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                           E U R O P E

           Friday, October 24, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 211

                            Headlines

A L B A N I A

ALBANIA: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating; Outlook Stable


A U S T R I A

OSTREGION INVESTMENTGESELLSCHAFT: Moody's Rates EUR425MM Bonds B3
VTB BANK AUSTRIA: Moody's Cuts Bank Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'


F R A N C E

RPC VOYAGES: Goes Into Receivership, Seeks Buyer


G E R M A N Y

HP PELZER: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
TALISMAN-5 FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC'
TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'D'


I R E L A N D

CASTLEKNOCK GOLF CLUB: Sells for Almost 80% Over Guide Price
CELF LOW: EMIR Deal No Impact on Moody's Ba2 Sub. Notes Rating
IRISH BANK: Ex-CEO Targeted for Extradition Over Collapse
IRISH BANK: AIB, Bank of Ireland Eye EUR250-Mil. Home Loan Book
PERMANENT TSB: Expects to Unveil Details of Capital-Raising Plan


I T A L Y

MONTE DEI PASCHI: To Face Capital Shortfall From ECB Test


N E T H E R L A N D S

JUBILEE CLO 2014-XIV: Moody's Rates EUR18.9MM Class F Notes 'B2'


R U S S I A

AHML INSURANCE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Financial Strength Rating
MORDOVIA CITY: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Issuer & Debt Rating
MTS BANK: Moody's Puts 'B1' Deposit & Debt Rating for Downgrade
PROBUSINESSBANK: Fitch Corrects Ratings Release


S P A I N

BBVA EMPRESAS 1: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR78.3MM C Notes to B1
RURAL HIPOTECARIO I: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR8MM C Notes 'B3'
TDA 26 MIXTO: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class D Notes
* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 37 Spanish Multi-Cedulas


S W E D E N

NORTHLAND RESOURCES: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to 'C'


T U R K E Y

YASAR HOLDING: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Proposed USD Notes
YASAR HOLDING: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating to USD250MM Bonds


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ACODENT: Swift Dental Buys Firm, Saves Jobs
CANLEY SPORTS AND SOCIAL CLUB: Will be Knocked Down
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Severe Mgmt. Failings Caused Near-Collapse
JIMMY'S WORLD: Restaurant Closes, Blames Competition
LONDON MINING: Frank Timis Ready to Rescue Firm

TULLOW OIL: Moody's Cuts Corp. Family Rating to Ba3; Outlook Neg.
ULSTER ORCHESTRA: Chairman Appears Before Culture Committee


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Competitive Strategy for Health Care Organizations


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A L B A N I A
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ALBANIA: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
The Albanian government's fiscal consolidation and arrear
repayment measures under its three-year extended arrangement with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) counterbalance the
country's sharp deterioration in fiscal strength in the run-up to
the June 2013 elections, says Moody's Investors Service in its
annual credit analysis report on the country. The new measures
offer a significant initial response to the decline in fiscal
strength, especially with respect to revenue generation where
Albania continues to perform below regional peers. Moody's rates
Albania B1 with a stable outlook.

Moody's credit analysis on Albania is an annual report and does
not constitute a rating action.

Albania's designation in June 2014 as a candidate for EU
membership is also credit positive, says Moody's. The country has
made some progress in addressing corruption and in advancing
judicial reform, although the institutional convergence process
to EU standards remains long and protracted. Moody's expects
positive effects from EU integration, which has proven to be an
important driver of foreign direct investment inflows among
accession countries in the region.

Albania's credit challenges relate to its high debt ratio, which
will likely peak at over 73% in 2015, and to large gross
borrowing requirements in 2015 given large domestic rollover
needs and the maturing of the EUR300 million Eurobond in November
2015.

The government is working closely with multilateral institutions
to improve the resilience of the country's domestic debt
structure, which features a short average maturity and a strong
reliance on the domestic banking system; the system is burdened
by large volumes of non-performing loans. Furthermore, Albania's
comprehensive power sector reforms, to be implemented with the
support of the World Bank, are essential for improvement in the
business environment and for the prevention of a renewed build-up
of arrears.

The outlook on Albania's B1 rating is stable. Progress with
respect to structural reforms, specifically tackling corruption,
the strengthening of property rights and judicial efficiency,
would result in improved competitiveness and enhanced business
attractiveness. On the other hand, a failure to stabilize the
fiscal deficit and the public debt ratio would exert downward
pressure on the rating, as would the materialization of
potentially large contingent liabilities stemming from property
restitution claims or from the electricity sector. Additional
downside risks stem from the still sizable current account
deficit amid waning remittance inflows.



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A U S T R I A
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OSTREGION INVESTMENTGESELLSCHAFT: Moody's Rates EUR425MM Bonds B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 ratings of the
EUR425 million senior secured bonds (the Bonds) and the EUR350
million senior secured European Investment Bank loan (the EIB
Loan) raised by Ostregion Investmentgesellschaft Nr.1 S.A. (the
Issuer). In addition, Moody's changed the outlook to stable, from
negative.

In 2007, Bonaventura Strassenerrichtungs-GmbH (ProjectCo) entered
into a 32 year concession agreement (CA) with Autobahnen-Und
Schnellstrassen-Finanzierungs AG (Asfinag, Aaa stable) to plan,
develop, construct and operate a concession route comprising four
motorway sections with a total length of 52 kilometers (km) to
the north of Vienna, Austria (the Project). To finance the
construction works, the Issuer entered into the EIB Loan and
issued the Bonds and then on-lent the proceeds to ProjectCo.
Construction was completed in January 2010.

Ratings Rationale

"The rating affirmation and outlook change was prompted by an
improving trend in traffic volumes and shadow toll revenues,
which increases, in Moody's view, the likelihood that ProjectCo's
updated (2011) traffic projections will be achieved", explains
Tomas O'Loughlin, a Senior Analyst in Moody's Infrastructure
Finance Group, and lead analyst for the Issuer.

The B3 ratings reflect (1) the Project's exposure to weak shadow
toll revenues; (2) ProjectCo's high leverage, with a very low
forecast annual debt service coverage ratio (ADSCR), and an
expectation that this ratio will remain close to, and at times
will breach, the 1.05x default level for much of the remaining
debt tenor; and (3) that the substantial mark to market
(currently EUR262 million) on ProjectCo's super senior interest
rate swap may limit recovery for senior creditors.

The ratings also reflects (1) the long-term CA that ProjectCo has
entered into with the highly rated Asfinag to plan, develop,
construct and operate the concession route and (2) the fact that
approximately 65% of ProjectCo's revenues are from availability-
based payments, which are not exposed to traffic risk.

The Bonds and the EIB Loan benefit from financial guarantees of
scheduled principal and interest under insurance policies that
Ambac Assurance UK Ltd (Ambac UK, unrated) issued. Because
Moody's no longer rate Ambac UK, the ratings do not factor in any
benefit from the guarantees.

Shadow toll revenue has shown an improving trend, both year on
year and compared to projections. In both 2012 and 2013, shadow
toll revenue grew by 5% year on year, but grew by 10% in the 8
months to August 2014, compared to the same period in 2013.
Similarly, in 2012 shadow toll revenue was 5% below the updated
traffic projections; improving to 3% below projections in 2013,
and 3% ahead of the updated traffic projections in the 8 months
to August 2014.

As the project is in lockup and no payments to mezzanine
debtholders or distributions to shareholders are expected until
around 2033, ProjectCo is expected to build up a sizeable cash
balance which would provide some additional liquidity to support
senior debt service, even if the ADSCR dropped below 1.00x in
some periods.

Moody's expects that the ADSCR will breach the 1.05x default
threshold at times over the debt tenor. However, as long as there
is an expectation that ProjectCo will continue to be able to meet
debt service as it falls due, Moody's expect that the controlling
creditors (Ambac UK and EIB) will waive an ADSCR threshold
default.

Rationale for Stable Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that (1) actual
traffic volumes and shadow toll revenues will continue to be in
line with the updated traffic projections, (2) ProjectCo's ADSCR
will remain near, and sometimes will breach, the 1.05x default
level, and (3) the controlling creditors will continue to waive
any such defaults.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Upward rating pressure may arise if (1) shadow toll revenues
consistently outperform the updated projections or (2) debt
service costs revert to base-case levels, resulting in ProjectCo
benefitting from the Minimum Traffic Guarantee.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the ratings if (1) the Issuer
experiences poor liquidity such that it needs to draw from its
reserves or (2) shadow toll revenues are weaker than the updated
projections, or costs are higher, leading to actual and projected
ADSCRs close to 1.00x on a permanent basis.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Privately
Managed Toll Roads published in May 2014.

Following an agreement to restructure the mezzanine debt in
February 2013, ProjectCo is now owned by Meridiam Infrastructure
Finance Sarl (45.00%), RREEF Infrastructure Limited (45.00%),
Alpine Mayreder Bau GmbH (4.44%), Hochtief PPP Solutions GmbH
(4.44%) and Egis Projects S.A. (1.12%).


VTB BANK AUSTRIA: Moody's Cuts Bank Deposit Ratings to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
supported senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings of
subsidiaries of the following three Russian Financial
Institutions: Bank VTB, JSC, Sberbank and Vnesheconombank.

These rating actions follow Moody's downgrade of the long-term
deposit, debt and issuer ratings of the respective Russian
parents on October 20, 2014.

Specifically, the actions affected the supported senior unsecured
and deposit ratings of the following international and domestic
subsidiaries of VTB Group (namely, VTB Bank (Austria) AG, VTB
Bank (Deutschland) AG, VTB Capital plc, VTB24, VTB Bank
(Armenia), and Bank of Moscow), one subsidiary of Sberbank
located in Kazakhstan (SB Sberbank JSC), and one domestic
subsidiary of Vnesheconombank (SME Bank). These subsidiaries'
supported ratings benefit from Moody's assessment of parental
support uplift.

The standalone ratings -- i.e., bank financial strength ratings
(BFSRs) and the corresponding baseline credit assessments (BCAs)
-- of these subsidiaries were not affected by this rating action.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the Russian parents' long-term deposit, debt and
issuer ratings has prompted a similar downgrade of the
subsidiaries' supported ratings, driven by the reduced capacity
of the parent's to provide support. At the same time the rating
agency notes the demonstrated willingness of these banks to
provide assistance to their domestic and international
subsidiaries in the context of ongoing volatility.

-- VTB Group's subsidiaries

The supported ratings of the domestic and international
subsidiaries of VTB Group incorporate Moody's assessment of the
very high probability of support from the parent, whose ratings,
in turn, benefit from Moody's assessment of systemic support
being provided in the event of need. Moody's believes that any
systemic support from the Russian government in the event of need
(directly or indirectly through VTB) will benefit the group's
subsidiaries given (1) the government's majority ownership of VTB
Group; and (2) the strong track record of this support being
extended to the group and its subsidiaries from the Russian
government and the Central Bank of Russia (CBR).

VTB Bank (Austria) AG

Moody's downgraded VTB Bank (Austria) AG's supported long-term
deposit ratings to Ba1 from Baa3, with a negative outlook. The
negative outlook on the supported rating is aligned with the
outlook on the support provider's rating.

VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG

Moody's affirmed VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG's Ba1 supported long-
term deposit ratings, and the outlook on this rating was changed
to negative from stable. The outlook is now aligned with the
outlook on the parent's long-term ratings.

VTB Capital Plc

Moody's downgraded VTB Capital plc's supported long-term ratings
to Ba1 from Baa3 with a negative outlook. The negative outlook on
the supported rating is aligned with the outlook on the support
provider's rating.

VTB24

Moody's downgraded VTB24's long-term deposit and LC Senior
secured ratings to Baa3 from Baa2 with a negative outlook. The
negative outlook on the supported rating is aligned with the
outlook of the support provider's rating.

VTB Bank (Armenia)

Moody's downgraded VTB Bank Armenia's long-term local currency
deposit rating to Ba2 from Ba1 with a stable outlook. The current
outlook reflects the fact that the bank's supported rating is not
sensitive to one notch of downgrade in the support provider's
ratings.

Bank of Moscow

Moody's affirmed Bank of Moscow's Ba1 supported long-term deposit
ratings, Ba1 senior unsecured bond ratings and Ba3 subordinate
debt rating. Concurrently, the outlook was changed to negative
from stable, and the outlook is now aligned with the outlook on
the parent's long-term ratings.

SB Sberbank JSC -- subsidiary of Sberbank

Moody's changed outlook on SB Sberbank's long-term foreign and
local-currency deposit ratings to negative from stable. The
outlook is now aligned with the outlook on the parent's long-term
ratings.

SME Bank -- subsidiary of Vnesheconombank

The deposit and debt ratings of SME Bank incorporate Moody's
assessment of the very high probability of support being provided
by the parent in the event of need, whose ratings, in turn,
benefit from Moody's assessment of systemic support. Moody's
believes that any systemic support from the Russian government in
the event of need (directly or indirectly through
Vnesheconombank) will benefit SME Bank given that (1) SME Bank is
a fully owned subsidiary of Vnesheconombank; (2) SME Bank is
utilized as a major government conduit to support the country's
small and medium-sized enterprises; and (3) there is a track
record of such support being extended to SME Bank from the
Russian government and Vnesheconombank.

Moody's downgraded SME Bank's supported long-term deposit and
debt ratings to Baa3 from Baa2 with a negative outlook. The
outlook on the supported rating is now aligned with the outlook
on the support provider's rating.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down

Moody's considers that upward pressure on the long-term ratings
of these subsidiaries is unlikely given the negative outlook on
the parents' ratings. The supported ratings of these subsidiaries
would be negatively affected if the ratings of their respective
parents were downgraded.

The subsidiaries' standalone credit profiles -- as expressed by
their BFSRs and BCAs -- could come under pressure in the event of
any further deterioration in their financial fundamentals and
risk-absorption capacity, given the challenging domestic
operating environment, as indicated by the negative outlooks on
most of these banks' BFSRs.

List of Affected Ratings

The following ratings have been downgraded and placed on negative
outlook:

  SME Bank's LC Senior unsecured and LC/FC deposit ratings to
  Baa3;

  VTB24's LC Senior secured and LC/FC deposit ratings to Baa3;

  VTB Bank (Austria) AG's LC/FC bank deposit ratings to Ba1;

  VTB Capital plc's LC/FC bank deposit ratings to Ba1;

The following ratings have been downgraded and placed on stable
outlook:

  VTB Bank (Armenia)'s LC bank deposits rating to Ba2;

The following ratings have been affirmed and placed on negative
outlook:

  VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG's LC/FC bank deposit ratings at Ba1;

  Bank of Moscow's LC/FC Senior unsecured and LC/FC bank deposits
  at Ba1; FC Senior Unsecured MTN at (P)Ba1; FC Subordiate rating
  at Ba3;

  Kuznetski Capital S.A.'s FC Backed subordinate rating at Ba3;

  SB Sberbank JSC's LC/FC bank deposit ratings at Ba2;

The following adjusted bca's were affected:

  SME Bank's adjusted BCA was changed to baa3;

  VTB24's adjusted BCA was changed to baa3;

  VTB Bank (Austria) AG's adjusted bca was changed to ba1;

  VTB Capital plc's adjusted bca was changed to ba1;

  VTB Bank (Armenia)'s adjusted bca was changed to ba2;

The following short-term ratings have been downgraded:

  SME Bank's FC short-term deposit rating to Prime-3;

  VTB24's LC/FC short-term deposit ratings to Prime-3;

  VTB Bank (Austria) AG's LC/FC short-term deposit ratings to Not
  Prime;

  VTB Capital plc's LC/FC short-term deposit ratings to Not
  Prime;

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in July 2014.



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F R A N C E
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RPC VOYAGES: Goes Into Receivership, Seeks Buyer
------------------------------------------------
travelmole.com reports that the parent company of French online
travel agent Ecotour.com has been placed in receivership while it
looks for a buyer, according to reports in the French media.

RPC Voyages, which has been controlled by Germany firm Tomorrow
Focus since September 2012, said it had been hit by the crises in
its flagship locations, especially in north Africa and Arabia,
and by the weak economy in France, according to travelmole.com.

The report notes that it will continue to operate under a court
supervision order while seeking a buyer.  It said the bankruptcy
procedure could allow the company to meet its challenges, and to
'preserve as many jobs' if a buyer appears, the report discloses.

The agency's turnover was EUR45.18 million in 2013, against EUR48
million in 2012, the report adds.



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HP PELZER: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had assigned its
'B+' long-term corporate credit rating to German auto supplier HP
Pelzer Holding GmbH, the 61%-owned subsidiary of the Italian
group Adler Plastics.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also assigned its 'B+' issue rating to HP Pelzer's EUR230
million senior secured notes.  The recovery rating is '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%) in
the event of a payment default.  At the same time, S&P corrected
an administrative error by changing the recovery rating to '3'
from '4'.

"We base our ratings on HP Pelzer primarily on our assessment of
Adler Plastics' credit quality.  We view Adler Plastics'
financial profile as "aggressive," owing to its sizable adjusted
debt and limited free operating cash flow (FOCF).  We expect that
the group will post a ratio of adjusted funds from operations
(FFO) to debt of about 17% and debt to EBITDA of 4x, based on a
weighted average forecast for the current and the next two years.
We also forecast FOCF at about EUR20 million, on average, over
that period, which translates into an adjusted FOCF-to-debt ratio
of only about 8%," S&P said.

At year-end 2014, S&P estimates that the group's adjusted debt
will reach approximately EUR330 million.  This comprises HP
Pelzer's EUR230 million of senior secured notes, about EUR35
million of finance leases and local debt, and roughly EUR30
million of operating leases.  S&P adds to that amount its
estimate of Adler Plastics' debt outside HP Pelzer's scope, which
amounts to about EUR35 million.

"Because we assess Adler Plastics' business profile as "weak," we
exclude surplus cash from our debt calculation, in line with our
criteria, to account for the risk of cash being depleted.  Our
view of the group's business profile reflects its small size,
weak competitive position, and low adjusted EBITDA margin.  With
a revenue base of approximately EUR1.3 billion, Adler Plastics is
one of Europe's smallest auto suppliers.  It operates in a small
and fragmented niche where it has no leading market shares.
This, combined with a lack of aftermarket revenues and limited
product innovation, constrains profitability, in our opinion,"
S&P added.

On the positive side, Adler Plastics has a good geographic
presence, with about half of its revenues generated outside
Europe.  The group also benefits from good relationships with car
makers, which share some research and development costs, and
eased payment terms when HP Pelzer experienced economic hardship
during the latest market downturn.  This did not prevent the
company from restructuring its debt in 2010, however.

In S&P's opinion, HP Pelzer's stand-alone credit quality is
similar to that of the Adler Plastics group, although S&P notes
that the entities outside the restricted group are barely
profitable.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that HP Pelzer will
maintain stable market shares and gradually increase its EBITDA.
It also factors in S&P's view that HP Pelzer's financial policy
will remain conservative, with no shareholder remuneration and
limited acquisitions.  S&P expects the Adler Plastics group to
achieve an adjusted EBITDA margin of more than 6% and report
about EUR20 million of adjusted FOCF.

S&P could lower the ratings on HP Pelzer if the group's adjusted
FFO-to-debt ratio fell to about 12%, if adjusted FOCF were
materially lower than S&P's expectations, or if profitability did
not improve.  S&P may also downgrade HP Pelzer if its
conservative financial policy loosened or the transparency of
Adler Plastics' financial statements does not improve.

S&P could upgrade HP Pelzer if the group's adjusted FFO-to-debt
ratio rose materially above 20% on a sustainable basis, provided
that operating trends remain supportive, notably reflected in a
continuous increase in profitability.  Any positive rating action
seems unlikely over the next 12 months, however.


TALISMAN-5 FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Talisman-5 Finance PLC's class A, B, and C notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class D and E
notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the four remaining
loans' credit quality.

Talisman-5 Finance closed in December 2006, with notes totaling
EUR544.3 million.  The original seven loans were secured on
commercial properties in Germany, France, and Finland.  Since
closing, the Tiger and Mouse loans fully repaid and the Bird loan
repaid with a EUR14.2 million principal loss to the notes.  The
notes have a current outstanding balance of EUR189.4 million and
their legal final MATURITY DATE is in Oct. 2016.  All of the
remaining loans are in special servicing.

FISH LOAN (32% OF THE POOL)

The loan is secured on a two-building office in the Hammberbook,
District of Hamburg in Germany.  The outstanding securitized
balance is EUR59.9 million and the B-note's balance is EUR12.0
million.

The loan entered special servicing after breaching the
transaction's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio covenant.  It matured in
July 2013.  The borrower and special servicer have signed a
workout agreement.  In the Aug. 2014 investor REPORT, the
servicer reported a whole LOAN INTEREST coverage ratio (ICR) of
3.74x and a securitized LTV ratio of 132.6%, based on a June 2012
valuation of EUR45.2 million.  S&P has assumed that the loan
experiences losses in its 'B' rating stress scenario.

PENGUIN LOAN (26% OF THE POOL)

The loan is secured on six buildings, consisting of secondary
office spaces in the outer Parisian suburbs (France).  The
outstanding securitized balance is EUR49.0 million and the B-
note's balance is EUR9.9 million.

The loan is in special servicing and the servicer extended the
MATURITY DATE until Oct. 15, 2014 to enable the portfolio's
disposal.  A sales and purchase agreement has been signed for
four of the properties.  The servicer is discussing a further
loan extension with the borrower.  The servicer has reported
that, based on the anticipated sale prices for the remaining
assets, full repayment of the securitized loan is expected.  In
the Aug. 2014 investor report, the servicer did not report an
ICR.  However, the borrower did fully pay the interest due on the
loan. There is no LTV ratio since the servicer is prohibited from
discussing the loan's valuation due to French confidentiality
restrictions.  S&P has assumed that the loan will fully repay in
its B rating stress scenario.

REINDEER LOAN (21% OF THE POOL)

The loan is secured on 20 primarily retail properties in Finland.
The outstanding securitized balance is EUR40.6 million and the B-
note's balance is EUR10.3 million.

The loan is in default and special servicing due to a maturity
payment default in Jan. 2013.  The special servicer has extended
the standstill agreement with the borrowers until Oct. 2014 to
allow time to progress the sale strategy.  In the Aug. 2014
investor REPORT , the servicer reported a whole loan ICR of 0.82x
and a securitized loan LTV ratio of 61.4%, based on a Feb. 2013
valuation of EUR66.1 million.  S&P has assumed that the loan
fully repays in its 'B' rating stress scenario.

MONKEY LOAN (21% OF THE POOL)

The loan is secured on a BUSINESS park and a four-star hotel.
The asset consists of six buildings in Unterhaching, 12
kilometers south of Munich (Germany).  The outstanding
securitized balance is EUR39.8 million.

The loan is in special servicing due to a payment default at loan
maturity in July 2013.  In the August 2014 investor REPORT, the
servicer reported an ICR of 3.49x and a LTV ratio of 95.4%, based
on a Sept. 2013 valuation of EUR41.7 million.  S&P has assumed
that the loan experiences losses in our 'B' rating stress
scenario.

RATING RATIONALE

S&P's ratings in Talisman-5 Finance address the timely payment of
interest (payable quarterly in arrears) and the payment of
principal no later than the Oct. 2016 legal final MATURITY DATE.

Following S&P's review, it has lowered its recovery expectations.
All four remaining loans are in special servicing and the
remaining time to resolve these loans is now two years.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class A
and B notes to be commensurate with lower rating levels.  As a
result, S&P has lowered its ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P now believes that the class C notes' repayment depends on
favorable economic conditions.  Therefore, in line with S&P's
criteria for assigning 'CCC' category ratings, S&P has lowered to
'CCC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class C notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class D and E notes
because they have previously experienced principal losses.

RATINGS LIST

Talisman-5 Finance PLC
EUR544.25 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes
                               Rating          Rating
Class       Identifier         To              From
A           XS0278333736       BBB+ (sf)       A (sf)
B           XS0278334460       BB- (sf)        BBB+ (sf)
C           XS0278334973       CCC (sf)        B- (sf)
D           XS0278335277       D (sf)          D (sf)
E           XS0278335863       D (sf)          D (sf)


TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: S&P Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'D'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1 Ltd.'s class C, D, and E notes.
At the same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A1,
A2, B, and F notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction after
the August 2014 note payment date, on which the class C, D, E,
and F notes experienced interest shortfalls.

The transaction is now backed by four loans secured on 31
commercial properties in Germany and France.  S&P has reviewed
their credit quality according to its criteria for rating
European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transactions.

FISHMAN JEC LOAN (72% OF THE POOL)

The Fishman loan, which is the largest loan in the pool, was due
to mature on July 30, 2014, and has a current balance equal to
EUR134.15 million.  The loan entered special servicing on May 6,
2014.

The loan failed to repay at maturity.  Since then, the borrower
has filed for a "safeguard" procedure under French insolvency
proceedings.

The loan is currently secured on a portfolio of 18 French mixed-
use assets (down from 20 at closing).

The portfolio is currently 87% let, with about 85% of income from
investment-grade tenants, including the French Government.  The
weighted-average unexpired lease term to break option is 0.92
years.  The top five tenants account for 78.28% of the income,
with the largest tenant accounting for 37.51% of the income.

The most recent valuation of the properties (June 2013) reported
a market value of EUR158 million.  Based on this information, the
loan exhibits a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 85.36%.

The short weighted-average unexpired lease term to break,
combined with a safeguard procedure, may have a detrimental
effect on recovery values, in S&P's opinion.  S&P has assumed
losses under a 'B' rating stress scenario.

HUTLEY LOAN (17% OF THE POOL)

This loan, which was fully securitized at closing, is the second
largest in the pool, and it has an outstanding principal balance
of EUR31.23 million.

Following the restructure of the loan in 2011, a new loan
maturity date was set to be July 30, 2014.  Subject to certain
conditions being met, the borrower has the option to extend the
maturity date to July 2015 and then to July 2016.  The borrower
has exercised the extension option and the loan is now due to
mature on July 30, 2015.

The loan is currently secured on a portfolio of 11 mixed-use
commercial properties in towns and cities throughout Germany.

The portfolio is currently 86% let, with nine tenants
representing 90% of the income.  The weighted-average unexpired
lease term to break option is 5.75 years (until first break).
The top five tenants account for 62.68% of the income, with the
largest tenant accounting for 24.57% of the income.

In Aug. 2014, the servicer reported an LTV ratio of 72.50% and an
interest coverage ratio (ICR) of 8.97x.

S&P has assumed the loan would fully repay under a 'B' rating
stress scenario.

LEIPZIG PORTFOLIO LOAN (8% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan has an outstanding balance of EUR14.30
million (72% of the whole loan) and additional debt of EUR5.57
million, which does not form part of this transaction.

The loan failed to repay at maturity (Jan. 30, 2014) and
subsequently entered special servicing.  The special servicer and
the borrower have entered into a standstill agreement with a view
to pursuing a consensual sale of the property.

The loan is secured by a single office property in Leipzig,
Germany.  The property is fully leased to a major European
banking group until Sept. 30, 2016 (2.16 years unexpired), with
two four-year extension options.

In Aug. 2014, the servicer reported a securitized ICR of 10.41x.
The most recent valuation of the property (April 2013) reported a
market value of EUR12.6 million.  Based on this information, the
loan exhibits a securitized LTV ratio of 113%.

S&P has assumed losses under a 'B' rating stress scenario.

WPC LOAN (3% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan has an outstanding balance of EUR5.45
million (83% of the whole loan) and additional debt of EUR1.14
million, which does not form part of this transaction.  The loan
is due to mature on Jan. 30, 2017.

The loan is secured on a single industrial property in St.
Ingbert, which is situated in southwest Germany.  The property is
100% occupied by a single tenant, with a reported weighted-
average unexpired lease term to break option of 7.0 years.

In Aug. 2014, the servicer reported a securitized LTV ratio of
194.72% and a securitized ICR of 1.84x.

S&P has assumed losses under a 'B' rating stress scenario.

CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

On the Aug. 2014 note payment date, the class C, D, E, and F
notes experienced interest shortfalls.  S&P understands, from the
cash manager, that the shortfalls were primarily due to about
EUR201,000 of legal expenses the Fishman JEC loan incurred.  In
particular, these relate to the safeguard proceedings, security
review, and meetings held between the borrower and the judiciary
negotiator before the borrower's filing for safeguard.

Although the cash manager is not anticipating similar fee levels
in the short term, S&P believes that this transaction will likely
remain vulnerable to future interest shortfalls if there are
unanticipated periodic spikes in prior-ranking senior costs
related to the ongoing workout of the loans.  In addition, future
principal repayments may create further spread compression
between the margin paid on the loans and the margin paid on the
notes.

RATING RATIONALE

S&P's ratings in Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1 address the
timely payments of interest and the full repayment of principal
no later than legal final maturity (Feb. 2020).

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class A1,
A2, and B notes to be sufficient to mitigate the risk of losses
from the underlying loans in a 'BB', 'B+', and 'B-' rating stress
scenario, respectively.  S&P has therefore affirmed its ratings
on these classes of notes.  S&P's analysis takes into account the
class C, D, E and F notes' cash flow disruptions.

S&P' has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the
class C notes because they have experienced an interest
shortfall. S&P did not lower its rating to 'D (sf)' because the
interest shortfall may be repaid, in S&P's opinion.  S&P may,
however, take further rating actions if the interest shortfall
persists.

The class D and E notes also experienced an interest shortfall on
the August 2014 note payment date, which will likely continue to
accrue in future quarters, in S&P's view.  Because S&P also
expects these classes of notes to experience losses in its 'B'
rating stress scenario, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC
(sf)' its rating on the class D notes, and to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC-
(sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

S&P has also affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class F notes.

RATINGS LIST

Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1 Ltd.
CHF.1 mil, EUR549.95 mil commercial mortgage-backed
floating-rate notes
                                     Rating             Rating
Class          Identifier            To                 From
A1             XS0305732181          BB (sf)            BB (sf)
A2             XS0309194248          B+ (sf)            B+ (sf)
B              XS0305744608          B- (sf)            B- (sf)
C              XS0305745597          CCC- (sf)          B- (sf)
D              XS0305746215          D (sf)             CCC (sf)
E              XS0309195567          D (sf)             CCC- (sf)
F              XS0309195997          D (sf)             D (sf)



=============
I R E L A N D
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CASTLEKNOCK GOLF CLUB: Sells for Almost 80% Over Guide Price
------------------------------------------------------------
Irish Times reports that Castleknock Golf Club close to the
Phoenix Park in Dublin has been sold for nearly 80 per cent over
its guide price.

Receivers PricewaterhouseCoopers have signed a contract to sell
the clubhouse and the 125-acre course to Tio plc, a regulated
fund in Ireland which is managed by the Los Angeles-based Oaktree
Capital Managemen, according to Irish Times.

The report notes that the new owners are believed to have paid
close to EUR4.5 million for the popular golf facility, well ahead
of the EUR2.5 million-plus sought by selling agent Marcus Magnier
of Colliers International.

Separately, Oaktree along with Nama and the Westmeath-based
Bennett Group are preparing a planning application for the
development of 50,000sqm (538,195sq ft) of commercial space in
the south docklands, the report relates.

The report discloses that although the Castleknock course is
located in the Liffey Valley Conservation Area, it is understood
that there may be scope to develop about three acres of the
grounds for housing.

The report relays that most of this area is currently used as a
driving range alongside an infill development of more than 30
large houses which were built by a previous owner, the late Phil
Monahan.  His son, Paul, developed and operated the golf course
until it was put into receivership by the Ulster Bank, the report
notes.

The report says that Castleknock's convenience to the city center
has allowed it to attract an ever increasing number of golfers
despite stiff competition from two other local clubs,
Luttrellstown, which is close by and the Hermitage on the
opposite side of the river Liffey.  The Castleknock Hotel beside
the golf course is owned by FBD Holidays and Resorts.

The financial success of the club is attributed in part to a
novel membership system which was put in place in 2010.  The 456
members can avail of a range of annual subscriptions which
include a five-day flexible option at EUR600; a seven-day
flexible option at EUR1,450; seven days unlimited at EUR1,750,
and junior and student membership from EUR295 to EUR895, the
report notes.

A debit card system allows funds lodged to a member's account to
be used for golf, bar, restaurant or pro shop, the report says.

The clubhouse extends to 870sqm over two floors.


CELF LOW: EMIR Deal No Impact on Moody's Ba2 Sub. Notes Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, announced that the proposed entry into
a EMIR Protocol Reconciliation, Dispute Resolution and Disclosure
Agreement with its hedge counterparty to reflect certain
portfolio reconciliation and dispute resolution obligations
imposed by EMIR regulation and to include certain confidentiality
waivers relating to reporting and record keeping obligations also
under EMIR, would not in and of itself and as of this time,
result in the downgrade or withdrawal of the rating assigned to
the notes issued by CELF Low Levered Partners plc:

EUR70.5M (Current outstanding balance: EUR70.2M) Class A-1 Senior
Secured Revolving Floating Rate Notes due March 4, 2024, rated
Aaa (sf);

EUR86.5M (Current outstanding balance: EUR86.2M) Class A-2 Senior
Secured Delayed Draw Floating Rate Notes due March 4, 2024, rated
Aaa (sf);

EUR86.5M (Current outstanding balance: EUR86.2M) Class A-3 Senior
Secured Floating Rate Notes due March 4, 2024, rated Aaa (sf);

EUR26.5M Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due March 4, 2024, rated Aa3 (sf);

EUR14M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
March 4, 2024, rated Baa1 (sf);

EUR30M (Current outstanding balance: EUR16.5M) Class D-1
Subordinated Notes due 4 March 2024, rated Ba2 (sf);

EUR22M Class D-2 Subordinated Notes due March 4, 2024, rated Ba2
(sf); and

EUR19M Class D-3 Subordinated Notes due March 4, 2024, rated Ba2
(sf).

CELF Low Levered Partners plc., issued in January 2007, is a
single currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by
a portfolio of mostly high yield senior secured European loans.
The portfolio is managed by CELF Advisors LLP. This transaction
passed its reinvestment period in March 2014.

Moody's has determined that the entry into the agreement, in and
of itself and at this time, will not result in the downgrade or
withdrawal of the notes' rating currently assigned. However,
Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with
the proposed entry into the agreement, and Moody's is not
expressing any opinion as to whether the entry into the agreement
has, or could have, other non-credit related effects that may
have a detrimental impact on the interests of note holders and/or
counterparties.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Other methodologies and factors that may have been considered in
the process of rating this issuer can also be found in the Rating
Methodologies sub-directory on Moody's website.

Moody's will continue monitoring the rating. Any change in the
rating will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.


IRISH BANK: Ex-CEO Targeted for Extradition Over Collapse
---------------------------------------------------------
Amy Anthony at Cape Cod Times, citing the Irish Independent,
reports that disgraced banker and former Chatham resident
David Drumm will be targeted for extradition to Ireland to answer
questions about the collapse of Anglo Irish Bank, now known as
Irish Bank Resolution Corp.

According to Cape Cod Times, an article published last week said
a preliminary court hearing on the extradition case is scheduled
for November.

The provisional warrant will be sent to the United States,
according to the Irish newspaper, Cape Cod Times says.  Mr. Drumm
has been living in Massachusetts since he resigned as Anglo's CEO
in December 2008, Cape Cod Times notes.

A month after Mr. Drumm's resignation, Anglo was nationalized by
the Irish government, which committed tens of billions of dollars
to prop up the bank, Cape Cod Times recounts.

Mr. Drumm lived in Chatham until August 2009, when he relocated
to Wellesley, where he still resides with his family, according
to Cape Cod Times.  He was later sued by Anglo, which sought the
return of millions of euros, Cape Cod Times relays.  Mr. Drumm
filed a countersuit against the bank, Cape Cod Times discloses.

As those cases headed to trial in Dublin, Mr. Drumm filed for
bankruptcy protection in 2010 in Boston, which stopped the Irish
court cases, Cape Cod Times relates.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Frank J. Bailey has yet to decide
whether to accept Drumm's bankruptcy claim after a trial in May
in Boston, Cape Cod Times says.  The trustee handling the case
has opposed granting Mr. Drumm bankruptcy protection, Cape Cod
Times discloses.

                About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

IBRC was granted protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in December 2013.

Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG have been named the
special liquidators.


IRISH BANK: AIB, Bank of Ireland Eye EUR250-Mil. Home Loan Book
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ciaran Hancock in The Irish Times reports that AIB and Bank of
Ireland could end up going head-to-head for a EUR250 million book
of former Irish Nationwide residential mortgages.

The Irish Times has learned that both Irish banks have expressed
an interest in acquiring the portfolio of performing home loans
that is being sold by the joint liquidators of Irish Bank
Resolution Corporation.

It is understood that Rockstead Ireland, a specialist loan
valuation group led by former Permanent TSB executive David
Guinane, has carried out due diligence on the portfolio for AIB,
and the bank is now expected to lodge a bid with IBRC's
liquidators, Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson, The Irish
Times discloses.

Bank of Ireland is also known to have run the rule over the
portfolio, although it is less clear if it will follow through
with a formal bid, The Irish Times states.

Five parties are thought to have engaged with the process, The
Irish Times notes.

According to The Irish Times, the loans are former Irish
Nationwide residential mortgages and are part of EUR2.5 billion
in residual assets that the liquidators did not sell earlier this
year, when 90% of IBRC's EUR21.7 billion loans were transacted
via various portfolio sales.

This followed the decision by the State to liquidate IBRC in
February 2013, The Irish Times relays.

In March, the liquidators sold 64% of IBRC's EUR1.8 billion
mortgage book as part of Project Sand, The Irish Times recounts.
The mortgages were 74% owner-occupied and 26% buy-to- let and
amounted to 12,778 loans, The Irish Times recounts.

                 About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion). About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

IBRC was granted protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in December 2013.

Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG have been named the
special liquidators.


PERMANENT TSB: Expects to Unveil Details of Capital-Raising Plan
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ciaran Hancock at The Irish Times reports that Permanent TSB,
which is 99.2% owned by the Irish state, is expected to announce
details of its capital-raising plan on Sunday after the European
Central Bank publishes the results of its pan-European
comprehensive assessments, which PTSB is expected to fail.

It is not clear how much capital PTSB will be required to raise
but the expectation is it will be below EUR1 billion, The Irish
Times notes.

According to The Irish Times, while the ECB will announce the
results of the test and the capital shortfall facing PTSB, the
Irish bank is likely to reveal the amount it will seek from the
markets is considerably less than the deficit identified by the
regulator.

PTSB is also expected to outline the details of actions it has
taken this year to repair its balance sheet and the benefits that
are accruing to the bank from recovery in the Irish economy and
property markets, The Irish Times discloses.

Permanent TSB is formerly Irish Permanent and TSB bank.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


MONTE DEI PASCHI: To Face Capital Shortfall From ECB Test
---------------------------------------------------------
Sonia Sirletti and Nicholas Comfort at Bloomberg News report that
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA and Banca Carige SpA, two of
15 Italian lenders in the European Central Bank's euro-area bank
health check, are set to face capital shortfalls they'll need to
plug.

The two Italian lenders are currently seen reporting a capital
hole under the most severe of the ECB's stress-test scenarios,
Bloomberg discloses.  According to Bloomberg, a person with
knowledge of the matter said that the banks are unlikely to have
raised sufficient capital this year to fill the shortfall and
will probably have to find fresh funds.

"Monte Paschi and Carige are the banks most at risk in failing
the review, even if I rule out results that can create a systemic
risk that may damage markets," Bloomberg quotes Wolfram Mrowetz,
the chairman of Alisei Sim, a Milan brokerage, as saying.  "A
potential hole will be manageable for Monte Paschi, given the
recovery path undertaken, while for Carige the situation appears
more complex."

Paschi, based in Siena, and Genoa-based Carige already raised
capital this year selling new shares to investors, Bloomberg
recounts.  Monte Paschi said at the time the bank increased the
size of its rights offer by EUR2 billion (US$2.5 billion) to EUR5
billion in April to build a buffer to absorb "eventual negative
impacts" from the review, Bloomberg relays.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 18,
2013, Fitch downgraded MPS's Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc' from
'b' and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

TCR-Europe also reported on June 19, 2013, that Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services lowered its long-term counterparty credit rating
on Italy-based Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'B'
from 'BB', and affirmed the 'B' short-term rating.  S&P also
lowered its rating on MPS' Lower Tier 2 subordinated notes to
'CCC-' from 'CCC+'.  S&P affirmed the ratings on MPS' junior
subordinated debt at 'CCC-' and on its preferred stock at 'C'. At
the same time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where it
placed them with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2012.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


JUBILEE CLO 2014-XIV: Moody's Rates EUR18.9MM Class F Notes 'B2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following ratings to notes issued by Jubilee CLO 2014-XIV B.V.:

  EUR319,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR5,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
  2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR51,200,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  EUR12,800,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
  2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

  EUR34,400,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

  EUR28,400,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
  due 2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

  EUR38,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
  2028, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

  EUR18,900,000 Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes due
  2028, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2028. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of loans given the characteristics
and eligibility criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant
portfolio tests and covenants as well as the transaction's
capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's is of the
opinion that the collateral manager, Alcentra Limited
("Alcentra"), has sufficient experience and operational capacity
and is capable of managing this CLO.

Jubilee CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
floating rate notes and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds. The bond bucket gives the flexibility to
Jubilee CLO to hold bonds if Volcker Rule is changed. The
portfolio is expected to be approximately 70% ramped up as of the
closing date and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans
to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

Alcentra will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer has issued EUR 58.0m of subordinated notes, which will not
be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Alcentra's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 550,000,000

Diversity Score: 39

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2720

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.80%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 44%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Moody's has analyzed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints and the current sovereign ratings in
Europe, such exposure may not exceed 10% of the total portfolio.
As a result and in conjunction with the current foreign
government bond ratings of the eligible countries, as a worst
case scenario, a maximum 5% of the pool would be domiciled in
countries with A3 and Baa3 local currency country ceiling each.
The remainder of the pool will be domiciled in countries which
currently have a local currency country ceiling of Aaa. Given
this portfolio composition, the model was run with different
target par amounts depending on the target rating of each class
as further described in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts
are a function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and
the target ratings of the rated notes and amount to 0.75% for the
Class A notes, 0.50% for the Class B notes, 0.38% for the Class C
notes and 0% for Classes D, E and F.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3128 from 2720)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3536 from 2720)

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -1

Given that the transaction allows for corporate rescue loans
which do not bear a Moody's rating or Credit Estimate, Moody's
has also tested the sensitivity of the ratings of the notes to
changes in the recovery rate assumption for corporate rescue
loans within the portfolio (up to 5% in aggregate). This analysis
includes haircuts to the 50% base recovery rate which Moody's
assume for corporate rescue loans if they satisfy certain
criteria, including having a Moody's rating or Credit Estimate.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


AHML INSURANCE: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Financial Strength Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 insurance
financial strength rating of AHML Insurance Company ("AHMLIC"),
and changed the outlook to negative from stable. AHMLIC is a
subsidiary of the Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending OJSC
("AHML"), which is 100% owned by the Russian Federal Government.

These actions follow the weakening of Russia's credit profile, as
reflected by Moody's downgrade of Russia's government bond rating
to Baa2 from Baa1 on 17 October 2014 and a similar single-notch
downgrade of AHML's issuer rating to Baa2 (negative outlook) on
20 October 2014. For additional information, please refer to the
related announcements:

Ratings Rationale

Rationale for Affirmation of Ba1 Global Scale Financial Strength
Rating

The Ba1 insurance financial strength rating of AHMLIC
incorporates two components: (1) a B1 standalone credit
assessment of AHMLIC and (2) three notches of implicit support
from its parent, AHML. Despite the latest downgrade of AHML,
Moody's believes that the standalone credit profile of AHMLIC is
largely unaffected and that implicit support from the parent
remains sufficient to justify three notches of uplift in AHMLIC's
rating.

The B1 standalone credit assessment of AHMLIC reflects the
franchise value it derives from its public policy role and the
promising growth potential for mortgage insurance in Russia.
Despite Russia's weakening economic growth, mortgage lending
continues to rise and housing affordability continues to improve.
The main credit challenges for AHMLIC are its modest capital
base, limited track record, mono-line business model, and an
evolving Russian mortgage market that may experience material
changes in underwriting, servicing, legal, and regulatory
standards as the market matures.

The implicit support provided by the parent company, AHML, is an
important driver of AHMLIC's Ba1 financial strength rating. The
two entities share a public policy mission to promote mortgage
lending and increase mortgage affordability in Russia. Given the
importance of the public policy mission, Moody's believes the
parent company's ability and willingness to provide implicit
support remains strong despite the one-notch downgrade. However,
AHMLIC is now more directly exposed to the downside risk of its
parent's rating.

Rationale for Negative Outlook

The rating outlook of AHMLIC has been changed to negative from
stable to mirror the rating outlook of Russia and AHML. Moody's
would likely downgrade AHMLIC in lockstep with any further
downgrade of AHML's rating to reflect the parent's diminished
ability or willingness to provide support.

What Could Change the Rating -- Up/Down

Moody's noted that the following factors could lead to an upgrade
of AHMLIC's ratings: (i) a multi-notch upgrade of AHML, (ii)
explicit forms of support from AHML, (iii) stronger capital base,
(iv) significant increase in demand for mortgage insurance, (v)
material improvement in mortgage underwriting and servicing
standards in Russia.

Conversely, the following factors could lead to a downgrade of
AHMLIC's ratings: (i) downgrade of AHML, (ii) deterioration of
rate adequacy, (iii) deterioration of housing market conditions.

The following rating has been affirmed and the outlook changed to
negative from stable:

AHML Insurance Company -- insurance financial strength at Ba1
global scale.

AHML Insurance Company, based in Moscow, Russia, writes mortgage
insurance and reinsurance in all regions of Russia. The company
was established in 2010 with a public policy mission to develop
the mortgage insurance market, institute legal and regulatory
framework and standards for mortgage insurance, and create
innovative insurance products.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's Global
Methodology for Rating Mortgage Insurers published in December
2012.


MORDOVIA CITY: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Issuer & Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
Russian cities and three government-related issuers, following
the downgrade of Russia's sovereign bond rating to Baa2 from Baa1
with a negative outlook on October 17, 2014.

Specifically, Moody's has downgraded the cities of Moscow and St.
Petersburg to Baa2 from Baa1, SUE Vodokanal and OOO Vodokanal
Finace to Baa3 from Baa2 and OJSC "Western High-Speed Diameter"
to Ba1 from Baa3. The rating outlook for these five issuers
remains negative.

Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the ratings of 17 Russian regional
and local governments (RLGs). Twelve had their outlooks changed
to negative from stable, namely Republic of Bashkortostan,
Republic of Tatarstan, Autonomous-Okrug (region) of Khanty-
Mansiysk, Samara Oblast, Chuvashia Republic, Krasnoyarsk krai,
Komi republic, Oblast of Omsk, Oblast of Nizhniy Novgorod, City
of Krasnodar, City of Omsk, and the City of Volgograd. Another
three, namely Krasnodar Krai, Belgorod Oblast and Vologda Oblast,
continue to have negative outlooks, while the remaining two,
Moscow Oblast and the Mordovia Republic, continue to have stable
outlooks.

Ratings Rationale

-- Rationale for Downgrades of The City of Moscow, City of St.
    Petersburg, Sue Vodokanal of St. Petersburg, Vodokanal
    Finance, and Western High-Speed Diameter

The downgrades of the ratings on the cities of Moscow and St.
Peterburg reflect their strong institutional links with the
federal government and their lack of special status, which
prevents them from being rated above the sovereign. Both cities
are exposed to market risks and on-going deterioration in the
operating environment.

The downgrade of the issuer ratings of SUE Vodokanal of St.
Petersburg, the senior unsecured rating of OOO Vodokanal Finance,
and senior unsecured rating of OJSC Western High-Speed Diameter
reflects their status as government-related issuers that are
fully owned by the St. Petersburg government.

The downgrade of OJSC Western High-Speed Diameter's bond rating
reflects its link with the City of St. Petersburg and the
guarantee that the Russian government provides on its bond
principal payments. This guarantee covers overall principal
payments (including put options) and principal acceleration.

-- Rationale for Assigning Negative Outlooks On These Entities

The negative outlooks on the ratings of the cities of Moscow and
St. Petersburg reflect the cities' institutional and
macroeconomic linkages with the national government and mirror
the negative outlook on the sovereign bond rating.

The negative outlooks on the ratings of SUE Vodokanal of St.
Petersburg reflect its strong institutional, financial and
operational linkages with the city of St. Petersburg.

The negative outlook on the rating of OJSC Western High-Speed
Diameter mirrors the negative outlook on the City of St.
Petersburg and the sovereign government bond rating.

-- Rationale for Affirmation of 17 RLGs

Moody's affirmation of the ratings of 17 RLGs reflect these
entities' capacity to withstand moderate systemic pressure.
Moody's notes that Russian regions usually demonstrate adequate
capacity to manage short term refinancing risks during periods of
greater systemic risk, aided both by the national government's
liquidity access mechanism for RLGs (which helps to offset
immediate liquidity pressures) and by ongoing lending from state-
owned banks. The RLGs' debt structure, which is almost free of
foreign currency risk, and the lengthening of maturities on local
currency borrowings also help mitigate refinancing risks.

-- Rationale for Outlook Change to Negative for 12 RLGs

Moody's changed the outlook to negative from stable on the
ratings of the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of
Tatarstan, and the Autonomous-Okrug Khanty-Mansiysk, reflecting
their exposure to rising systemic pressures. In addition, these
issuers have weaker intrinsic strength relative to Moscow and St.
Petersburg.

The changed outlook to negative from stable on the ratings of
another nine RLGs (Samara Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Komi
republic, Chuvashia Republic, Oblast of Omsk, Oblast of Nizhniy
Novgorod, City of Krasnodar, City of Omsk, and City of Volgograd)
takes into account the inherent weaknesses in their performances,
which undermine their ability to resist a possible deterioration
in the macroeconomic environment. Each region is vulnerable to
this systemic deterioration through one or a combination of the
following factors: (1) moderate or low operating balances,
translating into moderate or weak flexibility of financial
performance, (2) substantial refinancing risk and/or usually a
high or rapidly growing debt burden; (3) modest liquidity; and 4)
in many cases, substantial vulnerability of local economies to
domestic cycles, which implies earnings volatility.

-- Rationale for Maintaining Negative Outlooks for 3 RLGs and
    Stable Outlooks On 2 RLGs

The ratings of Krasnodar Krai, Belgorod Oblast and Vologda Oblast
continue to carry negative outlooks, which reflect the current
and expected deterioration of their intrinsic strengths.

The stable outlook on Moscow Oblast reflects (1) solid financial
fundamentals; and (2) a moderate probability of support from the
Russian government.

The stable outlook on the Mordovia Republic reflects the
significant detachment of its rating from the sovereign level,
which provides a certain tolerance buffer if the sovereign's
creditworthiness were to mildly deteriorate.

What Could Change the Ratings Up/Down

-- Ratings With a Negative Outlook

Further deterioration in the sovereign's credit quality could
exert downward pressure on these sub-sovereigns. In turn, if
systemic pressures abate, the negative outlook will likely be
changed to stable, provided there is no deterioration in their
budget performance.

For Krasnodar Krai, Belgorod Oblast and Vologda Oblast, a failure
to adjust their financial performance and improve debt metrics in
the short-to-medium term could lead to a downgrade. On the other
hand, structural improvements in their financial performance and
debt and liquidity metrics could lead to an outlook
stabilization.

-- Ratings With a Stable Outlook

Downward pressure on Russian sub-sovereign ratings with a stable
outlook may materialize following a rapid deterioration in their
financial metrics. Further substantial increase in systemic risk,
as reflected in a further weakening of the sovereign credit
profile, may also adversely impact these sub-sovereigns' ratings.

In contrast, upward rating pressure on Russian RLGs could result
from improving individual financial profiles, through a
significant debt reduction and/or structurally balanced budgets
and improving liquidity profiles.

-- Ratings Affected

-- The Ratings of the Following Five Issuers Were Downgraded

Moscow, City of: the foreign and local-currency issuer ratings
and foreign-currency senior unsecured rating downgraded to Baa2
from Baa1, outlook negative.

St. Petersburg, City of: the foreign- and local-currency issuer
ratings and local-currency senior unsecured rating downgraded to
Baa2 from Baa1, outlook negative.

SUE Vodokanal of St. Petersburg: the foreign- and local-currency
issuer ratings downgraded to Baa3 from Baa2, outlook negative.

OOO Vodokanal Finance: the senior unsecured rating downgraded to
Baa3 from Baa2, outlook negative.

OJSC Western High-Speed Diameter: the senior unsecured rating
downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3, outlook negative.

-- The Ratings of the Following 2 Issuers Were Affirmed With
Stable Outlooks

Moscow, Oblast of: issuer rating of Ba2 affirmed, stable outlook
maintained.

Mordovia, Republic of: issuer and debt ratings of B1 affirmed,
stable outlook maintained.

-- The Ratings of the Following 15 Issuers Were Affirmed With
Negative Outlooks

Bashkortostan, Republic of: issuer rating of Baa3 affirmed,
outlook changed to negative from stable.

Tatarstan, Republic of: issuer rating of Baa3 affirmed, outlook
changed to negative from stable.

Khanty-Mansiysk AO: issuer rating of Baa3 affirmed, outlook
changed to negative from stable.

Samara, Oblast of: issuer rating of Ba1 affirmed, outlook changed
to negative from stable.

Krasnodar, Krai of: issuer and debt ratings of Ba1 affirmed,
negative outlook maintained.

Komi, Republic of: issuer rating of Ba2 affirmed, outlook changed
to negative from stable.

Krasnoyarsk, Krai of: issuer rating of Ba2 affirmed, outlook
changed to negative from stable.

Chuvashia, Republic of: Ba2 issuer and debt ratings affirmed,
outlook changed to negative from stable.

Omsk, Oblast of: issuer rating of Ba2 affirmed, outlook changed
to negative from stable.

Nizhniy Novgorod, Oblast of: issuer rating of Ba2 affirmed,
outlook changed to negative from stable.

Belgorod, Oblast of: issuer and debt ratings of Ba2 affirmed,
negative outlook maintained.

Krasnodar, City of: issuer rating of Ba2 affirmed, outlook
changed to negative from stable.

Vologda, Oblast of: issuer rating of Ba3 affirmed, negative
outlook maintained.

Omsk, City of: issuer rating of Ba3 affirmed, outlook changed to
negative from stable.

Volgograd, City of: issuer rating of Ba3 affirmed, outlook
changed to negative from stable.

Specific economic indicators as required by EU regulation are not
applicable for these entities.

On October 17, 2014, a rating committee was called to discuss the
ratings of Russian sub-sovereign entities. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The systemic risk in which the
issuers operate has materially increased.

The principal methodology used in rating Russia RLGs was Regional
and Local Governments published in January 2013. The principal
methodology used in rating Russia GRIs was Government-Related
Issuers: Methodology Update published in July 2010.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.


MTS BANK: Moody's Puts 'B1' Deposit & Debt Rating for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
B1 long-term local- and foreign-currency deposit and B2 foreign-
currency subordinate debt ratings of MTS Bank, OJSC.
Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) of E+ with stable outlook. However, the
bank's BFSR is now equivalent to a baseline credit assessment
(BCA) of b3 (formerly b2). MTS Bank's Not Prime short-term local-
and foreign-currency deposit ratings were also affirmed.

Moody's assessment of MTS Bank's ratings is largely based on its
unaudited financial statements for the first six months of
2014 -- prepared under IFRS -- as well as information received
from the bank.

Ratings Rationale

The review for downgrade of MTS Bank's deposit ratings mirrors
the recent rating action on the bank's parent Sistema Joint Stock
Financial Corporation (Sistema, Ba2 corporate family rating,
under review for downgrade) and reflects Moody's assessment of
the risks associated with the potential weakening capacity and
willingness of the parent to provide support to its subsidiary.
The realignment of MTS Bank's BCA to b3 from b2 recognizes (1) a
notable deterioration of the bank's asset quality and
profitability caused by the heightened risks in the bank's loan
portfolio; (2) relatively low reserve coverage of non-performing
loans (NPLs) which requires additional provisions; and (3) the
bank's high dependence on regular capital injections from
shareholders.

In placing MTS Bank's deposit and debt ratings on review for
downgrade, Moody's notes that they currently benefit from a two-
notch uplift from the bank's b3 standalone credit strength,
reflecting the rating agency's assessment of a moderate
probability of parental support from Sistema. Moody's also
recognizes the high degree of interdependence between the parent
and the subsidiary, as evidenced by MTS Bank's involvement in
providing financial services to the Sistema group of companies
and partnership with MTS -- the largest mobile phone operator in
Russia and core asset of Sistema.

The placement on review for downgrade of Sistema's ratings
prompted the review of the bank's supported ratings. The rating
actions on Sistema is discussed in detail in the press release
"Moody's places Sistema JSFC's and Bashneft's Ba2 ratings on
review for downgrade", published September 18, 2014, on
moodys.com.

According to Moody's, the realignment of MTS Bank's BCA to b3
from b2 recognizes the dominance of negative trends in the bank's
key financial indicators. MTS Bank's entry into the high-yielding
retail market in 2012-13 -- amid heightened customer indebtedness
and worsened operating environment -- was ill-timed and resulted
in rapid deterioration of the bank's asset quality. In 1H-2014,
cost of risk (as measured by the loan loss provision-to-average
gross loans ratio) increased to 6.2% from 2.5% at year-end 2012.

Although MTS Bank has made some progress in improving its core
profitability, mostly by increasing the share of high-yielding
unsecured retail loans in the loan book (which resulted in
widening of net interest margin to 6.7% in the first half of 2014
from 3.8% at year-end 2012), the bank's revenue generation was
suppressed by the decreased proportion of performing loans.
Furthermore, 54% of the core revenue was absorbed by provision
charges. Nonetheless, loan loss reserve coverage remained modest
at around 70% and inferior to that of Moody's-rated peer banks in
Russia.

Moody's also notes that -- although MTS Bank reports consistently
strong capital adequacy ratios on consolidated basis (1H-2014:
Tier 1 of 14.8% and total capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 20.3%)
-- it became increasingly dependent on capital support from its
shareholders. In the period spanning 2012-1H-2014, this support
amounted to RUB15.5 billion (in various forms, i.e., fresh
capital injections, subordinated loans and donations), which is
equivalent to 45% of the bank's total capital as at end-June
2014. Given that the bank's internal capital generation capacity
remains weak and the loan book is insufficiently provisioned,
further timely capital injections by shareholders will be crucial
to supporting the bank's development strategy and capitalization
commensurate with its risk profile.

Moody's says that the factors underpinning MTS Bank's standalone
E+ BFSR and b3 BCA at their current levels are (1) the bank's
strengthened franchise; (2) its ample liquidity buffer, and (3)
the notable improvements in its risk profile as demonstrated by
reduced single-name borrower concentration and the improved
business model and transparency of MTS Bank's 66%-owned
subsidiary East West United Bank S.A. (based in Luxembourg).

What Could Move the Rating - Up

Upward pressure on MTS Bank's long-term ratings is unlikely at
present, given that the parent's ratings are placed on review for
downgrade. The supported ratings of the bank could be confirmed
if the ratings of its parents were downgraded and the latter
retains the capacity and willingness to provide support to its
subsidiary.

The upward potential of MTS Bank's standalone ratings is also
limited, given dominance of downward trends in MTS Bank's
financial performance and negative pressure on Sistema's ratings.
In the longer term, the ratings could be upgraded if the bank
eliminates risks of capital erosion by improving its risk-
adjusted profitability and decreasing the volume of problem
loans. These developments would serve to both improve MTS Bank's
credit risk profile and enhance its loss absorption capacity.

What Could Move the Rating - Down

Downward pressure could be exerted on MTS Bank's ratings as a
result of any further deterioration in asset quality, as well as
any weakening of its capitalization or profitability. Failure to
match any further asset quality erosion with an adequate increase
in capitalization and/or loan loss reserves would also have
downward rating implications.

A downgrade of Sistema's corporate family rating or weakening of
its capacity or willingness to provide support to MTS Bank could
also lead to downward adjustment of MTS Bank's ratings.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.

Domiciled in Moscow, Russia, MTS Bank reported total consolidated
assets of RUB206.3 billion (US$6.1 billion) and total equity of
RUB25.8 billion under unaudited IFRS at end-June 2014. In the
same reporting period, the bank posted a net IFRS loss of RUB1.1
billion (US$32.7 million).


PROBUSINESSBANK: Fitch Corrects Ratings Release
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings replaces the version published on October 15, 2014
and corrects information on the volumes of securities held with
custodians (see point (iii) in paragraph 4) in line with revised
disclosures from the bank.

Fitch Ratings has placed

Fitch Ratings has placed Russian-based Probusinessbank's (PBB)
ratings, including its 'B' Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR),
on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The RWN primarily reflects Fitch's concerns about the liquidity
of the bank's securities book, given that it is virtually all
held outside of Russia and has largely not been traded or
refinanced over an extended period of time.  The RWN also
reflects uncertainty concerning the recent review of the bank by
the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) and the potential impact of the
recent license withdrawal from a sister bank.

PBB's consolidated securities book increased to RUB47 billion
(27% of group assets) at end-1H14 from RUB42bn (25%) at end-2013
and RUB27 billion (15%) at end-2012.  The portfolio is virtually
all held on PBB's balance sheet (comprising 48% of standalone
assets at end-8M14), and Russian government bonds make up the
bulk of the book.

Unlike most banks in the sector, PBB (i) pledges only a small
amount of its securities (about RUB3 billion on average) to
obtain repo funding from CBR; (ii) holds a portfolio with
relatively long duration of around three to four years, compared
with peers' typical 1-1.5 years; and (iii) holds a large majority
of the portfolio (RUB39 billion) with two Russian privately-owned
brokers, of which RUB31 billion is held in their Cyprus and UK
custodians, in contrast to most Russian banks, which keep their
government bonds in the National Settlement Depositary (NSD, a
subsidiary of the Moscow Stock Exchange) in order to be able to
obtain CBR repo funding.  In Fitch's view, the economic rationale
for holding such a large unrepoed securities book is somewhat
unclear.  The agency therefore believes it is necessary to
further investigate the nature of these holdings and any
potential impact it might have on its assessment of the bank's
liquidity, asset quality and solvency.

In Sept., the CBR withdrew the license of Bank24.ru, a sister
bank of PBB (reportedly for non-compliance with anti-money
laundering regulations), only a few months after it was
deconsolidated by PBB.  According to management, PBB and other
group banks were reviewed by the CBR in August, and the results
of that review should be available soon.

PBB's 'B' Long-term IDR and 'b' Viability Rating reflect the
bank's solid reported pre-impairment profitability and liquidity.
However, the ratings also consider the bank's moderate
capitalization, increased credit losses in the bank's retail loan
portfolio and contingent risks relating to the acquisition in
1Q14 by the bank's shareholders of a smaller, failed Russian
bank, Solidarnost.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

To resolve the RWN, Fitch will seek further clarification on the
nature of the bank's securities holdings and consider the impact
of this on the bank's liquidity, asset quality and solvency.  The
agency will also assess the results of the CBR review.

The ratings may be downgraded (potentially by more than one
notch) if Fitch believes the securities book is not readily
available to the bank as a potential source of liquidity, or if
other significant risks arise as a result of the CBR review.
However, the ratings may be affirmed if concerns relating to the
securities book are alleviated and the CBR review does not
identify any new, material issues.

The rating actions are:

Long-term foreign currency IDR: B; placed on RWN
Long-term local currency IDR: B; placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: 'B'; placed on RWN
Viability Rating: 'b' placed on RWN'
Support Rating: 5 unaffected
Support Rating Floor: No Floor; unaffected
National Long-term rating: 'BBB(rus)'; placed on RWN
Senior unsecured Long-term Rating: 'B-'/RR4; placed on RWN
Senior unsecured Short-term Rating: 'B'; placed on RWN
Senior unsecured National Rating: 'BBB(rus)'; placed on RWN



=========
S P A I N
=========


BBVA EMPRESAS 1: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR78.3MM C Notes to B1
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on twelve
notes and affirmed the rating on one note in six Spanish asset-
backed securities (ABS) transactions.

The upgrades reflect (1) the increase in the Spanish local-
currency country ceiling to A1 and (2) the increase of credit
enhancement (CE) in the affected transactions over the last 12
months.

The rating action concludes the review of the 12 notes initiated
on 17 March 2014, following the upgrade of the Spanish sovereign
rating to Baa2 from Baa3 and the resulting increase in the local-
currency country ceiling to A1 from A3. The sovereign rating
upgrade reflects improvements in institutional strength and
reduced susceptibility to event risk associated with lower
government liquidity and banking sector risks.

All of these transactions are ABS backed by loans to small to
medium-sized enterprises and large corporates, originated in
Spain by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (Baa2/P-2).

Please refer to the end of the ratings rationale section for a
list of affected ratings.

Ratings Rationale

-- Reduced sovereign risk

Moody's upgraded the Spanish sovereign rating to Baa2 in February
2014, which resulted in an increase in the local-currency country
ceiling to A1. The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the
maximum rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish
issuer, including structured finance transactions backed by
Spanish receivables, is A1 (sf).

The increase in CE, combined with the improving performance and
the reduction in sovereign risk, prompted the upgrade of the
notes. Moody's also considered the concentration issues in these
deals, which did constrain the rating upgrade of Class C of BBVA
EMPRESAS 6, FTA.

-- Key collateral assumptions

Moody's has revised its volatility assumptions in the six
transactions given the reduced country risk. Most other
assumptions remain unchanged given the improving performance of
the transactions and the stable outlook for Spanish ABS.

Moody's increased the default probability (DP) in BBVA EMPRESAS
1, FTA to 20% from 12.3% on the current balance to reflect higher
borrower concentration (top 5 exposures increased from 24% of the
pool in May 2013 to 38% now). In BBVA EMPRESAS 6, FTA, Moody's
increased the DP to 30% from 20.2%, primarily to reflect worse
than anticipated pool performance, as delinquencies now stand at
7.87% of the pool, the highest value observed among the six
deals. DP was unchanged in the other deals. In order to reflect
the good recovery performance observed to date, Moody's increased
the recovery assumptions to 50% from 40% for both BBVA EMPRESAS
1, FTA and BBVA EMPRESAS 2, FTA, and to 45% from 42.5% for BBVA
EMPRESAS 5, FTA. Moody's increased the minimum portfolio CE to
26.5% from 21.5% for BBVA EMPRESAS 1, FTA; to 23% from 21.5% for
BBVA EMPRESAS 5, FTA; and to 30% from 26.0% for BBVA EMPRESAS 6.
These higher CE values are due mainly to increased concentration
levels.

In BBVA EMPRESAS 1, FTA, the increased DP on the current balance
of 20% (corresponding to a DP on the original balance of 7.6%),
together with the increased recovery rate of 50% and a volatility
of 50%, corresponds to an updated portfolio CE of 26.5% increased
from 21.5% given updated pool characteristics. The largest five
borrowers account for 38% of the pool, well in excess of the
credit enhancement available for Class C of 22.8%. Concentration
risk constrained the upgrade of Class C to B1(sf).

In BBVA EMPRESAS 2, FTA, the unchanged DP on the current balance
of 15% (corresponding to a DP on the original balance of 10.3%),
together with the increased recovery rate of 50% and a volatility
of 59.62%, corresponds to an unchanged portfolio CE of 22%.


In BBVA EMPRESAS 3, FTA, the unchanged DP on the current balance
of 18.2% (corresponding to a DP on original balance of 16%),
together with the unchanged recovery rate of 45% and a volatility
of 45.9%, corresponds to an unchanged portfolio CE of 24.7%.

In BBVA EMPRESAS 4, FTA, the unchanged DP on the current balance
of 17.1% (corresponding to a DP on the original balance of
12.9%), together with the unchanged recovery rate of 45% and a
volatility of 49.44%, corresponds to an unchanged portfolio CE of
24.6%.

In BBVA EMPRESAS 5, FTA, the unchanged DP on the current balance
of 14.9% (corresponding to a DP on original balance of 10.9%),
together with the increased recovery rate of 45% and a volatility
of 51.76%, corresponds to an increased portfolio CE of 23%.

In BBVA EMPRESAS 6, FTA, the increased DP on the current balance
of 30% (corresponding to a DP on original balance of 21.8%),
together with the unchanged recovery rate of 46.5% and a
volatility of 31.91%, corresponds to an increased portfolio CE of
30%.

-- Exposure to counterparties

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties. In these transactions, Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (Baa2/P-2), performs most roles,
including the roles of servicer, account bank and swap provider,
except in BBVA EMPRESAS 1, FTA, where Soci't' G'n'rale (A2/P-1)
acts as issuer account bank. Treasury account contracts were
modified in BBVA EMPRESAS 3, FTA, BBVA EMPRESAS 5, FTA and BBVA
EMPRESAS 6, FTA and rating triggers changed to Baa3 from P-1. In
the case of Class C of BBVA EMPRESAS 2, FTA, and Class A in BBVA
EMPRESAS 4, FTA, the lack of remedial action following the loss
of BBVA's P-1 rating limits the possible upgrade to A2(sf) of
their Classes C and A respectively.

At this stage, only BBVA EMPRESAS 1, FTA and BBVA EMPRESAS 3, FTA
benefit from a swap, as the contracts were cancelled in the four
other deals.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations"
published in January 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
better-than-expected performance of the underlying collateral,
(3) deleveraging of the capital structure, (4) improvements in
the credit quality of the transaction counterparties and (5)
lower borrower concentration.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2) worse-
than-expected performance of the underlying collateral, (3)
deterioration in the notes' available CE and (4) deterioration in
the credit quality of the transaction counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 1 FTA

EUR50.1M B Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2014
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR78.3M C Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 2 FTA

EUR2416.8M A Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR153.9M B Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR279.3M C Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 3, FTA

EUR260M B Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2014
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR130M C Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2014
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 4, FTA

EUR1700M A Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 5, FTA

EUR975M A Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2014
A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR275M B Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2014
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BBVA Empresas 6, FTA
  EUR804M A Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR240M B Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2014
Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR156M C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade


RURAL HIPOTECARIO I: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR8MM C Notes 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 5 notes and
affirmed the ratings of 3 notes in 3 Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions: Rural Hipotecario
Global I, FTA, Rural Hipotecario III, FTH and Rural Hipotecario
IV, FTH.

The rating action concludes the review of 4 notes placed on
review on March 17, 2014, following the upgrade of the Spanish
sovereign rating to Baa2 from Baa3 and the resulting increase of
the local-currency country ceiling to A1 from A3. The sovereign
rating upgrade reflected improvements in institutional strength
and reduced susceptibility to event risk associated with lower
government liquidity and banking sector risks.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect (1) the increase in the Spanish local-
currency country ceiling to A1 and (2) sufficiency of credit
enhancement in the affected transactions.

-- Reduced Sovereign Risk

The Spanish sovereign rating was upgraded to Baa2 in February
2014, which resulted in an increase in the local-currency country
ceiling to A1. The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the
maximum rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish
issuer including structured finance transactions backed by
Spanish receivables, is A1 (sf).

The increase of credit enhancement combined with stable
performance and the reduction in sovereign risk has prompted the
upgrade of the notes.

-- Key collateral assumptions

The key collateral assumptions have not been updated as part of
this review. The performance of the underlying asset portfolios
remain in line with Moody's assumptions. Moody's also has a
stable outlook for Spanish ABS and RMBS transactions.

-- Exposure to Counterparties

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties including the roles of
servicer, account bank and swap provider.

The rating action takes into account commingling exposure to
multiple Cajas Rurales for the three transactions.

Moody's also assessed the exposure to Banco Cooperativo Espanol,
SA (Ba2/NP) as swap counterparty for Rural Hipotecario Global I,
FTA.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
Moody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

List of affected ratings:

Issuer: RURAL HIPOTECARIO GLOBAL I, FTA

EUR1008.1M A Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR36.3M B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR8M C Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013
Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

EUR12.8M D Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on May 30, 2013
Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: RURAL HIPOTECARIO III, FTH

EUR312.3M A Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2014
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR12.7M B Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: RURAL HIPOTECARIO IV, FTH

EUR498.7M A Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17, 2014
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR21.3M B Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade


TDA 26 MIXTO: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded 1 tranche of TDA 26 Mixto Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos and affirmed the rest.

The residential mortgages in TDA 26 Mixto Series 1 and 2 are
originated by Banca March and Banco de Sabadell.  The transaction
comprises two groups of notes: Series 1 notes are backed by
mortgage loans with loan-to-value ratios (LTV) below 80%, whereas
Series 2 notes are backed by mortgage loans with LTVs above 80%.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Counterparty Exposure

In April 2014, Fitch placed the class A2 notes in TDA 26 Mixto
Series 1 on Rating Watch Negative as a result of insufficient
liquidity to cover for payment interruption risk.  Given that the
issuer has not put any remedial measures in place within six
months, Fitch has downgraded the Class A2 notes to 'Asf'.  The
downgrade is in line with Fitch's counterparty criteria for
structured finance transactions and reflects the risk that the
transaction is exposed to payment interruption risk.

Stable Performance of Underlying Assets

The performance of the underlying pools has been characterized by
a stable trend of late stage arrears (excluding defaults) since
the last review in April 2014.  As of end-July, three-month plus
arrears (excluding defaults) stood at 1.2% of the current
collateral balance in TDA 26 Mixto Series 1 and at 1% in TDA 26
Mixto Series 2, which is below Fitch's Spanish RMBS index (1.9%).

Cumulative gross defaults (defined as loans in arrears by more
than 12 months) have increased to 2.8% of the initial collateral
balance in TDA 26 Mixto Series 1, from 2.7% in April 2014,
resulting in further reserve fund draws.  The increase, however,
is within our expectations and in line with the trend seen in
previous years.  In TDA 26 Mixto Series 2, no defaults have
occurred since April 2014.  The stable asset performance is
reflected in today's affirmation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Further deterioration in asset performance and a corresponding
increase in new defaults and drawings on the reserve fund.
Furthermore, an abrupt shift in interest rates could jeopardize
the underlying borrowers' affordability and also lead to negative
rating action.

The rating actions are:

TDA 26-Mixto, FTA - Series 1
Class A2 (ISIN ES0377953015) downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AA-sf';
off RWN, Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN ES0377953023) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative
Class C (ISIN ES0377953031) affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Negative
Class D (ISIN ES0377953049) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE 0%

TDA 26-Mixto, FTA - Series 2
Class A (ISIN ES0377953056) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Negative
Class B (ISIN ES0377953064) affirmed 'BBsf'; Outlook Negative
Class C (ISIN ES0377953072) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE 20%


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on 37 Spanish Multi-Cedulas
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in 37 Spanish multi-cedulas transactions.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Lowered its ratings in 12 transactions, and

   -- Affirmed its ratings in 25 transactions.

S&P's ratings in these transactions are no longer under criteria
observation.

The rating actions reflect the application of S&P's updated
criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria) and the
deterioration in the underlying collateral credit quality.

Different factors affect S&P's ratings in Spanish multi-cedulas
transactions, including changes to ratings on the underlying
assets.  Since S&P's previous review, it has taken five rating
actions that affected the transactions' underlying collateral
credit quality:

   -- On July 25, 2014, S&P revised to positive from negative its
      CreditWatch status on S&P's ratings on Catalunya Banc,
      S.A.'s mortgage covered bonds.

   -- On Aug. 1, 2014, S&P lowered to 'BBB' from 'BBB+' its
      ratings on NCG Banco, S.A.'s mortgage covered bonds.

   -- On Oct. 14, 2014, S&P lowered to 'A' from 'AA-' its ratings
      on Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.'s mortgage covered
      bonds.

   -- On Oct. 14, 2014, S&P lowered to 'A' from 'AA-' its ratings
      on CaixaBank S.A.'s mortgage covered bonds.

   -- On Oct. 14, 2014, S&P lowered to 'A' from 'AA-' its ratings
      on Kutxabank S.A.'s mortgage covered bonds.

Furthermore, S&P has applied its RAS criteria to the multi-
cedulas transactions.  According to these criteria, S&P considers
covered bonds backed by mortgage assets as having "moderate"
sensitivity to country risk.  S&P can rate Spanish multi-cedulas
up to four notches above the sovereign rating because they
feature liquidity lines and extendible maturities that mitigate
refinancing risk.

Given S&P's current ratings on Spain (BBB/Stable/A-2), the
maximum rating for Spanish multi-cedulas transactions is 'A+'.

Taking into account the deterioration in the collateral's credit
quality and the application of S&P's RAS criteria, it has lowered
its ratings in 12 transactions and affirmed its ratings in 25.
S&P's rating actions in three multi-cedulas transactions are
unaffected by the application of S&P's RAS criteria, because it
did not take any rating actions on the underlying assets (these
ratings are also no longer under criteria observation).

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CRITERIA CHANGES

S&P's ratings are based on its applicable criteria, including
those set out in the criteria article "Covered Bond Ratings
Framework: Methodology And Assumptions," published on June. 26,
2012.  However, please note that these criteria are under review.

As a result of this review, S&P's future criteria applicable to
rating covered bonds may differ from S&P's current criteria.
These criteria changes may affect the ratings on the outstanding
multi-cedulas transactions.

Until such time that S&P adopts revised criteria, it will
continue to rate and surveil these multi-cedulas transactions
using S&P's existing criteria.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


NORTHLAND RESOURCES: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) and the probability of default rating (PDR) of
Northland Resources AB (Northland) to C and C-PD respectively.
Concurrently, the rating agency has lowered to Ca (LGD4 (60%))
the rating on the US$335 million of 15% senior secured notes with
warrants maturing in 2019 issued by Northland. The outlook on all
ratings is negative.

Northland, a subsidiary of publicly listed Northland Resources
SA, is a special purpose vehicle created to manage the
construction and development of the Kaunisvaara iron ore project
in northern Sweden. The Kaunisvaara project comprises the Tapuli
mine, the Sahavaara mine, a dual-line processing plant and a
fully integrated logistics solution for the delivery of iron ore
concentrate to the Port of Narvik in Norway. The company is
currently under reorganization overseen by the Swedish Court of
Lulea and has recently suspended all its mining operations.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the CFR to C reflects Moody's expectation that
the company is highly likely to default in the near future. This
is due to an extremely weak liquidity position, which has
recently forced Northland to suspend all its mining operations
and to make the vast majority of its employees redundant. Indeed,
liquidation of the company is a realistic prospect unless the
management is able to secure new resources within the next few
months. This can only happen if the District Court of Lulea,
which is overseeing the current reorganization, accepts the
request recently submitted by the company and its administrator
to approve the further continuation of the ongoing reorganization
for three more months.

Even if the reorganization were to continue, Moody's believes
that it will be extremely challenging for management to secure
additional meaningful resources within such a short timeframe,
also considering the materially deteriorated market environment,
with iron ore prices dropped below US$85/metrics tonne (mt). If
prices remain in the range of Us$75/mt - US$85/mt for a prolonged
period -- which Moody's now assumes as its base case scenario for
at least the next year -- then Northland's operations, even if
resumed after the current suspension, would remain unprofitable,
given Northland's average cash cost of around $100/mt during Q2
2014. Furthermore, Moody's estimates that re-starting operations
would require a substantial cash injection, not just for re-start
costs but also to provide liquidity to cover capex and working
capital requirements and provide some cushion against margin
volatility.

The Ca rating of the senior secured notes represents a one-notch
uplift from the CFR, which reflects the priority ranking status
of the secured bondholders relative to most of the other
creditors in the event of default. At the same time, the Ca
rating on the notes is constrained by Moody's assumption of a
very low overall family recovery rate, negatively impacted by
Moody's downward revision of pricing expectations for iron ore
prices. The notes' Ca rating also reflects their effective
subordination to $60 million of super senior notes, plus accrued
PIK interests, which will be repaid first in a scenario of
enforcement of the collateral.

Negative Outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view on the probability of
default of the company within a short timeframe, combined with
the possibility of a lower than expected recovery for secured
note-holders under a scenario of liquidation, also considering
the fast deteriorating market environment for iron ore, making
the company's mining operations -- currently suspended -
potentially less attractive.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Moody's does not expect any positive rating pressure in the near
term, unless the company can secure the funding needed to resume
its operations and execute its business plan even under the
current much more difficult operating environment for iron ore.

The ratings are already very low in the scale so there is limited
scope for a further downgrade except on the notes, if recovery
expectations weaken further.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


YASAR HOLDING: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Proposed USD Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B2 rating
to the proposed USD notes that Yasar Holding A.S. (Yasar, B2
corporate family rating/B2-PD probability of default rating,
stable) intends to issue. The assigned LGD assessment and rate
for the proposed notes are LGD4 and 50% respectively.

Ratings Rationale

Yasar will be the issuer of the notes that will be guaranteed
unconditionally and irrevocably on a joint and several basis by
main subsidiaries of Yasar. The issuer's and guarantors' assets
and revenues will make up at least 75% of consolidated total
assets or revenues. The notes will rank pari passu with all other
outstanding unsecured and unsubordinated obligations.

Yasar intends to use the proceeds for repayment of certain debts,
which will -- dependent on the tenure of the proposed notes --
lengthen the weighted average debt maturity profile. Whilst this
is a step towards strengthening its liquidity, Moody's notes that
Yasar's group funding is likely to remain reliant on short-term
funding from local and international banks thereby constraining
its liquidity profile.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Moody's could upgrade the rating if metrics are sustainably kept
at the following levels: EBIT margin is in excess of 8%,
debt/EBITDA trending towards 4.0x and EBIT/interest cover of
above 2x. The company's reliance on short-term funding may prove
to be a constraining factor for upward movement of the rating.
Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the rating if the EBIT margin
were to fall below 6%, debt/EBITDA trend towards 5.0x and
EBIT/interest cover below 1.0x.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Packaged
Goods published in June 2013. Other methodologies used include
Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies
in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Dating back to 1927 and controlled by the Selcuk Yasar family,
Yasar Holding is a leading diversified Turkish consumer products
group with major interests in food and beverage (67% of sales, as
of FY 2013) and coating (25%), where the company has two market
leading brands through Pinar (for F&B) and Dyo (for coatings).
Yasar has 13 F&B production facilities and 150,000 sales points
as well as five production plants and 13,000 sales points in
coatings, spread all over the country.


YASAR HOLDING: Fitch Assigns 'B(EXP)' Rating to USD250MM Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Yasar Holding A.S.'s (Yasar; B/Stable)
proposed senior unsecured USD250 million bond a 'B(EXP)' expected
rating, with a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'.

The assignment of the final rating is subject to the receipt of
final documentation conforming to information already received.

The planned USD250 million senior unsecured bond is expected to
be issued by Yasar Holdings A.S., and will be guaranteed on a
joint and several basis by its main operating subsidiaries Pinar
Entegre Et ve Un Sanayi A.S., Pinar Sut Mamulleri Sanayii A.S.,
Yasar Birlesik Pazarlama Dagitim Turizm ve Ticaret A.S., Camli
Yem Besicilik San. ve Tic. A.S, and Dyo Boya Fabrikalari Sanayi
ve Ticaret A.S.  The total assets and total revenues of the
guarantors and issuer represent no less than 75% of group assets
and revenues.  The proceeds will be used to prepay Yasar's USD250
million senior unsecured notes issued by Willow No.2 (Ireland)
PLC (Willow), currently due in Oct. 2015.  Consequently, there
will initially be no increase in gross or net debt as a result of
the bond issue.  The bond will also benefit from a change of
control and a cross-default clause.

The bond is rated at the same level as Yasar's Issuer Default
Rating of 'B' as it will rank equally with the company's senior
unsecured debt, including existing bank debt.

Yasar's ratings reflect the company's track record of dealing
effectively with Turkey's volatile economy and its long-
established profile as an important player in the structurally
growing Turkish food and beverages and coatings markets.  This
should restrain adverse external effects on its credit metrics in
the short term.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Robust Food and Beverage Business

Despite the Turkish lira devaluation and difficult consumer
environment, Yasar had a strong 2013 and 1H14, with its food &
beverage business reporting better than expected revenue and
profit growth.  In 2013 and 1H14 divisional revenue grew 9% and
18%, respectively, and divisional EBITDA grew by 2.5% and 15.3%.
The strong performance benefited from Yasar's ability to pass-
through input price increases to customers, from improved product
mix through the sale of higher margin products and from volume
growth resulting from market share growth.

Healthy Prospects for Food and Beverage

Fitch expects the strong 1H14 performance to continue for the
remainder of 2014 and that revenue, profit and profit margin
should be stronger than 2013.  Fitch expects increases in raw
material prices (e.g. raw milk prices) to normalize from the
current high, which is linked to government actions that include
subsidies to farmers.  Additionally, an ongoing structural shift
in consumer preference to packaged products as opposed to
unpackaged should continue to benefit Yasar.

Significant Improvement in Coatings Business

Revenue in the coatings business grew by 18.8% in 2013 and a
further 33.4% in 1H14.  Yasar's coatings business contributed
nearly 40% of group EBITDA in 2013 compared with just 12% in
2009. The significant improvement is due to operational changes
made since 2009, which resulted in the implementation of cost
rationalizations including foreign exchange hedging and other
efficiencies programs.  As a result, Yasar's market position has
strengthened, also leading to economies of scale that are
benefiting profitability.  The increasing volumes were also
attributed to Yasar's acquisition of the Turkish business of
Casati Spa in 4Q13.  Fitch expects this growth momentum to
continue into 2015.

Business Diversification

The ratings reflect Yasar's diverse range of products in its core
segments of food, beverages and coatings, and strong market
shares within particular product categories.  This is partially
offset by the challenges of managing a widely diversified holding
company, given the lack of synergies between some of the segments
and the recurring outlay of resources to enable growth and remain
competitive.  Fitch notes that the company is open for divestment
opportunities of some of its non-core businesses but Fitch has
not factored these given the uncertainty and non-committal
timeline.

Limited FCF

Free cash flow (FCF) remained negative at -TRY64.2 in 2013 (FY12:
negative TRY62.9 million) and Fitch projects it will remain
compressed over FY14-FY16 due to high capex in relation to a
number of investment projects identified by management.  Although
Yasar enjoys a healthy level of funds from operations (FFO),
increasing revenues absorb high levels of working capital and
capex (FY13: TRY134.3 million).  The dividend leakage to
minorities in the listed subsidiaries further depresses cash flow
by TRY20 million-TRY30 million a year. Mitigating these aspects,
Fitch believes Yasar retains flexibility to postpone some of its
capex should it need to protect its credit metrics.

High Foreign Currency Risk

Fitch estimates that nearly 70% of Yasar's debt at end-June 2014
was foreign currency-denominated, while most of its revenue is
generated in Turkish lira. As a result of currency devaluation,
Yasar's net debt increased by approximately TRY138 million at
end-December 2013, causing a net adverse impact of approximately
0.5x-0.6x on net debt/EBITDA.  Some operating costs, especially
in coatings, are foreign currency-denominated.  Exports provide
some relief in terms of foreign currency generation, but remain
limited, at under 10% of group sales.

Leverage Contained

The strong 1H14 performance and the reversal of the sharp Turkish
lira devaluation between November 2013 and January 2014, should
enable FFO net leverage to drop to around 4.4x in 2014
(FY13:5.2x).  Barring any currency devaluation and assuming the
continued momentum from the 1H14 performance, Fitch expects Yasar
to continue to deleverage.  However, given Fitch's expectations
of still mildly negative FCF generation over 2014-2015, we expect
there will be limited scope for Yasar's leverage to drop below
4.0x over the period.

Sufficient Liquidity

Liquidity was supported by cash of TRY85m at end-1H14,
approximately USD366m in undrawn uncommitted bank lines, as well
as strong relationships with both local and international banks.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

   -- An operating shortfall that further constrains cash flow
      and/or liquidity.

   -- Adjusted net debt/EBITDAR above 4.5x or FFO adjusted gross
      leverage above 5.0x on a sustained basis.

   -- FFO fixed charge coverage below 2.0x on a sustained basis.

   -- EBITDA margin falling below 8% for more than two financial
      years.

   -- Another major currency/economic downturn in Turkey
      affecting Yasar's operations.

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

   -- Adjusted net debt/EBITDAR consistently below 3.5x or
      adjusted net debt/FFO consistently below 4.0x.

   -- FFO fixed charge above 2.5x.

   -- EBITDA margin remaining at or above 10%.

   -- Negative FCF by no more than 1% of sales and maintenance of
      longer-dated debt profile.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ACODENT: Swift Dental Buys Firm, Saves Jobs
-------------------------------------------
Shelina Begum at Manchester Evening News reports new jobs will be
created after dental lab Acodent, which went into administration,
was sold to Manchester-based Swift Dental Laboratory.

Bolton-based Acodent had run into financial difficulties and the
company directors announced that the business was closing with
the loss of all 115 jobs, according to Manchester Evening.

The report notes that Robert Adamson and Tim Askam from Mazars'
business restructuring team were appointed as joint
administrators to Alpha Zahn, which traded as Acodent.

The administrators entered into a trading license agreement with
Swift, enabling Acodent to continue to trade while its future and
viability were assessed, the report discloses.

The report relates that the assets of Acodent were then purchased
by a new company, which will become part of the Swift Dental
Group, and will continue to trade as Acodent.

Swift Dental has announced that they are recruiting for a number
of roles in the new company.

"The purchase of Acodent is great news for the business, its
customers and the local community, the report quoted Robert
Adamson, joint administrator and partner in Mazars, as saying.

"We have worked closely with former staff at Acodent to help them
claim redundancy payments and we are pleased that Swift will
shortly be announcing job vacancies at the company," Mr. Adamson
said, the report notes.

The report relays that Roy McGillivray, managing director at
Swift, added: "We were pleased to be asked by Mazars to be
involved in the assessment of Acodent, and furthermore to be a
major supporter of the new company going forward."

"Swift Dental Group has a long history in the North West and an
excellent reputation amongst its customers," Mr. McGillivray the
report says.

Andrew Walker, restructuring partner at the Leeds office of Irwin
Mitchell advised Mazars, the report adds.


CANLEY SPORTS AND SOCIAL CLUB: Will be Knocked Down
---------------------------------------------------
Coventry Telegraph reports that popular sports and social club
Canley Sports and Social Club destroyed by arsonists will be
knocked down this side of Christmas.

The city council has approved plans to demolish Canley Sports and
sell off the land in Marler Road, Canley, according to Coventry
Telegraph.

The report notes that the club has stood in ruins since an arson
attack in September 2013 saw the roof collapse after flames
ripped through the building.

Now the site will be cleared, handed a new lease of life through
planning permission, and then sold off to a developer in the new
year, the report relates.

Originally set to be auctioned off when the company running the
club went into administration, the place was pulled from the
market and the lease surrendered to the council by the
administrator, the report says.

The proposals were passed by Coun Kevin Maton, cabinet member for
business, enterprise and employment.

"We have agreed to complete the demolition of the club later this
year so we have a clear site that doesn't attract any more anti-
social behavior," the report quoted Mr. Maton as saying.

"Then we will market the site for sale.  A site like this with an
outline approval for redevelopment should be attractive to a
developer and the sooner we can bring this site back into use the
better for everyone," Mr. Maton said, the report relays.

It comes just a couple of days after the Telegraph reported that
London Road Social Club was set to be knocked down to make way
for a seven-storey block of student flats.


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Severe Mgmt. Failings Caused Near-Collapse
-------------------------------------------------------------
According to The Scotsman's Martin Flanagan, a new report by MPs
has claimed Co-op Bank's near-collapse as it sought to take over
more than 600 Lloyds Bank branches was the result of severe
management failings at the mutual, plus regulatory and accounting
shortcomings.

The all-party Treasury committee's report, published on Oct. 23,
said the GBP1.5 billion black hole in the lender's balance sheet
that torpedoed the so-called Project Verde deal should have been
discovered earlier by long-standing auditor KPMG and the former
Financial Services Authority, The Scotsman relates.

When that deal fell through, Lloyds -- forced to divest the
branches by the European Union in return for its taxpayer bailout
in the financial crisis -- resorted to floating the business on
the stock market under the demerged TSB brand, The Scotsman
notes.

MPs also criticized the Co-op's convoluted board structure, with
directors lacking in financial management skills, for the
collapse of the transaction, claiming it was "an accident waiting
to happen and badly let down Co-op members and customers",
according to The Scotsman.

The report calls on the independent review commissioned last year
by the Treasury into the downfall of the Co-op to examine whether
KPMG could have done more earlier to identify the mutual's
financial weakness, and therefore unsuitability to vastly
increase in size with the acquisition of the Lloyds assets, The
Scotsman discloses.

KPMG, The Scotsman says, is also being investigated by the
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the accountancy regulatory
body, over its auditing of Co-op Bank.

The FRC inquiry will turn a spotlight on the Co-op's ill-starred
acquisition of the Britannia building society in 2009, which
brought a swathe of commercial bad debts on to the mutual's
balance sheet, The Scotsman states.

"The due diligence performed [on the Britannia loan book] has
proved to be totally inadequate," The Scotsman quotes the
Treasury committee report as saying.  According to The Scotsman,
it claimed KPMG's initial diligence was based on "incomplete
information", and called for the independent inquiry to "look
closely at the shortcomings of the bank's auditor, and its
apparent failure to ascertain the extent of the impairments".

The MPs said the independent inquiry also needed to look at
whether the FSA "could or should have developed better
supervisory tools earlier" that could have uncovered Co-op Bank's
balance sheet problems with less fallout, The Scotsman relays.

The report dismisses claims by Lord Levene, the chairman of rival
Project Verde bidder, City-backed NBNK Investments, that
political pressure was put on Lloyds to go with the Co-op offer,
The Scotsman notes.

The Co-operative Bank is a retail and commercial bank in the
United Kingdom, with its headquarters in Balloon Street,
Manchester.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 25,
2014, Moody's Investors Service downgraded by one notch to Caa2
the Co-Operative Bank Plc's senior unsecured debt and deposit
ratings, and maintained the negative outlook on the ratings.  The
bank's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was
affirmed at E, which is equivalent to a baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ca.  The BFSR has a stable outlook.


JIMMY'S WORLD: Restaurant Closes, Blames Competition
----------------------------------------------------
Derby Telegraph reports that a business leader has said that
competition from other eateries and an "isolated" location in the
city centre could have been contributing factors to the demise of
GBP1.5 million restaurant Jimmy's World Grill and Bar.

As reported in the Derby Telegraph, Jimmy's World Grill and Bar,
at the city's Riverlights development, has shut, according to
Derby Telegraph.

The 400-seater eaterie had only been open since February 2012.

John Forkin, managing director of Marketing Derby, a
public/private sector organization set up to promote Derby as a
place to invest, said that more needed to be done to attract
footfall to Riverlights, the report notes.

"It was always going to be difficult for an isolated unit to
survive at Riverlights as the quality of competition in Derby's
food and drink sector is getting better each year," the report
quoted Mr. Forkin as saying.

With the closure of Jimmy's World it means there are now five
vacant units at Riverlights, the report discloses.

"To work, the scheme needs the adjacent site developing and a
cluster of good quality food and drink operators that can take
full advantage of its riverside location," the report quoted Mr.
Forkin as saying.

The report notes that Jimmy's World had spent around GBP1.5
million fitting out two ground-floor units at Riverlights to
create the restaurant, which offered an all-you-can-eat, multi-
cuisine concept, selling a range of international dishes,
including Italian, Thai, Chinese, Mexican, Japanese and Indian
food.

At the time, the business said that the outlet had created 70
jobs, the report relays.

Last year, Riverlights was put up for sale with a price tag of
GBP23 million, the report discloses.

It came after the scheme's owner, Derby Riverlights Developments,
was placed into administration, forcing a sale of the building to
realize some value for the company's creditors, the report adds.


LONDON MINING: Frank Timis Ready to Rescue Firm
-----------------------------------------------
The Telegraph reports that Frank Timis, the chairman of African
Minerals, is close to securing a deal to buy London Mining's
operations in Sierra Leone out of administration.

London Mining toppled into administration after failing to find a
buyer for the business as it struggled with debts following a
slump in iron ore prices, according to The Telegraph.

The report notes that Sierra Leone's finance minister Kaifala
Marah flew to London last weekend to join talks about the
potential sale of the Marampa mine, which employs 1,400 people in
the West African country and has iron ore reserves expected to
support production for the next 40 years.

Timis Corporation is said to have secured financial backing in
Australia to acquire the operational Marampa mine, the report
relays.

The report notes that Mr. Timis's African Minerals owns a
neighboring iron ore mine, the Tonkolili project, in Sierra Leone
and is expected to enter into a joint venture with Marampa.

Earlier this month, the business also hired bankers at Standard
Chartered and Jefferies to evaluate a possible debt restructuring
for African Minerals, the report notes.

London Mining had been working with Goldman Sachs and Standard
Chartered to try to find a strategic buyer to plug a funding gap,
which meant that it was running out of money to service its only
operating iron ore mine, the report says.

The report discloses that the collapse came just a week after
London Mining's chief executive, Graeme Hossie, warned investors
that there was little to no value left in the equity of the
shares.

Indian steel conglomerate Jindal had also been involved in
discussions about buying the mine.

London Mining was ravaged by the plummeting price of iron ore
which is sitting at its lowest level since 2009, the report
recalls.  The group was also hit by a spat with commodities giant
Glencore over the pricing of an iron ore supply contract, which
is said to have put a squeeze on its short-term cash position,
the report notes.

The report relays that the Ebola outbreak, which has sparked a
crisis in Sierra Leone, has also piled pressure on the group,
which has already chartered flights to move its "non-essential"
staff out of the country

In June, Mr. Timis visited Sierra Leone and declared it "business
as ususal" despite the Ebola threat, the report says.


TULLOW OIL: Moody's Cuts Corp. Family Rating to Ba3; Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba3/Ba3-PD from
Ba2/Ba2-PD the corporate family and probability of default
ratings of Tullow Oil plc Moody's also downgraded to B2/LGD 5
from B1/LGD 5 the ratings on its USD650 million 2020 and USD650
million 2022 senior notes. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a
negative outlook to the issuer.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the CFR from Ba2 to Ba3 and the consequent one-
notch downgrade of the bond ratings reflect Moody's reassessment
of the increasing country risk exposure to Ghana, where Tullow
retains considerable and increasing concentration. Its core
Jubilee field has accounted for approximately 45% of its
production in 2014 (before adjusting for the recently announced
divestments of the European producing assets, principally in the
UK and the Netherlands). However, following the divestment of the
European operations, Ghana would account for 54% of production,
and approximately 90% of production would be concentrated in
Ghana, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Projected growth in capex and
production in Ghana should reinforce this concentration: Tullow's
next big project TEN, that remains the focus of its investment
program in 2015-2016 and underpins Moody's production and
developed reserve growth assumptions for the rating, is also
located in Ghana.

Moody's downgraded Ghana's sovereign rating from B1 to B2/
negative in June 2014. The repositioning of Tullow's ratings
reflects Moody's view on more limited de-linkage of the company's
credit ratings from the ratings of the largest country of
operations.

Tullow's Ba3 CFR is now positioned two notches above Ghana's B2/
negative rating, supported by several mitigating factors,
including (a) Tullow's off-shore production and direct
international sales of crude, (b) its US dollar-based pricing,
(c) its established and diversified financing framework, which
does not depend on the domestic banking system in Ghana, and (d)
a limited degree of production diversification with approximately
half of production in other West African countries.

Furthermore, Tullow's Petroleum Agreements (PAs) specify its
corporate tax and a 5% royalty paid in the country. Given
investment tax deductions allowed by Ghana to promote growth of
its oil sector, Moody's expect that a negative impact on Tullow's
cash flows of any future tax increases may be mitigated by its
substantial on-going investment in TEN, while Ghana is counting
on the successful completion of this USD 4.9 billion strategic
project in mid-2016.

Tullow's Ba3 CFR remains supported by the strong execution of its
organic growth strategy that has boosted its resource portfolio
and financial performance in the context of conservative
financial management practices, while reflecting the higher risk
characteristics inherent to its focus on exploration activity,
limited and concentrated producing asset base, as well as
aforementioned constraints of the country risk exposure.

The rating also reflects Tullow's sizeable oil and gas resource
base, which has been enhanced in recent years by a successful
exploration and appraisal program leading to the opening of new
hydrocarbon basins and significant oil discoveries in West and
East Africa, and in the Barents Sea in Norway. The rating is
further supported by the relatively good visibility of longer
term development projects, based on its existing oil discoveries
in Ghana, Uganda and Kenya, that underpin the production growth
trajectory.

Until the completion of the TEN project, Tullow's leverage will
remain elevated. Capital expenditure results in substantial
negative free cash flow and rising debt leverage until after the
TEN project comes on stream in mid-2016. Taking into account
Moody's recently revised oil price assumptions (US$90/boe Brent
in 2015), Moody's expect that Tullow's leverage will exceed
USD50,000/boe average daily production in 2015/2016, while
divestments should help it to maintain its net debt/EBITDA just
above 2.0x times. In this context, Moody's will be looking in
particular towards the timely development of the TEN project, as
well as further divestments (such as the recent disposal of the
group's Southern North Sea gas assets) to help Tullow to recover
its credit metrics and provide additional financial flexibility
to manage any fiscal pressures in Ghana.

Tullow's conservative financial policies, including a stable
dividend payout and its pro-active oil price risk management,
continue to support the ratings.

Rating Outlook

The negative outlook mirrors the negative outlook on Ghana, even
though the fundamentals of the business remain strong. Assuming
continuous strong execution of production and growth plans by the
company, a stabilization of the outlook on the sovereign rating
of Ghana should allow to stabilie the outlook on the Tullow's
ratings.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

The Ba3 ratings could come under pressure should (i) Tullow
suffer significant delays and/or cost overruns in progressing its
major growth projects and/or (ii) experience a significant and
sustained deterioration in production levels and/or oil price
realisations, which would put pressure on its internal cash flow
generation and result in more pronounced and sustained balance
sheet re-leveraging than currently expected, with net debt to
EBITDA remaining above 2 times and debt to average daily
production exceeding USD50,000 per barrel and RCF/Debt below 20%
after the completion of TEN project in mid-2016. The rating may
also be downgraded in an event of a downgrade of the ratings of
Ghana.

In spite of the profitable organic growth, the Ba3 rating remains
constrained by the sizable country exposure to Ghana. The upgrade
of the rating would require an improved geographical
diversification of the company's reserve base and production
profile towards lower risk jurisdictions, and a recovery in the
credit profile, with debt/average daily production falling to
below USD 40,000/boe and RCF/Debt improving towards 50% level.

Liquidity Profile

Tullow's liquidity position remains solid and is supported by (i)
its USD3.5 billion reserves based lending facility amortizing
from October 2016 and maturing in December 2019, supported by a
wide group of international banks, including the IFC; (ii) its
secured revolving credit facility (RCF), refinanced in March
2014, increased to USD750 million and extended to 2017 and (iii)
the issuance of certain letters of credit for USD200 million
under bilateral arrangements. As of 30 July 2014, Tullow reported
total availabilities of USD2.5 billion under its facilities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global
Independent Exploration and Production Industry published in
December 2011. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Tullow Oil is a leading independent oil and gas exploration and
production company with a large and diversified portfolio of
interests focused on Africa and the Atlantic margins. In the
first half of 2014, the company reported an average production
(on a working interest basis) of 78,400 barrels of oil equivalent
per day and sales revenue of USD1.265 billion.


ULSTER ORCHESTRA: Chairman Appears Before Culture Committee
-----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that the Ulster Orchestra has told Stormont's
culture committee it cannot cut more staff to save money, while
it tackles a GBP500,000 gap in funding.  It has already reduced
administrative staff from 23 to 18 and employs 63 musicians,
according to BBC News.

The report notes that the orchestra said it is negotiating with
musicians to get rid of what it calls "restrictive practices".

The orchestra assured MLAs it is trying to become less Belfast-
centered.

Sir George Bain, the executive chairman, told the committee it
could send smaller groups of musicians out to towns that could
not accommodate the full orchestra, the report notes.

The report discloses Sir Bain also added that musicians were paid
full salaries even when not giving performances, but their
contracts mean they could not be used for other projects, without
extra payment.

Earlier this month, Sir Bain revealed the orchestra would be
forced to close by the end of the year unless it received
GBP500,000 in emergency funding, the report says.

The report notes that Sir Bain's warning came as he revealed the
details behind a rescue plea to Belfast City Council that could
mean a name change for the orchestra.

It costs about GBP4.5 million a year to run the Ulster Orchestra,
the report relays.

It said it had lost 28% of funding from public sources -- the
equivalent of GBP1 million -- in the past four years, the report
says.

In a bid to survive, it has asked Belfast City Council to back a
rescue plan that includes a GBP500,000 funding guarantee to keep
it solvent until March next year when it would be restructured,
the report relays.

The report says that it is also asking for the free use for the
next five years of the Ulster Hall, which costs about GBP160,000
a year.

According to Sir George, the orchestra could end up changing its
name to something like the Belfast Symphony if the rescue plan
was accepted, the report says.

If the money is not forthcoming, the orchestra is warning it
could go into administration before Christmas and close not long
afterwards, the report relays.

The report notes that it is the only full-time professional
orchestra in Northern Ireland, and plays the majority of its
concerts in Belfast's Ulster Hall and the Waterfront Hall.

The BBC gives financial support of GBP639,000 a year to the
orchestra, the report relays.

Belfast City Council has yet to respond to the orchestra's
request for additional funding, the report adds.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Competitive Strategy for Health Care Organizations
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Title:  Competitive Strategy for Health Care Organizations:
Techniques for Strategic Action
Authors: Alan Sheldon and Susan Windham-Bannister
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 190 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Francoise C. Arsenault

Order your personal copy today at http://bit.ly/1nqvQ7V

Competitive Strategy for Health Care Organizations: Techniques
for Strategic Action is an informative book that provides
practical guidance for senior health care managers and other
health care professionals on the organizational and competitive
strategic action needed to survive and to be successful in
today's increasingly competitive health care marketplace. An
important premise of the book is that the development and
implementation of good competitive strategy involves a profound
understanding of change. As the authors state at the outset:
"What may need to be done in today's environment may involve
great departure from the past, including major changes in the
skills and attitudes of staff, and great tact and patience in
bringing about the necessary strategic training."

Although understanding change is certainly important in most
fields, the authors demonstrate the particular importance of
change to the health care field in the first and second chapters.
In Chapter 1, the authors review the three eras of medical care
(individual medicine, organizational medicine, and network
medicine) and lay the groundwork for their model for competitive
strategy development. Chapter 2 describes the factors that must
be taken into account for successful strategic decision-making.
These factors include the analysis of the environmental trends
and competitive forces affecting the health care field, past,
current, and future; the analysis of the competitive position of
the organization; the setting of goals, objectives, and a
strategy; the analysis of competitive performance; and the
readaptation of the business, if necessary, through positioning
activities, redirection of strategy, and organizational change.

Chapters 3 through 7 discuss in detail the five positioning
activities that are part of the model and therefore critical to
the development and implementation of a successful strategy:
scanning; product market analysis; collaboration; restructuring;
and managing the physician. The chapter on managing the physician
(Chapter 7) is the only section in the book that appears dated
(the book was first published in 1984). In this day of physician-
owned hospitals and physician-backed joint ventures, it is
difficult to envision the physician in the passive role of "being
managed." However, even the changing role of physicians since the
book's first publication correlates with the authors' premise
that their model for competitive strategic planning is based
exactly on understanding and anticipating change, which is no
better illustrated than in health care where change is measured
not in years but in months. These middle chapters and the other
chapters use a mixture of didactic presentation, graphs and
charts, quotations from famous individuals, and anecdotes to
render what can frequently be dry information in an entertaining
and readable format.

The final chapter of the book presents a case example (using the
"South Clinic") as a summary of many of the issues and strategic
alternatives discussed in the previous chapters. The final
chapter also discusses the competitive issues specific to various
types of health care delivery organizations, including teaching
hospitals, community hospitals, group practices, independent
practice associations, hospital groups, super groups and
alliances, nursing homes, home health agencies, and for-profits.
An interesting quote on for-profits indicates how time and change
are indeed important factors in strategic planning in the health
care field: "Behind many of the competitive concerns . . . lies
the specter of the for-profits. Their competitive edge has lain
until now in the excellence of their management. But developments
in the past half-decade have shown that the voluntary sector can
match the for-profits in management excellence. Despite
reservations that may not always be untrue, the for-profit sector
has demonstrated that good management can pay off in health care.
But will the voluntary institutions end up making the same
mistakes and having the same accusations leveled at them as the
for-profits have? It is disturbing to talk to the head of a
voluntary hospital group and hear him describe physicians as his
potential competitors."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *