TCREUR_Public/140815.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, August 15, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 161

                            Headlines

B U L G A R I A

* BULGARIA: Must Prepare Restructuring Plans for Banks


G E R M A N Y

CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-2: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. D Notes
GERMAN RESIDENTIAL 2013-2: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. F Notes
TAURUS CMBS 2006-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'D'


H U N G A R Y

FHB MORTGAGE: Moody's Lowers Covered Bonds Rating to 'Ba3'


I R E L A N D

BACCHUS 2006-2: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

CD&R MILLENNIUM: S&P Assigns B Corp Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
MINERVA LUXEMBOURG: S&P Keeps BB- Rating on Unsec. Notes Due 2023
MINERVA LUXEMBOURG: Fitch Rates $100-Mil. Add-On Notes 'BB-'


N E T H E R L A N D S

PANGAEA ABS 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC-'
* NETHERLANDS: Number of Bankruptcies Up in July 2014


P O R T U G A L

BANCO ESPIRITO: S&P Suspends 'C' Ratings on 2 CD Programs


R O M A N I A

OLTCHIM SA: Asset Auction Scheduled for December 15


R U S S I A

RSHB CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Old-Style Sub. Debt


S W E D E N

NATIONAL ELECTRIC: Labo Test Withdraws Bankruptcy Petition


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALPHA TOPCO: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
DECO 6 UK LARGE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'C'
EUROSAIL 2006-4NP: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class E1C Notes
MENARYS: Enters Into Creditors Voluntary Arrangement
TAURUS CMBS 2006-2: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'D'

VOYAGE HOLDINGS: Fitch Says Acquisition No Impact on 'B' IDR


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Roy C. Smith's The Money Wars


                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


* BULGARIA: Must Prepare Restructuring Plans for Banks
------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that the European Commission said Bulgaria should
prepare by the end of August a restructuring plan for the banks
which received BGN3.3 billion (US$2.3 billion/EUR1.7 billion) in
liquidity support from the state.

On June 29, the European Commission approved Bulgaria's request
that the country extend a BGN3.3 billion (US$2.3 billion/EUR1.7
billion) credit line in support of its banking system, following
speculative attacks, SeeNews relates.

Three days earlier, Bulgaria's central bank said there was an
organized attack carried out through rumors and ill-intentioned
statements against local banks, First Investment Bank in
particular, which jeopardizes the stability of the country's
banking system, SeeNews recounts.

First Investment Bank received the full amount of the funding
envisaged under the liquidity support scheme, SeeNews says,
citing local daily Capital.

"Bulgaria commits to provide the Commission individual
restructuring or liquidation plans, within two months, for banks
which use the measure described in this decision," SeeNews quotes
the Commission as saying in a statement published on its Web
site.

According to the terms of the scheme, Bulgaria will make state
deposits to credit institutions in need of liquidity support with
maturity of five months.

"The state deposits will be remunerated in line with State aid
rules and will be at least at the level observed in the market
for the same maturity in the period preceding the State
intervention by one month," the Commission, as cited by SeeNews,
said.

The Commission noted that the beneficiaries of the scheme should
be credit institutions in need of liquidity support, adding that
it is open to solvent institutions according to the existing
rules in place within the applicable CRR/CRD IV framework,
according to SeeNews.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2013-2: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro
CLO 2013-2 Limited as follows:

EUR179.0 million class A-1 affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR31.5 million class A-2A affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR19.9 million class A-2B affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR19.4 million class B affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR18.8 million class C affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR19.9 million class D affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR7.8 million class E affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

Carlyle GMS Euro 2013-2 is an arbitrage cash flow collateralized
loan obligation.  Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes
were used to purchase a EUR325 million portfolio of European
leveraged loans and bonds.  The portfolio is managed by CELF
Advisors LLP (part of The Carlyle Group LP).

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation reflects the transaction's performance being in
line with Fitch's expectations.  All portfolio quality tests and
portfolio profile tests are passing.

The transaction became effective as of January 2014.  Between
closing in September 2013 and the report date as of July 2014,
credit enhancement increased marginally on all notes through
trading and par building.  There is no defaulted or CCC assets
and the majority of underlying assets are rated in the 'B'
category.

Senior secured assets make up 98.68% of the portfolio and the
rest are mezzanine obligations.  The largest country is Germany,
followed by France.  European peripheral exposure is presented by
Spain, Italy and Ireland, which make up for 7.67% of the
performing portfolio and cash balance.  Fixed rate assets
represent 5.08% of the performing portfolio and cash while fixed
rate liabilities accounts for 5.9% of the structure.  The 10
largest obligors account for 19.83% of the portfolio.  The
largest obligor is 2.53% of the portfolio.

The notes pay interest quarterly and the transaction uses an
interest smoothing account and a liquidity facility to mitigate
reset risk.  As of the July 2014 payment date, the liquidity
facility was undrawn and the balance of the interest smoothing
account is zero.  The notes will switch to semi-annual payments
once the liquidity facility matures.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch has incorporated two stress tests to simulate the ratings'
sensitivity to changes in the underlying assumptions.  A 25%
increase in the expected obligor default probability would lead
to a downgrade of zero to two notches for the rated notes.  A 25%
reduction in the expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of one to four notches for the rated notes.


GERMAN RESIDENTIAL 2013-2: Fitch Affirms BB Rating on Cl. F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed German Residential Funding 2013-2
Limited's (GRF 2013-2) ratings, as follows:

  EUR76.6 million senior debt: Not rated

  EUR429.4 million class A due November 2024 (ISIN XS0973049983):
  affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR83.3 million class B due November 2024 (ISIN XS0973050569):
  affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR53.5 million class C due November 2024 (ISIN XS0973050726):
  affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR59.5 million class D due November 2024 (ISIN XS0973051021):
  affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR23.8 million class E due November 2024 (ISIN XS0973051294):
  affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR47.6 million class F due November 2024 (ISIN XS0973051450):
  affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR36.9 million class G due November 2024 (ISIN XS0977930261):
  not rated

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations reflect the stable operating performance since
the notes' issue in Oct. 2014, reinforced by stable demand for
low-risk income streams, such as that generated by well-managed
German multi-family housing (MFH) assets.

Residential vacancy has slightly decreased to 5.7% (May 2014)
from 5.9% at issuance, and remains in line with Fitch's
expectations. Residential rents have increased to EUR5.22/sq.
m/month from EUR5.18/sq. m/month at issuance, supported by
continued growth of the mid-sized German cities, where a large
part of the assets are located.

Irrecoverable costs, a key driver of operating margins, remain at
around 40% of net cold rent (rental net of recoverable items), in
line with other comparable diversified MFH portfolios.  Higher
capital expenditure for modernization and energy efficiency may
temporarily increase the cost ratio, but investment in the
maintenance of the buildings is favorable for value and occupancy
over the long term.

Fitch expects investor appetite for well-managed German MFH
portfolios to remain strong in 2014-2015, following record sales
volume in 2013 since the previous peak in 2007.  Fitch expects
the portfolio's market value will be supported by strong investor
appetite in the medium term, drawn by stable cash flows based on
a highly granular tenant base.

Rating Sensitivities

Any disruption in the management of the portfolio or a sharp
economic decline in the regions represented in the portfolio
could prompt downgrades or revisions of the Outlooks to Negative.

Fitch estimates 'Bsf' collateral proceeds of EUR870 million.


TAURUS CMBS 2006-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D(sf)' from
'CC(sf)' its credit ratings on Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 PLC's
class C and D notes.

Following the repayment of the Bewag Berlin loan at a loss, the
issuer applied a non-accruing interest (NAI) amount to the class
C and D notes on the April 2014 interest payment date (IPD).

Given the NAI amount allocated, the class C notes only received
interest on the portion of the balance which was not subject to
an NAI amount on the July 2014 IPD.  As such, the class C notes
have not received their full interest payment, in S&P's view.

Similarly, given that the current principal balance (including
the NAI amount) of the class D notes is zero, this class of notes
did not receive any interest payments on the July 2014 IPD.

S&P's ratings on Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1's notes address the
timely payment of interest quarterly in arrears, and the payment
of principal no later than the legal final maturity date in April
2015.

The rating actions on the class C and D notes reflect S&P's view
that, given the NAI amount outstanding, both of these classes of
notes have experienced interest shortfalls, which S&P believes
will likely continue to increase on future IPDs.  S&P also
expects both classes of notes to experience principal losses on
their final payment date.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'D (sf)'
from 'CC (sf)' its ratings on the class C and D notes.

Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 is a 2006 vintage commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction backed by two
senior loans secured by two commercial properties in Germany.

RATINGS LIST

Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 PLC
EUR571.25 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes

                                   Rating         Rating
Class         Identifier           To             From
C             XS0257715242         D (sf)         CC (sf)
D             XS0257715838         D (sf)         CC (sf)



=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


FHB MORTGAGE: Moody's Lowers Covered Bonds Rating to 'Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the
ratings on the covered bonds issued by FHB Mortgage Bank Co. Plc.
(FHB, deposits B3 negative; bank financial strength rating
E/adjusted baseline credit assessment caa1).

Ratings Rationale

The rating action on FHB's covered bonds was prompted by Moody's
downgrade of the issuer's deposit rating to B3 from B2 on
August 12, 2014.

A downgrade of an issuer's ratings negatively affects the covered
bond ratings through its impact on both the timely payment
indicator (TPI) framework and the expected loss method.

FHB's covered bonds are assigned a TPI of "Very Improbable".
Hence, the TPI framework indicates a maximum rating range of Ba2-
B1 for FHB's covered bonds. Therefore, the upper bound of the TPI
range does not constrain the ratings of the covered bonds.

The covered bondholders' significant exposure to both refinancing
and foreign-exchange risk is the primary driver of the limited
rating uplift of the covered bonds above the issuer ratings.
FHB's covered bond programs has material amounts of foreign
exchange denominated assets and covered bonds. More precisely,
45.9% of the assets in the cover pool (Swiss franc and Euro) are
foreign-exchange denominated. Foreign-exchange denominated
covered bonds account for 18.9%.

In this context, Moody's believes that recoveries for covered
bondholders may be threatened by political and economic factors,
such as devaluation, redenomination and a foreign-exchange debt
moratorium. In this scenario, FHB may not be in the position to
fulfil their obligations on their covered bonds, and in
particular the foreign-exchange denominated covered bonds.

Moody's have considered these uncertainties in Moody's analysis.
This risk therefore constrains the rating of FHB's covered bonds
at two notches above the CB anchor. For this program the CB
anchor is the deposit rating plus one notch.

Key Rating Assumptions/Factors

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its covered bond model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability
that the issuer will cease making payments under the covered
bonds (a CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the
cover pool assets following a CB anchor event.

The CB anchor for this program is the deposit rating plus one
notch given the debt ratio is above 10%.

The cover pool losses for this program are 41.8%. This is an
estimate of the losses Moody's currently models following a CB
anchor event. Moody's splits cover pool losses between market
risk of 29.1% and collateral risk of 12.7%. Market risk measures
losses stemming from refinancing risk and risks related to
interest rate and currency mismatches (these losses may also
include certain legal risks). Collateral risk measures losses
resulting directly from cover pool assets' credit quality.
Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral score, which
for this program is currently 19.0%.

The over-collateralization in the cover pool is 31.3 %, of which
the issuer provides 13.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC
level consistent with the Ba3 rating target is 0%. These numbers
show that Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its
expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on the most recent
performance overview based on data, as per 31 March 2014. For
further details on cover pool losses, collateral risk, market
risk, collateral score and TPI Leeway across covered bond
programs rated by Moody's please refer to "Moody's Global Covered
Bonds Monitoring Overview", published quarterly.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which measures the likelihood of timely payments to
covered bondholders following a CB anchor event. The TPI
framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain number of
notches above the CB anchor.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond program's
rating robustness. A change in the level of the CB anchor could
lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the covered bonds. The TPI
Leeway measures the number of notches by which Moody's might
lower the CB anchor before the rating agency downgrades the
covered bonds because of TPI framework constraints.

The TPI assigned to this program is Very Improbable. The TPI
Leeway for this program is limited, and thus any reduction of the
CB anchor may lead to a downgrade of the covered bonds.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (1) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting both the issuer's deposit rating and the
TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the issuer; or (3) a
material reduction of the value of the cover pool.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


BACCHUS 2006-2: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
BACCHUS 2006-2 PLC's class A-1, A-2A, A-2B, B, and C notes.  At
the same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class D and E
notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's analysis of the transaction using
data from the trustee report dated May 30, 2014, and the
application of S&P's relevant criteria.

"We conducted our cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes at each rating
level.  The BDR represents our estimate of the maximum level of
gross defaults, based on our stress assumptions, that a tranche
can withstand and still fully repay interest and principal to the
noteholders.  We used the aggregate collateral balance that we
consider to be performing (EUR163 million), the reported
weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates
calculated in line with our criteria.  We applied various cash
flow stresses using our standard default patterns and timings for
each rating category assumed for each class of notes, combined
with different interest stresses as outlined in our criteria,"
S&P said.

"Since our previous review on April 30, 2012, the portfolio's
aggregate collateral balance has significantly reduced by
approximately EUR197 million, leading to the further amortization
of the class A-1 and A-2A notes, which we expect will be fully
repaid with the available cash and scheduled principal
amortization proceeds on the next interest payment date, in
accordance with the priority of payments.  As a result, the
available credit enhancement has increased for all rated classes
of notes, which now pass all their coverage tests.  Additionally,
the weighted-average spread has increased to 3.94% from 3.50%,
the weighted-average life has shortened over the same period to
3.8 years from 4.5 years, and the weighted-average recovery rates
have increased overall.  However, the obligor concentration has
increased, with 33 different obligors compared with 80 in our
previous review.  Over this period, we have also observed a
slight negative rating migration in the portfolio.  Furthermore,
the pool's share of defaulted assets has increased," S&P added.

In S&P's opinion, the documentation for the non-euro denominated
asset swaps (representing 4.2% of the aggregate collateral
balance) is not fully in line with S&P's current counterparty
criteria.  Therefore, in S&P's cash flow analysis for ratings
that are more than one notch above its long-term 'A' issuer
credit rating on Bank of America N.A., S&P considered potential
scenarios where the swap counterparties fail to perform, and
where the transaction is consequently exposed to greater currency
risk.

Taking into account S&P's credit and cash flow analysis and the
application of its current counterparty criteria, S&P considers
that the available credit enhancement for the class A-1, A-2A,
and A-2B notes to be commensurate with higher ratings.  S&P has
therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' its ratings on these classes of
notes.

The results of S&P's analysis also indicate that the class B, C,
D, and E notes can sustain defaults at higher rating levels.  At
the same time, the largest obligor test constrains S&P's ratings
on these classes of notes at lower rating levels than its credit
and cash flow analysis.  The largest obligor test measures the
risk of several of the portfolio's largest obligors defaulting
simultaneously.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on the
class B and C notes, in line with the test results.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class D and E notes, as
the largest obligor test still constrains these tranches at the
same rating levels.

BACCHUS 2006-2 is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans granted to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  Its reinvestment period ended
in August 2012 and IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG is the manager.

RATINGS LIST

BACCHUS 2006-2 PLC
EUR491.21 mil senior secured and deferrable floating-rate notes

                                 Rating           Rating
Class        Identifier          To               From
A-1          XS0260552962        AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)
A-2A         XS0261928039        AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)
A-2B         XS0261928468        AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)
B            XS0260554232        A+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
C            XS0260554661        BBB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)
D            XS0260555395        B+ (sf)          B+ (sf)
E            XS0260555981        CCC+ (sf)        CCC+ (sf)



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


CD&R MILLENNIUM: S&P Assigns B Corp Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to Luxembourg-registered CD&R Millennium
HoldCo 6 S.a.r.l (CD&R Millennium), an indirect holding company
for rigid packaging manufacturer Mauser Holding GmbH (Mauser).
The outlook is stable.

"At the same time, we assigned our 'B' issue rating to CD&R
Millennium's EUR150 million revolving credit facility (RCF) and
EUR50 million acquisition facility, in line with its corporate
credit rating.  The recovery rating on this RCF is '3'.  We also
assigned our 'B' issue rating to the EUR445 million and $320
million first-lien term loans.  The recovery rating on these
notes is '3'.  Finally, we assigned our 'CCC+' rating to the $402
million second-lien term loan.  The recovery rating on these
notes is '6'," S&P said.

The rating on CD&R Millennium reflects S&P's assessment of
Mauser's business risk profile as "fair," and its financial risk
profile as "highly leveraged."

The financial sponsor, Clayton Dubilier & Rice (CD&R), financed
its EUR1.2 billion acquisition of Mauser by placing EUR975
million-equivalent first- and second-lien loans, making a EUR187
million pure equity contribution, and issuing EUR55 million in
preferred equity certificates.  S&P estimates that the group will
report Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6.9x
for the financial year ending Dec. 31, 2014.

S&P's assessment of the business risk profile as "fair" is based
on Mauser's products having commodity-like characteristics and it
operating in a competitive industry.  Sales volumes and operating
profits can therefore vary, depending on supply-and-demand
conditions and pricing pressures, caused by exposure to
fluctuations in the cost of key raw materials.  Steel and high-
density polyethylene resin are two primary inputs.

These risks are partly offset by Mauser's ability to pass through
raw material price changes due to mechanisms in their contracts
with most of its customers.  It also reflects its large market
shares in rigid packaging, including steel and plastic drums and
containers, and intermediate bulk containers (IBCs).  These are
mainly used for petrochemical and specialty chemical applications
and sold through a global distribution network.  Mauser also
benefits from long-standing relationships with its diversified
customer and supplier base.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Organic revenue growth (excluding foreign exchange impact)
      of about 5%-6%, supported by the higher growth potential of
      its IBC and reconditioned IBC segments;

   -- Improving margins, with Standard & Poor's-adjusted margins
      of about 13.0%-13.5% for next two years; and

   -- Bolt-on acquisitions of EUR20 million per year.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 6.9x; and

   -- Free operating cash flow of about EUR25 million for
      financial year 2014.

On the basis of S&P's criteria "The Treatment Of Non-Common
Equity Financing In Nonfinancial Corporate Entities," published
on April 29, 2014, on RatingsDirect, S&P has included the EUR55
million preferred equity certificates in its calculation of the
leverage ratio.

The company maintains "adequate" liquidity as a result of its
ability to generate positive free cash flow because of moderate
capital expenditure requirements, an undrawn RCF at close, and
long-dated debt maturities.  S&P expects sources to exceed uses
by 1.2x over the next 24 months.  Management estimates that the
minimum cash balance to run the combined company is about $30
million.

Working capital tends to peak in the June/July period, before
winding down and hitting a low point in Dec.  The group is
subject to just one financial maintenance covenant -- leverage of
less than 6.75x -- which will be tested only when 30% of the
facility is utilized.

S&P estimates that the group has the following principal
liquidity sources after completing the transaction:

   -- Funds from operations of EUR90 million or more per year.
   -- Availability under the EUR150 million RCF maturing in 2019.
   -- Availability under a EUR50 million acquisition facility.
   -- Modest cash balances.

S&P estimates that the group has the following principal
liquidity uses after completing the transaction:

   -- Peak working capital requirement of around EUR30 million.
   -- EUR55 million-EUR65 million of capital spending per year.
   -- Bolt-on acquisitions of EUR20 million per year.
   -- Modest amortization of about EUR6 million per year under
      the senior term loan.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Mauser will improve
its Standard & Poor's-adjusted EBITDA margin to about 13% over
the next 12-18 months.  In S&P's base case, it assumes that
EBITDA will improve because of earlier restructuring efforts,
efficiency gains, and the higher margins in the IBC segments.
The stable outlook also reflects S&P's view that the group will
maintain its credit metrics in line with a "highly leveraged"
financial risk profile in the near term, including a ratio of
adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6.9x.

S&P do not anticipate substantial deleveraging of the group's
balance sheet over the next year.  Consequently, S&P do not
expect to raise the rating in the next 12-18 months.

S&P could consider lowering the rating if Mauser posted negative
free operating cash flow or we observed a sustained contraction
in its EBITDA margin.  This could arise if its profitability
deteriorates markedly in its various markets or if the IBC
segment grows far more slowly than S&P currently expects.


MINERVA LUXEMBOURG: S&P Keeps BB- Rating on Unsec. Notes Due 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that its 'BB-' global
scale and 'brA' national scale corporate credit ratings and 'BB-'
issue-level ratings on Minerva S.A. remain unchanged following
the proposed add-on to the company's 2023 notes.  S&P expects
Minerva to use the proceeds from the issuance to pay down
interest and short-term debt, maintaining its current gross and
net credit metrics and improving its capital structure somewhat.

Ratings List

Minerva S.A.
Issuer credit rating
  Global scale                           BB-/Stable/--
  National scale                         brA/Stable/--

Minerva Luxembourg S.A.
Senior unsecured notes due 2023         BB-


MINERVA LUXEMBOURG: Fitch Rates $100-Mil. Add-On Notes 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings rates Minerva Luxembourg S.A.'s proposed USD100
million add-on issuance in a reopening of its 2023 notes (rated
'BB-').  The notes are unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed
by Minerva S.A. (Minerva).  The purpose of the re-opening is to
repay higher coupon outstanding indebtedness.

The notes are unsecured, unsubordinated obligations of the issuer
and rank equally in right of payment with unsecured and
unsubordinated indebtedness of Minerva.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Positive Industry Fundamentals

The fundamentals of the Brazilian beef industry remain positive
due to the abundant cattle herd, low cost structure and positive
revenue momentum derived from strong revenue growth from exports;
Fitch expects this favorable environment to remain in the near
term.  In July 2014, China removed its embargo of Brazilian beef,
which will benefit companies such as Minerva that have export
capacity.  Minerva has one plant in Barretos that is qualified to
export to China.

Positive Performance

Minerva reported improving revenues and EBITDA in 2Q'14.  The
company's net revenue reached BRL1.7 billion, which is 25% higher
than in 2Q'13.  Sales from the Beef Division and the Others
Division, which includes Live Cattle and Leather, performed
strongly.  Export market revenues increased by 28% year-over-
year. During the same period, Minerva's EBITDA increased 33%
year-over-year.  LTM EBITDA margins for the period ended June 30,
2014 was 10.9%, up 20 bps over the same period in 2013.  The
group's debt maturity schedule remains comfortable with the next
material maturity date due in 2023 when its USD850 million
unsecured notes fall due (the group has bought back BRL 286
million of these notes).

Improve Credit Metrics Expected

Fitch expects Minerva's net debt to EBITDA ratio to improve
toward 3x over the next two years; it was 3.4x as of June 30,
2014.  The company is doing bolt-on acquisitions that will
significantly increase its production capacity and should improve
operating cash flow.  In early 2014, the company acquired a
slaughtering and deboning plant in Janauba, Minas Gerais state
for BRL40 million and concluded the acquisition in Uruguay, of
Frigorifico Matadero Carrasco S.A. for USD37 million.  The group
has also signed a six-month agreement with BRF SA (IDR 'BBB-
'/Stable Outlook) in which Minerva will supply cattle to BRF,
which will offer slaughtering and deboning services, including
the packaging, storage and offer of beef in its production units.
Then, Minerva will collect and distribute these products.  This
agreement became effective on July 15th.  The company is awaiting
for the Brazilian Antitrust Agency's (CADE) final approval of the
acquisition of BRF's plants.

Product and Country Concentration Risks

Minerva is less diversified from a product and geographic
position than two other large protein companies based in Brazil,
JBS S.A. and Marfrig S.A.  Minerva's operations are highly
focused on beef production with exports representing about 68% of
its revenues as of 2Q'14, Minerva's performance is exposed to
exchange rate variations.  A downturn in the economy of a given
export market, the imposition of increased tariffs or commercial
or sanitary barriers, and strikes or other events that may affect
the availability of ports and transportation are also significant
risks faced by the company.

Rating Sensitivities

A negative rating action could occur as a result of a sharp
contraction of the group's performance, an increase in net
leverage close to 4.0x as a result of either a large debt-
financed acquisition and/or a sharp operational deterioration.

A positive rating action could be triggered by additional
geographic and protein diversification and substantial decrease
in gross and net leverage.

Fitch currently rates Minerva as follows:

Minerva S.A.:

   -- Local Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB-';
   -- Foreign currency IDR 'BB-';
   -- National scale rating 'A-(bra)';

Minerva Luxembourg S.A.:

   -- Local currency IDR 'BB-';
   -- Foreign currency IDR 'BB-';
   -- Senior unsecured notes due in 2017, 2019, 2022 and 2023
      'BB-';
   -- Perpetual notes 'BB-'.

The corporate Rating Outlook is Stable.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


PANGAEA ABS 2007-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
PANGAEA ABS 2007-1 B.V.'s class A, B, C, and D notes.

The downgrades follow the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

CAPITAL STRUCTURE

                     Notional
        Current      amount as
        notional     of November
        amount       2013 (mil.   Current OC   November
Deferrable
Class   (mil. EUR)   EUR)         (%)          2013 (%)   (Y/N)
A       143.65       166.56       33.8         32.3       No
B       16.00        16.00        26.4         25.8       No
C       18.00        18.00        18.1         18.5       No
D       24.03        23.85        7.0          8.8        Yes
E       19.00        18.69        0.0          1.2        Yes
F       7.17         6.90         0.0          0.0        Yes
Sub.    19.17        18.12        0.0          0.0        Yes

OC-Overcollateralization.
EURIBOR-Euro Interbank Offered Rate.

Since S&P's previous review on Nov. 22, 2013, it has lowered its
ratings on 18 assets in the underlying portfolio.  As a result,
the portfolio's weighted-average rating has deteriorated to 'B+'
from 'BB-'.  This has been detrimental to the scenario default
rate (SDR) at each rating level.  The SDR is S&P's expectation of
the level of defaults the portfolio will experience in a specific
rating environment using Standard & Poor's CDO evaluator.

In the interest proceeds waterfall, interest on the nondeferrable
notes (the class A, B, and C notes) is paid before principal on
the rated notes when the coverage tests are failing.  If the
interest proceeds are insufficient to fully pay interest on the
class A, B, and C notes, the issuer will use principal proceeds
to pay such interest.

Since S&P's previous review, the break-even default rates (BDRs)
at each rating level have decreased for all of the classes of
notes.  The BDRs represent S&P's estimate of the maximum level of
gross defaults, under its stress assumptions, that the notes can
withstand and still fully pay interest and principal to the
noteholders.  As the weighted-average premium of the class A, B,
and C notes increased, the proportion of available collateral
that will be used to pay interest under our rating scenarios also
increased.

In addition, S&P notes that class D notes continued to defer
interest and that the overcollateralization for the class C and D
notes has decreased.

As a result, S&P's analysis shows that the available credit
enhancement for the class A, B, C, and D notes is commensurate
with lower ratings than those previously assigned.  S&P has
therefore lowered its ratings on these classes of notes.

PANGAEA ABS 2007-1 is a cash flow collateralized debt obligation
(CDO) transaction, which is backed by a portfolio of mainly
mezzanine and junior tranches of residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS), asset-backed securities (ABS), CDOs, and
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).  The transaction
closed in March 2007 and entered its amortization period in June
2013.  It is managed by Investec Bank (U.K.) Ltd.

RATINGS LIST

PANGAEA ABS 2007-1 B.V.
EUR309.2 mil asset-backed floating-rate notes

                         Rating       Rating
Class    Identifier      To           From
A        XS0287257280    BB- (sf)     BB (sf)
B        XS0287266356    B+ (sf)      BB- (sf)
C        XS0287267677    CCC+ (sf)    B (sf)
D        XS0287268642    CCC- (sf)    CCC (sf)


* NETHERLANDS: Number of Bankruptcies Up in July 2014
-----------------------------------------------------
According to Statistics Netherlands, 621 businesses and
institutions (excluding one-man businesses) were declared
bankrupt in July 2014, i.e. nearly 160 more than in the preceding
month.

The increase is due to the extra day courts were in session in
July, Statistics Netherlands notes.  The number of bankruptcies
was considerably lower than in July 2013, when 782 businesses and
institutions were declared bankrupt, Statistics Netherlands
states.  In July 2014, the number of court session days was the
same as in July 2013, Statistics Netherlands relays.

From June to July, the number of bankruptcies rose across nearly
all sectors, but most notably in the sectors trade (123),
financial services (112) and specialist services, e.g.
consultancy and research (66), Statistics Netherlands discloses.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO ESPIRITO: S&P Suspends 'C' Ratings on 2 CD Programs
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and then suspended
its 'C' ratings on two short-term certificate of deposit programs
and one commercial paper program originally issued by Portugal-
based Banco Espirito Santo S.A. (BES).  As S&P publically
communicated on Aug. 8, 2014, most of BES' senior unsecured debt
has been transferred to newly formed Novo Banco S.A. (not rated)
as part of BES' resolution proceedings.  S&P currently does not
have satisfactory information to perform its ratings analysis on
these debt instruments, and S&P is therefore suspending its
ratings on them.

Due to an administrative error, the suspension of the ratings
listed below was not previously processed in S&P's database.  S&P
is now correcting this error.

RATINGS LIST
                             To       Intermediate   From

3(A)3 CP program             NR       C              C
EUR10 bln CD Program         NR       C              C
EUR15 bln CD Program         NR       C              C

CP--Commercial paper.
CD--Certificate of deposit.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


OLTCHIM SA: Asset Auction Scheduled for December 15
---------------------------------------------------
Edith Balazs at Bloomberg News reports that the judicial
administrator of insolvent chemical company Oltchim invites bids
for all assets held in Oltchim SPV.

According to Bloomberg, an auction is called for Dec. 15 and bids
can be submitted by Dec. 12.

Oltchim is based in Romania.  The company has been under
insolvency procedures since January 2013.  This came soon after
the state failed to privatize Oltchim in its first privatization
stage, which was won by media mogul Dan Diaconescu.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


RSHB CAPITAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Rating on Old-Style Sub. Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Agricultural Bank's (RusAg)
Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB-'.  The Outlooks
are Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS -- IDRs, NATIONAL RATING, SENIOR DEBT RATINGs,
SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The affirmation reflects Fitch's assessment of potential support
from the Russian authorities for the bank, in case of need.  In
Fitch's view, the propensity to support the bank would likely be
high, given the bank's full ownership by the State and its policy
role of supporting the agriculture sector, which may become even
more important in light of Russia's recently introduced ban on
food imports from major western countries.  There is no
indication so far of a weakened propensity to support foreign
creditors of state-owned banks, although tail risks could emerge
in case of further escalation of geopolitical tensions and
further sanctions. The government's ability to provide assistance
is currently sound, in particular considering the moderate size
of RusAg's balance sheet relative to the sovereign's available
financial resources.

RusAg's Long-term IDRs, Support Rating Floor and senior debt
ratings are notched down once from the sovereign's ratings due to
the only moderate capital injections provided to the bank so far
relative to the scale of its asset quality problems, and the
absence at present of a confirmed and sufficiently robust
recapitalization plan.  Earlier this year, the government
included RusAg's future recapitalization into the state program
of agribusiness development (part of the federal budget) for the
next six years, but it has not yet decided on the size and the
schedule of capital injections.  The bank's management expects
the total amount of this recapitalization to be around RUB100
billion.

The Negative Outlook on the bank's Long-term IDRs mirrors that on
the sovereign and reflects potential deterioration of the
government's ability to provide support, given the weakening
economy and risks from sanctions.

The affirmation of RusAg's debt ratings applies to all debt
issued prior to August 1, 2014.

KEY RATING DRIVERS -- VIABILITY RATING

The affirmation of RusAg's Viability Rating (VR) at 'b-'
primarily reflects the bank's still weak asset quality and
moderate capitalization.  The rating also considers RusAg's
modest profitability and significant reliance on wholesale
funding.

RusAg's asset quality remains weak, with non-performing loans
(NPLs, including all loans over 90 days, whether classified as
impaired or watch list exposures in the IFRS accounts) comprising
a high 15% of the end-2013 loan book.  In addition, there were
around 8% of rolled-over and/or restructured loans designated as
watch list, resulting in total recognized problem/high risk
exposures of 23% of the loan book.  Reserve coverage of these
exposures was a moderate 36%, with the unreserved part amounting
to RUB206 billion or 94% of Fitch Core Capital (FCC).  There is
also a risk of further problems being recognized upon seasoning
of the predominantly long-term loan book, in particular as
exposures are often structured with bullet repayments and
subsidized interest rates.

The bank has received RUB70 billion of equity injections in the
last two years, and at end-2013 the FCC ratio stood at 13.2%.
Capital is sufficient to fully reserve NPLs without the FCC
falling below 8%, but would not be enough to increase reserving
of restructured loans or any new potential problems, or support
future growth. Internal capital generation is weak with pre-
impairment profit (net of accrued but not received interest
income) amounting to only RUB9 billion (equal to 0.6% of average
risk-weighted assets) in 2013.

The recent government decision allowing RusAg to convert its
RUB25bn subordinated loan from Vnesheconombank into preferred
shares would moderately support its regulatory Tier 1 ratio,
although the instrument would have weak loss absorption capacity
(due to its low 2% conversion trigger) and so would not improve
core Tier 1 capital.

RusAg's high loans/deposits ratio (190% at end-2013) and the
fairly long-term nature of its loan book make the bank's
liquidity position somewhat vulnerable to a sustained reduction
in access to wholesale funding.  However, near-term maturities
are moderate and liquidity is comfortable at present, so recently
introduced sanctions are unlikely to result in a sharp increase
in refinancing risks.  At end-1H14, RusAg had USD10 billion of
foreign liabilities (22% of total non-equity funding) with
negligible maturities in 2H14 and USD0.7 billion due for
repayment in 2015, while the bank held USD4.3 billion of liquid
assets (including USD0.9 billion of foreign correspondent
accounts and short-term bank placements).

RATING SENSITIVITIES -- IDRS, NATIONAL RATING, SENIOR DEBT
RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

RusAg's ratings could be downgraded, or the Outlook revised to
Stable, in case of a similar rating action on the Russian
sovereign.

The ratings could be equalized with the sovereign if the support
framework for the bank materially strengthens or if future
support made available to the bank enables it to operate with
consistently stronger capitalization over an extended period of
time.

The ratings could be downgraded if capital or liquidity support
is not forthcoming when urgently required, or if the bank's
policy role is considerably weakened.  However, Fitch views these
scenarios as unlikely.

RATING SENSITIVITIES -- VR

A further marked deterioration in asset quality could result in a
downgrade of the VR.  A strengthening of capitalization, which
significantly alleviates asset quality risks, could lead to an
upgrade.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES -- SUBBORDINATED DEBT

The rating of RusAg's subordinated debt continues to be notched
off the bank's Long-term IDRs, reflecting Fitch's methodology for
rating 'old style' subordinated debt in Russia.  Accordingly, an
upgrade or downgrade of the subordinated debt rating would follow
similar actions on the bank's Long-term IDRs.

The rating actions are as follows:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook
  Negative

  Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook
  Negative

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

  National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(rus)'; Outlook
  Stable

  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

  Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB-'

  Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'/'BBB-
  (EXP)'/'AA+(rus)'/AA+(EXP)(rus)'

  Senior unsecured debt of RSHB Capital S.A.: affirmed at 'BBB-'
  /'AA+(rus)'

  "Old-style" subordinated debt of RSHB Capital S.A.: affirmed at
  'BB+'



===========
S W E D E N
===========


NATIONAL ELECTRIC: Labo Test Withdraws Bankruptcy Petition
----------------------------------------------------------
Christina Zander at The Wall Street Journal reports that National
Electric Vehicle Sweden AB (NEVS), the Chinese-backed company
that bought Sweden's Saab automobile brand out of bankruptcy,
said on Wednesday that a petition from one of its suppliers to
declare it bankrupt will be withdrawn.

NEVS said in an interview that it has run out of cash to pay its
suppliers, the Journal relates.  The company stopped what was
only limited production of Saab-branded cars earlier this year
after it ran into financial difficulties, the Journal notes.

Labo Test, one of NEVS' suppliers, had petitioned a Swedish court
to declare the auto maker bankrupt over unpaid bills of
SEK150,000 (US$21,800), the Journal recounts.  According to the
Journal, NEVS said that the petition has now been withdrawn.

Labo Test isn't the only creditor NEVS has to worry about, the
Journal states.  The auto maker has debts amounting to SEK3.6
million at the Swedish Enforcement Authority waiting to be paid,
the Journal discloses.  The government agency, as cited by the
Journal, said that another 91 claims, many of which are for
several million kronor each, are waiting in the pipeline for NEVS
to acknowledge them.

NEVS bought the Saab brand out of bankruptcy in 2012 and
restarted production of the Saab 9-3 sedan on Sweden's west coast
late last year, the Journal recounts.

National Electric Vehicle Sweden AB is a Swedish holding company.
Nevs is majority owned by British Virgin Islands-registered, Hong
Kong-based, National Modern Energy Holdings Ltd., an energy
company with operations in China, Macau, and Hong Kong.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALPHA TOPCO: Moody's Assigns 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3 corporate family
rating (CFR) and B3-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to
Alpha Topco Limited, a holding company of the Formula One group
of companies. Concurrently, Moody's has withdrawn Delta Debtco's
B2 CFR and B2-PD PDR.

Moody's has also assigned a definitive B2 rating to the senior
secured term loans and Caa2 to the new second lien term loans
borrowed at Delta 2 (Lux) S.a.r.l. The outlook on all ratings is
stable.

The rating action follows the closing of the refinancing and
shareholder distribution, and concludes the review initiated on
July 17, 2014.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has moved the CFR and PDR to Alpha Topco Limited
following the repayment of the high yield debt at Delta Debtco
Limited and the resulting change in the restricted group. Alpha
Topco Limited is a direct subsidiary of Delta Debtco Limited and
holding company of the restricted group and a guarantor of the
new debt.

The change in CFR to B3 from B2 reflects the company's high
expected Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA of around 9x for 2014
following completion of the US$1 billion increase in term loans
(to US$4.1 billion) to fund a distribution to shareholders. It
also continues to consider: (1) the company's asset-light
business model that relies on the continuation of current
contractual relationships; (2) its dependence on a relatively
small number of revenue generating events; (3) the need for
Formula One to innovate and adapt the franchise to keep and
enhance its appeal to its fan base; (4) degree of key person risk
given the long tenure and deep involvement of CEO Bernie
Ecclestone and (5) the Formula One group's complex corporate
structure. Moody's also notes a fall in viewership numbers in
2013 and a delay in advertising sales for the current season.

However, the B3 also recognizes the strength of Formula One's
position as one of the world's best-known sport franchises and
leading motorsport event with a well-established tradition and
large global fan base. The rating also acknowledges: (1) Formula
One's consistent operational track record and solid financial
performance over the last few years; (2) a good level of revenue
visibility from multi-year contracts with key commercial
partners, including promoters and broadcasters; and (3) the cash
generative nature of the business with limited ongoing capital
expenditure needs.

The B3-PD PDR, aligned with the CFR, reflects Moody's assumption
of a 50% recovery rate. The Caa2 on the US$1 billion of second
lien term loans due 2022 reflects the subordination to a
substantial amount of priority debt including the US$3.1 billion
of senior secured term loans due 2021 and US$75 million revolving
credit facility due 2020. Moody's also notes the weaker covenant
package following the transaction including a financial
maintenance covenant that is tested when the revolver is at least
40% drawn and the introduction of a portability clause.

Liquidity Profile

Moody's views Alpha Topco Limited's liquidity as strong. Although
the higher interest burden from the transaction will reduce free
cash flows, the business remains cash generative (as measured by
Moody's -- after capex and dividends) and, together with existing
cash balances and an undrawn $75 million revolving credit
facility, should be in a position to cover any ongoing liquidity
needs. The next major debt maturity will be in 2020 and 2021.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Formula One
will continue to show solid revenue growth and be in a position
to reduce leverage from current levels.

What Could Change the Rating DOWN/UP

Following the company's recent aggressive distribution step,
which followed similar transaction in 2012/2013, ratings could
come under negative pressure if: (i) leverage measured by Debt/
EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) continues to rise; (ii) the
company generates negative free cash flow; (iii) (EBITDA-
CAPEX)/interest approaches 1.5x; or (iv) there are signs that the
company loses operating momentum on a sustained basis e.g. losses
of major broadcasting contracts, material disruptions to the race
schedule or a deterioration in audience trends. Conversely,
ratings could come under upward pressure if the company reduces
leverage visibly and sustainably towards 7x, together with
ongoing free cash flow generation and steady operational
performance (revenue growth, margin maintenance).

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Alpha Topco Limited is the holding company for the group of
companies that exploit the commercial rights to the FIA Formula
One World Championship. In 2013, the companies held by Alpha
Topco Limited generated revenues of US$ 1.6 billion. Alpha
Topco -- through Delta Debtco Limited and Delta Topco Limited --
is owned by a group of private investors with voting control held
by funds advised by CVC Capital Partners Limited. It derives its
revenues mainly from promoters, broadcasters and
advertisers/sponsors.


DECO 6 UK LARGE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the class A2 and B
Notes, and affirmed the class C and D Notes issued by Deco 6 - UK
Large Loan 2plc.

Moody's rating action is as follows:

Issuer: DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 plc

  GBP259.9M (current outstanding balance of EUR109.6M) A2 Notes,
  Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2012 Downgraded
  to Caa2(sf)

  GBP43M (current outstanding balance of EUR34.4M) B Notes,
  Downgraded to C (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2012 Downgraded to
  Ca(sf)

  GBP49.1M (current outstanding balance of EUR39.3M) C Notes,
  Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 29, 2012 Downgraded to
  C(sf)

  GBP30.119911M(current outstanding balance of EUR24.1M) D Notes,
  Affirmed C (sf); previously on Jan 18, 2012 Downgraded to C(sf)

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the Class A2 and B Notes is driven by an
increase in Moody's loss expectation for both remaining loans.
This is principally due to a continued deterioration in
performance of the remaining eight Mapeley assets, with the
income profile resulting in the latest reported ICR of 0.12x.
Additionally, the Brunel shopping center has posted further
declines in net income due to higher irrecoverable costs and
lower achievable rents. A new valuation taken in January 2014
shows the shopping center declining in value from GBP87.2 million
to GBP63 million.

The Class C and D Notes are affirmed because the respective
ratings are in line with Moody's recovery expectations for the
Notes.

Moody's downgrade reflects a base expected loss in the range of
60%-70% of the current balance, compared with 50%-60% at the last
review. Moody's derives this loss expectation from the analysis
of the default probability of the securitized loans (both during
the term and at maturity) and its value assessment of the
collateral.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA CMBS Transactions published in December
2013.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2014-16 Central Scenarios published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of
the ratings are a further deterioration of the Mapeley loan
stemming from increased vacancy, thereby depressing market values
and ultimate recoveries even further.

The main factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade
of the ratings are higher than expected sales proceeds from the
remaining Mapeley assets. Previous asset sales have been above
their January 2012 market values, however these have tended to be
the better located London properties. It remains doubtful if the
remaining assets would achieve sales above their current market
values.

Moody's Portfolio Analysis

As of the April 2014 IPD, the transaction balance has declined by
62.6% to GPB207.4 million from GPB555.1 million at closing in
December 2005 due to the pay off of two loans originally in the
pool. The notes are currently secured by first-ranking legal
mortgages over nine commercial properties. The pool has an above
average concentration in terms of geographic location (100% UK,
based on UW market value) and property type (74% retail and 26%
office). Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl Index, in
which a higher number represents greater diversity, to measure
the diversity of loan size. Large multi-borrower transactions
typically have a Herf of less than 10 with an average of around
5. This pool has a Herf of 1.6, slightly lower than the 1.9 seen
at Moody's prior review.The WA Moodys LTV on the securitized pool
is 355% up from the 233% at the last review.

Currently both loans are in special servicing, with Hatfield
Phillips undertaking the role for the Mapeley loan whilst Solutus
are acting for the Brunel loan.

SUMMARY OF MOODY'S LOAN ASSUMPTIONS

Below are Moody's key assumptions for both loans.

Mapeley (51.9% of pool) - LTV: 538% (Whole)/ 538% (A-Loan); Total
Default probability -- N/A; Expected Loss 80%-90%.

    * The collateral backing the loan is comprised of eight
      secondary office properties located throughout the UK in
      predominantly provincial towns in classic 'back office'
      locations. Five of the assets are known to be 100% vacant,
      whilst the occupational situation of the largest asset,
      Chesser House is unknown. The eight assets have
      collectively suffered a 74% market value decline from their
      closing valuation, highlighting the weak underlying
      property fundamentals.

    * The loan was transferred to special servicing in October
      2011, due to the sponsor indicating that they would not be
      injecting any further equity. The loan was accelerated in
      July 2012 with Jones Lang Lasalle acting as receiver. Since
      Jan 2013, 12 assets have been sold with proceeds used to
      pay interest, swap breakage fees, opex costs and corporate
      expenses, along with paying down the loan.

Brunel (48.1%) - LTV: 170% (Whole)/ 159% (A-Loan); Total Default
probability -- N/A; Expected Loss 30%-40%.

    * The loan is secured on a regional in-town shopping centre
      located in Swindon.

    * The loan was transferred into special servicing in June
      2011 due to a default under the DSCR covenant.

    * Since the last review the asset has been revalued in
      January 2014 for GBP63 million down from GBP87.2 million.
      During this time, frame net income has also reduced from
      GBP4.66 million to GBP3.92 million reflecting an increase
      in irrecoverable costs and lower achievable rents.


EUROSAIL 2006-4NP: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class E1C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on all rated classes of notes in Eurosail 2006-4NP PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised to 'A (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' and removed from
      CreditWatch positive its ratings on the class M1a and M1c
      notes;

   -- Raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' its rating on the
      class B1a notes; and

   -- Affirmed its ratings on the class A3a, A3c, C1a, C1c, D1a,
      D1c, and E1c notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis
using the most recent data, and the application of its relevant
criteria.

On May 14, 2014, S&P placed on CreditWatch positive its 'A- (sf)'
ratings on the class M1a and M1c notes following its upgrade of
Danske Bank A/S.

In the December 2012 investor report, the servicer (Acenden Ltd.)
updated how it reports arrears to include amounts outstanding,
delinquencies, and other amounts owed, which include, among other
items, arrears of fees, charges, costs, ground rent, and
insurance.  Delinquencies include principal and interest arrears
on the mortgages, based on the borrowers' monthly installments.
Amounts outstanding are principal and interest arrears, after the
servicer allocates borrower payments to other amounts owed.

In this transaction, the servicer first allocates any arrears
payments to other amounts owed, then interest and principal
amounts.  From a borrowers' perspective, the servicer first
allocates any arrears payments to interest and principal amounts,
and then to other amounts owed.  This difference in the
servicer's allocation of payments for the transaction and the
borrower results in amounts outstanding being greater than
delinquencies.

Since S&P's previous review, amounts outstanding have breached
the 90+ days arrears trigger and have increased to 24.88% from
14.68%. Total amounts outstanding have also increased,
representing 33.48% of the pool, up from 23.97% in December 2011.

The notes in this transaction are currently amortizing
sequentially, as they have breached the pro rata payment triggers
relating to arrears and cumulative repossessions.  As the amounts
outstanding continue to increase, S&P considers that the
transaction will likely continue paying principal sequentially
and S&P has incorporated this assumption in its cash flow
analysis.

S&P's weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) assumptions
and its weighted-average loss severity (WALS) assumptions have
increased for this transaction since S&P's previous review.
Primarily, projected arrears have increased S&P's WAFF
assumptions, while its WALS assumptions have increased because it
expects potential losses to be higher, given the servicer's
method of allocating payments of other amounts owed for the
transaction.

WAFF (%)            WALS (%)            Expected loss (%)
AAA                 41.86               49.77               20.83
AA                  34.05               43.23               14.73
A                   27.19               33.45               9.00
BBB                 22.34               27.92               6.24
BB                  16.91               23.66               4.00
B                   14.35               20.38               2.92

The available credit enhancement has increased for the senior
classes of notes, particularly since March 2013 when the
transaction started to pay sequentially, which has offset the
pool's increased credit risk.  Since Danske Bank's upgrade in
April this year, the cap on the ratings has also increased to
'A'. Taking these factors into account, S&P considers that the
available credit enhancement is now commensurate with higher
ratings for the class M1a, M1c, and B1a notes.  S&P has therefore
raised to 'A (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch
positive its ratings on the class M1a and M1c notes.  At the same
time, S&P has raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' its rating on
the class B1a notes, as it believes that the transaction will
continue to pay down sequentially because the pro rata payment
trigger is referencing amounts outstanding, rather than pure
delinquencies.

In S&P's view, the available credit enhancement for the class
A3a, A3c, C1a, C1c, D1a, D1c, and E1c notes is commensurate with
its currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed its
ratings on these classes of notes.

Following the breach of the documented rating trigger, the cash
bond administrator did not replace Danske Bank when it was due to
be replaced as the bank account and guarantee investment contract
provider.  Additionally, the currency swap agreement between the
issuer and Barclays is not in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria.  Accordingly, S&P's ratings on the notes
in this transaction are capped at 'A', the long-term issuer
credit rating (ICR) on Barclays Bank.

Eurosail 2006-4NP is a U.K. nonconforming residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction, which Southern Pacific
Mortgage Ltd., Preferred Mortgages Ltd., and GMAC-RFC Ltd.
originated.

RATINGS LIST

Eurosail 2006-4NP PLC
EUR327.5 mil, GBP496.45 mil, US$64 mil mortgage-backed floating-
rate notes, excess-spread backed floating-rate notes
                                Rating
Class    Identifier     To          From
A3a   29880JAR3         A (sf)      A (sf)
A3c   29880JAT9         A (sf)      A (sf)
M1a   29880JAU6         A (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos
M1c   29880JAW2         A (sf)      A- (sf)/Watch Pos.
B1a   29880JAG7         BBB+ (sf)   BBB (sf)
C1a   29880JAK8         BB (sf)     BB (sf)
C1c   29880JAM4         BB (sf)     BB (sf)
D1a   29880JAN2         B (sf)      B (sf)
D1c   29880JAQ5         B (sf)      B (sf)
E1c   XS0274216018      B- (sf)     B- (sf)


MENARYS: Enters Into Creditors Voluntary Arrangement
-----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Menarys has entered a voluntary arrangement
with its creditors.

Details filed at Companies House indicate the creditors voluntary
arrangement took effect on July 17, BBC relates.  It can
sometimes involve a debt write-off or standstill arrangement but
the details of the Menarys CVA are unclear, BBC notes.

The most recent accounts for Menarys main firm, Menary's Retail
Ltd., show it made a loss of GBP3.6 million in 2013, BBC
discloses.

According to BBC, that was largely due to an exceptional cost of
GBP2.7 million which related to the write-off of loans due from
related firms.

Menarys is a Northern Ireland fashion chain.


TAURUS CMBS 2006-2: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)' its credit ratings on Taurus CMBS (U.K.) 2006-2 PLC's
class B, C and D notes.

Following the repayment of the Time Square loan at a loss, the
issuer applied a non-accruing interest (NAI) amount to the class
B, C, and D notes reverse sequentially on the April 2014 interest
payment date (IPD).

On the July 2014 IPD, the class B notes only received interest on
the portion of their balance that is not subject to a NAI amount.
As such, the class B notes did not receive their full interest
payment, in S&P's view.  Similarly, given that the class C and D
notes' current principal balance (including the NAI amount) is
zero, they did not receive any interest payments on the July 2014
IPD.

S&P's ratings in Taurus CMBS (U.K.) 2006-2 address the timely
payment of interest quarterly in arrears and the payment of
principal no later than the legal final maturity date in April
2024.

The downgrades reflect S&P's view that, given the outstanding NAI
amount, the class B, C, and D notes have experienced interest
shortfalls, which S&P believes will likely continue to increase
on future IPDs.  S&P also expects that these classes of notes
will experience principal losses on their final payment date.
S&P has therefore lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' its ratings
on the class B, C, and D notes.

Taurus CMBS (U.K.) 2006-2 is a 2006-vintage securitization of two
loans secured on 89 U.K. commercial properties.

RATINGS LIST

Taurus CMBS (U.K.) 2006-2 PLC
GBP447.15 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes

                                 Rating        Rating
Class        Identifier          To            From
B            XS0271523259        D (sf)        CC (sf)
C            XS0271523846        D (sf)        CC (sf)
D            XS0271524653        D (sf)        CC (sf)


VOYAGE HOLDINGS: Fitch Says Acquisition No Impact on 'B' IDR
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says the acquisition of Voyage Holdings Limited's
(Voyage) by Partners Group and Duke Street from HgCapital has no
impact on Voyage's ratings.  This is because the debt levels of
the restricted group are unaffected by the shareholding change.
The acquisition price of the transaction is GBP375 million.

Voyage is rated at Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'B' with Stable
Outlook, while at its subsidiary, Voyage Care BondCo plc's senior
secured notes are rated 'BB'/'RR1' and second lien notes 'CCC+'/
'RR6'.

As part of this transaction, the existing debt structure
comprising a GBP30 million revolving credit facility (RCF),
GBP222 million senior secured notes and GBP50 million second lien
notes is intended to remain in place.  To this effect, the issuer
of the notes, VoyageBondCo plc has launched a consent
solicitation with the noteholders seeking a waiver of the
requirement for the issuer to offer to repurchase the notes if
the transaction proceeds, and also an amendment of the indentures
to deem each of Partners Group and Duke Street and their
respective affiliates permitted holders.

The change in ownership will not result in fresh equity injection
into the group at completion.  As part of the transaction, the
existing loan notes, which amounted to about GBP400 million as of
the financial year to March 2014, will remain in place but will
be reduced to GBP110 million after the transaction.  Fitch
continues to exclude these instruments from the calculation of
its leverage metrics due to their equity-like features.

Voyage's ratings continue to reflect its leading market position
as the independent provider of care to people with learning
disability.  They also take into account on-going pressure on its
EBITDA margins from limited fee inflation and rising costs
reflected in the high funds from operations (FFO) lease-adjusted
gross leverage at FYE14 of 7.1x (6.7x adjusted for lower lease
costs and bolt-on acquisitions in FY14).  While leverage is tight
for the 'B' rating, its FFO fixed charge cover at 1.8x (1.9x pro-
forma) remains consistent with the rating.  Fitch expects
improvement in Voyage's operating performance and cost control to
result in gradual deleveraging from FY15.  The new ownership will
not result in any change to the current strategy or financial
policy of the group.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Roy C. Smith's The Money Wars
--------------------------------------------
Author: Roy C. Smith
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by David Henderson

The Money Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Great Buyout Boom of the
1980s

Get your own personal today at http://is.gd/kxvqjA
Business is war by civilized means. It won't get you a tailhook
landing on an n aircraft carrier docked in San Diego, but the
spoils of war can be glorious to behold.

Most executives do not approach business this way. They are
content to nudge along their behemoths, cash their options, and
pillage their workers. This author calls those managers "inertia
ridden." He quotes Carl Icahn describing their companies as run
by "gross and widespread incompetent management."

In cycles though, the U.S. economy generates a few business
warriors with the drive, or hubris, to treat the market as a
battlefield. The 1980s saw the last great spectacle of business
titans clashing. (The '90s, by contrast, was an era of the
investment banks waging war on the gullible.) The Money Wars is
the story of the last great buyout boom. Between 1982 and 1988,
more than ten thousand transactions were completed within the
U.S. alone, aggregating more than $1 trillion of capitalization.

Roy Smith has written a breezy read, traversing the reader
through an important piece of U.S. history, not just business
history. Two thirds of the way through the book, after covering
early twentieth century business history, the growth of financial
engineering after WWII, the conglomerate era, the RJR-Nabisco
story, and the financial machinations of KKR, we finally meet the
star of the show, Michael Milken. The picture painted by the
author leads the reader to observe that, every now and then, an
individual comes along at the right time and place in history who
knows exactly where he or she is in that history, and leaves a
world-historical footprint as a result. Whatever one may think of
Milken's ethics or his priorities, the reader will conclude that
he is the greatest financial genius this country has produced
since J.P. Morgan.

No high-flying financial era has ever happened in this country
without the frothy market attracting common criminals, or in some
cases making criminals out of weak, but previously honest men
(and it always seems to be men). Something there is about
testosterone and money. With so many deals being done, insider
trading was inevitable. Was Michael Milken guilty of insider
trading? Probably, but in all likelihood, everybody who attended
his lavish parties, called "Predators' Balls," shared the same
information.

Why did the Justice Department go after Milken and his firm,
Drexel Burnham Lambert with such raw enthusiasm? That history has
not yet been written, but Drexel had created a lot of envy and
enemies on the Street.

When a better history of the period is written, it will be a
study in the confluence of forces that made Michael Milken's
genius possible: the sclerotic management of irrational
conglomerates, a ready market for the junk bonds Milken was
selling, and a few malcontent capitalist like Carl Icahn and Ted
Turner, who were ready and able to wage their own financial
warfare.

This book is a must read for any student of business who did not
live through any of these fascination financial eras.

Roy C. Smith is a professor of entrepreneurship, finance and
international business at NYU, and teaches on the faculty there
of the Stern School of Business. Prior to 1987, he was a partner
at Goldman Sachs. He received a B.S. from the Naval Academy in
1960 and an M.B.A. from Harvard in 1966.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *