TCREUR_Public/141003.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, October 3, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 196

                            Headlines

G E R M A N Y

MOX TELECOM: Faces Insolvency; Dec. 5 Creditors Meeting Set


I R E L A N D

CAVENDISH SQUARE: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class C Notes


I T A L Y

FINMECCANICA SPA: S&P Alters Outlook to Neg. & Affirms BB+/B CCR


L U X E M B O U R G

ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Puts Ba3 CFR on Review for Downgrade
GALAPAGOS HOLDING: S&P Assigns 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
KERNEL HOLDING: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings
OXEA SARL: Moody's Puts 'B2' CFR on Review for Downgrade


N E T H E R L A N D S

LEOPARD CLO II: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on Class D Notes
NETHERLANDS: Second Hand Shops Face Bankruptcies


R U S S I A

MECHEL OAO: Agrees to Hold Asset Sale Negotiations
MECHEL OAO: Moody's Lowers National Scale Rating to 'Caa2.ru'
MECHEL OAO: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'Caa3'


S P A I N

IM CAJAMAR 4: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
MADRID RMBS I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa1'
TDA CAM 5: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3' Rating on EUR56MM B Notes


S W E D E N

MUNTERS TOPHOLDING: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B3' CFR to Neg.


U K R A I N E

UKRLANDFARMING: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC'; Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE GROUP: Richard Pennycook to Join Board on Oct. 15
DANIEL STEWART: Missed Filing Deadline Prompts Share Suspension
THEBUSINESSDESK: Tax Debts Prompt Administration


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit


                            *********


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G E R M A N Y
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MOX TELECOM: Faces Insolvency; Dec. 5 Creditors Meeting Set
-----------------------------------------------------------
Telecompaper reports that Mox Telecom Holding has gone insolvent
following a verdict of the administrative court in Duesseldorf on
Oct. 1.

Horst Piepenburg has been appointed as insolvency administrator,
Telecompaper discloses.

At the same time, Mox Telecom's creditor's committee decided to
sell Mox Telecom's majority stake in US subsidiary Sohel
Distributors to the minority shareholder, which is not part of
the insolvency, Telecompaper relates.  No financial details were
disclosed, Telecompaper notes.

The insolvency administrator and KPMG will now look for new
investors for Mox Telecom's remaining divisions, Telecompaper
says.

According to Telecompaper, Mox Telecom's operations will continue
as no other division has been affected by the insolvency of the
Holding.

The court also set the date for a creditor's meeting on Dec. 5 of
this year, Telecompaper states.

Mox Telecom Holding is a Germany-based provider of global calling
cards and VoIP services.



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I R E L A N D
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CAVENDISH SQUARE: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Cavendish Square Funding plc's notes:

Class A1 (XS0241540763): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative

Class A2 (XS0241541571): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative

Class B (XS0241542033): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Negative

Class C (XS0241543353): affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Negative

Cavendish Square Funding plc is a cash arbitrage securitization
of structured finance assets.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation reflects the increase in available credit
enhancement (CE) for the notes due to the deleveraging of the
underlying portfolio.  The revision of the Outlook on the class
A1 notes reflects the EUR21 million reduction in outstanding note
balance since the last review, accompanied by slight positive
rating migration in the portfolio.  Over the past year, assets
rated below 'BBB-sf' have reduced to 40.46% from 43.58% in
Sept. 2013. Overall the current defaults have reduced to EUR27.3
million from EUR31.2 million in Sept. 2013.

At the time of the last review, the class C overcollateralization
test was breaching its trigger level.  However, as a result of
deleveraging, this test is currently in compliance.  Moreover,
the SPV is able to pay interest on all the rated notes along with
sizeable payments to the subordinated noteholders.

The portfolio continues to be concentrated at the sector level
with RMBS and CMBS assets representing 57.21% and 8.73%,
respectively, of the total assets, and residually in SF CDO and
ABS assets.  The majority of the assets are mezzanine with
original tranche thickness below 10%.  The portfolio has
considerable exposure to peripheral European countries, currently
reported at 45% of the portfolio.

The Negative Outlook on the mezzanine and junior notes reflect
the extension risk of the portfolio assets beyond their expected
weighted average life.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch tested the impact on the ratings of bringing the maturity
of the assets in the portfolio to their legal maturity, and this
stress would result in a downgrade of up to two categories across
the capital structure.



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I T A L Y
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FINMECCANICA SPA: S&P Alters Outlook to Neg. & Affirms BB+/B CCR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Italian aerospace and defense group Finmeccanica SpA
to negative from stable.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'BB+/B' long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on the
company.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB+' issue ratings on Finmeccanica's
unsecured notes.  The recovery rating is unchanged at '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%) in
the event of a payment default.

The outlook revision reflects that Finmeccanica's financial
metrics are below S&P's expectation for the ratings, due to
subdued operating performance in the aerospace and defense sector
and still disappointing results from the transportation business.

In the first half of 2014, Finmeccanica reported EBITDA of EUR442
million and an EBITDA margin of 6.7%.  Reported EBITA stood at
EUR351 million, down by 17.6% compared with EBITA in 2013.  A
good performance in the helicopter and aeronautics sectors was
offset by a loss on a specific contract in the U.S. defense
sector.  The company's transportation business has performed
better this year than in 2013, but is still posting losses and
continues to weigh on the operating margin and financial
leverage.  S&P anticipates that the company's credit metrics for
2014 will likely be weaker than its previous forecasts.  S&P
expects the Standard & Poor's-adjusted ratio of funds from
operations (FFO) to debt to be 17%-18% and adjusted debt to
EBITDA to be only marginally below 4x. This is weaker than S&P's
previous estimate of FFO to debt of 24% and debt to EBITDA of
3.7x.  S&P expects the unadjusted EBITDA margin to be about 10%
in 2014, higher than in 2013 when restructuring costs pushed it
down to 5%.  However, this is still below the average for global
industry peers in aerospace and defense.

"We expect Finmeccanica's operating performance to improve
marginally in 2015, primarily supported by restructuring
benefits, but in our base case we forecast FFO to debt slightly
below 20% and debt to EBITDA of about 3.7x.  Such metrics, if
they persist, are at the bottom of the range commensurate with
our current "significant" financial risk profile assessment.
Finmeccanica's trading outlook relies on an order backlog of
EUR37.6 billion at midyear 2014, which provides visibility for
about 2.5 years of production in its most important markets: the
U.K., Italy, and the U.S.  In 2014 and 2015, we expect defense
procurement spending to stay flat in Italy, and to moderately
decline in the U.K. and U.S., limiting growth opportunities that
could strengthen the company's cash flow generation over the next
few years," S&P said.

"We appreciate the new management's firm stance on restructuring,
cost reduction, and disposals.  In June 2014, Finmeccanica's
board of directors approved guidelines to streamline the group's
structure and implement a divisional model, and we anticipate a
more detailed plan over the next few months.  We believe that
this would improve the group's corporate governance and operating
performance in the next two to three years.  At the same time, we
consider that the associated cost benefits may not materialize in
the near term," S&P added.

"Additionally, in our opinion, Finmeccanica has an ambitious
investment plan for the next few years, which will likely absorb
a large portion of its cash.  Consequently, a significant
reduction in debt through cash generated from ongoing operations
appears unlikely.  In our view, Finmeccanica could reduce its
financial debt somewhat only if it found a solution for the
underperforming transportation division.  On Sept. 25, 2014,
Finmeccanica's board decided to request binding offers for
Ansaldo Breda, the group's loss-making transportation company,"
S&P said.

The negative outlook indicates that S&P could lower the ratings
by one notch if Finmeccanica's credit metrics do not improve
steadily throughout 2015 as a result of the ongoing restructuring
and disposal plan.

More specifically, S&P could lower the ratings if it believes
that Finmeccanica's profitability would continue to lag industry
peers' and that the FFO-to-debt ratio would stay below 20% and
free operating cash flow in negative territory in 2015.  This may
happen if the group is unable to complete the disposal of its
noncore transportation assets, which would therefore continue to
impair margins, and if restructuring efforts do not translate
into significant cost savings and a tangible improvement in
profitability.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Finmeccanica realizes
benefits from its restructuring and asset disposal plan, and S&P
believes FFO to debt would stay comfortably higher than 20% for a
sustained period, with profitability strengthening toward the
industry peer average.  This may happen if the company completes
the sale of its transportation business.

Ratings upside could arise from a significant reduction of
Finmeccanica's sizable fully adjusted debt that resulted in an
adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio approaching 30%.



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L U X E M B O U R G
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ENDO INTERNATIONAL: Moody's Puts Ba3 CFR on Review for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service commented that the increase in mesh
litigation reserves announced by Endo International plc is credit
negative for the company including the rated issuers Endo
Luxembourg Finance I Company S.a.r.l., Endo Finance LLC and Endo
Finance Co. Endo's Corporate Family Rating is Ba3 and its ratings
are under review for possible downgrade related to the company's
recent proposal to acquire Auxilium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Moody's
rating review of Endo will consider the impact of mesh litigation
outflows anticipated over the next several years.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Pharmaceutical Industry published in December 2012. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Endo Luxembourg Finance I Company
S.a.r.l. is a subsidiary of Endo International plc, which is
headquartered in Dublin, Ireland. Endo is a specialty healthcare
company offering branded and generic pharmaceuticals and medical
devices. Including the predecessor company Endo Health Solutions,
Inc., net revenues for the 12 months ended June 30, 2014 were
approximately US$2.6 billion.


GALAPAGOS HOLDING: S&P Assigns 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to Luxembourg-based heat-exchanger
equipment provider Galapagos Holdings S.A.  The outlook is
stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned:

   -- S&P's 'BB-' issue rating to the super senior secured
      facilities issued by Galapagos S.A., comprising a EUR75
      million revolving credit facility (RCF) and a EUR400
      million guarantee facility.  The recovery rating on these
      facilities is '1', reflecting S&P's expectation of very
      high (90%-100%) recovery in the event of a payment default;

   -- S&P's 'B' issue rating to the senior secured notes issued
      by Galapagos S.A., with a recovery rating of '4',
      indicating S&P's expecation of an average (30%-50%)
      recovery; and

   -- S&P's 'CCC+' issue rating to the senior unsecured notes
      issued by Galapagos Holding S.A.  The recovery rating on
      these notes is '6', reflecting S&P's expectation of
      negligible (0%-10%) recovery.

The ratings are at the same level as the preliminary rating S&P
assigned on May 19, 2014.

The ratings on Galapagos, the former heat exchanger division of
German industrial GEA Group AG, reflect S&P's view of the group's
capital structure as relatively aggressive following the proposed
leveraged buyout by private equity Group Triton.  The buyout was
announced on April 16, 2014, and S&P expects it to be completed
by the end of 2014.

"We assess Galapagos' financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged" under our criteria.  Based on the proposed capital
structure after the buyout, we estimate the group's Standard &
Poor's-adjusted net debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be at about 6.5x by
Dec. 31, 2014.  This is moderately higher than our previous base
case and incorporates the somewhat weaker operating performance
in the first half of 2014 than we expected in May 2014.  Under
our current base case, our metrics include financial debt of
about EUR775 million, excluding the EUR75 million undrawn RCF and
the EUR400 million guarantee facility.  As of Dec. 31, 2013, the
group had issued guarantees exceeding EUR350 million," S&P said.

"We exclude the preferred equity certificates (PECs) to be
provided by shareholders from our debt calculation for Galapagos,
since we believe they are likely to qualify for equity treatment,
according to our criteria.  We note, however, that we need to
review the final documentation to confirm that the PECs are
stapled to the equity, deeply subordinated to all existing and
future debt instruments, and that no mandatory cash payments will
be associated with these instruments.  These are the most
important conditions to be fulfilled that would in turn enable us
to treat these instruments as equity-like.  Still, we understand
that the group does not expect to make changes to the final
documentation.  We understand that final documentation on the
PECs will only become available upon closing of the transaction.
Including these instruments, Galapagos' debt to EBITDA will
increase by about 2x based on the EBITDA we expect for 2014," S&P
added.

"We assess Galapagos' business risk profile as "fair," based
primarily on the constraint from the group's exposure to cyclical
and mature end markets, including power, climate and energy, and
oil and gas, which we view as inherently cyclical.  The group is
exposed to high competition from a number of larger direct peers,
such as Alfa Laval AB and SPX Corp., both of which we consider as
having solid financial strength to compete with Galapagos and
stronger business diversity than the group.  Its profitability is
at the low end of the 11%-18% range that we have defined as
"average" for a capital goods company.  This can partly be
attributed also to the group's relatively low aftermarket
business through which it generates less than 15% of revenues,"
S&P noted.

"On the positive side, Galapagos holds leading niche market
positions in the manufacturing of heat exchanger equipment for a
number of end markets with a wide product offering.  Over our
forecast period, the group's business lines should also benefit
from natural growth opportunities, supported by megatrends such
as rising energy needs, urbanization, and the need for efficient
energy sources.  Good geographical diversity, with about 56% of
revenues outside of Western Europe (although a much lower
proportion of earnings -- between 25% and 35% of EBITDA
generation for some years) should position the group to capture
stronger demand outside of the eurozone (European Economic and
Monetary Union) in the near term.  We also regard Galapagos'
large installed base and longstanding relationships with
customers as a competitive advantage.  We view positively the
group's diversified customer base.  Our business risk assessment
is also supported by our expectation that Galapagos will maintain
its solid performance over our forecast horizon, supported by its
track record of fair resilience to cyclical downturns," S&P said.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Slow growth in the capital goods industry, with a likely
      modest uptick in demand in 2014, and a slightly more
      sustained increase from 2015.  Geographically, prospects
      are mixed.  S&P forecasts that Europe will remain the
      weakest link until 2015.

   -- As a result of S&P's economic and industry-specific
      assumptions, it expects Galapagos to deliver generally
      stable operating performance.  S&P thinks the adjusted
      EBITDA margin will narrow to between 9.5% and 10.0% in
      2014, largely due to sizable restructuring costs that S&P
      expects the company will incur, and to recover to about
      11.0% in 2015 (compared with 11.5% for 2013).

   -- S&P expects a revenue decline of about 2%-6%, following a
      7% decline in 2013.  Margins are likely to be supported by
      efficiency improvement measures implemented in recent
      years, in S&P's view.  Concurrently, though, S&P thinks the
      competitive landscape will remain fierce.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 8% for 2014
      and approximately 9% in 2015.

   -- EBITDA coverage ratios higher than 2.5x over S&P's forecast
      horizon.

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 6.5x in 2014, moving toward 5.5x in
      2015.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Galapagos should
continue to generate positive free operating cash flow (FOCF)
from 2015, without significantly negative FOCF generation in
2014, based on S&P's assumption that the group will gradually
improve its operating performance after 2015 and control
expansionary investments in capital expenditures and working
capital.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if Galapagos' fully
adjusted debt to EBITDA moves below 5x, which could be consistent
with a higher rating, if the group simultaneously continues to
generate positive FOCF while liquidity remains at least
"adequate."

S&P could lower the rating if the group faced unexpected adverse
operating developments, such as a sharp economic downturn in the
global economy that affects Galapagos' end markets.  This could
squeeze the group's reported EBITDA margin to less than 7% and
spark a contraction in operating cash flow generation.  The
ratings could also come under pressure if the group's FOCF turned
negative as a result of operating shortfalls, adverse working
capital swings, or if the non-cash-paying PEC was replaced by a
cash-paying instrument.


KERNEL HOLDING: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Issuer Default Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Luxembourg-based Kernel Holding S.A.'s
long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'CCC'.

The affirmation reflects the political and economic uncertainty
in Ukraine, where Kernel's assets and operations are mainly
based, which may ultimately threaten its financial flexibility
and ability to meet its debt obligations.

Kernel's ratings are based on Fitch's expectation of weak credit
metrics in FY14 (fiscal year-ending June 2014), its high reliance
on working capital financing, dependence on grain and sunflower
seed availability in Ukraine, vulnerability to soft commodity
price risk and tax and export regulation.  Currently Fitch
expects Kernel's leverage and interest cover metrics to return to
pre-FY14 levels only by FY16-FY17 subject to a successful
turnaround in its loss-making farming segment and reduced capex.

The ratings continue to reflect Kernel's position as the largest
sunflower seed processor and exporter of bulk sunflower oil in
Ukraine and a top four grain exporter and farming operator in the
country.  Kernel's presence across the agriculture value chain,
limited FX risk and maintained access to international bank's
funding also support the ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Linkage to Sovereign Rating

Kernel's ratings are constrained by Ukraine's Country Celling of
'CCC', reflecting the ongoing heightened uncertainty regarding
the political and economic situation in the Ukraine, which may
ultimately threaten the ability of Ukrainian corporates to meet
their debt obligations.  With zero exposure to Crimea, Donetsk
and Lugansk regions, Kernel is removed from the military conflict
in the Eastern part of the country and Ukraine-Russia tensions.

Turnaround of Farming Critical for Deleveraging

Fitch expects Kernel's FFO to decrease to around USD85 million in
FY14 (FY13: USD116 million) as a result of the lossmaking farming
segment and lower sunflower oil prices.  This would result in FFO
adjusted leverage reaching 5.3x in FY14 (2013: 4.1x).  Fitch
believes that turnaround of farming operations in FY15 is
critical for Kernel's deleveraging in the medium term.  Giving
credit to management's efforts towards yield improvement and
reduced capex plans, we expect FFO adjusted leverage to decrease
to 4.2x-4.0x in FY17-FY18.  This is also based on Fitch's
assumption of declining soft commodity prices in FY15 and their
stabilization thereafter.

Less Aggressive Growth Plans

Fitch understands that after increasing leverage in FY14, Kernel
will stick to a less aggressive growth strategy.  Consequently,
Fitch expects the company to grow organically over the medium
term with capex not exceeding 2.5%-3.0% of revenues.  This should
enable the company to generate positive FCF, despite expected
dividend payments, and lead to a gradual improvement in credit
metrics.

High Dependence on Working Capital Funding

As a soft commodity trader and sunflower seed processor, Kernel
strongly depends on the availability of working capital
financing, which is usually extended for one year.  This leads to
a high proportion of short-term debt, reaching 50-70% depending
on season and high refinancing risks, which the company faces in
July-August when its major trade finance facilities mature.
Fitch positively views Kernel's recent renewal of pre-export
financing (PXF) facilities, which should fully cover the
company's needs for FY15. This also proves the company's ability
to maintain access to international banks' funding, despite the
challenging economic environment in Ukraine.

Diversification and Upper-end Integration Add Stability

Kernel benefits from integration into processing and soft
commodity trading and well developed infrastructure (silos and
port terminals).  Integration towards the upper end of the value
chain ensures a higher stability of margin compared with pure
farmers in the event of wide grain price fluctuations.  Kernel's
revenues from its Russian procurement and processing facilities,
which we estimate at 16% in FY14, also provide some
diversification benefit.

Limited Hryvnia Depreciation Impact

The recent sharp depreciation of the hryvnia should not
jeopardize Kernel's capacity to service its debt, which is
entirely foreign currency-denominated.  Although the company's
FY14-15 operating cash flow may be negatively affected by a lower
amount of hryvnia-denominated VAT refunds when converted into US
dollars, in the longer term we consider the company's operations
as naturally hedged as dollarized revenues are well matched with
US dollar-based operating and interest costs.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action on the foreign and local currency IDR include:

   -- A liquidity shortage caused by limited available bank
      financing of working capital investments or by refinancing
      at more onerous terms than expected.

   -- A severe shock from soft commodity prices, export
      restrictions, material reduction in VAT refunds or limited
      crop availability in Ukraine leading to material
      deterioration of Kernel's credit metrics.

Positive: An upgrade of the local currency IDR would only be
possible if Fitch considers there has been a sustained
improvement in the issuer's operating environment.  An upgrade of
the foreign currency IDR would only be possible if Ukraine's
Country Ceiling was raised.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Short-Term Liquidity, Refinancing Risks

Adequate liquidity is supported by available cash of USD99
million as of March 2014 together with recently re-established
PXF facilities with a maximum limit of USD600m and expected
positive FCF in FY15 assuming Kernel maintains control over its
capex and working capital spending.  Highly marketable
inventories could further support liquidity (estimated at around
USD450m as of March 2014). However, we note Kernel's refinancing
risks, which could arise next summer when PXF facilities need to
be renewed.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

  Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'CCC'.  The rating
  is constrained by Ukraine's Country Ceiling of 'CCC'

  Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'CCC'

  National Long-term rating affirmed at 'A(ukr)' with Stable
  Outlook


OXEA SARL: Moody's Puts 'B2' CFR on Review for Downgrade
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) of
Oxea S.a r.l., the ultimate holding company of the subsidiary
guarantors to the group's senior secured credit facilities, as
well as the B1 rating on the first-lien senior secured credit
facility and the Caa1 rating on the second-lien senior secured
credit facility due 2020 at Oxea's subsidiary Oxea Finance & Cy
S.C.A. ("OF") on review for downgrade.

Ratings Rationale

The rating announcement follows Oxea's continued weak operating
performance since the completion of Oman Oil Company's (OOC
unrated) acquisition of Oxea from private-equity firm Advent
International Corporation. Credit metrics are extremely weak for
the current rating and significantly worse than Moody's
expectations, with Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA increasing to
7.6x for the last-twelve-months (LTM) ended June 2014.
Performance has suffered as a result of a difficult economic
environment in Europe, declines in exports to Asia, as well as
the turnaround of Oxea's Bay City plant and subsequent unplanned
outage, competitive pressures, a strong Euro and a severe winter
in the US.

OOC is pursuing investments in the wider energy sector that are
consistent with the long-term strategy of its owner, the
Government of Oman (A1 stable). Moody's views OOC as a more
strategic owner than Advent, with the acquisition in line with
its downstream strategy to become an integrated player in the
chemical industry with the production of higher margin specialty
chemicals. Moody's also expects that the new owner will adopt a
more conservative financial policy than Advent. However, at this
stage no announcement has been made regarding intentions with
respect to Oxea's capital structure.

The ratings review will monitor OOC's intentions regarding the
legal and capital structure of Oxea, including the level of
integration into OOC and funding policies, considering Oxea's
very high leverage, as well as Oxea's earnings and liquidity
position during the second half of 2014 and into 2015,
considering its historical track record of cash generation.
Moody's expects to conclude the review by the end of December.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Chemical Industry Rating Methodology published in December 2013.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Incorporated in Luxembourg, Oxea S.ar.l. is a leading global
producer of oxo intermediates and derivatives with a key product
portfolio of oxo chemical products and well-established market
positions in Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, and South
America. Oxo chemicals are critical to the production of other
chemicals used in a variety of industries such as automotive,
construction, industrial goods, consumer and retail,
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, agriculture and packaging. As of
financial year-end (FYE) December 2013, Oxea reported revenues
and EBITDA of EUR1.4 billion and EUR191 million, respectively and
on a Moody's-adjusted basis.



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LEOPARD CLO II: Moody's Affirms 'Ca' Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
rating of the following notes issued by Leopard CLO II B.V.:

  EUR22 million Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2019, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2014
  Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Leopard CLO II B.V.:

  EUR45 million (current outstanding amount of EUR8.5m) Class A-2
  Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Jan 28, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR15 million Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
  Notes due 2019, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2014
  Affirmed Caa2 (sf)

  EUR8.25 million (current outstanding amount of EUR10.6m) Class
  D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2019,
  Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Jan 28, 2014 Affirmed Ca (sf)

Leopard CLO II B.V., issued in April 2004, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high
yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by
M&G Investment Management Limited. The transaction passed its
reinvestment period in April 2009.

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade to the rating on the Class B notes is primarily a
result of the improvement in its over-collateralization ratio
following a significant amortization of the Class A-2 notes.
Class A-2 has paid down by EUR25.11 million (55.8% of closing
balance) since the last rating action on 28 January 2014.

As a result of deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios (or
"OC ratios") of the Class A-2 and B notes have increased since
the rating action in January 2014. As of the trustee report dated
August 15, 2014, the Class A-2 and Class B ratios are reported at
503.7% and 139.63% respectively, versus December 2013 levels of
190.25%, and 122.35% respectively. Moody's also notes that
Class C and D Par Value Tests are still failing compared to the
last rating action and Class D continues to defer interest. In
particular Class C OC and the Class D OC have worsened over the
same period of time from 98.4% and 88.84% to 93.55% and 79.18%
respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR31.8M,
defaulted par of EUR15.3M, a weighted average default probability
of 24.53% (consistent with a WARF of 4,316), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 46.07% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 10 and a weighted average spread of
4.23%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that a recovery of 50% of the 88.77% of the
portfolio exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets
upon default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
performed a sensitivity analysis defaulting the largest asset
with 18.7% exposure of the performing portfolio. Moody's also
performed an additional sensitivity run reducing the recovery
rate of the assets by 5%. These runs generated model outputs that
were consistent with the ratings.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy 2) the large concentration of lowly- rated debt
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

   * Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

   * Around 54% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates.

   * Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

   * Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


NETHERLANDS: Second Hand Shops Face Bankruptcies
------------------------------------------------
DutchNews.nl, citing sector organization BKN, reports that the
growth in the number of second hand shops in the Netherlands
would appear to be over, with a downturn in sales and the first
bankruptcies.

Last year, the 180 shops affiliated to BKN saw their combined
turnover fall 3% to EUR79 million, DutchNews.nl relates.  In
2009, there were over 200 second hand shops, DutchNews.nl
discloses.

According to DutchNews.nl, spokeswoman Leonie Reinders told
broadcaster Nos the good years would appear to be over.

"Many people see the shops as dusty and old-fashioned,"
DutchNews.nl quotes Ms. Reinders as saying.  "The quality varies
enormously.  Some are very professionally run, others are
amateurish."

Ms. Reinders, as cited by DutchNews.nl, said the arrival of high
street budget stores such as Primark, Action and Big Bazar have
also had an impact.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


MECHEL OAO: Agrees to Hold Asset Sale Negotiations
--------------------------------------------------
RIA Novosti reports that Oleg Korzhov, chief executive officer of
Mechel OAO, said the indebted company has agreed to hold
negotiations in order to sell its assets.

"If buyers of our assets have banks acting on their behalf, I may
say only that they should approach us directly.  Mechel is
prepared to consider a sale of almost any asset.  We have
received offers from interested parties and are holding
negotiations," RIA Novosti quotes Mr. Korzhov as saying, refusing
to disclose details of the talks.

Vedomosti reported that Mechel's major shareholder Igor Zyuzin
has received an offer to sell his 67.42% stake in the company,
RIA Novosti relates.

According to RIA Novosti, a source told the daily that soon after
a number of statements and VTB's lawsuit which led to a 53%
Mechel's stock slump the businessman got a proposal from
unspecified persons and companies to discuss the possibility of
selling Mechel and a call from one of the creditor banks asking
about the businessman's decision.

A source close to one of Mechel's creditors noted that the offer
was not from the banks' client, RIA Novosti relates.  Two people
acquainted with Mr. Zyuzin said that the businessman suspects
that his company attracted the interest of Gennady Timchenko, RIA
Novosti notes.

However, the banks' plan to swap the US$3 billion debt for a 75%
stake does not suit the CEO, RIA Novosti says.

Mr. Korzhov, as cited by RIA Novosti, said that the banks put the
value of the entire company at US$4 billion, whereas the balance
sheet value of its assets was at US$14 billion as of the end of
2013, and enterprise value calculated as market capitalization
plus debt currently amounts US$9 billion.

Mechel OAO is a Russian steel and coking coal producer.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 2,
2014, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Mechel OAO's corporate
family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) to
Caa1 and Caa1-PD, respectively.  Moody's said the outlook remains
negative.


MECHEL OAO: Moody's Lowers National Scale Rating to 'Caa2.ru'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has downgraded Mechel OAO's
national scale rating (NSR) to Caa2.ru from Ba3.ru. The outlook
on the rating is negative. Moody's Interfax is majority-owned by
Moody's Investors Service (MIS).

Ratings Rationale

Moody's Interfax's downgrade of the NSR of Mechel follows MIS's
downgrade of the company's corporate family rating to Caa3 with a
negative outlook.

Mechel is a vertically integrated mining and metals company. Its
business comprises three segments: mining, steel and power. The
group produces coal, iron ore, ferrosilicon, as well as long
(rebar, wire rod, structural shapes, etc), and carbon flat-rolled
steel products, engineered steel, hardware and other high value-
added steel products.

In 2013, Mechel reported revenue of US$8.6 billion (a 19%
decrease year-over-year) and EBITDA of US$0.7 billion (a 50%
decrease year-over-year). Mechel is majority owned by its
Chairman of the Board of Directors Mr. Igor Zyuzin, who controls
67.42% of the voting shares. After its initial public offering in
2004, 32.58% of the company's shares are in free float.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For
further information on Moody's approach to national scale
ratings, please refer to Moody's Rating Methodology published in
June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to
Global Scale Ratings".

About Moody's and Moody's Interfax

Moody's Interfax Credit rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in
credit risk analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between
Moody's Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings,
research and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in
the global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).


MECHEL OAO: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Mechel OAO's corporate
family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) to
Caa3 and Ca-PD, respectively from Caa1 and Caa1-PD. The outlook
on all ratings remains negative.

The rating action is driven by an increased probability of a
distressed exchange, which constitutes a debt default under
Moody's definition, or alternatively by a payment default under
bank facilities that might take place shortly. The deterioration
of Mechel's financial profile has been exacerbated by the
company's sizeable leverage and weak coal market environment, so
the company has very limited prospects for meaningful recovery in
2015.

"The downgrade is driven by the increased likelihood of Mechel
restructuring debt in an effort to avoid bankruptcy, which might
entail any combination of lowered interest rates, write-down of
principal, extension of debt maturities, or conversion of part of
debt into equity, all of which would imply an economic loss to
the existing lenders and therefore falls under Moody's definition
of default", says Denis Perevezentsev, a Moody's Vice President
and lead analyst for Mechel. "The downgrade reflects Moody's view
that the government and state banks will not continue to provide
funding to avoid a debt restructuring and a default of Mechel,
although Moody's remain confident that they will strive to
achieve an orderly debt restructuring," added Mr. Perevezentsev.

Ratings Rationale

The Caa3 CFR is reflective of Moody's assumption that the capital
structure is not sustainable given the current low coking coal
prices and Mechel's sizeable debt. Although the capital structure
is likely to be firmed up over the course of a managed
restructuring, allowing the company to avoid bankruptcy, there is
an implied economic loss to lenders, with Moody's estimate of a
family loss given default (LGD) rate of less than 50% across
Mechel's current debt structure. Moody's notes the residual
uncertainty as to whether the restructuring plan will be
successfully completed and as to the actual loss the lenders will
incur following a distressed exchange.

The downgrade of the PDR to Ca-PD reflects Moody's expectation of
a near-term default and a restructuring of the whole capital
structure given the considerable challenges the company is
facing, and the unsustainable debt capital structure.

Mechel exceeded its financial covenant in its interim financials
as of June 30, 2013 of net debt/EBITDA below 7.5x. As a result,
the company reset covenants to a temporary level of net
debt/EBITDA of 10x as of 31 December 2014 and 7.5x as of
June 30, 2015 and agreed with its creditors not to test the
covenants until 31 December 2014. Moody's estimates that there is
a high probability that the covenants' thresholds will be
exceeded as of December 31, 2014 under the current capital
structure.

The current liquidity situation is very weak. Moody's also
believes that non-repayment of any of the upcoming loan
maturities by the company might trigger cross-default provisions
on the company's loans with other banks. The company has
maturities as of July 31, 2014 of about US$2.4 billion in both
2015 and 2016.

Support from large Russian banks, including state-controlled
banks, was an important factor which facilitated the company's
successful refinancing efforts at year-end 2013. The company
estimates that borrowings from Russian banks make up about 69% of
its consolidated debt as of December 2013. However, coking coal
prices, which determine the profitability of Mechel's operations,
remain at a low level, despite Moody's expectation of 2014 prices
of US$120-US$125 per tonne recovering to US$135-US$145 per tonne
by the end of 2015. Moody's anticipates that low coking coal
prices are likely to keep leverage as measured by net debt/EBITDA
at an elevated level of about 13x-16x at year-end 2014.

Rationale for Negative Outlook

The negative outlook reflects that further downward pressure on
the CFR could be exerted if the company fails to complete the
consensual restructuring plan with its lenders, possibly
resulting in bankruptcy, or if actual debt restructuring results
in a greater-than-currently-expected loss for lenders.

What Could Change the Rating -- DOWN/UP

Negative pressure on the CFR would result from Mechel's inability
to complete a consensual restructuring, and probably leaving no
other alternative than bankruptcy.

Upward pressure on the rating is currently unlikely. However
Moody's would consider an upgrade of the rating if the company
manages to complete its restructuring, which would lead to a more
sustainable capital structure with a reduced debt burden and
better liquidity cushion. Positive rating pressure would also
require signs of a gradual recovery in the reference markets for
the company, especially with reference to the currently depressed
coal prices.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Mining Industry published in August 2014.

Mechel is a vertically integrated mining and metals company. Its
business comprises three segments: mining, steel and power. The
group produces coal, iron ore, ferrosilicon, as well as long
(rebar, wire rod, structural shapes, etc), and carbon flat-rolled
steel products, engineered steel, hardware and other high value-
added steel products. In 2013, Mechel reported revenue of US$8.6
billion (a 19% decrease year-over-year) and EBITDA of US$0.7
billion (a 50% decrease year-over-year). Mechel is majority owned
by its Chairman of the Board of Directors Mr. Igor Zyuzin, who
controls 67.42% of the voting shares. After its initial public
offering in 2004, 32.58% of the company's shares are in free
float.



=========
S P A I N
=========


IM CAJAMAR 4: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings upgraded three and affirmed 11 tranches of the
Cajamar series.  Of the 11 affirmed tranches, six have had their
Outlook revised to Stable from Negative.  The transactions are
part of a series of RMBS transactions that were originated and
are serviced by Cajamar Caja Rural, Sociedad Cooperativa de
Credito (now part of Cajas Rurales Unidas, Sociedad Cooperativa
de Credito; BB/Stable/B).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Country Ceiling Revision Drives Upgrade

Fitch had placed the class A notes of all three transactions on
Rating Watch Positive (RWP) on 15 April 2014, following the
revision of Spain's Country Ceiling to 'AA+', six notches above
its sovereign Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BBB+'.

Following the publication of its updated criteria assumptions for
Spanish RMBS on 5 June 2014, Fitch had set its assumptions for
'AA+sf' rating stresses.  The analysis showed that the credit
enhancement available to the class A notes of Cajamar 2 and 3 was
sufficient to warrant a one-notch upgrade.

Positive Asset Performance

The Outlook revision and affirmation of the remaining tranches
reflect the positive asset performance of the transactions.  As
of the latest reporting periods, three-months plus arrears
(excluding defaults) ranged from 0.2% (IM Cajamar 3) to 0.6% (TDA
Cajamar 2 and IM Cajamar 4) of the current pool balances.
Cumulative gross defaults (defined as loans in arrears for more
than 12 months) ranged between 1.6% (TDA Cajamar 2) and 3.1% (IM
Cajamar 4) of the initial portfolio balance, most of which have
been fully provisioned for using excess spread.  In IM Cajamar 3
and 4 the excess spread has not always been sufficient to
provision for defaults immediately, which has led to some reserve
fund draws. However, the reserve funds have subsequently been
replenished and are currently on target.

Future Reduction in Credit Enhancement

Amortisation of the notes is currently pro-rata in TDA Cajamar 2
and IM Cajamar 3.  IM Cajamar 4 is expected to begin pro-rata
amortisation in the next year.  This, combined with the
amortising reserve funds in IM Cajamar 3 and 4, should lead to a
reduction in credit enhancement across the structures.  Despite
the potential decline, credit enhancement is expected to be
sufficient to support the ratings at the current levels.

Counterparty Risk Mitigated

Under Fitch's structured finance counterparty criteria, the
servicer and collection account bank, Cajas Rurales Unidas,
Sociedad Cooperativa de Credito (BB/Stable/B) is not eligible to
support notes rated above 'BBsf'.  To mitigate this risk, the
collection account provides daily sweeps to the treasury account
bank BNP Paribas (A+/Stable/F1).  Fitch has also tested the
transactions for payment interruption and found that all three
structures have suitable liquidity to deal with a default of the
servicer and collection account bank.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Changes in asset performance may result from economic factors, in
particular the effect of unemployment.  A corresponding change in
new defaults and associated reduction or increase of excess
spread and reserve funds, beyond Fitch's assumptions, could lead
to negative or positive rating action respectively.

The ratings are also sensitive to changes to Spain's country
ceiling and, consequently, changes to the highest achievable
rating of Spanish Structured Finance notes.

The rating actions are as follows:

TDA Cajamar 2

Class A2 (ISIN ES0377965019): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class A3 (ISIN ES0377965027): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN ES0377965035): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

Class C (ISIN ES0377965043): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

Class D (ISIS ES0377965050): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable
IM Cajamar 3

Class A (ISIN ES0347783005): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWP, Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN ES0347783013): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

Class C (ISIN ES0347783021): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

Class D (ISIN ES0347783039): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative
IM Cajamar 4

Class A (ISIN ES0349044000): affirmed at 'AA-sf''; off RWP,
Outlook Stable

Class B (ISIN ES0349044000): affirmed at BBBsf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

Class C (ISIN ES0349044026): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative

Class D (ISIN ES0349044034): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

Class E (ISIN ES0349044042): affirmed at 'CCsf'; Outlook Stable;
Recovery estimate revised to 85% from 50%


MADRID RMBS I: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'Caa1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of eight notes
in three Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions: Madrid Residencial II, FTA, Madrid RMBS I, FTA and
Madrid RMBS II, FTA.

The rating action concludes the review of six notes placed on
review on March 17, 2014, following the upgrade of the Spanish
sovereign rating to Baa2 from Baa3 and the resulting increase of
the local currency country ceiling to A1 from A3. The sovereign
rating upgrade reflected improvements in institutional strength
and reduced susceptibility to event risk associated with lower
government liquidity and banking sector risks.

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades reflect (1) the increase in the Spanish local-
currency country ceiling to A1 and (2) sufficiency of credit
enhancement in the affected transactions; for the revised rating
levels.

For Madrid Residencial II, FTA and Madrid RMBS I, FTA, the rating
action also reflects the correction of a model input error. In
prior rating actions, the recovery rate input in the model was
inconsistent with the MILAN input, therefore the tail of the
asset loss distribution was generated incorrectly. The model has
now been adjusted, and the rating action reflects this change.

-- Reduced Sovereign Risk

The Spanish sovereign rating was upgraded to Baa2 in February
2014, which resulted in an increase in the local-currency country
ceiling to A1. The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the
maximum rating that Moody's assigns to a domestic Spanish issuer
including structured finance transactions backed by Spanish
receivables, is A1 (sf).

-- Key collateral assumptions

The key collateral assumptions for Madrid Residencial II, FTA,
Madrid RMBS I, FTA and Madrid RMBS II, FTA have not been updated
as part of this review. The performance of the underlying asset
portfolios remain in line with Moody's assumptions. Moody's also
has a stable outlook for Spanish ABS and RMBS transactions.

-- Exposure to Counterparties

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties. Including the roles of
servicer, account bank, and swap provider.

The rating action takes into account servicer commingling
exposure to Bankia, S.A for all three transactions and account
bank exposure to Banco Santander S.A. (Spain) for Madrid
Residencial II, FTA.

Moody's also assessed the exposure to Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, S.A. and Royal Bank of Scotland plc acting as swap
counterparties in each deal when revising ratings.

Principal Methodology:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
March 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the
Ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
Moody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: Madrid Residencial II, FTA

EUR456M Class A Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: MADRID RMBS I FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

EUR1340M Class A2 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR70M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR75M Class C Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Apr 30, 2013 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: MADRID RMBS II FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

EUR936M Class A2 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR270M Class A3 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR63M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR67.5M Class C Notes, Upgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on
Apr 30, 2013 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)


TDA CAM 5: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3' Rating on EUR56MM B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 10 notes
and affirmed the ratings of 1 note in 4 Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions: TDA CAM 1, FTA;
TDA CAM 3, FTA; TDA CAM 5, FTA; and TDA CAM 12, FTA.

The rating action concludes the review of 9 notes placed on
review on 17 March 2014, following the upgrade of the Spanish
sovereign rating to Baa2 from Baa3 and the resulting increase of
the local-currency country ceiling to A1 from A3. The sovereign
rating upgrade reflected improvements in institutional strength
and reduced susceptibility to event risk associated with lower
government liquidity and banking sector risks.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects (1) the increase in the Spanish local-
currency country ceiling to A1 and (2) sufficiency of credit
enhancement in the affected transactions.

-- Reduced Sovereign Risk

The Spanish sovereign rating was upgraded to Baa2 in February
2014, which resulted in an increase in the local-currency country
ceiling to A1. The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the
maximum rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish
issuer including structured finance transactions backed by
Spanish receivables, is A1 (sf).

The increase of credit enhancement and the reduction in sovereign
risk has prompted the upgrade of the notes.

-- Key collateral assumptions

The key collateral assumptions have not been updated as part of
this review. The performance of the underlying asset portfolios
remain in line with Moody's assumptions. Moody's also has a
stable outlook for Spanish ABS and RMBS transactions.

-- Exposure to Counterparties

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties. Including the roles of
servicer (Banco Sabadell, S.A.), reinvestment account bank (Banco
Santander S.A. (Spain) for TDA CAM 12, Bank of Spain for all
others), Treasury account bank (Barclays Bank PLC), and swap
provider for TDA CAM 1,3 and 5 (J.P. Morgan Securities PLC).

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
Moody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: TDA CAM 1, FTA

EUR973.5M A Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR26.5M B Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: TDA CAM 3, FTA

EUR1171.2M A Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR28.8M B Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: TDA CAM 5, FTA

EUR1944M A Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR56M B Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Apr 9, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: TDA CAM 12, FTA

EUR665M A2 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR418M A3 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR228M A4 Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR57M B Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR152M C Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jul 5, 2013
Affirmed Caa1 (sf)



===========
S W E D E N
===========


MUNTERS TOPHOLDING: Moody's Changes Outlook on 'B3' CFR to Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has changed the outlook from positive
to negative on the B3 corporate family rating (CFR) and B3-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) of Munters Topholding AB.
Moody's has also assigned a definitive rating of B3 from (P)B3 to
the US$45 million Revolving Credit Facility and US$280 million
Term Loan B issued by Munters Corporation. Concurrently, Moody's
has affirmed the ratings of Munters Topholding AB.

The rating action takes into consideration the company's very
weak performance in the first half of 2014 which has led to an
increased leverage and a very weak short term liquidity position.
This is also contrary to Moody's expectations of an improvement
that was factored in the previous positive outlook.

The primary borrowers of the facilities are Munters Corporation
and Munters AB, respectively, two intermediate holding companies
residing below Munters Topholding (Topholding), the parent
company and guarantor of the facilities.

Ratings Rationale

The B3 CFR and B3-PD PDR reflect the company's small scale, high
Moody's adjusted debt-to- EBITDA of around 8.1x at the end of
June 2014, up from 7.1x at the end of 2013, high revenue
concentration in climate control solutions, limited addressable
markets and an overall aggressive financial policy. These
weaknesses are mitigated by Munters' broad geographic and end-
market diversification, leading market position in the well-
established market for as well as ongoing measures to increase
market penetration and lower costs.

The previous positive outlook reflected expectations of an
improvement of leverage towards 6.0x in 2014, which looks
increasingly challenging after a weak operating and cash flow
performance in the first half of the year, although some comfort
is provided by the strong order intake suggesting a potentially
stronger performance in the second half of 2014 and in early
2015.

Moody's views Munters' liquidity profile to be very weak
reflecting limited available cash on balance sheet, slightly
negative free cash flow generation in the first half of the year
which led to nearly fully usage of the revolving credit facility,
and very limited headroom under the financial covenants of the
company's US$45 million (SEK300 million) revolving credit
facility. Reported cash of SEK237 million at the end of June was
not accessible as it is used as collateral for outstanding
guarantees. Nevertheless, Moody's expect liquidity to improve
towards yearend driven by expectations of free cash flow turning
positive in the second half the year offsetting the cash burn
recorder in the first half. The company will face SEK249 million
deferred payments in early 2015 for minority stakes in companies
previously acquired, ability to finance this cash outflow is
dependent on the free cash flow turning positive again in the
rest of the year. Alternate sources of liquidity are constrained
since the company's domestic assets are encumbered to secure its
bank borrowings.

The negative rating outlook reflects the uncertainty with regard
to Munters' liquidity position, and its operating performance in
the second half of 2014. The rating could be lowered if the
company's operating performance and liquidity failed to
materially improve in the second half of the year, as evidenced
by debt-to-EBITDA around 6.5x in 2014 with further expectations
of an improvement below 6.0 times thereafter on a sustained
basis. Failure to improve the currently weak liquidity and the
headroom under the financial covenants of the company's RCF could
also result in a rating downgrade.

Although unlikely after the weak performance in the first half of
the year, a rating upgrade could be driven by an improvement of
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio below 6.0x in 2014 and
sustainably below 5.0x thereafter.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in July 2014. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Munters AB, headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden, is a global
manufacturer of air treatment and dehumidification technologies
and solutions used in the industrial, agricultural and other
sectors. The company is owned by private equity investors Nordic
Capital (88.1%), FAI Investments, a fund managed by Rothschild,
(8.7%) and other shareholders (3.2%). Revenues were approximately
SEK3.8 billion (around $580 million) in 2013.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRLANDFARMING: S&P Lowers CCR to 'CCC'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its local currency
long-term corporate credit rating on Ukraine-based farming group
UkrLandFarming to 'CCC' from 'B-'.  Simultaneously, S&P affirmed
its 'CCC' foreign currency long-term corporate credit rating on
UkrLandFarming.  The outlook on both long-term ratings is stable.

S&P also affirmed its 'CCC' issue rating on UkrLandFarming's $500
million unsecured notes.  The recovery rating remains at '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.

"We lowered our local currency long-term rating on UkrLandFarming
to reflect our decision to equalize our foreign and local
currency ratings.  Given UkrLandFarming's weak liquidity and
significant debt, we think that all of the group's obligations
are likely to be equally disadvantaged from a liquidity
perspective in the event of a sovereign default.  We believe that
UkrLandFarming doesn't have sufficient local currency liquidity
to pay foreign currency debt and local currency debt with cross-
default clauses that could be accelerated due to a default of the
sovereign and restrictions on currency conversion.  We consider
that UkrLandFarming's exposure to country risks is high since
almost all of UkrLandFarming's assets are concentrated in Ukraine
(foreign currency CCC/Stable/C; local currency B-/Stable/B)," S&P
said.

"We cap the foreign currency ratings on UkrLandFarming at our
'CCC' transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment on Ukraine
because we think the group's ability to service its debt
obligations would be constrained if the government implemented
restrictions on foreign currency conversion and foreign currency
cross-border transactions in the event of a sovereign default.
We consider that UkrLandFarming's access to foreign currency
liquidity sources in such a stress scenario would be insufficient
to cover its liquidity needs, including large seasonal working
capital requirements," S&P added.

Despite this, S&P's assessment of UkrLandFarming's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) remains unchanged at 'b-'.  S&P considers
the company's stand-alone credit quality, before taking into
account potential negative sovereign intervention, to be higher
than that of the sovereign.

The SACP for UkrLandFarming reflects S&P's assessments of the
company's "vulnerable" business risk profile and its
"significant" financial risk profile.  S&P revised its assessment
of financial risk profile to "significant" from "intermediate" to
reflect increased debt leverage, which it now expects to be about
3x and EBITDA interest coverage in the range of 3x-6x.  The SACP
also reflects S&P's two-notch downward adjustment to
UkrLandFarming's anchor, based on its assessments of the
company's "negative" financial policy and "weak" liquidity.

"We primarily base our view of UkrLandFarming's "vulnerable"
business risk on the very high risk of doing business in Ukraine
and also on the company's exposure to supply and demand of
commodity-type products within the volatile agribusiness
industry. UkrLandFarming's solid market positions in its key
business segments and its overall position as a large
agribusiness player in Ukraine underpin its business risk
profile," S&P said.

Recent challenges in the macroeconomic environment in Ukraine are
likely to weigh heavily on UkrLandFarming's revenues and margins.
This could lead S&P to assume that adjusted EBITDA will decline
by more than 30% in 2014.  S&P believes the company's operating
results will be somewhat supported by foreign currency-generating
export sales in the crops segments and some export sales in the
egg division, AvangardCo, as well as hard-currency-linked
revenues from the distribution segment, focusing on crop inputs.
At the same time, the falling prices of corn -- UkrLandFarming's
key crop -- could be damaging to the company's margins, as well
as the strain of local currency depreciation -- by almost 50% on
domestic revenues from the egg segment, as UkrLandFarming reports
in U.S. dollars -- and weakening domestic demand as a result of a
7% decline in GDP expected in 2014.  S&P also believes that
additional pressure on the company's operating performance will
stem from ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, where part of
AvangardCo's production facilities are located.

UkrLandFarming has significant foreign currency exposure, as more
than 90% of its debt is denominated in U.S. dollars and euros,
while less than half of its revenues are sourced outside Ukraine.
S&P expects UkrLandFarming will generate positive free operating
cash flow in 2014 since the company reduced its capital
expenditure to maintenance level.  This should support the
company's debt protection metrics and offset declines in the
company's revenues and earnings.  S&P expects interest coverage
ratio to drop below 3.0x in 2014 and recover somewhat in 2015.

The stable outlook on both S&P's foreign and local currency long-
term ratings on UkrLandFarming takes into account its stable
outlook on Ukraine.

S&P could lower the ratings on UkrLandFarming if the company
faced tighter currency controls, more restrictions on the
transfer of funds, or rising political or fiscal pressures.  S&P
could also lower the ratings if UkrLandFarming's liquidity
deteriorated further.  However, a downgrade of Ukraine or a
downward revision of our T&C assessment would not automatically
result in a rating downgrade if UkrLandFarming showed resilience
to country-specific risks, such as stricter currency
restrictions, and was able to continue to service its debt even
in the event of a sovereign default.  S&P notes that
UkrLandFarming benefits from recurrent foreign currency inflows
stemming from exports.  This, combined with offshore cash
accounts, somewhat mitigates local T&C constraints.

S&P would raise the ratings on UkrLandFarming if conditions in
Ukraine stabilized and it saw lower risk related to currency
controls and repatriation requirements.  Any rating upside would
be closely linked to positive rating actions on the sovereign and
a revision of S&P's T&C assessment.  However, S&P could also
consider an upgrade if UkrLandFarming demonstrated an ability to
continue servicing its debt despite the liquidity constraints
stemming from the sovereign.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CO-OPERATIVE GROUP: Richard Pennycook to Join Board on Oct. 15
--------------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Bounds at The Financial Times reports that
The Co-operative Group's new chief executive Richard Pennycook
will join its board on October 15 as the retailer won regulator
approval for a radical change in structure.

The Financial Conduct Authority accepted the new rules to govern
the mutual on Oct. 1, immediately shrinking the board from 18 to
seven members, the FT relates.

According to the FT, Mr. Pennycook, former finance director at Wm
Morrison, is set to join on Oct. 15, along with one professional
independent director, increasing the board to nine.

The group voted to change its constitution in August after a
scathing report from Lord Myners, the former City minister, said
the 22-strong board of elected members was not fit for purpose,
the FT relays.

It had failed to constrain a management team that went on a
debt-fueled buying spree from 2008, imperiling the group, forcing
it to give up a majority stake in the Co-operative Bank and
leading to a GBP2.5 billion statutory loss in 2013, the FT
recounts.

All four eligible directors from the group's subsidiary board are
in contention for the professional non-executive post, the FT
says.  One insider, as cited by the FT, said Simon Burke, the
former chief executive of Hamleys toy store, was the favorite.

Mr. Burke won friends among the Co-op's 7 million members by
backing the decision to allow three of them to remain on the
board, against Lord Myners' advice, the FT notes.

John Longworth, the former Asda and Tesco director and director-
general of the British Chambers of Commerce, is also in the
running, the FT discloses.

The final board will comprise 11 members, including an
independent chair and the group chief operating officer, both yet
to be appointed, along with more non-executives, the FT states.
It should be in place by May's annual meeting, the FT says.

In December, the half-yearly meeting will be the first at which
all members, not just representatives, can attend and vote, the
FT notes.

                     About Co-operative Group

Founded in 183, The Co-operative Group is UK's largest mutual
business owned by nearly 8 million members.  The consumer
cooperative organization is widely known as "The Co-op."  It has
a diverse range of retail businesses, which include food,
financial services, funeral care, legal services and online
electricals.  It operates 4,500 retail outlets, employs about
87,000 people, and has an GBP11 billion annual turnover.

In May 2013, the Group mulled the sale of a GBP2 billion loan
portfolio after Moody's downgraded the rating on the Group's
banking arm to "junk" status and raised concerns that the
division needed a government bail-out.  This was also around the
time Euan Sutherland took over Peter Marks as chief executive.
Euan Sutherland eventually resigned in March 2014, saying that
the mutual is "ungovernable."

On Aug. 30, 2014, members approved board reforms.  About 80% of
member representatives voted to replace the existing board with a
plc-style body dominated by independent directors.  With this new
development, the number of board members is expected to be
decreased by 50%.

In 2014, the Group sold its pharmacy unit, The Co-operative
Pharmacy, to Bestway Group for GBP620 million; and its farming
business, Co-operative Farms, to Wellcome Trust for GBP249
million -- all in an effort to reduce debt.

The Group posted a GBP2.5 billion (US$4.2 billion) loss in 2013,
with debts aggregating GBP1.4 billion at the end of last year.


DANIEL STEWART: Missed Filing Deadline Prompts Share Suspension
---------------------------------------------------------------
Kate Burgess and Harriet Agnew at The Financial Times report that
Daniel Stewart Securities, the London Stock Exchange's nominated
adviser to 27 companies on the Alternative Investment Market, has
had its shares suspended because it missed a regulatory deadline
for filing its accounts.

Shares in the company, which appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers as
its new auditor in June, were frozen at 0.35p, having fallen 6%
over the course of the year, the FT relates.

Brokers that act as nominated advisers are charged with ensuring
quoted clients communicate properly and in a timely manner to the
market -- so it is unusual for them to fail to publish their
accounts in time, the FT notes.

The LSE, which oversees Aim, insists that if this happens to any
kind of Aim-quoted company, it must suspend trading in their
shares, the FT states.

Daniel Stewart's last published financial statement was nine
months ago on Christmas Eve 2013, when it unveiled a 16% drop in
half-year revenues, a cash outflow of GBP691,000 and pre-tax
losses of GBP982,000, against GBP998,000 the year before, the FT
recounts.  Its pre-tax loss in the full-year to March 2013 was
GBP3.1 million, the FT discloses.

Unlike some of its peers, which have recovered strongly in the
past two years, Daniel Stewart has seen its client base dwindle
from 60 companies in 2011 to about 30 now, the FT relays.  In
December, it reported its client list had dropped to 33 in total
from 41 six months previously, the FT states.

Daniel Stewart declined to comment on its share suspension.
However, a person familiar with the situation said: "The company
is ... waiting on the completion and provision of certain
processes and additional information to complete the audit, then
the results will be published which should only take a few days."

In June, PwC was appointed to audit the company's results,
replacing Keelings in Hertfordshire, which was its auditor for 15
years, the FT recounts.  A month later, Daniel Stewart, as cited
by the FT, said in a trading update that its losses had narrowed
in the year to March on the back of improving stock market
sentiment.

Despite this, though, Daniel Stewart revealed on Oct. 1 that it
had failed to meet the Sept. 30 deadline for publishing full-year
results to March, the FT relates.

According to figures from the London Stock Exchange, which sets
the rules and oversees the junior market, Daniel Stewart
currently acts as nomad to 27 Aim-quoted companies, including
strife-torn Rangers International Football Club, making it a
midsized Aim-market broker.


THEBUSINESSDESK: Tax Debts Prompt Administration
------------------------------------------------
Jon Griffin at Birmingham Post reports that TheBusinessDesk
has been forced into administration over tax debts.

Bosses of TheBusinessDesk, which operates in Yorkshire, the North
West and West Midlands, say the jobs of all 14 staff will be
protected, Birmingham Post relates.

According to Birmingham Post, the new owners say the situation
relates to historical tax liabilities accrued under the previous
ownership.

"The restructuring process currently underway protects the
creditors and suppliers of TheBusinessDesk and safeguards the
jobs of 14 staff in Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester," Birmingham
Post quotes TheBusinessDesk as saying in a statement.

"Following the acquisition of the company by entrepreneur Mark
Hales in 2013 there has been significant investment in new staff
and management processes.  The underlying business is now
profitable.

"The current situation relates entirely to legacy arrears due to
HMRC accrued under the previous ownership.

"Regrettably, HMRC has refused to extend the reasonable and
affordable repayment terms agreed in 2013 at the time of
acquisition, and has left the current owner no alternative than
to appoint an administrator.

"The new business (Regional Media Services Ltd) will be free from
historical liabilities and will continue to deliver regional
business news across its core regions in the North West,
Yorkshire and West Midlands.

"As previously stated all creditors of the former business will
be transferred to the new company and will be paid in due
course."

TheBusinessDesk said there were no redundancies and Chris Barry,
the editor of its North West edition has taken on a new role as
editorial director for Yorkshire and the North West, Birmingham
Post relates.

TheBusinessDesk is a business news Web site.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
-------------------------------------------
Author: Frank H. Knight
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 381 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher

Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/al9gqP

The tenets Frank H. Knight sets out in this, his first book,
have become an integral part of modern economic theory. Still
readable today, it was included as a classic in the 1998 Forbes
reading list. The book grew out of Knight's 1917 Cornell
University doctoral thesis, which took second prize in an essay
contest that year sponsored by Hart, Schaffner and Marx. In it,
he examined the relationship between knowledge on the part of
entrepreneurs and changes in the economy. He, quite famously,
distinguished between two types of change, risk and uncertainty,
defining risk as randomness with knowable probabilities and
uncertainty as randomness with unknowable probabilities. Risk,
166he said, arises from repeated changes for which probabilities
can be calculated and insured against, such as the risk of fire.
Uncertainty arises from unpredictable changes in an economy,
such as resources, preferences, and knowledge, changes that
cannot be insured against. Uncertainty, he said "is one of the
fundamental facts of life."

One of the larger issues of Knight's time was how the
entrepreneur, the central figure in a free enterprise system,
earns profits in the face of competition. It was thought that
competition would reduce profits to zero across a sector because
any profits would attract more entrepreneurs into the sector and
increase supply, which would drive prices down, resulting in
competitive equilibrium and zero profit.

Knight argued that uncertainty itself may allow some
entrepreneurs to earn profits despite this equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs, he said, are forced to guess at their expected
total receipts. They cannot foresee the number of products they
will sell because of the unpredictability of consumer
preferences. Still, they must purchase product inputs, so they
base these purchases on the number of products they guess they
will sell. Finally, they have to guess the price at which their
products will sell. These factors are all uncertain and
impossible to know. Profits are earned when uncertainty yields
higher total receipts than forecasted total receipts. Thus,
Knight postulated, profits are merely due to luck. Such
entrepreneurs who "get lucky" will try to reproduce their
success, but will be unable to because their luck will
eventually turn.

At the time, some theorists were saying that when this luck runs
out, entrepreneurs will then rely on and substitute improved
decision making and management for their original
entrepreneurship, and the profits will return. Knight saw
entrepreneurs as poor managers, however, who will in time fail
against new and lucky entrepreneurs. He concluded that economic
change is a result of this constant interplay between new
entrepreneurial action and existing businesses hedging against
uncertainty by improving their internal organization.

Frank H. Knight has been called "among the most broad-ranging
and influential economists of the twentieth century" and "one of
the most eclectic economists and perhaps the deepest thinker and
scholar American economics has produced." He stands among the
giants of American economists that include Schumpeter and Viner.
His students included Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, George
Stigler and James Buchanan, as well as Paul Samuelson. At the
University of Chicago, Knight specialized in the history of
economic thought. He revolutionized the economics department
there, becoming one the leaders of what has become known as the
Chicago School of Economics. Under his tutelage and guidance,
the University of Chicago became the bulwark against the more
interventionist and anti-market approaches followed elsewhere in
American economic thought. He died in 1972.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *