TCREUR_Public/140711.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, July 11, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 136

                            Headlines

F R A N C E

ELIOR SA: Fitch Raises LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
GENERALE DE SANTE: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' CCR; Outlook Stable
TYROL ACQUISITION: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR & Revises Outlook to Neg


G E R M A N Y

CENTROSOLAR GROUP: Solar-Fabrik Buys Module Manufacturing Plant
CORONA EQUITY: Leuchten Manufactur Unit Files Insolvency
SIC PROCESSING: Administrator Files Lawsuit Against Yingli Solar


I R E L A N D

ALME LOAN: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes
CELBRIDGE PLAYZONE: Exits Examinership; 33 Jobs Saved
SETANTA INSURANCE: Liquidation May "Take Some Time"


I T A L Y

TWIN SET: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Corporate Family Rating


K A Z A K H S T A N

KASPI BANK: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Deposit Ratings & 'E+' BFSR


L I T H U A N I A

GO PLANET: Insolvency to Affect 900 Tourists


L U X E M B O U R G

ESPIRITO SANTO: May Seek Creditor Protection if Debt Talks Fail


N E T H E R L A N D S

BRIT INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
CADOGAN SQUARE III: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. D Notes From Ba1
CADOGAN SQUARE IV: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. X Notes From Ba2
SELECTA GROUP: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating


P O R T U G A L

BANCO BPI: S&P Raises Non-deferrable Sub. Debt Rating to 'B'
ESPIRITO SANTO: Moody's Lowers Issuer & Debt Ratings to 'Caa2'


R U S S I A

MDM BANK: Moody's Cuts Deposit & Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings to B2
PROMSVYAZBANK: Moody's Puts Ba3 Ratings on Review for Downgrade
RENAISSANCE FINANCIAL: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Ratings; Outlook Stable
SURGUT: S&P Raises ICR From 'BB+'; Outlook Negative


S L O V E N I A

NOVA KREDITNA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR; Outlook Negative


T U R K E Y

ANADOLUBANK AS: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

FAIRHOLD SECURITISATION: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Notes to Caa3
UNIPART AUTOMOTIVE: Denies Going to Administration


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Roy C. Smith's The Money Wars


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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ELIOR SA: Fitch Raises LT Issuer Default Rating to 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded French-based foodservices company
Elior SA's (previously Holding Bercy Investissement SCA) Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  The ratings
of Elior's senior secured credit facilities and Elior Finance &
Co. SCA's EUR350 million senior secured notes were upgraded to
'BB+' from 'BB-'.

All ratings have been removed from Rating Watch Positive (RWP).
The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is Stable.

The upgrade reflects the recent completion of a EUR954 million
initial public offering (IPO) by the group, which has been used
partly to repay secured bank and bond debt.  Fitch estimates
Fitch-adjusted funds from operations (FFO) gross leverage to
decline to 5.2x post-IPO from 7.6x at the financial year ended
Sept. 2013.  The ratio should remain at or below 5.0x thereafter.
The upgrade of the senior secured credit facilities and notes'
ratings reflect enhanced recoveries post IPO.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Declining but High Leverage

The IPO of EUR954 million (EUR785 million of new shares and
EUR169 million of existing shares) would have reduced FYE13 FFO
adjusted gross leverage to a still high 5.2x from 7.6x.  Fitch
expects credit metrics to show additional improvement by FY15,
driven by moderate organic sales growth and mild profit margin
expansion as extraordinary costs dissipate.  Thereafter, any
meaningful deleveraging will be predicated on continued profit
growth and Fitch does not expect any further material repayment
of debt prior to bullet maturities in 2019/2020.

Geographic Concentration

Elior's geographical concentration in France and other southern
European countries remains a constraining factor on the rating
relative to its closest peers Compass (A-/Stable) and Sodexo
(BBB+/Stable), which maintain broader geographical
diversification.

Balanced Business Profile

The ratings continue to reflect Elior's balanced business profile
resulting from its broad product offering, strong customer and
business diversification, and high barriers to entry in the
catering sector.  The group possesses several company-specific
traits akin to low investment grade business services companies
such as a broad range of services and customer diversification as
well as a high proportion of contracted revenues and low renewal
risk.

In addition, Elior's public listing will further diversify the
group's funding sources and enhance its financial flexibility.

Strong Cash Flow Conversion

The asset-light nature and low capital intensity of the business
should allow Elior to convert operating profits into positive
cash flow before debt service; Fitch estimates free cash flow
(FCF) margin averaging 2% of sales over the next four years.
This should provide some financial flexibility, a key supporting
factor of the company's credit profile.  However, FFO fixed
charge cover is expected to be 2.4x by FY15 (around 2.0x pre-
IPO), which is at the lower end of expectations for the 'BB-'
rating.

Long-Term Outsourcing Trend

The long-term trend toward outsourced foodservices is expected to
support continued sales and profit growth over the medium term.
Diversified Profit Drivers

Elior's contract catering and support services segment
(representing 68% of FY13 group EBITDA) is a key anchor of the
ratings.  Fitch expects profitability under these contracts,
which is largely P&L based (ie where the provider is paid for the
service and bears the costs), to remain steady in a low
inflationary environment while retaining any productivity
improvements.  Fitch also expect concession activities,
accounting for one-third of group EBITDA, to remain structurally
more profitable, albeit more capital-intensive, than contract
catering over the next two years.

Adequate Liquidity

Unrestricted cash of EUR260 million at end-March 2014 (EUR210
million at FYE13), together with access to nearly EUR170 million
of undrawn revolving credit facilities post-IPO, is sufficient to
address business needs and moderate debt repayments for 2014 and
2015 of around EUR300 million.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating actions include:

   -- Additional diversification of operations either by
      operating segment and/or geography

   -- Further de-leveraging resulting in FFO adjusted gross
      leverage below 4.5x on a sustained basis

   -- FFO fixed charge coverage sustained above 3.0x
     (FYE13: 1.7x)

   -- FCF/total adjusted debt margin above 12% (FYE13: Negative)

Negative Future developments that could, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating actions include:

   -- FFO adjusted gross leverage above 6.5x on a sustained basis

   -- FFO fixed charge coverage below 2.0x on a sustained basis

   -- FCF/total adjusted debt margin below 2%


GENERALE DE SANTE: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'BB-' CCR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'BB-'
long-term corporate credit rating to France-based private
hospital group Generale de Sante (GdS).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB-' preliminary long-term
issue rating to GdS' proposed EUR900 million term loans and
EUR175 million of credit facilities.  S&P has assigned a
preliminary recovery rating of '3' to the term loans and credit
facilities, indicating its expectation of meaningful (50%-70%)
recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.

The final ratings will be subject to the successful closing of
the transaction under terms similar to those currently indicated,
and will depend on S&P's receipt and satisfactory review of all
final transaction documentation.  Accordingly, the preliminary
ratings should not be construed as evidence of the final ratings.
If the terms and conditions of the final transaction depart from
the material S&P has already reviewed, or if the transaction does
not close within what S&P considers to be a reasonable timeframe,
it reserves the right to withdraw or revise its ratings.

The ratings reflect S&P's assessment of GdS' business risk
profile as "satisfactory" and its financial risk profile as
"aggressive," as S&P's criteria define the terms.  The rating on
GdS incorporates a downward adjustment of one notch under S&P's
"comparable rating analysis" modifier, to reflect its view of the
group's substantial operating lease and rent commitments, which
add to its fixed cost base.

GdS is in the process of being acquired by Australia-based
private hospital group Ramsay Health Care Ltd. (RHC) and French
insurance group Credit Agricole Assurances (CAA).  RHC and CAA
intend to merge their current joint venture company, hospital
group Ramsay Sante, into GdS.

GdS' relatively large size and leading market position in the
private hospital market in France, together with its operating
efficiency and relatively high EBITDA margins, underpin S&P's
assessment of its business risk profile as "satisfactory."  S&P
considers that scale of operations is important because it
provides a solid foundation for negotiations and should
facilitate efforts to save costs on procurement and other areas
in focus for efficiency measures.

S&P believes that demand for health care services in France will
steadily increase due to an aging population and an increasing
number of medical interventions per patient, and S&P forecasts
volume-driven revenue growth of up to 2% annually over the near
term.  S&P believes that pro forma adjusted revenues would be
about EUR2.1 billion and EBITDA about EUR400 million in 2014,
resulting in sustained adjusted EBITDA margins of around 19%.

These positives are partially mitigated by GdS' dependence on
France and the social security system for 95% of its revenue
base, and the group's exposure to the vagaries of the political
climate in Europe.  S&P assumes that tariffs for French health
care providers will be largely flat over the near term, as the
government aims to save on health care spending amid ongoing
challenging economic conditions.  This will put pressure on fees
of GdS and other health care operators and could challenge their
profitability, especially in an environment of rising cost
inflation.  While wages account for a significant portion of
health care providers' operating costs, and wage increases could
cause margin erosion, S&P notes that GdS has put in place ongoing
efficiency and savings programs to mitigate the impact on
earnings, with satisfactory results over the past three years.
Adjusted EBITDA margins have remained fairly stable at around
19%, underpinning S&P's view that large-scale providers such as
GdS are better positioned to weather any pressure on
profitability.

GdS leases more than 75% of its assets, which S&P views
negatively.  The lease payments add to the health care service
provider's fixed cost base, which is already high due to high
staff costs.  S&P anticipates that GdS will achieve adjusted
EBITDA of close to EUR400 million in 2014.  This will cover
annual fixed charges--comprising cash interest payments and
rents--by about 1.9x, which in combination with otherwise strong
credit metrics, including an adjusted debt to EBITDA ratio below
5x, underpin S&P's assessment of GdS' financial risk profile as
"aggressive."

S&P's estimate of GdS' adjusted debt in 2014 includes EUR900
million of term loans, finance leases totaling about EUR200
million, and close to EUR850 million of operating lease
adjustments.  S&P deducts from debt about EUR90 million of cash
that it considers to be surplus cash.  S&P estimates that GdS'
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will fall to 4.8x by Dec. 31, 2014,
down from 5.3x in 2013 on a GdS stand-alone basis, and continue
to decrease to 4.6x in 2015.  This view is based on S&P's
estimate that EBITDA is likely to gradually grow in line with
revenues and that debt would decrease because of the owners' and
management's focus on debt reduction, including mandatory debt
redemptions over the near term.

"We assess the group credit profile of soon-to-be majority owner
RHC as stronger than GdS, but the ratings on GdS do not currently
include any uplift for group support.  This is because we assess
GdS as "moderately strategic" to the group, as it is a new
acquisition.  Before assessing GdS as more strategically
important to RHC, we will look for a track record of the RHC
group's financial policies, acquisition strategy, operating
performance, and credit ratio development in relation to the
transaction," S&P said.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of about 1.5%-2.0% over the near term,
      mainly driven by increasing volumes;

   -- Stable EBITDA margins at around 19%;

   -- Capital expenditure (capex) of about EUR100 million
      annually; and

   -- Limited acquisitions in the near term, with the group
      focusing on integrating GdS and Ramsay Sante into the new
      GdS group

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.8x in 2014 and 4.6x in 2015;

   -- A fixed charge cover ratio of 1.9x in 2014 and 2015; and

   -- EBITDA interest coverage of 3.6x in 2014 and 3.4x in 2015

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that GdS' solid position
in the French private hospital markets will enable the group to
sustain broadly positive underlying revenue growth over the next
12 months, despite the potential negative effects of French
public spending cuts on health care.  S&P believes that GdS will
be able to comfortably service its debt and operating lease
obligations and to maintain fixed-charge coverage of about 1.9x
over the coming 12 months, a level that S&P, in combination with
a net debt-to-EBITDA ratio below 5x, consider commensurate with
the 'BB-' rating.

S&P could raise the ratings if the group's ability to service its
debt and operating lease obligations strengthens, in which case
S&P might no longer make a downward adjustment for its
comparative rating analysis modifier.  S&P could also consider an
upgrade if it was to assess GdS as more strategically important
to RHC, after S&P has observed some track record of the RHC
group's financial policies, acquisition strategy, operating
performance, and credit ratio development.

"We could consider lowering the ratings if the group's operating
performance deteriorates, such that net debt to EBITDA exceeds
5x, it fails to maintain adequate headroom under its covenants,
or liquidity weakens.  The most likely cause of such a
deterioration would be if the reimbursement of GdS' costs through
the French social security system does not keep up with
inflationary pressure on the group's cost base, resulting in
pressure on the group's profitability.  We could also consider
lowering the ratings if the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of the
group--or that of its soon-to-be owner RHC--increases to more
than 5x due to a higher level of debt-funded acquisitions or
capital investments," S&P said.


TYROL ACQUISITION: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR & Revises Outlook to Neg
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on France-
based broadcasting and telecoms infrastructure group Tyrol
Acquisition 1 SAS (TDF) to negative from stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on TDF.

In addition, S&P affirmed the 'B' and 'CCC+' issue ratings and
'3' and '6' recovery ratings on the company's first-lien and
second-lien senior secured term loans, respectively.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's opinion that TDF has not made
significant progress in refinancing its large approaching 2016
debt maturities.  Although TDF has recently shored up its
liquidity by selling its Hungarian assets for about EUR180
million -- following disposals of Dutch, Spanish, and Finnish
assets over the past few years -- the company's 2016 debt
maturities of EUR3 billion and EUR500 million in January and
June, respectively, far exceed its available liquidity sources.
In addition, S&P considers that the company's headroom under its
increasingly demanding net leverage financial covenant will
continue to shrink over the next few quarters.

S&P assess TDF's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged"
under its criteria.  S&P believes that the group's ratio of debt
to EBITDA (adjusted for pensions and operating leases and
including shareholder loans) will continue to exceed 9.5x over
the next two years (above 7.0x excluding the shareholder loan).
S&P also anticipates relatively limited free cash flow generation
over the next three years, after heavy interest charges,
restructuring costs, and high capital expenditure (capex).

In addition, S&P assess TDF's financial policy as very
aggressive, reflecting the group's majority control by private
equity groups and risks stemming from occasional acquisitions.
The group's large and concentrated debt maturities, limited
refinancing track record beyond a successful amend-to-extend
agreement from its lenders in 2011, and shrinking headroom under
its tightening financial covenants continue to weigh on the
rating.

"We assess TDF's business risk profile as "strong," reflecting
the company's position as the No. 1 player in the French and
German broadcasting and telecoms markets.  Our assessment also
reflects TDF's long-established record of delivering TV and radio
signals and providing telecoms site hosting to leading industry
players under long-term contracts that support revenue
predictability.  The company also benefits from high barriers to
entry in these markets, due to the scarcity of available
broadcasting sites, the technological and planning knowledge
required to compete, and the industry's significant capital
intensity," S&P said.

"Moreover, we see some favorable demand prospects for third-party
telecoms infrastructure in France, on the back of the continued
rollout of 3G, as well as the 4G rollout, which began recently.
However, due to the continued fierce competition and
uncertainties around potential consolidation in that market, we
anticipate relatively weak growth.  Furthermore, we see modest
growth potential from digital TV, thanks to the continued rollout
of the last multiplexes (MUX) launched in France in December
2012. However, we do not expect any new channels, including HD
channels, to be launched in the short term," S&P noted.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Revenue decline in financial 2015 and 2016, due to TDF's
      exit from the telecom managed services business in France,
      combined with weak performance in Germany, and the group's
      sale of its Hungarian assets in financial 2015.

   -- Continued growth in the French telecom site hosting
      division, although this may change depending on future
      announcements in this very unstable market.

   -- A continued improvement in the EBITDA margin thanks to
      TDF's exit from the low-margin managed services business in
      France and the satellite space segment in Germany, as well
      as benefits from TDF's cost-cutting plan.

   -- Relatively good operating profitability, which supports
      cash interest coverage, despite very high leverage.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following adjusted
credit measures:

   -- An EBITDA margin of about 48% in financial 2015, continuing
      to improve on the back of a better product mix.

   -- Leverage remaining at about 10x in the next two years
      (about 7.5x excluding the shareholder loan).

   -- A relatively strong ratio of EBITDA cash interest coverage
      of above 3.0x.

The negative outlook reflects the possibility of a downgrade in
early 2015 if TDF does not make significant progress in
refinancing its 2016 debt maturities and widen its covenant
headroom.  If TDF fails to do this as the January 2016 debt
repayments enter the one-year timeframe that S&P's liquidity
assessment mainly focuses on, a downgrade to 'B-' will become
increasingly likely.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable in the next few months if
TDF takes significant steps to refinance its 2016 debt maturities
and rebuild covenant headroom.



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CENTROSOLAR GROUP: Solar-Fabrik Buys Module Manufacturing Plant
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Osborne at pv-tech.org reports that German PV module
manufacturer Solar-Fabrik has acquired the module manufacturing
facility of insolvent Centrosolar, Sonnenstromfabrik, in Wismar,
Germany, securing 143 jobs.

The deal was organized through the insolvency administrator, the
report says.

According to pv-tech.org, Solar-Fabrik was operating its own
three-line production plant at around 150MW in 2013 with a
nameplate capacity of 210MW.  The report notes that the
acquisition of the Sonnenstromfabrik plant was said to increase
its capacity to around 300MW. However, the Sonnenstromfabrik
plant, which was established in 2008 was said to have a nameplate
capacity of 200MW.

Solar-Fabrik has established a new subsidiary company to operate
Sonnenstromfabrik with a capital injection of EUR25 million and
will headed by Joern Wirth, VP finance at Solar-Fabrik, and Ralf
Hennigs, the long-term managing director of Centrosolar's
Sonnenstromfabrik, pv-tech.org relates.

The report says the company noted that it expected a smooth
transition for the production plant from insolvency back to
normal operation, including processing of outstanding orders.

Solar-Fabrik has also acquired as part of the deal current
inventory valued at around EUR300,000 and will also have rights
to produce Centrosolar's module range, adds pv-tech.org.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on
Oct. 21, 2013, SolarServer said Centrosolar Group AG (Munich),
Centrosolar AG and Centrosolar Sonnenstromfabrik GmbH have
applied for "protective shield" creditor protection at a court in
Hamburg, Germany, which the company says will allow for faster
implementation of its restructuring plans.

Centrosolar Group AG, Munich is a supplier of photovoltaic (PV)
systems for roofs and key components.  Its product range
comprises solar integrated systems, modules, inverters and
mounting systems. Over two-thirds of revenue is generated in
North America.


CORONA EQUITY: Leuchten Manufactur Unit Files Insolvency
--------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Corona Equity Partner AG said subsidiary
Leuchten Manufactur seit 1862 i. SA. Gmbh files for insolvency in
self-administration.

The insolvency of this subsidiary has no impact on operations of
Corona Equity, Reuters says.


SIC PROCESSING: Administrator Files Lawsuit Against Yingli Solar
----------------------------------------------------------------
Edgar Meza at pv-magazine.com reports that the ongoing legal
dispute between the insolvent German slurry recycling company and
the Chinese solar giant appears to be intensifying following a
report that SIC Processing's administrator has initiated
litigation.

pv-magazine.com relates that with Yingli Solar enjoying nearly
daily global television exposure as a sponsor of this year's
World Cup football tournament, the insolvency administrator of
Germany's troubled SiC Processing GmbH appears to have chosen an
opportune time to file a lawsuit against the Chinese PV giant.

Christopher Seagon, the insolvency administrator of SiC
Processing, based in Hirschau, Germany, and its Chinese
subsidiary, SiC Processing in Baoding, China, said last year he
intended to enforce contractual compensation claims against
Yingli and several of its subsidiaries, the report recalls.

According to the report, Mr. Seagon said Yingli owes SiC
approximately EUR23 million ($31.27 million) and stresses that
the outstanding debt was a major reason behind the company's
financial troubles and its insolvency in 2012.

A German court in the Bavarian town of Amberg has confirmed that
the lawsuit has been filed, but it has not yet been served to
Yingli, which has declined to comment on the report,
pv-magazine.com says.

pv-magazine.com, citing German financial magazine
WirtschaftsWoche, reports that Seagon initially filed a partial
legal action against Yingli for EUR1 million but still aims to
collect up to EUR24 million from the group.

The report notes that Yingli already rejected similar claims made
by Seagon in October, saying it had not only already paid all
amounts due SiC but that the German company owed it outstanding
rents and utility bills, adding that both parties remained
divided over the determination of the residual payments. Yingli
also took aim at Seagon's claim that it was partly responsible
for SiC's bankruptcy, saying in October that the insolvency of
SiC was in virtue of its management and operation, which could
not be linked to Yingli, pv-magazine.com relays.

However, Yingli made it clear to pv-magazine.com on July 7 that
it would not comment on the current report until it had first
seen the latest complaint.

According to pv-magazine.com, WirtschaftsWoche said SiC
Processing invested EUR29 million in a slurry recycling facility
at Yingli's headquarters in Baoding, China, at the request of the
PV manufacturer.

Citing sources familiar with the situation, WirtschaftsWoche said
the lawsuit accused Yingli of subsequently opening its own
"secret" processing plant and essentially ending a 10-year
agreement with SiC in breach of contract, pv-magazine.com adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Asia Pacific on
Dec. 28, 2012, Solar Industry said the local court in Amberg,
Germany, has ordered debtor-in-possession proceedings in
accordance with section 270b of the German Insolvency Code
(Insolvenzordnung) for SiC Processing GmbH. The company's
Norwegian subsidiary also filed for insolvency after its only
customer, REC Wafer Norway, filed its own insolvency application.
For SiC Processing GmbH, the court has appointed Dr. Hubert
Ampferl, a partner at Nuremberg, Germany-based law firm Dr. Beck
& Partner, preliminary supervisor, according to Solar Industry.

SiC Processing GmbH is a Germany-based provider of solar slurry
recovery services.



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ALME LOAN: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ALME Loan Funding II Limited's notes
final ratings, as follows:

EUR223.5m Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR40.8m Class B: 'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR20.6m Class C: 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23.3m Class D: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR25.9m Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR11.3m Class F: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR37m subordinated notes: not rated

ALME Loan Funding II Limited is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation.  Net proceeds from the issue are
being used to purchase a EUR374.1 million portfolio of European
leveraged loans and bonds.  The portfolio is managed by Apollo
Management International LLP.  The reinvestment period is
scheduled to end in 2018.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors to be in
the 'B' category.  The agency has public ratings or credit
opinions on 52 of the 53 obligors in the identified portfolio.
The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of the identified
portfolio, which represents 50% of the target par amount, is
32.54, below the covenanted maximum of 33.5 for the ratings.

High Expected Recoveries

At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations.  Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets.  Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to 53 of the 54
obligations in the identified portfolio.  The weighted average
recovery rate (WARR) of the identified portfolio is 73.2%, above
the covenanted minimum 69.5% for the ratings.

Limited Interest Rate Risk

Interest rate risk is naturally hedged for most of the portfolio,
as all notes and a minimum of 90% of assets must be floating-
rate. Fitch modelled a 10% and a 0% fixed-rate asset bucket in
its analysis and the rated notes can withstand the interest rate
mismatch associated with both scenarios.

Limited FX Risk

Perfect asset swaps are used to mitigate any currency risk on
non-euro-denominated assets.  The transaction is permitted to
invest up to 30% of the portfolio in non-euro-denominated assets,
provided suitable asset swaps can be entered into.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of up to three notches for the rated notes.
A 25% reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to four notches for the rated notes.

Document Amendments

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation.  Where rating agency confirmation relates to risk
factors, Fitch will analyze the proposed change and may provide a
rating action commentary if the change has a negative impact on
the then current ratings.  Such amendments may delay the
repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis confirms the
expected repayment of principal at the legal final maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective, Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to
be given if Fitch declines to comment.


CELBRIDGE PLAYZONE: Exits Examinership; 33 Jobs Saved
-----------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that new legislation opening the option
of examinership to small- and medium-sized companies by allowing
the Circuit Court to handle more such cases passed its first test
on Wednesday, July 9, when Celbridge Playzone emerged from the
process on a "sound financial footing" and with all 33 jobs
saved.

According to The Irish Times, after Naas Circuit Court approved
its rescue plan (scheme of arrangement) on Wednesday, the
examiner, Joe Walsh of Hughes Blake, predicted that a large
number of SMEs that would otherwise "be destined for insolvency"
could now look to examinership to protect themselves and their
jobs.

Celbridge Playzone operates a children's play center in Celbridge
and has 33 employees.


SETANTA INSURANCE: Liquidation May "Take Some Time"
---------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that Bernard Sheridan, director of
consumer protection at the Central Bank, said on Wednesday, July
9, the liquidation of Setanta Insurance, which collapsed in April
of this year, may "take some time".

According to The Irish Times, speaking before the Joint
Oireachtas Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform,
Mr. Sheridan said the liquidator is currently in the process of
assessing the level of potential claims and the assets and
liabilities of Setanta in order to estimate the actual shortfall.

"This process could take some time, particularly as some claims
may not as yet have been submitted and also some claims may be
ongoing for some considerable time," The Irish Times quotes
Mr. Sheridan as saying, adding that policyholders or third party
claimants, who have not yet submitted their claim to the
liquidator, should do so as soon as possible.  "This will ensure
that the claimant will be included as a creditor of Setanta when
its liabilities are being assessed. Our understanding is that
premium refunds are automatically included on the creditors
list."

The insurer, which was established in Malta in 2007, was
authorized and supervised by the Malta Financial Services
Authority (MFSA) and it sold insurance in Ireland on a Freedom of
Services basis from an administrative office in Blanchardstown,
The Irish Times discloses.  Setanta was required to comply with
conduct of business requirements of the Central Bank when selling
to Irish consumers, The Irish Times notes.

Setanta provided private and commercial motor insurance policies
to Irish consumers and sold exclusively through 230 brokers,
according to The Irish Times.  When it went into liquidation,
Setanta had approximately 75,000 policyholders, two thirds of
which were commercial motor insurance policies and one third was
private motor insurance policies, The Irish Times states.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


TWIN SET: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a first-time B1 corporate
family rating (CFR) and Ba3-PD probability of default rating
(PDR) to TWIN SET -- Simona Barbieri S.p.A. (TWIN-SET), an
apparel producer focused in the women's affordable luxury
segment. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B1
rating, with a loss given default (LGD) assessment of LGD4 - 65%,
to the proposed EUR150 million worth of senior secured notes due
2019 to be issued by TWIN-SET. The outlook on the ratings is
stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these reflect Moody's credit opinion regarding
the transaction only. Upon closing of the refinancing and a
conclusive review of the final documentation Moody's will
endeavor to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating.

"The B1 rating reflects TWIN-SET's small size and modest
geographical diversification, with 70% of sales generated in the
highly fragmented Italian market. The group focuses in the highly
competitive 'affordable luxury' women's apparel segment, with a
mix of wholesale and direct retail distribution. However,
TWIN-SET benefits from good brand recognition and a solid track-
record of fast growing sales and high profitability" says Lorenzo
Re, a Moody's Vice President-Senior Analyst and lead analyst for
TWIN-SET.

Ratings Rationale

--B1 CFR/Ba3-PD PDR--

The B1 CFR reflects TWIN-SET's modest scale, with revenue of
EUR177 million in the financial year ended December 31, 2013, and
the company's modest revenue diversification. With 70% of revenue
generated in Italy in FY13, TWIN-SET is still largely reliant on
its domestic market, although its international diversification
has been increasing in the past three years and the group's
strategy aims to further expand internationally. However, Moody's
notes that this strategy carries some execution risk, as TWIN-SET
brand awareness abroad is lower, which could create higher
advertising costs or result in lower performance of new retail
stores outside Italy. In addition, the group's diversification in
terms of product and end markets is also modest, with the main
TWIN-SET apparel collection still accounting for more than one
half of sales. From 2011, the company successfully broadened its
product range with the introduction of new lines (accessories,
beachwear, shoes and jeans), but Moody's notes that these are all
primarily targeted to the same customer base (35-45 year old
women), thus offering only partial diversification.

More positively, TWIN-SET is successfully positioned in the
highly fragmented affordable luxury segment and in the last few
years emerged as one of the fastest growing brands, showing a
solid track record of revenue growth (33% CAGR from 2010) and
sound EBITDA margin (above 20%). The group was able to create a
solid brand image with its own style, but remains exposed to high
fashion risk as its products could become less appealing in the
future for its target customers in the highly competitive apparel
market. TWIN-SET's business model is based on a mix between
direct distribution through a network of stores (34 as of June
2014) and the wholesale channel. The latter offers some degree of
revenue visibility as wholesalers place their orders 6 months in
advance, which also allows the company to run production based on
orders received, thus minimizing inventory risk. The planned
roll-out of the retail network (some 100 new store openings by
2018) should support future sales growth and international
expansion. However, it will require sustained investment of more
than EUR20 million annually over the next three years (and
additional lease obligations), causing free cash flow generation
to be negative in 2014 and 2015, according to Moody's estimates.
This capex is however highly discretional, allowing for some
flexibility in case of underperforming operating results.

TWIN-SET's financial metrics are strong for the assigned rating.
Leverage -- defined as debt/EBITDA, after Moody's adjustments
principally for capitalized operating leases -- has been
historically modest, although is expected to increase following a
EUR40 million distribution to shareholders, including a EUR27.8
million dividend and a EUR12.2 million partial reimbursement of a
shareholders' loan. Notwithstanding this and the expected high
capex, Moody's expects leverage to remain at or slightly below
4.0x through 2016, which positions the rating solidly at the B1
level, leaving room for some underperformance. For its
calculations, Moody's has treated the outstanding shareholders
loan (EUR66 million pro-forma at March 2014 after the bond issue)
lent by Mo.Da Gioielli S.r.l. (situated outside of the restricted
group) as equity.

--(P)B1 Rating On Senior Secured Notes--

The (P)B1 rating (LGD4 - 65%) assigned to the company's proposed
senior secured notes due 2019 reflects the fact that the proposed
bond issuance will represent most of the group capital structure.
The notes will be issued by TWIN-SET - Simona Barbieri S.p.A.,
the parent company and most relevant operating company of the
group, representing approximately 100% of the consolidated
EBITDA. The notes will not be guaranteed by any other subsidiary
and will be secured against the parent company shares, the
shareholder loan and some intangible assets, including the main
group's brand, TWIN-SET. A committed EUR10 million super senior
revolving credit facility will rank first in priority to the
bond, but the small size of the RCF is not enough, in Moody's
view, to cause a subordination of the bond. Along with these
instruments, the company's capital structure will also include a
small number of existing bank credit lines which are unsecured.

The super-senior facility will only have one financial covenant
which is expected to be tested only if the facility is drawn. In
light of the absence of any maintenance financial covenants,
Moody's have considered the transaction as whole bond and
adjusted accordingly our family recovery rate expectation to 35%.
This has resulted in a probability of default rating of Ba3-PD.

Rationale for the Stable Outlook

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that TWIN-SET will be able to continue to show positive operating
performance, combining fast top-line growth with sound
profitability, and maintains a solid financial profile, with its
adjusted leverage ratio remaining constantly at or below 4.0x in
the next 12-18 months. TWIN-SET's business profile constrains the
rating in the B category.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if there was evidence of
operating performance deterioration leading to materially lower-
than-expected sales and EBITDA growth and increase in leverage,
with adjusted debt/EBITDA raising above 4.25x. A deterioration in
the liquidity profile, leading to possible difficulties in
covering the group's seasonal working capital absorption, could
also drive a negative rating action.

Positive rating pressure is unlikely in the mid-term, given the
modest size and sales concentration in few markets and product
categories. In the long-term, the successful execution of the
group expansion plan, leading to larger scale and higher
geographical and product category diversification could lead to a
positive rating action provided that the group maintains its
current conservative financial policy, with leverage
(debt/EBITDA) below 3.5x.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Apparel Companies published in May 2013. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Carpi, Italy, TWIN-SET -- Simona Barbieri S.p.A.
(TWIN-SET) is an apparel producer focused in the women's
affordable luxury segment. The group sells apparel and related
products (accessories, shoes, bags, beachwear, etc) mainly under
its own brand TWIN-SET and through both the wholesale and its own
retail network. In 2013, TWIN-SET generated EUR177 million of
sales, with EUR40 million in EBITDA.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KASPI BANK: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Deposit Ratings & 'E+' BFSR
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Kaspi Bank JSC's B1/Not
Prime deposit ratings and the E+ standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR), equivalent to a baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of b1. Moody's has also affirmed the bank's B1
senior unsecured local- and foreign-currency debt ratings, its B2
subordinated local currency debt ratings and Ba2.kz national
scale rating. The outlook on Kaspi Bank's BFSR and long-term
deposit ratings remains stable while the outlook on the bank's
debt ratings was changed to negative from stable.

Ratings Rationale

The affirmation of Kaspi Bank's ratings reflects its leading
position in Kazakhstan's consumer lending segment and strong loss
absorption cushion. As at year-end 2013, the bank's Tier 1
capital adequacy and total capital adequacy ratios stood at 13.1%
and 17.3%, respectively, with coverage of non-performing loans
(loans overdue by 90 days) at 111% of loan loss reserves. Moody's
also notes the bank's strong profitability. Kaspi Bank reported
return on average assets of 5.4% in 2013 because of the rapid
expansion in high-margin consumer loans and credit cards that was
aided by the highly efficient operational and distribution
platform. Against this background, Kaspi Bank is comfortably
positioned to withstand increasing competition as more players
enter into this rapidly expanding segment. Kaspi Bank is
currently Kazakhstan's largest loan originator in the segment of
"high-margin/high risk" consumer loans.

At the same time, Moody's notes that despite the recently
introduced regulatory measures to limit Kazakhstan banks'
expansion into consumer lending, household indebtedness has been
rapidly increasing over recent years and will continue to build
up. Moody's expects consumer loans to grow by 25% in 2014, which
is considerably above the average growth in disposable income.
The rating agency also expects that the one-off local currency
devaluation in February 2014 will negatively weigh on households'
disposable income and their ability to service debts. Moody's
expects increasing provisioning needs for Kaspi Bank in the next
12 to 18 months that will exert negative pressure on the bank's
profitability and might render its franchise vulnerable. These
expectations are based on: (1) the above-mentioned asset quality
risks; (2) the bank's loan performance in 2013 (overdue retail
loans increased year-on-year to 21.0% from 17.8%); and (3) the
bank's management data of the most recent retail loan
performance. The change of the outlook on the bank's debt ratings
to negative from stable was triggered by above-mentioned trends
and by Kaspi Bank's almost total reliance on consumer lending for
revenue.

Kaspi Bank's previous rapid loan growth (that was predominantly
funded by retail deposits) resulted in the bank's growing market
share in deposits and indicates an increasing probability of
systemic support for depositors, in case of need. Kaspi Bank's
market share in retail deposits increased to 10.3% at year-end
2013 from 9.3% at year-end 2012 and 8.1% at year-end 2011 (source
of data: National Bank of Kazakhstan). Moody's expectation of
higher probability of systemic support is counterbalanced by the
rating agency's assessment of the bank's asset quality risks;
therefore, the outlook on Kaspi Bank's deposit ratings remains
stable. Moody's asses a very low probability of support to
Kazakhstan banks' bondholders from the government, as evidenced
by the bail-in of a few large failed banks in the past several
years when only depositors were supported.

What Could Change the Rating Down/Up

Kaspi Bank's long-term debt ratings might be downgraded as a
result of accelerated deterioration in asset quality or
profitability, and/or a decline of the bank's capital buffer. The
bank's BFSR and deposit ratings carry stable outlook but might be
downgraded in case of deterioration in the bank's standalone
credit profile or a decline of the bank's systemic importance as
measured by market share in deposits.

Kaspi Bank's debt ratings carry negative outlook that might be
revised back to stable were the bank's credit fundamental to
exhibit strong resilience in the next 12 to 18 months. The
upgrade of the deposit ratings will be contingent on the bank's
ability to further develop its franchise and increase its market
share, whilst also maintaining a healthy capital buffer and
adequate risk appetite.


=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================


GO PLANET: Insolvency to Affect 900 Tourists
--------------------------------------------
The Baltic Course reports that the director of the Lithuanian
State Tourism Department said Lithuanian travel agency Go Planet
Travel's insolvency will affect some 900 tourists, but officials
are taking steps to resolve the situation.

"We have notified the prime minister about the situation, which
has been brought under control. It was found out Sunday night
that there are 902 contracts with obligations to tourists that
have not been met. Now we will ask an audit company to make
calculations relating to the obligations that have not been
fulfilled. The most important thing is that problems with people
have been resolved," she told LRT Radio on July 7, the Baltic
Course relates.

The report notes that due to insolvency the activities of
Lithuanian tour operator Go Planet Travel were suspended.
Tourists, who had to fly to Crete on Friday, have not left
Vilnius.

The Baltic Course, citing LETA/ELTA, says the Lithuanian State
Department of Tourism has informed that measures have been taken
to solve the problem related to 143 adults and 4 children, who
arrived in Antalya on Friday morning but were not admitted in
hotels.

The head of the Department Raimonda Balniene has contacted
Lithuania's Ambassador Kestutis Kudzmanas in Turkey to solve this
issue, the report adds.

Go Planet Travel was established in July 2013. It belongs to
tourism holding Grand Go Group Ltd.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ESPIRITO SANTO: May Seek Creditor Protection if Debt Talks Fail
---------------------------------------------------------------
Bloomberg News, citing Diario Economico, reports that Espirito
Santo International SA is considering making a request for
protection from creditors in Luxembourg if it can't reach a debt
renegotiation agreement with its main creditors.

According to Bloomberg, the paper said that a plan to sell assets
and renegotiate debt will be voted on at a shareholder meeting of
ES International on July 29.

Espirito Santo International S.A., through its subsidiaries,
provides services which include corporate and retail banking,
insurance, investment banking, brokerage, asset management, and
also operates in the agriculture, hotel, and real estate
industry.  The company was formerly known as Espirito Santo
International Holding S.A. and changed its name to Espirito Santo
International S.A. in August 2003.  The company was incorporated
in 1975 and is based in Luxembourg.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BRIT INSURANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Subordinated Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Brit Insurance Holdings B.V.'s Long-
term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB+' with a Stable Outlook
and its subordinated notes at 'BB+'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect the solid financial profile of the Brit group
(Brit), which is supported by strong risk-adjusted capitalization
and underlying earnings.  The group reported an overall profit
after tax for 2013 of GBP101.7 million (2012: GBP84.7 million).
The reported combined ratio, excluding FX effects, was 85.2%
(2012: 93.2%), which was assisted by a continued benign
catastrophe environment.

Fitch views positively Brit's streamlined operational structure,
writing solely through Lloyd's of London (Lloyd's) as a dedicated
global specialty insurer and reinsurer, and rebalancing of the
underwriting portfolio to focus on short tail direct insurance
and profitable specialty lines.  As a result of these changes,
Brit's financial performance has improved, with the attritional
loss ratio on an accident year basis falling to 51.3% in 2013
from 64.2% in 2009.

Fitch views the level of investment risk as high for the ratings.
Brit has increased its exposure to both equity and credit
markets, as the market environment in Europe and the US continues
to stabilize, in an effort to increase the investment yield on
its assets.  This has resulted in increased investment risk as
measured by a risky assets (non-investment grade bonds,
unaffiliated equities and investments in affiliates)-to- equity
ratio of 82% at end-2013, which is high compared with peers.

Brit's initial public offering (IPO), which returned 25% of the
company to public ownership, was a natural progression for the
insurer, which removes some uncertainty around the possibility
and nature of a return to public ownership.  Fitch recognizes the
improvements that have been made to Brit's underwriting
performance since the company was taken into private ownership
and views the IPO as a marginal credit positive.  Fitch will
closely monitor Brit's post-IPO profile, specifically in relation
to the size and timing of any further share sales, dividend
strategy and overall capitalization.

Brit continues to be majority-owned by Achilles Netherlands
Holdings B.V, a holding company majority owned by funds managed
by Apollo Management VII, L.P. and funds advised by CVC Capital
Partners Ltd.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A combined ratio consistently above 97%, or a marked shift
towards a higher-risk investment portfolio as represented by a
risky assets-to-equity ratio greater than 100%, could lead to a
downgrade.  Catastrophic events leading to significant
underwriting losses relative to Brit's peer group could also lead
to downgrade.

A decrease in investment risk as measured by a risky assets-to-
equity ratio of less than 50%, coupled with maintenance of
current strong underwriting performance, could lead to an
upgrade.


CADOGAN SQUARE III: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. D Notes From Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Cadogan Square CLO III B.V.:

  EUR36.10M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to
  Aa3 (sf)

  EUR27.50M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011
  Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  EUR30M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR7M (currently EUR4.29M outstanding Rated Balance) Class X
  Combination Notes due 2023, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
  Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Cadogan Square CLO III B.V.:

  EUR342.65M (current outstanding amount of EUR241.80M) Class A
  Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR18.75M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Sep 20, 2011 Upgraded
  to B1 (sf)

Cadogan Square CLO III B.V., issued in December 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Credit Suisse International. The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in January 2013.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement in over-collateralization (OC) ratios since in the
January 2014 payment date and the deleveraging of the Class A
notes following amortization of the underlying portfolio. The
Class A notes have paid down by approximately EUR44.9 million in
the last 7 months so that the 70.6% of the closing balance
remains. As a result of the deleveraging, the over-
collateralization (OC) ratios of the tranches have increased.
According to the May 2014 trustee report the OC ratios of Classes
A/B, C, D and E are 136.7%, 124.4%, 113.3%, 107.3% compared to
126.8%, 116.9%, 107.6%, 102.6% respectively in December 2013.

The rating on the combination notes addresses the repayment of
the rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the
Class X notes, the 'rated balance' at any time is equal to the
principal amount of the combination note on the issue date times
a rated coupon of 0.25% per annum accrued on the rated balance on
the preceding payment date, minus the sum of all payments made
from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. The rated balance will not necessarily correspond to
the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR370 million,
a weighted average default probability of 19.9% (consistent with
a WARF of 2830), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
58.8%for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 40
and a weighted average spread of 4.34%.

In its base case, Moody's addresses the exposure to obligors
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk bond
ceilings (LCCs) of A1 or lower. Given that the portfolio has
exposures to 3% of obligors in Italy, whose LCC is A2 and 8.4% in
Spain, whose LCC is A1, Moody's ran the model with different par
amounts depending on the target rating of each class of notes, in
accordance with Section 4.2.11 and Appendix 14 of the
methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the
rated notes, and amount to 0.58% for the Classes A and B notes,
0.36% for the Class C notes and 0% for the Classes D and E notes.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 89.3% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average spread in the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the weighted
average spread by 30bp; the model generated outputs that were
within one notch of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Around 27% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


CADOGAN SQUARE IV: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. X Notes From Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Cadogan Square CLO IV B.V.:

  EUR343.75M (current outstanding amount of EUR 286.87M) Class A
  Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023 Notes, Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  EUR25M Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023
  Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2011
  Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  EUR15M Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2023
  Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2011
  Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  EUR22.50M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2011
  Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  EUR26.25M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Oct 18,
  2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR3M (currently EUR2.04M Outstanding Rated Balance) Class X
  Combination Notes due 2023 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
  previously on Oct 18, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Cadogan Square CLO IV B.V.:

  EUR18.75M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2023 Notes, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 18, 2011
  Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Cadogan Square CLO IV B.V., issued in May 2007, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Credit Suisse International. The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in July 2013.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement in over-collateralization (OC) ratios since the
January 2014 payment date and the deleveraging of the Class A
notes following amortization of the underlying portfolio. The
Class A notes have paid down by approximately EUR35.3 million in
the last 7 months so that the 83% of the closing balance remains.
As a result of the deleveraging, the over-collateralization (OC)
ratios of the tranches have increased. According to the May 2014
trustee report the OC ratios of Classes A/B, C, D and E are
129.6%, 121.2%, 112.7%, 107.4% compared to 123.6%, 116.3%,
108.9%, 104.2% respectively in December 2013.

The rating on the combination notes addresses the repayment of
the rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the
Class X notes, the 'rated balance' at any time is equal to the
principal amount of the combination note on the issue date minus
the sum of all payments made from the issue date to such date, of
either interest or principal. The rated balance will not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR388 million,
a weighted average default probability of 19.8% (consistent with
a WARF of 2722), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
58.4%for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 47
and a weighted average spread of 4.23%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 89.7% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average spread in the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the weighted
average spread by 30bp; the model generated outputs that were
within one notch of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Around 24% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


SELECTA GROUP: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B3 Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) and a B3-PD Probability of Default to Selecta
Group B.V.   Concurrently, it has assigned a definitive B2 rating
to its dual tranche EUR350 million and CHF245 million senior
secured notes due 2020 and a definitive Ba3 rating to its EUR50
million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) due 2019,
following receipt of final documentation and completion of the
company's refinancing, including the repayment of its previous
bank indebtedness. The outlook remains stable.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive ratings for the CFR, senior secured notes and
RCF are in line with the provisional ratings assigned on 10 June
2014. Moody's rating rationale was set out in a press release on
that date. The final terms of the notes and RCF were in line with
the drafts reviewed for the provisional instrument rating
assignments.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Selecta will
maintain its current operating performance, will stabilize its
revenues and not incur material contract losses, and that
industry conditions will not further deteriorate. Moody's also
expects that the company will continue to pursue its organic
growth strategy and make no material debt-funded acquisitions,
adhering to its financial policy of investing any excess cash in
the business and in de-leveraging.

What Could Change the Rating Up

There could be positive pressure if the conditions for a stable
outlook are met and if Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio falls
below 5.5x on a sustained basis and the company maintains a
Moody's-adjusted EBITDA margin of around 30%, whilst generating
positive free cash flow and keeping a solid liquidity profile.
Any potential upgrade would also include an assessment of market
conditions.

What Could Change the Rating Down

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if any of the conditions for
maintaining a stable outlook are not met, or if the company's
margins, liquidity profile or debt protection ratios deteriorate
as the result of a weakening of its operational performance.
Quantitatively, Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the
company's Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio rises towards 7x or
if the company fails to generate free cash flow.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Selecta Group B.V., registered in The Netherlands, is the leading
operator of vending machines in Europe by revenue, with
operations in 21 countries across Europe and leading market
shares in its key markets of Switzerland, Sweden and France. For
the year ended September 30, 2013, the company reported revenues
of EUR740 million. Selecta is ultimately owned by Allianz Capital
Partners, the in-house investment platform for alternative
investments of the Allianz Group, with an investment volume of
approximately EUR9.2 billion as of December 31, 2013.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO BPI: S&P Raises Non-deferrable Sub. Debt Rating to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'B' from 'B-' its
issue ratings on the non-deferrable subordinated debt issued by
Banco BPI S.A.  At the same time, S&P raised the ratings on BPI's
preferred stock to 'B-' from 'D'.

The rating action follows BPI's announcement on June 25, 2014,
that it had repaid in full the contingent convertible capital
instruments subscribed by the government.  BPI initially received
EUR1.5 billion through issuing government-subscribed hybrids in
2012, and has now repaid the remaining EUR420 million.

Therefore, S&P now anticipates that an EU restriction on coupon
payments for non-deferrable debt and preferred stock is unlikely.
As a result, S&P has upgraded the non-deferrable debt to 'B', two
notches below BPI's stand-alone credit profile (SACP).  This is
in line with our standard approach for these instruments.

In addition, S&P has reviewed its issue ratings on the preference
shares still outstanding after the completion of the tender offer
described.  S&P anticipates that BPI will resume paying interest
on these shares on the next scheduled date, Aug. 12, 2014.  S&P
has therefore raised the ratings to 'B-' from 'D'; that is, three
notches below the SACP, in line with S&P's standard approach for
preference shares.

The repayment of the hybrid instrument does not affect S&P's
risk-adjusted capital measure for the bank.  As a result, the
rating actions do not affect S&P's counterparty credit ratings or
outlook on BPI.  In contrast with the regulatory approach, under
S&P's criteria, the contingent convertible instruments subscribed
by the government did not qualify for equity credit because they
had short residual lives and the annual step-ups provided an
incentive to redeem them.


ESPIRITO SANTO: Moody's Lowers Issuer & Debt Ratings to 'Caa2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term issuer and
debt ratings of Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A. (ESFG) to
Caa2 from B2. The entity's ratings remain on review for downgrade
and the short-term ratings have been affirmed at Not Prime.

The downgrade reflects Moody's view of a higher credit risk
profile for ESFG following the increase in ESFG's exposure to its
indirect shareholders (Espirito Santo International (ESI) and
Rioforte, both unrated) which it disclosed on July 3, 2014.
Moody's concerns regarding ESFG's creditworthiness are heightened
by the lack of transparency around both the Espirito Santo
Group's financial position and the extent of intra-group linkages
including ESFG's direct and indirect exposure to ESI.

Ratings Rationale

--- Lowering Of The Issuer Ratings

The three notch downgrade of ESFG's issuer and long-term debt
ratings to Caa2, reflects the entity's deteriorating credit risk
profile following the increase in its exposure to ESI and
Rioforte to EUR2.35 billion at end-June 2014 from EUR1.37 billion
at year-end 2013. The financial troubles of these two companies
have been the catalyst for the weakening of ESFG's
creditworthiness in recent months. ESFG had already raised a
EUR700 million provision at end-December 2013 against possible
losses stemming from its commitment to safeguard retail customers
of Banco Espirito Santo, S.A. (BES, Ba3/E+/b1 review for
downgrade) against any losses experienced on their holdings of
ESI's commercial paper. While that indirect exposure has
diminished in recent months as the commercial paper has matured,
ESFG's direct lending exposure to ESI and Rioforte has increased
significantly over the period.

As well as heightening EFSG's vulnerability to the default of
these companies, the increase raises concerns that its exposure
may increase still further over the coming months, whether
through direct lending or as a result of any further obligations
stemming from Espirito Santo Group debt for which ESFG might
choose to assume liability. Those concerns are magnified by the
lack of transparency around the financial position of ESI and the
lack of information from the Espirito Santo group on the extent
of intra-group linkages including ESFG's direct and indirect
exposure to ESI.

The continued review for downgrade of ESFG's rating will attempt
to address that opacity and to obtain the information needed to
understand the full extent of ESFG's current and potential future
exposure to other parts of the Espirito Santo Group, and the
risks associated with that exposure. The downward bias of the
review reflects the downside risks to ESFG's rating that could
stem from the conclusion of the review for downgrade of its
operating company BES as well as the potential for its credit
profile to deteriorate still further should more support need to
be provided to any other Espirito Santo Group interests. The
review of ESFG's issuer rating will also focus on (1) impact of
the restructuring plan of the Espirito Santo Group, and (2) the
implications of the change in the scope of supervision by Bank of
Portugal announced on 5 July 2014 from ESFG to its operating
company BES.

The increase in the rating differential between ESFG and its
operating company BES to four notches reflects the rising risks
to creditors highlighted above as well as the structural
subordination of ESFG's creditors to those of the bank.

Downgrade of Subordinated Debt and Hybrid Ratings

The downgrade of ESFG's long-term issuer rating to Caa2 and
further review for downgrade, has prompted the downgrade to Caa3
and further review for downgrade of its subordinated debt ratings
and to C(hyb) of its preference shares.

What Could Change the Rating Down/Up

The ratings remain on review for downgrade, indicating downward
pressure. In addition, a lowering of BES's stand alone credit
assessment would likely lead to a downgrade of ESFG's issuer
rating.

Upward pressure on ESFG's ratings is unlikely given the current
review for downgrade.

List of Affected Ratings

Downgrades:

Issuer: ESFG International Limited

  Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, Downgraded to
  C(hyb) from Caa2(hyb)

Issuer: Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A.

  Issuer Rating, Downgraded to Caa2 from B2; Placed Under Review
  for further Downgrade

  Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
  (P)Caa2 from (P)B2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
  (P)Caa3 from (P)B3; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa3 from B3;
  Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Senior Unsecured Conv./Exch. Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa2
  from B2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Issuer: Espirito Santo Financiere S.A.

  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
  (P)Caa2 from (P)B2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Jun, Downgraded to Caa2
  from B2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Affirmations:

Issuer: Banco Espirito Santo N. A. Capital, LLC

Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

Issuer: Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A.

Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

Issuer: Espirito Santo Financiere S.A.

Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Issuer: Espirito Santo Plc

Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

Outlooks:

Unchanged at Rating Under Review:

Issuer: Espirito Santo Financial Group S.A.

Issuer: Espirito Santo Financiere S.A.

No Outlook:

Issuer: Banco Espirito Santo N. A. Capital, LLC

Issuer: Espirito Santo Plc

Issuer: ESFG International Limited



===========
R U S S I A
===========


MDM BANK: Moody's Cuts Deposit & Sr. Unsecured Debt Ratings to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded MDM Bank's long-term
deposit ratings and local-currency senior unsecured debt rating
to B2 from B1. The bank's E+ standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) was affirmed, but the baseline credit assessment
(BCA) was lowered to b2 (from b1). Moody's has also affirmed the
Not-Prime short-term deposit ratings. The outlook on the bank's
long-term ratings is negative while the standalone E+ BFSR
carries a stable outlook.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of MDM Bank's long-term ratings reflects: (1) the
bank's recently weak financial results; (2) persistently high
level of problem loans with, in Moody's view, uncertain recovery
prospects for some large credit exposures that are insufficiently
provisioned; and (3) the recent decline in interest-bearing
loans.

As a result of significant credit losses, MDM Bank reported a
loss (audited IFRS) of RUB13.3 billion for the full year 2013
that materially eroded the bank's capital cushion and triggered a
decline in the Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio (Basel I) to 13.4%
from 16.9% as at year-end 2012, which, however, still remains
stronger than its peers. Moody's notes the bank's pro-active
approach to reducing the volume of problem loans through (1)
sales of loans; (2) loan write-offs; and (3) repossession of
collateral. However, the gross volume of MDM Bank's problem loans
(including impaired loans to corporate customers and 90+ days
overdue loans to individuals) amounted to RUB71 billion (under
unaudited IFRS) as at Q1 2014 (year-end 2012: RUB69 billion;
audited IFRS).

In the past year, MDM Bank's coverage of problem loans with loan
loss reserves has increased. As at Q1 2014, this metric stood at
51% compared to 42% at year-end 2012, but Moody's notes that this
coverage might not be sufficient. The difference between the
gross volume of problem loans and loan loss reserves was RUB34
billion as at year-end 2013. Moody's analysis of the bank's
largest problem exposures indicates a risk that further
provisions might be required, particularly if the operating
environment were to deteriorate further, rendering MDM Bank's
capital profile vulnerable.

Moody's believes that although MDM Bank's pre-provision income
improved in 2013, it remains modest for a Russian bank (2013:
2.4% of average risk-weighted assets), and the rating agency
expects this ratio to decline given the contraction of MDM bank's
interest-earning loans in 2013. Moody's assumes that the
provisioning needs on MDM Bank's currently performing loan book
in 2014 will match the pre-provision income, thereby preventing
the bank from generating capital this year.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down

MDM Bank's ratings have limited upside potential, as captured in
the negative outlook. The rating outlook can be changed to stable
if the macroeconomic environment improves and/or the bank
eliminates risks of capital erosion by improving its risk-
adjusted profitability and by decreasing the volume of problem
loans and/or increasing coverage of problem loans with loan loss
reserves.

MDM Bank's ratings could be further downgraded if its problem
loans require higher loan loss provisioning than currently
anticipated by Moody's, or if the deterioration in the domestic
operating environment negatively affects the bank's financial
fundamentals.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, MDM Bank reported total
(unaudited IFRS) assets of RUB261.6 billion and shareholder
equity of RUB35.9 billion at March 31, 2014. For the first three
months of 2014, the bank earned a net income of RUB319 million.


PROMSVYAZBANK: Moody's Puts Ba3 Ratings on Review for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade
Promsvyazbank's Ba3 long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit
ratings, its Ba3 senior unsecured debt ratings, B1 subordinated
debt rating and standalone D- bank financial strength rating
(BFSR).

Concurrently, Moody's placed on review for downgrade the
following credit ratings on Promsvyazbank:

-- The provisional (P) Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Notes
    Programme (foreign currency) rating of (P)Ba3

-- Subordinated Medium-Term Notes Programme (foreign currency)
    rating of (P)B1

The rating action was triggered by (1) the negative trends in
Promsvyazbank's asset quality and earnings-generating capacity in
H2 2013 and Q1 2014; and (2) the bank's relatively weak loss-
absorption buffer, as reflected in its modest capital cushion and
low loan loss reserves compared to the volume of problem loans.

Moody's review will seek to obtain greater clarity on (1)
Promsvyazbank's ability to raise new capital over the next three
months as planned; (2) the bank's asset quality dynamics; and (3)
the sustainability of its earnings-generating capacity.

Promsvyazbank's Not-Prime short-term local- and foreign-currency
deposit ratings are not affected by this review and remain
unchanged. Concurrently, the (P)Not Prime rating of
Promsvyazbank's Short-Term Notes Programme (foreign currency)
also remains unchanged.

Ratings Rationale

The key drivers behind the review for downgrade of
Promsvyazbank's ratings are: (1) the negative trends in the
bank's asset quality and earnings-generating capacity in H2 2013
and Q1 2014; and (2) the bank's relatively weak loss-absorption
buffer, as reflected in its modest capital cushion and low loan
loss reserves compared to the volume of problem loans.

As of Q1 2014, Promsvyazbank's problem loans (NPLs overdue by
more than 90 days, and impaired corporate and SME loans that are
either not past-due, or less than 90 days past due) increased to
11.4% of gross loans from 9.0% as of H1 2013. The resulting
increase in provisioning charges through the profit and loss
account pushed the bank into losses in Q4 2013 and Q1 2014.

Promsvyazbank's healthy pre-provision income (around 3% of
average assets in 2010-13) has historically been the bank's first
line of defense against asset quality deterioration and a key
supporting factor for its credit profile. Moody's notes that in
Q1 2014 Promsvyazbank reported a significant 17% gap between
interest income accrued and received in cash. This differential
was partly attributed to rouble depreciation and other technical
factors, but also partly stemmed from the increased proportion of
problem loans on the bank's balance sheet.

Following two consecutive quarters of net losses and the rapid
loan growth in Q1 2014 (up 9.6% compared to year-end 2013),
Promsvyazbank's 13.1% total capital adequacy ratio and 8.5% Tier
1 ratio under Basel I are rather thin, and therefore insufficient
to address any potential further asset quality deterioration.
Moreover, the bank's regulatory capital adequacy ratio (N1.0) of
10.4% as of 1 June 2014 was just marginally above the 10% minimum
requirement.

Promsvyazbank's loan loss reserves as a proportion of gross loans
was at 4.9% as of Q1 2014; and, in Moody's opinion, this ratio is
low in the context of the bank's (1) NPLs, which accounted for
4.0% of gross loans; and (2) impaired corporate and SME loans
that are not past-due, or less than 90 days past due, which
accounted for 7.4% of gross loans.

What Could Move the Ratings Down/Up

Moody's would downgrade Promsvyazbank's ratings (1) if the bank
fails to improve its capital adequacy in the next three months;
or (2) as a result of any significant negative pressure on asset
quality and/or pre-provision income over the same time period.

While an upgrade is unlikely given the current review for
downgrade, Moody's would confirm Promsvyazbank's ratings at their
current levels if the bank strengthens its capital adequacy to a
sufficient extent, while also demonstrating an ability to
stabilize its asset quality and sustain its strong pre-provision
income generation.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Promsvyazbank reported total
(unaudited IFRS) assets of RUB777 billion (US$21.8 billion) and
shareholder equity of RUB64 billion (US$1.8 billion) at Q1 2014.
The bank reported net income of RUB4.0 billion (US$124 million)
for 2013 under audited IFRS.


RENAISSANCE FINANCIAL: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Ratings; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'B/B' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
Bermuda-registered Renaissance Financial Holdings Ltd. (RFHL),
the full owner of several companies that form the Russia-based
investment group Renaissance Capital (RenCap).  The outlook is
stable.

The affirmation reflects S&P's balanced view of the deteriorating
environment to which RenCap is exposed and the group's gradually
improving financial risk profile and lower risk appetite.  The
group has taken significant steps to cut operating expenses and
sell its noncore assets.

In 2013, the group returned to profitability for the first time
in four years, showing a bottom-line profit of US$14 million
(compared with a US$378 million loss in 2012).  The improvement
was primarily the result of:

   -- Lower operating expenses, mainly due a 27% reduction in
      staff in 2013;

   -- Higher net trading income -- improved business flows and
      decreased proprietary equity positions meant that the group
      suffered minimal losses, even when the Russian stock market
      fell by more than 10% on March 3, 2014; and

   -- Lower restructuring and impairment costs.

In addition, last year RenCap sold almost US$200 million of
noncore assets.  The remaining large equity holdings (US$223
million in Ukrainian agriculture business and US$46 million in
Kenyan land) and intragroup loans (US$750 million) continue to
weigh on the company's capital.  S&P understands that RenCap is
taking steps to sell the remaining noncore assets, but the
process is lengthy and complex, especially in the current
environment.  S&P notes that Ukrainian investment may suffer from
significant revaluation losses, given the current instability in
that country.

The group continues to operate in a challenging market
environment, with low investor interest for emerging markets risk
and increasing competitive pressures from Russian state-owned and
international investment banks.  The ratings are also constrained
by RenCap's residual large intragroup loans.  S&P notes that
RenCap's financial profile has limited funding flexibility due to
significant asset encumbrance and maturity mismatches.  As of
year-end 2013, 85% of RFHL's total liabilities were due within
one month, but only 64% of assets had similar short-term
maturities, which exposes the group to ongoing refinancing risk.

S&P acknowledges that RFHL's creditworthiness benefits from
ongoing and potential extraordinary support from its 100%
shareholder, the Russian investment fund ONEXIM Group.  In April
2014, for example, RenCap used a US$185 million liquidity line
from ONEXIM to redeem US$200 million midterm notes.  S&P
understands that ONEXIM has publicly stated its willingness to
support RenCap in case of need.

RFHL is the non-operating holding company of a group of
geographically diverse fully owned operating entities, some of
which are not regulated or are subject to what S&P views as
"loose" regulation.  S&P rates RFHL at the level of the group
credit profile because there is no debt to creditors outside the
group at the holding level and S&P believes that there are no
material restrictions preventing the operating entities from
upstreaming cash to RFHL.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, under current
ownership, RenCap will maintain a lower risk appetite and
continue to seek opportunities to divest its large equity
holdings and further reduce intragroup loans.

S&P could consider lowering the ratings if the operating
environment worsens, which could put pressure on the group's
capital, liquidity, and business flows.

An upgrade appears unlikely at this stage.  However, S&P would
consider raising the ratings if it saw a material strengthening
of the group's capital position.


SURGUT: S&P Raises ICR From 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term issuer
credit rating to 'BBB-' from 'BB+' on Russia's City of Surgut.
The outlook is negative.

S&P also raised the Russia national scale rating on Surgut to
'ruAAA' from 'ruAA+'.

As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 [EU CRA Regulation]),
the ratings on Surgut are subject to certain publication
restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation,
including publication in accordance with a pre-established
calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the
announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and
must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for
the deviation.  In this case, the deviation has been caused by
the application of S&P's revised criteria for rating non-U.S.
local and regional governments, as more fully described in the
following Rationale.

RATIONALE

S&P raised the ratings on Surgut because it revised upward its
view of the city's liquidity, which S&P now assess as
"exceptional" under S&P's revised criteria, versus "very strong"
previously.  Surgut's average cash continues to exceed its debt
service needs within one year, and in line with S&P's new
criteria, S&P has removed the negative adjustment for "limited"
access to the external liquidity that S&P previously applied.
S&P also revised its view on contingent liabilities to "very low"
from "low" given that S&P estimates Surgut's exposure to fully or
partially owned companies at less than 5% of city's revenues.

The ratings on Surgut are constrained by S&P's view of Russia's
"volatile and unbalanced" institutional framework, the city's
weak budgetary flexibility and predictability, and weak economy.
S&P views the city's financial management as "satisfactory" for
the rating.  S&P assess that the city has an average budgetary
performance, very low debt burden, exceptional liquidity, and
very low contingent liabilities, which all support the ratings.

Surgut's economic wealth is well above the Russian average
because of oil production in the surrounding region.  However,
the city's economic and tax base is concentrated on the oil
industry, which exposes its budgeted revenues to volatility.  A
single enterprise, one of Russia's largest oil producers
Surgutneftegas, employs about 15% of the city's workforce and
accounts for more than 35% of its tax revenues, primarily via
personal income tax (PIT) paid by its employees.  S&P expects
that over the long term the city's economic growth will stagnate
as mature oil fields gradually deplete.  In S&P's view, Surgut's
budgetary flexibility and predictability is also limited by its
dependence on the decisions of the federal government and of
Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug (KMAO) regarding municipal
revenues and spending responsibilities. About 90% of total
revenues are not regulated by the city.  Also, the predictability
of the okrug's decisions is limited.  KMAO sets an additional
share of PIT that the city receives on top of what is outlined in
the federal budget code.  This share is fixed in KMAO's three-
year budget, and S&P estimates it at about 25% of the city's
operating revenues in 2014.  If KMAO were under continued
financial pressure, it could decrease this share, which would
restrict Surgut's budgeted revenues.

In S&P's base case, it expects that over the next three years
Surgut's continued economic and revenue growth will support
moderate budgetary performance.  S&P forecasts the average
operating margin at about 1% of operating revenues over 2014-
2016, compared with 4% posted over 2011-2013.  S&P also believes
that cofinancing and direct investment in Surgut's infrastructure
from higher-tier budgets should support its balance after capital
accounts and translate into only moderate deficits of about 2%-3%
of total revenues over 2014-2016, after a wide 10% deficit in
2013 and an average 1.5% over 2011-2013.  S&P also thinks that
Surgut's infrastructure is already of better quality than average
in Russia, so if needed it could cut the self-financed part of
its capital program, which is equal to about 7% of total
expenditures.

"Under our base-case scenario, we therefore assume that Surgut
will incur only modest new borrowing and that tax-supported debt
will remain low over the medium term.  We forecast that tax-
supported debt will remain below 10% of consolidated operating
revenues until the end of 2016 and will mostly consist of medium-
term bank loans that the city incurs and repays gradually.  We
include in tax-supported debt guarantees that Surgut has provided
for local water, sewage, and housing construction projects, and
minor debt of city-owned companies.  In our view, the amount of
outstanding contingent liabilities is limited because Surgut has
little involvement in the local economy," S&P noted.

S&P sees Surgut's financial management practices as satisfactory
for its creditworthiness in a global context.  In S&P's view, the
city has a good track record of implementing a cautious financial
policy, a conservative approach to debt management, and strict
control over its revenue and expenditure balance, especially
compared with Russian peers.

Liquidity

S&P considers Surgut's liquidity to be "exceptional" as its
criteria define the term.  In line with S&P's base-case scenario,
it expects that the city's average cash reserves net of the
deficit after capital accounts will exceed its very low debt
service falling due in the next 12 months by more than 8x.

Over the past 12 months, Surgut's cash stood at Russian ruble
(RUB)2.4 billion (about US$70 million) on average.  By the end of
2013, the city had spent a large portion of its reserves to
finance its capital program.  S&P forecasts that average cash net
of the deficit after capital accounts will equal about RUB2.2
billion (approximately US$63 million) through the next 12 months
and will exceed the debt service upcoming in the next 12 months
by about 8x.

In 2014 and 2015, the city might spend a portion of its cash, but
average cash will likely continue to significantly exceed the
city's debt service.  S&P forecasts that debt service will remain
low, at about 2% of operating revenues, thanks to limited
borrowing and medium-term maturities with a very gradual
repayment schedule.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on Surgut reflects that on Russia,
indicating that S&P could lower its rating on the city if it
lowered its long-term rating on Russia, all else remaining equal.

S&P could take a negative rating action if the city moved away
from its cautious financial management, resulting in a
deterioration of the city's budgetary performance, more
aggressive debt and liquidity management, and potential depletion
of its cash reserves in 2014-2015.  In S&P's downside scenario,
it assumes a persistently negative operating balance, deficits
after capital accounts of more than 5% of total revenues, and
weakening liquidity due to short-term debt accumulation.

S&P would likely revise the outlook on Surgut to stable, all else
being equal, if it revised the outlook on Russia to stable, and
if Surgut's performance remained within its base-case scenario.
S&P currently sees no upside rating potential.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.

RATINGS LIST

Upgraded
                                        To                 From
Surgut (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating          BBB-/Negative/--   BB+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale         ruAAA/--/--        ruAA+/--/--



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


NOVA KREDITNA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' IDR; Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor (NKBM) and
Nova Ljubljanska Banka's (NLB) Viability Ratings (VR) to 'b' from
'b-', and removed them from Rating Watch Positive (RWP).  The
banks' support-driven Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) have
been affirmed at 'BB-' with Negative Outlooks.

At the same time, Fitch has maintained Abanka Vipa's (Abanka)
'B-' Long-term IDR on RWP pending further expected
recapitalization measures by the Slovenian government.  Banka
Koper's Long-term IDR has been affirmed at 'BBB', reflecting
support from the bank's 100% owner, Intesa San Paolo
(BBB+/Stable).

KEY RATING DRIVERS: NKBM AND NLB's VRs

The upgrades of NLB and NKBM's VRs follow Fitch's review of the
impact of state aid measures.  In particular, the upgrades
reflect the banks' increased loss absorption capacity following
their recapitalization by the Slovenian government in December
2013.  The VRs are also supported by the banks' comfortable
liquidity positions.  However, the ratings are constrained by the
banks' still weak asset quality and expected subdued performance.

At end-1Q14, NKBM's and NLB's impaired loans ratios, defined by
Fitch as loans in regulatory categories C, D and E, stood at 47%
and 41%, respectively.  Loans overdue by 90 days or more stood at
28% at NKBM and 18.6% at NLB.  The still high levels of problem
exposures after the transfers of bad assets to the state-owned
Bad Asset Management Company (BAMC) in December 2013 reflect the
fact that some impaired loans were not eligible for transfer
(such as loans originated after September 2012 or below
EUR500,000) and banks' decisions to work out some eligible
exposures themselves. In Fitch's view, any improvement in asset
quality is likely to be slow given moderate growth prospects for
the economy and high levels of corporate debt.  However, the
agency believes a further marked increase in impaired loan
recognition as a result of the 2014 Asset Quality Review or
Stress Tests is unlikely, given the review which the banks were
subjected to in 2013.

NKBM and NLB's Tier 1 ratios were 19.4% and 16%, respectively, at
end-1Q14.  Fitch calculates that at that date the banks could
have increased specific reserve coverage of impaired loans to 67%
from 45% (NKBM), and to 63% from 51% (NLB) before their Tier 1
ratios would have fallen to 10%.  This represents significant
loss absorption capacity in the agency's view, although the
banks' solvency could still come under pressure in case of weak
recoveries on impaired exposures and/or a moderate further
increase in bad debts.

The banks' internal capital generation capacity is likely to be
modest at best as a result of revenue and asset quality pressures
in the difficult operating environment.  The banks' annualized
1Q14 pre-impairment profit was equal to 1.5% (NLB) and 1.6%
(NKBM) of average assets, although interest income accrued but
not received in cash was moderate, suggesting reasonable quality
of reported revenues.  Both banks expect limited (but positive)
net income for 2014 as pre-impairment results will largely be
channeled into strengthening loan provisions.

Liquidity buffers are robust representing over one-third of total
assets at end-1Q14 at both banks, and comfortably covered both
banks' refinancing needs to end-2015.  NLB's and NKBM's improved
liquidity positions partly reflect the ECB-eligible debt
securities (issued by the BAMC and guaranteed by the Slovenian
sovereign), which they received in return for transferred assets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - NKBM AND NLB's VRs

Renewed deterioration in asset quality, and hence solvency of the
banks could put the VRs under downward pressure.  Upgrades would
likely require significant progress with work outs of problem
loans.

KEY RATING DRIVERS: ABANKA'S IDRS AND VR

Abanka's IDRs are driven by its intrinsic strength, as reflected
in its VR.  The RWP on these ratings reflects expected
improvements in the bank's asset quality and solvency following
completion of the planned second stage of the bank's
recapitalization by the Slovenian government.  This will include
a further equity injection and the transfer of problem assets to
the BAMC, which Fitch understands are likely to be completed in
3Q14.

The agency calculates that the bank's pro-forma (post BAMC
transfer) impaired loans ratio should fall to about 30% (end-
2013: 60%), assuming a transfer of about EUR1 billion gross bad
debts.  The Tier 1 capital ratio should exceed 20% (end-2013: 9%)
assuming about EUR240 million capital injection (initially agreed
with the European Commission).  Consequently, the bank should be
able to increase specific reserve coverage of impaired loans to
around 75% before its Tier 1 capital ratio level would breach
10%. Performance and liquidity metrics are likely to be broadly
in line with those of NLB and NKBM, in Fitch's view.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: ABANKA'S IDRS AND VR

If the support measures go through as currently planned, Fitch is
likely to upgrade Abanka's VR to 'b+' and its Long-term IDR to
'B+'.  The higher VR, relative to NLB and NKBM, would reflect the
bank's significantly better loss absorption capacity, reflected
in a somewhat lower impaired loans ratio, a higher capital ratio
and greater ability to provision problem exposures.  Any
subsequent changes to the bank's ratings would likely be driven
by trends in asset quality, capital and performance ratios.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: IDRS (NLB, NKBM), SUPPORT
RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS (NLB, NKBM, ABANKA)

The Long-term IDRs of NKBM and NLB and Support Ratings (SR) and
Support Rating Floors (SRF) of NKBM, NLB and Abanka continue to
be driven by potential support from the Slovenian authorities.
This reflects their full state ownership, systemic importance
(somewhat lower for Abanka) and their current restructuring in
accordance with state aid procedures.

The Negative Outlooks on NKBM's and NLB's Long-term IDRs reflect
the likelihood of their SRs and SRFs being respectively
downgraded to '5' and revised downwards to 'No Floor' within the
next one to two years.  Consequently, both banks' Long-term IDRs
will most likely be downgraded to the level of their VRs.  This
is based on further progress being made in implementing the
legislative and practical aspects of enabling effective bank
resolution frameworks, which is likely to reduce implicit
sovereign support for banks in the EU.  This is likely to occur
through national implementation of the provisions of the Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive.

NKBM's and NLB's IDRs, SRs and SRFs, and Abanka's SRF, could also
be revised in case of their privatization, which is embedded in
their restructuring plans approved by the European Commission
(approval is still pending in the case of Abanka).  Fitch
understands that NKBM is more likely to be put up for sale first.
However a divestment of the sovereign's stake in any state-owned
bank is likely to be challenging in the near term, due to the
ongoing restructuring process at the banks and the only fragile
economic recovery in Slovenia.

KEY RATING DRIVERS: BK's VR

The affirmation of BK's 'bb' VR reflects the bank's adequate
capitalization, only moderate asset quality problems and deposit
growth, which has strengthened the bank's funding and liquidity.
The VR also reflects the bank's superior risk management
framework, credit underwriting and corporate governance compared
with peers, in part due to its ownership by Intesa.

RATING SENSITIVITIES: BK's VR

There is still some downside risk to the VR in light of the weak
and uncertain operating environment in Slovenia, particularly in
view of the bank's significant single-name concentrations.  BK's
VR could be downgraded in the event of a material deterioration
in asset quality that erodes capital.  An upgrade of the VR is
unlikely in the foreseeable future.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES: BK'S IDRS AND SUPPORT
RATING

The affirmation of BK's Long-term IDR at 'BBB' and Support Rating
at '2' reflects Fitch's view that Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. (Intesa;
BBB+/Stable) will continue to have a strong propensity to support
its subsidiaries in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region,
notwithstanding its primary focus on the Italian market.

The revision of the Outlook on BK's Long-term IDR to Stable from
Negative mirrors the rating action on Intesa.  The upgrade of
BK's Short-term IDR to 'F2' from 'F3' also reflects the change in
Outlook on Intesa, and the strength of potential support from the
parent, underpinned by the latter's own robust liquidity.

The rating actions are as follows:

Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB-' Outlook Negative
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating upgraded to 'b' from b-', removed from RWP
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB-'

Nova Ljubljanska Banka
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB-' Outlook Negative
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating upgraded to 'b' from b-', removed from RWP
Support Rating: affirmed at '3'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BB-'
Senior Unsecured Debt Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'BB-'

Abanka:
Long-Term IDR: 'B-', maintained on RWP
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: 'b-', maintained on RWP
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B-'

Banka Koper:
Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB', Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative
Short-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'F2' from 'F3'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


ANADOLUBANK AS: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB'
------------------------------------------------------------
The agency has affirmed the ratings of Arap Turk Bankasi A.S.
(A&T Bank), BankPozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi A.S., Tekstil
Bankasi A.S. and Turkland Bank A.S.

The Viability Rating (VR) of Anadolubank A.S. was downgraded to
'bb' from 'bb+'.  This resulted in a downgrade of the bank's
Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BB' from 'BB+' and a
downgrade of the Long-term National Rating to 'AA-(tur)' from
'AA(tur)'.  The VR of Alternatifbank A.S. was downgraded to 'b+'
from 'bb' but this did not impact its Long-term IDR and National
Long-term rating which are support-driven.

The Outlook on Sekerbank T.A.S's Long-term IDRs and National
Long-term rating was changed to Negative from Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, VRS AND SUPPORT
RATINGS

Institutional support drives the IDRs and National ratings of
Alternatifbank (74.25% owned by Commercial bank of Qatar --
A/Stable), BankPozitif (around 70% controlled by Bank Hapoalim --
A-/Stable) and Turkland Bank (50% owned by Arab Bank PLC -- BBB-
/Negative).

Alternatifbank and Turkland Bank are viewed as strategically
important subsidiaries for their respective parents.  Turkland
Bank is notched down two levels from Arab Bank PLC's Long-term
Foreign Currency IDR to reflect its 50% ownership.
Alternatifbank's Long-term IDRs are constrained by Turkey's
Country Ceiling of 'BBB'.  The importance of BankPozitif to its
parent bank is considered to be limited because of its small size
and the subsidiary is notched down three levels from the parent's
rating.

Parental support is not formally factored into the IDRs and
National ratings of either A&T Bank, wholly-owned by The Libyan
Foreign Bank which is not rated by Fitch, or Sekerbank, around
34% controlled by Kazakhstan's sovereign wealth fund, Samruk
Kazyna (SK).  SK provides little strategic or operational support
to the bank.

An offer made by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC;
A/Stable) for around 75% of Tekstilbank's shares is awaiting
regulatory approval, expected to be forthcoming by end-2014.  The
Positive Rating Watch (RWP) on Tekstilbank's IDRs, National
rating and Support rating will be resolved if and when ownership
changes.

The IDRs and National ratings of Anadolubank, A&T Bank, Sekerbank
and Tekstilbank are driven by their VRs.  In the case of
Tekstilbank, this may change, pending the potential ownership
change.

The VRs of all seven banks range from 'b+' (Alternatifbank,
Tekstilbank, BankPozitif and Turkland Bank) to 'bb-' (Sekerbank
and A&T Bank) and 'bb' (Anadolubank).

The revision of the Outlook on Sekerbank to Negative reflects a
deteriorating trend in several key financial metrics, including
asset quality, capitalization and profitability.

The downgrade of Alternatifbank's VR reflects primarily its much
weakened core capital ratios as the bank pursues a strategy of
rapid growth, vastly outpacing internal capital generation.
Subsidiary Alternatif Finansal Kiralama's ratings are equalized
with those of its parent because Fitch considers it as a core,
highly integrated subsidiary.

The downgrade of Anadolubank's VR reflects the more difficult
operating conditions for small banks, resulting in margin
pressure and some weakening of capital adequacy ratios.  Key
financial indicators at the bank, once well ahead of those
displayed by other small Turkish banks, have now fallen more in
line with peers'.

The franchises of all seven banks are narrow -- none of them
controls a deposit market share in excess of 1%.  Most offer a
mixture of general commercial and retail banking services,
largely to small and medium-sized companies.  Two are more
specialized, namely A&T Bank, which focuses on trade and other
financial services conducted primarily between Turkey and Libya,
and BankPozitif, which provides boutique transactional loans to
large and medium-sized companies and specialized consumer loans.

The banks' VRs reflect their limited franchises, small absolute
size, and dwindling competitive advantages.  The country's
leading banks are increasingly able to undercut pricing and offer
a broader product range.  Operating conditions, to date in 2014,
have been volatile, impacted by sharp interest rate movements and
political pressure in the build-up to Presidential elections
scheduled for August.  Economic growth was robust in 1Q14 but
confidence remains sluggish and loan growth slowed across all
seven banks, with the exception of Anadolubank where loans were
up by nearly 12%, which Fitch considers rather high.

BankPozitif, Tekstilbank, Turkland Bank and, following the
downgrade, Alternatifbank, share 'b+' VRs. BankPozitif is
wholesale-funded and both its specialization and strategy change
frequently, limiting upside potential for the bank's VR.
Tekstilbank and Turkland Bank are similar in size and product
range.  Both banks target corporate, commercial and SME
customers, and relationships with core customers are well
established.  Given margin pressure, both banks are finding it
difficult to absorb rising staff and administrative costs, and
cost/income ratios are the highest among peers.

Under new ownership, Alternatifbank's growth is being prioritized
and the customer base is changing.  The bank is seeking to
develop relationships with other CBQ customers and subsidiaries.
The stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) is rising rapidly and
Fitch expects further deterioration as the loan book seasons.
Core capital ratios are the lowest among peers but subordinated
debt, provided largely by international financial institutions,
boosts regulatory capital ratios.  Given aggressive budgeted
growth plans and weak internal capital generation, core capital
ratios may soon come under renewed pressure, in Fitch's opinion.

Sekerbank and A&T Bank are both rated 'bb-' in their VRs.  A&T
Bank's trade finance specialization and its close relationship
with its shareholder set it apart from the other six Turkish
banks.  Sekerbank, too, is somewhat different.  It operates a
fairly large branch network nationwide, and focuses on more
remote areas of Turkey where it targets mainly small companies
and retail customers.  The bank has long enjoyed some of the
widest margins among its peers but asset quality indicators have
traditionally been weaker.  The change in its Outlook to Negative
reflects the bank's margin squeeze, potential asset quality
deterioration and pressure on capital ratios.

Anadolubank's VR is the highest among peers, at 'bb'.  This
reflects generally stronger metrics across a broad range of key
areas.  Anadolubank continues to boast the lowest NPLs /total
loans ratio among peers (stable at 2.8%, reserved at a high 95%),
while its cost control is strong and internal capital generation
remains reasonable at around 10%.

The NPL/total loan ratios for all seven banks average around 4%
(Sekerbank: 5.4% at end-March 2014).  Single name concentration
risk is fairly high across all banks, as can be expected given
their size and customer base.

Fitch core capital (FCC)/weighted risks ratios at all seven banks
range from a high 16% and 17% at BankPozitif and Tekstilbank,
respectively, to a low 8.3% at Alternatifbank.  The FCC/weighted
risks ratio at Sekerbank (10.2% at end-March 2014) offers modest
loss absorption capacity given the bank's risk profile and low
internal capital generation capabilities.  Anadolubank's
FCC/weighted risks ratio, at around 13%, is considered adequate,
especially given a high loan loss reserve cover at the bank,
which means that expected losses are well reserved.

The Support Ratings of '5' of Anadolubank, A&T Bank, Sekerbank
and Tekstilbank reflect their lack of systemic significance in
the Turkish banking sector; Fitch does not rule out potential
support from the Turkish authorities for them but believes that
such support cannot be relied upon.  This is reflected in their
'No Floor' Support Rating Floors.

The Support Ratings of '2' of Alternatifbank and BankPozitif and
'3' for Turkland Bank reflect strong potential shareholder
support.  Alternatifbank's Long- and Short-term foreign currency
IDRs are constrained by Turkey's 'BBB' Country Ceiling.  The
Long-term local currency IDR is notched down two times from CBQ's
Long-term IDR, reflecting Fitch's classification of
Alternatifbank as a 'strategically important' subsidiary for CBQ.
Alternatifbank's Short-term foreign currency IDR was upgraded to
'F2' from 'F3' to reflect the higher certainty of the
shareholder's propensity to support in the near term.  Similar
action was taken at Alternatifbank's leasing subsidiary.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATING, VRS AND SUPPORT
RATINGS

The IDRs and National ratings of A&T Bank, Anadolubank and
Sekerbank are sensitive to a change in their VRs.

An upgrade of their VRs in the foreseeable future is not Fitch's
base case scenario.  A&T Bank's niche profile and dependence on
volatile Libyan, Middle Eastern and African economies makes it
difficult to envisage an upgrade.  Neither Anadolubank nor
Sekerbank are displaying any notable improvement in its key
financial metrics to suggest likely upward pressure on the VRs.
The most likely source of downside pressure on Sekerbank's VR is
a weakening of asset quality, particularly among the portfolio of
smaller companies which may find it more difficult to compete as
economic conditions remain tough, and amid continued capital
ratio erosion.

The Outlooks on all other ratings is Stable.

The IDRs, National and Support Ratings of Alternatifbank,
BankPozitif and Turkland Bank are sensitive a change in the IDRs
of their parents and/or a change of strategy at group level,
thereby reducing their propensity to support their subsidiaries.
The Negative Outlook on Turkland Bank's Long-term rating mirrors
that of Arab Bank PLC.  The Outlooks on the remaining support-
driven Long-term ratings is Stable.

Alternatifbank's VR may be upgraded on improvements in its core
capitalisation and slower NPL generation.  Alternatifbank's and
Turkland Bank's VRs are further sensitive to the banks
establishing and maintaining a track record of sustainable growth
and profitability, leading to improved internal capital
generation.

The RWP on Tekstilbank's Long and Short-term IDRs, National
Rating and Support Rating will be resolved upon completion of the
change of ownership.  If the acquisition is successful, the bank
will likely see a multi-notch upgrade of its Long-term IDRs,
National and Support Ratings.  The bank's Long-term foreign
currency IDR will most likely be upgraded to 'BBB', Turkey's
Country Ceiling.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - ALTERNATIF FINANSAL
KIRALAMA

The ratings of Alternatif Leasing are equalized with those of its
parent, Alternatifbank.  The bank fully owns the leasing company
which shares the same brand, distribution channels, board members
and membership of key committees.  Alternatif Leasing's ratings
are sensitive to a change in its parent's ratings.

The rating actions are as follows:

Alternatifbank A.S.

Long-term FC IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Stable Outlook
Long-term LC IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Stable Outlook
Short-term FC IDR upgraded to 'F2' from 'F3'
Short-term LC IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating downgraded to 'b+' from 'bb'
Support Rating affirmed at '2'
National Long-term Rating affirmed at 'AAA(tur)' Stable Outlook

Anadolubank A.S.

Long-term FC and LC IDR downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'; Stable
Outlook
Short-term FC and LC IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating downgraded to 'bb' from 'bb+'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'
National Long-term Rating downgraded to 'AA-(tur)' from
'AA(tur)'; Stable Outlook

Arap Turk Bankasi A.S.

Long-term FC and LC IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Stable Outlook
Short-term FC and LC IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'bb-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'
National Long-term Rating affirmed at 'A+(tur)'; Stable Outlook

BankPozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi A.S.

Long-term FC and LC IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Stable Outlook
Short-term FC and LC IDR affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b+'
Support Rating affirmed at '2'
National Long-term Rating affirmed at 'AAA(tur)'; Stable Outlook
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Senior unsecured debt issued out of Commerzbank International
  S.A.: affirmed at 'BBB-'

Sekerbank T.A.S.

Long-term FC and LC IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook changed to
  Negative from Stable
Short-term FC and LC IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'bb-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'
National Long-term Rating affirmed at 'A+(tur)'; Outlook changed
  to Negative from Stable

Tekstil Bankasi A.S.

Long-term FC and LC IDR: 'B+'; Rating Watch Positive Maintained
Short-term FC and LC IDR: 'B'; Rating Watch Positive Maintained
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b+'
Support Rating: '5'; Rating Watch Positive Maintained
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'
National Long-term Rating: 'A(tur)'; Rating Watch Positive
  Maintained

Turkland Bank A.S.

Long-term FC and LC IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Negative Outlook
Short-term FC and LC IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b+'
Support Rating affirmed at '3'
National Long-term Rating affirmed at 'AA-(tur)'; Negative
  Outlook

Alternatif Finansal Kiralama A.S.

Long-term FC IDR affirmed at 'BBB'; Stable Outlook
Long-term LC IDR affirmed at 'BBB+'; Stable Outlook
Short-term FC IDR upgraded to 'F2' from 'F3'
Short-term LC IDR affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating affirmed at '2'
National Long-term Rating affirmed at 'AAA(tur)' Negative
  Outlook



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


FAIRHOLD SECURITISATION: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Notes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
classes of Notes issued by Fairhold Securitisation Limited.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

  GBP329M A Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jul 5,
  2013 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  GBP84.7M A(N) Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
  Jul 5, 2013 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  GBP24M B Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 5,
  2013 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

  GBP5.8M B(N) Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on
  Jul 5, 2013 Downgraded to B3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade action reflects Moody's increased concerns
regarding the refinancing of the loan due in October 2015. In
terms of asset performance the transaction has been stable since
the previous downgrade of the Notes in July 2013 and Moody's
continues to recognize the very good quality and predictability
of the cash flows derived from ground rents. However, due to the
continued low interest rate environment, no positive developments
have been observed on the swap mark to market valuation amount,
which ranks mostly senior to the Notes. The updated value of the
assets as of April 2014 shows a moderate increase of 3.6% in
value, but this is not sufficient to significantly improve the
Note to Value ratios on the rated classes when the swap mark to
market (MtM) is included. Based on the external valuation, the
Note to Value Ratios on classes A and B are 85.4% and 89.2%
respectively, compared to 89.3% and 93.1% previously. As a
result, in the absence of noticeable improvements and with the
loan maturity date approaching in October 2015, the loan
probability of default assessment has been increased.

As noted in the previous rating action, there could be an
incremental risk of swap breakage costs becoming due and payable
prior to the note final maturity as the transfer fee reserve is
being depleted at a faster rate than initially anticipated.
Considering the current level of income, the transfer fee reserve
should ensure debt service payments until the loan maturity date,
but it may not be sufficient until the note legal final maturity.

The current ratings take into account a possible future
improvement of the swap MtM valuation before loan maturity, due
to a possible increase in interest rates from the Bank of England
within the next 12 months. If the swap MtM does not materially
decrease before loan maturity, and in the absence of visibility
on an exit strategy or a restructuring of the transaction, the
ratings could be downgraded further as the loan maturity
approaches.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA CMBS Transactions published in December
2013.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Main factors that could lead to a downgrade or an upgrade of the
ratings are (i) the swap MtM valuation and (ii) the valuation of
the underlying assets. Both factors are subject to change;
primary sources of assumption uncertainty are (i) sensitivity of
the swap MtM amounts to future changes in interest and inflation
rates and (ii) sensitivity of asset valuation to real interest
rate expectations. The value volatility of the assets is
substantial due to the limited evidence of large transactions in
the investment market for ground rent portfolios.

MOODY'S PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS

Fairhold closed in March 2006 and was subsequently tapped in
2007. It represents the securitization of a loan granted by the
Issuer to Fairhold Finance Limited (the "Borrower"). The loan's
repayment relies on the receipt of ground rent payments, warden's
apartments rents and transfer fees arising from freehold and long
leasehold reversionary interests in 406 sheltered housing
developments (the "Portfolio") owned by thirteen property owning
subsidiaries of the Borrower. The Portfolio's cashflows relate to
18,678 sheltered housing apartments and 310 warden's apartments
located in town centers throughout the United Kingdom.

The transaction has been performing well with no issues to date.
Therefore, the default probability of the loan is principally due
to the refinancing risk when the loan reaches maturity in 2015
and as such the default risk of the notes is concentrated in the
period between the loan maturity date and note maturity date in
2017.

As noted in the previous rating action, Moody's is aware that
ground rent portfolios are potentially attractive to certain
types of investors, in particular those looking for exposure to
long-dated, inflation-linked cashflows. Despite this, Moody's
believes that ground rent portfolios are still a relatively niche
asset class, and as such the market is still neither particularly
deep nor are ground rent portfolios apparently liquid. This,
combined with the difficult refinancing conditions which are
expected to persist throughout 2015, the absence of significant
improvements on the swap MtM valuation over the last year and the
need to unwind the swaps, caused Moody's to further revise its
refinancing outlook for the underlying loan to incorporate a
greater probability of default at the loan's maturity date.

The other driver of the ratings is Moody's valuation. The
portfolio valuation supplied in the investor reporting follows an
actuarial approach. There is doubt in Moody's view whether a
buyer of the portfolio would purchase solely based on an
actuarial valuation, given the uncertainty around projecting very
long-dated cash flows. Market comparables to date have indicated
that a yield-based approach would be used to value similar
portfolios.

In the analysis, Moody's took a blended approach, giving part
value to an actuarial method and part value to a yield-based
method, to derive Moody's sustainable portfolio valuation of GBP
550 million, which is unchanged compared to last review. The main
characteristics of the ground rents have been considered in the
yield based approach, in particular: (i) the length of the leases
and the remaining years until lease extension, (ii) the frequency
of the rent reviews and the inflation linked nature of the rent
reviews, (iii) the timing of the rent reviews, and (iv) the
average ground rents per unit and the costs associated with
collecting the income. Moody's didn't consider potential lease
enfranchisements and Moody's gave no benefit for potential
ancillary income. This results in a Moody's loan-to-value ratio
of 80.6%, prior to the swap MtM and 129.9% including the whole
MtM as at April 2014, mostly unchanged since last review.

In the event of a portfolio sale, and under current interest rate
conditions, it is highly likely that the existing hedging
structure would need to be dismantled and a termination payment
would become payable by the issuer and borrowers. The requirement
to pay swap termination payments will further constrain the
availability of financing at the refinancing date. Moody's has
assumed a base-case termination payment of GBP172 million in its
updated credit assessment of the notes. Significant and
persistent deviations above this level, not offset by
corresponding asset value increases or by deleveraging may result
in additional negative rating pressure in the future.


UNIPART AUTOMOTIVE: Denies Going to Administration
--------------------------------------------------
itv.com reports that Unipart Automotive denied it's going into
administration.  The report relates that a spokesman for the
company said: "we have no intention of doing so."

They made the statement after filing a notice of intent to
appoint KPMG as administrators.

The move can give firms some protection in law during difficult
trading conditions, the report notes.

The report discloses that a spokesman for the company said they
had turned the business around and were within touching distance
of going into profit.  Under the previous owners, he said, the
business had been loss making, the report relates.

The spokesman said the firm is talking to three investors about
putting more cash into the business, the report relays.

Unipart Automotive is based in Solihull and has 170 branches
around the country selling spare parts for cars. It employs 1600
people.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Roy C. Smith's The Money Wars
--------------------------------------------
Author: Roy C. Smith
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by David Henderson
151Get your own personal today at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1893122697/internetbankrup
t

Business is war by civilized means. It won't get you a tailhook
landing on an n aircraft carrier docked in San Diego, but the
spoils of war can be glorious to behold.

Most executives do not approach business this way. They are
content to nudge along their behemoths, cash their options, and
pillage their workers. This author calls those managers "inertia
ridden." He quotes Carl Icahn describing their companies as run
by "gross and widespread incompetent management."

In cycles though, the U.S. economy generates a few business
warriors with the drive, or hubris, to treat the market as a
battlefield. The 1980s saw the last great spectacle of business
titans clashing. (The '90s, by contrast, was an era of the
investment banks waging war on the gullible.) The Money Wars is
the story of the last great buyout boom. Between 1982 and 1988,
more than ten thousand transactions were completed within the
U.S. alone, aggregating more than $1 trillion of capitalization.

Roy Smith has written a breezy read, traversing the reader
through an important piece of U.S. history, not just business
history. Two thirds of the way through the book, after covering
early twentieth century business history, the growth of financial
engineering after WWII, the conglomerate era, the RJR-Nabisco
story, and the financial machinations of KKR, we finally meet the
star of the show, Michael Milken. The picture painted by the
author leads the reader to observe that, every now and then, an
individual comes along at the right time and place in history who
knows exactly where he or she is in that history, and leaves a
world-historical footprint as a result. Whatever one may think of
Milken's ethics or his priorities, the reader will conclude that
he is the greatest financial genius this country has produced
since J.P. Morgan.

No high-flying financial era has ever happened in this country
without the frothy market attracting common criminals, or in some
cases making criminals out of weak, but previously honest men
(and it always seems to be men). Something there is about
testosterone and money. With so many deals being done, insider
trading was inevitable. Was Michael Milken guilty of insider
trading? Probably, but in all likelihood, everybody who attended
his lavish parties, called "Predators' Balls," shared the same
information.

Why did the Justice Department go after Milken and his firm,
Drexel Burnham Lambert with such raw enthusiasm? That history has
not yet been written, but Drexel had created a lot of envy and
enemies on the Street.

When a better history of the period is written, it will be a
study in the confluence of forces that made Michael Milken's
genius possible: the sclerotic management of irrational
conglomerates, a ready market for the junk bonds Milken was
selling, and a few malcontent capitalist like Carl Icahn and Ted
Turner, who were ready and able to wage their own financial
warfare.

This book is a must read for any student of business who did not
152live through any of these fascination financial eras.
Roy C. Smith is a professor of entrepreneurship, finance and
international business at NYU, and teaches on the faculty there
of the Stern School of Business. Prior to 1987, he was a partner
at Goldman Sachs. He received a B.S. from the Naval Academy in
1960 and an M.B.A. from Harvard in 1966.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *