TCREUR_Public/140820.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, August 20, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 164



ALCATEL-LUCENT: S&P Raises CCR to 'B' on Better Operating Results


GRIFONAS FINANCE: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa2'


IRISH BANK: Special Liquidators Begin Sale Process for Loans




EUROPROP SA: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on EUR35MM C Notes


BANCO ESPIRITO: Three Cos. Linked to Downfall Based in Jersey


ROMSTRADE: Owner Accuses CITR of Causing Losses


RGS ASSETS: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'CCC+' ICR
ROSGOSSTRAKH OOO: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating; Outlook Negative


MBS BANCAJA 2: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class F Tranche



U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRITAX GROUP: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'
PUNCH TAVERNS: Optimistic on Debt Restructuring Proposal



ALCATEL-LUCENT: S&P Raises CCR to 'B' on Better Operating Results
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit ratings on French-American telecommunications equipment
supplier Alcatel-Lucent and its subsidiary Alcatel-Lucent USA
Inc. to 'B' from 'B-'.  The outlook is stable.  S&P also affirmed
the 'B' short-term rating on Alcatel-Lucent.

At the same time, S&P raised its issue rating on the senior
secured term facilities issued by Alcatel-Lucent USA to 'BB-'
from 'B+'.  The recovery rating on these facilities is '1',
indicating S&P's expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery for
debtholders in the event of a payment default.  S&P expects to
withdraw the issue rating later this week, once it gets
confirmation that the facilities have been redeemed in full.

S&P raised its issue ratings on Alcatel-Lucent's recently issued
EUR688 million and EUR460 million convertible bonds to 'B' from
'B-'.  The recovery rating on the bonds is '4', indicating S&P's
view of average (30%-50%) recovery prospects in the event of a
payment default.

S&P also raised its issue ratings on the group's remaining senior
unsecured debt instruments to 'B' from 'CCC+' and removed them
from CreditWatch with positive implications.  The recovery rating
on these debt instruments is '4', reflecting S&P's expectation of
average (30%-50%) recovery for debtholders in the event of a
payment default.

The upgrade primarily reflects S&P's expectation that Alcatel-
Lucent is on track with its restructuring program to sustainably
improve its operating margins in 2014 and 2015.  In addition, the
group has sharply reduced its interest costs and improved its
liquidity by refinancing expensive debt instruments with cheaper
long-term debt.  As a result, S&P now expects a marked
improvement in the group's interest cover ratios in the next 12
months, as well as almost break-even free operating cash flow
(FOCF) in 2015, compared with negative FOCF of about EUR0.7
billion in 2014.

Nevertheless, S&P continues to assess the group's financial risk
profile as "highly leveraged," which primarily reflects S&P's
expectation of still-high Standard & Poor's-adjusted gross
leverage ratios, including debt to EBITDA and funds from
operations (FFO) to debt well above 5x and below 10%,
respectively, in 2014 and 2015.  S&P's projections of volatile
credit measures through the industry cycle also underpin its

S&P continues to assess the group's business risk profile as
"weak," which primarily reflects the group's still relatively low
profitability relative to many of its peers, partly due to
continued significant restructuring needs.  The group reported a
4.8 percentage point year-on-year improvement in operating
margins (before restructuring costs) in the first-half of 2014 to
2.7%. However, reported operating margins after restructuring
costs were still a negative 3.4% in the first half of 2014.

In addition, the group faces fierce competition, volatile demand,
and has substantial operating leverage due to a highly fixed-cost
base.  This is partly mitigated by Alcatel-Lucent's solid
diversification in terms of technologies and products, as well as
its leading positions in fixed-line access, internet protocol
(IP) and fiber optics transmission, and core network

Under S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Flat- to low-single-digit organic revenue growth in 2014,
      based on its expectation of roughly flat revenues in its
      Core Networking segment, and modestly growing Wireless
      Access revenues.  This excludes revenues from the Managed
      Services subsegment, which S&P expects to decline by more
      than 50% in 2014.

   -- Revenue growth of 4%-6% in 2015, primarily due to solid
      revenue growth in the group's subsegments IP Routing, IP
      Transport and Fixed Access, partly offsetting lower
      wireless equipment revenues.

   -- An operating margin improvement (as adjusted by Alcatel-
      Lucent) toward about 5% in 2014 and 6%-7% in 2015, up from
      2.0% in 2013, primarily on the back of the group's
      continued cost cutting, higher gross margins due to a
      better product mix and higher revenues, and the exiting
      from unprofitable managed services contracts and

   -- Continued high cash outflows from restructuring of about
      EUR0.50 billion to EUR0.55 billion in 2014, and about
      EUR0.45 billion to EUR0.50 billion in 2015, compared with
      EUR0.52 billion in 2013.

   -- Moderately negative working capital requirements of about
      EUR0.2 billion to EUR0.3 billion in 2014 and 2015.

   -- EUR550 million to EUR600 million in capital expenditures in
      2014 and 2015, up from EUR528 million in 2013.

   -- Disposal proceeds of up to EUR0.4 billion from the
      divestment of subsidiaries LGS Innovations LLC and Alcatel-
      Lucent Enterprise, to be received in part in 2015.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures for Alcatel-Lucent:

   -- Standard & Poor's-adjusted gross debt to EBITDA of more
      than 10x and FFO to debt of about 2.0% at year-end 2014,
      improving to about 7.0x and 8.0% by year-end 2015, compared
      with 20.5x and negative 2.8% at year-end 2013.

   -- EBITDA interest coverage ratios, as adjusted by Standard &
      Poor's, of about 1.5x at year-end 2014 and about 3x at
      year-end 2015, up from 0.6x in 2013.

   -- Close to break-even FOCF in 2015, compared with FOCF of
      approximately negative EUR0.7 billion in 2014 and negative
      EUR663 million in 2013.

S&P assess Alcatel-Lucent USA as a core subsidiary for its 100%-
owner Alcatel-Lucent.  S&P views Alcatel-Lucent USA's as integral
to the group's operations, identity, and future strategy.  In
addition, S&P understands that Alcatel-Lucent USA generates most
of the group's profits.  S&P's long-term corporate credit rating
on Alcatel-Lucent USA is therefore the same as that on Alcatel-

The stable outlook primarily reflects S&P's expectation that the
group will demonstrate further improvement in its operating
margin (Alcatel-Lucent-adjusted) toward about 5% for the full
year 2014 and 6%-7% in 2015, coupled with prospects of achieving
close to break-even FOCF generation (excluding potential asset
disposal proceeds) in 2015.

S&P could raise the ratings if Alcatel-Lucent achieved stronger
operating margin improvement and better FOCF generation than it
currently expects for 2015 as a result of higher-than-expected
revenue growth or higher-than-expected gross margins.  In
particular, an operating margin (Alcatel-Lucent-adjusted) of
about 8%-9% and sustainable positive FOCF could support a one-
notch upgrade.

S&P could lower the ratings if Alcatel-Lucent's FOCF generation
does not materially improve compared with the expected cash burn
of EUR0.6 billion to EUR0.7 billion in 2014 or if the group's
operating margins (Alcatel-Lucent-adjusted) remain in the low-
single digits in 2014 and 2015 as a result of stronger-than-
expected competitive pressure on revenues and gross margins or
insufficient cost-cutting measures.  This could also lead S&P to
revise down its business risk assessment on Alcatel-Lucent to
"vulnerable" from "weak."


GRIFONAS FINANCE: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa2'
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded 20 notes, affirmed one
note, and placed one note on watch for upgrade in nine Greek
structured finance transactions. This follows Moody's raising of
its country ceiling on Greece to Ba3 from B3 and its upgrade of
Greece's sovereign rating to Caa1 from Caa3. Moody's has also
reassessed collateral performance and revised portfolio
assumptions in three transactions.

The raising of Greece's country ceiling to Ba3 reflects the
improvement in Greece's economic outlook, the significant
improvement in Greece's fiscal position over the past year and
the government's reduced interest burden and lengthened
maturities of the debt. As a result of the rating actions, the
highest rating for outstanding Greek structured finance
securities is now Ba3 (sf), up from B3 (sf) previously. A
detailed list of the rating actions is included towards the end
of this press release before the regulatory disclosure section.

Ratings Rationale

   Highest Rating for Greek Structured Finance Transactions
   Is Now Ba3(sf)

The rating actions reflect Moody's upgrade of its assessment of
the highest rating that can be assigned to debt obligations
issued by domestic Greek issuers, or where cash flows used to
repay debt obligations are sourced from domestic Greek assets, to
Ba3. This new maximum achievable rating applies to all forms of
ratings in Greece, including structured finance ratings.

  Approach Used for RMBS Ratings

MILAN CE is a key input in the RMBS methodology used to calibrate
the loss distribution in the cash flow model, however given the
low level of the Greek country ceiling, and the relatively high
level of expected losses, a MILAN CE that would generate the
desired loss distribution cannot be established. Therefore
Moody's did not carry out the cash flow analysis to determine the
note rating, but rather used a qualitative approach. The ratings
were positioned according to the ratio of the note credit
enhancement to the portfolio expected loss (CE/EL). The position
in the capital structure as well as note size were also taken
into account in the ratings. According to the approach, senior
notes with a CE/EL ratio of 2 or above can achieve a Ba3 (sf)
rating, whereas a mezzanine or junior note with the CE/EL ratio
of 2 would on average achieve a Caa1 (sf) rating. If CE/EL ratio
approximately equals 1, a senior note would likely achieve a B1
(sf) rating, whereas a mezzanine or junior note would likely
achieve a Caa3(sf) rating. The note ratings corresponding to the
various CE/EL levels were determined using a test cashflow model
run with the loss calibrated using a MILAN CE that equals the
expected loss.

  Six Senior Notes Upgraded on Sufficient Credit Enhancement

Moody's assessed the current credit enhancement (CE) level under
each senior RMBS note and compared it against the observed
performance and the expected loss for each transaction. Moody's
upgraded six senior notes to Ba3 (sf), with CE covering more than
three times the expected loss level. Moody's upgraded Estia
Mortgage Finance II PLC to B1 (sf), with a CE only slightly above
the expected loss level.

  Moody's Also Upgraded a Number of Subordinated Notes

Moody's upgraded most mezzanine and junior notes, taking into
account the notes' CE levels compared to the expected loss
assumed for each transaction. Small subordinated notes are
subject to higher severities given that 1) available cash flows
would first be allocated to the senior notes; and 2) any
allocation of losses in smaller tranches results in a higher
severity compared to the same level of losses in a much larger
note. As a result, Moody's upgraded twelve subordinated notes in
six transactions to levels ranging from B1 (sf) to Caa2 (sf) and
affirmed one junior note at Caa3 (sf) for which the current CE
level is lower than the expected loss level. The extent of the
upgrade is one notch for junior notes and one to three notches
for mezzanine notes.

  Collateral Performance

Collateral performance has remained broadly stable in Greek RMBS
transactions. With few exceptions, arrears levels have remained
low and stable, with 90+ arrears on average standing at 2% of
current portfolio balance.

Moody's has reduced the portfolio expected loss assumption in
KION Mortgage Finance Plc and Themeleion Mortgage Finance PLC to
2% from 3.38% of original portfolio balance and to 0.6% from
0.74% of the original portfolio balance, respectively. The
updated expected loss assumptions correspond to approximately 8%
of the current portfolio balance in both transactions, aligning
the assumptions with market average. Both transactions have
performed broadly in line with the rest of the market to date.

The performance of Estia Mortgage Finance II PLC has continued to
deteriorate and to further diverge from market average, with
cumulative defaults increasing from 5.4% to 7% of the original
portfolio balance over the past year. Moody's has increased the
portfolio expected loss assumption in the transaction to 11.2%
from 8.5% of the original pool balance.

Titlos Plc Notes Upgraded on Reduced Sovereign Risk

Moody's upgraded the notes issued by Titlos plc to Caa1 (sf) from
Caa3 (sf). These notes are backed by a swap relying on payments
by the Greek government, reflecting the Greek sovereign rating.
Moody's believes the main risk driver of this transaction is
Greek sovereign risk and, as such, the rating on the notes
closely mirror that of the Greek government.

Epihiro Plc Notes Placed on Watch for Upgrade on Reduced
Sovereign Risk

Moody's has placed on watch for upgrade Class A of EPIHIRO PLC.
Class A benefits from a substantial credit enhancement of
approximately 51%. During the review Moody's will assess
portfolio composition and borrower concentration.

The principal methodology used in rating Estia Mortgage Finance
II PLC, Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc, KION Mortgage Finance Plc,
Themeleion Mortgage Finance PLC, Themeleion II Mortgage Finance
Plc, Themeleion III Mortgage Finance Plc and Themeleion IV
Mortgage Finance Plc was "Moody's Approach to Rating RMBS Using
the MILAN Framework", published in March 2014. The principal
methodology used in rating EPIHIRO PLC was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations", published in
February 2014. The principal methodology used in rating Titlos
plc was "Moody's Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities",
published in April 2010.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the

-- A further lowering in Moody's assessment of the sovereign
    risk in Greece could lead to an additional upgrade of the
    ratings. Conversely, an increase in Moody's assessment of the
    sovereign risk in Greece, as well as a deterioration in the
    collateral performance, could lead to a downgrade of the

Sensitivity Analysis

Moody's did not conduct a cash flow analysis as the main driver
of the rating actions was its upgrade of the country ceiling for
Greek debt.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Estia Mortgage Finance II PLC

  EUR1137.5M A Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc

  EUR897.7M A Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  EUR23.8M B Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  EUR28.5M C Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: KION Mortgage Finance Plc

  EUR553.8M A Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  EUR28.2M B Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

  EUR18M C Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Themeleion II Mortgage Finance Plc

  EUR690M A Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  EUR37.5M B Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  EUR22.5M C Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Themeleion III Mortgage Finance Plc

  EUR900M A Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
  2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  EUR20M B Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2013
  Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

EUR40M C Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

EUR40M M Notes, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2013
Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Themeleion IV Mortgage Finance Plc

EUR1352.9M A Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

EUR155.5M B Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

EUR46.6M C Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2013
Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Themeleion Mortgage Finance PLC

EUR693.5M A Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

EUR32M B Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 4, 2013
Upgraded to Caa2 (sf)

EUR24.5M C Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
2013 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)


EUR1623M Class A Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Dec 4, 2013 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Titlos plc

EUR5100M A Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Dec 4,
2013 Upgraded to Caa3 (sf)


IRISH BANK: Special Liquidators Begin Sale Process for Loans
Colm Kelpie at Irish Independent reports that the special
liquidators of the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) have
begun the sales process for the final EUR2.4 billion worth of
loans linked to the former bank.

The loans have been divided across three so-called projects --
Amber, Quartz and Pearl, Irish Independent discloses.

The special liquidators confirmed that the sales process for
Project Amber, which includes EUR675 million worth of Irish-based
corporate and commercial loans, began last week, Irish
Independent relates.

Accountants PricewaterhouseCoopers are advising special
liquidators Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG on
Project Amber, Irish Independent notes.

The sales process for Projects Quartz and Pearl are expected
to begin next month, Irish Independent says.

Quartz includes EUR1.1 billion worth of commercial property
loans, while Pearl is comprised of EUR655 million worth of
mortgages, mostly in the Republic, according to Irish

Binding bids for Amber are expected by October, with November and
December pencilled in for Quartz and Pearl, Irish Independent

The special liquidators compiled a progress report which was
published by Finance Minister Michael Noonan in June and showed
that 90% of the loan book had been sold since the scandal-hit
lender was placed into liquidation in February of last year, with
EUR21.7 billion of loans brought to the market, Irish Independent

According to Irish Independent, IBRC's progress report revealed
that EUR110 million in fees had been paid to accountants, banks
and lawyers working on the liquidation of Irish Bank Resolution
Corporation (IBRC) in the 14 months to the end of March.

                   About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

IBRC was granted protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in December 2013.

Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG have been named the
special liquidators.


Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB-/B' counterparty credit ratings on Italy-based Banco Popolare
Societa Cooperativa SCRL (Banco Popolare) and its core subsidiary
Banca Aletti & C. SpA.  S&P then withdrew the ratings at Banco
Popolare's request.  S&P also withdrew the issue ratings on all
the debt instruments issued by Banco Popolare.

The affirmation reflects S&P's review of Banco Popolare's first-
half results, announced on Aug. 8, 2014, which S&P considers to
be in line with its previous expectations.

"At the time of the withdrawal, the ratings reflected our view
that, despite Banco Popolare's solid nationwide franchise, its
relatively modest capitalization and expected earnings -- in the
context of the downside risk stemming from its weak asset quality
and the prevailing relatively high-risk economic environment in
Italy -- continue to negatively affect its creditworthiness.  At
the same time, we assessed Banco Popolare's funding position to
be in line with the average of the Italian banking system and its
liquidity position to be adequate, taking into account that the
exposure to short-term wholesale funding is almost entirely
covered by liquid assets," S&P said.

"According to our criteria, the long-term issuer credit rating at
the time of the withdrawal also included one notch of uplift to
reflect the potential for extraordinary government support given
our view of Banco Popolare's "high" systemic importance in Italy
and the Italian authorities' supportive stance to its banking
system," S&P added.

At the time of the withdrawal, the outlook was negative.  This
primarily reflected the possibility that S&P could have lowered
its ratings on Banco Popolare by one notch by year-end 2015 if it
had considered that extraordinary government support is less
predictable under the new EU legislative framework.  S&P could
have removed the one notch of uplift for potential extraordinary
support, which S&P incorporated into the ratings, shortly before
the Jan. 2016 introduction of bail-in powers under the European
Union's Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) for senior
unsecured liabilities.  In addition to potential changes in Banco
Popolare's business and financial profiles and government
support, S&P would have reviewed other relevant rating factors
when taking any future rating actions.  These might have included
any measures Banco Popolare might have taken that provided
substantial additional flexibility to absorb losses while a
going-concern and mitigate bail-in risks to senior unsecured


EUROPROP SA: Moody's Affirms 'C' Rating on EUR35MM C Notes
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the ratings of the Class
A, Class B and Class C Notes issued by EuroProp (EMC VI) S.A.

Issuer: EuroProp (EMC VI) S.A.

  EUR380.25M A Notes, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on Oct 17,
  2013 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

  EUR30M B Notes, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013
  Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

  EUR35M C Notes, Affirmed C (sf); previously on Oct 17, 2013
  Downgraded to C (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating affirmation reflects Moody's unchanged assessment of
the pool's base expected loss since the last review in October
2013. Since the last review, the marginal increase in credit
enhancement resulting from the repayment of the Project Ash and
Gutperle loans and the increased pace of asset sales under the
Sunrise II loan are offset by higher expected losses on the Epic
Horse and Epic Rhino loans following recent asset sales below
Moody's previous expectations. In addition, Moody's remains
concerned that ongoing legal proceedings relating to the Signac
loan may delay recoveries until after the note maturity date in
April 2017.

Moody's affirmation reflects a base expected loss in the range of
30%-40% of the current balance, the same as at the last review.
Moody's derives this loss expectation from the analysis of the
default probability of the securitized loans (both during the
term and at maturity) and its recovery expectation for the
collateral. For a summary of Moody's key assumptions for the
loans in the pool please refer to the section SUMMARY OF MOODY'S

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA CMBS Transactions published in December

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2014-16 Central Scenarios, published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Main factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of
the ratings are generally (i) a slowdown in the pace of asset
sales in the Sunrise II loan or (ii) an extended delay in the
workout of the Signac loan.

Main factor or circumstance that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings is an increase in recovery expectations before the Notes'
legal final maturity date.

Moody's Portfolio Analysis

   * EuroProp (EMC VI) S.A. closed in June 2007 and represents
     the securitisation of initially 18 commercial mortgage
     loans. Currently, 10 loans remain in the pool, secured by 66

   * The pool exhibits below average diversity in terms of
     geographic location. Nine of the 10 remaining loans are
     secured by assets located in Germany (85% by portfolio
     balance), while the remaining loan is secured by a single
     office property in France. Moody's uses a variation of Herf
     to measure diversity of loan size, where a higher number
     represents greater diversity. Large multi-borrower
     transactions typically have a Herf of less than 10 with an
     average of around 5. This pool has a Herf of 5.3 compared to
     a Herf of 8.9 at closing.

Summary of Moody's Loan Assumptions

Below are Moody's key assumptions for the Top three loans.

Sunrise II Loan (34.6% of pool) - LTV: 131%; Total Default
Probability: N/A; Expected Loss: 30% - 40%.

The loan is secured by a portfolio of 46 retail properties
located across Germany, predominantly in secondary locations.
Whilst asset sales have been slow to date, the pace of progress
has improved considerably in recent months: six property sales
have been notarized whilst a further 21 are at various stages of
due diligence with the special servicer reporting that a further
10 assets are under offer. On average, the completed and
notarized sales have been at 86% of the allocated loan amount.

Signac Loan (18.7% of pool) - LTV: 161.0%; Total Default
Probability: N/A; Expected Loss: 50% - 60%.

The Signac loan is secured by a single office property located in
Gennevilliers, Paris. Following the loan's non-payment at
maturity in July 2011, the borrower was granted Safeguard
proceedings as well as a loan extension to June 2015. Under the
terms of the Safeguard Plan, the Borrowers were required to place
the asset on the market from Jan 2014 provided that certain
targets in relation to vacancy and value have been met. Failure
to meet these targets means the asset has not been marketed for
sale and the Special Servicer is seeking confirmation that the
borrower intends to bring the asset to market ahead of the new
maturity date in June 2015. The lack of control by the Special
Servicer remains a concern to Moody's, in particular with regards
to realizing recoveries ahead of legal final maturity of the

Henderson -- Staples Loan (10.7% of pool) - LTV: 97%; Total
Default Probability: N/A; Expected Loss: 10% - 20%.

The loan is secured over a portfolio of two office and two retail
properties in Germany. Originally scheduled to mature in January
2013, the loan was initially extended for 12 months however after
failing to repay in January 2014, the loan was transferred to
special servicing. The loan is currently in standstill whilst the
borrower pursues a consensual sale of the assets.


BANCO ESPIRITO: Three Cos. Linked to Downfall Based in Jersey
BBC News reports that three companies implicated in the downfall
of the Portuguese bank, Banco Espirito Santo (BES), are
registered in Jersey.

They bought debts from the bank, and other Espirito Santo
companies, and repackaged them as investments for branch
customers, BBC discloses.

Following complaints, BES was made to refund the customers,
contributing to a record GBP2.8 billion half-year loss, BBC

BES was eventually split into a "good bank" and a "bad bank" on
Aug. 3, BBC notes.

Portuguese regulators are now interested in three Jersey
companies, or "Special Purpose Vehicles", and one in the British
Virgin Islands, which they say are connected to the Espirito
Santo conglomerate, BBC says, citing a Wall Street Journal

According to BBC, the companies named are Top Renda, EuroAforro
Investments, and Poupanca Plus Investments.

Their alleged link to the Espirito Santos group is difficult to
verify because Jersey companies can conceal their true
beneficiaries by nominating local trust firms as shareholders,
BBC states.

The filings of the three Jersey companies do show, however, that
over the past ten years they bought hundreds of millions of euros
worth of debt from Espirito Santo group companies, BBC discloses.

To fund this, they sold many small batches of "preferred shares",
which are a cross between shares and bonds, according to BBC.
These are the products which had to be refunded, BBC says.

Swiss bank Credit Suisse is named on the filings as the
"arranger" of the deals, BBC notes.

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon.  It is 20% owned by Espirito Santo Financial Group.

Banco Espirito Santo has been split into "good" and "bad" banks
as part of a EUR4.9 billion rescue of the distressed Portuguese
lender that protects taxpayers and senior creditors but leaves
shareholders and junior bondholders holding only toxic assets.  A
total of EUR4.9 billion in fresh capital is being injected into
this "good bank", which will subsequently be offered for sale.
It has been renamed "Novo Banco", meaning new bank, and will
include all BES's branches, workers, deposits and healthy credit


ROMSTRADE: Owner Accuses CITR of Causing Losses
Irina Popescu at reports that Romanian
businessman Nelu Iordache accuses Casa de Insolventa Transilvania
(CITR), the former judicial administrator of Romstrade, that it
looted his company, causing losses by ending contracts,
maintaining others and signing new ones, but also by selling
assets of Blue Air airline.

Mr. Iordache, the owner of both companies, who is serving jail
time for misuse of EU funds, made a series of accusations in a
report addressed to creditors, Romania-Insider says, citing
Adevarul.  According to Romania-Insider, one of the accusations
refers to the termination of leasing contracts for equipment,
which led to the termination of some of the company's road and
infrastructure contracts.

Taking into account all the accusations, the report also asks for
a new judicial administrator to be appointed, Romania-Insider
discloses.  This was to be done on Aug. 18, during the meeting of
creditors, Romania-Insider notes.

"The presented statements are unfounded.  All the measures CTIR
undertakes in the insolvency procedures it manages are taken with
the agreement of creditors and under the court's control of
legality, according to the Insolvency Law.  CITR is no longer the
judicial administrator of Romstrade, since March 2014.  Thus, we
can't comment on its activity," Romania-Insider quotes CITR
officials as saying.

Romstrade is a Romanian construction company.


RGS ASSETS: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'CCC+' ICR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had revised its
outlook on RGS Assets, owner of Russian insurer OAO Rosgosstrakh,
to stable from negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'CCC+' long-term issuer credit rating.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that RGS Assets is less
likely to default than previously, following the successful
refinancing of its external debt at the ultimate holding company
RGS Holdings and the consequent repayment of external debt to
Russian government-owned VTB Bank.  RGS Holdings' borrowings from
its subsidiaries RGS Assets and OAO Rosgosstrakh simultaneously

RGS Assets is registered in Cyprus and owns 23.33% of
Rosgosstrakh directly and 52% via a Russian holding company that
does not perform any operating activity.  S&P treats RGS Assets
as an intermediate holding company of its financial sponsor RGS

S&P's rating on RGS Assets reflects the underlying credit quality
of its assets, which are limited to Rosgosstrakh, and its
structural subordination as a holding company.  The rating on RGS
Assets is four notches below that on the operating entity, rather
than the standard two notches under S&P's criteria, to reflect
significant liability risks at RGS Holdings.  S&P's analysis of
RGS Assets consolidates the material debt at RGS Holdings, given
its role and profile within the group, the absence of
subordination between the two unregulated holding entities, and
that there is no mechanism to stop capital flow between them.
S&P understands that dividends upstreamed from the operating
companies will be used to refinance this debt.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's understanding that current debt
at RGS Holdings is intragroup, and that there is a high
probability of rescheduling or extension of tenure.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if it saw significant
deleveraging at the RGS Holdings level.

A negative rating action could follow if RGS Holdings raised
additional external debt.

ROSGOSSTRAKH OOO: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating; Outlook Negative
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term insurer financial strength and counterparty credit
ratings on Russian Insurer Rosgosstrakh OAO and its core
subsidiary Rosgosstrakh OOO. The outlook is negative.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed the 'ruAA-' Russia national scale ratings
on both companies.

The affirmation balances that Rosgosstrakh's 2013 performance
exceeded S&P's previous expectations, with the company's
increased credit exposure to its financial sponsor and ultimate
holding company.  S&P notes that this increase in lending was not
in line with its previous expectations.  In S&P's view, it had a
negative influence on the group's capitalization, but was
somewhat counterbalanced by good operating performance.

S&P considers these loans to be equivalent to a dividend payout
and accordingly deduct the full amount of loans from S&P's
calculation of Rosgosstrakh's capital.  Under S&P's base case, it
assumes that capital adequacy, although weakened by the loans,
will improve to less than adequate over the next three years.

The ratings continue to reflect S&P's view of Rosgosstrakh's
strong business risk profile and very weak financial risk
profile. S&P derives its 'bb-' anchor for Rosgosstrakh from the
combination of these factors.

Rosgosstrakh is the largest non-life insurer in Russia in terms
of gross premiums written (GPW), which totalled RUB107 billion
($3 billion) in 2013.

The rating on Rosgosstrakh OOO is at the same level as the rating
on Rosgosstrakh because Rosgosstrakh OOO is 99.9% owned by and is
a core subsidiary of Rosgosstrakh.  Rosgosstrakh OOO is the
largest operating company within the Rosgosstrakh OAO group,
constituting 80% of total assets of the consolidated Rosgosstrakh
OAO group, and close to 90% of total capital and 90% of GPW.

The negative outlook reflects risks that Rosgosstrakh may fail to
improve capital adequacy over the next year to a level that would
allow it to reach S&P's less than adequate category over the next
three years.  Risks come from the increasing size and complexity
of intragroup transactions including loans to the holding company
negatively influencing capitalization, and any potential
underperformance of the insurance portfolio, in particular the
motor portfolio weakening retained profits.

The outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Rosgosstrakh will
preserve a strong competitive position, maintaining leading
positions in the Russian insurance market.  The outlook also
incorporates S&P's expectations that future dividends will be
used to repay debt to the operating companies.


MBS BANCAJA 2: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class F Tranche
Fitch Ratings has upgraded six and affirmed ten tranches of AyT
Hipotecario BBK I (BBK I), AyT Hipotecario BBK II (BBK II), MBS
Bancaja 1, and MBS Bancaja 2.

Key Rating Drivers

Upgrades Driven by Rating Cap Revision
Fitch placed the class A notes of all four transactions and the
class B notes of MBS Bancaja 1 and 2 on Rating Watch Positive
(RWP) following the revision of Spain's Country Ceiling to 'AA+',
six notches above its sovereign Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of

With the publication of its updated criteria assumptions for
Spanish RMBS on June 5, 2014, Fitch set its assumptions for
'AA+sf' rating stresses used to analyze the ability of some
senior tranches to withstand higher rating stresses. The analysis
showed that the credit enhancement (CE) available to the six
notes on RWP is sufficient to warrant a two-notch upgrade.

Solid Asset Performance

The affirmation of the remaining tranches reflects the asset
performance of the transactions. As of the latest reporting
periods, three-months plus arrears (excluding defaults) ranged
from 0.78% (BBK II) to 2.2% (MBS Bancaja 2) of the current pool
balances. Cumulative gross defaults (defined as loans in arrears
for more than 18 months) ranged between 0.6% (BBK I) and 2.1%
(MBS Bancaja 2) of the initial portfolio balance, all of which
have been fully provisioned by using excess spread in BBK I and
BBK II, leaving their reserve funds fully funded. Meanwhile,
gross excess spread in MBS Bancaja 1 and MBS Bancaja 2 has been
insufficient to fully cover period defaults, leading to draws on
the reserve funds. The reserve funds were at 96% (MBS Bancaja 1)
and 90% (MBS Bancaja 2) of their target amounts.

The Negative Outlook on the junior tranche in MBS Bancaja 2
reflects Fitch's expectation of future reserve draws, and the
subsequent reduction in available credit enhancement for this

Swap Counterparty Risk Mitigated
Under Fitch's structured finance counterparty criteria, the
ratings of the interest rate swap counterparty in BBK I and BBK
II, Kutxabank (BBB/Positive/F3), are not eligible to support the
highest-rated notes (AA+sf) in the transactions. To mitigate
counterparty risk, the swap provider opened a swap collateral
account with Barclays Bank plc (A/Stable/F1). The latest investor
report shows that collateral posted is EUR4.5 million for BBK I
and EUR8.7 million for BBK II.

Rating Sensitivities

Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors, in particular the increasing effect of unemployment. A
corresponding increase in new defaults and associated pressure on
excess spread and reserve funds, beyond Fitch's assumptions,
could lead to negative rating actions.

The rating actions are as follows:

AyT Hipotecario BBK I
Class A (ISIN ES0312364005): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0312364013): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0312364021): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

AyT Hipotecario BBK II
Class A (ISIN ES0312251004): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0312251012): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0312251020): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

MBS Bancaja 1
Class A (ISIN ES0361794003): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0361794011): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0361794029): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN ES0361794037): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

MBS Bancaja 2
Class A (ISIN ES0361795000): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0361795018): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN ES0361795026): affirmed at 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN ES0361795034): affirmed 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable
Class E (ISIN ES0361795042): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
Class F (ISIN ES0361795059): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery
Estimate 90%


Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukraine-based Avangardco Investments
Public Limited's Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) at 'CCC'. Fitch has also affirmed the company's Long-term
local currency IDR at 'B-' with Negative Outlook.

The affirmation reflects the political and economic uncertainty
in Ukraine, including Avangardco's exposure to Eastern Ukraine
regions, which may ultimately threaten the group's financial
flexibility and its ability to meet its debt obligations.
"Nevertheless, we note significant headroom in the ratings
supported by Avangardco's low leverage, even accounting for a
negative impact from hryvna devaluation on EBITDA, as well as
growing exports and a high portion of cash accumulated for
Eurobond repayment in 2015, mostly held outside Ukraine," Fitch

Key Rating Drivers

Linkage to Sovereign Rating
Avangardco's ratings are constrained by Ukraine's Country Celling
of 'CCC', reflecting the uncertain regulatory, tax and operating
environment, including the ability of Ukrainian corporates to
access foreign currency. "We also note Avangardco's exposure to
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which contributed around 19% to
group revenues in 2013," Fitch said.

Limited Impact from Guarantee to ULF

"We consider that the unconditional and irrevocable suretyship to
its parent's (UkrLandFarming PLC; ULF) Eurobond issue is neutral
for Avangardco's credit profile, although we recognize strong
legal and strategic ties between the companies. We expect that
ULF's operational and financial standalone profile will remain
strong and therefore the risk of claim under the suretyship would
be remote," Fitch said.

Fitch estimates that even accounting for ULF's USD500 million
bond as a contingent liability, Avangardco's funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage would be commensurate with
the 'B' rating category, without the sovereign rating constraint.
"In our recovery analysis we continue to treat the ULF Eurobond
as senior unsecured and expect above-average recovery prospects
for unsecured creditors at the Avangardco level, capped at 'RR4'
for the Ukraine jurisdiction," Fitch said.

Hryvna Devaluation Vulnerability

Avangardco benefits from a strong position in the domestic market
for shell eggs, where the group generates nearly 70% of its
revenue. However significant hryvnia depreciation starting 2014
will diminish domestic revenues when converted into US dollars
and reduce the group's ability to service its debt, which is
predominantly in hard currency. Nevertheless, with low leverage
as of end-2013, Avangardco is well positioned to avoid any
problems with debt servicing and we expect FFO fixed charge cover
to remain at 5x-7x in 2014-2015.

Growing Export Improves Risk Profile
Fitch considers export growth is critical for further development
and improvement of the company's business risk profile and
expects an increase in export's share of revenue up to 45% in the
medium term (29% in 2013). This growth will be supported by the
company's proactive work towards extending its presence in export
markets and sufficient production capacity at newly constructed

Low Leverage despite EBITDA Decline
Fitch expects significant EBITDA decline in 2014 both in absolute
terms and relative to revenues due to hryvnia depreciation and
declining export prices, which will lead to FFO adjusted leverage
increasing up to 2.2x (1.3x in 2013). However, in 2015 it will
fall to around 1x following the expected repayment of the USD200m
Eurobond and assuming lower capex spending after completion of
major expansion projects in 2013.

Dividend Policy Adoption
Additional pressure on FCF and consequently credit metrics could
arise from dividend distributions, which could reach up to 40% of
net income as per the recently adopted dividend policy. Fitch
understands that dividends in 2014 will not exceed USD60 million
and management will maintain a reasonable financial policy to
accumulate enough cash for bond repayment in 2015.

Rating Sensitivities

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action on the Long-term local currency IDR include:

-- Liquidity shortage caused by limited available bank financing
    of working capital investments or by refinancing at more
    onerous terms than expected.

-- An increase in consolidated FFO adjusted gross leverage to
    3.5x on a sustained basis.

-- FFO fixed charge cover weakening below 2.5x.

Positive: An upgrade of the local currency IDR would only be
possible if Fitch considers there has been a sustained
improvement in the issuer's operating environment. An upgrade of
the foreign currency IDR would only be possible if Ukraine's
Country Ceiling was raised.

Liquidity and Debt Structure

Fitch evaluates Avangardco's liquidity position as adequate,
supported by USD30 million of undrawn committed credit lines and
cash and cash equivalents of USD178 million as of end-March 2014.
Fitch expects Avangardco to generate positive albeit small FCF in
2014 due to reduced capex.

The debt maturity schedule for 2014 is relaxed as Oshchadbank has
extended a USD50 million loan until June 2017. The next large
repayment peak is in October 2015 when a USD200 million bond
matures, which Fitch expects that Avangardco will be able to
repay from internally generated cash flows and accumulated cash
balances. Fitch expects that to support its cash position the
company will need to attract new debt in 2015, which will not
exceed 10%-20% of projected EBITDA.

Full List Of Rating Actions

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'

Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Negative

Foreign currency senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'CCC';
Recovery Rating 'RR4'

National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+ (ukr)'; Stable

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRITAX GROUP: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B3 from B1 the
corporate family rating (CFR) of Britax Group Limited, a
manufacturer of premium child car safety seats and wheeled-goods.
The probability of default rating (PDR) was lowered to B3--PD
from B1-PD.

Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded to B3 from B1 the rating on
the first lien term loan and the EUR40 million revolving credit
facility issued by Britax US Holdings Inc. (as the Lead
Borrower). The outlook on all ratings is negative.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action primarily reflects a significant deterioration
in Britax's financial performance across all geographic regions
and particularly in its car seat product segment, which is both
the largest and highest margin business for the company. These
factors have resulted in significantly weakened credit metrics,
which are well below Moody's expectations for a company in the B1
rating category. Previously Moody's expected that Britax would be
able to reduce its gross opening leverage of 4.6x towards 4.0x
debt/EBITDA on an adjusted basis by the end of fiscal year 2014.
However, the rating agency now believes that Britax's gross
adjusted leverage will end the year above 7.5x.

Britax operates in three main geographies, namely US (41% of 2013
sales), Europe (35%), Australasia (19%) as well as the rest of
the world (5%). Within these markets Britax has multiple sales
channels for both car seats and wheeled goods products including
retailers and increasingly e-tailers, although there is a degree
of customer concentration with the top 10 customers accounting
for more than 50% of FY 2013 sales.

Moody's expects that a high level of competition across all
regions and product segments will affect Britax's trading
performance for the remainder of fiscal year 2014 and further

In the European market, a significant fall in sales of infant and
child car safety seats has adversely affected Britax's trading
performance. In particular, the rapid growth in shield system
products by some competitors has impacted the company. These
products have been gaining market share in central Europe
(particularly in Germany) as a result of favorable product
assessment and ratings by the German consumer organization,
Stiftung Warentest. Fierce price competition from these and other
manufacturers has compounded the effect of the company's loss of
market share to shield system products.

New product introductions over the past 12 months have improved
the age profile and features of Britax's car seat range. However,
this has not proved sufficient to arrest a decline in European
profitability. As a result, the company has implemented two
rounds of overhead cost cuts aimed at delivering annualized
savings of EUR6.8 million in this region.

The US market is more concentrated by channel and by product than
in Europe. Britax has faced increased competition across all
product categories. In the second half of 2014 Britax plans to
launch its new "Click-Tight" convertible car seat range, which
will offer end users improved ease of use and is aimed at driving
sales growth in this region. Moody's expects that the launch will
improve trading, but not sufficiently to fully offset weakness in
the first half of the year.

In Australia, increased discounting, promotions and price
reductions have weakened the company's market leading position.
In particular, Britax's two largest competitors, InfaSecure (not
rated) and Dorel (not rated) have been offering improved products
at lower pricing points. Following changes in the regional
management team, Britax has moved to reassert product and channel
management discipline as well as strengthening controls over
customer incentives and discounting, which has allowed
overstocking in several product channels to fall. As a result,
margins have improved and recent trading has been encouraging.
However, Britax expects a long term 5% to 10% loss in market
share at lower price points as a result of the more competitive
trading environment.


Moody's views Britax's liquidity as adequate, being supported by
an undrawn revolving credit facility of EUR40 million, which is
sufficiently sized to manage swings in working capital of around
EUR40 million from peak to trough. Although seasonality in the
business is relatively low, cash flow can be irregular due to new
product launches causing spikes in working capital and earnings.
Following its 2013 refinancing, the company also has an extended
debt maturity profile, with only limited Term Loan A

However, Britax's liquidity profile has weakened since the recent
refinancing on the back of two main factors. First, a sustained
reduction in the company's balance sheet cash to EUR21.1 million
at the end of Q2 2014 and an expected EUR22 million at the end of
2014. These amounts compare unfavorably with the EUR51.4 million
originally projected for the year end 2014. Second, Moody's
expects that Britax's free cash flow will turn negative in FY
2014 due to a combination of lower earnings and negative working
capital due to the timing of new product launches in the US.

Rationale for Negative Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that Britax's
operational performance will remain challenged in key markets,
particularly in Europe and the US. If not addressed rapidly this
is likely to lead to a further deterioration in the company's
credit metrics.

What Could Change the Ratings Up/Down

Given the negative outlook, there is no upward ratings pressure.
However, the ratings could be stabilized if Britax stabilizes its
operating performance resulting in a sustained reduction in
adjusted gross leverage and improvement in liquidity, with
positive free cash flow generation.

Downward ratings pressure could occur if the company fails to
stabilize its operating performance, resulting in a further
weakening of Britax's credit metrics, specifically including
leverage failing to reduce sustainably, or a deteriorating
liquidity profile.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Consumer Durables published in October 2010. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Britax Group Limited, headquartered in the UK, is a manufacturer
of a range of child car safety seats and wheeled-goods. The
company operates across Europe, North America and Australasia.
For the year ending December 31, 2013, the company reported net
sales of EUR374 million. The company is owned by Nordic Capital.

PUNCH TAVERNS: Optimistic on Debt Restructuring Proposal
Nick Wilson at The Financial Times reports that Punch Taverns
says it now has the necessary "momentum behind" its debt
restructuring proposal that aims to slash a quarter off the pub
group's GBP2.3 billion debt burden.

The company said on Monday its restructuring proposal, which is
largely unchanged from the one announced in June and would reduce
the total net debt by GBP600 million, now had the support of 65%
of its bondholders and 54 per cent of its shareholders, the FT
relates.  In order for the restructuring proposal to go ahead, it
needs 75% support from each class of debt and equity holders, the
FT notes.

"We have more people on side than we did on June 26.  I think the
company is optimistic that it is now on the road to completing
the restructuring.  It has the momentum behind the current
proposals with the majority of bondholders and shareholders
supporting the latest proposals," the FT quotes Stephen
Billingham, executive chairman of Punch, as saying.

The proposal would be put to shareholders and creditors for a
vote on Sept. 17 and if the company received the support of 75%
from each of its stakeholder groups, the plan would become
effective from Oct. 8, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Punch's debts are patently unsustainable, at
almost 11 times its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization, and the group has warned that without a
restructuring it will default in a way that would have "material
adverse consequences for all stakeholders".

The proposed restructuring includes a debt-for-equity swap that
would dilute existing shareholders until they owned just 15 per
cent of the company and in the process lower its net debt to 7.7
times ebitda, the FT discloses.

Punch Taverns Plc is a U.K. pub operator.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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