TCREUR_Public/140725.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, July 25, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 146

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

ALPINE BAU: Putevi Srbije Sues Over Poor Construction Work


B U L G A R I A

CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Fate Hangs in Balance Amid Political Crisis


G E R M A N Y

APOLLO 5: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
CIDRON GLORIA: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
HP PELZER: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

BEREHAVEN CREDIT: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidators
MOUNT WOLSELEY HOTEL: High Court Approves Survival Scheme


M A C E D O N I A

MACEDONIA REPUBLIC: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

DRYDEN 32: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to EUR17MM Class F Notes
DRYDEN 32: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F Notes
FORNAX ECLIPSE 2006-2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating to Class X Notes


P O R T U G A L

BANCO ESPIRITO: Ricardo Salgado Arrested Over Money-Laundering


S P A I N

AYT GENOVA VI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
BANCO SANTANDER: S&P Reinstates 'BB+' Rating on Preference Share
SANTANDER FINANCIACION 1: S&P Retains CCC- Rating on Cl. D Notes
TDA TARRAGONA I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B+'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CLARENVILLE CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC-'
ITHACA ENERGY: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
PIZZAEXPRESS: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
THRONES 2014-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' Rating to Class F Notes
UNIPART AUTOMOTIVE: In Administration; 1,244 Jobs Affected


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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ALPINE BAU: Putevi Srbije Sues Over Poor Construction Work
----------------------------------------------------------
B92 reports that public company Putevi Srbije (Roads of Serbia)
has filed a lawsuit in Vienna against Austria's Alpine Bau GmbH
over poorly executed construction works on a bridge.

According to B92, the Serbian side is seeking EUR27.5 million in
damages over breach of deadlines, lost profit, and poor quality
of works on the Beska bridge over the Danube, north of Belgrade.

The Belgrade-based daily Vecernje Novosti also reported that the
Austrian company is preparing a lawsuit of their own, B92
relates.

Alpine went bankrupt in 2013, after which the Mostogradnja
company took over to finish the bridge, recounts.  The total cost
remains unknown at this time, B92 states.

Because of additional works that Alpine carried out the figure
found in the contract has been exceeded, "but there has been no
agreement with the investor about by how much," B92 quotes the
paper as saying.

Alpine officials are saying the bridge cost slightly more than
EUR100 million, while Roads of Serbia accept about half that
figure, B92 discloses.

According to B92, the report said it is likely that the final
number will have to be determined through arbitration,

The Austrian company's liabilities toward Serbia alone reach
EUR136 million, B92 says.  This sum includes the money sought by
Roads of Serbia, Corridors of Serbia, and various contractors and
suppliers, B92 notes.

Alpine Bau GmbH is Austria's second biggest construction group.
Alpine Bau, owned by Spain's Fomento de Construcciones y
Contratas SA, filed for insolvency on June 19 with liabilities of
EUR2.56 billion (US$3.4 billion).



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B U L G A R I A
===============


CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Fate Hangs in Balance Amid Political Crisis
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Georgi Kantchev at The New York Times reports that the fate of
Corporate Commercial Bank remains hostage to a political crisis,
which caused the prime minister's government to resign on
Wednesday.

The resignation of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski and his
cabinet, which had been expected for weeks, comes as Bulgaria's
worst banking crisis since the 1990s threatens to take an
economic toll on local businesses and foreign investors, The New
York Times relates.  And with a caretaker government presiding
until elections in the fall, there may be no quick resolution of
a rescue plan for the bank, The New York Times says.

The bank, Corporate Commercial Bank, also known as K.T.B., has
been closed since June 20, after a three-day run in which some
US$700 million -- about a fifth of the bank's deposits -- was
withdrawn, The New York Times relays.  It had been set to reopen
on July 21, a month after the central bank took control of its
operations, The New York Times notes.  But the bank remains
closed as officials continue to wrangle over whether the state
should bail it out or find private investors to save it,
according to The New York Times.

Prosecutors have told the local news media that they are
investigating claims that up to 90% of the bank's loans were
granted to companies and individuals connected to K.T.B.'s main
shareholder, Tsvetan Vassilev, The New York Times recounts.

On Tuesday, the nominally independent governor of the Bulgarian
central bank told Parliament that he was ready to step down in
light of what he described as political meddling in efforts to
rescue K.T.B., The New York Times relays.  The governor,
Ivan Iskrov, who has been in the post since 2004, as cited by The
New York Times, said he would wait until the legislature could
nominate his successor, but he is unlikely to leave office soon
with Parliament itself expected to disband.

While K.T.B.'s future remains uncertain -- Mr. Iskrov said the
bank could remain closed for five more months -- the banking
tumult is causing jitters in Bulgaria and abroad, The New York
Times notes.

Corporate Commercial Bank is Bulgaria's fourth largest private
lender with total assets topping BGN7.3 billion in the first
quarter of 2014, or 8.4% of total Bulgarian private banking
assets, according to AFP.



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G E R M A N Y
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APOLLO 5: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time B3 corporate
family rating (CFR) and B3-PD probability default rating (PDR) to
Apollo 5 GmbH, which is the parent company of Aenova group.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B2 rating to
EUR500 million equivalent first lien term loan due 2020, a (P)B2
rating to its EUR50 million revolving credit facility due 2020, a
(P)B2 rating to its EUR25 million acquisition/capex facility, and
a (P)Caa2 rating to its EUR155 million second lien term loan due
2021 all borrowed by Aenova Holding GmbH and other subsidiaries.
The outlook on all the ratings is stable.

The proceeds from the term loans will be utilized mainly to repay
the existing senior and mezzanine facilities and to repay
shareholder loan instruments in the amount of up to EUR120
million.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these reflect the rating agency's credit
opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive review
of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign
definitive ratings to the instruments mentioned above. A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

-- Assignment of B3 CFR --

Aenova's B3 CFR reflects (1) the high leverage pro forma for the
refinancing and its weak free cash flow generation; (2) the
company's geographic concentration in Europe, particularly
Germany; (3) the execution risk associated with the integration
of Haupt Pharma AG ("Haupt") and the implementation of planned
restructuring and savings initiatives; (4) the fragmented and
competitive nature of the CDMO industry, resulting in pricing
pressure, particularly in the tablets business, which remains
Aenova's main segment accounting for 43% of pro forma revenues;
and (5) ongoing consolidation trends among Aenova's customers in
the pharmaceutical industry, which could lead to pharmaceutical
companies rationalizing their portfolio of suppliers or in-
sourcing the manufacturing of certain products should they have
spare capacity. That said, such trends could also be seen in
favour of larger players like Aenova.

Aenova's B3 CFR more positively takes into account (1) the
company's leading market positions particularly in Europe owing
to (i) the enhanced scale following the Temmler and Haupt
acquisitions in 2013 and (ii) its broad product portfolio; (2)
modest customer concentration, with its largest customer
estimated to represent around 9% of the company's sales (2013,
pro forma); (3) good long-term growth prospects in the CDMO
industry, as there is a general outsourcing trend combined with
positive underlying growth at the consumer level; and (4) high
barriers to entry in certain segments (e.g., soft-gel capsules,
sterile products), owing to the more complex technology used.

Aenova's leverage pro forma for the refinancing (based on FY14
Moody's adjusted figures but excluding one-off exceptional
items), is high at 7.2x, with the main debt adjustment being the
operating leases. Exceptional items are numerous, particularly
including redundancy and M&A related costs and external
consultancy services. However, Moody's expects that Aenova's
leverage will decrease below 6.5x by the end of fiscal year 2015.
Positive industry trends and material margin improvements driven
by cost savings and synergies will underpin this deleveraging.
Moody's also notes that the company has historically been able to
achieve its reorganization and savings targets.

Moody's considers Aenova's liquidity profile as being adequate,
supported by (1) EUR7 million in cash balances; (2) a EUR50
million revolving credit facility and a EUR25 million
acquisition/capex facility (available for drawings for three
years) which are both undrawn at close; and (3) a lack of debt
amortization. Moody's expects that Aenova's free cash flow
generation will be weak over the next 12-18 months, owing to
material exceptional costs and a large capex program. However,
Moody's notes that a significant portion of this program
comprises project capex and could therefore be reduced and/or
delayed in the event of need. The term facilities are not subject
to any maintenance covenants except for a springing net leverage
covenant set with large headroom on the revolving credit facility
which will only be tested when drawings exceed 35% of total
commitment amount.

-- Assignment of B3-PD PDR --

The B3-PD is line with the CFR reflecting an assumption of a 50%
family loss given default consistent with a structure of bank
loans with different seniority and lack of financial covenants.
The debt facilities will be secured by pledges over assets and
shares and guaranteed by material subsidiaries, which represent
at least 85% of the consolidated EBITDA and gross assets. The
intercreditor allows for the revolving credit facility, the
acquisition facility and the first lien term loan to rank pari
passu with the hedging liabilities but ahead of the second lien
term loan. The (P)B2 on the first lien debt reflects its prior
ranking, resulting also in the second lien rating of (P)Caa2
being two notches below the CFR.

Rationale for Stable Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Aenova will
be able to achieve the expected cost savings and synergies,
thereby improving its profitability and deleveraging below 6.5x
by the end of fiscal year 2015 whilst maintaining adequate
liquidity. Moody's also expects that industry conditions will not
deteriorate and that the company will pursue an organic growth
strategy and make no material debt-funded acquisitions or
dividend distribution, with the exception of EUR25 million
following the disposal of the Munich plant.

What Could Change the Rating Up

Positive rating pressure could arise if Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA ratio falls sustainably to 5.5x and the company
generates positive free cash flow on a sustainable basis.

What Could Change the Rating Down

Downward rating pressure would be exerted if the conditions for a
stable outlook are not met, for example if operating performance
weakens due to industry headwinds, operating challenges or
significant delays in the implementation of its planned cost
savings and synergies. In addition, any weakness in Aenova's
liquidity, such as persistent negative free cash flow, would also
exert downward pressure on the rating.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Starnberg, Germany, Aenova is a leading contract
development and manufacturing organisation (CDMO) providing
outsourcing services for the pharmaceutical and the healthcare
industry along with the development of its own products. The
company offers a broad range of products such as tablets, hard
and soft gel capsules, liquids, sterile liquids and high
containment formulations. It operates primarily through 18
production sites in Europe and the USA and employs around 4000
employees. For the year ended 31 December 2013 the company
generated revenues of EUR704 million pro forma for the
acquisition of Haupt.


CIDRON GLORIA: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first time corporate
family rating (CFR) of B2 and a probability of default rating
(PDR) of B2-PD to Cidron Gloria Holding GmbH, the holding company
to the GHD Verwaltung GesundHeits GmbH (GHD) group of companies.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a (P)B2 rating to the new
EUR310 million seven-year first lien term loan that Cidron Gloria
Group Services GmbH will issue and also assigned a (P)B2 rating
to the new EUR45 million six-year revolving credit facility. The
outlook on all the ratings is stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the completion
of the transaction and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the term loan. A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating.

Proceeds from the term loan will be used to partially finance the
acquisition of GHD by funds managed by Nordic Capital, pay
transaction costs, and finance a small acquisition in the UK.

Ratings Rationale

The B2 CFR reflects GHD's (1) high opening financial leverage;
(2) exposure to pricing changes within the reimbursement system;
(3) low EBITDA margins; and (4) lack of geographic diversity.

However, Moody's acknowledges the company's (1) leading market
positions in the German homecare and oncology markets; (2)
positive market dynamics; (3) customer (patient) loyalty
providing an effective backlog of revenues; and (4) significant
barriers to entry.

GHD holds leading positions in the German homecare and oncology
markets. It is the only national player in homecare, whereas its
competitors are mainly regionally-focused or limited by product.
Moody's considers scale to be critical for sustained success,
particularly in the homecare and wholesale markets. GHD's
Homecare business offers a comprehensive product range to
patients across the whole of Germany. Its scale enables it to
have agreed pricing frameworks with 130 of Germany's statutory
health insurance funds (GKVs or Krankenkassen) and operating
agreements with hospitals across the country, which is becoming
increasingly important as the hospital chains become more
national.

As the largest national wholesaler in the sector, GHD is able to
offer a full product range from external and internal suppliers.
However, whilst a leading player in its market, GHD operations
are mainly limited to Germany and this lack of diversification
influences its CFR. The wholesale channel relies upon volume
discount agreements with suppliers and so GHD's high volumes
ensures they are able to compete on pricing. However, margins are
sensitive to changes in discounting and/or marketing subsidies.
At the same time, Moody's acknowledges that GHD's national
distribution capability is highly desired by suppliers and was a
key factor behind the exclusive distribution partnerships signed
with Nestl' and Abbott for enteral nutrition in Germany.

Moody's expects that the market dynamics will remain positive.
Homecare is an effective way to reduce costs in the healthcare
system by keeping patients out of higher-cost in-hospital care
whilst improving their quality of life and accelerate the healing
process. The demographic trends and aging population in Germany
are expected to result in increasing healthcare requirements,
with an increasing proportion of the population aged 65 or over,
despite a decline in overall population.

Moody's expects GHD's Oncology division to benefit from
increasing expenditure by European countries on cancer therapies.
In addition, there has been a positive shift in the production
environment for compounders of cytostatic drugs, such as GHD,
following an amendment to the German Pharmaceutical Law in 2012.
This has resulted in pharmacies increasingly outsourcing their
production to compounders in order to avoid significant
investment requirements, certifications and quality control
requirements. Moody's expects GHD's Oncology production volumes
to increase as a result of this trend.

Barriers to entry are significant in the homecare market. GHD has
established a track record of service quality, which is crucial
to both hospitals and to GKV purchasing decisions. Earlier
outpatient treatment is desirable for hospitals because of their
capacity constraints but they also seek to avoid re-
hospitalization and its associated additional costs. Only
contractual partners of the public health insurers can carry out
care for insured patients. Likewise, reimbursement rates for
products also need to be agreed with every GKV.

Patients have a tendency to stay with the same homecare provider
throughout the course of their treatment and so this loyalty
creates an effective backlog of future sales for GHD. This
loyalty is only possible because of the relationships and track
record established with the hospitals to acquire patients at the
outset.

GHD's financial performance is sensitive to changes in pricing
and reimbursement schemes agreed with the GKVs and private health
insurers. Pricing for products are effectively regulated and so
whilst GHD has agreements in place with over 130 separate GKVs,
there will be an element of commonality in reimbursement levels.

Moody's expects that the GKVs and private health insurers will
continue to seek lower reimbursement rates from healthcare
providers and suppliers over the medium to long term. After
several years of price declines, management report that prices
have generally been increasing over the past two years. To date,
GHD has been able to offset lower pricing demands through product
management and purchasing savings. However, these tactics are
likely to have limitations, and so Moody's expect that pricing
pressures will affect margins over the medium term. EBITDA
margins are low and could reduce further if, on the other side,
suppliers reduce rebates or marketing incentives.

Moody's considers opening leverage of 5.9x (LTM March 2014
Moody's-adjusted pro forma) to be high. Moody's expects that
EBITDA growth will stem mainly from the Oncology division as a
result of cooperation agreements in place with pharmacies, mix
shift towards higher-margin nutritional therapies and purchasing
savings. Moody's expects leverage will likely trend to around
5.5x over the next two to three years. However, capex is low
despite additional production investment in production capacity
planned for 2014 and, as a result, Moody's expects that GHD's
free cash flow to debt ratio to will be around 5%-6% in the
medium term. Moody's also notes the ability to increase leverage
by approximately 1x within the senior facilities agreement
through utilization of the incremental facility.

Moody's considers GHD's near-term liquidity to be good, with
sufficient internal resources to service debt. The business model
requires low levels of maintenance capex, although working
capital requirements could increase if GHD achieves a significant
uplift in sales volume. Moody's expects free cash flow to be
around EUR14 million for 2015 and EUR20 million for 2016, with a
50% cash sweep initially applicable. Pro forma for the proposed
transaction, Moody's expects that the company will have EUR10
million of cash on balance sheet and access to the undrawn EUR45
million RCF. The RCF has a springing maintenance leverage
covenant when drawn more than 30%.

The senior secured loan and RCF are ranked pari passu and will
share the same security and guarantee package, with guarantors
representing a minimum of 80% of EBITDA and total assets. The
(P)B2 rating on the EUR310 million first lien term loan and EUR45
million RCF is in line with the CFR.

Rationale For The Stable Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that GHD will be
able to retain its leading positions in the homecare and oncology
markets and not be subject to any material changes in
reimbursement policies. The outlook also incorporates Moody's
expectation that the company's pro forma leverage will remain
below 6.0x and that the company will not embark on any
transforming acquisitions or make debt-funded shareholder
distributions.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure on the rating could materialize if the Moody's-
adjusted debt/EBITDA falls sustainably below 5.5x, with Moody's-
adjusted EBITA/interest expenses above 3.0x.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating could materialize
could arise if Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA increases above 6.5x,
or Moody's-adjusted EBITA/interest expenses falling towards 2.0x
and /or liquidity concerns emerge. Moody's could also consider
downgrading the ratings in the event of any material acquisitions
or changes in financial policy.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Healthcare Service Providers published in December 2011. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Germany, GHD is Germany's largest provider of
homecare services for a broad range of therapeutic areas,
including oncology and antibiosis. It provides medical products
and outpatient services for patients that require long and
continuous care. Andreas Rudolph, the current CEO, founded GHD's
predecessor company in 1992. The company has over 1,700
employees. In the financial year ended 31st December 2013, it
reported revenues of EUR481 million and a pro forma adjusted
EBITDA of EUR53 million.


HP PELZER: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had assigned its
preliminary 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating to German auto
supplier HP Pelzer Holding GmbH, the 61%-owned subsidiary of the
Italian group Adler Plastics.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary 'B+' issue rating
to HP Pelzer's proposed EUR230 million senior secured notes.  The
recovery rating on these instruments is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

Final ratings will depend on S&P's receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation.  Accordingly, the
preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of final
ratings.  If S&P do not receive final documentation within a
reasonable time frame, or if final documentation departs from
materials reviewed, S&P reserves the right to withdraw or revise
its ratings.  Potential changes include, but are not limited to,
utilization of loan proceeds, maturity, size, and conditions of
the term loan, financial and other covenants, security, and
ranking.

The ratings on HP Pelzer are based on S&P's assumption that, in
the next few months, HP Pelzer will issue EUR230 million of
seven-year senior secured notes.

S&P understands that, from the proceeds, the company will repay
all its debt, including some intergroup loans, to its parent
company, Adler Plastics, excluding about EUR6 million of lease
liabilities and EUR13 million of local debt.

S&P bases its assessment of a preliminary 'B+' rating on HP
Pelzer primarily on Adler Plastics' credit quality.

S&P views Adler Plastics' financial profile as "aggressive" owing
to its sizable adjusted debt and limited free operating cash flow
(FOCF) generation.  S&P expects that the group will post adjusted
funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 17% and debt to
EBITDA of about 4x, based on a weighted average for the current
year and the next two years.  S&P also forecasts that FOCF will
amount to EUR20 million, on average, over that period, which
translates into an adjusted FOCF-to-debt ratio of only about 8%.

At year-end 2014, S&P estimates that the group's adjusted debt
will reach approximately EUR330 million.  This comprises, at the
HP Pelzer level, EUR230 million of senior secured notes, about
EUR35 million of finance leases and local debt, and roughly EUR30
million of operating leases.  S&P adds to that amount its
estimate of Adler Plastics' debt outside the restricted group,
which amounts to about EUR35 million.

Because S&P assess the group's business profile as "weak," it
excludes surplus cash from our debt calculation, in line with its
criteria, to account for the risk of cash burning.

S&P's view of Adler Plastics' business profile reflects its small
size, weak competitive position, and low adjusted EBITDA margin.
With a revenue base of approximately EUR1.3 billion, Adler
Plastics is one of the smallest auto suppliers in Europe, the
Middle East, and Africa.  It operates in a small and fragmented
niche where it has no leading market shares.  This, combined with
a lack of aftermarket revenues and a product portfolio with
limited innovative content, constrains profitability, in S&P's
opinion.

On the positive side, Adler Plastics has a good geographic
presence, with about one-half of its revenues generated outside
Europe.  The group also benefits from good relationships with car
makers, which shared some research and development costs and
eased payment terms when HP Pelzer experienced economic hardship
during the latest market downturn.  This did not prevent the
company from restructuring its debt in 2010, however.

In S&P's opinion, HP Pelzer's stand-alone credit quality is
similar to that of the Adler Plastics group, although S&P notes
that the entities outside the restricted group are barely
profitable.  S&P notes that the transparency of Adler Plastics is
limited as it reports under Italian generally accepted accounting
principles and does not publish a cash flow statement.  This
could constrain the ratings if the level of disclosure does not
improve.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that HP Pelzer will
maintain stable market shares and gradually increase its EBITDA.
It also factors in S&P's view that the financial policy will
remain conservative, with no shareholder remuneration and limited
acquisitions.  S&P expects the group to achieve an adjusted
EBITDA margin of more than 6% and to post about EUR20 million of
adjusted FOCF.

S&P could lower the ratings on HP Pelzer if the group's adjusted
FFO-to-debt ratio fell to about 12%, if adjusted FOCF fell
materially below its expectations, or if the group failed to
improve its profitability.  S&P could also lower the ratings if
the group's conservative financial policy loosened or if the
transparency of Adler Plastics' financial statements did not
improve.

S&P could raise the ratings on HP Pelzer if the group's adjusted
FFO-to-debt ratio rose materially above 20% on a sustainable
basis, provided that operating trends remained supportive,
notably with a continuous increase in profitability.  Any
positive rating action seems unlikely over the next 12 months,
however.



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BEREHAVEN CREDIT: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidators
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Irish Times reports that the Central Bank has secured High
Court orders winding up Berehaven Credit Union.

The president of the High Court, Mr. Justice Nicholas Kearns, on
Wednesday appointed insolvency practitioners Jim Hamilton and
David O'Connor of BDO Ireland as provisional liquidators of the
credit union, The Irish Times relates.

Mr. Justice Kearns, as cited by The Irish Times, said he was
satisfied to appoint the provisional liquidators.

Counsel said the Central Bank had concerns that unless an orderly
winding up process was put in place, there was a risk of
corporate failure and a "disorderly collapse" of the credit
union, The Irish Times relays.

Earlier, Mr. Gallagher told the court the Central Bank had been
made aware in 2010 of difficulties in Berehaven Credit Union,
founded in 1978, The Irish Times recounts.  Counsel said a 2010
report revealed irregularities with corporate governance, and
issues with its loan book and another review earlier this year
showed these difficulties had not been dealt with, The Irish
Times discloses.

According to The Irish Times, there was now a net deficit in the
accounts of EUR50,000.  There was a capital shortfall of EUR1.3
million, The Irish Times states.

The Central Bank has given the credit union every opportunity to
address its problems but it has been unable to do so, The Irish
Times notes.

Berehaven Credit Union is based in Cork and has 3,500 members.


MOUNT WOLSELEY HOTEL: High Court Approves Survival Scheme
---------------------------------------------------------
Tim Healy at Irish Independent reports that the High Court has
confirmed survival scheme for the troubled Mount Wolseley Hotel
and Golf Resort in Co Carlow following a EUR7.5 million
investment proposal from Brehon Capital.

The Morrisseys claimed there were uncertainties over Brehon's
investment proposal because it would have to come up with another
EUR2.37 million to provide alternative fire access arrangements
for the hotel and to relocate underground services which run
through their (Morrisseys') land, Irish Independent relates.

They also said the ability to run the business as a going concern
would be affected as it would no longer be possible for wedding
parties to use the gardens, which are part of Mount Wolesley
House, as a back drop for photos, Irish Independent relays.

The examiner and Brehon said the cost of alternative fire access
arrangements would be not be near the sum suggested by the
Morrisseys, Irish Independent notes.  According to Irish
Independent, they said that the effect of the loss of the gardens
on hotel wedding business would not be serious as only between
seven and ten bookings annually are likely to be lost as a
result.

Mr. Justice Peter Kelly on Wednesday approved a survival scheme
put forward by insolvency practitioner Ian Lawlor for the hotel
which has been run by the Morrissey family and employs 175, Irish
Independent relates.

