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          T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, October 31, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 216

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

HYPO ALPE-ADRIA: Agrees to Sell Balkan Banking Unit to Advent


A Z E R B A I J A N

AZERBAIJAN: Commits to Continue Funding Agricultural Sector


G E R M A N Y

FLINT GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-3: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class E Notes
CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-3: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class E Notes
THESEUS EUROPEAN: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on EUR15MM E Notes


I T A L Y

MONTE DEI PASCHI: In Talks with Government Over Capital Options


P O L A N D

KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Moody's Assigns '(P)B1' Corporate Family Rating
KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable


P O R T U G A L

BANCO ESPIRITO: Insolvency "Not Good," Portuguese PM Says
MAGELLAN MORTGAGES 1: Moody's Hikes Class C Notes Rating to B1


R U S S I A

PIK GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR
PROMSVYAZBANK: Moody's Confirms 'Ba3' Long-Term Deposit Rating


S L O V E N I A

ABANKA VIPA: Moody's Raises Long-Term Deposit Rating to 'Caa1'


S P A I N

TDA 19 MIXTO: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR6MM C Notes to 'Ba1'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALBA 2006-1 PLC: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
CARDIFF RESTAURANT: High Court Serves Owner With Six-Year Ban
HALLIWELLS LLP: Partners Not Liable for Overpaid Drawings
INTER CITY EXPRESS: Enters Liquidation
LADY HAIG CLUB: Liquidators Close to a Sale Deal for Club

MOTHERCARE PLC: Investors Back GBP100 Million Rights Issue
SKIPTON BUILDING: Moody's Hikes Subordinated Debt Rating to Ba1

* More Formula One Teams May Go Bust, Ex-FIA President Says
* Small Biz Bill Threatens Creditor Engagement in Insolvencies
* SCOTLAND: GBP19.2 Million Unclaimed by Business Creditors


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Landmarks in Medicine


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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HYPO ALPE-ADRIA: Agrees to Sell Balkan Banking Unit to Advent
-------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News reports that Hypo Alpe-Adria
Bank International AG, the bailed-out Austrian lender being
broken up, agreed to sell its Balkan banking unit to U.S. private
equity firm Advent International Corp.

According to Bloomberg, Hypo Alpe said in a statement on Oct. 30
that the sale depends on approvals from the Austrian government
as well as Advent and its co-investor, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.  Hypo Alpe will continue to
extend EUR2.2 billion (US$2.8 billion) of loans to the division
after the sale, Bloomberg discloses.

"The consortium offers a very attractive combination of capital
market expertise and knowledge of eastern European markets,"
Bloomberg quotes Hypo Alpe supervisory board Chairman Herbert
Walter as saying in the statement.  "At the same time, it's a
solid partner that offers the necessary safety for the repayment
of the 2.2 billion-euro refinancing."

Hypo Alpe, which expanded rapidly into former Yugoslavia in the
2000s with the backing of Austria's Carinthia province, was
nationalized in 2009 to avert its collapse, Bloomberg recounts.
It has cost Austrian taxpayers EUR5.5 billion since, and more is
still expected to be needed to fund its wind-down, Bloomberg
relays.  The sale of its operating businesses was required by the
European Union in return for the state aid, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Slovenian news portal Finance.si reported
on Oct. 29 that while a purchase price wasn't disclosed, Advent
will pay about 100 million euros for the unit, known as Hypo SEE-
Holding AG.

Before the sale to Advent is completed, Hypo Alpe will spin off
Hypo SEE into a separate company that's owned by the Austrian
government, Bloomberg states.  That company will then be renamed
Hypo Group Alpe Adria AG and retain Hypo Alpe's banking license,
according to Bloomberg.

After the spinoff, the remainder of Hypo Alpe will be turned into
a "bad bank" and renamed Heta Asset Resolution, Bloomberg
relates.  Its sole task will be to wind down its about EUR18
billion of assets, which include the loans to Hypo SEE, over the
next years and use the proceeds to repay its bonds, about EUR10
billion of which are guaranteed by the Carinthia province,
Bloomberg notes.

                      About Hypo Alpe-Adria

Hypo Alpe-Adria International AG is a subsidiary of BayernLB.  It
is active in banking and leasing.  In banking, HGAA serves both
corporate and retail customers and offers services ranging from
traditional lending through savings and deposits to complex
investment products and asset management services.

Hypo Alpe received EUR1.75 billion in aid in emergency
capital from the Austrian government.  European Union Competition
Commissioner Joaquin Almunia said in March 2013 that Hypo Alpe
faced possible closure for failing to adequately restructure.
The European Commission approved Hypo's recapitalization in
December 2013, but made it conditional on the management
presenting a thorough plan to overhaul the group.  The Austrian
finance ministry, which effectively runs Hypo Alpe, submitted a
restructuring plan to the Commission on Feb. 5, 2013.  On Sept.
3, 2013, the Commission cleared Hypo Alpe's restructuring plan,
which includes the sale of the bank's Austrian unit and Balkans
banking network and the winding-down of non-viable parts.  It
also approved additional aid to wind down the bank.



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A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


AZERBAIJAN: Commits to Continue Funding Agricultural Sector
-----------------------------------------------------------
abc.az reports that Azerbaijan will not stop state funding for
agriculture until the set goals for its development are achieved.

Azerbaijan Minister of Agriculture Heydar Asadov said the state
actively supports farm enterprises and provides benefits to
ensure the appropriate level of agriculture development,
according to abc.az.

"Yes, indeed, we receive recommendations from some economic
structures to stop state funding but our relations with such
structures, the same as with other countries and organizations
are built on the basis of partnership and cooperation and not on
the basis of demands.  Therefore, I'd like to note that
Azerbaijan has its own economy development strategy where
agriculture is a single link of the chain.  To achieve our goals,
we cooperate with foreign structures and international financial
institutions but we don't work with them on demands level," the
report quoted the Minister as saying.

In his words, some European countries, even now, still practice
state funding and even increase it every year, the report notes.

"Azerbaijan can stop state funding only when our farmers reach
such level that they are able to make their own investments into
development of agricultural sector", the report quoted Mr. Asadov
as saying.



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G E R M A N Y
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FLINT GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating to Germany-based ink and print
consumables provider Flint Group (ColourOZ Holdco Sarl) (Flint).
The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating with a
recovery rating of '3' to the EUR150 million multicurrency
revolving facility, as well as to the euro- and U.S. dollar-
denominated EUR1,250 billion first lien term loan tranches B1,
B2, and C.  S&P also assigned a 'B-' issue rating with a recovery
rating of '6' to the EUR300 million second lien term loan, which
is euro- and U.S. dollar-denominated.

These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P
assigned on April 15, 2014.

S&P's rating on Flint reflects the group's leverage profile now
that Goldman Sachs Merchant Banking and Koch Equity Development
LLC, a subsidiary of Koch Industries Inc., have each acquired 50%
of Flint's share capital.  Shareholders have refinanced all
existing debt with the proceeds from the EUR500 million equity
brought in by the acquirers and the EUR1.55 billion of debt
issued, including EUR1.25 billion first lien and EUR300 million
second lien term loans.

The rating reflects S&P's view of Flint's "fair" business risk
profile and its "highly leveraged" financial risk profile,
resulting in an anchor of 'b'.  S&P applies a one-notch upward
adjustment to reflect the resilience of Flint's profits in recent
years, which supports reasonable visibility over its medium-term
free cash flows.

S&P's base-case assumptions have not materially changed and take
into account adverse currency impacts on revenues in 2014 to
date. S&P continues to forecast adjusted EBITDA of about EUR285
million to EUR300 million in 2014, supported by continued cost
control efforts and restructuring measures.  Downside within that
range may materialize in S&P's view from the print media
division, which reported an 8% revenue drop year-on-year in the
first half of 2014, which is weaker than expected though largely
impacted by currencies.

Furthermore, excluding one-off higher-than-expected transaction
fees and the reversal in first-half 2014 of an extraordinary
working capital inflow that incurred in 2013, S&P anticipates
positive free cash flow of about EUR70 million-EUR80 million in
2014.  S&P also anticipates that yearly free cash flow will
likely ramp up to EUR80 million-EUR100 million by 2015-2016, as
it will benefit from lower cost of debt than under the former
capital structure in place until Sept. 2014.  This will also
depend on the level of investments and notably the pace of
restructuring measures in print media, of which a higher portion
than previously expected may be incurred in 2014 and 2015.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Flint's profits
should show a fair degree of resilience in 2014 and 2015.  S&P
thinks growth prospects in the packaging segment should broadly
compensate for assumed structurally stagnant or gradually
declining sales in the print media business.  In addition, EBITDA
resilience should continue to benefit from management's continued
cost control and restructuring initiatives in print media.

The business' low capital intensity should therefore support
steady free cash flow in the coming years, in S&P's view.  This,
together with adjusted gross debt to EBITDA of about 5.5x and FFO
cash interest coverage of 2.5x-3.0x, is commensurate with the
'B+' rating.

S&P could lower the rating if free cash flow was materially lower
than the annual EUR90 million-EUR100 million S&P currently
anticipates on a recurring basis.  This could occur, for
instance, in case of unexpected abrupt or higher-than-anticipated
decline in print media volumes materially impairing EBITDA,
without offsetting management actions.  S&P might also consider a
downgrade if gross debt was not reduced over the coming years,
for example, if free cash flow was spent solely on acquisitions.

Rating upside is limited due to Flint's 50% private equity
ownership.  However, S&P might consider an upgrade if it saw an
explicit and strong commitment from the owners to support more
rapid debt repayment that led to adjusted debt to EBITDA of 4.0x-
4.5x.  Upside would also need to be accompanied by continued
resilience of Flint's print-media segment and annual free cash
flow of about EUR100 million.



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I R E L A N D
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CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-3: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following ratings to notes
issued by Carlyle Global Market Strategies Euro CLO 2014-3
Limited:

EUR257,250,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR5,250,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR39,750,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR11,500,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR25,750,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR23,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

EUR30,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

EUR12,250,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2027, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2027. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of loans given the characteristics
and eligibility criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant
portfolio tests and covenants as well as the transaction's
capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's is of the
opinion that the collateral manager, CELF Advisors LLP ("CELF"),
has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable
of managing this CLO.

Carlyle CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
floating rate notes and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations, high
yield bonds and other floating rate bonds. The bond bucket gives
the flexibility to Carlyle CLO to hold bonds if Volcker Rule is
changed. The portfolio is expected to be 70% ramped up as of the
closing date and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans
to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

CELF will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer has issued EUR 44.25m of subordinated notes, which will
not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. CELF's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 437,500,000

Diversity Score: 36

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2785

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Moody's has analysed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints and the current sovereign ratings in
Europe, such exposure may not exceed 10% of the total portfolio.
As a result and in conjunction with the current foreign
government bond ratings of the eligible countries, as a worst
case scenario, a maximum 10% of the pool would be domiciled in
countries with A3 local currency country ceiling. The remainder
of the pool will be domiciled in countries which currently have a
local currency country ceiling of Aaa.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the rating assigned to the rated notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the impact of an
increase in default probability (expressed in terms of WARF
level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the number
of notch difference versus the current model output, whereby a
negative difference corresponds to higher expected losses),
holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3203 from 2785)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating/Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating/Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3621 from 2785)

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating/Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating/Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Given that the transaction allows for corporate rescue loans
which do not bear a Moody's rating or Credit Estimate, Moody's
has also tested the sensitivity of the ratings of the notes to
changes in the recovery rate assumption for corporate rescue
loans within the portfolio (up to 5% in aggregate). This analysis
includes haircuts to the 50% base recovery rate which Moody's
assume for corporate rescue loans if they satisfy certain
criteria, including having a Moody's rating or Credit Estimate.
Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.


CARLYLE GLOBAL 2014-3: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Carlyle Global Market Strategies EURO
CLO 2014-3 Limited's notes final ratings, as:

EUR257.25 million Class A-1A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR5.25 million Class A-1B: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR39.75 million Class A-2A: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR11.5 million Class A-2B: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR25.75 million Class B: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR23.5 million Class C: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR30.5 million Class D: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR12.25 million Class E: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR44.25 million Subordinated notes: not rated

Carlyle Global Market Strategies EURO CLO 2014-3 Limited is an
arbitrage cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO).  Net
proceeds from the notes were used to purchase a EUR437.5 million
portfolio of mainly European leveraged loans and bonds.  The
transaction features a four-year reinvestment period and the
portfolio of assets is managed by CELF Advisors LLP (part of The
Carlyle Group LP).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors to be in
the 'B'/'B-' category.  Fitch has public ratings or credit
opinions on all obligors in the identified portfolio.  The
weighted average rating factor of the identified portfolio, which
represents 76% of the target par amount, is 33.33.

High Expected Recoveries

At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations.  Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets.  Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to all obligations
in the identified portfolio.  The weighted average recovery rate
of the identified portfolio is 69.7%

Limited Interest Rate Risk

Interest rate risk is naturally hedged for most of the portfolio,
as floating rate liabilities and assets represent 4% and between
0% and 10% of the target par amount respectively.  As the fixed
notes are junior in the transaction's structure, the proportion
of fixed-rate liabilities increases as the class A-1 notes
amortize. Fitch therefore modeled both a 10% and a 0% fixed-rate
asset bucket in its analysis.

Limited FX Risk

Perfect asset swaps are used to mitigate any currency risk on
non-euro-denominated assets.  The transaction is permitted to
invest up to 30% of the portfolio in non-euro-denominated assets,
provided suitable asset swaps can be entered into.

Document Amendments

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or note-holder approval.  Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the then current ratings.  Such
amendments may delay the repayment of the notes as long as
Fitch's analysis confirms the expected repayment of principal at
the legal final maturity

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective, Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that the structure considers the confirmation to
be given if Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the expected obligor default probability would
lead to a downgrade of one to two notches for the rated notes.

A 25% reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of one to three notches for the rated notes.


THESEUS EUROPEAN: Moody's Affirms Ba2 Rating on EUR15MM E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has taken a variety of rating actions on the following
notes issued by Theseus European CLO S.A.:

EUR135 million (current outstanding balance of EUR 37.18M) Class
A1 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

EUR90 million (current outstanding balance of EUR 17.54M) Class
A2A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2014 Affirmed
Aaa (sf)

EUR10 million Class A2B Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
Feb 3, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR16 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
Feb 3, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

EUR19 million Class C Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
Feb 3, 2014 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

EUR11 million Class D Notes, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on
Feb 3, 2014 Affirmed Baa3 (sf)

EUR15 million Class E Notes, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on
Feb 3, 2014 Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Theseus European CLO S.A., issued in August 2006, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Invesco Senior Secured Management, Inc. The
transaction's reinvestment period ended in August 2012.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result the improvement in credit metrics of the underlying
portfolio and the deleveraging since last rating action in
February 2014.

The credit quality has improved as reflected in the improvement
in the average credit rating of the portfolio (measured by the
weighted average rating factor, or WARF) and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers with ratings of Caa1 or
lower. As of the trustee's September 2014 report, the WARF has
decreased to 2537 from 2725 in December 2013. Securities with
ratings of Caa1 or lower currently make up approximately 5.1% of
the underlying portfolio, versus 14.6% in December 2013.

The Class A1 notes and the Class A2A facility have paid down by
approximately EUR33.5 million (24.8% of closing balance) and
EUR24.8m (27.6% of closing balance), respectively, in the last 2
payment dates since last rating action. As a result of the
deleveraging, over-collateralization (OC) ratios have increased.
As per the trustee report dated September 2014,the Class A
(Senior), Class B, and Class C OC ratios are reported at
209.3%,167.8%, and 135.8% compared to December 2013 levels of
161.9%, 143.3%, and 126.1% respectively. Moody's were notified
the September 2014 OC ratios were based in the incorrect amount
of cash and that the reported levels should higher. The correct
figures for Class A, B and C are 216.9%, 173.9% and 140.8%,
respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR133.5 million, principal proceeds balance of
EUR5.1 million, defaulted par of EUR11.6 million, a weighted
average default probability of 24.6% (consistent with a 10 year
WARF of 3,179), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
43.0% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 21
and a weighted average spread of 3.67%.

In its base case, Moody's addresses the exposure to obligors
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk bond
ceilings (LCCs) of A1 or lower. Given that the portfolio has
exposures to11.1% of obligors in Italy and Spain, whose LCC are
A2 and A1, Moody's ran the model with different par amounts
depending on the target rating of each class of notes, in
accordance with Section 4.2.11 and Appendix 14 of the
methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the
rated notes, and amount to 0.45% for the Class A and B notes, and
0.11% for the Class C notes.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% for the 81.8% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default, of 15% for the 6.9% of the portfolio exposed to non-
first-lien loan corporate assets upon default and of 9.6% for the
11.3% of portfolio exposed to structured finance assets upon
default. In each case, historical and market performance and a
collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were within 1 to 2 notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy especially as 11.1% of the portfolio is exposed
to obligors located in Spain and Italy. CLO notes' performance
may also be impacted either positively or negatively by 1) the
manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in
the legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different
transactional parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

   * Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

   * Around 25% of the collateral pool consists of debt
     obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
     using credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's
     has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing
     a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the
     Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published
     in October 2009.

   * Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

   * Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
     liquidation risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at
     transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset
     will depend on the nature of the asset as well as the extent
     to which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities.
     Liquidation values higher than Moody's expectations would
     have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


MONTE DEI PASCHI: In Talks with Government Over Capital Options
---------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Italy's Treasury has not ruled out extending
repayment deadlines on hundreds of millions of euros in state aid
to help Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena as the troubled lender
struggles to raise fresh capital.

Officials said Monte dei Paschi chairman Alessandro Profumo and
chief executive Fabrizio Viola held meetings with the economy
ministry on Oct. 28 to seek options for the bank after it failed
European Central Bank stress tests, Reuters relates.

Monte dei Paschi, Italy's third largest bank, was left badly
exposed by the ECB's health check of 130 European banks, needing
to raise EUR2.1 billion to meet capital thresholds designed to
ensure the solidity of the financial system, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, the person close to the situation gave no
details of the talks but said nothing had been ruled out,
including options connected with repayment of EUR750 million
euros of state aid, offered in the form of "Monti Bonds" in 2013
to prop up the bank after a previous crisis.

Asked whether a delay in the repayment schedule or converting the
loan into share capital in the bank was being looked at, the
person, as cited by Reuters, said: "All options are under
consideration.  The bank is working on it.  The system is solid."

                     About Monte dei Paschi

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: Moody's Assigns '(P)B1' Corporate Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B1
corporate family rating (CFR) to Kompania Weglowa S.A., the
parent company of the group ("KW" or "the company"). This
provisional rating is subject to the successful completion of the
issuance of new notes as currently contemplated by management.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B1 rating
with a loss-given default (LGD) assessment of 3 (46%) to the
senior unsecured notes to be issued by Kompania Weglowa Finance
AB (publ), a financing vehicle owned by the company. The outlook
on all ratings is stable.

The provisional ratings reflect Moody's preliminary credit
opinion regarding the capital structure and liquidity position of
the company, as well as the key terms of the notes, pending
confirmation of final terms of the transaction. Upon completion
of the issuance of the new notes and conclusive review of the
final documentation, Moody's will assign definitive ratings. A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

The provisional (P)B1 CFR for KW, a 100% Polish government owned
coal mining company, reflects the application of Moody's rating
methodology for government-related issuers (GRIs) in determining
the company's CFR. According to this methodology, the CFR is
driven by a combination of (1) KW's provisional baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of (P)b3, determined applying Moody's global
mining industry methodology; (2) the A2 foreign currency rating
of the Polish government; (3) a high default dependence between
the company and the government; and (4) Moody's assessment of
high probability of strong state support to the company in the
event of financial distress due to the strategic nature of KW's
thermal coal business for the Polish economy, and its relevance
also in terms of employment as KW is one of the largest employers
in the country.

KW's assigned (P)b3 BCA factors (i) KW's lack of business
diversification, due to the high reliance on thermal coal
production, which generates over 90% of consolidated sales; (ii)
its high degree of customer and geographic concentration, due to
the high exposure to a few large utilities in Poland; (iii) the
company's weak financial position due to the very high cost base
of its operations, which translates into marginally negative
operating profitability and modest operating cash flows; (iv) the
high annual capital expenditures required to run a large asset
base of mature and deep underground mines, leading to substantial
cash burn rates when coal prices are low; and (v) meaningful
execution risk for the implementation of a multi-year turnaround
plan for restoring profitability and strengthening liquidity and
balance sheet to more sustainable levels. Furthermore, the rating
takes into account the material increase in financial leverage
following the issuance of the new notes resulting in a gross
debt/EBITDA ratio, as adjusted by Moody's, approaching 4x for
2014.

At the same time, Moody's acknowledges that the successful
issuance of the new notes would be an important milestone
enabling the company to fund a large portion of its investments
going forward, and to build a higher degree of financial
flexibility to more comfortably execute the operational
turnaround plan management has started to implement this year.
The plan is expected to drive a modest improvement in the credit
metrics in 2015 leading to deleveraging in the following years.

The provisional BCA also reflects (i) KW's well established
position as the largest thermal coal supplier in Poland and
within the European Union; (ii) large and high quality coal
reserves in its mines, providing stability to the company's
production base; (iii) a stable domestic customer base, with a
number of medium and long term off-take agreements with main
local utilities providing good visibility on annual volume
requirements of thermal coal; and (iv) a supportive environment
for the coal industry in Poland, which partially mitigates the
unfavorable dynamics prevailing in the international thermal coal
markets, which are currently characterized by oversupply and high
level of inventories exerting negative pressure on prices.

Liquidity is adequate, however this is based on the assumption
that the company successfully completes the launch of the senior
unsecured notes in the amount contemplated, which would then
allow, together with the Pln 1.49 billion worth of proceeds
received from the disposal of its Knurow-Szczyglowice ('K-S')
mine earlier this year, to build a sizeable cash buffer to cover
the main scheduled outflows over the next 12 to 18 months, mainly
related to capex and, to a lesser extent, working capital.
Moody's understands that most of the projected capex over the
next several quarters cannot be deferred, as it is related to
urgent initiatives to restore the profitability of the mines and
to maintain their compliance with health, safety and
environmental requirements for deep underground mines. The
planned disposal of four mines to Weglokoks SA (unrated) in 2015
will further support the liquidity position and provide
additional cushion to more comfortably execute the turnaround
plan, while the operating cash flows, albeit gradually improving,
are expected to remain insufficient to cover all the scheduled
capex and working capital requirements under a conservative
scenario of coal prices remaining at current weak levels.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will effectively execute its turnaround plan, without material
delays or cost overruns, and that its business profile and market
position will remain solid even after the planned disposal of
four mines to Weglokoks SA in 2015. The outlook also assumes the
company will continue to adopt a prudent financial policy focused
on proactive liquidity management, in order to ensure an adequate
cash position at all times to comfortably accommodate the
required investments for the turnaround plan.

While there is limited rating upside potential at the moment,
Moody's would consider upgrading the rating if the company were
able to effectively execute the main near term milestones of its
turnaround plan over the next 12-18 months, and this translates
into an improvement of its key credit metrics, with a clear
deleveraging trend. Positive rating pressure could arise if the
company restores operating profitability at least in the mid
single digit, improves its EBIT/Interest expense ratio, as
adjusted by Moody's, to above 1.5x, and is able to further
strengthen its liquidity position. An upgrade of the sovereign
rating of Poland could also result in positive rating pressure
developing.

Moody's would consider downgrading the rating if the company were
to perform materially below expectations, with this resulting in
a failure to reach operating profit breakeven within next 18
months or a substantial deterioration of the Debt/EBITDA ratio,
as adjusted by Moody's, compared to the level of approximately 4x
projected by the rating agency for 2014YE (pro-forma for the
issuance of the new notes). Furthermore, any material
deterioration in the company's liquidity position could
contribute towards a possible rating downgrade, as well as any
re-assessment by Moody's of its assumption of government support,
currently considered by the rating agency as strong.

Structural Considerations

The (P)B1 rating assigned to the new senior unsecured notes to be
issued by Kompania Weglowa Finance AB (publ), a financing vehicle
directly owned by KW SA, the parent company of the group and the
guarantor of the notes, is in line with the CFR. This reflects
the dominant position of the new notes in the prospective capital
structure, with a negligible amount of priority debt --
represented by a Pln 150 million senior secured revolving credit
facility typically rolled-over on an annual basis - which Moody's
assumes is or will be likely drawn to a large extent over the
next 12 to 18 months, considering the projected requirements in
connection with the execution of the company's capex plan. To
assign the provisional rating to the new notes, Moody's has
assumed a 50% family recovery rate as is customary for capital
structures including both senior bank facilities and notes.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009 and
the Government-Related Issuers: Methodology Update published in
July 2010.

Kompania Weglowa S.A (KW), headquartered in Poland, is the
largest hard coal producer in Poland and in the European Union.
For the year ended December 31, 2013, KWSA sold 36 million tonnes
of coal out of fifteen underground mines in the Polish upper
Silesian Basin, and thermal coal accounted for 93.6% of volumes
produced, the rest being semi-soft coking coal. Based on current
concessions, as of December 2013 the company possesses economic
recoverable reserves of 247.4 million tonnes, equivalent to 7
years of average residual life, however the economic reserve base
potentially available to KW is much bigger at approximately 1.6
billion tonnes assuming its ability to obtain new concessions
from Polish authorities. In 2013 the company reported revenues of
PLN 9.9 billion (equivalent to approximately USD 3.1 billion).

KW is 100% owned by the Polish Ministry of Treasury and is one of
their strategic assets. The company is currently undergoing a
process of operational improvement which will contemplate
disposal of four mines in 2015, in addition to the Knurow-
Szczyglowice ('K-S') mine disposed in July 2014, and associated
reduction in workforce, as well as large investments at its
remaining mines to improve productivity and reduce costs.


KOMPANIA WEGLOWA: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B+'
long-term corporate credit rating to Poland-based 100% state-
owned coal miner Kompania Weglowa S.A. (KW).  The outlook is
stable.

In addition, S&P has assigned a preliminary 'B+' rating to the
EUR750 million proposed senior unsecured notes.

The final rating will depend on the company's ability to issue
about EUR750 million of senior unsecured notes.  The rating will
also depend on S&P's receipt and satisfactory review of all final
transaction documentation.  Accordingly, the preliminary ratings
should not be construed as evidence of final ratings.  If the
proposed transactions don't go through within a reasonable time
frame, or if final bond documentation departs from materials
reviewed, S&P reserves the right to withdraw or revise its
ratings.  Potential changes include, but are not limited to, bond
issuance, utilization of proceeds, maturity, terms and conditions
of the bonds, financial and other covenants, security, and
ranking.

The preliminary rating reflects S&P's view of KW's business risk
profile as "weak" and its financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged," as S&P's criteria define these terms.  In addition,
the rating factors in two notches of uplift for government-
related entity (GRE) support from its stand-alone credit profile
of 'b-'. S&P views the track record of the government providing
extraordinary support over the last decade as a strong rating
factor.

"Our assessment of KW's business risk profile as "weak" reflects
our view of the company's high cash cost position on the back of
current very weak thermal coal prices.  We estimate that out of
the company's 14 mines, at least four will report EBITDA losses
in 2014, before adding their maintenance capital expenditure
(capex). We understand that the company's higher-than-average
mining costs are driven by a legacy workforce and the nature of
underground mining operations.  In our view, the company has
limited operating flexibility to change its cost structure over
the short term.  In addition, unlike its close peers, the company
does not benefit from product mix (for example 55% state-owned
Polish peer, JSW, also produces coking coal, coke, and energy),"
S&P said.

Positively, some of these weaknesses are partly mitigated by the
landlocked position of the mines and the proximity of the heavy
industry in Poland, providing the company a logistical advantage.
S&P expects some improvement in the cash cost over the coming
years, as part of the company's aggressive program to reduce the
mining cash cost to Polish zloty (PLN) 230 per ton by 2020 from
PLN300 per ton in 2014.

Recently, KW has signed an agreement with the state-owner coal
trader Weglokoks, under which KW will sell four mines for about
PLN2.5 billion.  S&P do not factor this agreement into its base
case, as it lacks full visibility on the likelihood of the
execution post the notes issue.  S&P views the transaction as
neutral to the business risk profile of the company, even if it
were positive overall as it would further strengthen liquidity as
well as further demonstrate the government's support.

S&P's assessment of KW's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged" reflects its view that the company will continue to
generate negative free operating cash flows (FOCF) in 2015 and in
2016 under S&P's baseline scenario, because of depressed coal
prices and high maintenance capex.  That said, S&P believes that
the planned notes proceeds would sufficiently mitigate such
negative FOCF, till a recovery in the thermal coal prices and
improvement in the company's cost structure materializes.

The financial risk profile also reflects material debt on a pro
forma basis.  S&P forecasts KW's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt
at about PLN9.0 billion at the end of 2014.  The adjusted debt
takes into account the proposed EUR750 million notes issue (about
PLN3.1 billion); pension obligations of PLN2.0 billion and PLN2.9
billion of free-of-charge coal allowances to pensioners.  The
later was recently terminated by the company, but success of its
implementation is still uncertain, in S&P's view.

In S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes that KW's EBITDA will be
around PLN1.3 billion to PLN1.4 billion in 2014 and PLN1.5
billion to PLN1.7 billion in 2015.  In S&P's view, the EBITDA is
expected to improve together with a gradual improvement in
thermal coal prices and some improvement in the cost structure.
In the first half of the year, the company reported EBITDA of
PLN0.7 billion.

S&P's scenario factors in these assumptions:

   -- Thermal coal prices remaining in the order of US$75 per ton
      in 2015 with some improvement to $80 per ton in 2016.

   -- Production of 32Mt-34Mt, including the mines under the sale
      agreement with Weglokoks (production of about 8Mt).  S&P
      understands that a divestment of the mines will deduct
      about PLN100 million from the EBITDA.

   -- Coal allowances liabilities remain in place.  S&P believes
      a termination of the coal allowance would have a positive
      impact of about PLN200 million on EBITDA.

   -- Capex of about PLN2.0 billion, most of which is
      maintenance. The execution of the Weglokoks transaction is
      likely to reduce capex by PLN0.5 billion per year.  On the
      other hand, S&P also understands that under such a
      scenario, the company will pursue other growth projects
     (such as the joint venture with Mitsui) starting in 2016.

Under S&P's base case, it projects free operating cash from
operations (FOCF) to be negative in the coming years, about
PLN0.8 billion and PLN0.9 billion in 2015, improving to PLN0.4
billion-PLN0.5 billion in 2016.  The company's leverage should
improve over time, but from a relative high starting point--debt
to EBITDA of about 6.5x in 2014 and about 4.5x in 2016.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for rating GREs, it views the
likelihood of timely and sufficient extraordinary financial
support from the Polish government for KW, if needed, as
"moderately high," resulting in two notches of uplift to the
company's stand-alone credit profile.  S&P bases this view on its
assessment of KW's:

   -- "Important" role in Polish economy, due to the central role
      of the coal industry and KW to the country, both
      economically and socially, as confirmed in recent public
      statements by the government.  The company employs about
      50,000 workers, and the industry is highly unionized.  S&P
      also factors into its assessment that KW accounts for about
      40%-45% of thermal coal supplies to domestic utilities.
      S&P anticipates that if KW were to default, this would not
      result in the liquidation of the assets, and hence would
      not have a systemic impact on the economy.  That said, it
      could affect the rest of the coal industry and other state-
      owned companies' ability to access the capital markets.

   -- "Strong" link with the Polish state, which controls KW as
      100% owner and directs the company through its
      representatives on the board and through complementary
      regulations and laws.  S&P takes into account the
      government's track record of providing KW extraordinary
      support over the last few years.

The stable outlook balances the challenging industry conditions
for coal miners, with its "adequate" liquidity following the
proposed EUR750 million notes issue.  S&P also assumes that KW
will have negative free operating cash flows in 2015-2016 that
S&P believes can be absorbed by the projected cash levels.  S&P
considers debt to EBITDA below 5.0x to be commensurate with the
current rating.

Pressure on the rating could occur if current low thermal coal
prices further declined and the company was not able to address
this with lower capex or by reducing its cost structure.  Less-
than-adequate liquidity would also add to rating pressure.

Upside to the rating is currently not envisaged, but could result
from a combination of the Weglokoks transaction leading to an
additional cash cushion, combined with cancellation of coal
allowances (significantly reducing its debt level).  This would,
however, need to be accompanied by evidence of improving costs
and declining negative to breakeven FOCF.  At the higher rating
level S&P would expect debt-to-EBITDA at or below 4.0x.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO ESPIRITO: Insolvency "Not Good," Portuguese PM Says
---------------------------------------------------------
Xinhua News Agency reports that Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro
Passos Coelho claimed on October 28 that the government doesn't
know the impact the Banco Espirito Santo (BES) insolvency has had
on the economy, but admitted it "isn't good."

Xinhua News relates that the Portugal government's comments on
the impact of the Banco Espirito Santo crisis, which shook
fragile stock markets across Europe, came as the international
lenders -- known as "Troika" and comprised by the European
Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European
Central Bank -- undertook their first mission to Portugal since
the country officially ended its EUR78 billion bailout earlier
this year.

"The situation of insolvency in which the Espirito Santo Group
plunged into and the impact it will have in microeconomic terms,
would not be desired by anyone in Portugal . . .," Passos Coelho
told journalists in the Azores islands on October 28 during an
official visit, according to Portuguese news agency Lusa, Xinhua
relays.

". . . That is certainly going to have negative consequences,
which we cannot quantify. It is very difficult to have a precise
perspective on what impact it will have on the economy, but it
isn't good," he added, according to the report.

Xinhua notes that a national disaster was averted in August by
rescuing the bank in a EUR4.9 billion bailout plan and launching
a new bank. But the BES crisis raised fears of knocking the
country's recovery, despite its recent praise by the eurozone for
sticking to rough reforms, relays the report.

Xinhua says Passos Coelho claimed that the BES bailout program
was a "resolution" and not "bankrupty," saying the former had
been a solution which "most protects Portuguese taxpayers" and
which will "enable to assure a better stability of the financial
system in Portugal."

On the Troika's mission in Portugal, the prime minister said
Portugal had been successful in ending its bailout program,
adding that more had to be done to put the economy back on track,
according to Xinhua.

"What has happened until today . . . has been recognition that
Portugal was successful in concluding its program, and it has
obviously a long way to go in recovering from the decline in
public debt and in bosting the economy's growth potential, but we
are following this path," the report quotes Mr. Passos Coelho as
saying.

Mr. Passos Coelho also said Portugal's reformist agenda was on
track and that the country would make way for new key areas of
reform, the report adds.

                        About Banco Espirito Santo

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon, Portugal.  It is 20% owned by Espirito Santo Financial
Group.

In August 2014, Banco Espirito Santo had been split into "good"
and "bad" banks as part of a EUR4.9 billion rescue of the
distressed Portuguese lender that protects taxpayers and senior
creditors but leaves shareholders and junior bondholders holding
only toxic assets.  A total of EUR4.9 billion in fresh capital is
being injected into this "good bank", which will subsequently be
offered for sale.  It has been renamed "Novo Banco", meaning new
bank, and will include all BES's branches, workers, deposits and
healthy credit portfolios.

In August 2014, Espirito Santo Financial Portugal, a unit fully
owned by Espirito Santo Financial Group, filed under Portuguese
corporate insolvency and recovery code.

Also in August 2014, Espirito Santo Financiere SA, another entity
of troubled Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo International
SA, filed for creditor protection in Luxembourg.

In July 2014, Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo
International SA filed for creditor protection in a Luxembourg
court, saying it is unable to meet its debt obligations.

                        *     *     *

On Aug. 15, 2014, The Troubled Company Reporter reported that
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and then suspended
its 'C' ratings on two short-term certificate of deposit programs
and one commercial paper program originally issued by Portugal-
based Banco Espirito Santo S.A. (BES).  As S&P publically
communicated on Aug. 8, 2014, most of BES' senior unsecured debt
has been transferred to newly formed Novo Banco S.A. (not rated)
as part of BES' resolution proceedings.  S&P currently does not
have satisfactory information to perform its ratings analysis on
these debt instruments, and S&P is therefore suspending its
ratings on them.

The TCR, on Aug. 14, 2014, also reported that Moody's Investors
Service has assigned debt, deposit ratings and a standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) to the newly established
Portuguese entity Novo Banco, S.A., in response to the transfer
of the majority of assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet
items from Banco Espirito Santo, S.A. (BES), together with the
banking activities of this bank. The following ratings have been
assigned: (1) long- and short-term deposit ratings of B2/Not-
Prime; (2) a standalone BFSR of E (equivalent to a ca baseline
credit assessment [BCA]).


MAGELLAN MORTGAGES 1: Moody's Hikes Class C Notes Rating to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of five notes,
confirmed the rating of one note and affirmed the ratings of
three notes in three Portuguese residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions: Magellan Mortgages No. 1 plc,
Magellan Mortgages No. 2 plc and Navigator Mortgage Finance No. 1
plc.

The rating action concludes the review of six notes placed on
review on May 29, 2014, following the upgrade of the Portuguese
sovereign rating to Ba2 on review for upgrade from Ba3 and the
resulting increase of the local-currency country ceiling to Baa1
from Baa3. The sovereign rating upgrade reflected improvements in
institutional strength and reduced susceptibility to event risk
associated with lower government liquidity and banking sector
risks. The Portuguese sovereign rating was further upgraded to
Ba1 from Ba2 on July 25, 2014 and as a result the local-currency
ceiling was increased to A3 from Baa1, but no action was taken on
the notes in these deals which were already on review.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions reflect (1) the increase in the Portuguese
local-currency country ceiling to A3 and (2) sufficiency of
credit enhancement in the affected transactions; for the revised
rating levels.

For Navigator Mortgage Finance No. 1 plc, the rating action also
reflects the correction of a model input error. In prior rating
actions, the recovery rate input in the model was inconsistent
with the MILAN input, therefore the tail of the asset loss
distribution was generated incorrectly. The model has now been
adjusted, and the rating action reflects this change.

-- Reduced Sovereign Risk

The Portuguese sovereign rating was upgraded to Ba1 in July 2014,
which resulted in an increase in the local-currency country
ceiling to A3. The Portuguese country ceiling, and therefore the
maximum rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic Portuguese
issuer including structured finance transactions backed by
Portuguese receivables, is A3 (sf).

The sufficiency of credit enhancement combined with the reduction
in sovereign risk has prompted the upgrade of the notes.

-- Key collateral assumptions

The key collateral assumptions for Magellan Mortgages No. 1 plc,
Magellan Mortgages No. 2 plc and Navigator Mortgage Finance No. 1
plc have not been updated as part of this review. The performance
of the underlying asset portfolios remain in line with Moody's
assumptions. Moody's also has a stable outlook for Portuguese
RMBS transactions.

-- Exposure to Counterparties

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties. Including the roles of
servicer, account bank, and swap provider.

The rating action takes into account servicer commingling and
set-off exposure to Banco Comercial Portugues S.A. for Magellan
Mortgages No. 1 plc and Magellan Mortgages No. 2 plc and to Banco
Popular Portugal for Navigator Mortgage Finance No. 1 plc.

Moody's also assessed the exposure to Royal Bank of Scotland plc
and UBS AG in the case of Magellan Mortgages No. 1 plc, Royal
Bank of Scotland plc in the case of Magellan Mortgages No. 2 plc
and Deutsche Bank AG in the case of Navigator Mortgage Finance
No. 1 plc acting as swap counterparties when revising ratings.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
Moody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: MAGELLAN MORTGAGES NO. 1 PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY

EUR942.5 million Class A Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on
Aug 7, 2014 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR37 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously
on May 29, 2014 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

EUR20.5 million Class C Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously
on May 29, 2014 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: MAGELLAN MORTGAGES NO. 2 PLC

EUR930 million Class A Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on
Aug 7, 2014 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR40 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
May 29, 2014 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR25 million Class C Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
May 29, 2014 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: NAVIGATOR MORTGAGE FINANCE NO. 1 PLC

EUR230 million Class A Notes, Affirmed A3 (sf); previously on
Aug 7, 2014 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR10 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously
on May 29, 2014 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade

EUR10 million Class C Notes, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on
May 29, 2014 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade



===========
R U S S I A
===========


PIK GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on Russia-
based property developer JSC PIK Group (PIK) to stable from
positive.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that refinancing risks
have increased for PIK as the company has been unable to access
credit markets in 2014 and will be unlikely to issue bonds before
2015.  S&P also thinks that PIK may find generating cash through
land or project disposals difficult due to the more cautious
appetite of property buyers in Russia.  S&P therefore views PIK
as more reliant on internal cash flow generation and on its core
banks' willingness to refinance RUB24 billion of debt maturities
(95% of its total debt) due in June 2015.

S&P continues to assess PIK's business risk profile as "weak" and
its financial risk profile as "aggressive."

S&P believes that PIK's operating performance is likely to remain
steady in the next 12 months but that demand for new residential
properties in Russia will likely weaken in the short term due to
lower household disposable incomes and rising mortgage rates.
S&P also notes that PIK's cash collection for the nine months to
end-Sept. 2014 declined by 25% compared with the same period last
year, although S&P understands that this was mostly due to fewer
new projects being available for sale.

S&P forecasts that PIK will likely pursue a significant amount of
new developments in 2015 and that its free operating cash flow
(FOCF) will therefore be negative next year.  Discretionary cash
flow generation will also be affected by the company's decision
to pay RUB2.75 billion of dividends, which S&P had not factored
into its previous base case.  Nevertheless, S&P thinks that PIK
has some flexibility in terms of capital expenditure (capex) in
2015 and note that 100% of its debt is in local currency.  S&P
believes this makes it easier to refinance with local Russian
banks.  S&P also thinks that PIK could also raise project finance
debt as an alternative to corporate debt.

S&P's revised base case for PIK assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of 3% in 2014, based on an increase in
      completions and the average selling price; but a revenue
      decline of 10% in 2015 due to a reduced average selling
      price despite a slight rise in completions.

   -- EBITDA of RUB13 billion in 2014 and RUB10 billion in 2015,
      with a slightly lower gross margin and an increase in
      marketing and selling costs.

   -- Positive FOCF of about RUB2 billion in 2014, but negative
      FOCF of RUB1.0 billion to RUB1.5 billion in 2015.  The
      changes from S&P's previous base case relate to a change in
      the timing of land acquisitions and disposals.

   -- Total debt of around RUB25 billion in 2014 and around RUB20
      billion in 2015.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- EBITDA interest coverage of 3.0x-4.0x in 2014-2015.
   -- Debt to EBITDA of around 2.0x in 2014-2015.
   -- Very low or negative FOCF to debt in 2014-2015.

Reflecting the historical and intra-year volatility of working
capital--which is due to the capital intensity and length of
large development projects-- S&P has revised downward its
assessment of PIK's credit metrics to the "aggressive" financial
risk category, leading to an anchor of 'b+'.

The stable outlook balances S&P's view that PIK's refinancing
risks have increased (due to most of its debt maturing in June
2015) against S&P's view that its operating performance should
remain steady in the next 12 months, despite demand for new
residential properties in Moscow possibly declining.

S&P thinks that PIK currently has an unbalanced capital structure
that could affect its liquidity position from mid-next year.  S&P
thinks the company is now very reliant on local Russian banks to
extend credit or refinance its debt.  However, S&P still believes
PIK should be able to improve its debt maturity profile by early
2015.

Downside scenario

Negative pressure on the ratings will arise if PIK is unable to
refinance its large debt maturities with long- or medium-term
funding before June 30, 2015, either through local banks or
capital markets.  A significant decline in cash collections due
to lower demand for new apartments combined with still-large cash
outflows for land acquisitions and new developments could also
put pressure on the ratings.  In addition, S&P would view
negatively an EBITDA interest coverage ratio declining below
3.0x.

Upside scenario

S&P could upgrade PIK if it is able to secure sizable new long-
term debt to refinance its upcoming maturities, due June 2015,
and sustainably strengthen its capital structure.  For example,
S&P would view positively the group's average debt maturity
increasing to two-to-three years to match the development cycle
of the business model.  S&P would also view positively the group
accessing more diversified lenders and sources of funding, as
well as demonstrating prudent working capital management.  S&P
believes that PIK should also be able to maintain an EBITDA
interest coverage ratio of 3.5x-4.0x over the next 12 months.


PROMSVYAZBANK: Moody's Confirms 'Ba3' Long-Term Deposit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the long-term ratings of
Promsvyazbank, including its Ba3 long-term local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings, Ba3 senior unsecured debt ratings, B1
subordinated debt rating and D- standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR), which is equivalent to a baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ba3.

Concurrently, Moody's confirmed:

-- the provisional (P)Ba3 foreign-currency rating assigned to
    Promsvyazbank's senior unsecured medium-term notes program

-- the provisional (P)B1 foreign-currency rating assigned to
    Promsvyazbank's subordinated medium-term notes program

This rating action does not affect Promsvyazbank's Not-Prime
short-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings. The
(P)Not-Prime rating assigned to Promsvyazbank's short-term
foreign-currency notes program also remains unchanged.

Moody's has confirmed Promsvyazbank's long-term ratings with a
negative outlook.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade of
Promsvyazbank's ratings initiated on July 9, 2014.

Ratings Rationale

The confirmation of Promsvyazbank's ratings reflects a moderation
in the negative credit factors at the bank during the second and
third quarters of 2014, as reflected by (1) Promsvyazbank's
ability to strengthen its capital base as planned, (2) easing
pressure on the bank's asset quality and (3) the stabilization of
its earnings-generating capacity. The rating action also reflects
Moody's expectation that Promsvyazbank's business franchise will
remain resilient to a market downturn and that its financial
fundamentals will not deteriorate significantly in the next 12 to
18 months. However, the outlook on Promsvyazbank's ratings
remains negative, reflecting the persistent risks to the bank's
credit profile in Russia's challenging operating environment.

Moody's recognizes that, from Q1 2014 to Q3 2014, Promsvyazbank
managed to strengthen its capital position and thus moderately
improve its loss absorption capacity. The bank had planned to
raise around US$700 million during 2014, and the rating agency
notes that the bank has already received a US$100 million (Tier
2) in Q12014 and US$433 million capital contribution (both Tier 1
and Tier 2) in Q32014 from local institutional and private
investors and from its majority shareholders, in accordance with
its capital-raising plan.

On a quarter-on-quarter basis, Promsvyazbank's Tier 1 ratio and
total capital adequacy ratio (Basel I) rose to 8.71% and 13.38%
respectively in Q2 2014 from 8.50% and 13.00% respectively in Q1
2014. (compared with annualized figures of 14.43% and 9.40% for
year-end 2013). Moody's expects that the bank will restore its
capital levels by year-end 2014 as a result of (1) recent and
forthcoming capital contributions as well as retained earnings,
and (2) the rating agency's expectation of low levels of lending
growth. Moody's, however, notes that following the capital
increase, Promsvyazbank's capital buffer will still remain thin
and, therefore sensitive to any potential asset quality erosion,
insufficient to support business growth, thus will remain a key
negative rating driver over the next 12-18 months.

During Q2 2014, Promsvyazbank's problem loans, which include
impaired corporate and small and medium-sized enterprise loans,
and non-performing loans to individuals (the latter defined as
overdue by more than 90 days) decreased in nominal terms to 10.8%
of gross loans as of end-June 2014, from 11.4% as of end-March
2014 (year-end 2013: 9.6%). The combined volume of non-performing
loans decreased to 3.8% of gross loans as of end-Q2 2014 from
4.0% as of end-Q1 2014. Although asset quality pressure is
decreasing, Moody's expects that the bank's asset quality trend
will remain negative, owing to weak economic conditions in
Russia.

Following two consecutive loss-making quarters (i.e., Q4 2013 and
Q1 2014), Promsvyazbank returned to profitability in Q2 2014,
reporting net profit of RUB2.6 billion (under International
Financial Reporting Standards) for the three-month period ended
30 June 2014. For the six-month period to 30 June 2014, the bank
reported a profit of RUB561 million compared with a net profit of
RUB4.5 billion posted in H1 2013. This performance translated
into a relatively low annualized return on average assets of
0.15%.

What Could Move the Ratings Down/Up

Moody's would downgrade Promsvyazbank's ratings if the bank were
to exhibit significant negative pressure on asset quality and/or
pre-provision income and capital levels over the next 12-18
months.

While an upgrade is unlikely given the negative outlook on
Promsvyazbank's ratings, Moody's could change the outlook to
stable if the bank materially strengthens its loss absorption
capacity and demonstrates the resilience of its financial
performance to negative trends in the operating environment.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Promsvyazbank reported total
(unaudited International Financial Reporting Standards) assets of
RUB783.0 billion and shareholder equity of RUB66.8 billion in Q2
2014.



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


ABANKA VIPA: Moody's Raises Long-Term Deposit Rating to 'Caa1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the long-term deposit
rating of Abanka Vipa d.d. to Caa1 from Caa2. Concurrently
Moody's has raised the bank's Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) to
caa2 from caa3 within the E Bank Financial Strength rating (BFSR)
category. Abanka's E BFSR was affirmed. The outlook on the
ratings is stable.

This rating action concludes the review for upgrade initiated in
May 2014. The upgrade of the long-term ratings reflects the
higher BCA. The raising of the bank's standalone BCA follows the
completion of a bank recapitalization program by the Slovenian
government (Ba1 stable) in October 2014. As part of the
recapitalization program, Abanka received a capital injection and
transferred a large portion of its non-performing loans to the
government-owned Bad Asset Management Company (BAMC).

Ratings Rationale

Abanka's Caa1 deposit ratings incorporate one notch of rating
uplift from the standalone BCA, based on Moody's assessment of
moderate level of support from the Slovenian government,
similarly to the two largest government-owned Slovenian banks --
Nova Ljubljanska banka d.d. (Caa1/stable/E/caa2) and Nova
Kreditna banka Maribor d.d. (Caa1/stable/E/caa2) -- that
participated in the bank restructuring program in 2013.

However, at the same time, Moody's notes that any future large-
scale state-aid will be significantly constrained by (1) the
Slovenian government's more limited capacity to use its balance
sheet to absorb further losses; and (2) increasing regulatory
pressure at the European level, restricting the use of government
funds to resolve failing banks.

Standalone BCA

Moody's says that the raising of Abanka's BCA to caa2 reflects
(1) the EUR243 million recapitalization with government bonds;
and (2) the transfer of EUR423.8 million of impaired assets to
BAMC in exchange for BAMC bonds guaranteed by the Slovenian
government.

Following these measures, Moody's expects that Abanka will report
a substantially improved Equity-to-Assets ratio of around 15% at
year-end 2014, up from 8.59% at end-H1 2014.

As the result of the problem loans transfer, the bank's asset-
quality ratio will improve substantially, with non-performing
loans reduced to about 15% of gross loans from 46.1% at year-end
2013. Similarly, the bank's funding position will also improve,
with loan-to-deposit ratio below 100%, from around 130% before
the recapitalization.

Abanka managed to break even with an annualized return on average
assets (RoAA) of 0.04% in H1 2014 after three consecutive years
of losses. This improvement was driven by considerably lower loan
loss provisions and reduced operating expenses. However, a
contracting loan portfolio and declining interest rates constrain
the bank's recurring profitability, with the pre-provision
income-to-risk weighted assets ratio at 1.72% at end-H1 2014. In
addition, Moody's notes that the corporate sector in Slovenia
remains highly indebted and its deleverage and recovery may take
some time to emerge.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down

Upward pressure could develop on the ratings in the short to
medium-term if the bank (1) returns to a sustainable business
model, with reasonable growth opportunities and comparable
profitability; and (2) maintains sufficient capital buffers and
robust asset-quality trends.

Downward pressure is unlikely to develop in the near term, given
(1) the current already low BCA level and limited uplift in the
long-term deposit ratings; and (2) substantially improved capital
and asset quality ratios which can absorb further moderate
volatility in the banks' performance. The long-term deposit
rating could come under downward pressure in the event of a lower
expectation of systemic support, resulting from either a lower
propensity of the government to provide support, or as a result
of EU level regulatory pressure.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.



=========
S P A I N
=========


TDA 19 MIXTO: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR6MM C Notes to 'Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of 8 notes,
confirmed the rating of 1 note and affirmed the ratings of 7
notes in 4 Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions: TDA 14 Mixto, FTA; TDA 16 Mixto, FTA; TDA 17 Mixto,
FTA; and TDA 19 Mixto, FTA.

The rating action concludes the review of 8 notes placed on
review on March 17, 2014, following the upgrade of the Spanish
sovereign rating to Baa2 from Baa3 and the resulting increase of
the local-currency country ceiling to A1 from A3. The sovereign
rating upgrade reflected improvements in institutional strength
and reduced susceptibility to event risk associated with lower
government liquidity and banking sector risks.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action reflects (1) the increase in the Spanish local-
currency country ceiling to A1 and (2) sufficiency of credit
enhancement in the affected transactions.

-- Reduced Sovereign Risk

The Spanish sovereign rating was upgraded to Baa2 in February
2014, which resulted in an increase in the local-currency country
ceiling to A1. The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the
maximum rating that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish
issuer including structured finance transactions backed by
Spanish receivables, is A1 (sf).

-- Key collateral assumptions

The Key collateral assumptions for TDA 14 Mixto, FTA sub-pool 2,
TDA 16 Mixto, FTA, TDA 17 Mixto, FTA sub-pool 2, and TDA 19
Mixto, FTA have not been updated as part of this review. The
performance of the asset portfolios remain in line with Moody's
assumptions. Moody's also has a stable outlook for Spanish ABS
and RMBS transactions.

For TDA 14 Mixto, FTA sub-pool 1: Moody's has reassessed its
lifetime loss expectation taking into account the collateral
performance of the transactions to date. The portfolios show
improving growth rate in delinquencies. The 90 days delinquencies
as a percentage of the current pool balance reached 0.22% versus
0.31% in October 2013. As a result, Moody's reduced its key
expected assumption to 0.34% down from 0.49% of the original pool
balance respectively, effectively reducing EL as a percentage of
current balance to 1.69% from 3.19%.

For TDA 17 Mixto, FTA sub-pool 1: Moody's has reassessed its
lifetime loss expectation taking into account the collateral
performance of the transactions to date. The portfolios show
deteriorating growth rate in delinquencies. The cumulative
defaults as a percentage of the original pool balance reached
1.21% versus 1.01% in September 2013. As a result, Moody's
increased its key expected assumption to 0.89% up from 0.70% of
the original pool balance respectively, effectively increasing EL
as a percentage of current balance to 2.1% from 0.82%.

Exposure to Counterparties

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties. Including the roles of
servicer, account bank, and swap provider.

The rating action takes into account non-investment grade multi-
servicers as counterparties and commingling exposure in the
transactions.

Moody's also assessed the exposure to JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA
acting as swap counterparty in TDA 19 Mixto, FTA when revising
ratings.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
Moody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: TDA 14 MIXTO, FTA

EUR326.4 million A3 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR126.6 million ANC Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR18.7 million B1 Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
Jun 6, 2013 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

EUR8.1 million BNC Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: TDA 16 MIXTO, FTA

EUR377.4 million A1 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR130.4 million A2 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR15.1 million B1 Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR9.1 million B2 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: TDA 17 MIXTO, FTA

EUR395 million A1 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on Mar 17,
2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR43.8 million A2 Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR14 million B1 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR2.2 million B2 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: TDA 19 MIXTO, FTA

EUR567.3 million A Notes, Affirmed A1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

EUR19.2 million B Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR6 million C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

EUR7.5 million D Notes, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on
Mar 17, 2014 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALBA 2006-1 PLC: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded six, downgraded one and affirmed 16
other tranches of the Alba series, a series of four UK non-
conforming RMBS transactions.

The Alba series comprise non-conforming residential mortgages
originated by Money Partners Holding Limited, Kensington Group
plc and Paratus AMC Limited (GMAC).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improving Asset Performance

The transactions have recently reported improved asset
performance, a trend that is seen across the UK non-conforming
RMBS sector.  The decline in arrears across the sector is driven
by the current low interest rate environment positively impacting
borrower affordability.  Year-on-year loans in arrears by more
than three months range between 3.9% and 7.2% (Alba 2012-1 and
Alba 2006-2), compared with between 5.3% and 8.6% (Alba 2012-1
and Alba 2006-2) in Sept. 2013.

Alba 2007-1 and 2012-1 have been the stronger performers in the
series, which can partially be attributed to 100% of their
underlying portfolio being originated by GMAC.  The portfolios of
the other transactions comprise loans originated by Kensington
(50% of Alba 2006-1 and 31% of Alba 2006-2) and Money Partners
(10% of Alba 2006-1).  According to the investor reports, three
month plus arrears were around 10 percentage points higher for
loans originated by Money Partners and Kensington than GMAC
collateral.

Strong Credit Enhancement

The seasoning of the transactions has led to a significant
increase in credit enhancement (CE) for class A2, A3, B, C and D
notes of Alba 2007-1 and the class B1 notes of Alba 2012-1.
These notes are therefore well insulated at higher rating
scenarios, as is reflected in today's upgrades of these six
tranches.

Pro-rata Amortization

Alba 2006-1 and 2006-2 are currently amortizing pro-rata, due to
loans in arrears by more than three months falling below the
trigger of 22.5%.  Alba 2007-1 is expected to commence its pro-
rata amortization in the next 18 months once the current note
balance falls below 50% of initial note balance.  Pro-rata
amortization will be beneficial for the mezzanine and junior
notes of these transactions, but will slow down the pace of
credit enhancement build-up.

Unhedged Interest Rate Risk

The Alba 2012-1 series comprises 100% floating-rate loans, while
27% of the total note balance (class B1 and B2) is paying a fixed
rate of 1.5%.  This mismatch has resulted in low excess spread,
particularly in the low interest rate environment.  Fitch
believes that excess spread will be further compressed in a
decreasing interest rate scenario and for this reason reduced the
excess revenue in its analysis.  The analysis showed that the
credit enhancement available to the rated notes is sufficient to
withstand such stresses, as reflected in the affirmations and
upgrades of the notes in this transaction.

Downgrade Driven by Insufficient CE

The downgrade of Alba 2006-2 class C notes follows Fitch's
assessment of the CE available to withstand its updated criteria
assumptions.  Almost 100% of loans in Alba 2006-2 were originated
at the peak of market (2006 and 2007), which were more adversely
affected under the new assumptions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In Fitch's view an expected increase in interest rates before
end-2015 will put a strain on borrower affordability,
particularly given the weaker profile of non-conforming
borrowers.  If defaults and associated losses increase beyond the
agency's stresses, the junior tranches may be downgraded.

The CE of the class B1 notes of Alba 2012-1 is entirely provided
by the reserve fund, which is held with Barclays plc
(A/Stable/F1).  Therefore a rating action on Barclays may lead to
a corresponding action on this rated tranche.

The rating actions are:

Alba 2006-1 PLC:

Class A3a (ISIN XS0254830499): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable
Class A3b (ISIN XS0254831893): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0254833089): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0254833758): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0254834053): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E (ISIN XS0254834301): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
  Estimate 95%

Alba 2006-2 PLC:

Class A3a (ISIN XS0271529967): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable
Class A3b (ISIN XS0272876623): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0271530114): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0271530544): downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAsf';
  Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0271530973): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
  Stable
Class E (ISIN XS0271531435): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class F (ISIN XS0272877514): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
  Estimate 95%

Alba 2007-1 PLC

Class A2 (ISIN XS0301704747): upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
  Outlook Stable
Class A3 (ISIN XS0301721832): upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA+sf';
  Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0301706288): upgraded to 'AA+sf' from 'AA-sf';
  Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0301707096): upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf';
  Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0301708060): upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf';
  Outlook Stable
Class E (ISIN XS0301708573): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class F (ISIN XS0301708813): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
  Estimate 85%

Alba 2012-1 PLC

Class A (ISIN XS0757132666): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1 (ISIN XS0757140172): upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'AA-sf';
  Outlook Stable
Class B2 (ISIN XS0758338650): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable


CARDIFF RESTAURANT: High Court Serves Owner With Six-Year Ban
-------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Geoffrey Kealy, sole director of The Cardiff Restaurant
Company Limited, has been disqualified for six years by the
High Court on Aug. 29, 2014, for trading to the detriment of
creditors, in particular HM Revenue & Customs.

Mr. Kealy's disqualification follows an investigation by the
Insolvency Service and prevents him from becoming directly or
indirectly involved in the promotion, formation or management of
a company for six years from September 19, 2014.

Commenting on the disqualification, Sue Macleod, Chief
Investigator at The Insolvency Service, said: "This is a case
where the director caused the company to continue to incur
liabilities so that creditors were bearing all the risk of the
company's trading, breaching his duties to both HMRC and trade
creditors."

The investigation uncovered that:

-- Mr. Kealy failed to ensure that CRC complied with statutory
   obligations to submit Value Added Tax ("VAT") returns to HM
   Revenue & Customs ("HMRC") and make payments in respect of VAT
   and Pay as You Earn and National Insurance Contributions
   ("PAYE/NIC") from at least September 30, 2010 to April 11,
   2012.  In that:

   * CRC registered for VAT with effect from July 1, 2010
   * The VAT return for the period 08/10 for GBP2,620 was
     submitted on October 7, 2010, following this, CRC failed to
     submit any further VAT returns; the 11/10 return became
     overdue after December 31, 2010
   * As a consequence of CRC's failure to submit VAT returns,
     HMRC raised central assessments for the periods 11/10 to
     05/12 of GBP26,236
   * Between April 29, 2010 and April 11, 2012, CRC paid GBP894
     in respect of VAT leading to an estimated liability of
     GBP25,011, of which GBP1,726 was overdue from at least
     September 30, 2010, and made no payments towards its
     PAYE/NIC liabilities of GBP14,020; of which GBP7,010 was
     overdue from April 19, 2011 at the latest

-- Mr. Kealy caused CRC to trade with knowledge of insolvency to
   the unreasonable risk and ultimate detriment of creditors, in
   particular HMRC, from at least Oct. 20, 2011 to April 11,
   2012, resulting in additional creditor losses of at least
   GBP17,695.  In particular:

   * On October 19, 2011, CRC was insolvent; it had no known
     assets and net liabilities of at least GBP53,018.
   * Payments had been returned unpaid by CRC's bank from August
     17, 2010 to October 19, 2011 on 81 occasions.
   * CRC had estimated VAT liabilities of GBP16,962 and PAYE/NIC
     liabilities of GBP11,686 overdue from September 30, 2010 and
     April 19, 2011 respectively.
   * On October 19, 2011, HMRC issued CRC with a warning letter
     threatening the issuing of a Requirement to give Security
     due to outstanding VAT returns and liabilities.

-- A trade creditor was in the process of obtaining a county
   court judgment against CRC with a hearing scheduled for
   November 4, 2011.

The court also ordered Mr. Kealy to pay costs of GBP4,935.

                     About Cardiff Restaurant

The Cardiff Restaurant Company Limited was incorporated on April
29, 2010. It traded as a hotel and restaurant from The Old Post
Office, Greenwood Lane, St Fagans, Cardiff, CF5 6EL.

Mr. Kealy was appointed sole director of The Cardiff Restaurant
on April 29, 2010 and remained so until liquidation.  The
restaurant went into liquidation on April 11, 2012.


HALLIWELLS LLP: Partners Not Liable for Overpaid Drawings
---------------------------------------------------------
Insider Media Limited reports that nine former partners of
defunct law firm Halliwells LLP are not liable for claims for
overpaid drawings and tax, a High Court judge has ruled.

In the test case brought by Steven Fennell against Halliwells LLP
(in liquidation), Judge Hodge QC ruled the firm's partners could
not be pursued for any overpaid drawings, according to Insider
Media Limited.

In late 2009 and early 2010, Fennell and eight other members
resigned from the firm and joined Kennedys, the report recounts.
They all signed a retirement deed in March 2010.  The claimant's
case, Insider Media relates, argued that as a result of the
retirement deed, the firm is unable to pursue claims for drawings
against the nine former partners.  The case was heard in July but
the judgment has only just been published.

Insider Media relates that Judge Hodge QC ruled that the terms of
the retirement deed "are clear" and as a result, Haliwells
"thereby waived and released any claim to pursue Fennell (and the
other departing fixed share members) for any overpaid drawings
and any overpaid tax (which, on the view that I take, does not
arise)."

                         About Halliwells

Halliwells LLP is a law firm based in Manchester.  It had offices
in Manchester, Sheffield, Liverpool and London when it collapsed
and its assets were later taken over by Hill Dickinson, HBJ
Gateley Wareing and Barlow Lyde & Gilbert.

The firm went into administration in July 2010 and entered
compulsory liquidation in January 2012.  BDO was appointed as
administrator and liquidator of the firm.


INTER CITY EXPRESS: Enters Liquidation
--------------------------------------
Hanna Sharpe at Business Sale Report reports that Phones 4U's
courier Inter City Express has failed in the wake of the
retailer's demise.

Inter City Express is now in the hands of liquidators Lindsey
Cooper and Jeremy Woodside of Baker Tilly, who said Phones 4U's
failure has had a "catastrophic impact" on the Inter city Express
business, according to Business Sale Report.

The report notes that Phones 4U was the courier's largest client,
with about three quarters of its sales deriving from the delivery
of handsets from Phones 4U from its five depots.

The report discloses that the recent sudden loss of Phones 4U's
business proved to be an insurmountable problem for Inter City
Express.

"In addition, the company was left with a substantial bad debt
from Phones 4U.  The combined impact of the loss of turnover and
the bad debt meant the directors were left with no alternative
other than to seek insolvency advice.  The cessation of trade has
resulted in all 69 members of staff being made redundant," the
report quoted Joint liquidator Miss Cooper as saying.

Inter City Express was founded in 2000 by Howard Biggs, after
working in the police service for 14 years and in the air
courier/freight industry for 20 years. He wanted to set up the
sort of service he had been looking for in suppliers, but had
never found.


LADY HAIG CLUB: Liquidators Close to a Sale Deal for Club
---------------------------------------------------------
Slough & South Bucks Observer reports that a deal is close to
being struck for the sale of the Lady Haig Club, a former Royal
British Legion club, after the society running it fell into
"hundreds of thousands of pounds" of debt.

Liquidators of the Lady Haig Club, according to Slough & South
Bucks Observer, are close to agreeing a deal with a potential
suitor for the site in Stoke Road, Slough.

It has been on the market for offers over GBP1 million after the
Lady Haig Royal British Legion (Slough) Club Limited, an
industrial and provident society which owned the club, was put
into compulsory liquidation in May, according to Slough & South
Bucks Observer.

The report notes that liquidator Peter Levy said the company owed
money to the taxman, electricity board, and creditors in the 'low
end of hundreds of thousands of pounds.'

"We are in the process of selling the property and are on the
edge of exchanging contracts," Mr. Levy told The Observer.

"The problem was there was no money coming in.  It is in a
dilapidated condition. Quite a lot of work has been done to keep
it safe -- we've had to board it up," Mr. Levy said, the report
notes.

In October last year, the company that owned the club was given
56 days to raise funds to pay a tax debt and avoid being wound up
at the High Court, The Observer recounts.  Lawyers for the club
at the time said it was in the process of selling its property
and getting the money together to settle the debt, the report
notes.  It was not revealed how much was owed.

However, a winding up order was made on May 12 this year, and the
Club was put into compulsory liquidation, The Observer relays.

Mr. Levy was appointed liquidator of the company on May 23, 2014,
and the company was deregistered as an industrial and provident
society in June, The Observer adds.


MOTHERCARE PLC: Investors Back GBP100 Million Rights Issue
----------------------------------------------------------
Kadhim Shubbera at The Financial Times reports that plans to
revitalize and modernize Mothercare PLC are set to go ahead after
investors backed the struggling retail chain's GBP100 million
rights issue.

According to the FT, the buggy-to-babywear retailer received
acceptance for about 94.6% of its heavily-discounted nine-for-10
rights issue at 125p, which shareholders approved last month.

Mothercare said out of the 79.94 million shares from the rights
issue, more than 75.6 million shares were taken up, the FT
relates.  In a separate statement later, the company said its
underwriters had secured subscribers for the remaining 4.32
million shares in a placing at a price of 170 pence per share,
the FT relays.

The bulk of the proceeds from the issue will be used to pay down
debt, and close up to 75 UK stores, the FT says. It will also use
the cash to improve the company's IT systems and transform the
property-heavy business to a digitally-led one, the FT notes.

According to the FT, analysts cited the weakness in the UK
business as a risk for the company's international franchise
model.

Last month, Mothercare said it would use about GBP25 million of
the rights issue proceeds for store closures, GBP20 million for
its store refurbishment program, GBP10 million to invest in
digital systems and infrastructure, and GBP40 million to repay
its existing term loan, the FT recounts.

The retailer has identified roughly 50 to 75 lossmaking stores
that it intends to close by financial year 2016/17, the FT
discloses.

Mothercare plc is a British retailer which specializes in
products for expectant mothers and in general merchandise for
children up to 8 years old.  It is listed on the London Stock
Exchange and is a constituent of the FTSE SmallCap Index.


SKIPTON BUILDING: Moody's Hikes Subordinated Debt Rating to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Skipton Building
Society's long-term deposit and senior unsecured ratings to Baa3
from Ba1. Skipton's short-term rating was upgraded to Prime-3
from Non-Prime. Moody's affirmed Skipton's D+ Bank Financial
Strength Rating (BFSR) and raised its standalone baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to baa3 from ba1. At the same time, Moody's
upgraded Skipton's subordinated debt to Ba1 from Ba2 and upgraded
its junior subordinated debt to Ba3(hyb) from B1(hyb). The
outlook on the society's ratings remains stable.

Ratings Rationale

The change in Skipton's BCA to baa3 from ba1 reflects its 1)
progress in reducing organizational complexity; 2) significant
improvements in profitability; 3) decreased, although still
material, reliance on non-lending subsidiaries' profit and the
greater contribution of the core Mortgages & Savings (M&S)
business; 4) strengthened capital position; and 5) improving
asset quality which, however, it is still weaker than that of
peers. The ratings also reflect Skipton's solid retail deposit
funding base, adequate liquidity and relatively lower level of
operating efficiency on a group consolidated basis.

Skipton's management has recently made considerable progress in
the disposal of subsidiaries which have not been profitable or
not sufficiently aligned to its core M&S business. In 2013,
Skipton disposed of its money broker subsidiary Sterling
International Brokers and Mutual One, a support service provider.
In July 2014, the sale of Homeloan Management Limited, its
mortgage servicing subsidiary, was agreed, subject to regulatory
approval. This was closely followed by the sale of Private Health
Partnership Ltd, a private medical insurance company, and the
disposal of Torquil Clark Holdings Limited, a financial advisory
subsidiary. Moody's positively notes the disposals have
simplified the organizational complexity and reduced the
diversion of management and financial resources from the core
business. At the same time, Skipton's estate agent subsidiary
(Connells) acquired Peter Alan estate agency from Principality
Building Society. Although the transaction strengthens Connells,
Moody's notes the risks associated with the integration and
believe that the acquisition will require increased management
attention.

Skipton has demonstrated significant improvements in
profitability in the last three years. The rise in profitability
is largely driven by stronger performance in the M&S division,
which delivered a pre-tax profit of GBP51.3 million, or 57% of
total, in the first half of 2014. As a result of lower cost
funding from the Funding for Lending Scheme and higher lending
volumes Skipton's net interest margin rose to an above the pre-
crisis level and stands at 1.45% as of June 2014. Moody's
positively views the growth of the core lending business, but
notes a substantial part of group profits is contributed by
estate agency division. The profitability is limited by operating
efficiency. Skipton's group cost-to-income ratio of 72.4% is much
higher than that of peers', driven by the cost-intensive estate
agency division and other non-lending subsidiaries.

On the back of the increase in profitability, Skipton's capital
level has strengthened with the CRD IV end-point Common Equity
Tier 1 ratio for the prudential consolidation group of 15.0% and
fully loaded leverage ratio of 5.6% at 30 June 2014, as
calculated on the standardized basis. These capital levels are in
line with building society peers and well above the current
thresholds set by the Prudential Regulation Authority.

Skipton's asset quality has improved significantly in the last
three years however its non-performing loan ratio of 3.2% at 30
June 2014, as per Moody's calculations, is still higher than that
of peers reflecting the worse asset quality of sub-prime and
self-certified mortgage books. In addition, Skipton has a
relatively low problem loans coverage at 14.2% relative to the
peer average of approximately 24.0%.

The ratings are also underpinned by Skipton's solid and stable
funding base and sufficient liquidity. Typical of a building
society, it is predominantly retail savings funded with only
14.0% of funding coming from wholesale sources. The society has
an adequate level and quality of liquid assets.

The stable outlook reflects the expectation that Skipton will
continue to deliver sustainable profitability, maintain sound
capital levels and sufficient liquidity. In Moody's view the
ratings fully reflect the group's risk profile with its lower,
albeit improving, asset quality compared to peers and still
relatively complex corporate structure.

What Could Change the Ratings Down/Up

Given the recent upgrade, upward pressure on Skipton's ratings is
unlikely in the near term but could arise from (1) further
improvements in asset quality with a problem loan ratio at a
similar level with peers; (2) significant improvements in
efficiency; (3) a more simplified portfolio of investments; while
maintaining (4) solid profitability and capital levels.

Difficulties at one of Skipton's major subsidiaries, leading to a
drain on resources (either financial or managerial) away from the
core lending franchise might exert downward pressure on the
standalone assessment. Any material deterioration in asset
quality and profitability would have the same impact.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.


* More Formula One Teams May Go Bust, Ex-FIA President Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Max Mosley, the former head of the sport's
governing body, warned on Oct. 27 that more Formula One teams
could follow Caterham and Marussia into administration or
failure.

According to Reuters, this week's U.S. Grand Prix in Austin,
Texas, will have just nine teams on the track, the lowest number
since 2005, and Mr. Mosley feared the number could fall further.

"It's not a fair competition any more," Reuters quotes the former
International Automobile Federation (FIA) president, as saying.
"The big problem is the big teams have so much more money than
teams like Caterham and Marussia.

"In the end, they were bound to drop off.  And they may not be
the last," the Briton told the BBC.

Mr. Mosley tried and failed to bring a cost cap during his time
at the FIA helm and said there should be some basic level of
equality, Reuter notes.

Formula One has revenues of more than US$1.5 billion, with more
than half going to the commercial rights holders CVC, Reuters
discloses.  Teams share 47.5% as a prize fund but the
distribution is based on performance, Reuters states.


* Small Biz Bill Threatens Creditor Engagement in Insolvencies
--------------------------------------------------------------
creditman.biz reports that Phillip Sykes, a partner at Top Ten
accountancy firm Moore Stephens, has warned the Public Bill
Committee of the House of Commons that the Government's Small
Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill threatens creditors'
ability to engage in the insolvency process.

According to the report, Moore Stephens explains that plans to
abolish physical meetings of creditors unless 10% of creditors
call for them would reduce transparency and creditor engagement,
particularly for smaller unsecured creditors.

creditman.biz quotes Mr. Sykes as saying that: "First meetings
for creditors are crucial, particularly for unsecured creditors
that don't often encounter the insolvency process. The meetings
encourage transparency, allow problems to be aired and provide a
forum for the professional fees of the insolvency practitioner to
be discussed.

"In our experience, a face-to-face meeting is vital because all
creditors -- no matter how small -- have an equal voice. Physical
meetings mean more information emerges on hidden assets and
possible wrong-doing by a director or an individual, providing
useful ammunition for the insolvency practitioner in ensuring a
fair deal for all creditors."

            Measures Aimed at Clamping Down on Company
      Directors Could Reduce the Number of Disqualifications

creditman.biz reports that Moore Stephens explains that proposed
changes to enable the Secretary of State to make compensation
orders against a disqualified company director could result in
the unintended consequence of fewer directors being disqualified.

creditman.biz relates that the new compensation awards will mean
directors are more likely to contest the disqualification
(currently about 80% of disqualifications are by voluntary
undertakings by the director). This means the Insolvency Service
would have to enforce more disqualification orders through the
courts in expensive and time-consuming proceedings.

"The Insolvency Service already has a heavy workload, so anything
that means more contested director disqualifications should be
avoided," the report quotes Mr. Sykes as saying.  "The aim of
increased penalties for rogue directors is a noble one, but we
are concerned about unintended consequences that decrease the
likelihood of a disqualification. Fewer disqualifications would
be a bad result for creditors."

creditman.biz adds that Mr. Sykes also warned that there will be
a reduction in the number of cases against rogue directors if, as
planned, a rule that allows insolvency practitioners to bring no
win no fee cases against fraudulent directors comes to an end.

creditman.biz notes that insolvency practitioners currently have
a carve out from the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Act 2012 that allows them to instruct law firms to
launch claims against directors on a no win no fee basis.

This allows insolvency practitioners to launch claims without
having to find money for the lawyer's fees -- however, the carve
out is due to end in April 2015, the report relays.

"Insolvency practitioners need to be able to fund cases against
fraudulent and negligent directors on a no win, no fee basis
otherwise smaller but significant cases will no longer be
possible. Independent research shows that up to 78% of such cases
are in respect of claims under GBP100,000. That will let a lot of
unscrupulous behaviour go unpunished and will reduce the amount
of money that can be returned to creditors," Mr. Sykes, as cited
by creditman.biz, said.


* SCOTLAND: GBP19.2 Million Unclaimed by Business Creditors
-----------------------------------------------------------
Herald Scotland reports that creditors of people and businesses
that have gone bust had left GBP19.2 million total funds
unclaimed at March 31, the official Accountant in Bankruptcy has
revealed.

Matt Henderson -- matt.henderson@jcca.co.uk -- head of
restructuring at accountancy firm Johnston Carmichael, said the
onus lay on businesses to pursue money they are owed that may be
held by the agency, Herald Scotland relates.

He said businesses were unaware of the process for claiming funds
held by the agency and gave up on being paid if a customer became
insolvent, according to Herald Scotland.

Mr. Henderson said companies due money from a failed firm should
complete the relevant formal documentation and maintain contact
with the practitioner handling the insolvency, the report adds.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Landmarks in Medicine
------------------------------------
Introduction by James Alexander Miller, M.D.
Title: Landmarks in Medicine - Laity Lectures of the New York
Academy of Medicine
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 355 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your own personal copy today at http://bit.ly/1sTKOm6

As the subtitle points out, the seven lectures reproduced in this
collection are meant especially for general readers with an
interest in medicine, including its history and the cultural
context it works within. James Miller, president of the New York
Academy of Medicine which sponsored the lectures, states in his
brief "Introduction" that this leading medical organization "has
long recognized as an obligation the interpretation of the
progress of medical knowledge to the public." The lectures
collected here succeed admirably in fulfilling this obligation.

The authors are all doctors, most specialists in different areas
of medicine. Lewis Gregory Cole, whose lecture is "X-ray Within
the Memory of Man," is a consulting roentgenologist at New York's
Fifth Avenue Hospital. Harrison Stanford Martland is a professor
of forensic medicine at New York University College of Medicine.
Many readers will undoubtedly find his lecture titled "Dr. Watson
and Mr. Sherlock Holmes" the most engrossing one. Other doctor-
authors are more involved in academic areas of medicine and
teaching. Reginald Burbank is the chairman of the Section of
Historical and Cultural Medicine at the New York Academy of
Medicine. He lectured on "Medicine and the Progress of
Civilization." Raymond Pearl, whose selection is "The Search for
Longevity," is a professor of biology at Johns Hopkins
University.

The authors' high professional standing and involvement in
specialized areas do not get in the way of their aim to speak to
a general audience. They are all skilled writers and effective
communicators. As the titles of some of the lectures noted in the
previous paragraph indicate, the seven selections of "Landmarks
in Medicine" focus on the human-interest side of medicine rather
than the scientific or technological. Even the two with titles
which seem to suggest concern with technical aspects of medicine
show when read to take up the human-interest nature of these
topics. "The Meaning of Medical Research", by Dr. Alfred E. Cohn
of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, is not so much
about methods, techniques, and equipment of medical research, but
is mostly about the interinvolvement of medical research, the
perennial concern of individuals with keeping and recovering good
health, and social concerns and pressures of the day. "The
meaning of medical research must regard these various social and
personal aspects," Cohn writes. In this essay, the doctor does
answer the questions of what is studied in medical research and
how it is studied. And he answers the related question of who
does the research. But his discussion of these questions leads to
the final and most significant question "for what reason does the
study take place?" His answer is "to understand the mechanisms at
play and to be concerned with their alleviation and cure." By
"mechanisms," Cohn means the natural--i. e., biological--causes
of disease and illness. The lay person may take it for granted
that medical research is always principally concerned with
finding cures for medical problems. But as Cohn goes into in part
of his lecture, competition for government grants or professional
or public notoriety, the lure of novel experimentation, or
research mainly to justify a university or government agency can,
and often do, distract medical researchers and their associates
from what Cohn specifies should be the constant purpose of
medical research. Such purpose gives medicine meaning to
humankind.

The second lecture with a title sounding as if it might be about
a technical feature of medicine, "X-ray Within the Memory of
Man," is a historical perspective on the beginnings of the use of
x-ray in medicine. Its author Lewis Cole was a pioneer in the
development of x-rays in the late 1800s and early1900s. He mostly
talks about the development of x-ray within his memory. In doing
so, he also covers the work of other pioneers, notably William
Konrad Roentgen and Thomas Edison. Roentgen was a "pure
scientist" who discovered x-rays almost by accident and at first
resented the application of his discovery to practical uses such
as medical diagnosis. Edison, the prodigious inventor who was
interested only in the practical application of scientific
discoveries, and his co-worker Clarence Dally enthusiastically
investigated the practical possibilities of the discoveries in
the new field of radiation. Dally became so committed to his work
in this field that he shortly developed an illness and died. At
the time, no on knew about the dangers of prolonged exposure to
x-rays. But sensing some connection between his co-worker's
untimely death and his work with x-rays, Edison stopped his own
investigations.

Cole himself became involved in work with x-rays during his
internship at Roosevelt Hospital in New York City in 1898 and
1899. His contribution to this important field was in the area of
interpretation of what were at the time primitive x-rays and
diagnosis of ailments such as tuberculosis and kidney stones.
Cole writes in such a way that the reader feels she or he is
right with him in the steps he makes in improving the use of x-
rays. He adds drama and human interest to the origins of this
important medical technology. The lecture "Dr. Watson and Mr.
Sherlock Holmes" uses the popular mystery stories of Arthur Conan
Doyle to explore the role of medicine in solving crimes,
particularly murder. In some cases, medical tests are required to
figure out if a crime was even committed. This lecture in
particular demonstrates the fundamental role played by medicine
in nearly all major areas of society throughout history. The
seven collected lectures have broad appeal. All of them are
informative and educational in an engaging way. Each is on an
always interesting topic taken up by a professional in the field
of medicine obviously skilled in communicating to the general
reader. The authors seem almost mind readers in picking out the
most fascinating aspects of their subjects which will appeal to
the lay readers who are their intended audience. While meant
mainly for lay persons, the lectures will appeal as well to
doctors, nurses, and other professionals in the field of medicine
for putting their work in a broader social context and bringing
more clearly to mind the interests, as well as the stake, of the
public in medicine.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *