TCREUR_Public/140806.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, August 6, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 154



CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Bulgaria May Face Suit if Bond Defaults
CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Central Bank to Ask Full Audit of Assets


BANQUE PSA: Moody's Changes 'D' BFSR Outlook to Positive


GREECE: Moody's Hikes Government Bond Rating to 'Caa1'
YIOULA GLASSWORKS: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC' on Refinancing


DEXIA CREDIOP: S&P Revises Outlook to Dev. & Affirms 'BB-' Rating
PIAGGIO & C: Moody's Changes 'Ba3' CFR Outlook to Negative
VENUS-1 FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to 'Csf'


QAZAQ BANKI: S&P Assigns 'B-' Counterparty Rating; Outlook Stable


ESPIRITO SANTO: Regulators to Probe Eurofin Relationship
TRAVELPORT FINANCE: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to $2.3BB Debt


BANCO ESPIRITO: Fiscal Impact of Bailout Limited, Fitch Says


BANCAJA 9: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Tranche
BBVA RMBS 1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class C Tranche to 'CCsf'
CABLEUROPA SAU: Moody's Lifts CFR to 'Ba1' After Vodafone Buyout
IDCSALUD HOLDING: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable


UKRAINIAN RAILWAYS: S&P Affirms 'CCC' CCR; Outlook Negative

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALDERSHOT TOWN: Exits CVA Two Years Ahead of Schedule
HEREFORD UNITED: CVA Document Unveils Creditors List
KEYDATA INVESTMENT: Ford Threatens to Sue UK Financial Regulator



CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Bulgaria May Face Suit if Bond Defaults
Matthias Williams at Reuters reports that holders of
dollar-denominated bonds at Bulgaria's Corporate Commercial Bank
(Corpbank) 6C9.BB are gearing up for legal action against the
government if the bond defaults and the bank is tipped into

A default has looked increasingly likely after a run on deposits
at Corpbank in June, which prompted the central bank to seize
control of Bulgaria's fourth largest lender, shut down its
operations and block depositors from taking out money, Reuters

There is still no solution in sight for a rescue of the bank,
whose closure sparked the Balkan country's worst banking crisis
since the 1990s, especially after lawmakers rejected a proposed
rescue package earlier in July, Reuters notes.

The maturity of the bond, which had an original issue of US$150
million, falls on Aug. 8, Reuters discloses.

Two sources told Reuters that a group of bondholders, which
includes hedge funds and institutions in the United States and
Europe, have formed a committee and hired legal representation in
Bulgaria in the event the government tips Corpbank into

Corporate Commercial Bank is Bulgaria's fourth largest private
lender with total assets topping BGN7.3 billion in the first
quarter of 2014, or 8.4% of total Bulgarian private banking
assets, according to AFP.

CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Central Bank to Ask Full Audit of Assets
Tsvetelia Tsolova at Reuters reports that Bulgaria's central bank
said on July 31 it will ask independent auditors to carry out a
thorough review of Corporate Commercial Bank's (Corpbank) books
until Oct. 20, effectively extending its control over the bank.

The central bank took control of Corpbank on June 20 for three
months following a bank run, which plunged the Balkan country
into its worst banking crisis since the 1990s, Reuters recounts.
The central bank proposed a rescue plan for Bulgaria's fourth
largest lender, which failed to get parliament's approval,
Reuters relays.

According to Reuters, the central bank said it now plans to ask
current shareholders of Corpbank to express interest in whether
they are willing to provide capital and liquidity support.  It
said it plans to extend its control over the bank beyond an
initial deadline of Sept. 21, Reuters notes.

The central bank can keep a lender under its supervision for up
to six months under Bulgarian law, Reuters states.

Clients unnerved by reports of alleged shady deals involving
Corpbank's main owner Tsvetan Vassilev withdrew more than a fifth
of deposits in a week-long bank run in June, forcing the central
bank to shut down its operations, Reuters relates.

According to Reuters, a report by the central bank's
administrators showed that Corpbank's loan portfolio stood at
BGN5.3 billion (US$3.63 billion)at the end of June, while its
deposits had dropped by BGN630 million from a month earlier to
BGN5.6 billion.

The bank registered a loss of BGN65.3 million after having to
cover devaluations of its loans, the central bank, as cited by
Reuters, said in a statement, while its total capital adequacy
ratio had dropped to 10.54 percent at the end of June, from
12.56% at the end of 2013.

The central bank will ask Deloitte, EY and local auditing firm
AFA to carry out a full review of the bank's assets, after their
initial audit showed insufficient information to value loans
worth BGN3.5 billion, Reuters discloses.  It said that the
initial audit had indicated "activities incompatible with the law
and good banking practices", Reuters relays.

Corporate Commercial Bank is Bulgaria's fourth largest private
lender with total assets topping BGN7.3 billion in the first
quarter of 2014, or 8.4% of total Bulgarian private banking
assets, according to AFP.


BANQUE PSA: Moody's Changes 'D' BFSR Outlook to Positive
Moody's Investors Service has changed to positive the outlook on
Banque PSA Finance (BPF)'s standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) of D, equivalent to a baseline credit assessment
(BCA) of ba2, and changed to stable the outlook on its Ba1
long-term debt and deposit ratings.

Furthermore, the outlook on the Ba1 backed long-term debt ratings
of BPF's subsidiary, Peugeot Finance International N.V. (PFI),
has also been changed to stable from negative. Concurrently,
these ratings were affirmed.

The changes in outlook follow the change to a positive outlook on
the long-term ratings of BPF's parent, Peugeot S.A. (PSA).
Moody's recently changed outlook on Peugeot's B1 ratings to

The EUR1.5 billion government-guaranteed senior unsecured debt
securities are unaffected by the rating actions and remain rated
Aa1, negative.

Ratings Rationale

In affirming the bank's 'D' BFSR, Moody's takes into account that
the bank's creditworthiness is stronger than that of its parent.
Hence, its ba2 BCA is positioned two notches above PSA's B1
senior debt rating. Nevertheless, Moody's believes that the
bank's strong credit linkages to PSA -- intricate strategic,
commercial and financial ties -- continue to constrain BPF's
standalone BCA. Moody's revised the outlook on BPF's BFSR to
positive as a result of the change in the outlook of PSA's
rating, which is now positive.

Moody's has also revised the outlook on BPF's Ba1 long-term debt
and deposit ratings to stable from negative, which reflects the
balance between (1) the positive outlook on the bank's BFSR,
which is credit positive for the bank's long-term ratings; and
(2) the credit-negative impact of recent regulatory evolution in
the EU on Moody's systemic support assumptions for banks.

On July 10, PSA announced that BPF and Santander Consumer Finance
S.A. (Santander CF, Baa1 stable, BFSR C- stable/BCA baa2) had
signed an agreement to set up 50/50 local partnerships to develop
BPF's European activities. The details of the future set-up
starting during 2015 are still unknown and completion is not
expected until early 2016. However, Moody's believes that a
partnership with Santander CF would be credit positive for the
bank, at least in relation to the expansion of its business and
its funding. For example, the local partnerships would have
access to cheaper funding. This could significantly improve BPF's
profitability through dividends received from the local
partnerships and BPF would be able to discontinue its reliance on
the French State guarantee, which is costly and contributed to a
reduction of the bank's net interest margin in 2013. However, too
little is yet known about the implications of the local
partnerships for the bank's strategy or structure for Moody's to
draw any clear conclusions in relation to the credit implications
for holders of BPF's debt during the outlook horizon.

What Could Change the Rating UP

An upgrade of PSA's long-term ratings would likely result in a
similar rating action on BPF's standalone BFSR, which would, in
turn, likely exert upward pressure on the bank's long-term

An upgrade of BPF's standalone BFSR and long-term ratings could
also occur if (1) the stresses associated with the bank's
intrinsic credit links with its industrial parent are alleviated
thanks to the transaction with Santander CF; and (2) there is a
continuation or improvement in BPF's financial performance.

What Could Change the Rating DOWN

A downgrade of BPF's standalone BFSR is unlikely at present, as
reflected by the positive outlook.

The long-term ratings of BPF could be downgraded as a result of a
lower probability of systemic support available to BPF in the
future, which may occur due to the evolving regulatory framework
for resolution in the EU.

List of Affected Ratings

The following ratings of BPF and related entities were affected
by the rating actions:

   -- The outlook on BPF's standalone BFSR of D, equivalent to a
      BCA of ba2, was changed to positive from stable

   -- The outlook on BPF's long-term debt and deposit ratings of
      Ba1 was changed to stable from negative

   -- The outlook on Peugeot Finance International N.V.'s backed
      long-term senior unsecured rating of Ba1 was changed to
      stable from negative

   -- All of the above ratings were affirmed


GREECE: Moody's Hikes Government Bond Rating to 'Caa1'
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Greece's government bond
rating to Caa1 from Caa3. Moody's expectation on the improvement
in Greece's economic outlook, the significant improvement in
Greece's fiscal position over the past year and the government's
reduced interest burden and lengthened maturities of the debt
triggered the positive rating action. In addition, Moody's raised
Greece's local and foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings to
Ba3 from B3 to reflect the country's reduced economic, legal and
political risks.

Consequently, the maximum achievable rating for Greek structured
finance rated transactions increased to Ba3(sf) from B3(sf).

Moody's is assessing the impact of Greece's government bond
rating action and the corresponding increase in the local-
currency country ceiling on all outstanding Greek structured
finance rated transactions. For this purpose, Moody's also
considers (i) the performance of the underlying asset portfolios
in line with Moody's collateral assumptions and (ii) the
counterparty risks imbedded in the transactions, including
servicers, account banks and swap counterparties exposures, in
accordance with Moody's methodologies.

YIOULA GLASSWORKS: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC' on Refinancing
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit ratings on Greece-based glass container manufacturer
Yioula Glassworks S.A. and its core subsidiary Glasstank B.V. to
'CCC' from 'CCC-'.  S&P kept the ratings on both entities on
CreditWatch with positive implications, where it had placed them
on May 5, 2014 and May 14, 2014, respectively.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC' ratings on the EUR185
million senior secured notes due 2019, issued by Glasstank.

In addition, S&P withdrew its 'CC' issue ratings on Yioula's
senior unsecured notes, which it had placed on CreditWatch with
positive implications on May 5, 2014.

The upgrade follows the group's successful refinancing of its
EUR140 million senior unsecured notes, through new EUR185 million
senior secured notes issued by its core subsidiary Glasstank.
Since this transaction, the group has partially addressed its
short-term refinancing risk and has further extended its debt
maturity profile.

Yet, S&P considers that the group's strained liquidity position
continues to weigh on the ratings.

The ratings remain on CreditWatch because of pending discussions
with Eurobank Ergasias S.A and Piraeus Bank S.A. over the
extension of debt commitments, currently due by June 2015,
totaling approximately EUR40 million.  S&P expects to obtain an
update on the progress of these negotiations within the next 60

In S&P's view, a successful extension of its debt obligations
with Eurobank and Piraeus Bank will translate into a more
manageable debt maturity profile, as yearly commitments are
unlikely to exceed EUR12 million over the next 24 months,
excluding the impact of short-term lines renewed annually.

S&P continues to assess Yioula's financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged" because of its Standard & Poor's-adjusted
total debt-to-EBITDA ratio well above 5x.  The group's low cash
balance and still-limited free operating cash flow (FOCF)
generation, resulting from heavy capital outlays for the
refurbishment of its furnaces, continue to constrain the ratings.

That said, the group delivered reasonable operating performance
in 2013.  Although sales slipped due to the reconstruction of the
furnaces at Drujba (Bulgaria) and Stirom (Romania), and the halt
of operations at Bucha (Ukraine), EBITDA generation remained
fairly satisfactory, reaching EUR54 million at year-end 2013
(excluding the EUR19 million impairment on Ukrainian operations).
This translated into still healthy EBITDA margin in excess of
20%, thanks to a relief in input costs, particularly for natural
gas, combined with continuous price increases.  While Glasstank's
first-quarter results still show satisfactory operating results,
S&P thinks that a deteriorating socioeconomic and political
environment in Ukraine and continuously weak economic prospects
in Greece may constrain the group's consolidated results.

"Our view of the group's business risk profile as "weak"
primarily stems from its narrow focus on the Balkan area and its
presence in countries featuring moderate to high country risk,
under our criteria.  We acknowledge management's efforts to
lessen the group's exposure to its core markets through
penetration of the larger Western Europe glass tableware market,
which accounts for approximately 11% of group sales.  Still, in
this market, the group faces fierce competition from much larger
and integrated glass container manufacturers. An additional
constraint on Yioula's business risk profile is its exposure to
volatile energy costs and its concentration on glass packaging,
which we view as mature and vulnerable to substitution risks from
plastics and metal. Yioula also has high capital expenditure
needs, particularly to refurbish furnaces," S&P said.

These weaknesses are partially tempered by the group's leading
positions in its core markets, with market share in excess of
70%; above average EBITDA margin; a diversified customer base;
and longstanding relationships with multinational companies from
the food and beverage industry.  S&P understands that the group
is currently refurbishing its furnaces with an eye to increasing
its production capacity, while reducing energy consumption by
applying best-in-class technology.

S&P assess management and governance as "weak," under its
criteria, owing to Yioula's ongoing liquidity issues.

Glasstank accounts for roughly 70% of Yioula's revenues, EBITDA,
and total assets as of Dec. 31, 2013.  S&P assess Glasstank as a
core subsidiary of the group, as per its group rating
methodology. In S&P's view, its creditworthiness is fairly
comparable with that of the consolidated group, which leads S&P
to align the ratings with those on Yioula. We don't think that
Glasstank can be viewed as an "insulated subsidiary," as defined
in S&P's criteria, because the parent company is gearing up this
subsidiary to refinance its existing debt through the proposed

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Flat revenue growth in 2014-2015, as extra production from
      the new furnaces--and S&P's view that the market has the
      potential to absorb it--is likely to be offset by a
      deteriorating Ukrainian environment and ongoing weak
      economic prospects in Greece;

   -- EBITDA margin likely to remain at about 21%-24%; and

   -- Continuous capital spending on the ongoing enhancement of
     the production facilities.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit

   -- Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA well above 5x at
      year-end 2014 and year-end 2015;

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt limited to 7%-9% over
      the same period; and

   -- Persistently negative FOCF because of the ongoing
      refurbishment of the Bulgarian and Romanian production

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch placement within the next 60

The CreditWatch reflects S&P's expectation that it would likely
raise the corporate credit rating by one notch should Yioula's
negotiations with Eurobank Ergasias and Piraeus Bank allow the
group to address its near-term debt commitments.

If management fails to renegotiate its debt obligations, S&P is
likely to affirm the corporate credit rating at 'CCC' and
reassess the issue rating.


DEXIA CREDIOP: S&P Revises Outlook to Dev. & Affirms 'BB-' Rating
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised the
outlook on Italian bank Dexia Crediop SpA to developing from
negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on the bank.

The outlook revision follows Dexia Crediop's announcement on
July 16 that its parent Dexia Credit Local (DCL) has not yet
received a firm offer for the purchase of Crediop, but that
negotiations are ongoing.  With no sale confirmed, the European
Commission said it will not further extend the period in which
Crediop could provide funding to existing clients, and the bank
would be managed in run-off as part of the resolution of the
Dexia Group.  The developing outlook reflects S&P's view that
Crediop's relationship with DCL could evolve in different
directions: either becoming stronger, with Crediop fully
integrated in the group following the European Commission's
decision, or being dissolved when Crediop is sold to a third
party.  If a sale is completed, S&P will assess the implications
for the bank's business and financial profiles and the level of
support it will receive from its new parent.

S&P's current rating on Crediop incorporates three notches of
uplift for potential extraordinary support from its parent, as
S&P views it as a "strategically important" subsidiary of DCL.
Following the European Commission's decision, if Crediop is not
sold S&P expects it to become more integrated with the Dexia
Group and to be managed more in line with the other rated group
subsidiaries--all of which S&P considers "core" to the group's
main operating entity, DCL.  S&P's analysis also takes into
account its view of the increased likelihood of the Dexia Group
providing additional liquidity support to Crediop if needed.

Despite the stable trend that S&P now sees for the industry risks
Italian banks face, it believes that Crediop, like other Italian
banks, may face risks deriving from a potentially weaker-than-
anticipated economic recovery in Italy.  If economic risk were to
increase it would likely affect S&P's anchor for Crediop, the
starting point for S&P's rating.

"We expect Crediop to continue its gradual deleveraging process.
In 2013, Crediop reduced its total assets by almost 27% compared
with 2012; a large portion of this reduction was due to the
EUR3.4 billion sale of Dexia Crediop per la Cartolarizzazione
(DCC) to French public sector bank Caisse Fran‡aise de
Financement Local. We expect Crediop to gradually further reduce
its asset portfolio, per the agreement with the European
Commission, supporting its capital position while a sale remains
uncertain.  Despite the asset sales, Crediop reported net losses
of EUR31 million in 2013 and we currently expect it to be
lossmaking in 2014.  Our "adequate" assessment of Crediop's
capital and earnings continues to incorporate our view that its
risk-adjusted capital ratio, which was 7.9% in 2013, will remain
above 7% over the next two years," S&P said.

"That said, we believe that Crediop's credit portfolio continues
to show high business and single-name concentration.  Crediop
faces significant complexity in managing a fairly long-dated
portfolio that can generate tail risk.  We reflect this in our
"moderate" assessment of the bank's risk position," S&P added.

Crediop's weak liquidity position remains a significant rating
constraint.  The bank still depends heavily on European Central
Bank funding in the form of both long-term repurchase operations
and short-term refinancing.

The developing outlook reflects the possibility that S&P could
raise, affirm, or lower the ratings on Crediop, depending on the
evolution of its integration with the parent, taking into account
the outcome of sale negotiations.

S&P could raise the rating on Crediop if it perceives that a sale
will not materialize and S&P anticipates that Crediop will
further integrate with DCL, such that it considers Crediop to be
a "highly strategic" or "core" subsidiary of its parent.  This
could happen if DCL increases its ownership of Crediop to 100%.

If no sale is forthcoming but S&P do not consider that Crediop
will become a "highly strategic" or "core" subsidiary of DCL, it
could affirm the ratings.

S&P could lower the rating if it anticipates that the economic
risk which Italian banks face increases further, or if Crediop's
solvency weakens, particularly if this is due to losses from
extraordinary costs or to the impact of a potential downgrade of
the sovereign and public sector entities, to which Crediop
remains highly exposed.

S&P will continue to closely monitor the development of the
ongoing negotiations.  If Crediop is sold, S&P will evaluate the
implications for Crediop's business and financial profiles and
the level of support it might receive from the new parent.

PIAGGIO & C: Moody's Changes 'Ba3' CFR Outlook to Negative
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook to negative from
stable on Piaggio & C. S.p.A. Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR)
and Ba3-PD probability of default rating (PDR). Concurrently,
Moody's has affirmed these ratings. The provisional (P)Ba3 senior
unsecured rating assigned to the EUR250 million notes due 2021
was assigned a Ba3 rating with a negative outlook.

"Piaggio's operational performance for 2014 is likely to be
weaker than previously expected and it will be challenging for
the group to restore its financial metrics to a level
commensurate to the current rating by year end. The rating is
still weakly positioned and the failure to materially improve
operating results already in 3Q14 compared to similar period of
2013 would add to the negative pressure" says Lorenzo Re, Moody's
Vice President - Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Piaggio.

Ratings Rationale

In 1H14, Piaggio reported a 6.7% decline in total volume of
vehicles sold, mainly as a result of weak performance in Asian
markets, with a 50% drop in two-wheel vehicles sold in India and
a 15% decline in other Asia-Pacific markets (mainly Vietnam).
Revenues in the semester declined by 6.3% (-2.4% at constant
exchange rates), but despite this decline, effective sales mix
and pricing policies and operating cost reduction allowed Piaggio
to maintain a stable EBITDA margin at 15%. However, EBITDA in
absolute terms dropped to EUR94 million from EUR100.6 million in
1H13, reverting the positive trend posted in 1Q14 and falling
below Moody's expectation. Thus, the rating agency now forecasts
that FY14 operating performance will be worse than previously
anticipated. Moody's still expects some recovery in 2H14, on the
basis of (1) an expected lower negative impact from forex; and
(2) improving volume trends in some markets (i.e., Indian
commercial vehicles and Western Europe 2-wheelers). In
particular, the agency expects 3Q14 EBITDA to improve to around
EUR45 million (from EUR33 million in 3Q13). Failure to achieve
such improvement could lead to a negative rating action as it
would signal a likely slower pace of deleveraging than currently
built in the rating through sustained operating performance

More positively, Moody's notes that Piaggio adopted a number of
cash preservation measures, including tight working capital
management, capex reduction and dividend cancellation, that
allowed a positive cash generation of EUR3.3 million in 1H14
(from a EUR66.3 million absorption in 1H13).

However, as a result of the persisting difficult trading
conditions, Moody's expects that Piaggio's credit metrics will
improve only marginally in 2014. In particular, the agency
forecasts that financial leverage, measured as Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA, will remain above 5x at year-end 2014 (from 5.4x at
the end of 2013). This would not be commensurate with a Ba3
rating, but Moody's expects a degree of recovery in leverage in
2015. More positively, the dividend cancellation should allow
retained cash flow (RCF)/net debt to improve to above 10% in 2014
from 3.7% in 2013.

The current rating continues to be supported by Piaggio's solid
financial profile, underpinned by its leading market positions in
a number of markets, broad and well-known brand portfolio and
increasing geographical diversification, with a growing presence
in Asia and, more recently, Latam.

Moody's also notes that Piaggio's liquidity remains adequate and
that its debt maturity profile and cost of funding materially
improved following the issue of a EUR250 senior unsecured note in
April 2014 and the refinancing of the EUR200 million revolving
facility maturing in 2015, with a new EUR220 million facility
maturing in 2019.

Rationale For Negative Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Piaggio's
key credit metrics are likely to remain weak over the next 6-12
months and that the group will remain challenged to reduce
financial leverage below 4.5x as its operating performances are
likely to remain under pressure.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Although currently unlikely given the negative outlook, positive
rating pressure could develop as a result of (1) an improvement
in Piaggio's operating cash flow towards historical levels and
tight working capital management; and (2) a sustained reduction
in the group's financial leverage, reflected by a debt/EBITDA
ratio below 4.0x.

Conversely, further negative rating pressure could occur in the
event of (1) further sequential deteriorations in Piaggio's
operating performance; (2) failure to reduce financial leverage
towards 4.5x and to improve RCF/net debt to around 10% in the
next 12-18 months.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Consumer Durables published in October 2010. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Based in Italy, Piaggio & C. S.p.A. is a leading global
manufacturer and distributor of light mobility vehicles for both
personal and business purposes. In 2013, the group reported total
consolidated revenues of EUR1,212 million and sold 555,600
vehicles. With a global presence in terms of production and
research and development plants, and with nine names in its brand
portfolio, the group ranks as one of the world's top four players
in its core business in terms of volumes.

VENUS-1 FINANCE: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class E Notes to 'Csf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Venus-1 Finance S.r.l.'s notes as

EUR15.1 million class A (IT0004148026) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
'Bsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) of 50% assigned

EUR8.2 million class B (IT0004148034) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%

EUR6.3 million class C (IT0004148042) downgraded to 'CCsf' from
'CCCsf'; RE 0%

EUR9.1 million class D (IT0004148059) affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE 0%

EUR6.5 million class E (IT0004148067) downgraded to 'Csf' from
'CCsf; RE 0%

Venus-1 Finance S.r.l. is a securitization of two portfolios of
predominantly unsecured non-performing loans (NPLs), Monviso 1
and Monviso 2, which are serviced by FBS SpA.


The downgrades are driven by the continuous decline in the pace
of collection, reflecting the persistent challenges facing
unsecured lenders in Italy. While Fitch had in the past
incorporated some slight improvements in future collections,
mostly related to "rolling" cash-in-court balance awaiting
distribution and availability of certain mortgage security for
some claims, the performance over the past 12 months has been
disappointing and explains the slight revision in Fitch's
expected base case.

As of the January 2014 semi-annual interest payment date (IPD),
cumulative total collections since closing in 2005 stood at
EUR80.2 million. While the latest servicer report relating to the
Monviso 1 and Monviso 2 portfolios is not yet available, the
July 2014 Venus-1 investor report does not suggest a reversal of
trend. Over the last two IPDs, no principal had been distributed
to noteholders, and the liquidity facility was drawn in January
2014 to meet interest payments on the class D notes. Unpaid
interest on the class E (not covered by the liquidity facility)
now amounts to EUR0.48 million.

Collection performance on a claim-by-claim basis remains sound,
with recovery rates on total collections and closed positions of
77% and 94% by gross book value (GBV), respectively. However, on
a cumulative basis, the collection process is underperforming,
and unless the decline in collections volumes is arrested,
further liquidity facility drawings may be needed to maintain
timely interest on the class C and D notes. Without some recovery
uplift, total issuer available funds will not be sufficient to
repay the outstanding bonds.

Gross collections on the two Monviso sub-portfolios are a
multiple of the redemption amount at the issuer level. As of the
last two IPDs, interest paid on the notes amounted to a further
EUR0.6 million, with the balance of gross collections comprising
issuer senior expenses, principally servicing fees and legal

The reported outstanding GBV of the portfolio is EUR236 million,
predominantly unsecured. While it may be feasible for the
portfolio to generate sufficient recoveries to repay the EUR45.2
million of outstanding principal, adverse selection embedded
within a highly seasoned loan book makes even a sub-20% advance
rate excessive, underlining the weakness in asset performance.

The portfolios were originated in Italy by Sanpaolo IMI Group,
now part of Intesa Sanpaolo Spa (BBB+/Stable/F2), and were
acquired in 2005 by ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (A+/Stable/F1+) through
the Monviso 1 and Monviso 2 securitization transactions. The
notes issued by the Monviso securitizations were then repackaged
in 2005 into Venus-1. The outstanding portfolio is split between
claims against corporates (47% by GBV) and individuals (53%)
concentrated in the southern regions of Italy (45%). The majority
(68%) of defaulted positions have a balance of less than


Given a five-year term to note maturity, it will take an increase
in the pace of collections to prevent defaults on the class A and
B notes, and a significant increase in collection activity to
avoid full loss on the class C to E notes.


QAZAQ BANKI: S&P Assigns 'B-' Counterparty Rating; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B-' long-term
and 'C' short-term counterparty credit ratings to Qazaq Banki.
The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'kzBB-' Kazakhstan national
scale rating to the bank.

The ratings on Qazaq Banki reflect the structurally high
operating risks for a bank operating primarily in Kazakhstan,
which S&P factors into its 'bb-' anchor for local banks.  The
ratings also reflect S&P's view of the bank's "weak" business
position, "adequate" capital and earnings, "moderate" risk
position, "average" funding, and "adequate" liquidity, as S&P's
criteria define these terms.  This assessment takes into account
S&P's view of the bank's modest competitive position in the
Kazakh banking sector, an untested growth strategy and asset
quality, current low risk-adjusted returns, and high lending and
funding concentrations.  Positively, S&P sees better
diversification between corporate and retail business on both
sides of the balance sheet compared with other small Kazakh
banks.  S&P also expects that shareholders will remain willing to
inject substantial amounts of capital to support the bank's
growth if needed.

S&P's assessment of Qazaq Banki's business position as "weak"
reflects its small asset size and a limited franchise in the
Kazakh banking sector, as well as a new management team with an
unproven track record of working together.  With total assets of
Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 76 billion (about US$0.4 billion) and a
market share of 0.5% by assets as of June 30, 2014.  Qazaq Banki
ranks No. 25 among Kazakhstan's 38 banks.

The bank aims to increase its market share to about 1% by
year-end 2018.  However, S&P believes this would likely entail
very aggressive loan growth and rapid development of the bank's
distribution network.  In S&P's opinion, the success of this
strategy will depend on the ability of the new management team to
diversify the bank's narrow franchise and obtain sufficient
stable resources -- both capital and deposits -- to match its
ambitious asset-growth targets.  The ability and willingness of
the bank's majority shareholders to inject fresh capital would
therefore be vital, in S&P's view.

"We assess Qazaqi Banki's capital and earnings as "adequate,"
reflecting our view that rapid loan growth will be sufficiently
supported by common equity capital injections to bring Tier 1
capital to about KZT20 billion at year-end 2014 and KZT30 billion
at year-end 2015.  Our risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio before
adjustments was 9.4% at year-end 2013.  We project that it could
move higher in the next 12-18 months, possibly to about 11%.
However, we see considerable uncertainty around this projection,
related to the amount and timing of the shareholder capital
injections and, mainly, the pace of credit growth.  Over time, we
expect greater visibility of these factors, as well as the
broader capital policy and philosophy.  An improved assessment
would also be supported by a strengthening in the bank's earnings
capacity. We currently expect this to remain modest over the next
two years, affected by pressure on net interest margin and
significant investments in infrastructure and staff," S&P said.

"We incorporate our risk position assessment to our view of the
specific risks facing a financial institution beyond the standard
capital assumptions in our RAC framework.  We take a combined
view of capital and earnings and risk position when evaluating an
institution's exposure to unexpected losses and its capacity to
absorb them.  We assess Qazaq Banki's risk position as "moderate"
in comparison with peers in Kazakhstan and banking systems with
an economic risk score of '8', as per our methodology for
determining banking industry country risk.  This reflects the
bank's rapid loan growth and high individual loan
concentrations," S&P added.

The level of nonperforming loans (NPLs) is currently extremely
low.  While S&P expects an upward trend in NPLs and provisions
over the next 24 months, reflecting the maturing loan portfolio,
the NPL ratio will likely remain substantially below the average
for the Kazakh banking system.  That said, S&P considers that
asset quality metrics tend to be better for banks that are in a
strong growth phase, and S&P thinks Qazaq Banki's management has
yet to prove its ability to manage rapid growth.  S&P's
assessment also accounts for the bank's apparent high
concentrations in the trade, construction, and rental properties.
S&P also sees significant single-name concentration, with the top
20 borrowers accounting for about 3x total adjusted capital at
midyear 2014, by S&P's estimate.

"We consider Qazaq Banki's funding to be "average" and its
liquidity "adequate."  This reflects a Standard & Poor's stable
funding ratio of about 125% at both year-end 2013 and year-end
2012, and a ratio of liquid assets to total assets of about 13%
at midyear 2014.  In line with small Kazakh banks we also rate,
customer deposits represent the largest funding source and
accounted for 96% of the funding base at midyear 2014.  There are
also substantial deposit concentrations, in our view, which is
another typical feature of Kazakh banks," S&P noted.

The counterparty credit rating on Qazaq Banki is at the same
level as the stand-alone credit profile, which is 'b-', because
S&P don't apply notches of uplift for extraordinary owner or
government support.  S&P considers the bank to have "low"
systemic importance in Kazakhstan's banking industry, principally
reflecting its relatively modest scale.

The stable outlook on Qazaq Banki reflects S&P's view that there
is a limited prospect of an upgrade or downgrade in the next 12-
18 months.  S&P expects that the bank's loss-absorption capacity
will remain satisfactory, with planned rapid asset growth
supported by sufficient shareholder capital injections.  S&P also
expects the bank will report somewhat higher NPLs and will need
to increase provisions as its loan portfolio matures, but also
that it will gradually diversify its lending and funding

S&P would consider a positive rating action if it noted that
management's actions were leading to a substantial and sustained
improvement in the bank's loss-absorption capacity.  This could
prompt S&P to conclude that the RAC ratio would reach and stay
comfortably above 10% throughout the forecast horizon for 2014-
2015.  However, even if the bank's capitalization improves, an
upgrade would only follow S&P's view that the bank's management
of its exposure to unexpected losses had enhanced.  This would
include stronger evidence of the quality of loan underwriting
relative to peers, and that the bank's risk management was
keeping pace with business growth.  An upgrade would also hinge
on a reduction of loan concentrations in the construction and
real estate sector, which S&P views as high risk and highly

A negative rating action could be triggered by asset-quality
deterioration beyond S&P's current expectations, or by a
liquidity shortage, for example, due to the exit of large


ESPIRITO SANTO: Regulators to Probe Eurofin Relationship
Patricia Kowsmann, Margot Patrick and David Enrich at The Wall
Street Journal report that as regulators try to untangle the
financial mess surrounding Espirito Santo International SA,
multiple threads lead back to Eurofin Holding SA, a small Swiss
company whose business interests are intermingled with the
powerful Portuguese conglomerate.

An employee of Eurofin was the lone auditor of Espirito Santo
International's books, which were later found to be riddled with
irregularities, the Journal discloses.  Eurofin, the Journal
says, is indirectly connected to the new chief financial officer
of Banco Espirito Santo, Portugal's No. 2 lender by assets and
part of the Espirito Santo empire.

And Eurofin helped the bank create debt products that were
recently sold to retail investors in transactions that Portuguese
authorities now suspect helped prop up other parts of Espirito
Santo, the Journal says, citing Portuguese officials.

Espirito Santo International, a closely held company with
interests ranging from banking to hospitals and hotels, filed for
creditor protection in Luxembourg last month, following a series
of disclosures about accounting irregularities and extensive
financial dealings with sister companies, the Journal recounts.
The saga has unnerved European investors and prompted authorities
in Portugal and Luxembourg to launch criminal and civil
investigations, the Journal states.

According to the Journal, the Portuguese officials said that the
behind-the-scenes role played by Eurofin has caught the attention
of Portuguese regulators and central-bank officials.  They are
trying to better understand Eurofin's multifaceted relationship
with Espirito Santo, whose rapid downfall has become one of
Europe's biggest corporate scandals in recent memory, the Journal

A person close to Eurofin, as cited by the Journal, said that the
firm never sold investments directly to Espirito Santo clients.
The person said that while Eurofin for years structured products
for Banco Espirito Santo, it adhered to all applicable rules and
regulations, the Journal notes.  The person said that Eurofin is
currently reviewing its long-standing relationship with Espirito
Santo in light of recent events, the Journal relays.

Eurofin, based in Lausanne, Switzerland, describes itself as a
financial adviser to institutions and individuals.  In addition
to Lausanne, it has offices in London, Luxembourg and Porto,
Portugal.  Its Eurofin Capital unit is regulated by the U.K.'s
Financial Conduct Authority.

Espirito Santo International S.A., through its subsidiaries,
provides services which include corporate and retail banking,
insurance, investment banking, brokerage, asset management, and
also operates in the agriculture, hotel, and real estate
industry.  The company was formerly known as Espirito Santo
International Holding S.A. and changed its name to Espirito Santo
International S.A. in August 2003.  The company was incorporated
in 1975 and is based in Luxembourg.

TRAVELPORT FINANCE: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Rating to $2.3BB Debt
Moody's Investors service has placed Travelport LLC's Caa1
corporate family rating (CFR) and Caa1-PD probability of default
rating (PDR) under review for upgrade. At the same time, Moody's
has assigned provisional (P)B3 ratings to the proposed US$2.3
billion first-lien loan facility and US$100 million revolving
credit facility (RCF) to be issued by Travelport Finance
(Luxembourg) S.a.r.l. Moody's has also placed the (P)B3 ratings
under review for upgrade.

"Upon the successful closing of the transaction, Moody's expect
to move the CFR from Travelport LLC to Travelport Limited which
is the top entity of the new restricted group", said Knut
Slatten, Moody's Assistant Vice President and Lead Analyst for
Travelport. The refinancing is expected to enhance Travelport's
free cash flows as interest expenses diminish significantly.
Moreover, Travelport has in recent months de-leveraged its
capital structure. "As a result Moody's expect to upgrade the CFR
and PDR to B3 upon transaction closing as currently presented.
Moody's also expect to withdraw all existing ratings at
Travelport LLC", adds Mr. Slatten. Following the refinancing,
Moody's understands Travelport's capital structure will
essentially consist of the USD2.3 billion first-lien loan and
USD500 million of unsecured notes. Should the ultimate capital
structure of Travelport be along these lines, Moody's would
expect to upgrade the ratings of the USD2.3 billion first-lien
facility and USD100 million RCF to B2 driven by the high amount
of junior debt ranking behind it in the waterfall.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the first-lien loan facility. A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

On August 1, Travelport announced it would embark upon an
extensive refinancing which will see all of its existing
financial debt refinanced through the issuance of USD2.3 billion
of first-lien loans and USD500 million of unsecured notes. The
envisaged refinancing will strengthen Travelport's credit profile
as free cash flows are projected to significantly increase as the
company's annual interest expenses diminish considerably. The
liquidity profile will further strengthen as Travelport will have
no upcoming debt-maturities in the foreseeable future. Following
the refinancing, Moody's would also no longer expect the
company's liquidity profile to be dented by limited headroom to
financial maintenance covenants.

In recent months, Travelport has taken several measures in order
to de-leverage its capital structure. Among others, the company
has divested its stake in Orbitz Worldwide, Inc -- an asset
Travelport earlier in the year had classified as being a non-core
asset -- and have already applied these funds towards debt
redemption in advance of the refinancing transaction. At closing
of the transaction, Moody's would expect the company's leverage
-- defined as Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA -- to remain high at
around 6.5x. Moody's anticipates only limited de-leveraging to
take place until the end of FY2015 as Travelport during 2015 will
face headwinds following its revised distribution-agreement with
Orbitz. As a result, Travelport has guided towards its 2015
EBITDA being broadly flat against 2014.

Whilst not incorporated into the ratings at this stage, Moody's
acknowledges, however, that Travelport Worldwide (the parent
company of Travelport LLC), in the beginning of June announced it
had filed a registration statement with the SEC related to a
proposed initial public offering (IPO) of its common shares. A
successful IPO could further contribute to de-leveraging and
upward pressure on the ratings, depending on the amount raised in
the offering.

The (P)B3 rating assigned to the first-lien instrument reflects
its preferential positioning in the waterfall. Moody's
understands the first-lien loan facility to be secured upon
assets and benefit from upstream guarantees from its operating

Following the refinancing, Moody's expects that Travelport's
liquidity profile will be adequate over the next 12-18 months.
Pro-forma for the transaction, Moody's understands Travelport
will have unrestricted cash balances of around USD163 million and
expects that Travelport will generate positive free cash flows.
Further liquidity cushion is provided by access to an undrawn RCF
of USD100 million. Moody's would expect the company to have ample
leeway to financial maintenance covenants, which will only be
tested if the RCF is drawn by 30% or more.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, Travelport is a leading
provider of transaction processing services to the travel
industry through its global distribution system (GDS) business,
which includes the group's airline information technology
solutions business. During FY2013, the group reported revenues
and adjusted EBITDA of USD2.1 billion and USD517 million,


BANCO ESPIRITO: Fiscal Impact of Bailout Limited, Fitch Says
The split of Banco Espirito Santo (BES) into a "good" and "bad"
bank has limited direct fiscal impact on the Portuguese
sovereign, but erodes the cash buffer available to deal with any
future shocks, Fitch Ratings says.

The Bank of Portugal announced late on Aug. 3 that Novo Banco
will receive EUR4.9 billion of fresh capital from Portugal's
Resolution Fund set up two years ago. The Portuguese fund
consists of bank contributions and a bank levy but is not large
enough to meet the needs of Novo Banco's capitalization, and so
will receive a temporary government loan. Money already set aside
for bank recapitalization under the IMF-EU program that Portugal
exited in May this year is sufficient to cover the cost of the
BES operation without additional borrowing. This suggests that
the operation will not change our fiscal forecasts for the
sovereign, or put any pressure on Portugal's 'BB+' rating.

But the establishment of Novo Banco will significantly reduce the
cash buffer set aside for Portuguese banks to around EUR2
billion, which may limit its effectiveness. There would therefore
probably be a fiscal impact if other banks needed support --
although this is not our base case assumption. The government's
deposit buffer remains large (around 7.6% of GDP) but the cushion
against possible market volatility, which helped Portugal make a
"clean exit" from its IMF-EU program without a precautionary
credit line, has shrunk.

Whether BES's bailout contributes to a reversal of the
improvement in Portugal's fiscal financing conditions may depend
on investor perceptions of the health of the banking sector and
if, like us, they regard BES's problems as idiosyncratic. The
spill-over risk appears contained for now, and short-dated
Portuguese sovereign bonds continue to trade at multi-year lows.
The ECB's asset-quality review may help address any concerns of
wider risks in the banking sector.

Doubts about the effectiveness of monitoring by national
authorities may also contribute to popular disillusion in
Portugal with post-program economic reform and consolidation,
which could cause political commitment to the process to weaken.

Fitch revised the Outlook on Portugal to Positive on April 11,
reflecting the progress the country has made in reducing its
budget deficit, and the improving economy, growth projections and
financing conditions. Our next scheduled review is on October 30.


BANCAJA 9: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Tranche
Fitch Ratings has upgraded nine and affirmed 15 tranches of eight
Bancaja, FTA transactions, a series of Spanish prime RMBS
comprising loans originated and serviced by Bankia, S.A. (BBB-
/Negative/F3). Two tranches have been placed on Rating Watch
Evolving (RWE) and the Outlooks on eight tranches have been
revised to Stable from Negative.

Key Rating Drivers

Rating Cap Revision
Fitch placed the senior notes of Bancaja 3 to 8 and mezzanine
notes of Bancaja 3 and 6 on Rating Watch Positive (RWP) following
the upgrade of Spain's Country Ceiling from 'AA-' to 'AA+', six
notches above its sovereign Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of

With the publication of its updated criteria assumptions for
Spanish RMBS on June 5, 2014, Fitch defined its assumptions for
'AA+sf' rating scenarios, which are used to analyze the ability
of tranches to withstand higher rating stresses. The analysis
showed that the credit enhancement (CE) available to the class A
notes Bancaja 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 and class B notes of Bancaja 3 and
6 is sufficient to warrant a two-notch upgrade.

Improved Arrears Performance

The affirmations and revisions of Outlook to Stable from Negative
reflect the robust performance of the transactions. The improved
arrears performance is reflected in a decrease in three-months
and one-month plus arrears across all deals. Fitch estimates that
over the past 12 months the three-months and one-month plus
arrears on average decreased by 0.9% and 1% respectively. The
decline was driven by both late-stage arrears rolling through to
default and the improved economic environment in Spain, which is
causing a decline in the number of new borrowers entering

There is, however, a clear divergence in asset performance
between the more seasoned Bancaja (3 to 7) and the later issuance
in the series (8, 9 and 13). As of the latest reporting periods,
the three-month plus arrears ranged between 0.6% (Bancaja 5) and
1.2% (Bancaja 7) compared with the 2.2%-3% range for Bancaja 8, 9
and 13. The better performance of the former group of
transactions was driven by highly seasoned (from 134 to 177
months) and low weighted average current loan-to-value ratio
mortgages (between 25.3% and 44.6%). The average seasoning in the
later deals ranges from 123 months in Bancaja 8 to 84 months in
Bancaja 13, while the weighted average current loan-to-value
ratio ranges from 54.1% in Bancaja 8 to 70.4% in Bancaja 13.

Reserve Fund Draws

The transactions' structures allow for the full provisioning of
defaulted loans, which are defined as loans in arrears by more
than 18 months. At present, gross excess spread, remains adequate
to fully provision for defaulted loans and to ensure that the
reserve funds remain fully funded in Bancaja 3 to 6. Meanwhile,
gross excess spread and recoveries in Bancaja 7, 8, 9 and 13 have
been insufficient to fully cover period defaults, leading to
draws on their respective reserve funds. The reserve fund levels
were 72%, 76%, 28% and 65% in Bancaja 7, 8, 9 and 13,

The Negative Outlooks on the junior tranche in Bancaja 7 and all
tranches in Bancaja 9 and 13 reflect Fitch's expectations of
future reserve fund draws in combination with the low levels of
credit enhancement available for these tranches.

Despite being off-target, as of July 2014 the reserve fund of
Bancaja 8 has started to replenish. Given the current low
pipeline of late stage arrears Fitch expects the reserve of
Bancaja 8 to continue replenishing, thus the levels of credit
enhancement available to the notes, particularly at the junior
end of the structure, were deemed sufficient to withstand credit
losses at their rating levels.

Payment Interruption Risk

The class A2 and B notes of Bancaja 7 have been placed on RWE due
to exposure to payment interruption, which would arise upon the
default of the servicer. In its analysis, Fitch assessed the
liquidity available in the transaction to fully cover senior
fees, net swap payments and note interest in case the servicer
were to default. As the transaction is currently drawing on its
reserve fund and is expected to continue utilizing these funds,
the cash reserve cannot be relied upon to meet these liquidity
needs. Therefore, Fitch believes that the transaction is not
adequately equipped to mitigate a disruption to collections. As
the payments to the swap counterparty can be deferred for one
payment date, a rating cap of 'Asf' may be applicable to the
notes. Fitch expects to resolve the RWE in the next six months.

Rating Sensitivities

Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors. A corresponding increase in new defaults and associated
pressure on excess spread levels and reserve funds, beyond
Fitch's assumptions, could result in negative rating actions,
particularly at the lower end of the capital structure.

The rating actions are as follows:

Bancaja 3, FTA

Class A (ISIN ES0312882006): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN ES0312882014): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class C (ISIN ES0312882022): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

Bancaja 4, FTA

Class A (ISIN ES0312883004): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN ES0312883012): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

Class C (ISIN ES0312883020): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

Bancaja 5, FTA

Class A (ISIN ES0312884002): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN ES0312884010): upgraded to 'AAsf' from 'AA-sf';
Outlook Stable

Class C (ISIN ES0312884028): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

Bancaja 6, FTA

Class A2 (ISIN ES0312885017): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN ES0312885025): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class C (ISIN ES0312885033): upgraded to 'Asf' from 'A-sf';
Outlook Stable

Bancaja 7, FTA

Class A2 (ISIN ES0312886015): 'AA-sf'; Rating Watch revised to
Evolving from Positive

Class B (ISIN ES0312886023): 'AA-sf'; placed on RWE

Class C (ISIN ES0312886031): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

Class D (ISIN ES0312886049): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

Bancaja 8, FTA

Class A (ISIN ES0312887005): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN ES0312887013): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

Class C (ISIN ES0312887021): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

Class D (ISIN ES0312887039): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

Bancaja 9, FTA

Class A2 (ISIN ES0312888011): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook

Class B (ISIN ES0312888029): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook

Class C (ISIN ES0312888037): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook

Class D (ISIN ES0312888045): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

Class E (ISIN ES0312888052): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 50%

Bancaja 13, FTA

Class A (ISIN ES0312847009): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook

BBVA RMBS 1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class C Tranche to 'CCsf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 10 and affirmed three tranches of
BBVA RMBS, a series of Spanish RMBS comprising loans originated
by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA; A-/Stable/F2).
The notes have all been removed from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

Key Rating Drivers

Defaulted and Foreclosed Assets
Fitch placed the notes on RWN on May 16, 2014, pending analysis
of the information on distressed loans that was provided by the
management company, Europea de Titulizacion S.A., S.G.F.T. (EdT;
not rated). Following further analysis of the data received,
Fitch found that the volume of distressed loans in the portfolios
was understated in the regular reporting for all three

The structure of the three transactions recognizes loans in
arrears by 12 months or more as defaulted with provisions made
with excess spread. The structures also provision for loans where
the underlying assets have been taken into possession and in a
number of instances this is before the loans have reached the
12-month arrears stage and recognized as defaulted. While loans
declared as defaulted range between 3.5% and 8.9% of the original
balance, the extra data recently received suggests that if loans
with foreclosed properties were included, the total number of
failed borrowers would be 4.9% (BBVA RMBS 1 and 2) and 11.7%
(BBVA RMBS 3) of the original balance.

Despite the recent decline in the reported constant default rate
in BBVA RMBS 1, the inclusion of loans with foreclosed properties
in the provisioned amounts has meant that the volume of un-
provisioned loans continued to increase to June 2014, when the
first decline of EUR0.7 million was reported. Meanwhile credit
enhancement for BBVA RMBS 2 and 3 continue to be eroded by an
increasing amount of un-provisioned loans. As of 2Q14 the balance
of these implicit principal deficiencies ranged between EUR10.7
million and EUR202.1 million. The trend of these deficiencies is
difficult to predict given the uncertainty surrounding the future
foreclosure actions of the servicer.

Analysis of the defaulted loans suggests that the underlying
borrowers have adverse credit characteristics: broker-originated
loans (on average 55.6% of the defaulted balance) and/or loans to
borrowers with temporary employment contracts (on average 20.6%)
or self-employed (on average 18.8%).

Expectations of Future Defaults

Although the level of arrears in the three transactions remains
low compared with most other Spanish RMBS transactions, Fitch
does not put much emphasis on the pipeline of late stage arrears
as an indicator of future defaults. The tendency of the servicer
to start foreclosure proceedings ahead of the 12-month arrears
default definition would suggest that the pipeline of future
enforcements is understated.

In its analysis of the transactions, Fitch views BBVA RMBS 1 and
2 as having similar performance, despite BBVA RMBS 1 having an
average original loan-to-value ratio around 15 percentage points
higher than that of BBVA RMBS 2. For this reason the levels of
future defaults expected are similar for the two transactions.

The performance of BBVA RMBS 3 suggests that the borrowers in
this pool have a much weaker credit profile. Consequently, in its
analysis of the portfolio Fitch assumed default levels almost
double those derived for BBVA RMBS 1 and 2.

Low Recovery Expectations

Information on sold properties suggests that the market value
decline across the series has been steeper that the market
average. In its analysis of the transactions, Fitch found that
sales on properties sold in 2013 achieved only 27.5% of the
original property values. Given the already high loan-to-value
nature of the loans in the underlying portfolios, recoveries on
these assets are expected to be limited. In combination with the
expected defaults, Fitch concludes that the expected losses for
these portfolios across all rating scenarios no longer warrant
their current ratings, as reflected in the rating actions taken
across the three structures.


The ratings of these transactions remain vulnerable to lower than
expected recoveries on defaulted loans. The 65bp of excess spread
generated by the structures has been insufficient to offset low
levels of recoveries. Higher losses incurred on future sales
would lead to a further build-up in principal deficiencies and
thus erosion of credit enhancement, which could trigger
subsequent downgrades of the ratings.

The rating actions are as follows:


Class A2 (ISIN ES0314147010): downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf';
off RWN; Outlook Negative

Class A3 (ISIN ES0314147028): downgraded to 'BBsf' from 'BBBsf';
off RWN; Outlook Negative

Class B (ISIN ES0314147036): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'BB-sf';
off RWN; Recovery Estimate 75% assigned

Class C (ISIN ES0314147044): downgraded to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf';
off RWN; Recovery Estimate 0%


Class A2 (ISIN ES0314148018): downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
off RWN; Outlook Negative

Class A3 (ISIN ES0314148026): downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
off RWN; Outlook Negative

Class A4 (ISIN ES0314148034): downgraded to 'Bsf' from 'BBsf';
off RWN; Outlook Negative

Class B (ISIN ES0314148042): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
off RWN; Recovery Estimate 95% assigned

Class C (ISIN ES0314148059): affirmed at 'CCsf'; off RWN;
Recovery Estimate 0%


Class A1 (ISIN ES0314149008): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
off RWN; Recovery Estimate 90% assigned

Class A2 (ISIN ES0314149016): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
off RWN; Recovery Estimate 90% assigned

Class B (ISIN ES0314149032): affirmed at 'CCsf'; off RWN;
Recovery Estimate 0%

Class C (ISIN ES0314149040): affirmed at 'CCsf'; off RWN;
Recovery Estimate 0%

CABLEUROPA SAU: Moody's Lifts CFR to 'Ba1' After Vodafone Buyout
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the Corporate Family Rating
(CFR) of Cableuropa S.A.U. ('ONO' or 'the company') to Ba1 (from
B2) and its Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Ba1-PD (from
B2-PD). The instrument ratings at Nara Cable Funding Limited and
Nara Cable Funding II Limited, two special purpose vehicles that
have on-lent the funds from the issuance of senior secured notes
due 2018 and 2020 to ONO were upgraded to Ba1 (from B1) and the
rating of the senior notes due 2019 issued by ONO Finance II Plc
to Ba2 (from Caa1). The outlook is positive. The rating actions
follow the confirmation by Vodafone Group Plc that its indirectly
wholly owned subsidiary Vodafone Espana S.A.U. has completed the
acquisition of 100% of the share capital of Grupo Corporativo
Ono, S.A., ONO's ultimate parent company.

Ratings Rationale

The ratings upgrades acknowledge that ONO is now part of the much
larger (GBP43.6 billion revenues for the 2013/14 financial year)
and highly rated Vodafone Group (Baa1 stable). While Moody's does
not expect Vodafone to provide explicit credit support for the
rated ONO debt, the agency believes that ONO will be deeply
integrated with Vodafone's operations in Spain, one of Vodafone's
core markets. As such, the acquisition is an important step in
Vodafone's convergence strategy aimed at combining the company's
mobile assets with selected acquired fixed line assets and
Vodafone's self-built program. In Spain this is further
complemented by a recently revised agreement with Orange to
co-build fiber and to give Orange access to one million homes
from ONO. The acquisition should also yield cost synergies, such
as the migration of ONO's mobile traffic to Vodafone's network as
well as revenue synergies from cross-selling and marketing.

Moody's notes that the combined ONO/Vodafone entity continues to
face a fiercely competitive operating environment and still
challenging (albeit improving) macroeconomic conditions in Spain,
which have had a constraining effect on the company's recent
operating performance. During the first quarter of 2014 ONO
reported a 2.8% revenue increase due mainly to higher wholesale
revenues, but adjusted EBITDA declined by 7%. The EBITDA decline
was due amongst other factors to the higher interconnection costs
related to ONO's growing wholesale activity as well as the
increased revenue contribution of the lower-margined mobile

The rating action is based on ONO's pre-deal capital structure.
However, Vodafone has launched a tender offer for its outstanding
bonds apart from the senior secured notes due 2020, and bonds
tendered will be cancelled. Therefore instrument ratings apply
only to bonds that remain outstanding. The agency will evaluate
any changes to notes' indentures and comment as necessary. The
positive outlook reflects the potential for further positive
ratings development should the tender result in a material
permanent debt reduction. Moody's notes that apart from the 2020
notes, all rated bonds are currently callable.

What Could Change the Rating -- Up

A permanent material debt reduction, explicit credit support for
ONO's rated debt instruments or an upgrade of Vodafone's rating
could result in upward pressure on the rating.

What Could Change the Rating -- Down

While Moody's does not see any near-term catalyst for negative
rating pressure, this could develop if the company's operating
performance deteriorated significantly or in the case of a
downgrade of Vodafone's credit rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Pay Television - Cable and Direct-to-Home Satellite Operators
published in April 2013. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

ONO is the largest cable TV operator in Spain. During fiscal year
2013, ONO generated EUR1.6 billion in revenues and EUR680 million
in adjusted EBITDA (as reported by the company).

IDCSALUD HOLDING: S&P Assigns 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Rating Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating to Spanish hospital operator IDCSalud
Holding S.L.U. (IDC).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'B+' issue rating and '3'
recovery rating to the proposed EUR1.8 billion senior secured

S&P also assigned a 'B-' issue rating with a recovery rating of
'6' to the company's proposed EUR350 million second-lien

The ratings on IDC reflect S&P's view that the company's
announced merger with Grupo Hospitalario Quiron (GHQ) is
supportive for S&P's assessment of IDC's business risk profile as
"satisfactory" and its financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged."  From these assessments, S&P derives its anchor of
'b+' and corporate credit rating of 'B+'.  Modifiers have a
neutral effect on the rating.

"Our "satisfactory" business risk profile assessment on IDC
reflects that, as a private hospital operator, the company
generates its profits from health care services, an industry that
we consider poses an "intermediate" level of risk.  This reflects
the industry's long-term sustainable growth prospects in the
low-single digits thanks to increasing volumes, partly offset by
negative price trends.  The health care segment of most European
countries is subject to strict regulations, with increasing price
pressures.  As such, IDC is likely to face the task of adapting
its cost structures to lower reimbursement rates.  We view the
risk of operating in Spain as "moderate"," S&P said.

S&P's assessment of IDC's business risk profile also reflects its
view of its "satisfactory" competitive position.  Key
considerations in S&P's assessment include IDC's position as the
leading operator in the Spanish private hospital market, which
S&P believes offers a favorable regulatory environment, good-
quality earnings, and long-term volume growth prospects, as a
result of an aging population and the increasing prevalence of
diseases such as diabetes and cancer.

S&P views positively the increased size of the combined entity
(post merger, which should be completed in November 2014) and
believe that the merger will render it the clear market leader.
The larger scale should enable the company to achieve better cost
savings, for example from procurement, and help negotiations with
payers.  However, the group will still only have about 13% market
share in the highly fragmented Spanish private hospital market.

The combined entity will also benefit from increased
diversification within Spain.  GHQ brings with it exposure to new
regions covering the biggest cities in Spain, such as Madrid,
Barcelona, Valencia, Seville, and Bilbao.  In addition to this
national coverage, the merger with GHQ will also decrease the
company's reliance on the Spanish national and local governments
as its main payers, given that the majority of GHQ revenues come
from privately insured and self-pay patients; the combined entity
will generate about 62% of its revenues from privately funded
care.  However, this move away from the government as the main
payer will also decrease the amount of revenues generated from
the stable and predictable capitation model.  In turn, this could
give rise to potentially volatile revenues, as privately funded
care is more closely correlated with underlying economic
conditions, such as employment levels.

Both companies have good track records of maintaining
profitability, despite volumes and tariff pressure.  They are
able to do so thanks to effective cost savings and a focus on
specialties and complex procedures that carry higher tariffs.
There is also potential for additional synergies from the
proposed transaction, which should further strengthen margin
resilience.  S&P assumes that IDC will improve its EBITDAR margin
toward 24% over the next three years, broadly in line with pre-
merger levels.

GHQ's assets are predominantly leased, unlike IDC's freehold
model.  S&P views leasehold cost structures negatively because
health care services providers are price-takers, and rents will
represent additional fixed costs, which are already high once
staff costs are taken into account.  In S&P's view, this could
open a profitability gap because it considers that the industry
offers low growth prospects, assuming flat-to-slightly increasing
volumes, but decreasing tariffs and higher costs, which at least
reflect inflation.

S&P considers IDC's financial risk profile to be "highly
leveraged" under its criteria, reflecting its estimate that
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA will remain above 5x
(about 6.4x including the shareholder loan and 5.4x excluding it)
on average over the next three years.  S&P's adjustment includes
about EUR2 billion of financial debt, EUR174 million under
operating leases, and about EUR400 million of shareholder loans.

S&P forecasts adjusted fixed-charge coverage of about 2.7x as a
result of the annual rental payments from GHQ.  As such, S&P
anticipates that IDC will be able to comfortably service its
financial debt obligations.

However, given the high proportion of fixed costs, including rent
payments, S&P considers that any structural operational issues
could hinder IDC's ability to cover its fixed costs should its
profitability deteriorate below S&P's base-case assumptions.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Standard & Poor's estimate of 0.8% GDP growth in Spain in
      2014 and 1.4% in 2015.

   -- A limited correlation between these GDP growth rates and
      IDC's revenue growth, due to the health care industry's
      noncyclical nature.  However, S&P uses GDP as an indication
      of the state's willingness to pay for health care.

   -- High-single to low-double-digit organic revenue growth in
      2014 as Villalba hospital -- which was delivered to the
      administration last year and will be opened in 2014 --
      becomes fully operational and ramps up its capacity.

   -- Post 2014, S&P estimates organic revenue growth in the low-
      single digits, reflecting a normalized run-rate and the
      aforementioned factors.

   -- An EBITDA margin in the 20%-24% range over the next three
      years, mainly on account of continuing cost efficiencies
      and productivity improvements.

   -- Stable capital expenditure (capex) of about EUR70 million-
      EUR90 million.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit

   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 6.4x on average over the next
      three years.

   -- A fixed-charge coverage ratio of 2.7x on average over the
      next three years.

The stable outlook reflects IDC's position as the market leader
in the Spanish private hospitals market, and S&P's view that the
company will be able to successfully integrate GHQ without
jeopardizing its profitability.  The outlook also reflects S&P's
belief that the company will continue to reduce its leverage
through scheduled and voluntary debt repayments, while
maintaining adequate headroom under its financial covenants.
This would broadly correspond with fixed-charge coverage of about
2.2x.  S&P bases these assumptions on its estimate of organic
revenue growth of low-single to mid-single-digits in 2014 and

S&P could consider taking a negative rating action if IDC's
liquidity deteriorates.  In S&P's opinion, the most likely cause
of this would be the company experiencing significant cash
outflows following a build-up of receivables from public bodies,
greater pressure on reimbursement fees from both the public
bodies and the insurance companies, or significant changes in the
regulatory environment.

S&P could take a positive rating action if IDC is able to sustain
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA of less than 5x,
supported by the commitment of its sponsor CVC to continue to do


UKRAINIAN RAILWAYS: S&P Affirms 'CCC' CCR; Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'CCC' long-term corporate credit rating on Ukrainian railway
company The State Administration of Railways Transport of Ukraine
(Ukrainian Railways).  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC' issue rating on the loan
participation notes issued by Shortline PLC and on-lent to
Ukrainian Railways.

The geopolitical risks in Ukraine, together with deepening
economic recession are putting pressure on Ukrainian Railways
ability to generate cash while local financial markets remain
very vulnerable.  This has elevated liquidity risk for the
company, which faces significant debt maturities over the next 12

This led us to revise Ukrainian Railways' stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) downward to 'ccc+' from 'b-'.  In S&P's view,
Ukrainian Railways is currently vulnerable and dependent on
favorable business, financial, and economic conditions to meet
its financial commitments.  The rating on Ukrainian Railways
remains 'CCC', one notch below the SACP, because S&P caps the
corporate credit rating at the level of the long-term foreign
currency sovereign rating on Ukraine, in accordance with S&P's
criteria for rating government-related entities.

At the end of 2013, Ukrainian Railways' reported debt was
Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) 20.3 billion, about 70% consisting of
foreign currency denominated debt, and with about UAH7 billion of
short-term debt.  At the same time, the company's cash balance
was only about UAH644 million.

"We note that access to both international and local liquidity in
Ukraine continues to be difficult, amid high geopolitical risks
in the country and a relationship with Russia that remains
difficult and unpredictable.  The recession in Ukraine continues
to deepen and we understand that Ukrainian Railways' transit
operations -- the main source of its foreign currency cash
flows -- have slowed down. The Ukrainian hryvnia, in which the
company earns the majority of its revenues, has lost more than
40% of its value against the U.S. dollar since the beginning of
the year," S&P said.

"Our assessment of Ukrainian Railways' business risk profile as
"weak" incorporates our view of "very high" country risk in
Ukraine.  In addition, it reflects Ukrainian Railways'
significant capital expenditure (capex) requirements to upgrade
and renew its infrastructure and fleet.  The company does not
receive any state subsidies to finance its capex, and has not
been able to increase tariffs to remunerate these investments.
However, we acknowledge Ukrainian Railways' substantial market
share in freight (about 70%), and its monopoly status in domestic
passenger rail services and management of the national rail
infrastructure," S&P added.

Ukrainian Railways is 100% state-owned, and S&P believes that
there is a "high" likelihood of timely and sufficient
extraordinary government support to Ukrainian Railways in the
event of financial distress.  This reflects S&P's assessment of
the company's:

   -- "Very important" role for the government as the
      strategically important manager of the national rail
      infrastructure, monopoly passenger transport provider, and
      dominant freight provider; and

   -- "Strong" link with the government, reflecting the high
      state involvement in the company's strategy and financial
      policy. However, this is partly lessened by the challenging
      financial situation in Ukraine, which in S&P's view has
      significantly reduced the government's capacity to provide
      timely and sufficient financial support to Ukrainian
      Railways if needed.

The likelihood of state support does not provide any ratings
uplift as S&P continues to cap the ratings on Ukrainian Railways
at the level of the foreign currency rating on the sovereign.

S&P assess Ukrainian Railways' liquidity as "weak."  S&P's
assessment is constrained by:

   -- S&P's view of the company's continuing weak access to
      cross-border financing and foreign currencies, in light of
      S&P's low sovereign rating and transfer and convertibility
      assessment on Ukraine.

   -- S&P's view of the limited availability of medium-term
      financing in Ukraine and risks stemming from Ukraine's weak
      local banking sector, where Ukrainian Railways holds its
      cash and has open credit lines.  Further risks are posed by
      the generally weak local capital markets and the
      current foreign exchange controls.

   -- Ukrainian Railways' history of violating its financial
      covenants under the credit facilities from the European
      Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD).  The
      company received a waiver for 2011 and a covenant reset for
      2012.  S&P understands that the company was in compliance
      with covenants as of year-end 2013.  S&P sees a risk that,
      absent an improvement in the operating environment by year-
      end 2014, Ukrainian Railways' interest coverage ratio may
      fall below 3.5x, the threshold under its EBRD loan
      agreements.  However, S&P notes that Ukrainian Railways has
      a track record of obtaining waivers with this bank.

   -- Ukrainian Railways' history of financial restructuring.
      S&P notes that in late 2009 and into 2010, the company
      restructured its U.S. dollar-denominated syndicated loan
      facility as available capital was scarce in Ukraine at the
      time.  To date, however, all the debt has been repaid in
      line with re-negotiated conditions.

S&P estimates that Ukrainian Railways' main sources of liquidity
over the 12 months to June 2014 will comprise:

   -- Cash and cash equivalents of about UAH266 million as of
      end-June 2014;

   -- S&P's conservative forecast of cash flow from operations of
      about UAH6.1 billion-UAH6.3 billion; and

   -- About UAH3.2 billion available under committed credit
      facilities extending beyond 12 months, most of which are
      with local banks.

S&P's base-case credit scenario factors in the following
liquidity needs over the next 12 months:

   -- Debt-amortization payments of about UAH6 billion;

   -- Capex of about UAH4.5 billion, though S&P believes that
      Ukrainian Railways has some leeway to cut this further if
      there is a liquidity need; and

   -- A dividend distribution of UAH220 million.

The negative outlook reflects the possibility of a downgrade if
liquidity risk escalates.  In S&P's view, the company's operating
environment continues to be challenging and local financial
markets remain vulnerable, at a time when the company's
refinancing needs are significant.  Given the challenging
environment, Ukrainian Railways could face covenant pressure over
the next 12 months, which could further weaken the company's
liquidity position.

S&P could lower the rating if it forecasts that a default,
distressed exchange, or redemption is almost inevitable within
six months, absent significantly favorable changes in Ukrainian
Railways' circumstances.  This could occur, for instance, if the
company no longer benefited from the liquidity lines that
currently support its liquidity position, or if cash flows were
to deteriorate significantly more than S&P forecasts.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the situation in
Ukraine stabilizes and if liquidity pressures ease.  Any upside
potential for the rating would be connected with S&P raising the
sovereign rating on Ukraine.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALDERSHOT TOWN: Exits CVA Two Years Ahead of Schedule
Jon Couch at getHAMPSHIRE reports that directors of Aldershot
Town FC have revealed the club has exited its Company Voluntary
Arrangement (CVA) -- two years ahead of schedule.

The news comes almost exactly a year to the day that Shahid Azeem
and his consortium officially took control of the cash-strapped
Shots following their relegation from the Football League and
entering into administration, getHAMPSHIRE relays.

According to getHAMPSHIRE, Mr. Azeem revealed the club made a
"modest profit" in the consortium's first year in charge, while
also narrowly avoiding relegation from Conference Premier despite
being hit with a 10-point deduction.

Now, directors believe that with creditors finally paid off, the
club is in a better financial position "than it has been for many
years", getHAMPSHIRE says.

Aldershot Town Football Club is an English association football
club based in Aldershot, Hampshire.

HEREFORD UNITED: CVA Document Unveils Creditors List
Paul Broome at Hereford Times reports that for the first time,
details have been released showing the huge list of creditors
owed money by Hereford United.

According to Hereford Times, they include payments running into
tens of thousands of pounds to groups including Herefordshire
Council and a global law firm amid a creditor list totaling
GBP1.4 million.

The details were published in the club's proposed CVA (Company
Voluntary Arrangement) which will come back before the High Court
in September after a winding up order on July 28 was adjourned,
Hereford Times relays.

The 55-page document was drawn up in the names of club directors
John Edwards, Philip Gambrill and Elke Thuerlings, Hereford Times

In introducing the idea, which would, if approved, see United's
creditors paid in full over a three-year period beginning in
September, the directors say the move would preserve the company,
Hereford Times relates.

A meeting of creditors is planned for Aug. 14 at the club,
Hereford Times discloses.

Hereford United Football Club is an English association football
club based in the city of Hereford. The club participates in the
Southern League Premier Division, the seventh tier of English

KEYDATA INVESTMENT: Ford Threatens to Sue UK Financial Regulator
James Pickford at The Financial Times reports that Stewart Ford,
the founder and former chief executive of Keydata Investment
Services Ltd., the collapsed investment company, is threatening
to sue the UK's financial regulator for GBP371 million, alleging
it abused its power during an investigation that led to the group
entering administration.

Mr. Ford wrote to the Financial Conduct Authority, informing it
that he intended to sue over financial losses and what he called
the "grievous, irreparable harm" to his reputation stemming from
its investigation five years ago, the FT relates.

Keydata was closed in June 2009 after the Financial Services
Authority, the FCA's predecessor body, called in PwC as
administrators amid concerns that some of its investments had
been improperly marketed as tax-free individual savings accounts,
the FT recounts.

According to the FT, the FSA said that PwC subsequently found
that GBP103 million invested by Keydata clients in bonds issued
by SLS, a Luxembourg company, had been "misappropriated".

However, Mr. Ford claimed his company had been negotiating with
HM Revenue & Customs over the Isa problem but was "ambushed" by
the regulator's decision, the FT says.  He said he had a stake in
the business worth about GBP100 million at the time of its
collapse, the FT notes.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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