The examinership application had been brought last April by the
operating companies after Bank of Ireland (BoI) -- the largest
creditor owed around EUR28 million -- had sought to appoint a
trading receiver over the hotel, Irish Independent recounts.

The judge, as cited by Irish Independent, said that subsequently,
BoI "did a 180 degree turn" and not only no longer opposed the
examinership but supported it and agreed to provide Brehon with
the bulk of the EUR7.5 million investment.  He said that in the
course of doing so, BoI was taking a substantial write-down on
the debt to around EUR6 million, Irish Independent notes.



=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


MACEDONIA REPUBLIC: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'BB-' long-term senior unsecured debt rating to the proposed
EUR500 million seven-year notes to be issued by the Republic of
Macedonia (foreign currency BB-/Stable/B).



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DRYDEN 32: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to EUR17MM Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following ratings to notes issued by Dryden 32 Euro CLO 2014
B.V.:

  EUR199,250,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
  due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR31,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
  2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR18,420,000 Class B-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  EUR31,580,000 Class B-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
  2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  EUR32,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  EUR22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  EUR26,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  EUR17,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
  Rate Notes due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's rating of the rated notes addresses the expected loss
posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of the notes in
2026. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of loans given the characteristics and
eligibility criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant
portfolio tests and covenants as well as the transaction's
capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's is of the
opinion that the collateral manager, Pramerica Investment
Management Limited ("Pramerica"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Dryden 32 is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 85% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans or senior secured
bonds, up to 15% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior
obligations and high yield bonds, and up to 10% of the portfolio
may consist of second-lien loans and mezzanine obligations. The
portfolio is expected to be 90% ramped up as of the closing date
and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors
domiciled in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will
be acquired during the six month ramp-up period in compliance
with the portfolio guidelines.

Pramerica will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk obligations or credit improved obligations, and are subject
to certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer has issued EUR 39.45m of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 401,800,000

Diversity Score: 43

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2690

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.30%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 38%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the ratings assigned to the rated notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the impact of an
increase in default probability (expressed in terms of WARF
level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the number
of notch difference versus the current model output, whereby a
negative difference corresponds to higher expected losses),
holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3094 from 2690)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3497 from 2690)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Pramerica's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.


DRYDEN 32: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned credit ratings to
Dryden 32 Euro CLO 2014 B.V.'s class A-1A, A-1B, B-1A, B-1B, C,
D, E, and F notes.  At closing, Dryden 32 Euro CLO 2014 also
issued an unrated subordinated class of notes.

"We have assigned our ratings following our assessment of the
transaction's capital structure and the collateral portfolio's
credit quality, a cash flow analysis, and a review of the
transaction documents.  We understand that the portfolio at
closing was diversified, primarily comprising broadly syndicated
speculative-grade senior secured term loans and senior secured
bonds," S&P said.

S&P's ratings are commensurate with the available credit
enhancement for the rated notes through the subordination of cash
flows payable to the subordinated notes.  S&P subjected the
capital structure to a cash flow analysis to determine the break-
even default rate for each rated class of notes at each rating
level.

In S&P's analysis, it used the target par amount, the covenanted
weighted-average spread, the covenanted weighted-average coupon,
and the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates.  S&P applied
various cash flow stresses, using four different default
patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate stresses
for each liability rating category.

The transaction documents allow between 10% and 20% of assets
paying a fixed interest rate where no additional hedging is
required.  S&P tested the mix of fixed- and floating-rate assets
at the maximum and minimum levels under the transaction
documents. S&P also biased defaults toward fixed-rate assets
during low interest-rate environments and toward floating-rate
assets during high interest-rate environments.

S&P's analysis also shows that the credit enhancement available
to each rated class of notes is sufficient to withstand the
defaults applicable under the supplemental tests (not counting
excess spread) outlined in our corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria.

S&P considers that the transaction's documented replacement and
remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its exposure to
counterparty risk under S&P's current counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's criteria for nonsovereign
ratings that exceed eurozone (European Economic and Monetary
Union) sovereign ratings, S&P considers the transaction's
exposure to country risk to be limited at the assigned rating
levels, as the concentration of the pool comprising of assets in
countries rated lower than 'A-' does not exceed 10% of the
aggregate collateral balance.

S&P considers that the transaction's legal structure is
bankruptcy-remote, in line with its European legal criteria.

Dryden 32 Euro CLO 2014 is a European cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction, comprising euro-denominated
senior secured loans and bonds issued by European borrowers.
Pramerica Investment Management Ltd. is the collateral manager.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

Dryden 32 Euro CLO 2014 B.V.
EUR416.7 Million Floating-Rate, Fixed-Rate,
and Subordinated Notes

Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. EUR)

A-1A                  AAA (sf)        199.25
A-1B                  AAA (sf)         31.00
B-1A                  AA (sf)          18.42
B-1B                  AA (sf)          31.58
C                     A (sf)           32.00
D                     BBB (sf)         22.00
E                     BB (sf)          26.00
F                     B- (sf)          17.00
Subordinated          NR               39.45

NR-Not rated.


FORNAX ECLIPSE 2006-2: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating to Class X Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following classes of Notes issued by Fornax (Eclipse 2006-2) B.V.
(amounts reflect initial outstanding):

Issuer: Fornax (Eclipse 2006-2) B.V.

  EUR263.193M B Notes, Affirmed Aa3 (sf); previously on Aug 1,
  2011 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  EUR57.86M C Notes, Downgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Apr 26,
  2012 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  EUR36.05M D Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 18,
  2009 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  EUR0.1M X Notes, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Aug 22, 2012
  Downgraded to B2 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class E, Class F and Class G Notes.

Ratings Rationale

The action reflects the increased risk that the issuer will not
be able to pay the interest on a timely basis due to i)
decreasing issuer available revenues as loans continue to repay,
ii) high percentage of senior costs relative to the total
available issuer revenues, which is unlikely to improve and iii)
the uncertainty around the sequence and timing of loan workouts.

While Moody's loss expectation on the pool is unchanged from last
review and the key assumptions for the remaining loans suggest
very high recoveries for both Classes C and D, the increased risk
of interest shortfalls is not commensurate with the A1 (sf)
rating of the C Notes. As per the terms and conditions of the
notes, interest on the notes can be deferred if available
cashflows are insufficient. The deferred interest will accrue
additional interest and will be paid only to the extent that
funds are available at the next interest payment date (IPD). Non-
payment of interest subject to a grace period, on the most senior
class of notes is a note event of default. It is Moody's
understanding that drawdowns on the liquidity facility are only
permitted if there is a shortfall in the amount due from a
borrower. Therefore, if interest is fully paid by the borrowers,
but it is not sufficient to cover interest on the notes,
drawdowns cannot be made. At the last IPD, senior costs
represented 72% of available issuer income and interest
shortfalls occurred on Class G. Moody's will continue to monitor
the interest shortfall developments given the uncertaintly around
the combination of repayments of higher margins loans and
payments of special servicing fees and related expenses. The
Class D is affirmed because the current ratings is commensurate
with the increased risk, however the class could become more
susceptible to continued negative developments on interest
shortfall.

Moody's affirmation of Classes B and D reflects a base expected
loss in the range of 20%-25% of the current pool balance, similar
to the one at the last review. Class B is expected to repay at
the next interest payment date.

Moody's derives this loss expectation from the analysis of the
default probability of the securitized loans (both during the
term and at maturity) and its value assessment of the collateral.
Realized losses are currently EUR 1.3 million, or less than 1% of
the original securitized balance.

The rating on the Class X Notes is affirmed because the current
rating is commensurate with the updated risk assessment. The
Class X Notes reference the underlying loan pool. As such, the
key rating parameters that influence the expected loss on the
referenced loan pool also influences the ratings on the Class X
Notes. The rating of the Class X Notes was based on the
methodology described in Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities published in February 2012.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA CMBS Transactions published in December
2013.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2014-16 Central Scenarios published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Main factors that could lead to an upgrade of the ratings are (i)
an increase in the property values backing the underlying loans,
and (ii) a decrease of the senior issuer costs. However, ratings
are subject to a Aa3 (sf) rating cap due to operational risk.

Main factors that could lead to a downgrade of the rating are (i)
increase of the length and cost of loan workouts or a decrease of
available issuer revenues due to loan repayments that will lead
to interest deferrals that are unlikely to be repaid together
with the accrued interest by the legal final maturity of the
notes, and (ii) a decrease of the property values backing the
underlying loans. The ratings of the Class D notes could be
susceptible to continued negative developments on interest
shortfall.

Moody's Portfolio Analysis

As of the May 2014 IPD, the transaction balance has declined by
16% to EUR100.3 million from EUR 120.0 million at the February
2014 IPD and EUR545.0 million at closing in September 2006 due to
the pay off of loans originally in the pool. The notes are
currently secured by first-ranking legal mortgages over 51
commercial and multi-family properties. Since the last review two
loans partially repaid. The Netto loan was repaid with an 6% loss
and the ATU Germany loan had a partial repayment ahead of its
extended maturity in July 2014. The pool has an average
concentration in terms of geographic location (46% Germany, based
on loan amounts) and property type (40% office). Moody's uses a
variation of the Herfindahl Index, in which a higher number
represents greater diversity, to measure the diversity of loan
size. Large multi-borrower transactions typically have a Herf of
less than 10 with an average of around 5. This pool has a Herf of
3.2, lower than the 5.9 at Moody's prior review.

Moody's weighted average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of the pool is
106%. Four of the six remaining loans are in special servicing
due to non-payment at maturity, including the largest loan
Cassina Plaza. The other two loans, Bielfeld/Berlin and ATU
Germany, are on watch list because of recent debt-service-
coverage ratio (DSCR) breaches and pending maturity respectively.
Three of the loans are secured by specialist assets with little
alternative use and are linked to the credit quality of the
respective single tenant.

Summary of Moody's Loan Assumptions

Below are Moody's key assumptions for the Top 3 loans.

Casina Plaza loan - LTV: 129% (Whole)/ 129% (A-Loan); Total
Default probability: N/A - Defaulted; Expected Loss 35%-40%.

Cassina Plaza loan is the largest loan and represents 40% of the
pool. It is secured by a medium sized mulit-let office park close
to Milan. The loan is in special servicing since October 2013 and
failed to refinance at maturity. The property is currently 32%
vacant, however the vacancy rate has been stable since the loan
inception. Given the secondary location of the collateral
property and the need for active asset management, Moody's
expects a loss on this loan. The main concern is the length of
the loan work out given the less creditor friendly jurisdiction
and less than five years remaining until the Notes legal final
maturity.

Bielfeld/Berlin loan - LTV: 77% (Whole)/ 77% (A-Loan); Total
Default probability: Very High; Expected Loss 0%-5%.

Bielfeld/Berlin loan represents 25% of the pool and is secured by
one office and retail property in Berlin and few residential
properties in Bielefeld, West Germany. The loan is currently
performing, however due to recent DSCR covenant breach, all cash
is being trapped. The loan maturity is in January 2016.

KingBu loan- LTV: 97% (Whole)/ 97% (A-Loan); Total Default
probability: N/A - Defaulted; Expected Loss 10%-15%.

KingBu loan represents 14% of the pool and is secured initially
by 12 properties in Germany, let mostly to Burger King
restaurants. The loan defaulted at maturity in October 2012 and
has been transferred to special servicing. The strategy for the
loan work out is consensual sale of the properties with one
property sold and agreed sales on another three properties to
date.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO ESPIRITO: Ricardo Salgado Arrested Over Money-Laundering
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Telegraph reports that Ricardo Salgado, who was recently
forced to quit as head of stricken Portuguese bank Banco Espirito
Santo (BES), was arrested on Thursday in connection with money-
laundering.

According to The Telegraph, prosecutors said 70-year-old
Mr. Salgado was arrested early in the day at his home near Lisbon
and brought before a judge.  The arrest, which relates to a long-
running investigation into money-laundering and tax evasion, came
a day after several premises in the Espirito Santo group were
searched on Wednesday, The Telegraph relays.

Mr. Salgado had run BES for 23 years until he was forced out of
office on June 20 as pressure rose amid allegations of accounting
irregularities in some of its holding companies, The Telegraph
discloses.

Last month, BES rattled European stock and bond markets as the
spectre of the eurozone debt crisis was raised again, The
Telegraph recounts.  Fears over BES were triggered by the
accounts claims and the fact that Espirito Santo Financial Group,
which partially owns the bank, missed a payment on short-term
debt, The Telegraph relates.  Alarm was compounded by the group's
structure, which has been controlled by the Espirito Santo family
for nearly 100 years, The Telegraph notes.

According to The Telegraph, Portugal's central bank governor said
on July 18 that BES should be able to tap private investors if it
needs to boost its defenses against losses.

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon.  It is 20% owned by Espirito Santo Financial Group.



=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT GENOVA VI: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed all of its credit
ratings in AyT Genova Hipotecario II Fondo de Titulizacion
Hipotecaria, AyT Genova Hipotecario III Fondo de Titulizacion
Hipotecaria, AyT Genova Hipotecario IV Fondo de Titulizacion
Hipotecaria, AyT Genova Hipotecario VI Fondo de Titulizacion
Hipotecaria, and AyT Genova Hipotecario VII Fondo de Titulizacion
Hipotecaria.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transactions using the most recent information that it has
received for these transactions from the latest investor reports
(May 2014 for Genova IV, June 2014 for Genova II and VII, and
July 2014 for Genova III and VI), as well as the application of
S&P's relevant criteria.

The performance of the underlying collateral has so far been
relatively stable since closing, and even through the adverse
macroeconomic and residential housing conditions that began in
2007.  As of the latest investor reports, the ratio of cumulative
defaults (defined in the transaction documents as loans in
arrears for more than 18 months) over the original collateral
balance was 0.15% for Genova II, 0.22% for Genova III, 0.12% for
Genova IV, 0.33% for Genova VI, and 0.51% for Genova VII.  Severe
delinquencies (defined in the transaction documents as loans in
arrears for more than 90 days) are increasing, but remain low
compared with the 6.17% average for transactions in S&P's Spanish
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) index.  As of the
latest investor reports, severe delinquencies were 0.49% for
Genova II, 0.20% for Genova III, 0.42% for  Genova IV, 0.26% for
Genova VI, and 0.59% for Genova VII.

"We have increased our current weighted-average foreclosure
frequency (WAFF) assumptions, and our weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) assumptions have either remained stable or
decreased for all transactions since our previous reviews.  Our
WAFF assumptions have increased primarily due to our expectations
for GDP growth and unemployment.  Our WALS assumptions have
remained stable or decreased following lower loan-to-value
ratios. All of the portfolios benefit from appropriate levels of
seasoning and geographical diversification," S&P said.

The available credit enhancement for the rated notes -- provided
by subordination and the reserve fund--has increased since S&P's
previous reviews.  This is due to the transactions' amortization
profiles and the fact that the reserve funds have reach their
floor levels.  As of the previous investor report, reserve funds
were at 96.6%, 97.9%, 100%, 100%, and 99.9% of their required
levels for series II, III, IV, VI, and VII, respectively.

Using S&P's WAFF and WALS assumptions in its cash flow model and
taking into account the transactions' structural features and the
notes available credit enhancement, all of the classes of notes
in each transaction pass the cash flow stresses that S&P applies
at their currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed
its ratings on all classes of notes in these transactions.

S&P's ratings on class A and A2 notes in the transactions are
constrained by its sovereign rating on the Kingdom of Spain
(BBB/Stable/A-2) and the application of its nonsovereign ratings
criteria, in which it rates issuers or low sensitivity
transactions in the European Monetary Union up to six notches
above the sovereign rating.

The transaction documents, for all transactions, relating to the
basis swap counterparty and bank account provider are in line
with S&P's current counterparty criteria.  Under the transaction
documents, the counterparties will take remedy actions within a
certain period if the counterparty loses the rating required
under the documents.

These transactions are Spanish RMBS transactions backed by pools
of first-ranking mortgages secured over owner-occupied
residential properties in Spain.  Barclays Bank S.A. originated
the underlying collateral between May 1989 and January 2005.

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CRITERIA CHANGES

As a result of this review, S&P's future criteria applicable to
ratings above the sovereign and to rating transactions backed by
Spanish mortgage assets may differ from S&P's current criteria.
These criteria changes may affect the ratings on the outstanding
RMBS transactions that S&P rates.  Until such time that S&P
adopts new criteria, it will continue to rate and surveil these
transactions using our existing criteria.

RATINGS LIST

Class     Rating

Ratings Affirmed

AyT Genova Hipotecario II Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR800 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A         AA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario III Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR800 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A         AA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario IV Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR800 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A         AA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario VI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR700 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A2        AA (sf)
B         AA- (sf)
C         BBB+ (sf)
D         BB (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario VII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1.4 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A2        AA (sf)
B         A+ (sf)
C         BBB (sf)


BANCO SANTANDER: S&P Reinstates 'BB+' Rating on Preference Share
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has reinstated
its issue rating of 'BB+' to a preference share issued by
Santander Finance Preferred S.A. Unipersonal and guaranteed by
Banco Santander S.A. Due to an administrative error, the rating
of this instrument was withdrawn on July 10, 2014.  The rating
assigned now is the same as the one outstanding at the time of
the withdrawal.  The ISIN number has been corrected to
US80281RAC60 from US80281R8705.

RATINGS LIST
                                          To             From

Santander Finance Preferred S.A. Unipersonal
US$161.587 mil 10.5% non cumulative guaranteed series 11
Preferred
Securities*                               BB+          NR

Guaranteed by Banco Santander S.A.


SANTANDER FINANCIACION 1: S&P Retains CCC- Rating on Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from
'BBB (sf)' its credit rating on Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
Santander Financiacion 1's class C notes.  S&P's ratings on the
class D, E, and F notes are unaffected by the rating actions.

Banco Santander S.A. is the swap counterparty and servicer for
the transaction.  On June 4, 2014, S&P raised to 'BBB+' from
'BBB' its long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on Banco
Santander.

The amount of consumer loans granted to Santander Group employees
in the pool's balance has increased to 60.00% from 16.93% at
closing in 2006.  These loans could potentially result in
employee set-off risk, as the obligors could have a counterclaim
against the seller with respect to due and unpaid salaries.  If
the seller and servicer become insolvent, the obligors could also
have the right to exercise a counterclaim against the issuer.
The transaction's structural features do not mitigate this risk.
Therefore, in S&P's analysis, it assumed that 100% of the
employee's liability toward the issuer could be set off.

Because the transaction has no structural features to mitigate
the existing employee set-off risk, S&P's current counterparty
criteria weak-link its rating on the class C notes to its long-
term ICR on Banco Santander.  Therefore, S&P has raised to 'BBB+
(sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.

The class D notes have not breached their interest deferral
trigger (based on the principal redemption shortfall) in the last
interest payment date.  Therefore, S&P's 'CCC- (sf)' rating on
the class D notes is unaffected by the rating action.

The class E and F notes already defaulted on interest payments in
August 2009 and July 2009, respectively.  Since these defaults,
none of these classes of notes have paid any of the defaulted
interest.  Therefore, S&P's 'D (sf)' ratings on the class E and F
notes also remain unaffected by today's rating action.

Santander Financiacion 1 is a Spanish asset-backed securities
(ABS) transaction that closed in December 2006.  Static
portfolios of auto and consumer loans--originated and serviced by
Banco Santander--back the notes.


TDA TARRAGONA I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'BBB- (sf)' from
'BB+ (sf)' its credit rating on TDA Tarragona 1, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos' class A notes.  At the same time, S&P
has lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' its rating on the class
B notes.

Under S&P's current counterparty criteria, the ratings in this
transaction will be the higher of the credit and cash flow rating
results without the support of the swap agreement, and the long-
term issuer credit rating (ICR) on the swap counterparty.

On June 4, 2014, S&P raised to 'BBB-/A-3' from 'BB+/B' S&P's
long- and short-term ratings on Cecabank S.A.  As a result, S&P's
rating on the class A notes is now capped at 'BBB- (sf)'.  S&P
has therefore raised to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on
the class A notes, as the class A notes' credit and cash flow
results do not support a higher rating when S&P do not give
credit to the support of the swap agreement.

In S&P's cash flow analysis for the class B notes, it bases its
commingling risk stress on the credit quality of the servicer,
Catalunya Banc.  Due to the recent deterioration of the
servicer's credit quality, S&P has lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB-
(sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

After the rating actions, S&P's estimated ratings for TDA
Tarragona I in its Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) index scenario analysis are listed as.

Class A notes:

   -- Estimated rating if all counterparties were rated 'AAA':
      'A'
   -- Estimated rating if the sovereign were rated 'AAA': 'A'
   -- Estimated rating if all counterparties and the sovereign
      were rated 'AAA': 'A'

Class B notes:

   -- Estimated rating if all counterparties were rated 'AAA':
      'BB'
   -- Estimated rating if the sovereign were rated 'AAA': 'BB'
   -- Estimated rating if all counterparties and the sovereign
      were rated 'AAA': 'BB'

TDA Tarragona I is a Spanish RMBS transaction that closed in
November 2007.  It securitizes a portfolio of residential
mortgage loans, most of which are originated by real estate
agents.  The loans are secured over Spanish properties, mainly in
Catalonia (95.13% of the balance of the outstanding pool).  Loans
granted to second-home buyers currently represent 11% of the
pool, and loans granted to self-employed borrowers account for
6.3% of the pool's outstanding balance.  Catalunya Banc
(previously Caixa D'Estalvis de Tarragona) originated the
underlying loans.

RATINGS LIST

Class      Rating            Rating
           To                From

TDA Tarragona 1, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR397.4 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A          BBB- (sf)         BB+ (sf)

Rating Lowered

B          B+ (sf)           BB- (sf)



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CLARENVILLE CDO: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from
'BB+ (sf)' its credit rating on Clarenville CDO S.A.'s class B
notes.  At the same time, S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from
'CCC+ (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the trustee report dated May 2,
2014 and the application of its relevant criteria.

"We conducted our cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes at each rating
level.  The BDR represents our estimate of the maximum level of
gross defaults, based on our stress assumptions, that a tranche
can withstand and still pay interest and fully repay principal to
the noteholders.  We used the portfolio balance that we consider
to be performing, the reported weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate.  We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using our standard default patterns and timings for each rating
category assumed for each class of notes, combined with different
interest stress scenarios as outlined in our 2009 corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria," S&P said.

The transaction has deleveraged significantly since S&P's
previous review on May 31, 2012.  The class B notes have
amortized by about 65.7% of its initial note balance.  This has
increased the available credit enhancement for the class B and C
notes.

However, the portfolio is highly concentrated with nine distinct
performing obligors, and its credit quality has deteriorated
since S&P's previous review.  The proportion of assets rated 'B+'
and above has fallen to 21.5% from 33.5% of the performing
portfolio, and defaulted assets and assets rated 'CCC-', 'CCC',
or 'CCC+' have increased as a percentage of the total portfolio.
Additionally, the transaction's weighted-average spread has
decreased to 2.92% from 3.33% and the class C notes are failing
the interest coverage test.  S&P's analysis shows that long-dated
assets (assets that mature beyond the transaction's legal final
maturity) make up 49.6% of the performing portfolio, exposing the
transaction to potential market value risk.  Therefore, in S&P's
cash flow analysis, it has applied additional stresses to the
long-dated assets.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the available
credit enhancement for the class B notes is commensurate with a
higher rating than currently assigned.  However, the application
of the largest obligor test constrains S&P's rating on the class
B notes at 'BBB+ (sf)'.  S&P has therefore raised to 'BBB+ (sf)'
from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.  The largest
obligor test measures the risk of several of the largest obligors
within the portfolio defaulting simultaneously.  S&P introduced
this supplemental stress test in its 2009 CDO criteria.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the available
credit enhancement for the class C notes is commensurate with a
lower rating than currently assigned.  S&P has therefore lowered
to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.

Clarenville CDO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans granted to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
February 2004 and Pacific Investment Management Co. LLC. manages
it.  Since the reinvestment period ended in March 2009, the
issuer has used all of the scheduled principal proceeds to redeem
the notes in line with the transaction's documented priority of
payments.

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating            Rating
             To                From

Clarenville CDO S.A.
EUR226 Million, GBP25 Million, US$55.5 Million Floating-Rate
Notes

Rating Raised

B            BBB+ (sf)         BB+ (sf)

Rating Lowered

C            CCC- (sf)         CCC+ (sf)


ITHACA ENERGY: S&P Assigns 'B' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to U.K.-based oil and gas development and
production company Ithaca Energy Inc.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'CCC+' issue rating to Ithaca's
$300 million senior unsecured notes due 2019.  The recovery
rating is '6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible
(0%-10%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.

The ratings reflect S&P's view of Ithaca's "significant"
financial risk profile and "vulnerable" business risk profile.

S&P's assessment of Ithaca's business risk profile and
competitive position as "vulnerable" reflects its view of the
company's limited, but fast-growing, scale of production and low
diversity of operations.  Ithaca operates almost exclusively on
the U.K. Continental Shelf (UKCS) with an interest in 11
production fields, increasing to 13 on completion of the Summit
Petroleum acquisition.  Ithaca's business model is to focus on
production and development, rather than riskier exploration
activities.

Ithaca's oil reserves and production are comparably very low,
with commercial reserves (2P; proven plus probable reserves) of
58 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) and average production
of just 10,390 boe per day (boepd) in 2013.  These figures
exclude contribution from the Summit Petroleum acquisition, which
Ithaca estimates will add approximately 12 million boe to
reserves.  The company's significant forecast production growth
is heavily dependent on the Greater Stella Area (GSA) development
hitting targets and coming online without further delays.  S&P
understands that Ithaca plans to complete the acquisition of
small, nonoperated interests in three U.K. oil fields from Summit
Petroleum (for about US$160 million) in the third quarter of
2014. S&P assumes that these interests will further augment
Ithaca's production profile, with the company targeting total
production of approximately 25,000 boepd in 2015.

S&P views Ithaca's production at 95% oil as favorable given the
currently high oil price, although it expects the proportion of
gas to increase going forward.  Furthermore, any changes to local
tax rules and allowances are inherent, as with peers.  However,
S&P understands that the U.K. government remains supportive of
efforts to invest, and stimulate production, in new developments
and mature fields on the UKCS.  S&P assess Ithaca's management
and governance as "satisfactory," reflecting its experienced
management team.

Ithaca's "significant" financial risk profile reflects S&P's
forecast that Ithaca will deleverage following a peak in adjusted
debt to EBITDA of above 2.5x, and a low in funds from operations
(FFO) to debt of less than 40% at year-end 2014.  S&P's
assessment also reflects Ithaca's negative free operating cash
flow generation in 2014, due to acquisition spending and high
capital expenditure (capex).  S&P further factors in potentially
highly volatile cash flows, given that oil prices can be
unpredictable and the oil industry is associated with heavy
capital intensity. However, the company has a rolling commodity
price hedging program, which helps to mitigate this risk to some
extent.

S&P's base-case scenario assumes that there are no material
further delays to production start-up in the GSA and that the
non-operated interests are acquired from Summit Petroleum.
Together these factors would result in a material increase in
production in 2015 and 2016.

S&P's base-case scenario incorporates the following assumptions:

   -- A Brent Oil price of $110 per barrel (/bbl) in 2014 and
      US$105/bbl in 2015.

   -- Production of approximately 25,000 boepd in 2015.

   -- Capex of about US$340 million in 2014 and US$180 million in
      2015.

   -- No material cash income tax over the medium term.  Ithaca
      benefits from tax incentives and carried forward tax
      losses.

   -- No dividends.  Ithaca has not paid any dividends since its
      incorporation and does not plan to pay any in the near
      term.

   -- Acquisitions are likely to play a significant role in the
      company's future reserves and production growth, but S&P
      understands that such spending will be restricted to the
      company's financial policy of reported net debt to EBITDA
      of less than 2x on a sustained basis.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures at year-end 2014:

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of above 2.5x in 2014 but below
      2.0x from 2015.

   -- Funds from operations to debt of below 40% in 2014 and
      about 60% in 2015.

   -- Negative free operating cash flow (FOCF) in 2014 as a
      result of acquisition spending and capex, returning to
      positive from 2015 as the GSA comes online.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's forecasts that Ithaca will
increase its production in the U.K. North Sea materially, once
the GSA comes online in mid-2015.  S&P forecasts that Ithaca will
deleverage below 2.0x following a peak in adjusted debt to EBITDA
of above 2.5x at year-end 2014.  S&P anticipates that liquidity
will remain "adequate" over the next 12 months.

S&P could lower the rating if Ithaca does not meet its forecast
material step-up in production growth.  This could occur as a
result of unexpected operational issues, or if GSA is subject to
further material production delays or start-up issues.  Downside
pressure could also result from large debt-funded acquisitions or
liquidity issues.

S&P views the likelihood of an upgrade as remote in the near
term, due to Ithaca's lack of diversification and limited scope
of operations.  However, if the company continues to aggressively
grow its production levels, without materially increasing debt
leverage, S&P could consider raising the rating over the medium
to longer term.


PIZZAEXPRESS: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to Twinkle Pizza Holdings PLC
(PizzaExpress).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary 'B' long-term
issue rating to the group's proposed GBP410 million senior
secured notes.  The preliminary recovery rating on the notes is
'3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%)
recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.

In addition, S&P assigned its 'CCC+' preliminary long-term issue
rating to the group's proposed GBP200 million senior unsecured
notes.  The preliminary recovery rating on the notes is '6',
indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.

S&P also assigned a preliminary 'BB-' long-term issue rating to
the group's proposed GBP30 million super senior revolving credit
facility (RCF).  The preliminary recovery rating on the RCF is
'1', indicating our expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.

The preliminary ratings are subject to the successful issuance of
the notes and S&P's review of the final documentation.  If
Standard & Poor's does not receive the final documentation within
a reasonable timeframe, or if the final documentation departs
from the materials S&P has already reviewed, it reserves the
right to withdraw or revise its ratings.

"The preliminary ratings reflect our view of PizzaExpress'
business risk profile as 'fair' and financial risk profile as
'highly leveraged', as our criteria define the terms" said
Standard & Poor's credit analyst Raam Ratnam.  "We combine these
factors to derive an anchor of 'b'. Our modifiers have no impact
on the rating outcome," said Mr. Ratnam.

S&P's assessment of PizzaExpress' "fair" business risk profile
reflects its view of its well-established market position in the
highly competitive and cyclical U.K. restaurant sector.
PizzaExpress is exposed to changing trends in consumers'
discretionary spending and volatile commodity prices, and has
currently limited geographic diversification outside the U.K.
These weaknesses are alleviated by PizzaExpress' strong brand and
market-leading position in the U.K. casual dining segment, with a
large portfolio of over 430 well-located restaurants.  S&P's
business risk profile assessment also incorporates its view of
the restaurant industry's "intermediate" risk and the "very low"
country risk in the U.K., where PizzaExpress generates more than
95% of its EBITDA.

S&P considers that PizzaExpress has an efficient operating model,
thanks to its relatively standardized and focused menu, which
results in a consistent food offering and helps to keep down the
cost of ingredients.  Together with a uniform, simple cooking
platform, these factors help to lower the requirements for
specialized staff and provide some economies of scale--supporting
PizzaExpress' profit margin, which is above average compared with
its peers in the restaurant sector.

PizzaExpress' "highly leveraged" financial risk profile
assessment reflects S&P's view of the company's leverage metrics
and its assessment of its financial policy as "financial sponsor-
6," based on its private equity ownership.

S&P assess PizzaExpress' liquidity position as "adequate," as
defined in its criteria, under the proposed capital structure.

The stable rating outlook reflects S&P's expectation that
PizzaExpress will be able to achieve moderate EBITDA growth
thanks to positive like-for-like sales growth in an improving
macroeconomic environment in the U.K., new store openings, and
stable EBITDA margins.  S&P expects that the company's adjusted
debt to EBITDA will remain stable at over 9x (over 6.5x when
excluding the shareholder loans) and EBITDAR coverage will remain
around 1.7x.  S&P anticipates that PizzaExpress will continue to
maintain free cash flow generation in excess of GBP30 million,
even after funding the expansion capex.

"We could lower the ratings if PizzaExpress does not achieve
EBITDA growth, causing a weakening of credit ratios and
liquidity. This could result from factors such as deterioration
in the U.K.'s economy, an inability to pass on commodity price
inflation, execution risks related to the international expansion
strategy, or a supply chain disruption or food safety scare.  We
could also lower the ratings if the financial sponsor owner
chooses to materially increase leverage in the company, if
liquidity deteriorates on back of declining free cash flows, or
if the EBITDAR coverage drops below 1.5x," S&P said.

S&P currently considers an upgrade to be unlikely.  However, S&P
could raise the ratings if it perceives that Hony Capital's
financial policy for PizzaExpress is conservative, and the
EBITDAR overage ratio sustainably rises to more than 2.2x and
adjusted debt to EBITDA falls below 5.0x, with low risk of
releveraging.


THRONES 2014-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
credit ratings to Thrones 2014-1 PLC's class A to F notes.  At
closing, Thrones 2014-1 will also issue unrated residual
certificates.

At closing, the issuer will purchase the beneficial interest in a
portfolio of U.K. residential mortgage loans from the beneficial
title seller (Raphael Mortgages Ltd.), using the proceeds from
the issuance of the rated notes and the unrated residual
certificates. At closing, the issuer will use the proceeds from a
reserve subordinated loan to fund a general reserve fund and
liquidity reserve fund.

As the seller is a special-purpose entity (SPE), it has limited
resources to meet its financial obligations under the
representations and warranties in the transaction documentation.
In S&P's view, this limits the value of the seller's
representations and warranties to the issuer.  S&P considers the
package of representations and warranties to be nonstandard.  S&P
has therefore increased its weighted-average foreclosure
frequency (WAFF) estimates to address this risk.

The GBP310.89 million preliminary pool (as of May 31, 2014)
comprises first-lien U.K. nonconforming residential mortgage
loans owned by Raphael Mortgages.  The originators are Edeus
Mortgage Creators Ltd. (63.82%) and Victoria Mortgage Funding
Ltd. (36.18%).

The first-lien U.K. nonconforming residential mortgage loans
include 10.30% of loans with previous County Court judgments
(CCJs), as well as 1.95% of loans to borrowers who have
previously been declared bankrupt.  Of the preliminary pool,
46.91% are self-certified loans.  The portfolio's weighted-
average current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 91.09% (according to
S&P's methodology, which includes haircuts [discounts] to
valuations when the valuation method was not a full surveyor
valuation).  The weighted-average original LTV ratio is 85.40%.
Of the preliminary pool, 26.27% are for buy-to-let mortgages and
22.41% are loans made to first-time buyers.  There is also a high
proportion (85.01%) of interest-only loans in the preliminary
pool.

The class A to F notes' interest rates are equal to three-month
British pound sterling LIBOR plus class-specific margins.  There
will be basis risk in the pool as the underlying collateral
contains loans that are linked to the Bank of England Base Rate
(BBR) or three-month sterling LIBOR (that resets at a different
reset date to the notes).  As a result, S&P stresses the
historical difference between the index paid on the assets and
the liabilities.  S&P's analysis then takes the percentiles of
the resulting distribution according to table 20 of its U.K.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria.  This
transaction will not benefit from a swap to hedge basis risk.

S&P treated the class B to F notes as deferrable-interest notes
in its analysis.  Under the transaction documentation, the issuer
can defer interest payments on the class B to F notes.
Consequently, any deferral of interest on the class B to F notes
would not constitute an event of default.  While S&P's
preliminary 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A notes addresses the
timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment of principal,
S&P's preliminary ratings on the class B to F notes address the
ultimate payment of principal and the ultimate payment of
interest only.

S&P's preliminary ratings reflect its assessment of the
transaction's payment structure, cash flow mechanics, and the
results of its cash flow analysis to assess whether the notes
would be repaid under stress test scenarios.  Subordination and
the general reserve fund provide credit enhancement to the notes
that are senior to the unrated residual certificates.  Taking
these factors into account, S&P considers the available credit
enhancement for the rated notes to be commensurate with the
preliminary ratings that S&P has assigned.

RATINGS LIST

Thrones 2014-1 PLC
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes and
Unrated Residual Certificates

Class           Prelim.          Prelim.
                rating        class size
                                     (%)

A               AAA (sf)           60.50
B               AA (sf)            10.50
C               A (sf)              9.50
D               BBB (sf)            7.50
E               BB (sf)             5.50
F               B (sf)              1.50
RC              NR                  5.50

RC--Residual certificates.
NR--Not rated.


UNIPART AUTOMOTIVE: In Administration; 1,244 Jobs Affected
----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Unipart Automotive has gone into
administration with the loss of 1,244 jobs following "financial
stress" in recent years.

According to BBC, Unipart Automotive staff in Cardiff, Newport,
Trealaw, Swansea, Lllanelli, Bangor, Llandudno, Porthmadog and
Wrexham are all affected.

A total of 33 sites around the country have been sold as ongoing
concerns, BBC discloses.

"Despite intensive efforts over recent weeks, a sale of the whole
Unipart Automotive business could not be reached, and a buyer
could only be found for 33 of the sites on a going concern
basis," BBC quotes joint administrator Mark Orton, of KPMG, as
saying.  "Unfortunately, the business had been experiencing
financial stress for a number of years, so the level of cash and
further operational restructuring required to rescue a more
substantial part of the business posed too much risk for most
interested parties."

Unipart Automotive is a car parts firm based in Solihull, West
Midlands.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
-------------------------------------------
Author: Frank H. Knight
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 381 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/al9gqP

The tenets Frank H. Knight sets out in this, his first book,
have become an integral part of modern economic theory. Still
readable today, it was included as a classic in the 1998 Forbes
reading list. The book grew out of Knight's 1917 Cornell
University doctoral thesis, which took second prize in an essay
contest that year sponsored by Hart, Schaffner and Marx. In it,
he examined the relationship between knowledge on the part of
entrepreneurs and changes in the economy. He, quite famously,
distinguished between two types of change, risk and uncertainty,
defining risk as randomness with knowable probabilities and
uncertainty as randomness with unknowable probabilities. Risk,
he said, arises from repeated changes for which probabilities
can be calculated and insured against, such as the risk of fire.
Uncertainty arises from unpredictable changes in an economy,
such as resources, preferences, and knowledge, changes that
cannot be insured against. Uncertainty, he said "is one of the
fundamental facts of life."

One of the larger issues of Knight's time was how the
entrepreneur, the central figure in a free enterprise system,
earns profits in the face of competition. It was thought that
competition would reduce profits to zero across a sector because
any profits would attract more entrepreneurs into the sector and
increase supply, which would drive prices down, resulting in
competitive equilibrium and zero profit.

Knight argued that uncertainty itself may allow some
entrepreneurs to earn profits despite this equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs, he said, are forced to guess at their expected
total receipts. They cannot foresee the number of products they
will sell because of the unpredictability of consumer
preferences. Still, they must purchase product inputs, so they
base these purchases on the number of products they guess they
will sell. Finally, they have to guess the price at which their
products will sell. These factors are all uncertain and
impossible to know. Profits are earned when uncertainty yields
higher total receipts than forecasted total receipts. Thus,
Knight postulated, profits are merely due to luck. Such
entrepreneurs who "get lucky" will try to reproduce their
success, but will be unable to because their luck
will eventually turn.

At the time, some theorists were saying that when this luck runs
out, entrepreneurs will then rely on and substitute improved
decision making and management for their original
entrepreneurship, and the profits will return. Knight saw
entrepreneurs as poor managers, however, who will in time fail
against new and lucky entrepreneurs. He concluded that economic
change is a result of this constant interplay between new
entrepreneurial action and existing businesses hedging against
uncertainty by improving their internal organization.

Frank H. Knight has been called "among the most broad-ranging
and influential economists of the twentieth century" and "one of
the most eclectic economists and perhaps the deepest thinker and
scholar American economics has produced." He stands among the
giants of American economists that include Schumpeter and Viner.
His students included Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, George
Stigler and James Buchanan, as well as Paul Samuelson. At the
University of Chicago, Knight specialized in the history of
economic thought. He revolutionized the economics department
there, becoming one the leaders of what has become known as the
Chicago School of Economics. Under his tutelage and guidance,
the University of Chicago became the bulwark against the more
interventionist and anti-market approaches followed elsewhere in

American economic thought. He died in 1972.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *