TCREUR_Public/141017.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, October 17, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 206

                            Headlines

F R A N C E

THOM EUROPE: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

CIDRON GLORIA: S&P Assigns 'B' Corporate Credit Rating


G R E E C E

* Greek Banks Still Burdened By Problem Loans, Fitch Says


I T A L Y

MONTE DEI PASCHI: Investors Sell Capital Concern Amid ECB Tests


K A Z A K H S T A N

ALLIANCE BANK: Nears US$1.2 Billion Debt Restructuring Deal


N E T H E R L A N D S

DALRADIAN EUROPEAN: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'B3'
DUCHESS VI CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
FIAT CHRYSLER: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
NORTH WESTERLY: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes


R O M A N I A

RAIFFEISEN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Long-Term Deposit Ratings


R U S S I A

BANK PURPE: Russia's Central Bank Revokes License
KHABAROVSKY AIRPORT: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms B+ CCR
KREDITBANK OJSC: Central Bank Revokes License
PROBUSINESSBANK: Fitch Puts 'B' IDR on Rating Watch Negative


S P A I N

SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 3: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 3 Notes to 'CCsf'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ARROW GLOBAL: Moody's Lifts Rating on GBP220MM Sr. Bond to 'B1'
PUNCH TAVERNS: Taps Slaughters to Advise on Debt Refinancing


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS


                            *********



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F R A N C E
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THOM EUROPE: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to France-based affordable jewelry
retailer THOM Europe S.A.S. (THOM Europe).  The outlook is
stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the
EUR346.8 million senior secured notes due 2019.  The recovery
rating on these notes is '4', indicating S&P's expectation of
average (30%-50%) recovery prospects.

S&P also assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the EUR60 million
super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) due 2019.  The
recovery rating is '2', reflecting S&P's expectation of
substantial (70%-90%) recovery prospects.

The rating assignment follows THOM Europe's placement of its
EUR346.8 million bond and the syndication of its EUR60 million
RCF to refinance its debt, with terms and conditions broadly in
line with those S&P factored into its preliminary rating on the
company.  Although the five-year bond was issued with a coupon
112.5 basis points above S&P's previous expectation, representing
an increase in annual cash interest of about EUR4 million, THOM
Europe's credit metrics, including interest coverage ratios,
remain commensurate with a 'B' rating.  THOM Europe's latest
reported performance also remains in line with S&P's base-case
assumptions.

The rating continues to reflect S&P's view of THOM Europe's
business risk profile as "fair" and its financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged," according to S&P's criteria.

In October 2010, financial sponsors Bridgepoint and Apax
partnered with the THOM Europe management team to acquire French
jewelry retailer Histoire d'Or and merge it with the Marc
Orian/TresOr jewelry chain.  Since then, Bridgepoint has been
THOM Europe's majority shareholder, with a 59.1% stake, followed
by Apax holding 25.3%.  Through the combination of these two
leading players in French jewelry and watch retail, THOM Europe
benefits from a leading position in shopping center distribution
channels and covers both the generalist and everyday-low-price
segments through three banners, Histoire d'Or and Marc Orian as
generalists and TresOr offering lower-priced items.

S&P understands that management considers the integration of
Histoire d'Or and Marc Orian/TresOr as complete, and that THOM
Europe is now moving toward a consolidation and development
phase. As part of its expansion, the company has refinanced about
EUR203 million of net debt, repaid roughly EUR154 million of
convertible bonds owned by shareholders, and paid approximately
EUR14 million in transaction fees.  In addition, it used some
funding from the refinancing to acquire 31 stores -- the purchase
of which it had completed as of Sept. 1, 2014.

S&P views THOM Europe's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged," although S&P recognizes that some of its credit
ratios deviate from this assessment.  In particular, S&P believes
that some lease-adjusted ratios tend to understate THOM Europe's
leverage, given its operating-lease structure composed of lease
contracts that can be cancelled every three years.  This is the
case, for example, with the ratios of funds from operations (FFO)
to debt and debt to EBITDA.  S&P therefore complements its
analysis with other ratios, such as the EBITDAR interest coverage
ratio (a ratio that measures an issuer's lease-related
obligations by capturing actual rents instead of minimum
contractual rents), which reflects a more leveraged financial
risk profile for THOM Europe.  However, S&P acknowledges that
this ratio may not capture the company's operating flexibility to
terminate rents on a three-year basis if a particular store is
underperforming.  S&P consequently expects that THOM Europe's
Standard & Poor's adjusted debt to EBITDA will remain slightly
below 5.0x (or about 6.2x as of Sept. 30, 2014, including
adjustments, except for operating-lease obligations).  However,
its EBITDAR interest coverage -- currently at less than 2.2x --
will likely move toward 1.5x-1.6x over the next two years, which
is more commensurate with S&P's "highly leveraged" category.

Despite S&P's use of these various ratios, it mainly bases its
view of THOM Europe's financial risk as "highly leveraged" on
S&P's "FS-6" (financial sponsorship) assessment, reflecting the
company's private equity ownership.

"We view THOM Europe's business risk profile as "fair,"
incorporating its status as France's largest jewelry retailer, a
successful commercial and supply strategy, solid operating
margins and good free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation.
THOM Europe operates in a highly fragmented industry where
independent jewelry stores continue representing a substantial
69% or so of the industry.  We believe that the company has shown
good ability to secure stores in strategic and high-traffic
locations, facilitated by its early positioning in the shopping
center segment and its longstanding relationship with lessors.
We also believe that the company benefits from a merchandizing
strategy focused on own-products with relatively low fashion risk
and a compelling multiconcept retail proposition.  Supplier
concentration exists, but is partly mitigated by THOM Europe's
efficient supply chain management and bargaining power since the
company is a key client for these suppliers, placing orders
weekly," S&P said.

"At the same time, the company's business risk profile is
constrained by its modest size and scale, and its narrow
geographic diversification, with approximately 90% of revenues
generated in France.  We consider jewelry expenditures to be
particularly discretionary and easily substitutable, although we
acknowledge the company's good track record in capturing
recurring sales.  In addition, our assessment factors in THOM
Europe's narrow footprint in city centers and only nascent e-
commerce platform and some supplier concentration," S&P added.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes:

   -- 2%-4% in-store revenue growth in 2014 and 6%-9% in-store
      revenue growth thereafter, following expected improvement
      in GDP growth and consumer spending in France, combined
      with THOM Europe's historical market outperformance.  S&P
      also factors in scheduled store openings and a ramp-up
      also factors in scheduled store openings and a ramp-up
      phase of development strategy;

   -- Relatively stable gross margin over the next two years, to
      improve by 25 basis points annually thereafter;

   -- A slightly widening adjusted EBITDA margin in 2014, then
      remaining globally stable in 2015, reflecting potential
      cost overruns linked to store openings in the pipeline and
      marketing efforts, with gradual improvement of 50 to 75
      basis points thereafter;

   -- FOCF to include about EUR4 million of additional cash
      interest after the issue of the EUR346.8 million in senior
      secured bonds bearing a coupon of 7.375%; and

   -- That the company's convertible bonds are not debt in S&P's
      ratio calculations.

Based on these assumptions, S&P forecasts these credit metrics
for THOM Europe:

   -- A Standard & Poor's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio close to
      4.5x in 2014, or about 6.2x including adjustments except
      for operating-lease obligations;

   -- Adjusted FFO to debt of about 16%-17% over the next two
      years, but close to 10%-11% when offsetting the impact of
      S&P's operating-lease adjustment only; and

   -- EBITDAR interest coverage of approximately 1.5x-1.6x over
      the next two years.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's anticipation that THOM Europe's
debt-to-EBITDA ratio will remain below 5.0x on a Standard &
Poor's adjusted basis (and approximately 6.0x including
adjustments except operating-lease obligations) and that the
ratio of EBITDAR to interest and rent will be below 2.2x.
However, S&P considers that the company will gradually improve
its cash generation and steadily deleverage based on its revenue
growth and EBITDA improvement.  S&P also factors in THOM Europe's
likely ability to maintain EBITDA interest coverage and Standard
& Poor's adjusted FFO cash interest coverage of more than 3.0x
(and above 2.0x excluding our operating-lease adjustment only).

S&P could lower its rating if THOM Europe adopted a more
aggressive financial policy that weakened credit metrics.
Negative rating pressure could also arise if THOM Europe's
revenue and EBITDA generation declined, for example, because of
slower like-for-like growth and/or a deviation from planned store
openings, resulting in a deterioration of the company's cash
generation and interest coverage metrics.  Specifically, S&P
could lower its rating if interest coverage metrics dropped to
close to or below 2.0x or if FOCF weakened significantly or
turned negative because of underperforming business or a more
aggressive financial policy.

S&P could consider raising the rating if THOM Europe's EBITDAR
interest coverage were to significantly strengthen and
comfortably fall in S&P's "aggressive" category for financial
risk, and if its debt to EBITDA, based on adjusted metrics except
for operating-lease obligations, improved to S&P's "aggressive"
category.  If this ratio improvement occurred, S&P could raise
its rating if EBITDAR interest coverage substantially increased
above 2.2x, while the company maintained interest coverage
metrics above 3.0x (or above 2.0x excluding S&P's operating-lease
adjustment only).



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G E R M A N Y
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CIDRON GLORIA: S&P Assigns 'B' Corporate Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had assigned its
'B' long-term corporate credit rating to Cidron Gloria Holding
GmbH (Cidron), the holding company of Germany-based home health
care services provider GHD GesundHeits GmbH Deutschland (GHD).
The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to Cidron's
senior secured debt facilities, in line with the corporate credit
rating.  The recovery rating on these facilities is '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the
event of default.

S&P's assessment of Cidron's business risk profile reflects GHD's
relatively small size, its reliance on public funding, and its
concentration in Germany.  The group is reimbursed by statutory
health insurers (GKVs or Krankenkassen) and pharmacies through
flat-rate or unit payments for the products and services provided
to patients, as well as volume-based supplier bonuses from
manufacturers of medical devices.  S&P expects reimbursement
rates and bonus levels to remain relatively flat over the next 12
months, and that the group will experience further growth in its
lower-margin product categories such as incontinence or
parenteral nutrition.  Hence, S&P believes the group will
concentrate on operational efficiencies and improvements in its
product/supplier mix to preserve margins over the coming years,
which are currently about 10% on an adjusted basis and lower than
those of similarly rated peers.  Although GHD is the market
leader, the home care market in Germany remains highly
fragmented, with many regional and specialized players.

This is partly offset by the group's status as the only home care
provider with a national coverage and contracts with each of the
130 GKVs in Germany, as well as the group's vertically integrated
business model.  GHD is the largest wholesaler of medical devices
in Germany, and since 2012, has exclusivity agreements with large
multinationals, Nestle and Abbott, to distribute enteral
nutrition products throughout the country.  The home care sector
also benefits from favorable industry growth trends due to an
aging population and a higher prevalence of diseases, allowing
for a more cost-effective alternative to hospitalization at a
time when government budgets have been pared.  New laws on the
production standards of cytostatic solutions in Germany has also
made it more costly for pharmacies to keep such activities in
house, which S&P expects will boost volumes for Cidron's oncology
division, Profusio, given its position as a leading cytostatic
compounder in the German market.

S&P's assessment of Cidron's financial risk profile reflects its
financial sponsor-ownership by private equity firm, Nordic
Capital, and the group's highly leveraged balance sheet following
the takeover, with an adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 9x.
The new capital structure consists of a EUR310 million first-lien
loan, EUR72 million in equity, an EUR78 million shareholder loan,
and EUR139 million in payment-in kind preferred shares.  S&P
understands that the shareholder loan does not pay any cash
interest and respects the other conditions to receive equity
treatment under our criteria.  Hence, S&P excludes this from its
adjusted debt calculation. Cidron's high leverage is mitigated by
S&P's forecast of relatively strong interest coverage ratios,
with a funds from operations (FFO) cash interest coverage of
about 2.5x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Cidron will maintain
stable operating margins over the next 12 months, notwithstanding
the ongoing pressure on prices mainly due to the constraints on
Germany's public health care budget.  S&P believes that the group
will gain from its presence in growing sectors and its market-
leading position in Germany.  S&P assumes that it will maintain
FFO to cash interest coverage at about 2x and that no significant
cash outflows will take place beyond those indicated in the base-
case assumptions.

S&P could take a negative rating action if the external
environment deteriorates significantly or if Cidron experiences a
pronounced deterioration in its market position.  Both events
could result in weaker operational performance and financial
ratios.  In particular, S&P would consider a downgrade if the FFO
interest coverage falls below 1.5x.

S&P sees the possibility of a positive rating action in the next
12 months as remote due to the highly leveraged financial
structure.  A positive rating action would depend on an
improvement of the assessment of the group's business risk
profile.



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G R E E C E
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* Greek Banks Still Burdened By Problem Loans, Fitch Says
---------------------------------------------------------
Greek banks remain burdened by large problem loan portfolios,
despite boosting capital and progress with their integration and
restructuring plans, Fitch Ratings says.  This means that EU-wide
stress tests could reveal additional capital shortfalls,
especially if on-going restructuring measures are not fully
incorporated.

The four large Greek banks -- National Bank of Greece (NBG),
Piraeus, Eurobank and Alpha -- raised substantial capital through
two rounds of recapitalizations from both public and private
sources.  Capital will also benefit from recent deferred tax
asset (DTA) changes, which allow for conversions of DTAs into
actual tax credits from the state.  This follows similar actions
in other southern European countries and aligns tax treatment of
impairment provisions better with practices in northern European
banks. However, changing practice at a time when bank earnings
are weak means that the realization of tax credits is likely to
be some time away and may not be straightforward.

The large amounts of unreserved problem loans leave the four
major banks' balance sheets vulnerable to developments in an
improving but still very weak economy.  Problem loans (impaired
plus unimpaired 90 days past due) are high, at between 29.7% for
the lowest, NBG, and 45.6% for the highest, Alpha, at end-2013.
Meanwhile, reserve coverage is low, below 47% at the same date.
The property market continues to trend downwards, potentially
further depressing collateral valuations.  Further de-risking
envisaged in banks' restructuring plans, including downsizing of
foreign operations and sales of non-core domestic assets, would
support capital.

The ECB's comprehensive assessment could reveal further capital
needs for Greek banks, especially if potential benefits from on-
going restructuring measures are not fully incorporated.  Fitch's
base-case is that banks will fill any gaps privately, as was the
case in 1H14 following the Bank of Greece's stress test exercise,
rather than tapping the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, which
still has in excess of EUR11bn available.  Given the banks'
already very low ratings of 'B-', we do not anticipate any
ratings actions following the comprehensive assessment results.
But should any material capital shortfalls emerge from the asset
quality review that we believe cannot realistically be addressed
in the short term through restructuring measures, there may be
negative rating actions.

Tackling legacy problem loans remains the primary challenge for
these banks.  Banks' recovery units have been internally
enhanced, in part explaining the lower new problem loan formation
in 1H14. Credit weakening is likely to continue, but more slowly
as the economy has bottomed out and is set to slowly recover.
Fitch forecasts GDP growth of 0.5% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015.

Mortgage foreclosure bans were partially lifted early this year.
Remaining restrictions could be lifted soon as part of plans to
reinforce private debt resolution regimes.  These measures should
assist with arrears recoveries, although they may involve
forbearance and repossessions that could drive further
provisioning.

Greek banks' profit generation will remain heavily challenged by
high impairments.  Returns will remain weak, despite lower
deposit spreads and efficiency gains from the restructurings.



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I T A L Y
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MONTE DEI PASCHI: Investors Sell Capital Concern Amid ECB Tests
----------------------------------- ----------------------------
Sonia Sirletti at Bloomberg News reports that Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena SpA extended a three-day losing streak in Milan,
falling to the lowest on record amid concern it may need
additional capital as a result of the European Central Bank's
tests.

The stock dropped 25% this year, leaving the Siena, Italy-based
bank with a market value of EUR4.2 billion (US$5.4 billion).

"Monte Paschi is one of the most problematic banks at the
European level and this could emerge from upcoming stress tests
result," Bloomberg quotes Vincenzo Longo, a Milan-based
strategist at IG Markets, as saying.  "Investors are selling on
concern the bank needs to raise additional funds to fill an
eventual gap emerging from the stress test."

Monte Paschi, one of the 15 Italian lenders included in the ECB's
region-wide review of bank balance sheets, raised EUR5 billion
from investors in June, to partially reimburse state aid and to
strengthen finances, Bloomberg relates.

Chief Executive Officer Fabrizio Viola is trying to turn the bank
around as it posted a ninth consecutive quarterly loss in June by
curbing risk and cutting costs, Bloomberg discloses.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 18,
2013, Fitch downgraded MPS's Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc' from
'b' and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

TCR-Europe also reported on June 19, 2013, that Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its long-term counterparty credit rating
on Italy-based Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'B'
from 'BB', and affirmed the 'B' short-term rating.  S&P also
lowered its rating on MPS' Lower Tier 2 subordinated notes to
'CCC-' from 'CCC+'.  S&P affirmed the ratings on MPS' junior
subordinated debt at 'CCC-' and on its preferred stock at 'C'. At
the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where it
placed them with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2012.



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K A Z A K H S T A N
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ALLIANCE BANK: Nears US$1.2 Billion Debt Restructuring Deal
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sujata Rao at Reuters reports that Timur Issatay, chief executive
of Alliance Bank, on Oct. 15 said the bank is close to completing
a US$1.2 billion debt restructuring and a merger with Temir Bank
and ForteBank.

Mr. Issatayev, who has been meeting creditors in London and
New York, told Reuters he was confident of getting the go-ahead
at creditor and shareholder meetings due in coming weeks, Reuters
relates.

The proposals, put forward in August, are seen halving the
nominal value of existing bond holdings to US$300 million,
Reuters notes.

"The meetings went very well, I believe we received the full
green light for restructuring . . . we are confident this will be
approved," Reuters quotes Mr. Issatayev as saying, estimating the
recovery rate for all classes of creditors at 55.1%.

Creditors and shareholders must now hold meetings and vote on the
restructuring proposals as well as on the merger, Reuters
discloses.

Mr. Issatayev said the bank is currently 51%-owned by wealth fund
Samruk-Kazyna but following the merger, Samruk's stake in the
unified bank will fall to less than 1%, Reuters relays.

He said the merger is expected to be complete by year-end in
terms of legal formalities to create a new unified bank, Reuters
notes.

Alliance Bank JSC -- http://www.alb.kz-- provides commercial
banking services for retail and corporate customers, and small
and medium sized enterprises in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The
company operates through Retail Banking, Corporate Banking, and
Financial Institutions segments. It accepts deposits; grants
loans and guarantees; exchanges foreign currencies; deals with
securities; and transfers cash payments, as well as provides
corporate finance and other banking services. The company was
founded in 1993 and is headquartered in Almaty, the Republic of
Kazakhstan. Alliance Bank JSC is a subsidiary of Sovereign Wealth
Fund Samruk Kazyna.



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N E T H E R L A N D S
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DALRADIAN EUROPEAN: Moody's Hikes Rating on Class E Notes to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by Dalradian European CLO
IV B.V.:

EUR32M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2013 Upgraded to Aa1
(sf)

EUR24M Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2013 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

EUR15M Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2013 Upgraded to Caa2
(sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes:

EUR164M (current outstanding balance of EUR4.1M) Class A Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Dec 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR100M (current outstanding balance of EUR48.3M) Senior Secured
Floating Rate Variable Funding Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Dec 5, 2013 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR25M Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Dec 5, 2013 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Dalradian European CLO IV B.V., issued in August 2007, is a multi
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly senior secured European leveraged loans. The
portfolio is managed by Rothschild (NM) & Sons Limited. This
transaction has ended the reinvestment period in August 2013.

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades of the notes are primarily a result of the
deleveraging since the last rating action in December 2013 which
was based on the September 2013 trustee report. Since September
2013, class A has paid down EUR117.5 million (72% of initial
balance) and the Variable Funding Notes have paid down EUR18.2
million (18.2% of initial balance) resulting in significant
increases in over-collateralization levels. As of the August 2014
trustee report, class B, class C, class D and class E observed an
over-collateralization levels of 190.70%, 147.55%, 119.41% and
107.15% respectively compared with 134.64%, 120.95%, 109.37% and
103.42% in September 2013.

The reported weighted average rating factor ("WARF") has remained
stable at 2839 compared to 2754 in September 2013 whilst the
diversity score has decreased from 33 to 23 during the same
period.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
EUR pool with performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR150.9 million, a defaulted par of EUR7.4 million, a weighted
average default probability of 18.1% (consistent with a WARF of
2526 over a weighted average life of 4.66 years), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.06% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 22 and a weighted average
spread of 3.70%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 92% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%. In
each case, historical and market performance and a collateral
manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors.
Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics
of the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis,
subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were within two notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Around 12% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.

3) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


DUCHESS VI CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ba2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Duchess VI CLO B.V.:

  EUR35M Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
  Jan 13, 2014 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR25M Class C Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
  Jan 13, 2014 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  EUR32.5M Class D Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
  Jan 13, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR15M (current outstanding balance: EUR11.8M) Class E Notes,
  Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2014 Affirmed
  B1 (sf)

Moody's has affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  EUR215M (current outstanding balance: EUR142.2M) Class A-1
  Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13, 2014 Affirmed
  Aaa (sf)

  EUR125M (current outstanding balance: EUR41.7M) Revolving
  Credit Facility Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jan 13,
  2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Duchess VI CLO B.V., issued in August 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by Babson
Capital Europe Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in August 2013.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result the improvement in credit metrics of the underlying
portfolio and the deleveraging since last rating action in
January 2014.

The credit quality has improved as reflected in the improvement
in the average credit rating of the portfolio (measured by the
weighted average rating factor, or WARF) and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers with ratings of Caa1 or
lower. As of the trustee's August 2014 report, the WARF was 2586,
compared with 2453 in November 2013. Securities with ratings of
Caa1 or lower currently make up approximately 7.0% of the
underlying portfolio, versus 10.4% in November 2013.

The Class A-1 notes and the revolving credit facility have paid
down by approximately EUR51.0 million (23.7% of closing balance)
and GBP39.1 million, respectively, in the last 3 payment dates.
In addition, over the same period the class E notes have paid
down approximately EUR2.6 million (17.4% of closing balance) from
remaining excess spread at the end of the waterfall . As a result
of the deleveraging, over-collateralization (OC) ratios have
increased. As of the trustee's August 2014 report, the senior
notes has an over-collateralization ratio of 181.8% compared with
144.9% in November 2013, the Class B an over-collateralization
ratio of 152.7% compared with 129.4%, the Class C an over-
collateralization ratio of 137.1% compared with 120.2%, the Class
D an over-collateralization ratio of 120.9% compared with 110.1%,
and the Class E an over-collateralization ratio of 116.0%
compared with 106.1%.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR251.8 million and GBP40.8 million, and
principal proceeds balance of EUR13.6 million and GBP4.2 million,
a weighted average default probability of 22.4% over a 4.6 year
weighted average life (consistent with a 10 year WARF of 3041), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.3% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 32 and a weighted
average spread of 4.28%. The GBP-denominated liabilities are
naturally hedged by the GBP assets.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 78.0% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were within two notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy and 2) the exposure to lowly-rated debt maturing
between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for issuers to
refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted either
positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment strategy
and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties because of
embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

   * Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

   * Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

   * Foreign currency exposure: The deal has a significant
exposures to non-EUR denominated assets. Volatility in foreign
exchange rates will have a direct impact on interest and
principal proceeds available to the transaction, which can affect
the expected loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


FIAT CHRYSLER: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B1 corporate family
rating (CFR), a B1-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR) as well
as a (P)B2 senior unsecured and a (P)Not Prime ((P)NP) short-term
ratings to the EUR15 billion global medium term notes program to
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (FCA). The (P)B2/(P)NP ratings
assigned to the EUR15 billion global medium term notes program
and the B2 senior unsecured ratings of FCA's subsidiaries Fiat
Finance & Trade Ltd., Fiat Finance North America Inc. and Fiat
Finance Canada Ltd. and previously guaranteed by Fiat S.p.A. are
unchanged on the basis that FCA has assumed the guarantees
granted by Fiat S.p.A.. The outlook for all ratings is stable.

Concurrently, Moody's has withdrawn the B1 CFR, B1-PD PDR, (P)B2
senior unsecured and (P)NP ratings of Fiat S.p.A for reasons of
reorganization.

Following the merger of Fiat S.p.A. with, and into FCA, which
became effective on 12 October 2014, FCA has become the holding
company of the Fiat Group. FCA has succeeded to and assumed all
of the rights and obligations as well as the assets and
liabilities and other legal relationships of Fiat S.p.A under
universal title of succession. As the absorbed company, Fiat
S.p.A has ceased to exist as a standalone company.

Ratings Rationale

FCA's B1 rating is constrained by (1) FCA's weak credit metrics
(excluding Chrysler) with limited improvement expected in 2014;
(2) FCA's (excluding Chrysler) high reliance on the European
passenger car market, particularly in Italy, which represents
approximately half of FCA's European car registrations; (3)
difficult pricing environment in Europe; (4) eroding
profitability in Latin America (mainly Brazil), driven by
declining demand, intense competition, increasing capacities,
price pressure and adverse exchange rates effects against the
euro; (5) FCA's significant overcapacities in Italy, which is
likely to take time to be resolved as the group is planning to
utilize its EMEA production base to develop its global brands
(Alfa Romeo, Maserati, Jeep and the Fiat 500 "family"); (6)
limited number of high volume model launches in the next 12
months may weigh on FCA's competitive position in Europe; and (7)
some remaining constraints on the group's access to the cash and
cash flows of Chrysler and Moody's expectation that this
situation is unlikely to change in the short term (this is one of
the main reasons why Moody's is currently maintaining separate
corporate family ratings for FCA and Chrysler).

However, more positively FCA's rating also takes into account (1)
the inclusion of Chrysler, which has helped to improve FCA's
previously limited geographic diversification, and creates
potential for cost savings from increasing operational
integration; (2) a strong and growing profit contribution from
Fiat's Luxury and Performance division (namely Maserati and
Ferrari), which is driven by a widening product offering; (3) its
leading market position in Brazil (with an approximate market
share of 20.9% in Q2-2014), which has been the group's major
source of profit and cash flow in recent years; and (4) a
dominant market presence in Italy, with a passenger car market
share of approximately 28%. However, ongoing sovereign austerity
programs and weak growth of the Italian economy is likely to
constrain demand in the group's key market, absent any industry-
specific incentive plan.

Rationale for the Stable Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that (1) FCA
(excluding Chrysler) would be able to limit negative operating
free cash flow to below EUR1.5 billion in 2014; (2) FCA's losses
in Europe, the Middle East and Africa from its mass market brands
can be further reduced in the current year towards breakeven
levels anticipated to be achieved mid-decade; (3) Maserati's
model expansion program will further increase profits from the
Luxury and Performance division; and (4) consolidated negative
free cash flow will be limited to around EUR1.0 billion.

Furthermore, the stable outlook anticipates erosion in
profitability in FCA's Latin American operations can be offset by
improving performance from other regions and in its Luxury and
Performance division. A weakening performance at Chrysler could
also put pressure on FCA's ratings.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure on FCA's rating could result from FCA (excluding
Chrysler) achieving positive free cash flow exceeding EUR1.0
billion to reduce debt and, on a consolidated basis, generating
significantly more than EUR4.0 billion in EBIT (excluding unusual
items) in 2014, with visibility of further improvements in 2015
and beyond.

Negative pressure would develop on FCA's ratings if the group
fails to limit its standalone negative net industrial free cash
flow to EUR1.5 billion in 2014, with no indication of a material
improvement in 2015. The rating could also come under downward
pressure if (1) FCA was to lose significant market share in
Europe; and/or (2) the group's earnings and cash flow
contribution from its Brazilian operations, a major source of
cash flow, were to decline to the extent that it cannot be offset
by anticipated improvements in its other regions and its Luxury
and Performance division. Negative pressure could also develop if
the Chrysler product renewal program was to stall, as evidenced
by the group's inability to generate EBIT (excluding unusual
items) of around EUR3.0 billion on a consolidated basis.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Automobile Manufacturer Industry published in June 2011. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. has its corporate seat in
Amsterdam, the Netherlands, with principal executive office in
the United Kingdom. FCA owns 100% of Chrysler Group LLC (B1
stable) and is one of the largest automotive manufacturers by
unit sales. FCA common shares are listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and on the Mercato Telematico Azionario (MTA) in Italy.


NORTH WESTERLY: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings of the following notes issued by North Westerly CLO II
B.V:

EUR5.4M (current outstanding balance of EUR4.25M) Class B-1
Deferrable Interest Fixed Rate Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on Feb 24, 2014 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

EUR31.3M (current outstanding balance of EUR24.65M) Class B-2
Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on Feb 24, 2014 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

EUR14.1M Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
2019, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Feb 24, 2014
Downgraded to B1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by North Westerly CLO II B.V.:

EUR7.68M (current outstanding balance of EUR6.16M) Class D-1
Deferrable Interest Fixed Rate Notes due 2019, Affirmed Caa3
(sf); previously on Feb 24, 2014 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

EUR13.02M (current outstanding balance of EUR10.45M) Class D-2
Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2019, Affirmed Caa3
(sf); previously on Feb 24, 2014 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

The rating of the class A note has been withdrawn due to full
redemption.

North Westerly CLO II B.V., issued in September 2004, is a
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by
NIBC Bank N.V. The reinvestment period of this transaction ended
in Sep 2010.

Ratings Rationale

The upgrades of the notes is primarily a result of substantial
deleveraging (EUR121 million paid down from a total balance of
EUR227 million) since the last rating action in Feb 2014 which
was based on the December 2013 trustee report. Since December
2013, class A has paid down EUR113.5 million (100% of balance)
and class B has paid down EUR7.8 million (21.3% of initial
balance) resulting in significant increases in over-
collateralization levels. A large proportion of this deleveraging
occurred during the recent payment in September 2014 where the
class B OC level increased by approximately 68% in a single
month. As of the August 2014 trustee report, class A, class B,
class C, and class D observed an over-collateralization levels of
272.59%, 139.52%, 117.48% and 99.05% respectively compared with
161.60%, 122.11%, 111.63% and 100.77% in December 2013. (The
August 2014 reported OC levels do not capture the recent
September 2014 payments).

The reported weighted average rating factor ("WARF") has
increased from 3066 to 3498 since December 2013 whilst diversity
score has decreased from 21 to 9 during the same period.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
EUR pool with performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR60.2 million, a defaulted par of EUR18.3 million, a weighted
average default probability of 29.0% (consistent with a WARF of
5304 over a weighted average life of 2.5 years), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.3% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 10 and a weighted average
spread of 4.21%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 92% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%. In
each case, historical and market performance and a collateral
manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors.
Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics
of the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis,
subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were within one notch of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Around 70.8% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates.

3) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


RAIFFEISEN BANK: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Long-Term Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Raiffeisen Bank SA's Ba1
long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings, Ba1 local-
currency senior unsecured debt rating and Not Prime short-term
ratings. The outlook on the bank's long-term deposit and debt
ratings was changed to negative from stable. Raiffeisen Bank SA's
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of D-,
equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of ba3, is
unaffected by this rating action.

Ratings Rationale

This rating action was prompted by Moody's rating action on
Raiffeisen Bank SA's parent, Raiffeisen Bank International AG
(RBI; A3 negative, D+ negative /ba1) on 10 October 2014 whereby
the rating agency affirmed RBI's ratings and changed the outlook
to negative from stable on its standalone D+ bank financial
strength rating (BFSR), corresponding to a baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ba1.

Moody's implies a high probability of parental support in
Raiffeisen Bank SA's Ba1 deposit and debt ratings. Consequently,
these ratings receive two-notches of uplift from the bank's BCA
of ba3. A potential downgrade of RBI's BFSR would signal the
parent's weaker capacity to support its subsidiary and will
increase downward pressure on Raiffeisen Bank SA's deposit
ratings.

Moody's also implies a moderate expectation of systemic support
to the bank owing to Raiffeisen Bank SA's significant role in the
Romanian banking system. However, currently systemic support does
not result into a notching uplift for deposit and debt ratings.
The bank's share in the total loans and deposits amounted to 7.1%
and 8.4%, respectively, at year-end 2013, according to Raiffeisen
Bank SA's financial reports and the data from the National Bank
of Romania. However, the recent adoption of the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM) regulation in the EU may result in Moody's lowering the
systemic support probabilities it inputs into banks' ratings. In
particular, this reflects that, with the legislation underlying
the new resolution framework now in place and the explicit
inclusion of burden-sharing with unsecured creditors as a means
of reducing the public cost of bank resolutions, the balance of
risk for banks' senior unsecured creditors has shifted to the
downside. Although Moody's support assumptions are unchanged for
now, the probability has risen that they will be revised
downwards to reflect the new framework.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/ Down

Given the negative outlook, there is limited upwards pressure on
Raiffeisen Bank SA's deposit and debt ratings. A reversal of
outlook back to stable on RBI's BFSR would likely result in
stabilizing Raiffeisen Bank SA's ratings' outlook. A material
improvement in the operating environment leading to stronger
asset quality and capital adequacy could have positive effect on
Raiffeisen Bank SA's BFSR.

A downgrade of RBI's BFSR and a reduction in the rating agency's
systemic support assumptions could prompt a downgrade of
Raiffeisen Bank SA's deposit and debt ratings. The bank's BFSR
may experience downward pressure as a result of a substantial
deterioration in its asset quality and profitability.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.

Headquartered in Bucharest, Romania Raiffeisen Bank SA had total
assets of US$8.3 billion as of year-end 2013.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK PURPE: Russia's Central Bank Revokes License
-------------------------------------------------
Itar-Tass reports that Russia's Central Bank revoked on Oct. 16
the license of the Bank Purpe, a Urals regional loan organization
located in the city of Nizhnevartovsk, due to violations in
financial documentation.

According to Itar-Tass, in 2014, at least 63 banking structures
have been deprived of the right to provide financial services,
thus reducing the amount to 868.  In 2013, the licenses were
revoked from 32 banks, Itar-Tass discloses.

Bank Purpe was Russia's 640th largest by assets as of October 1,
2014.


KHABAROVSKY AIRPORT: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms B+ CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on OAO
Khabarovsky Airport to negative from stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B+' long-term corporate
credit rating on the company.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that Khabarovsky
Airport's credit ratios are likely to come under pressure in the
next 12 months, if the company decides to fully implement its
ambitious capital expenditure (capex) plan in the current weaker
operating environment.  The plan would see Khabarovsky Airport
spending nearly Russian ruble (RUB) 1.9 billion (EUR37 million)
in 2015.  In S&P's view, if the company finances this with new
debt, it could lead to a decline in the Standard & Poor's-
adjusted ratio of funds from operations (FFO) to debt to below
12%, which is commensurate with a lower long-term corporate
credit rating of 'B'.

Passenger growth at Khabarovsky Airport has been significantly
weaker in 2014, especially in recent months, compared with 2013.
Some major Russian carriers have shifted aircraft capacity from
the Far East Federal District to other domestic routes.
Moreover, one of Khabarovsky Airport's key airlines, Aurora, has
experienced issues with aircraft deliveries this year, which has
contributed to smaller passenger numbers.  S&P now expects full-
year growth figures to underperform both management's and our
earlier forecast.

In addition, on Oct. 8, 2014, Standard & Poor's published "Risks
Mount For A Longer Downturn In Russia," in which S&P presented
new, lower macroeconomic projections for Russia.  S&P now expects
to see a contraction in GDP in the second half of 2014, leading
to an average growth rate of about 0.3% for the full year and
growth of 1.1% in 2015.  Previously, S&P expected growth of 1.7%
in 2015. S&P also expects consumer prices index (CPI) growth of
7.5% in 2014 and 6.5% in 2015.  S&P has, therefore, revised its
forecast of passenger volume growth at the airport to 0%-3% per
year in 2014-2016.  S&P's base case also assumes an EBITDA margin
of 20%-23% in 2014-2016, reflecting higher costs related to
necessary preparatory works before the investment plan fully
kicks off.

S&P continues to view Khabarovsky Airport' business risk profile
as "fair," reflecting its high exposure to domestic traffic,
which accounts for more than 80% of total passenger volumes.
Khabarovsky Airport is located in Khabarovsk Krai, in the Far
East Federal District in Russia.  The company has a relatively
small catchment area, in S&P's view, with only 6.2 million
inhabitants in the whole of the Far East Federal District, and a
population of only about 1.3 million in Khabarovsk Krai.
Khabarovsky Airport is almost wholly exposed to Russian airlines,
which in S&P's view have relatively weak credit quality.

These weaknesses are partially offset by Khabarovsky Airport's
strong position in its market as the hub airport for the region.
In our view, Khabarovsky Airport has a good geographic location
and, as it is one of the largest cities in the Far East Federal
District, it is a good transfer point for passengers and freight.
In addition, air travel is crucial in the Far East Federal
District, because, in S&P's opinion, there are limited
alternative transport options.  This is due to the vast size of
the region, combined with relatively weak road infrastructure,
the distance of commercial hubs in western Russia, and a lack of
high-speed rail services.

Khabarovsky Airport's financial risk profile remains in the
"aggressive" category reflecting the company's expansion plans
over the next two years, which, if financed with debt will in
S&P's view weaken the company's financial ratios.  In S&P's base-
case scenario it expects FFO to debt to remain in the range 20%-
30% in 2014, but consider it possible that it will drop below 12%
in 2015 once the monies on the capex are spent, if passenger
volumes do not increase and if the company cannot recoup lost
aeronautical revenues through higher tariffs.  S&P understands
that Khabarovsky Airport has asked for a significant increase in
aviation tariffs for 2015-2016.

S&P's rating on Khabarovsky Airport also incorporates its
negative financial policy modifier, which reflects S&P's view of
the risk associated with the potential extension of further loans
to the company's shareholders, which in S&P's opinion could lead
to financial ratios weakening beyond S&P's base-case assumptions.

The negative outlook on Khabarovsky Airport reflects S&P's view
that the company's large capex plans, the weakening economic
conditions in Russia, and national airlines shifting capacity to
other domestic destinations could lead to a material decline in
financial ratios over the next 12 months.  S&P estimates that FFO
to debt could decline to below 12% in 2015.  S&P also notes a
slowdown in the airport's operating performance, in terms of
declining passenger growth and lower operating income in the
first nine months of 2014.

S&P could take a negative rating action if Khabarovsky Airport's
adjusted FFO to debt declines to less than 12%, or if S&P assess
its liquidity as "less than adequate."  S&P believes the ratio
could dip below 12% in 2015 if the company decides to finance the
majority of its investment plan with new debt, and if passenger
volumes remain weak and are not compensated for with tariff
increases.

S&P could also consider a downgrade if it revises its liquidity
assessment to "less than adequate" and if the company is unable
to fund planned capex with new bank facilities ahead of time.  A
negative rating action could also occur if the company extends
further material loans to its shareholders or if its corporate
governance weakens.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it believes that
Khabarovsky Airport can sustain adjusted weighted-average FFO to
debt of more than 12% throughout the capex program.  This could
be the case if the company funds a material proportion of its
capex via equity, or if it is able to grow revenues by about 10%
in 2015 through a mix of tariff increases and growing passenger
volumes, all else being equal.

S&P could also revise the outlook to stable if it felt that the
negative financial policy modifier was no longer applicable.
This could occur if, in S&P's view, the company makes a
significant improvement in its corporate governance, provides
clarity on its ultimate ownership structure, and establishes a
track record of not lending any further monies to its
shareholders.


KREDITBANK OJSC: Central Bank Revokes License
---------------------------------------------
By its Order No. OD-2871, dated October 16, 2014, the Bank of
Russia revoked the banking license from the Elista-based credit
institution OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY KALMYK COMMERCIAL BANK
KREDITBANK or OJSC KCB KREDITBANK (Registration No. 1035) from
October 16, 2014.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within a year of the
requirements of Articles 6 and 7 (except for Clause 3 of Article
7) of the Federal Law 'On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism' and the application of supervisory measures envisaged
by the Federal Law 'On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation
(Bank of Russia)'.

OJSC KCB KREDITBANK did not comply with the requirements of the
legislation on anti-money laundering and the financing of
terrorism in terms of identification and timely notification of
the authorized body about operations subject to obligatory
control.  The rules of internal controls of the credit
institution in the field of anti-money laundering and the
financing of terrorism did not comply with Bank of Russia
requirements.  The bank estimated inadequately the assumed risks.
Besides, the credit institution was involved in dubious
operations connected with overseas money transfer in significant
amounts.  The management and owners of the bank did not take
measures to normalize its activities.

By its Order No. OD-2872, dated October 16, 2014, the Bank of
Russia has appointed a provisional administration to OJSC KCB
KREDITBANK for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law 'On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy) of
Credit Institutions' or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the
Federal Law 'On Banks and Banking Activities'. In accordance with
federal laws, the powers of the credit institution's executive
bodies are suspended.

OJSC KCB KREDITBANK is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of banking license is an insured event envisaged
by Federal Law No. 177-FZ 'On Insurance of Household Deposits
with Russian Banks' regarding the bank's liabilities on household
deposits determined in accordance with the legislation.

According to the financial statements, as of October 1, 2014,
OJSC KCB KREDITBANK ranked 681st by assets in the Russian banking
system.


PROBUSINESSBANK: Fitch Puts 'B' IDR on Rating Watch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Russian-based Probusinessbank's (PBB)
ratings, including its 'B' Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR),
on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The RWN primarily reflects Fitch's concerns about the liquidity
of the bank's securities book, given that it is virtually all
held outside of Russia and has largely not been traded or
refinanced over an extended period of time.  The RWN also
reflects uncertainty concerning the recent review of the bank by
the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and the potential impact of the
recent license withdrawal from a sister bank.

PBB's consolidated securities book increased to RUB47 billion
(27% of group assets) at end-1H14 from RUB42bn (25%) at end-2013
and RUB27 billion (15%) at end-2012.  The portfolio is virtually
all held on PBB's balance sheet (comprising 48% of standalone
assets at end-8M14), and Russian government bonds make up the
bulk of the book.

Unlike most banks in the sector, PBB (i) pledges only a small
amount of its securities (about RUB3bn on average) to obtain repo
funding from CBR; (ii) holds a portfolio with relatively long
duration of around three to four years, compared with peers'
typical 1-1.5 years; and (iii) holds a large majority of the
portfolio (RUB42bn) in two Cyprus-based custodians which are
subsidiaries of Russian privately-owned brokers, in contrast to
most Russian banks, which keep their government bonds in the
National Settlement Depositary (NSD, a subsidiary of the Moscow
Stock Exchange) in order to be able to obtain CBR repo funding.
In Fitch's view, the economic rationale for holding such a large
unrepoed securities book is somewhat unclear.  The agency
therefore believes it is necessary to further investigate the
nature of these holdings and any potential impact it might have
on its assessment of the bank's liquidity, asset quality and
solvency.

In September, the CBR withdrew the license of Bank24.ru, a sister
bank of PBB (reportedly for non-compliance with anti-money
laundering regulations), only a few months after it was
deconsolidated by PBB.  According to management, PBB and other
group banks were reviewed by the CBR in August, and the results
of that review should be available soon.

PBB's 'B' Long-term IDR and 'b' Viability Rating reflect the
bank's solid reported pre-impairment profitability and liquidity.
However, the ratings also consider the bank's moderate
capitalization, increased credit losses in the bank's retail loan
portfolio and contingent risks relating to the acquisition in
1Q14 by the bank's shareholders of a smaller, failed Russian
bank, Solidarnost.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

To resolve the RWN, Fitch will seek further clarification on the
nature of the bank's securities holdings and consider the impact
of this on the bank's liquidity, asset quality and solvency.  The
agency will also assess the results of the CBR review.

The ratings may be downgraded (potentially by more than one
notch) if Fitch believes the securities book is not readily
available to the bank as a potential source of liquidity, or if
other significant risks arise as a result of the CBR review.
However, the ratings may be affirmed if concerns relating to the
securities book are alleviated and the CBR review does not
identify any new, material issues.

The rating actions are:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: B; placed on RWN
Long-term local currency IDR: B; placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: 'B'; placed on RWN
Viability Rating: 'b' placed on RWN'
Support Rating: 5 unaffected
Support Rating Floor: No Floor; unaffected
National Long-term rating: 'BBB(rus)'; placed on RWN
Senior unsecured Long-term Rating: 'B-'/RR4; placed on RWN
Senior unsecured Short-term Rating: 'B'; placed on RWN
Senior unsecured National Rating: 'BBB(rus)'; placed on RWN



=========
S P A I N
=========


SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO 3: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 3 Notes to 'CCsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three tranches of FTA, Santander
Hipotecario 3, a Spanish RMBS originated by Banco Santander (A-
/Stable/F2), as follows:

Class A1 (ISIN ES0338093000) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
Recovery Estimate 90%
Class A2 (ISIN ES0338093018) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
Recovery Estimate 90%
Class A3 (ISIN ES0338093026) downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
Recovery Estimate 90%
Class B (ISIN ES0338093034) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate
0%
Class C (ISIN ES0338093042) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate
0%
Class D (ISIN ES0338093059) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate
0%
Class E (ISIN ES0338093067) affirmed at 'CCsf'; Recovery Estimate
0%
Class F (ISIN ES0338093075) affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate
0%

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weak Asset Performance

Over the last 12 months the pipeline of defaulted mortgages,
defined as loans with at least 18 monthly payments overdue, has
increased to 7.1% of the initial pool from 6.5%.  Meanwhile, late
stage arrears (loans with at least three unpaid installments)
have decreased to 1.4% of the current pool as a result of loans
in advanced arrears status rolling through default.  Fitch
believes that the weak asset performance is mainly due to the
aggressive origination standards applied to the underlying
portfolio and will continue.

Limited Recoveries

Fitch notes that Santander has sold repossessed properties at
around 60% discount from the original price, reflected in the low
recoveries to date.  In its analysis, the agency has adjusted its
market value decline assumptions to capture this effect.

Given the high discounts applied and illiquidity of the housing
market, the agency expects that the income from the enforcement
activity will remain limited.

Increasing Principal Deficiencies

The combination of high defaults, low recovery income and
insufficient excess spread has caused the pipeline of un-
provisioned loans (PDL) to reach EUR195.7m (13.1% of the current
note balance).

Given the pronounced defaults and limited recovery expectation,
the agency believes that future cash flows will not be sufficient
to clear the outstanding PDL.  As a result, the probability of
default for the senior notes is deemed possible, as reflected in
the downgrade to 'CCCsf'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Recovery income below Fitch's stressed assumptions would imply
negative rating actions.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ARROW GLOBAL: Moody's Lifts Rating on GBP220MM Sr. Bond to 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Arrow Global Finance plc's
GBP220 million senior secured bond to B1 from B2. Moody's has
also upgraded the Corporate Family Rating of Arrow Global Group
plc and its subsidiaries (Arrow) to B1 from B2. The outlook is
stable.

Moody's says that the upgrade reflects its view that the
company's financial fundamentals have substantially improved over
the past 18 months. Moody's believes that Arrow's financials are
sufficiently robust at the B1 rating level to withstand some
deterioration. Such a deterioration of Arrow's financial metrics
could come from the proposed acquisition of Capquest (not rated),
a UK consumer debt purchaser and outsourced collection provider,
for a total consideration of GBP158 million. The transaction was
announced on 24 September and it is expected to receive final
approval by end 2014.

Ratings Rationale

The key drivers of the rating action are Arrow's substantial
strengthening of leverage metrics following the company's listing
on the London Stock Exchange in October 2013 and improved
profitability on the back of higher collections. Additional
elements supporting the rating upgrade were the implementation of
more sophisticated risk management framework and improvement in
corporate governance.

Moody's note that Arrow materially strengthened its credit
fundamentals over the past 18 months owing to the GBP50 million
gross proceed raised through the listing and increase in reported
core cash collections. Leverage, calculated as gross debt on
adjusted EBITDA, went down to 2.8x at end-1H2014 from 3.5x of
end-2012, while capital, measured as tangible common equity (TCE)
on total managed assets (TMA), increased to 29.3% from 3.9%
respectively. Reported cash collections went up to GBP127.8
million at end-2013 from GBP88.7 million of the previous year,
benefitting the reported adjusted EBITDA, which increased to
GBP89.6 million versus GBP61.9 million of 2012. The same trend
was visible also in the first six months of 2014, with reported
core cash collections and adjusted EBITDA at GBP69.3 million and
GBP48 million respectively.

Moreover the agency positively views the introduction of a three
lines of defense and enterprise-wide risk management framework
and the fact that the majority of the 8-strong board of directors
is now composed by independent members. In Moody's opinion, these
elements should improve Arrow's risk positioning.

While the upgrade was not driven by the announced transaction, in
Moody's view this is credit positive because: (1) it strengthens
the firm's franchise at a time when the sector is consolidating;
(2) it represents a partial shift in the company's strategy.
Arrow was the only large rated debt purchaser to outsource its
collections and Moody's considered this aspect of the business
model a source of risk, as it exposed the firm to additional
legal and operational risks. Owing to the acquisition of Capquest
and the intention to move about 40% of its own collections in-
house, Arrow can now mitigate these risks; and (3) it materially
improves Arrow's data management and analytics capabilities as
the company is expected to benefit from Capquest's data platform,
which has been substantially enhanced over the past year. In
Moody's opinion the integration and operational risks arising
from the transaction should be manageable, however execution risk
will remain through the next few quarters after which the merger
process will be sufficiently progressed and synergies should have
begun to materialize.

From what the Agency understood, the acquisition of Capquest will
weaken Arrow's leverage ratios as it will be primarily funded
through the issuance of GBP225 million new debt. According to
Moody's calculation, the pro-forma gross debt on adjusted EBITDA
will go up to 3.5x from the 2.8x of end-1H2014, while the pro-
forma TCE on TMA will go down to 17.6% from 29.3%.

Notwithstanding this deterioration, the highlighted ratios remain
consistent with a B1 rating and in line with rated peers. It is
understood that Capquest's employees will be retained and the
current CEO will remain as part of Arrow's senior management. The
agency expects a gradual improvement in the financial metrics
already from 2015, once the synergies and Capquest's contribution
to the group EBITDA start to materialize.

Rationale For Stable Outlook

The outlook is stable reflecting the favorable market conditions,
improving operating environment and the anticipation that Arrow
will perform according to the expectations incorporated in the
rating. A slight short-term deterioration in post-acquisition
leverage metrics remains compatible with the B1 rating. The
Stable outlook does not incorporate any exceptional growth.

What Could Move The Rating Up

Considering the recent upgrade, Arrow will be challenged to
obtain a higher Corporate Family Rating. Upward rating pressure
could arise from sustainable improvements in: (1) profitability
ratios, with the adjusted EBITDA over interest expenses above 5x;
(2) leverage metrics, with gross debt on adjusted EBITDA below
2.5x.

What Could Move The Ratings Down

A worsening of leverage metrics or a decline in profitability
would be factors for determining whether a downward adjustment in
the rating is appropriate. More generally, a perceived increase
in the operational and integration risks coming from the
acquisition of Capquest along with failure to achieve targeted
synergies could lead to downward pressure on Arrow's Corporate
Family Rating.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Company Global Rating Methodology published in March 2012.


PUNCH TAVERNS: Taps Slaughters to Advise on Debt Refinancing
------------------------------------------------------------
Pui-Guan Man at LegalWeek reports that Slaughter and May,
Clifford Chance (CC), and Hogan Lovells have won advisory roles
on pubs giant Punch Taverns' GBP2.3 billion debt refinancing.

Punch Tavers, which began talks on its restructuring nearly two
years ago, received the approval needed for its restructuring
proposals from the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds Bank
last week, LegalWeek relates.

The deal, which has reduced net debt by GBP600 million to GBP1.5
billion, included a debt-for-equity swap that has given
bondholders 85% of the company's equity, LegalWeek discloses.

Slaughters corporate partner David Johnson, who is also the
client relationship partner, led the team advising Punch Taverns
on the deal alongside financing partner Guy O'Keefe,
restructuring partner Ian Johnson and financing partner Ed Fife,
LegalWeek notes.

City-based Cravath Swaine & Moore corporate partner Philip
Boeckman represented Punch on US matters, LegalWeek states.

CC represented RBS, with a team comprising partner John
MacLennan, who advised on restructuring aspects, and structured
finance partner Jessica Littlewood, who provided counsel on
securitization, LegalWeek relays.

Lloyds turned to Hogan Lovells London restructuring and
insolvency partner Stephen Foster for advice, LegalWeek says.

Punch has been involved in protracted negotiations with senior
lenders, represented by an Association of British Insurers (ABI)
committee, on the proposals, LegalWeek discloses.

Latham & Watkins London structured finance partner Mark
Nicolaides advised the ABI committee, according to LegalWeek.
Meanwhile Linklaters capital markets partner Mark Nuttall advised
junior creditors on securitization, LegalWeek states.

Punch Taverns plc is a United Kingdom-based pub company.  The
Company is engaged in the operation of public houses under either
the leased model or as directly managed by the Company.  The
Company operates in two business segments: punch partnerships, a
leased estate and punch pub company, a managed estate.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS
----------------------------------------
Title: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: Bankruptcy and
Consumer Credit in America
Authors: Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Westbrook
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 Pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by: Susan Pannell
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/29BBVw

So you think you know the profile of the average consumer debtor:
either a deadbeat slouched on a sagging sofa with a three-day
growth on his chin or a crafty lower-middle class type opting for
bankruptcy to avoid both poverty and responsible debt repayment.

Except that it might be a single or divorced female who's the one
most likely to file for personal bankruptcy protection, and her
petition might be the last stage of a continuum of crises that
began with her job loss or divorce. Moreover, her dilemma might
be attributable in part to a consumer credit industry that has
increased its profitability by relaxing its standards and
extending credit to almost anyone who can scribble his or her
name on an application.

Such are among the unexpected findings in this painstaking study
of 2,400 bankruptcy filings in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas
during the seven-year period from 1981 to 1987. Rather than
relying on case counts or gross data collected for a court's
administrative records, as has been done elsewhere, the authors
use data contained in the actual petitions. In so doing, they
offer a unique window into debtors' lives.

The authors conclude that people who file for bankruptcy are, as
a rule, neither impoverished families nor wily manipulators of
the system. Instead, debtors are a cross-section of America. If
one demographic segment can be isolated as particularly debt-
prone, it would be women householders, whom the authors found
often live on the edge of financial disaster. Very few debtors
(3.7 percent in the study) were repeat filers who might be viewed
as abusing the system, and most (70 percent in the study) of
Chapter 13 cases fail and become Chapter 7s. Accordingly, the
authors conclude that the economic model of behavior -- which
assumes a petitioner is a "calculating maximizer" in his decision
to seek bankruptcy protection and his selection of chapter to
file under, a profile routinely used to justify changes in the
law is at variance with the actual debtor profile derived from
this study.

A few stereotypes about debtors are, however, borne out. It is
less than surprising to learn, for example, that most debtors are
simply not as well off as the average American, or that while
bankrupts' mortgage debts are about average, their consumer debts
are oft the charts. Petitioners seem particularly susceptible to
the siren song of credit card companies. In the study sample,
creditors were found to have made between 27 percent and 36
percent of their loans to debtors with incomes below $12,500
(although the loans might have been made before the debtors'
income dropped so low). Of course, the vigor with which consumer
credit lenders pursue their goal of maximizing profits has a
corresponding impact on the number of bankruptcy filings.

The book won the ABA's 1990 Silver Gavel Award. A special 1999
update by the authors is included exclusively in the Beard Books
reprint edition.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *