TCREUR_Public/140828.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, August 28, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 170

                            Headlines

C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

SAZKA AS: Ex-CEO Ales Husak Assigns Claim to Hungarian Company


F I N L A N D

METSA BOARD: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'B+' CCR


G E R M A N Y

DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: Moody's Hikes Sub. Debt Rating to 'B3'


G R E E C E

FREESEAS INC: Regains Compliance with Nasdaq's Equity Rule


I C E L A N D

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: De Nederlandsche Bank Sells Remaining Claims


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Posts EUR411 Million Profit in H1 2014
PERMANENT TSB: DBRS Says 1st Half 2014 Financial Results Improve


L U X E M B O U R G

SLS CAPITAL: HSBC Intends to Fight Keydata Fraud Lawsuit


R U S S I A

UC RUSAL: Returns to Profit After Debt Restructuring
UCL RAIL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating


S P A I N

IM PRESTAMOS FONDOS: Moody's Cuts Cl. A Notes Rating to 'B2(sf)'


U K R A I N E

UKREXIMBANK JSC: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'CCC'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

MOY PARK: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Positive
PASTA REALE: In Administration; 169 Jobs Affected


                            *********


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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
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SAZKA AS: Ex-CEO Ales Husak Assigns Claim to Hungarian Company
--------------------------------------------------------------
CTK reports that public broadcaster Czech Television on Aug. 25
said Ales Husak, former CEO of Sazka, has assigned his alleged
claim to severance pay worth more than CZK70 million to a
Hungarian company.

Sazka got into insolvency in 2011 and its lottery business was
later bought by investment groups PPF and KKCG, CTK recounts.
Mr. Husak was dismissed in June 2011 but under a managerial
contract, he was to be paid severance pay of over CZK70 million,
CTK discloses.

Sazka's insolvency administrator did not, however, recognize
Mr. Husak's claim, CTK says.  The dispute may end in court, CTK
notes.

Sazka AS is the Czech Republic's biggest betting firm.



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F I N L A N D
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METSA BOARD: S&P Revises Outlook to Positive & Affirms 'B+' CCR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Finland-based forest and paper products company Metsa Board Corp.
to positive from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'B+/B' long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on Metsa
Board.

S&P also affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on Metsa Board's senior
unsecured debt.  The recovery rating is unchanged at '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.

The outlook revision primarily reflects S&P's expectation that
Metsa Board could improve its profitability and cash flow
generation in the coming 12 months and that such an improvement
would lead to a sustainably stronger business risk profile.  This
stems from S&P's view of the continuing stability of the
company's core paperboard operations and growth in new products
and markets. As a result, S&P has revised its assessment of Metsa
Board's business risk profile upward, to fair from weak, leading
to an anchor of 'bb-' compared with 'b+' previously.

S&P's assessment of Metsa Board's business risk profile as fair
reflects its view of the company's track record of stability and
improving performance in its core paperboard business, which S&P
expects will continue, supported by a clear and credible
strategy. Since 2012, after years of major restructuring, Metsa
Board has focused on folding boxboard and white-top kraftliner,
both used in the packaging of consumer products such as food,
cosmetics, and cigarettes.  Metsa Board's key competitive
advantage is its proximity to fresh fiber, a key raw material in
the manufacture of folding boxboard and kraftliner, and its well-
developed asset base.  S&P views as positive the company's
strategy to increase sales volumes outside Europe, notably in the
U.S. where folding boxboard is less common.  There is also
relatively stable demand for packaging-related products and solid
growth opportunities in emerging markets.  However, S&P notes
that about 25% of Metsa Board's sales consist of other products,
such as office, magazine, and specialty paper, which are
experiencing a structural demand decline and pricing pressure.
These products therefore weigh on overall profitability.
However, given the growth in paperboard, S&P believes
profitability could improve in the coming years.

S&P still regards Metsa Board's financial risk profile as
aggressive, despite some strengthening owing to recent
refinancing and low investment levels.  This is primarily due to
uncertainty regarding Metsa Board's role in a new pulp mill
planned by associated company Metsa Fibre. The mill is expected
to cost about EUR1.1 billion, with construction potentially
starting in 2015. Metsa Board owns about 25% of Metsa Fibre and
will announce its role in the new mill after it's been decided
whether the project will go ahead.  In addition, S&P sees a risk
that Metsa Fibre would not be able to pay dividends during the
investment phase, which amount to about EUR25 million for Metsa
Board in 2014.  S&P also understands that Metsa Board might
consider expanding its capacity in folding boxboard in the coming
years.  While positive for growth prospects in the long term, S&P
believes that such an investment could constrain Metsa Board's
credit metrics during the investment phase.

The positive outlook indicates that S&P could raise the long-term
rating on Metsa Board to 'BB-', if it sees further sustainable
improvements in profitability over the next six to 12 months.  An
upgrade could also materialize as a result of more clarity
regarding Metsa Board's and Metsa Group's investment plans, and
the effect of such plans on Metsa Board's financial risk profile.

S&P may raise the ratings if Metsa Board maintains FFO to debt
higher than 20% and debt to EBITDA lower than 4x, while
increasing its profitability.  This could lead to an improvement
of the SACP to 'bb-' from 'b+' and, in turn, a one-notch upgrade
to 'BB-'.

S&P could also upgrade Metsa Board if S&P revised its assessment
of the GCP to 'bb', even though Metsa Board's SACP remains at
'b+'.  This could result from more clarity regarding the timing
and funding of the new pulp mill, as well as from continued solid
performance of the group's other business units, such as the
timber and tissue operations.

S&P may revise the outlook to stable if both Metsa Group and
Metsa Board's operational performance weakened, while the
expansionary investments went ahead, causing the GCP and SACP to
remain at 'bb-' and 'b+' respectively.



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G E R M A N Y
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DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: Moody's Hikes Sub. Debt Rating to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating for senior
subordinated debt of Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG (pbb) to B3 from
Caa1, and affirmed the long- and short-term debt and deposit
ratings at Baa2/Prime-2. The rating actions were prompted by the
raising of pbb's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) to
b2 from b3, within the E+ standalone bank financial strength
ratings (BFSR) category. At the same time, Moody's affirmed the
E+ BFSR and changed the outlook to stable from negative. The
outlook on the B3 senior subordinated debt rating has been
changed to stable from negative, whilst the outlook on the Baa2
senior debt and deposit ratings remains negative.

The raising of pbb's standalone credit assessment was driven by
the gradual progress in pbb's efforts to improve recurring
profitability and write new business, which has positive
implications for its commercial banking franchise.

The senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings now benefit from
six notches of systemic support uplift, versus seven notches
previously. The small reduction in the support Moody's factors
into these ratings takes into account (1) the prospects for a
weakening of government support, due to the targeted change of
ownership for pbb in 2015; as well as (2) the limitations to
future support post introduction of a more restrictive bank
resolution regime in Germany. However, Moody's expects that the
demonstrated high (implicit) commitment of the German government,
as the sole owner of pbb, will continue until the time of its
privatization. That said, Moody's does not rule out the potential
for support from a future owner replacing (some of) the current
support assumptions.

Ratings Rationale

Standalone Profile Benefits From Gradual Earnings Recovery

Moody's raised the BCA to b2 and changed the outlook to stable on
the E+ BFSR to reflect the gradual improvement of pbb's intrinsic
earnings power. This improvement is illustrated by rising
recurring revenues and reduced costs, as per unaudited/reviewed
accounts of pbb for the six months to June 2014. The cancellation
of low-return servicing contracts with third parties in late 2013
helped pbb to cut costs by 20% year on year during the period,
allowing for somewhat higher profits and more transparency of the
bank's intrinsic earnings power. In addition, the mildly positive
outlook on earnings due to further cost reductions in 2015 and
growing net interest income is positive for pbb's still-weak
commercial franchise.

At the same time, the rating agency highlighted that pbb's
earnings recovery remains fragile, which is partly due to
unsustainably low risk charges and further expenses relating to
franchise adjustments and regulatory requirements over the next
few quarters. In addition, the standalone credit assessment
remains constrained by the bank's modest economic capitalization
and uncertainties stemming from the targeted privatization in
2015. Moody's reiterates that some of pbb's stronger financial
metrics, including funding and liquidity, represent imperfect
mitigants to the uncertainties posed by the targeted
privatization, as the 2015 deadline implies considerable risk for
bondholders.

Upgrade of Subordinated Debt Mirrors Raising of Standalone Credit
Assessment

The upgrade of the rating for senior subordinated debt
instruments to B3 from Caa1 follows the raising of pbb's
standalone BCA to b2 from b3. The B3 senior subordinated debt
rating is one notch below pbb's b2 standalone BCA and carries a
stable outlook, which mirrors the stable outlook of the E+ BFSR.

Small Revision of Support in Debt Ratings Reflects Weakening
Support Prospects

The affirmation of pbb's Baa2/Prime-2 senior unsecured debt and
deposit ratings reflects the higher BCA and a small downward
revision of Moody's assumptions for systemic support as the 2015
deadline for pbb's privatization is drawing closer. This reduced
support assumption reflects Moody's view that, post
privatization, support is unlikely to yield rating uplift of more
than six notches, even if the acquirer displays a strong
financial profile and commitment to supporting pbb.

As reflected by the six notches of uplift, Moody's currently
continues to factor in a very high probability of support from
the German government (Aaa stable) into pbb's Baa2/Prime-2 long-
and short-term debt and deposit ratings. This support assumption
takes into account (1) the bank's full ownership by the German
government; and (2) the bank's high systemic relevance as the
second-largest covered bond issuer in Germany.

Negative Outlook on Senior Debt Ratings Reflects Pressure from
Weakening Support

The approaching deadline for pbb's privatization in 2015 involves
some uncertainty for bondholders, given that non-compliance with
the European Commission's conditionality may have considerable
consequences for pbb's future in its current set-up. Such
uncertainty, combined with the expected restrictions on future
government support under the Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive (BRRD) that policymakers are set to introduce in 2016
(or, in the case of Germany, as soon as 2015), implies continued
pressures on debt ratings that benefit from high systemic support
assumptions and respective rating uplift.

Moody's added that the acquisition of pbb by a strong strategic
investor with both the necessary financial strength and clear
intention to support the bank could indicate some probability of
parental support. Whilst a successful sale of pbb remains
uncertain, such support may offset some of the pressure on the
supported Baa2 ratings stemming from the weakening environment
for government support. The rating agency does not rule out
maintaining its assumptions of some systemic support even after
pbb's privatization, especially if the government maintains a
stake in (or otherwise exposure to) the bank.

What Could Move the Ratings -- UP/DOWN

Upwards pressure on the E+ BFSR is limited, as the recovery of
pbb's earnings power and franchise remains fragile at this stage.
However, further progress in cost reduction and key profitability
metrics could lead to an upgrade. Other preconditions for a
higher standalone BFSR include (1) further strengthening of pbb's
business franchise as a specialized lender for commercial real-
estate and public investment finance; (2) higher economic
capitalization and/or demonstration that major portions of
existing hybrid capital will remain available to the bank in the
long term; and (3) maintained access to senior unsecured funding
with long-term maturities.

Upwards pressure on the group's senior debt and deposit ratings
is unlikely, and would be subject to a significantly higher
standalone BCA or explicit support from the German government (or
another entity with a strong credit profile).

Downwards pressure on the standalone E+ BFSR is considered
unlikely, but could be triggered if (1) pbb fails to further
improve its business franchise, in particular if cost-to-income
dynamics worsen; (2) higher-than-anticipated credit losses in
pbb's core business areas cause setbacks; and (3) the bank faces
renewed capital pressures.

Downwards pressure on the Baa2 ratings could result from any of
the following (1) a downgrade of the BFSR; (2) any weakening of
the prospects of future support for pbb, which could be due to
pbb's acquisition by a weak or less committed owner, or by
changing assumptions of future support post implementation of the
BRRD.



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G R E E C E
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FREESEAS INC: Regains Compliance with Nasdaq's Equity Rule
----------------------------------------------------------
FreeSeas Inc. disclosed it received a letter from Nasdaq, dated
Aug. 13, 2014, indicating that the Company has regained
compliance with Marketplace Rule 5550(b)(1) which requires a
minimum of US$2.5 million stockholders' equity for continued
listing on The Nasdaq Capital Market.

The determination by NASDAQ that the Company has complied with
the Rule was based on FreeSeas' Form 6-K filing of its interim
financial statements for the period ended June 30, 2014, which
evidenced stockholders' equity of US$37,563,000, resulting from
the May 2014 US$25 million public offering and settlement of debt
with US$15 million of debt forgiveness.  The Nasdaq letter
indicated that since the Company achieved compliance with the
Rule, the matter is now closed.

                        About FreeSeas Inc.

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as
Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands
on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding
company of ship-owning companies.  The management of FreeSeas'
vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands
company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's
Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal
shareholders.

The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one
Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities,
including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as
"major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel
products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks."  As of
Oct. 12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational
fleet is approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its
fleet is 15 years.

FreeSeas Inc. reported a net loss of US$48.70 million in 2013, a
net loss of US$30.88 million in 2012 and a net loss of US$88.19
million in 2011.  As of June 30, 2014, the Company had US$75.36
million in total assets, US$37.80 million in total liabilities
and US$37.56 million in total stockholders' equity.

RBSM LLP, in New York, issued a "going concern" qualification on
the consolidated financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31,
2013.  The independent auditors noted that the Company has
incurred recurring operating losses and has a working capital
deficiency.  In addition, the Company has failed to meet
scheduled payment obligations under its loan facilities and has
not complied with certain covenants included in its loan
agreements.  Furthermore, the vast majority of the Company's
assets are considered to be highly illiquid and if the Company
were forced to liquidate, the amount realized by the Company
could be substantially lower that the carrying value of these
assets.  These conditions among others raise substantial doubt
about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern.



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I C E L A N D
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LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: De Nederlandsche Bank Sells Remaining Claims
----------------------------------------------------------------
De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) on Aug. 27 disclosed that it has
entered into an agreement with Deutsche Bank for the sale of its
remaining claim on the insolvent Icelandic bank Landsbanki.  The
decision to sell was taken in close consultation with the
Ministry of Finance.  As a result of the sale, the EUR 1.636
billion compensation which DNB paid out under the deposit
guarantee scheme to depositors of Icesave has been recovered in
full.  DNB is no longer a creditor of Landsbanki.

Claims on the Landsbanki estate are tradable. Earlier this year,
a large number of British local authorities with claims on
Landsbanki decided to sell them. DNB's claim on Landsbanki arose
when a total of EUR1.636 billion was paid out to Dutch
depositors.  Of this amount, the Dutch State furnished EUR 1.428
billion and the Dutch banks EUR 208 million.

Added to the past repayments by Landsbanki's bankruptcy
receivers, with the completion of the sale of the remaining claim
the amount paid out in 2008-09 under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme
has been fully recovered.  Had the claim been held, complete
repayment from bankruptcy assets, according to current
expectations, would not have taken place until 2018.  Over the
intervening years, some EUR932 million has been collected by DNB
in distributions from the Landsbanki estate.

The Minister of Finance on Aug. 27 informed Parliament by letter
about the sale of the remaining claim.  The Minister has
indicated that he will continue the dialogue with other Dutch
creditors of former Landsbanki.

The Dutch branch of Landsbanki, operating under the name of
Icesave, ran into problems in October 2008 as Landsbanki and
other Icelandic banks faced mounting financial difficulties and
eventually collapsed. Dutch savers were subsequently compensated
for the loss of deposits up to EUR100.000 under the deposit
guarantee schemes of the Netherlands and Iceland.

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.



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I R E L A N D
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ALLIED IRISH: Posts EUR411 Million Profit in H1 2014
----------------------------------------------------
Allied Irish posted EUR411 million profit on EUR807 million of
net interest income for the half year ended June 30, 2014, as
compared with a loss of EUR758 million on EUR595 million of net
interest income for the half year ended June 30, 2013.

At June 30, 2014, Allied Irish had EUR110.6 million in total
assets, EUR99.4 million in total liabilities and EUR11.2 million
in shareholders' equity.

"AIB has achieved its stated aim of returning to sustainable
profitability on a post provision basis in 2014 with our half
year results reflecting strong improvements in margins, funding
position and capital ratios.  The Group has demonstrated its
capacity to support economic recovery with loan approvals,
including the UK, of c.EUR5.6bn, up 33% year on year.  Our
mortgage arrears and overall levels of impaired loans are
reducing and our performance in the first half of the year saw a
material reduction in provision charges.  As the Irish economy
and the bank recovers, we remain focused on growth and maximising
value for the Irish State, as 99.8% shareholder, and all other
stakeholders over time."

Full details on AIB's H1 2014 financial performance including all
relevant disclosures and notes to financial statements is
available for free at http://bankrupt.com/misc/ALLIED_H12014.pdf

                       About Allied Irish Banks

Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. -- http://www.aibgroup.com/-- is a
major commercial bank based in Ireland.  It has an extensive
branch network across the country, a head office in Dublin and a
capital markets operation based in the International Financial
Services Centre in Dublin.  AIB also has retail and corporate
businesses in the UK, offices in Europe and a subsidiary company
in the Isle of Man and Jersey (Channel Islands).

Since the onset of the global and Irish financial crisis, AIB's
relationship with the Irish Government has changed significantly.

As at Dec. 31, 2010, the Government, through the National Pension
Reserve Fund Commission ("NPRFC"), held 49.9% of the ordinary
shares of the Company (the share of the voting rights at
shareholders' general meetings), 10,489,899,564 convertible non-
voting ("CNV") shares and 3.5 billion 2009 Preference Shares.  On
April 8, 2011, the NPRFC converted the total outstanding amount
of CNV shares into 10,489,899,564 ordinary shares of AIB, thereby
increasing its holding to 92.8% of the ordinary share capital.

In addition to its shareholders' interests, the Government's
relationship with AIB is reflected through formal and informal
oversight by the Minister and the Department of Finance and the
Central Bank of Ireland, representation on the Board of Directors
(three non-executive directors are Government nominees),
participation in NAMA, and otherwise.

Allied Irish incurred a loss of EUR1.59 billion for the year
ended Dec. 31, 2013, a loss of EUR3.55 billion in 2012 and a net
loss of US$2.32 billion in 2011.


PERMANENT TSB: DBRS Says 1st Half 2014 Financial Results Improve
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited views the 1H14 results of Permanent tsb
Group Holdings plc (PTSB or the Bank) as showing signs of
improvement, taking into account the significant challenges still
faced by the Bank.  In 1H14, PTSB reported an underlying loss,
excluding exceptional items, of EUR171 million, an improvement of
62% year-on-year (YoY), driven principally by lower impairment
charges.  Following higher prior year charges associated with
changes in provisioning methodology, as well as reduced early and
late arrears and improving economic conditions within Ireland,
PTSB reported a 65% decrease in impairment charges, to EUR 148
million.  Particular improvements were evident in both the
Republic of Ireland residential mortgage book, and commercial
real estate book, which experienced impairment charge decreases
of 46% and 74% respectively.

PTSB, however, continued to report a pre-provision, pre-tax loss
in 1H14, of EUR22 million, as higher costs associated with
regulatory spend and legacy legal and compliance issues offset
the increased operating income, which was principally driven by
ELG fees (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee scheme).  On a net
basis, PTSB reported a loss for the period of EUR200 million,
compared to EUR141 million in 1H13 as EUR327 million of
exceptional gains related to the wind-up of the pension scheme
were not repeated in 1H14.

Positively though, PTSB reported a 6 basis points (bps) YoY
improvement in net interest margin (NIM), excluding ELG fees, to
0.88% in 1H14, driven by the Bank's progress in reducing the cost
of funding and broadening its retail and corporate deposit base,
whilst reducing its reliance on wholesale and ECB funding.  In
1H14, customer deposits increased 5% from end-2013, to EUR17.6
billion (excluding the EUR2.9 billion of term deposits placed by
a Government institution) and as a result ECB funding reduced by
16% YoY to EUR5.8 billion, or 17% of the Bank's total funding.
PTSB's wholesale funding use also decreased 5% in 1H14, to
EUR7.5 billion.

The level of non-performing loans (defined as loans which are
greater than 90 days in arrears, or impaired) remained very weak
in 1H14, albeit flat from end-2013, at EUR8.5 billion or 26% of
gross loans.  PTSB, has however, made progress in reducing the
number of customers in arrears over 90 days, with the total
number down 14% since end-2013.  Although still under pressure,
DBRS expects asset quality to improve, helped both by the Bank's
arrears management programme and the ongoing economic recoveries
in Ireland and the UK.

Under the transitional rules that became effective as of Jan. 1,
2014, the Basel III Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio stood at
12.7% at end-1H14, down from 13.1% at end-2013.  The reduction
reflects the loss recorded during the six months to end-1H14,
which was partly offset by a 5% decrease in RWAs, to EUR 16.1
billion.  Although capital level ratios remain relatively high at
present, DBRS is mindful that the Bank continues to report
losses, whilst also being subject to ongoing restructuring, and
the ECB's upcoming Asset Quality Review.  Depending on its
stringency, this review could result in additional capital being
required.

DBRS rates PTSB at BB (low), with a Negative trend, for Non-
Guaranteed Long-Term Debt & Deposits.



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L U X E M B O U R G
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SLS CAPITAL: HSBC Intends to Fight Keydata Fraud Lawsuit
--------------------------------------------------------
Caroline Binham at The Financial Times reports that HSBC has
vowed to fight a US$250 million lawsuit that alleges it aided and
abetted a "major international fraud".

In what could be the most prominent lawsuit to emanate from the
Keydata scandal, in which thousands of UK investors lost money
when the investment company collapsed in 2009, the bank's US
subsidiary is accused of failing to spot a series of red flags in
the run-up to the liquidation of SLS Capital, a Luxembourg-
domiciled vehicle that issued bonds that Keydata investors
bought, the FT discloses.

HSBC said that it would respond formally to the allegations by
filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was filed in a
New York court on Aug. 22 by SLS's liquidator, the FT relates.
The complaint was backed by a group of 900 Keydata investors who
lost money, known as KSLIT, the FT states.

The bank declined to comment further on the allegations; it is
accused of playing "a critical role in the eventual demise of
SLS" and "failing to prevent" a fire sale of SLS's portfolio,
which specialized in dealing in life insurance policies in the
secondary market, the FT notes.

According to the FT, while the bank did not sell nor market the
bonds, SLS's complaint states that HSBC was the custodian of the
life policies that underpinned the bonds.  The complaint alleges
that the bank did little to correct misleading marketing material
that held out the bank as the bonds' trustee, and that it did not
properly investigate claims that Keydata was an alleged Ponzi
scheme, the FT relays.



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R U S S I A
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UC RUSAL: Returns to Profit After Debt Restructuring
----------------------------------------------------
Sonali Paul at Reuters reports that Russia's United Company Rusal
Plc returned to profit for the first time in five quarters on
Wednesay and gave a bullish outlook for aluminium prices, driven
by growing demand from carmakers and supply cuts outside China.

The company emerged from the red thanks to higher aluminium
prices, cost cuts and smelter closures and forecast further
gains, as it sees a global supply deficit more than doubling in
the second half of the year to 1.5 million tonnes, Reuters
relates.

Rusal last week completed a crucial restructuring of US$5.15
billion in debt and has no payments due until January 2016,
Reuters recounts.  The deal gives it flexibility to pre-pay debt
when cash flows are strong and pay less when London Metal
Exchange prices fall, Reuters notes.

For the June quarter, Rusal's recurring net profit -- adjusted
net profit plus its share of Norilsk Nickel's earnings -- jumped
to US$129 million from a US$203 million loss a year earlier as it
cut costs, Reuters discloses.  Rusal owns 28% of Norilsk.

Revenue fell 10% to US$2.26 billion from a year earlier as it cut
aluminium output, Reuters relays.

United Co. Rusal is the world's largest aluminium producer.


UCL RAIL: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB+' long-term corporate credit rating and its 'ruAA+' Russia
national scale rating on privately held Russian transportation
and logistics company UCL Rail B.V.  S&P subsequently withdrew
the ratings at the company's request.

The outlook was stable at the time of the withdrawal.

The affirmation reflected S&P's assessment of UCL's business risk
profile as "fair" and its financial risk profile as
"intermediate," at the time of the rating withdrawal.

The business risk profile assessment incorporated S&P's view of
industry and country risk, as defined by its criteria.  S&P
assess the railroad and package express industry risk as "low"
and the country risk UCL Rail faces in Russia, where it is
headquartered and primarily operates, as "high."  S&P's "fair"
assessment also reflected its view of the company's fairly
diversified fleet and customer base and its leading market share.
The assessment was constrained by S&P's view of UCL Rail's
moderate number of long-term contracts in its overall contract
portfolio; the standardized nature of its service, which means it
often competes mostly on price (although S&P understands that
this is gradually changing as the company is increasingly
offering more complex logistics services); and the high age of
the company's railcar fleet.

S&P's view of UCL Rail's financial risk profile as "intermediate"
incorporated the company's sound free operating cash flow
generation ability, its commitment to deleverage, and S&P's base-
case expectation that UCL Rail will prevent a further decline in
EBITDA over the next year.  A lower debt burden as a result of
amortizing payments will further help UCL Rail to sustain its
leverage measures and improve its cash flow ratios.  S&P
forecasts the FFO-to-debt ratio to sustainably improve to at
least 30% over the next year -- a level S&P considers
commensurate with the rating. UCL Rail is not currently planning
any significant growth-related activities, and S&P's base-case
scenario also assumed no fleet changes or dividend payout in
2014.

S&P assessed UCL's liquidity as "adequate," as defined by its
criteria.  S&P's assessment was based on the expectation that UCL
Rail's cash on hand, committed long-term open credit lines, and
internal cash flows would cover its liquidity needs (primarily
debt amortization and capital expenditure) by more than 1.2x in
the following 12 months.



=========
S P A I N
=========


IM PRESTAMOS FONDOS: Moody's Cuts Cl. A Notes Rating to 'B2(sf)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken the
following rating actions on the notes issued by IM Prestamos
Fondos Cedulas, FTA, and the liquidity facility available to this
issuer:

EUR344,100,000 (current balance EUR99.0 million) Class A Notes,
Upgraded to B1 (sf) ; previously on March 21, 2013 Downgraded to
B2(sf) and Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR30,000,000 (currently undrawn) Liquidity Facility, Upgraded
to A3 (sf); previously on March 21, 2013 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)
and Remained on Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR6,900,000 (current balance EUR1.4 million) Class B Notes,
Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on March 21, 2013 Downgraded to
Caa3(sf)

EUR900,000 Class C Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on
March 21, 2013 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

This transaction is a static cash CBO of portions of subordinated
loans funding the reserve funds of four (at closing fourteen)
Spanish multi-issuer covered bonds (SMICBs), which can be
considered as a securitization of a pool of Cedulas. Each SMICB
is backed by a group of Cedulas which are bought by a Fund, which
in turn issues SMICBs. Cedulas holders are secured by the
issuer's entire mortgage book. The subordinated loans backing the
IM Prestamos transaction represent the first loss pieces in the
respective SMICB structures (or structured Cedulas). Therefore
this transaction is exposed to the risk of several Spanish
financial institutions defaulting under their mortgage covered
bonds (Cedulas).

The liquidity facility may be drawn to fund the difference
between interest accrued and due on the subordinated loans of the
4 SMICBs and interest actually received on these loans. The
amount drawn under this facility is thus a function of (i) number
and value of underlying delinquent and defaulted Cedulas, (ii)
level of short term EURIBOR and (iii) time taken for final
realization of recoveries on defaulted Cedulas. While the
liquidity facility is currently not drawn, Moody's analysis
assumes that a portion of it will be drawn at some time during
the remaining life of this transaction.

Moody's notes that as per the July 2014 payment report, there are
coupon arrears of about EUR40,000 on the Class C notes.

Ratings Rationale

Moodys said the rating action is a result of stability and
improvement in the credit quality of some of the issuers of
Cedulas which make up the SMICBs. As a result, Moody's loss
expectations for the majority of underlying covered bonds within
the SMICBs have stabilized and reduced over the past year.
Moody's considers that should a Cedulas issuer default, it is
likely that the reserve funds that form the underlying portfolio
of IM Prestamos would require to be drawn upon to make good the
potential shortfall suffered by the underlying Cedulas holders.
The extent of such potential shortfall is dependent on the level
of over collateralization and quality of the issuer's underlying
mortgage pool. Moody's analysis indicates that in the light of
such potential shortfalls, the credit quality of the reserve
funds of the four SMICBs that form the portfolio of IM Prestamos
Fondos Cedulas, FTA is presently more consistent with ratings in
a Caa1(sf)-B1(sf) range compared to a Caa2 (sf)-B2 (sf) range in
March 2013, a B1(sf)- Ba3(sf) range in Nov 2011, and a Ba3(sf)-
Ba1(sf) range in April 2011.

The credit quality of the reserve funds of these four SMICBs is
substantially driven by high recovery rate assumptions on the
underlying Cedulas. The ratings of the liquidity facility
available to IM Prestamos Fondos Cedulas, FTA and the issued
notes are therefore sensitive to these recovery rate assumptions.

In addition, the credit quality of the liquidity facility is
affected by the estimated level of draw-down, with higher draw-
downs resulting in declining credit quality. As stated earlier,
draw-down is affected by (i) number and value of delinquent and
defaulted Cedulas, (ii) short-term EURIBOR rates and (iii) time
taken for realization of final recoveries on defaulted Cedulas.

Moody's base case scenario assumes that the liquidity facility is
drawn down to the extent of EUR 4 million. This level of draw
down reflects (i) some of the current underlying pool of Cedulas
being delinquent or in default, (ii) ongoing short-term EURIBOR
at about two times current levels, and (iii) a two year period
between Cedulas default and final recoveries. The rating of the
liquidity facility is compliant with "Moody's Approach to
Counterparty Instrument Ratings" published in March 2014.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Synthetic Collateralized Debt
Obligations" published in November 2013.

Factors that Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base case run, Moody's undertook a number of
sensitivity runs assuming higher draw down amounts for the
liquidity facility. The model output for an EUR5 million draw
down was 1.5 notches worse compared to the base case, whereas it
was 3 notches worse than base case for a draw down amount of
EUR6 million.

The model outputs for the notes and the liquidity facility were
affected by less than half a notch and up to a notch and a half
respectively for an increased correlation of c 60% between the
underlying assets in the transaction portfolio. Except for the
increased correlation of c 60% used in the sensitivity run for
the notes, underlying Cedulas default probabilities and recovery
rates used in Moody's model are in line with the covered bond
rating methodology assumptions.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes and liquidity facility as evidenced by 1)
uncertainties of credit conditions in the general economy
especially as 100% of the portfolio is exposed to obligors
located in Spain 2) fluctuations in EURIBOR and 3) amount and
timing of final recoveries on defaulted Cedulas. Realization of
lower than expected recoveries would negatively impact the
ratings of the notes and the liquidity facility.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKREXIMBANK JSC: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Local Currency IDR to 'CCC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of Ukraine's JSC The State Export-Import
Bank of Ukraine (Ukreximbank) and JSC State Savings Bank of
Ukraine (Oschadbank) to 'CCC' from 'B-' and placed PJSC CB
PrivatBank's (Privat) Long-term local currency IDR of 'B-' on
Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

At the same time, Fitch has affirmed the 'B-' Long-term local
currency IDRs of Joint Stock Commercial Industrial & Investment
Bank (PJSC Prominvestbank, PIB), Public Joint Stock Company
UkrSibbank, Ukrsotsbank (Ukrsots), PJSC VTB Bank (VTBU),
ProCredit Bank (Ukraine) (PCBU), PJSCCB Pravex-Bank (Pravex),
PJSC Credit Agricole Bank (CAB) and PJSC Alfa-Bank (ABU).

The Long-term foreign currency IDRs of all 11 banks have been
affirmed at 'CCC'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating actions follow Fitch's downgrade of Ukraine's Long-
term local currency IDR to 'CCC' from 'B-' and the affirmation of
the sovereign's Long-term foreign currency IDR at 'CCC'.  The
Country Ceiling was also affirmed at 'CCC'.

The downgrades of the Long-term local currency IDRs of state-
owned Ukreximbank and Oschadbank and the affirmation of their
Long-term foreign currency IDRs -- all at 'CCC' -- reflect the
reduced ability of the Ukrainian authorities to provide support
in local as well as foreign currency, in case of need, as
indicated by the sovereign's 'CCC' Long-term IDRs.  However,
Fitch still believes the authorities' propensity to provide
support to Oschadbank and Ukreximbank would be quite high, based
on their 100%-state ownership, policy roles, high systemic
importance, and the track record of capital support for the banks
under different governments.

Privat's ratings are driven by its standalone credit strength as
reflected in its Viability Rating (VR) of 'b-'.  According to
Fitch's criteria the sovereign rating often acts as an effective
cap on the maximum level of the bank's ratings in a jurisdiction.
For the bank's VR to be rated above the sovereign Fitch would
expect it to demonstrate strong resilience to deteriorating
trends in the operating environment in terms of asset quality,
liquidity, performance and capitalization, while also having
limited direct correlation with the sovereign profile.  Following
the sovereign rating action, Fitch has therefore placed Privat's
VR of 'b-', 'B-' Long-term local currency IDR and National Long-
term Rating on RWN and intends to reassess the impact of the
sovereign action on Privat's ratings and resolve the RWN by the
end of this year.

The 'CCC' Long-term foreign-currency IDRs and, where assigned,
foreign currency senior debt ratings, of Privat and the eight
foreign-owned banks -- PIB, UkrSibbank, Ukrsots, VTBU, PCBU,
Pravex, CAB and ABU -- reflects the constraint of Ukraine's
Country Ceiling (CCC).  Ukraine's Country Ceiling reflects the
heightened risk of capital and/or exchange controls being
tightened, to the extent that these would materially constrain or
impede the private sector's ability to repay foreign-currency
obligations.  Limited capital controls introduced in February
2014 do not prevent external debt service.

The one-notch uplift of the Long-term local currency IDRs above
the sovereign rating in the eight foreign-owned banks --
Prominvestbank, UkrSibbank, Ukrsots, VTBU, PCBU, Pravex, CAB and
ABU -- reflects the strength of the shareholder support to these
entities.  The Negative Outlooks reflect country risks, and in
particular the risk, in extreme scenarios, of restrictions being
placed on banks' ability to service their local currency
obligations.

The IDRs, Support Ratings and senior debt ratings of the eight
foreign-owned banks factor in the likelihood of support the banks
may receive from their majority shareholders.  However, the
Country Ceiling limits the extent to which support from the
majority foreign shareholders of these banks can be factored into
most of these ratings.  PIB is 98.6%-owned by Russian state-owned
Vnesheconombank (VEB, BBB/Negative); UkrSibbank is 85%-owned by
BNP Paribas (A+/Stable); VTBU is more than 99%-owned by Russia's
JSC Bank VTB; PCBU is controlled (60% of voting stock) by
ProCredit Holding AG & Co. KGaA. (BBB/Stable); and CAB is fully
owned by Credit Agricole S.A. (A/Stable).

Ukrsots is 99.41%-owned by UniCredit S.p.A. (UniCredit,
BBB+/Negative) through its Vienna subsidiary UniCredit Bank
Austria AG (A/Negative), although its potential sale has recently
been announced.  UniCredit targets Ukrsots' sale as soon as the
opportunity arises, although it may take time given the currently
difficult operating environment in Ukraine.  Fitch believes that
UniCredit will likely have a high propensity to provide support
to Ukrsots prior to any sale.

Pravex is currently fully owned by Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.
(Intesa, BBB+/Stable), although its sale to CentraGas Holding, a
company controlled by Ukrainian shareholders, was announced in
early 2014 and is now awaiting the necessary regulatory
approvals.  Fitch believes that Intesa will provide any necessary
support up until the completion of the bank's sale.

The RWN on Ukrsots' and Pravex's local currency IDRs reflects
Fitch's view that shareholder support will probably become less
reliable if the banks are sold, in particular, to local
shareholders.

ABU's IDRs and senior debt ratings are driven by Fitch's view on
potential support the bank may receive from other assets
controlled by its main shareholders, including from its sister
bank, Russia-based OJSC Alfa-Bank (AB; BBB-/Negative).  However,
the probability of support is limited due to the indirect
relationship with other group assets and the mixed track record
of support.

For similar reasons to those for placing Privat's VR and local
currency IDR on RWN, Fitch has also placed the 'b-' VRs of PCBU
and CAB on RWN with a view to reassessing the impact of the
sovereign rating action and deteriorating trends in the operating
environment on the banks' stand-alone profiles.  Fitch intends to
resolve RWNs by the end of this year.

The VRs of other banks are not affected by these ratings actions.

With the exception of Privat's National Rating, which was placed
on RWN to mirror the action on its local currency IDR, the banks'
National Ratings are unaffected by today's ratings actions.
Fitch will review these ratings in the near term and publish a
relevant rating action commentary.

Fitch has downgraded Privat's senior unsecured debt's Long-term
rating and the Recovery Rating to 'CC' from 'CCC' and to 'RR5'
from 'RR4', respectively.  This reflects a marked increase in
subordination for senior unsecured creditors, including
bondholders, due to the sharp growth in the level of asset
encumbrance in 1H14 following the bank's increased reliance on
collateralized central bank borrowing.  This, coupled with its
high share of retail deposits (57% of Privat's non-equity funding
at end-1H14, local GAAP) that rank senior to other creditors
under Ukrainian law, leaves senior unsecured debt holders very
deeply subordinated.  This level of subordination could limit
recoveries for senior unsecured creditors in a default scenario.
At the same time, in Fitch's view, it would be highly unlikely,
in case of default, for Privat to be forced into outright
bankruptcy procedures and a fire sale of assets, due to its
sizable market shares and systemic importance, which could to
some extent reduce downside recovery risks for bondholders.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The IDRs, debt ratings and VRs of all 11 banks, and the Support
Rating Floors of Ukreximbank and Oschadbank are highly correlated
with the sovereign credit profile.  The ratings could be
downgraded further in case of a further downgrade of the
sovereign, or stabilize at their current levels if downward
pressure on the sovereign ratings abates.  The banks' IDRs and
debt ratings could also be downgraded in case of restrictions
being imposed on their ability to service their obligations.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN on Ukrsots' and Pravex's local
currency IDRs once the sales, should they take place, are
completed.  If, in Fitch's view, support from new shareholders
cannot be factored into the ratings, then the Long-term local
currency IDRs of these two banks are likely to be downgraded to
the level of their VRs (currently 'ccc').

The RWNs on the VRs of Privat, PCBU and CAB and Privat's local
currency Long-term IDR are likely to be downgraded unless our
review of the respective banks' exposure to the decline in the
economic environment and direct exposure to the sovereign
provides sufficient justification for these ratings to remain
above the sovereign's.

The rating actions are as follows:

Ukreximbank:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-'
Senior unsecured debt of Biz Finance PLC: affirmed at
  'CCC'/'RR4'
Subordinated debt: 'C'/'RR5' not affected
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'CCC'
Viability Rating: 'ccc' not affected
National Long-term rating: 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook Stable, not
  affected

Oschadbank:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B-'
Senior unsecured debt of SSB No.1 PLC: affirmed at 'CCC'/'RR4'
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'CCC'
Viability Rating: 'ccc' not affected
National Long-term rating: 'AA-(ukr)'; Outlook Stable, not
  affected

PJSC CB PrivatBank:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: 'B-', placed on RWN
Senior unsecured debt of UK SPV Credit Finance plc: downgraded
  to 'CC'/'RR5' from 'CCC'/'RR4'
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Viability Rating: 'b-', placed on RWN
National Long-term rating: 'A-(ukr)'; placed on RWN

PJSC UkrSibbank:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-', Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt: affirmed at 'B-'/'RR4';
  'AAA(ukr)' not affected
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Viability Rating: 'cc', not affected
National Long-term rating: 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook Stable, not
  affected

Ukrsotsbank:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: 'B-', maintained on RWN
Senior unsecured local currency debt: 'B-'/ 'RR4' ', maintained
  on RWN; 'AAA(ukr)'/RWN not affected
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Viability Rating: 'ccc' not affected
National Long-term rating: 'AAA(ukr)'/RWN not affected

PJSC VTB Bank:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-', Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt: affirmed at 'B-'/ 'RR4';
  'AAA(ukr)' not affected
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Viability Rating: 'ccc' not affected
National Long-term rating: 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook Stable, not
  affected

ProCredit Bank (Ukraine):

Long-Term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-', Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt: affirmed at 'B-'/ 'RR4';
  'AAA(ukr)' not affected
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Viability Rating: 'b-', placed on RWN
National Long-Term rating: 'AAA(ukr)';Outlook Stable, not
  affected

Pravex:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: 'B-', maintained on RWN
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Viability Rating: 'ccc' not affected
National Long-term rating: 'AAA(ukr)'/RWN not affected

CAB:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-', Outlook Negative
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Viability Rating: 'b-', placed on RWN
National Long-term Rating: 'AAA(ukr)';Outlook Stable, not
  affected

PJSC Alfa-Bank:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-', Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt: affirmed at 'B-'/'RR4';
  'BBB-(ukr)' not affected
Upcoming senior unsecured local currency debt: affirmed at 'B-
  (EXP)'/'RR4'; 'BBB-(EXP)(ukr)' not affected
Senior unsecured debt of Alfa Ukrfinance LLC: affirmed at
  'CCC'/'RR4'
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Viability Rating: 'ccc' not affected
National Long-term rating: 'BBB-(ukr)'; Outlook Stable, not
  affected

PJSC Prominvestbank:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'
Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-', Outlook Negative
Senior unsecured local currency debt rating: affirmed at 'B-'/
  'RR4'; 'AAA(ukr)' not affected
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Viability Rating: 'ccc' not affected
National Long-term Rating: 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook Stable, not
  affected



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


MOY PARK: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
final 'B' long-term corporate credit rating to U.K.-based poultry
producer Moy Park Holdings Europe.  The outlook is positive.

At the same time, S&P assigned its final 'B' issue rating to the
GBP200 million 6.25% senior unsecured notes issued by Moy Park
(Bondco) PLC.  The final recovery rating on the notes is '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.  The preliminary
recovery rating was weaker at '4' because the issued notes are
GBP50 million smaller than originally proposed.  The issue rating
on the notes is in line with the corporate credit rating at 'B'.

The rating on Moy Park reflects S&P's assessments of the group's
business risk profile as "weak" and financial risk profile as
"significant."  The combination of these assessments leads to an
anchor of 'bb-' on Moy Park.  Since the modifiers have no impact
on the anchor, S&P's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) on Moy
Park is at the same level of 'bb-'.  S&P considers Moy Park to be
"highly strategic" to its ultimate parent Marfrig Global Foods
S.A., a view supported by Marfig Global Foods' use of proceeds at
Moy Park to partially repay debt at the parent level.  S&P
therefore aligns the corporate credit rating on Moy Park with the
'b' group credit profile (GCP) on Marfrig Global Foods.

Moy Park's "weak" business risk profile assessment reflects S&P's
view of its limited product portfolio, with a focus on poultry;
its low geographic diversification, with concentration in the
U.K. and France; and EBITDA margins of about 7%, which S&P
considers "below average" for the nonalcoholic beverage and
packaged food sector.

These risks are partly mitigated by stable growth rates in food
retailing, especially in the U.K., which in S&P's opinion are
likely to continue.  S&P takes a positive view of Moy Park's
market diversification into Continental Europe, along with its
specialized pricing model for passing on feed prices, which S&P
considers one of the biggest challenges facing the business.

Moy Park is the second-largest poultry producer in the U.K. after
Boparan Holdings Ltd., with a 25% share of the total U.K. poultry
roduction market.  Furthermore, Moy Park has leading shares of
46% in the ready-to-eat poultry segment and 52% in the chilled
fresh coated poultry segment.

S&P's assessment of Moy Park's "significant" financial risk
profile reflects its base-case forecast of stable free operating
cash flow of about GBP30 million-GBP35 million for the next 12-18
months, and the group's ability to maintain debt to EBITDA around
3x.

S&P equalizes its SACP on Moy Park at the level of the 'b' GCP on
Marfrig Global Foods, which itself is in line with S&P's 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating on the parent company.  The
equalization of the SACP at the level of the GCP is in accordance
with S&P's "Group Rating Methodology" criteria, published on
Nov. 19, 2013.  S&P rates Moy Park the same as the parent because
of the subsidiary's strategic importance for Marfrig Global
Foods' financial policy; for example, Marfrig Global Foods used
funds from the recently issued GBP200 million bond to repay debt
at the parent level.  S&P's opinion that Moy Park is "highly
strategic" to Marfrig Global Foods is based on the following
considerations:

   -- S&P believes that Marfrig Global Foods is unlikely to sell
      Moy Park in its entirety in the near term.

   -- Both Moy Park and Marfrig Global Foods operate in the same
      line of business, although their geographical markets are
      different.

   -- Marfrig Holdings Europe B.V., which is Moy Park's immediate
      parent, has a strong, long-term commitment of support from
      group senior management, and S&P believes that incentives
      for providing such support exist both in good times and
      stressful conditions.

The positive outlook on Moy Park is in line with the positive
outlook on Marfrig Global Foods.  An upgrade of Marfrig Global
Foods could trigger an upgrade of Moy Park since S&P caps the
rating on Moy Park at the level of the GCP.

S&P could raise the rating on Marfrig -- triggering an upgrade of
Moy Park -- if the group continues to deleverage by increasing
its operating and free cash flow generation as it improves its
working capital management.

An upgrade of Moy Park is also contingent on the group
maintaining positive free operating cash for the next 12-18
months, and debt to EBITDA within the 3x-4x range commensurate
with the "significant" financial risk profile category.

S&P could revise the outlook on Moy Park to stable if it revises
that on Marfrig Global Foods to stable.


PASTA REALE: In Administration; 169 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------
Crawley Observer reports that more than 160 people lost their
jobs when Pasta Reale went into administration on Aug. 26.

BDO LLP business restructuring partners, Matthew Tait --
matthew.tait@bdo.co.uk -- and Kim Rayment --
kim.rayment@bdo.co.uk -- were appointed Joint Administrators over
Pasta Reale, Crawley Observer relates.

BDO LLP confirmed 169 people had been made redundant, Crawley
Observer discloses.

According to Crawley Observer, the joint administrators are
currently seeking a purchaser for the facilities and assets of
the company.

"The company experienced a gradual loss of custom over the past
year and, as a result, has experienced a deterioration in its
working capital position," Crawley Observer quotes Mr. Tait, BDO
as saying.  "Despite the best efforts of the company's directors
and stakeholders in the past months, the directors were left with
no option but to place the company into administration.

"Going forward, we will seek to achieve a sale of the company's
facilities and assets and maximize recoveries for creditors."

Pasta Reale was a manufacturer of fresh pasta and filled pasta
products.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


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