed
at a lower rating level.  S&P has therefore lowered its rating on
the class E notes.

Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2007-1 is a cash
flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that
securitizes loans granted to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms.  The transaction closed in May 2007 and Halcyon
Loan Investors L.P. is the manager.

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating            Rating
             To                From

Halcyon Structured Asset Management European CLO 2007-1 B.V.
EUR600 Million Senior Secured Variable Funding Floating-Rate
Notes

Ratings Raised

A2           AA (sf)           AA- (sf)
C            BBB+ (sf)         BBB (sf)

Ratings Lowered

E            B- (sf)           B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

VFN          AA+ (sf)
A1           AA+ (sf)
B            A+ (sf)
D            BB+ (sf)

VFN-Variable funding notes.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


HIDROELECTRICA: Likely to Exit Insolvency in May or June 2015
-------------------------------------------------------------
Luiza Ilie at Reuters reports that Remus Borza, Hidroelectrica's
manager, will likely exit insolvency in May or June 2015, then
carry out a stock market listing in the second half of that year.

The company was first forced into insolvency in 2012 by a severe
drought and a string of loss-making contracts, under which it
sold the bulk of its output below market prices, causing losses
of US$1.4 billion over six years, Reuters relates.

The company underwent a restructuring, cancelled the deals and
exited insolvency late last year while turning a profit, Reuters
recounts.  But contract holders challenged their cancellation and
a court ruling pushed the firm back into insolvency earlier this
year, Reuters notes.

Before it exits that status again, it needs to address the
cancelled contracts and figure out what penalties it will incur,
Reuters says.

The latest court ruling dashed plans to launch a stock market
flotation of 15 percent by July of this year, a plan the leftist
government had agreed with the International Monetary Fund under
a EUR4 billion aid deal, Reuters relays.

Gabriel Dumitrascu, head of the energy ministry's privatization
department, told Reuters he did not anticipate a shorter deadline
for the firm to exit insolvency.

Hidroelectrica is Romania's largest power producer.


ROMAVIA: May Face Insolvency in Third Quarter 2014
--------------------------------------------------
Romania-Insider, citing Mediafax, reports that Romavia will
become insolvent in the third quarter of this year, as it has due
debts of some EUR10 million.

The Romanian Government paid the company's previous debts, shrunk
its activity but also signed off on unjustified expenses,
Romania-Insider relates.

The company had its air operation certificate suspended as the
company lacked money to lease planes, Romania-Insider relays.
This led Romavia to lose its exclusivity in organizing special
flights, the report notes.

According to Romania-Insider, the company had overdue payments of
some EUR8.4 million at the end of 2013.

Romavia is a Romanian state-owned aviation company.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


SOVCOMBANK: Moody's Withdraws B2 Deposit Ratings; Outlook Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Sovcombank's B2 long-term
local and foreign currency deposit ratings, the bank's Not Prime
short-term local and foreign currency deposit ratings and the E+
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), equivalent to a
b2 baseline credit assessment. At the time of the withdrawal, the
bank's B2 deposit ratings carried a negative outlook, while the
outlook on the E+ BFSR was stable

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


COM HEM: S&P Puts 'B' Corp. Credit Rating on CreditWatch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Sweden-based cable operator NorCell 1B
AB (publ) (Com Hem) on CreditWatch with positive implications.

S&P also placed its 'B' issue rating on Com Hem's senior secured
debt and its 'CCC+' issue rating on its unsecured debt on
CreditWatch positive.

S&P placed its ratings on Com Hem on CreditWatch positive to
reflect its view that, if successful, the IPO and the debt
reduction could improve S&P's assessment of the company's
financial risk profile.

"We notably expect adjusted debt-EBITDA ratio to decline to 6x or
lower compared with 8.4x at year-end 2013.  This is based on the
company's future financial policy targeting a reported leverage
of 3.5x-4x.  Our main adjustment to Com Hem's debt is the
addition of a Swedish krona (SEK) 3.1 billion subordinated
shareholder loan and SEK1.4 billion in operating lease
adjustments.  Furthermore, we do not apply any adjustment for
surplus cash, in accordance with our methodology, because the
company is owned by a financial sponsor," S&P said.

Credit ratios, notably coverage ratios, will also benefit from a
reduction in the company's currently high average interest cost.

"Our assessment of Com Hem's business risk profile remains
supported by its established position in Sweden, with connections
to 1.83 million households in a country of 4.6 million
households. Moreover, Com Hem has a stable and diverse customer
base of landlords for its basic cable TV access business, with a
low churn rate, and high barriers to entry associated with the
landlord model.  Com Hem also has a well-invested and upgraded
hybrid-fiber-coaxial DOCSIS 3.0 network that offers Internet
speeds of 500 megabits per second in 92% of its coverage area,
high profitability with a Standard & Poor's-adjusted EBITDA
margin exceeding 50%, and some growth opportunities thanks to
increasing penetration in its coverage area of digital TV
supported by the TiVo platform (only 33% of Com Hem's subscribers
have digital TV) and recent expansion toward the corporate
segment (notably with the acquisition of Phonera, a virtual
telecom operator focused on the corporate segment, in April
2014)," S&P said.

These strengths are partly offset by severe competition from
various technology platforms in multidwelling areas.  Com Hem
competes with much larger operators TeliaSonera AB and Telenor
ASA, which use several alternative technologies including digital
subscriber lines and fiber networks.

"We aim to resolve the CreditWatch placement after completion of
the IPO, which we understand could take place over the next three
months, and after we meet with the group's management to discuss
its strategy, financial policy, and long-term capital structure
plans.  We could raise the corporate credit rating and issue
ratings by one or two notches," S&P noted.

A successful IPO and leverage reduction toward 6x could support a
one-notch upgrade.  However, the CreditWatch resolution will also
depend on the ownership and capital structure, including the
residual share of Com Hem's stock owned by financial sponsors,
controlling shareholders' exit strategy, and the potential
refinancing or equity conversion of shareholder loans, which
currently represent about 1.4x leverage in S&P's adjusted
calculation.

S&P could raise the ratings by two notches if it believed that
Com Hem's Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage were likely to
rapidly trend down to below 5x, with coverage of debt by free
cash flow of more than 5% following the IPO, or a clear exit path
to below 40% ownership by the financial sponsors.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ECO-SYNERGIES LTD: High Court Winds Up Carbon Credit Companies
--------------------------------------------------------------
A web of 13 companies involved in a scheme to sell carbon credits
to the public for investment that raised over GBP19 million have
been wound up in the High Court on grounds of public interest,
following an investigation by the Insolvency Service.

At the web's centre was Eco-Synergies Ltd, a wholesaler of
Voluntary Emission Reduction ("VER") carbon credits, which it
supplied to other, often related companies to market to the
public for investment.

Such investments were sold to the public using false claims
contained in slick brochures, among other methods.

Welcoming the court's winding up decisions Chris Mayhew, Company
Investigations Supervisor at the Insolvency Service, said:

"Eco-Synergies Ltd was at the centre of and controlled this web
of companies in this patently bad scheme to sell carbon credits
to the public for investment. The use of associates was central
to its "pioneering" business model. The credits were sold at such
inflated prices that an unnatural increase in value would be
required before investors could break even let alone see a return
on their investment".

"Essentially investors including vulnerable individuals and often
repeat victims who were urged to buy more and more credits have
lost their money.

"I would urge anyone cold called and offered hot air by callous
individuals to simply hang up the call.

"Nobody should be left in any doubt that the Insolvency Service
will act whenever we discover there are serious failings and such
businesses should therefore note that working together with other
regulators, we will be coming after you".

The investigation uncovered that carbon credits sourced by Eco-
Synergies Ltd for an average of 65p per credit were then sold to
investors by the web of ostensibly unrelated companies at an
overall mark up of up to 869%.

The investigation revealed that investors had paid some GBP19
million for carbon credits shown to have cost Eco-Synergies Ltd
some GBP2.3 million.

Eco-Synergies Ltd described itself as a carbon market pioneer and
claimed to be "The voluntary carbon specialists". This company
provided bespoke assistance to the outer web companies thereby
enabling those companies to sell carbon credits to the public for
investment.

Eco-Synergies Ltd benefitted from the sales made to the public by
such companies as it supplied the credits to them at a mark up
stressing to them that they themselves could expect returns in
excess of 60%, telling them "You simply complete a trade and we
will do the rest".

A presentation brochure to the web companies recovered by the
investigation describes Eco-Synergies Ltd as, among other things:

  * the largest wholesale supplier of carbon credits in the
    market with 25+ active trading agents,

  * that it settled between 1-2 million credits a month,

  * had a monthly turnover of GBP5m+

  * had spent GBP200,000 on legal fees to ensure its system and
    contracts were "watertight" and

  * would train your staff on the market and how to sell this
    product successfully.

The brochure's "Case Study" focused on one associated company MH
Carbon Limited which Eco-Synergies Ltd exclusively supplied and
worked with directly to sell out credits for them. The company
described MH Carbon Limited as, among other things:

  * one of the market leaders and the largest in terms of revenue
    floor of this type in London,

  * that it settled between 400,000-500,000 credits a month and

  * had average monthly sales of GBP2 million.

Mr. Gavin Manerowski, an initial shareholder of Eco-Synergies
Ltd, was a director of MH Carbon Limited which, together with the
other marketing companies, made false and misleading statements
to the public to persuade them to invest in carbon credits.

Mr. Manerowski, together with Mr. Richard Beese, Mr. David White
and Mr. Jonathan Cocks also established a non trading company
Eco-Synergies Nominees Ltd to hold the credits purchased by the
public on trust for investors.

Eco-Synergies Nominees Ltd did not oppose the winding up action
and afterwards the professional director and secretary of the
company served notice of their intention to resign their
appointments.

Custodian and trust services were provided to the scheme by an
FCA authorised trust company that shortly before the winding up
hearing wrote to investors informing them of the winding up
petition issued against Eco-Synergies Nominees Ltd that was not
being opposed.


WINDERMERE XI: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit rating on
Windermere XI CMBS PLC's class A notes.  At the same time, S&P
has lowered its ratings on the class B and C notes, and has
affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class D and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the credit quality of
the transaction's remaining loan under its European commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) criteria.

S&P's review follows the full repayment of the Long Acre loan
(GBP111.0 million) on the April 2014 interest payment date (IPD)
along with the full repayment of the Devonshire House loan
(GBP191.9 million) on the January 2014 IPD.  The cash manager
used these repayments to redeem the class A notes.

At the same time, following the completion of the workout of the
Westville loan, principal losses were applied to the class C and
D notes on the April 2014 IPD.

The Government Income Portfolio loan is the sole remaining loan
in the transaction.  It was originated in July 2006 with a
maturity date of October 2010, which was subsequently extended
until October 2012.  The borrower was not in a position to repay
the loan on the extended maturity date.  The servicer
restructured the loan and extended the final repayment date for
up to three additional periods (October 2013, October 2014, and
April 2015), subject to certain extension conditions.

The loan is currently secured on 13 office properties located
across a number of regional areas of the U.K., down from 22
properties at closing.  The properties are of secondary nature
and provide a total net lettable area of 52,216 sq m.

The regional spread of assets is diverse, with four in the North
West, three in Yorkshire, two in the West Midlands, two in the
East of England, and two in the South West.  The total portfolio
market value (as of May 2012) is GBP49.1 million with the three
major assets located in Plymouth (18.0% of total market value),
Rochdale (15.3%), and Ipswich (13.3%). Based on the May 2012
valuation, the loan-to-value ratio is 150.1%.

The portfolio is predominantly let to U.K. Government agencies,
which together account for 81.1% of the current contractual
income.  A further 18.9% of the current income is provided by
Trillium Property GP Ltd., a property outsourcing company
providing services to the U.K. Government.

Although occupancy levels have been relatively high, with a
current vacancy rate of 0.21%, the portfolio has a weak lease
profile with a short weighted-average remaining lease term of
3.64 years.  S&P also believes that the properties are over-
rented and would likely require considerable capital expenditures
before being re-let, if the U.K. Government were to vacate.

In view of these factors, S&P has assumed losses on the loan in
its expected-case scenario.

S&P's ratings in Windermere XI CMBS address the timely payment of
interest and payment of principal not later than the legal final
maturity date (April 2017).

Following the full repayment of the Long Acre and Devonshire
House loans, S&P considers that the available credit enhancement
for the class A notes has increased.  However, the transaction's
short tail period partially constrains S&P's rating on the class
A notes.

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class A notes is sufficient to address its principal loss
expectations under its 'A+' rating level scenario.  S&P has
therefore raised to 'A+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on the
class A notes.

In S&P's opinion, the class B notes' creditworthiness has
deteriorated.  S&P believes that the class B notes are now
exposed to principal losses from the remaining underlying loan in
its expected-case scenario.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'CCC
(sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

S&P has also lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' its rating on
the class C notes.  This class of notes experienced principal
losses in April 2014 following the liquidation of the Westville
loan. This loan repaid at a loss of GBP46.6 million.  The cash
manager applied these losses to the class C and D notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class D and E notes
as they experienced principal losses on prior payment dates.

Windermere XI CMBS is a CMBS transaction that closed in August
2007 and has a legal final maturity of April 2017.  The
transaction is currently secured on a sole remaining loan backed
by various commercial office real estate throughout a number of
regional U.K. locations.

RATINGS LIST

Windermere XI CMBS PLC
GBP707.767 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes

                               Rating           Rating
Class        Identifier        To               From
A            97320MAA8         A+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)
B            97320MAB6         CCC (sf)         B (sf)
C            97320MAC4         D (sf)           CCC (sf)
D            97320MAD2         D (sf)           D (sf)
E            97320MAE0         D (sf)           D (sf)



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: American Economic History
----------------------------------------
Author: Seymour E. Harris, editor
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 560 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today and one for a colleague at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/american_economic_history.html

A classic text on a fascinating topic by a host of notable
authors is again in print. American Economic History is a
collection of 15 studies of the economic development of the
United States from about 1800 to the late 1950s, written by 20
prominent and diverse 20th century thinkers. The authors show
America to be, in the words of contributor Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., ". . . a compact example of the growth of an underdeveloped
country into a great and rich industrial state."

The chapters are divided into four topics: major issues, policy
issues, determinants of income, and regional growth. The section
on major issues includes an compelling discussion by Mr.
Schlesinger called "Ideas and the Economic Process." In it, he
claims that the contribution to our unprecedented growth by the
"unfettered individual," the "genius" personage of the American
businessman, has been exaggerated, while the roles of public
policy and the influx of ideas and capital from abroad have been
diminished. Mr. Schlesinger concludes that "(t)he ability to
change one's mind (which is easier in a society in which people
have the freedom to think, inquire and speculate) turns out, in
the last analysis, to be the secret of American economic growth,
without which resources, population, climate and the other
favoring factors would have been of no avail." To complete this
section, Alfred H. Conrad discusses income growth and structural
change over time, and Peter B. Kenan undertook a statistical
survey of growth in population, transportation, output, wealth,
and industry.

The second part deals with policy. J. G. Gurley and E. S. Shaw
discuss the history of U.S. monetary policy, concluding that
"the failure to manufacture enough money may bring on recession
and stultify economic growth, (but) it is also clear . that
merely manufacturing money is not enough." Mr. Harris devotes a
chapter to fiscal policy, defined as an attempt "to adapt tax,
spending, and debt policies to the needs of the economy." He
agrees with Herbert Hoover, in that "when the private economy
was foundering, it was the task of the government to increase
the total amount of purchasing power at the disposal of the
people," and the "medicine for recession was to cut taxes and
increase the total amount of spending." Asher Achinstein
chronicles economic fluctuations in the U.S., and Douglass C.
North the role of the U.S. in the international economy. G. A.
193Lincoln, W. Y. Smith, and J. B. Durst recount the effects of
war and defense on the economy.

Part Three deals with determinants of income. In it are thorough
discussions of population and immigration (Elizabeth W. Gilboy
and Edgar M. Hoover); patterns of employment (Stanley
Lebergott); natural resource policies ( Joseph L. Fisher and
Donald J. Patton); transportation (Merton J. Peck); trade
unionism and collective bargaining (Lloyd Ulman); and
agriculture (John D. Black). The writers discuss the historic
linkages between and among population growth, construction, and
transportation growth. Messrs. Fisher and Patton lament the lack
of serious effort to conserve resources until the first quarter
of the 20th century. Professor Ulman concludes that collective
bargaining contributed much to the growth of fringe benefits.
Professor Black charts the decline in relative importance of the
agricultural sector. The book ends with a chapter on regional
income trends, 1840-1950, by Richard A. Easterlin.

Seymour E. Harris (1897-1974), earned undergraduate and doctoral
degrees from Harvard University. He was chairman of the
Department of Economics at Harvard and the University of
California, San Diego. Advisor to numerous government officials,
he was editor of the Review of Economics and Statistics from
1943 to 1964 and associate editor of the Quarterly Journal of
Economics from 1947 to 1974.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *