TCREUR_Public/141203.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, December 3, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 239



ARDSHININVESTBANK CJSC: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba2' FC Debt Rating


TALVIVAARA MINING: Unit Put Into Receivership
TALVIVAARA MINING: Has Until Jan. 30 to Submit Restructuring Plan


DECO 2014 - BONN: Fitch Rates Class F 2024 Notes 'BB(EXP)sf'
DEPFA BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Non-deferrable Sr. Debt
DEUTSCHE ANNINGTON: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
WEPA HYGIENEPRODUKTE: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'BB-' CCR


CELF LOAN: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR19.5MM Cl. D Notes


GEO TRAVEL FINANCE: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR, Alters Outlook to Neg


BANCO ESPIRITIO: Faces Probe Into Money-Laundering Activities
COMBOIOS DE PORTUGAL: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB'


KINO BEZ: Debt Woes, Art-House Segment Crisis Prompt Bankruptcy
TRANSCONTAINER OJSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Ratings


POHORJE: Terme Maribor to Operate Hotels


AYT CAJA MURCIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Class C Notes
TDA IBERCAJA 7: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class C Notes


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Two Asian Investors to Aid Turnaround


TURKIYE GARANTI: Fitch Revises Support Rating to 'BB-'


ORANTA: Regulator to Take Business Out of Administration
VRB BANK: Among List of Ukraine's Insolvent Banks



ARDSHININVESTBANK CJSC: Moody's Assigns '(P)Ba2' FC Debt Rating
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba2 long-
term global foreign-currency debt rating to the senior unsecured
notes of Ardshininvestbank CJSC. The rating carries a stable

The (P)Ba2 foreign-currency debt rating was assigned to the
following debt instruments to be issued by Ardshininvestbank:

-- Three-year US$75 million senior unsecured notes due 2017

Ratings Rationale

The (P)Ba2 rating is based on Ardshininvestbank's local-currency
deposit rating of Ba2. The debt rating is underpinned by the
bank's adequate capitalization, good profitability, acceptable
asset quality, and one of the largest branch networks in Armenia,
which supports the bank's franchise. However, the rating also
takes into account the bank's exposure to Armenia's undiversified

The rating assigned to Ardshininvestbank's senior unsecured notes
is provisional. Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of
the final sale of securities and the above-mentioned rating
reflects Moody's preliminary credit opinions regarding the
transaction only. Upon a conclusive review of the final
documentation and the final note structure, Moody's will endeavor
to assign a definitive rating to the aforementioned notes. A
definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.

Headquartered in Yerevan, Armenia, Ardshininvestbank reported
total assets of US$670 million, shareholder equity of $116
million and net income of US$9.9 million as of end-September
2014, according to its unaudited IFRS report.


TALVIVAARA MINING: Unit Put Into Receivership
Kasper Viita at Bloomberg News, citing newspaper Helsingin
Sanomat, reports that Talvivaara Sotkamo, the operative unit of
Talvivaara Mining Co., was placed into public receivership by
court on Dec. 1.

According to Bloomberg, Attorney Jari Salminen of JB Eversheds -- -- was named as receiver.
Creditors lose decision-making power in receivership, Bloomberg

The unit had filed for bankruptcy on Nov. 6, Bloomberg recounts.

                    About Talvivaara Mining

Talvivaara Mining Co. Ltd. is a Finnish nickel producer.  It
filed for a corporate reorganization on Nov. 15, 2013, to raise
funds and avoid bankruptcy.  The company suffered from falling
nickel prices and a slow ramp-up at its mine in northern Finland,
forcing it to seek fundraising help from investors and creditors.

TALVIVAARA MINING: Has Until Jan. 30 to Submit Restructuring Plan
Kasper Viita at Bloomberg News reports that Talvivaara Mining
Co., whose operational unit filed for bankruptcy last month, said
Espoo District Court granted extension on restructuring program
re-submission until Jan. 30, 2015.

According to Bloomberg, the company has cash and cash equivalents
of EUR5.5 million as of Nov. 28.

Directors don't contemplate liquidation, Bloomberg notes.  They
continue efforts to secure financing, Bloomberg discloses.

                    About Talvivaara Mining

Talvivaara Mining Co. Ltd. is a Finnish nickel producer.  It
filed for a corporate reorganization on Nov. 15, 2013, to raise
funds and avoid bankruptcy.  The company suffered from falling
nickel prices and a slow ramp-up at its mine in northern Finland,
forcing it to seek fundraising help from investors and creditors.


DECO 2014 - BONN: Fitch Rates Class F 2024 Notes 'BB(EXP)sf'
Fitch Ratings has assigned DECO 2014-BONN LIMITED expected
ratings as follows:

  EUR330 million Class A due November 2024: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook

  EUR100,000 Class X due November 2024: not rated

  EUR50 million Class B due November 2024: 'AA+(EXP)sf'; Outlook

  EUR77 million Class C due November 2024: 'AA-(EXP)sf'; Outlook

  EUR92 million Class D due November 2024: 'A-(EXP)sf'; Outlook

  EUR89 million Class E due November 2024: 'BBB-(EXP)sf'; Outlook

  EUR41.9 million Class F due November 2024: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook

The final ratings are contingent upon the receipt of final
documents and legal opinions conforming to the information
already received.

This transaction is a securitization of a EUR680 million
commercial mortgage loan. The loan was granted by Deutsche Bank
AG, London Branch (DB) to 24 pre-existing German special-purpose
vehicle (SPV) borrowers to refinance 29 office assets, located
mainly in the top seven German cities. All borrowers are
sponsored by IVG Immobilien AG, which has recently returned to

Key Rating Drivers

The expected ratings are based on Fitch's assessment of the
underlying collateral, available credit enhancement and the
transaction's sound legal structure.

Asset quality is one of the main drivers of the ratings. The
portfolio securing the loan is generally of sound quality and
well-located in the top seven German cities. Some of the assets
are dated and may require refurbishment but should still attract
occupier interest because of their attractive locations. Fitch
has considered capital expenditure needs and re-letting prospects
in its analysis.

The current high value of prime German office properties reflects
strong economic conditions, which have pushed yields toward 10-
year lows. This increases the market value decline applied by
Fitch, as this is derived from long-term average cap rates.

The dominance of the anchor tenant is both a benefit as well as a
risk for the transaction, with around 55% of income derived from
Allianz SE (AA-/Stable) over an average of seven years. This
should support loan performance over its term, although as leases
roll off concomitant re-letting risk will affect recovery value.
The Allianz buildings are typically large and, although
functional, often dated, purpose-built blocks where lease renewal
will be key to maximizing value. Although new properties are in
development, the risk of Allianz vacating from the entire stock
is remote due to the importance and scale of operations.

Some uncertainty results from the loan sponsor's, IVG Immobilien
AG, corporate restructuring following a now-completed insolvency
process (adopting a "self-management" approach). Neither the
borrowers nor the properties mortgaged in favor of the issuer
were brought into the previous insolvency proceedings.

Property sales are not a source of risk because while asset
quality varies within the portfolio, the corresponding release
premiums adequately differentiate by quality, in Fitch's view.
This isolates the performance of the weakest properties from the
notes. Moreover, release premiums are allocated sequentially,
which limits the exposure of senior notes to the weaker assets
(allocated loan amounts, are paid pro rata).

The loan has a reported loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of 69%, which
Fitch expects to reduce to 66% by maturity through scheduled
amortization. Fitch estimates a 'Bsf' LTV of 83.5%. Annual
revaluations should enable performance deterioration to be
detected well before loan default. However, no credit is given by
Fitch to the 80% LTV covenant due to doubts about the
enforceability of such covenants in Germany. The loan has a low
debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) cash trap covenant of 1.15x
and it is therefore not likely to benefit greatly from cash trap
before maturity.

Key Property Assumptions (all by net rent)
'Bsf' weighted average (WA) capitalization (cap) rate: 5.9%
'Bsf' WA structural vacancy: 11.7%
'Bsf' WA rental value decline: 5.6%

'BBBsf' WA cap rate: 6.7%
'BBBsf' WA structural vacancy: 14.6%
'BBBsf' WA rental value decline: 14.0%

'AAAsf' WA cap rate: 7.9%
'AAAsf' WA structural vacancy: 19.1%
'AAAsf' WA rental value decline: 26.5%

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch tested the rating sensitivity of the class A to F notes to
various scenarios, including steeper rental value declines,
increasing capitalization rates and rising structural vacancy.
The expected impact on the notes' ratings is as follows:

Class A/B/C/D/E/F

Current Rating: 'AAA(EXPsf)'/'AA+(EXP)sf'/'AA-(EXP)sf'/'A-

Deterioration in all factors by 1.1x: 'AA+(EXP)sf'/'AA-

Deterioration in all factors by 1.2x:

DEPFA BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Non-deferrable Sr. Debt
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term
counterparty credit rating on Ireland-based, Germany-owned Depfa
Bank PLC (Depfa) to 'A-' from 'BBB'.  The outlook is stable.  S&P
affirmed its 'A-2' short-term counterparty credit rating on

S&P also upgraded Depfa's core subsidiaries Depfa ACS Bank, Hypo
Pfandbrief Bank International S.A., and Hypo Public Finance Bank
to 'A-' from 'BBB'.  The outlook on these entities is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' issue ratings on the
bank's non-deferrable senior subordinated debt.  S&P also
affirmed its 'D' issue rating on the bank's preferred stock.

The upgrade of Depfa reflects S&P's view that, following the
completion of the ownership transfer to government-owned FMS
Wertmanagement Anstalt des oeffentlichen Rechts (FMSW), the bank
will benefit from an increased likelihood of government support
and Germany's commitment to facilitate an orderly run-down of the
bank's operations.

The transfer of the ownership of Depfa to FMSW is almost
complete. S&P understands that the closing is likely to take
place within the next weeks.  The German authorities announced
their decision to transfer the ownership of Depfa to FMSW on May
13, 2014, and to wind down the group's assets.

Upon completion of the ownership transfer, S&P thinks that Depfa
will be subject to an orderly wind-down within the German
government-owned FMSW and that Depfa group banks will retain
their legal entity status following the transfer.

S&P now regards Depfa as a government-related entity (GRE) and
believe there is a "high" likelihood of timely and sufficient
extraordinary support from the German government to Depfa if
needed, as per S&P's GRE criteria.  This is based on S&P's
assessment of Depfa's "important" role for and "very strong" link
with the German government.

S&P continues to assess Depfa's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
at 'bbb-'.  S&P's assessment incorporates the support Depfa has
received from the German government through capital injections
and asset transfers.  S&P also takes into account ongoing
government support, because it cannot segregate benefits deriving
from government ownership and commitment from S&P's stand-alone
analysis of the bank.

Depfa and its sister company, Germany-based Deutsche
Pfandbriefbank AG (PBB), are currently wholly owned by Hypo Real
Estate Holding, a non-operating holding company owned by the
German government since 2009.  The government has provided
various forms of extraordinary capital and funding support to
prevent a default of the group since 2008.  In addition, both
Depfa and PBB transferred a substantial amount of assets to FMSW,
which has materially improved both banks' credit, market, and
funding risks. The European Commission approved government aid
for PBB and Depfa in 2011.  Both banks were required to implement
restructuring plans.  The government agreed to reprivatize PBB by
year-end 2015. With regard to Depfa, the government had an option
to reprivatize the bank by year-end 2014, but it stopped the
process in May 2014.

Depfa's EUR46 billion remaining balance sheet is dominated by the
covered-bond pools and covered bonds issued by its subsidiaries,
Ireland-based Depfa ACS Bank and Luxembourg-based Hypo Pfandbrief
Bank International S.A.

S&P continues to regard Depfa ACS Bank, Hypo Pfandbrief Bank
International S.A., and Hypo Public Finance Bank as core
subsidiaries of Depfa.  Furthermore, S&P now regards the
subsidiaries as GREs, in line with the parent's GRE status.  As a
result, S&P also assumes there is a "high" likelihood that these
subsidiaries would receive extraordinary support from the German
government if necessary.

The ownership transfer does not affect S&P's ratings on Depfa's
hybrid instruments.  S&P don't expect Depfa's hybrid debt to
benefit from government support, despite Depfa's GRE status and
the benefits of increased government support for investors of
Depfa's senior unsecured issues.

The outlook on Depfa is stable.  This reflects S&P's expectations
that Depfa will be subject to an orderly wind-down within FMSW
and will continue to benefit from the strong commitment of the
German government until the wind-down is completed.  However, S&P
understands that Germany has no obligation to support Depfa, in
contrast to its obligation to support FMSW.  S&P expects the
ownership transfer to be completed in the next weeks.

S&P might lower the ratings on Depfa if, contrary to S&P's base-
case expectation, the ownership transfer does not go ahead as S&P
expects or if the bank's SACP deteriorates.  S&P might also lower
the ratings if the likelihood of government support were to

Rating upside is remote, given the current high level of ongoing
and extraordinary government support factored into the ratings.
A positive rating action would require either an improvement of
the bank's SACP or a strengthening of Germany's commitment to the

DEUTSCHE ANNINGTON: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its ratings on Deutsche
Annington Immobilien SE (DAI) on CreditWatch with positive
implications.  This includes S&P's 'BBB' long-term corporate
credit rating, its 'BBB' senior unsecured debt rating, and its
'BB+' rating on the company's subordinated hybrid debt.

The CreditWatch placement follows DAI's announcement of a EUR9.4
billion offer to acquire GAGFAH, a transaction which, if
completed, would combine Germany's largest and third-largest
residential real estate companies.

S&P believes that the transaction and the resulting synergies
would transform the combined entity into a larger and stronger
group in the short term, with a significantly higher asset value
and number of assets than DAI's closest peers, including Deutsche
Wohnen (BBB+/Stable/--).  S&P estimates that the combined group's
gross asset value would be EUR21 billion (up from DAI's EUR12.8
billion currently) and that it would have about 350,000 units
(215,000 currently).  By reaching a higher scale, S&P believes
the DAI will benefit from better revenue stability throughout
property cycles.  Moreover, S&P believes that GAGFAH's assets,
mainly affordable apartments with low vacancy rates (below 5%),
and a low proportion of rent restricted units (about 13%), are
well aligned with DAI's overall asset profile.  In S&P's view,
the integration of the target portfolio should provide DAI with
more balanced exposure to German regions, with notably more
weight in cities like Berlin, Dresden, and Hamburg, where healthy
economic and demographic trends are likely to support high
occupancy and stable rent rates over the long term.  Still, S&P
acknowledges GAGFAH's somewhat weaker track record of organic
growth and lower average tenancy length than DAI (although the
average in Germany remains significantly longer than most other
European residential markets).  Nevertheless, S&P believes the
extension of DAI's modernization program to the entire portfolio
should drive further growth and limit any operating burden on a
consolidated basis.

S&P believes the financial impact of the transaction should be
moderate, as it will comprise some equity component, which should
protect DAI's current leverage metrics, although further details
and progress on the financing will be part of S&P's CreditWatch
review.  S&P understands that the company has secured a fully
underwritten two-year bridge loan, which it intends to refinance
over the next 12 months with a combination of debt and equity
products.  As a result, S&P anticipates that EBITDA interest
coverage should remain above 1.8x and debt to debt plus equity
below 60%, which are key measures in S&P's assessment of a
"significant" financial risk profile.

The CreditWatch positive status reflects S&P's view that the
acquisition of GAGFAH should result in a stronger and more
diversified group, which will likely be able to generate robust

S&P believes the funding of the transaction could result in the
ratio of EBITDA interest coverage remaining above 1.8x and debt
to debt plus equity below 60%, which is commensurate with a
"significant" financial risk profile.

S&P would likely raise the rating by one notch if DAI
successfully closes its transaction with GAGFAH or acquires
control of it, while structuring the transaction such that its
key credit ratios remain consistent with the thresholds

S&P could consider affirming the ratings at the current level if
DAI does not complete the transaction with GAGFAH under the
current terms.  S&P would also take a negative view of DAI
deviating from its stated distribution and leverage policy.  A
deterioration of market conditions that prevents DAI from
maintaining the previously mentioned ratio targets would also be
negative for the rating.

WEPA HYGIENEPRODUKTE: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'BB-' CCR
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlook on German
tissue producer WEPA Hygieneprodukte GmbH to positive from
stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating and the 'B+' issue rating on WEPA's
EUR327 million senior secured notes.  The recovery rating on
these notes is unchanged at '5', indicating S&P's expectation of
modest (10%-30%) recovery for bondholders in the event of a

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that WEPA's credit
metrics will continue to improve in 2015, leading to a stronger
financial risk profile.  WEPA's profitability has been stronger
than S&P previously expected in 2014, primarily due to internal
efficiency measures, portfolio optimization, and lower raw
material costs, in particular for hardwood pulp.  S&P thinks that
the current construction of two paper machines to replace paper
volumes currently acquired from external suppliers could lead to
further cost benefits and hence EBITDA growth in 2015 and 2016.
While S&P understands that the company has a strategy to expand
further alongside its customers, it do not believe that it would
undertake a large acquisition on the scale of its 2009 purchase
of Italy-based Kartogroup.  S&P therefore thinks it increasingly
likely that credit metrics could improve to a level commensurate
with a 'BB' rating in the next 12-18 months.

The positive outlook reflects a one-in-three likelihood that S&P
could raise the rating in the next 12-18 months if WEPA's credit
metrics improve beyond S&P's base-case scenario.  S&P expects
that WEPA will maintain broadly flat to slightly positive organic
revenues and that its EBITDA margins will improve in the coming
two years as a result of efficiency investments and insourcing of
paper capacity.

S&P could take a positive rating action if it believed that WEPA
could sustain adjusted FFO to debt of more than 20% and generate
positive free cash flow after investments, while keeping
profitability stable throughout the cycle.  S&P believes this
could result from the successful execution of growth projects,
further efficiency measures, and price increases.  This scenario
would also likely be associated with continued moderate
shareholder remunerations and limited M&A activities.

S&P considers ratings downside unlikely over the next 12 months
due to WEPA's focus on internal efficiency and S&P's expectation
of continued low pulp prices in 2015.  S&P could, however, take a
negative rating action if WEPA's credit metrics fell below S&P's
current base-case assumptions--for example, if FFO to debt and
debt to EBITDA were to weaken to less than 15% and more than
4.5x, respectively, for an extended period.  This could stem from
decreasing operational cash flow, significant debt-funded
acquisitions, or larger shareholder distributions than S&P
currently anticipates.  Pressure on the ratings could also
materialize if S&P saw a material deterioration of WEPA's
profitability or cash flow generation, causing the EBITDA margin
to weaken significantly to less than 10%, although S&P thinks
this is unlikely at this stage.


CELF LOAN: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR19.5MM Cl. D Notes
Moody's Investors Service has taken a variety of rating actions
on the following notes issued by CELF Loan Partners II plc:

EUR300 million (current outstanding balance of EUR63,487,704)
Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed
Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

EUR50 million Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2014 Upgraded
to Aa1 (sf)

EUR7 million Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2021,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1

EUR42.5 million Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2014
Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

EUR19.5 million Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2021, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Apr 8, 2014
Affirmed B1 (sf)

EUR15 million Class R Combination Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
previously on Apr 8, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

CELF Loan Partners II plc, issued in November 2005, is a
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by CELF Advisors LLP. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in December 2011.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result from the improvement in credit metrics of the underlying
portfolio and the deleveraging since last rating action in April

The credit quality has improved as reflected in the improvement
in the average credit rating of the portfolio (measured by the
weighted average rating factor, or WARF) and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers with ratings of Caa1 or
lower. As of the trustee's October 2014 report, the WARF was
3237, compared with 3335 in February 2014. Securities with
ratings of Caa1 or lower currently make up approximately 10.6% of
the underlying portfolio, versus 16.3% in February 2014.

The Class A notes have paid down by approximately EUR53.6 million
(17.9% of closing balance) since last rating action. As a result
of the deleveraging, over-collateralization (OC) ratios have
increased. As of the trustee report dated October 2014, the Class
A/B, Class C and Class D OC ratios are reported at 162.3%,
119.9%, and 107.1%, respectively, versus February 2014 levels of
142.8%, 114.8%, and 105.3%, respectively.

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class R,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR161.6 million and principal proceeds balance
of EUR23.1 million, defaulted par of EUR16.9 million, a weighted
average default probability of 24.5% (consistent with a WARF of
3373), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 45.8% for
a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 18 and a
weighted average spread of 4.2%.

In its base case, Moody's addresses the exposure to obligors
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk bond
ceilings (LCCs) of A1 or lower. Given that the portfolio has
exposures to 14.6% of obligors in Italy and Spain whose LCC are
A2 and A1, respectively, Moody's ran the model with different par
amounts depending on the target rating of each class of notes, in
accordance with Section 4.2.11 and Appendix 14 of the
methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the
rated notes, and amount to 1.83% for the Classes A and B notes.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% for the 89.0% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default, and of 15% for remaining portion of portfolio exposed to
non-first-lien loan corporate assets upon default. In each case,
historical and market performance and a collateral manager's
latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's
incorporates these default and recovery characteristics of the
collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis, subjecting
them to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were within 1 notch of the base-case results

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy especially as 14.6% of the portfolio is exposed
to obligors located in Spain and Italy and 2) the exposure to
lowly-rated debt maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create
challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may
also be impacted either positively or negatively by 1) the
manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in
the legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different
transactional parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

   * Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

   * Around 25% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates.

   * Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

   * Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


GEO TRAVEL FINANCE: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR, Alters Outlook to Neg
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on Geo Travel Finance SCA Luxembourg's (ODIGEO) ratings.
At the same time, Moody's has affirmed ODIGEO's B2 corporate
family rating (CFR) and B2-PD probability of default rating
(PDR), as well as the Caa1 rating on the EUR129 million senior
unsecured notes maturing in 2019. Moody's has also affirmed the
B3 rating on the EUR325 million senior secured notes -- issued by
Geo Debt Finance S.C.A. -- maturing in 2018.

Ratings Rationale

On November 25, ODIGEO presented its results from the second
quarter (to September) which showed a double digit decline in
earnings for the second quarter in a row. In line with guidance
established at the end of August, the first half reported EBITDA
for FY2015 (to March 2015) was at EUR46.3 million, versus EUR62.1
million a year earlier. The company has attributed this decline
to a number of factors including higher merchant costs, changes
to a Google algorithm resulting in higher acquisitions costs per
booking, as well as higher call center costs. Moody's also notes
that the recent conflict involving ODIGEO and International
Airlines Group (unrated) -- while having little or no impact on
the company's underlying operating performance during the
conflict -- illustrates the high level of inherent business risks
in the industry.

Together with its second quarter results, the company re-
confirmed its prior guidance of reaching an adjusted EBITDA of
EUR90 million for the full year (versus EUR118 million in the
previous year). While ODIGEO reported neither deterioration nor
an improvement in the competitive environment during the quarter,
Moody's believes ODIGEO will find it challenging to retrieve
previous levels of profitability with EBITDA margins around 30%.
As such, Moody's believes the company's business model is facing
a structural rebasing of its EBITDA and profit-margins. The
negative outlook reflects Moody's expectations that ODIGEO over
the next three quarters will be operating with a high leverage --
defined as Moody's adjusted debt/ EBITDA -- close to the
threshold of 5x set for the downward trigger on the ratings
leaving limited headroom for deviation against the company's
guidance at a time when the agency has revised moderately
downwards its economic outlook for the year 2015.

The B2 CFR reflects (1) ODIGEO's high leverage; (2) a geographic
concentration in Southern Europe and France; and (3) industry
risks, including value chain disintermediation from airlines or
other intermediaries. Balancing these factors are (1) ODIGEO's
competitive positioning within the online travel agency industry
(OTA) in Europe, particularly within the flight segment; (2) the
company's particularly strong market penetration in its key
markets of France, Spain, Italy, Germany and Scandinavia; (3)
Moody's expectation that the online travel market will continue
to benefit from migration from high-street travel agencies; and
(4) Moody's expectation of general growth in the airline
passenger market.

Moody's considers ODIGEO's liquidity to be adequate. As of 30
September 2014, the company had a cash balance of EUR114 million
and further cushion is provided by the EUR130 million revolving
credit facility, from which EUR105 million can be used to finance
working capital or guarantees. Moody's expects headroom to
financial covenants to tighten somewhat throughout the year. As
previously communicated by Moody's, the company's cash-balances
are transitory in nature as payments largely are received from
travelers at the time of booking and only passed on to travel
suppliers within a few weeks after completing the transaction.
ODIGEO's trade payables largely outweigh its receivables and
Moody's cautions that liquidity profile could quickly deteriorate
should bookings (and revenues) come under significant pressure.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

The rating could be stabilized again should the company reach its
guidance for the full year with a clear trajectory towards
further growth in EBITDA. Conversely, negative rating pressure
would develop if ODIGEO's debt/EBITDA ratio were to exceed 5.0x
or if the company's liquidity profile was to weaken. As has been
the case in the past, Moody's would expect ODIGEO to continue
retaining solid cash balances. Lastly, negative pressure could
also develop in case of further downward pressure on the
company's profitability.

Whilst unlikely at this stage given the negative outlook, upward
pressure on the rating could occur if ODIGEO's debt/EBITDA ratio
were to trend below 4.0x on a sustainable basis. Moody's would in
such a scenario also expect ODIGEO to display growth in revenue
margin, allowing the company to generate consistent cash flow.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Geo Travel Finance SCA Luxembourg (ODIGEO) consists of Opodo,
eDreams and Go Voyages. ODIGEO is the largest OTA in Europe in
the flights segment. The company is present in 42 countries, with
a particularly strong penetration in France, Spain, Italy,
Germany, the UK and Scandinavia. During the financial year ended
March 31, 2014, the company reported revenues of EUR479 million
and generated around EUR9.8 billion of bookings.


BANCO ESPIRITIO: Faces Probe Into Money-Laundering Activities
Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that as investigators sift
through the wreckage of Banco Espirito Santo SA, their focus is
expanding beyond the alleged fraud and accounting problems that
doomed the large Portuguese lender.

According to Daily Bankruptcy Review, people familiar with the
investigations said they also are looking into whether the bank
was involved in money-laundering activities in multiple

Former Banco Espirito Santo officials said the web of
money-laundering investigations, most of them previously
unreported, highlight the lengths to which the bank went to win
business in parts of the world that were shunned by rival
lenders, Daily Bankruptcy Review relates.  And they mean that
remnants of the bank, as well as some former executives and
business partners, face a new level of government scrutiny and,
potentially, penalties as the probes unfold,  Daily Bankruptcy
Review notes.

                      About Espirito Santo

Espirito Santo Financial Group SA is the owner of about 20% of
Banco Espirito Santo SA.

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon, Portugal.

In August 2014, Banco Espirito Santo was split into "good"
and "bad" banks as part of a EUR4.9 billion rescue of the
distressed Portuguese lender that protects taxpayers and senior
creditors but leaves shareholders and junior bondholders holding
only toxic assets.  A total of EUR4.9 billion in fresh capital is
being injected into this "good bank", which will subsequently be
offered for sale.  It has been renamed "Novo Banco", meaning new
bank, and will include all BES's branches, workers, deposits and
healthy credit portfolios.

Also in August 2014, Espirito Santo Financial Portugal, a unit
fully owned by Espirito Santo Financial Group, filed under
Portuguese corporate insolvency and recovery code.

In August 2014, Espirito Santo Financiere SA, another entity of
troubled Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo International SA,
filed for creditor protection in Luxembourg.

In July 2014, Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo
International SA filed for creditor protection in a Luxembourg
court, saying it is unable to meet its debt obligations.

                    About Espirito Santo

Espirito Santo Financial Group SA is the owner of about 20% of
Banco Espirito Santo SA.

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon, Portugal.

In August 2014, Banco Espirito Santo was split into "good"
and "bad" banks as part of a EUR4.9 billion rescue of the
distressed Portuguese lender that protects taxpayers and senior
creditors but leaves shareholders and junior bondholders holding
only toxic assets.  A total of EUR4.9 billion in fresh capital is
being injected into this "good bank", which will subsequently be
offered for sale.  It has been renamed "Novo Banco", meaning new
bank, and will include all BES's branches, workers, deposits and
healthy credit portfolios.

Also in August 2014, Espirito Santo Financial Portugal, a unit
fully owned by Espirito Santo Financial Group, filed under
Portuguese corporate insolvency and recovery code.

In August 2014, Espirito Santo Financiere SA, another entity of
troubled Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo International SA,
filed for creditor protection in Luxembourg.

In July 2014, Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo
International SA filed for creditor protection in a Luxembourg
court, saying it is unable to meet its debt obligations.

COMBOIOS DE PORTUGAL: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB'
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit and non-guaranteed issue ratings on Portuguese rail
operator Comboios de Portugal E.P.E (CP) to 'BB' from 'CCC+'.
The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P is raising the rating on the senior secured
notes issued by CP's financing vehicle, Polo III - CP Finance
Ltd. (Polo III) to 'BB' from 'B'.  These notes are insured by
MBIA U.K. Insurance Ltd. (B/Stable) and, according to S&P's
criteria, the issue rating on a monoline-insured debt obligation
is the higher of the rating on the monoline and Standard & Poor's
underlying rating (SPUR) on the notes.  S&P's SPUR on the notes
is equalized with our senior unsecured debt rating on CP.

The issue rating on the debt that is guaranteed by the Republic
of Portugal (BB/Stable/B) is unchanged at 'BB'.

The upgrade of CP reflects Portugal's implementation of its new
framework law 133/2013 for state-owned enterprises and, in
particular, the government's integration of CP into the general
government in accordance with the European System of National and
Regional Accounts (ESA 2010).  It also reflects the inclusion of
all CP's funding and operating needs for the next year in the
government's 2015 budget, approved on Nov. 25, 2014.  The
combination of these factors have led S&P to revise upward to
"almost certain" from "very high" its view of the likelihood of
CP receiving timely and sufficient extraordinary support from
Portuguese government, if needed.

S&P has also revised CP's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to
'ccc+' from 'cc'.  This reflects S&P's view of the diminished
likelihood of the company defaulting within 12 months.  This is
following the refinancing of about EUR2 billion of debt coming
due during the fourth quarter of 2014 with local banks, using a
direct long-term loan from the state.  Previously, CP obtained
financing mainly through local banks, which had allowed the
company to roll over its short-term debt maturities as they came
due.  More recently, the government started to lend directly to
CP, reducing its reliance on banks and improving debt terms and

In accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities
(GREs), including CP, S&P sees an "almost certain" likelihood of
extraordinary government support in the event of financial
distress.  S&P bases this on its assessment of CP's:

   -- "Critical" role for the Portuguese government, given that
      CP is virtually the only passenger rail transport provider
      in Portugal.  In addition, although the country has adopted
      EU transport directives, competition from private players
      has been negligible.  In S&P's opinion, the company plays a
      key role in implementing the government's policy of
      fostering urban mobility in the country.  S&P believes
      that, as such, CP provides a key public service that a
      private entity could not readily undertake and that the
      government itself would likely conduct if CP ceased to

   -- "Integral" link with the Republic of Portugal, given CP's
      full state ownership and its strong legal status as a
      public company.  Moreover, CP operates under a strategy
      defined and monitored by the government.  As an "entidade
      publica empresarial" (EP; public enterprise entity), the
      group enjoys a stronger legal status than "sociedades
      anonimas" (public limited companies).  Even though EPs are
      generally subject to private law, they are not subject to
      the bankruptcy laws applicable to sociedades anonimas.
      Only the central government can liquidate an EP.

Furthermore, the government has a track record of sticking to its
policy of providing support to its GREs in all circumstances, as
evidenced by its timely and full servicing of GRE debt.  The
government has extended such support to CP.  In S&P's opinion,
the government's contributions to cover CP's operating costs and
investments have been insufficient over recent years.  However,
despite its weak liquidity and negative equity, the government
has provided financial support to CP in the form of explicit and
timely guarantees on part of its debt.  The government determines
CP's strategy and makes its key budgetary decisions, while
maintaining tight control of the company so that it carries out
its public policy role.

S&P believes that the link between the government and CP is
reinforced by the implementation of the framework law 133/2013
for state-owned enterprises.  Moreover, including CP in the
government's consolidation scope implies the company's regular
and comprehensive reporting to the government for budgetary
purposes, more comprehensively than in the past.

S&P also takes into consideration the fact that CP is now
included in the government's consolidation scope under its 2015
budget.  S&P understands that, under this new framework, the
company no longer has the right to access the financial markets
and that, from now on, the government will cover all its
financing needs.  S&P understands that this could be done in the
form of a budgetary allowance, with the state refinancing CP's
loans when they mature. The government could also intervene in
the form of capital injections.  This inclusion in the 2015 state
budget, which was approved by the Portuguese parliament at the
end of Nov. 2014, considerably reduces the company's short-term
refinancing risks.

S&P's 'ccc+' stand-alone credit profile reflects the fact that
financial commitments and leverage appear to be unsustainable in
the short-to-long term on a stand-alone basis, as the company
cannot meet its financial requirements without government

S&P continues to assess CP's business risk profile as "weak" due
to its business model, which includes a large component of public
service, being characterized by ongoing negative operating cash
flow generation.  This is due to limited operating efficiency,
with insufficient subsidies from the state to cover below-cost
tariffs.  On the other hand, S&P recognizes the company's
strategic position as the national railway operator, with only
marginal competition.

S&P still assess CP's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged", given its very weak credit ratios and cash flow
protection measures.  The group has negative net worth due to the
accumulation of persistent losses, and remains highly leveraged
with debt of around EUR3.9 billion as of Sept. 30, 2014,
according to the company.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Portugal's real GDP showing modest growth of 0.9% and 1.3%,
      respectively, in 2014 and 2015.

   -- Low single-digit increase in number of passengers in 2014
      and 2015 compared to 2013, due to sluggish macroeconomic
      recovery in Portugal.

   -- Diminishing subsidies from the state as the government
      intends to incentivize its public companies to reach
      positive operating earnings independently.

   -- Continuing cost-cutting measures that could support
      positive EBITDA.

   -- Interest payment burden reducing to below EUR200 million in
      2015 following the refinancing of most of the company's
      short-term commitments with state loans.

   -- Stable capital expenditures of below EUR20 million.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Flat revenues in 2014 and falling by about 5% in 2015 due
      to S&P's forecast of lower state subsidies.

   -- Low single-digit adjusted EBITDA margin in 2014 and 2015.

   -- Negative funds from operations (FFO) generation.

The stable outlook mirrors that on Portugal and reflects S&P's
view that the government support that CP receives is unlikely to
be challenged or to change in the foreseeable future.

S&P could upgrade CP if it raised its long-term rating on the
Republic of Portugal.

S&P could lower its long-term rating on CP if it lowered its
long-term rating on Portugal.  In addition, S&P could downgrade
CP if it revised downward its view of the likelihood of
extraordinary support from the Portuguese government.  This could
be the case if the general government were to exclude CP from its
scope of consolidation or if its future funding needs would stop
from being covered by the state budget, which we currently view
as unlikely.


KINO BEZ: Debt Woes, Art-House Segment Crisis Prompt Bankruptcy
Vladimir Kozlov at The Hollywood Reporter reports that Kino bez
granits (Cinema Without Frontiers) is facing bankruptcy due to
significant outstanding debts amid an overall crisis in the art-
house distribution segment.

"A bankruptcy hearing has been postponed," the company's founder
and head Sam Klebanov told The Hollywood Reporter.  "We are
trying to pay our debts from revenues collected from our library

"If we are able to get a good TV deal, we'll be able to pay our
debts in full," The Hollywood Reporter quotes Mr. Kebanov as
saying.  "All we need is one contract of the same scale as they
were before the [art house] market collapsed."

In 2010, Alexander Rodnyansky's A. R. Films Media Corporation
acquired a 51 percent stake in the distributor, The Hollywood
Reporter recounts.

Over the last year, or so, as viewers have been turning away from
auteur movies, the art house segment has shrunk dramatically in
Russia, putting some companies that operate there out of business
and pushing others, including Cinema without Frontiers, to the
brink of collapse, The Hollywood Reporter relates.

Kino bez granits is Russia's oldest art house distributor, which
brought to Russia many foreign indie titles.

TRANSCONTAINER OJSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Default Ratings
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based OJSC TransContainer
(TC)'s Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'BB+' with
Stable Outlook.

TC's 'BB+' Long-term IDR incorporates a one-notch uplift for
implied parental support from its majority shareholder, JSC
Russian Railways (RZD: BBB/Negative). Fitch considers that the
recent transfer of RZD's 50%+2 shares in TC to the newly
established holding company United Transportation and Logistics
Company (UTLC) does not have a material rating impact in the
short term.

However, over the medium- to long-term, the impact is potentially
credit negative. We expect RZD will retain effective control over
the company until the other partners of UTLC, namely Kazakhstan
Temir Zholy (KTZ: BBB/Stable) and Belarusian Railways contribute
their assets, at the earliest in 2016. As RZD's ownership stake
in TC goes down, the likelihood of parental support from RZD
declines due to ownership dilution. Therefore, once RZD loses its
effective control over TC, we would remove the single-notch
uplift for implied parental support, especially if there is no
tangible mechanism allowing for efficient and timely support from
UTLC's shareholders.

TC's standalone ratings are supported by the company's strong
domestic market position, cargo and customer diversification and
solid financial profile. Capex and dividend flexibility is a
credit positive.

Key Rating Drivers

Ratings Incorporate Parental Support

TC's ratings incorporate a one-notch uplift for implied parental
support given moderate ties between the company and RZD. RZD has
reiterated on several occasions that inter-modal container
shipments are part of its core growth plans, implying tangible
and intangible support for TC, if needed, at least while it
remains the controlling shareholder.

Transfer Credit Neutral in Short-term

Fitch expects no short-term material changes to TC's business,
strategy, financial policy and corporate governance, following
RZD's transfer of 50% + 2 shares of TC to UTLC on 24 November,
2014. While RZD's stake in TC is no longer direct and is now
reduced to 49.9%, RZD remains by far TC's largest and most
influential shareholder. TC's board of directors continues to be
dominated by RZD representatives.

We expect the stake and effective control could be reduced to 35%
in the medium term, via UTLC's additional share issuance in
exchange for asset contributions from KTZ and Belarusian
Railways. We would then revise our single-notch uplift for
parental support, taking into account any tangible mechanisms of
efficient and timely support from UTLC's shareholders.

Comfortable 'BB' Standalone Profile
TC's standalone profile is supported by its leading domestic
position flat-car and container fleet, its strong presence in key
Russian locations, growing geographical coverage via joint
ventures and a solid financial profile. The company maintains a
diversified customer base, which is likely to improve further
with the creation of UTLC. The rating is, however, constrained by
its modest earnings relative to rail peers.

Challenging Market Conditions

A slowdown in the Russian economy and growing competition are
negatively affecting pricing dynamics and transportation volumes.
Freight rates, which declined in 2013, continued to fall in 9M14.
TC's rail transportation volumes grew 1.8% in 9M14, lagging
behind an average market growth of 6%. The growth was driven
mainly by transit, and to a lesser extent by export and domestic
volumes while import volumes declined. TC's revenue contribution
from integrated logistics and forwarding services grew
significantly in 2013 and in 1H14, which we view as positive due
to their higher profitability relative to conventional rail-based
container transportation.

Sluggish GDP growth prospects and significant freight rolling
stock overcapacity suggest that 2015 may be another difficult
year for the industry.

Debt Reduction and Lower Capex
"Over the short to medium term, Fitch forecasts funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage to remain below 2.0x and
FFO fixed charge cover above 4.0x. Although weaker market
conditions and the de-consolidation of Kedentransservice (KDTS)
will likely cause FFO to decline yoy in 2014, leverage metrics
are aided by lower debt levels due to its amortization and lower
capitalized lease due to exclusion of KDTS's rent. For 2014 we
expect a gross debt reduction of RUB1.5 billion, due to partial
repayment of the rouble Series 02 bonds. TC also plans to reduce
capex for 2015. KDTS used to contribute 8% of TC's EBITDA and had
nearly no debt of its own. In 2014 we expect KDTS to contribute
RUB70 million of cash dividends to TC's FFO," Fitch said.

Liquidity and Debt Structure

At end-September 2014 TC's cash and cash equivalents stood at
RUB1.2 billion, which combined with RUB1.1 billion in short-term
deposits, provided adequate headroom to cover short-term
maturities of RUB1.5 billion. Future capex and dividends are
likely to be funded from operating cash flow, which Fitch expects
to remain healthy. TC's flexibility in capex and dividend
payments also support its liquidity and funding profile.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that could lead to a positive
rating action include:

-- A sustained decrease in FFO net lease-adjusted leverage to
   below 1.0x and FFO fixed charge coverage above 4.5x, although
   this is unlikely in the near term

Negative: Future developments that could lead to a negative
rating action include:

-- The single-notch uplift for implied parental support may be
   withdrawn if RZD loses its effective control of TC, especially
   if there is no tangible mechanism allowing for an efficient
   and timely support from UTLC's shareholders

-- Changes to the financing structure of UTLC, especially if
   material amount of debt is raised at the holding company
   level, supported mainly by TC's cash flow

-- A sustained rise in FFO net lease-adjusted leverage above
   2.25x and FFO fixed charge cover consistently below 3.5x,
   owing to decreases in earnings combined with continued high
   capex, dividends or M&A

TransContainer's ratings are as follows:

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'BB+';
  Outlook Stable

  Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs affirmed at 'B'

  National Long-term rating affirmed at 'AA(rus)'; Outlook Stable

  Local currency senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'BB+'


POHORJE: Terme Maribor to Operate Hotels
SeeNew reports that Terme Maribor on Dec. 1 entered into a
one-year lease to operate hotels of bankrupt Sports Centre
Pohorje, granted by state-owned Bank Assets Management Company,
or DUTB.

According to SeeNews, press agency STA said on Dec. 1 Terme
Maribor, which has reportedly passed into the hands of Russia's
gas major Gazprom, intends to re-open the Arena hotel on Dec. 5
and the other two hotels -- Bolfenk and Videc, before the
Christmas holidays.

DUTB took over the properties from Sports Centre Pohorje just
before the bankruptcy in order to reduce the claims against the
troubled company, SeeNews discloses.

According to SeeNews, the press agency said additional
investments into hotels are not planned.  Part of the former
employees of Sports Centre Pohorje will be hired again, SeeNews

Terme Maribor, the largest provider of overnight stays in the
northern city of Maribor, as cited by SeeNews, said their hotels
are almost completely booked for the New Year holidays and it
will now start using the capacities of the Pohorje hotels.

Sports Centre Pohorje is a tourist services provider based in


AYT CAJA MURCIA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Class C Notes
Fitch Ratings has taken multiple rating actions on AyT Caja
Murcia Hipotecario II, FTA as follows:

  Class A (ISIN ES0312272000): 'AA-sf'; maintained on Rating
  Watch Evolving

  Class B (ISIN ES0312272018): 'A+sf'; placed on Rating Watch

  Class C (ISIN ES0312272026): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
  Revised to Stable from Negative

The transaction comprises Spanish mortgage loans originated by
Caja Murcia, now part of Banco Mare Nostrum (BB+/Negative/B).

Key Rating Drivers

Stable Performance of Underlying Assets

As of the latest reporting period, three-month plus arrears
(excluding defaults) were at 0.25% of the current pool balance,
which is well below the 1.9% for Fitch's Spanish index for three-
months plus arrears. Cumulative gross defaults have increased to
0.07% of the initial portfolio balance from 0.02% a year earlier.
The level of defaults remains exceptionally low for the sector,
but the recent increase may indicate a reduction in originator

The continued strong performance is reflected in the affirmation
and revision of the Outlook for the junior tranche to Stable from

Payment Interruption Risk

The maintenance of Rating Watch Evolving on the senior notes and
the placement of Rating Watch Negative on the mezzanine tranche
are the result of the exposure to payment interruption. Fitch has
assessed the liquidity available in the transaction to fully
cover senior fees, net swap payments and note interest is now
insufficient to ensure two interest payments to the notes should
the servicer, Banco Mare Nostrum, default. As a result, Fitch
placed the senior notes on RWE on 7 October 2014 and has now
included the class B notes on RWN. The servicer has confirmed
that a deposit will be established to address the payment
interruption risk within the next three months. Fitch will review
whether the changes mitigate the risk by covering at least senior
note interest payments for two periods should the servicer

Rating Sensitivities

Deterioration in asset performance may result from economic
factors. An increase in new defaults and associated pressure on
excess spread levels and reserve funds beyond Fitch's
expectations could result in negative rating actions.

TDA IBERCAJA 7: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class C Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in TDA Ibercaja 3, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos and
TDA Ibercaja 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its rating on TDA Ibercaja 7's class A notes;

   -- Lowered its rating on TDA Ibercaja 3's class A notes; and

   -- Affirmed its ratings on the class B and C notes in TDA
      Ibercaja 3 and 7.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria) and its updated
criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received
dated Aug. 2014 for TDA Ibercaja 3 and July 2014 for TDA Ibercaja
7.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its RMBS criteria
and its RAS criteria.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as 'moderate'.  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.

Credit enhancement has increased in both transactions since S&P's
previous reviews, as shown:

Class         Available Credit
               Enhancement (%)

TDA Ibercaja 3
A                         9.5
B                         2.9
C                         1.4

TDA Ibercaja 7
A                        11.3
B                         4.7
C                         N/A

This transactions feature an amortizing reserve fund, which
currently represents 1.40% of the outstanding balance of the
mortgage assets for TDA Ibercaja 3, and 4.65% for TDA Ibercaja 7,
respectively.  The cash reserves are at their target amounts for
both transactions.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 0.69% for TDA
Ibercaja 3, and 0.55% for TDA Ibercaja 7 are on average lower for
these transactions than S&P's Spanish RMBS index.  Defaults are
defined as mortgage loans in arrears either equal to--or higher
than--18 months in both transactions.  Cumulative defaults (net
of recoveries) are 0.22% of the initial pool balance for TDA
Ibercaja 3.  Cumulative defaults over the initial pool balance
are 0.63% for TDA Ibercaja 7.  In both transactions, cumulative
defaults are lower than in other Spanish RMBS transactions that
S&P rates. Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction is
unlikely to pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P's

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to these transactions, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in the WAFF for 'A'
rating levels and above and an increase in the WAFF for lower
rating levels, since S&P's previous review.  The weighted-average
loss severity (WALS) has increased at each rating level for both

Rating level        WAFF (%)    WALS (%)  CC (%)

TDA Ibercaja 3

AAA                 16.7        22.8         3.8
AA                  12.6        19.0         2.4
A                   10.3        13.1         1.3
BBB                 7.5         10.2         0.8
BB                  4.9          8.3         0.4
B                   4.1          6.8         0.3

TDA Ibercaja 7

AAA                 19.7        43.9         8.7
AA                  14.8        39.9         5.9
A                   12.1        32.7         4.0
BBB                 8.8         28.7         2.5
BB                  5.7         25.8         1.5
B                   4.7         23.2         1.1

For both transactions, the decreases in the WAFF for rating
levels at 'A' and above are mainly due to adjustment factors that
S&P has applied to the original loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, the
different adjustments that S&P applies to seasoned loans,
geographical province concentration adjustments, and adjustment
factors that S&P applies for jumbo loans under our RMBS criteria.
The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application of
S&P's revised market value decline assumptions and the indexing
of its valuations under S&P's RMBS criteria.  The overall effect
is an increase in the required credit coverage for each rating
level for both transactions since S&P's previous review.

Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria and its RMBS
criteria, S&P has determined that its assigned rating on each
class of notes in this transaction should be the lower of (i) the
rating as capped by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that
the class of notes can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.  In this
transaction, none of the ratings on the notes are constrained by
the rating on the sovereign.

In both transactions, the pro rata conditions are currently met
and the notes are repaying pro rata.  S&P's RMBS criteria
envisage two different starting points for the recession, at
inception and at the end of the third year.  Delaying the
recession until the end of the third year results in the
transactions paying pro rata in S&P's cash flow analysis.  S&P's
cash flow analysis results show that pro rata redemption is less
beneficial for all of the tranches in both transactions.
Additionally, under S&P's RMBS criteria, it assumes a floating
fee of 0.50% of the outstanding loan balance as a stressed senior
fee assumption, which is higher than S&P's previous reviews of
both transactions.

Both transactions have interest deferral triggers.  For Ibercaja
3's class B and C notes, they are 6.3% and 4.3%, respectively, of
cumulative defaults (net of recoveries) over the closing
portfolio balance.  For Ibercaja 7's class B notes, they are 10%
of cumulative defaults over the closing portfolio balance.  S&P
do not expect any of these triggers to be breached in the near
term in both transactions.

Both transactions have interest swaps to mitigate the mismatch
between the reference index on the asset pool and that on the
notes.  In both transactions, the swap counterparty pays to the
issuer three-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate over the balance
that the issuer receives, plus a margin of 65 basis points, plus
the servicing fees (if the servicer is replaced).

TDA Ibercaja 3's class A notes do not pass S&P's cash flow
stresses under its RAS criteria, and therefore do not achieve any
notches of uplift above the sovereign rating.  S&P has therefore
lowered to 'BBB (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)' its rating on this class of
notes.  S&P has also affirmed its ratings on the class B and C
notes because the available credit enhancement is commensurate
with S&P's currently assigned ratings.

Although TDA Ibercaja 7's class A notes pass S&P's cash flow
stresses under its RAS criteria at a 'A+' rating level, S&P's
current counterparty criteria cap its rating on this class of
notes at its long-term 'BBB+' issuer credit rating on Banco
Santander S.A. as the swap counterparty and the transaction bank
account provider.  S&P has therefore raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from
'BBB (sf)' its rating on the class A notes.  S&P has also
affirmed its ratings on the class B and C notes, as the available
credit enhancement is commensurate with its currently assigned

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions for
both transactions by assuming additional arrears of 4% and 8% for
one-year and three-year horizons, respectively.  This did not
result in S&P's rating deteriorating below the maximum projected
deterioration that S&P would associate with each relevant rating
level, as outlined in S&P's credit stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and further falls in house prices for the remainder
of 2014, which will then level off in 2015.

On the back of improving but still depressed macroeconomic
conditions, S&P don't expect the performance of the transactions
in its Spanish RMBS index to improve in 2014.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth, high unemployment, and fiscal
tightening.  On the positive side, S&P expects interest rates to
remain low for the foreseeable future.

TDA Ibercaja 3 and 7 are Spanish RMBS transactions, which
securitize portfolios of first-ranking mortgage loans granted to
Spanish residents.  The transactions closed in May 2006 and Dec.
2009, respectively.


Class              Rating
            To                From

TDA Ibercaja 3, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.007 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

A           BBB (sf)          AA- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B           BB (sf)
C           B (sf)

TDA Ibercaja 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR2.07 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A           BBB+ (sf)          BBB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B           BB- (sf)
C           D (sf)


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Two Asian Investors to Aid Turnaround
Niklas Magnusson at Bloomberg News reports that National Electric
Vehicle Sweden AB, the investment group that bought the assets of
Saab Automobile two years ago, said it has found two Asian
investors that may help fund its revival of the Swedish car

According to Bloomberg, the company said in a statement on Dec. 1
that an Asian carmaker agreed on Nov. 30 to buy a majority stake
in Nevs and finance the company's operating costs until the deal
is complete early next year.  Nevs also said it is in talks with
another Asian manufacturer on a joint venture to develop new
vehicles, Bloomberg notes.

Talks with the two Asian manufacturers have "intensified
significantly in the past few weeks," Nevs, as cited by
Bloomberg, said on Dec. 1.

Nevs said the potential majority shareholder has offered to
provide bridge financing of EUR5 million (US$6.2 million) a month
to cover operating costs until the agreement is complete,
Bloomberg notes.  Pending due diligence, the company said the
deal should be finished by February, Bloomberg relays.

Nevs, a Chinese-Japanese investment group led by renewable energy
power-plant builder National Modern Energy Holdings Ltd., sought
protection from its creditors in August after struggling to
deliver on a target of producing 120,000 cars a year by 2016,
Bloomberg recounts.  That would have come close to the Saab
brand's 2006 peak of 133,000 autos, Bloomberg states.

Nevs, granted permission by a Swedish court on Aug. 29 to carry
out a reorganization of the company, applied on Dec. 1 to
Vaenersborg District Court to extend the reconstruction period by
three months, Bloomberg relates.  Nevs said it had trouble paying
its creditors after its shareholder Qingbo Investment Co. didn't
fulfill a promised investment of SEK1.15 billion (US$155
million), Bloomberg notes.

                      About Saab Automobile

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.  Saab halted production in March 2011 when it ran out of
cash to pay its component providers.  On Dec. 19, 2011, Saab
Automobile AB, Saab Automobile Tools AB and Saab Powertain AB
filed for bankruptcy after running out of cash.

Some of Saab's assets were sold to National Electric Vehicle
Sweden AB, a Chinese-Japanese backed start-up that plans to make
an electric car using Saab Automobile's former factory, tools and

On Jan. 30, 2012, more than 40 U.S.-based Saab dealerships filed
an involuntary Chapter 11 petition for Saab Cars North America,
Inc. (Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 12-10344).  The petitioners,
represented by Wilk Auslander LLP, assert claims totaling US$1.2
million on account of "unpaid warranty and incentive
reimbursement and related obligations" or "parts and warranty
reimbursement."  Leonard A. Bellavia, Esq., at Bellavia Gentile &
Associates, in New York, signed the Chapter 11 petition on behalf
of the dealers.

The dealers want the vehicle inventory and the parts business to
be sold, free of liens from Ally Financial Inc. and Caterpillar
Inc., and "to have an appropriate forum to address the claims of
the dealers," Leonard A. Bellavia said in an e-mail to Bloomberg

Saab Cars N.A. is the U.S. sales and distribution unit of Swedish
car maker Saab Automobile AB.  Saab Cars N.A. named in December
an outside administrator, McTevia & Associates, to run the
company as part of a plan to avoid immediate liquidation
following its parent company's bankruptcy filing.

On Feb. 24, 2012, the Court granted Saab Cars NA relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Donlin, Recano & Company, Inc., was retained as claims and
noticing agent to Saab Cars NA in the Chapter 11 case.

On March 9, 2012, the U.S. Trustee formed an official Committee
of Unsecured Creditors and appointed these members: Peter Mueller
Inc., IFS Vehicle Distributors, Countryside Volkwagen, Saab of
North Olmstead, Saab of Bedford, Whitcomb Motors Inc., and
Delaware Motor Sales, Inc.  The Committee tapped Wilk Auslander
LLP as general bankruptcy counsel, and Polsinelli Shughart as its
Delaware counsel.

The Troubled Company Reporter, on July 18, 2013, reported that
the U.S. arm of Saab Automobile AB won approval of its Chapter 11
liquidation plan, marking the end of the road for Swedish auto
maker's bankruptcy proceedings.


TURKIYE GARANTI: Fitch Revises Support Rating to 'BB-'
Fitch Ratings has placed the Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. (Garanti) and its domestic
subsidiaries on Rating Watch Positive (RWP).  This follows an
announcement made by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBVA;
A-/ Stable) on 19 November 2014 that it intends to increase its
stake in Garanti to 39.9% from the current 25%.

At the same time, Fitch has revised down the Support Rating
Floors (SRF) of Garanti, Turkiye Is Bankasi A.S. (Isbank) and
Akbank T.A.S. - all privately-owned Turkish banks - to 'BB-' from
'BB+'. The revision of the SRFs reflects a reassessment of the
Turkish sovereign's ability to provide support to the banks in
foreign currency (FC).  The SRF of Finansbank A.S. was affirmed
at 'BB-'. All other ratings of Isbank, Akbank and Finansbank,
including their 'BBB-' Long-term IDRs, are unaffected by this
rating action.

Key Rating Drivers -- IDRS, Senior Debt Rating, Support Rating,
National Rating Of Garanti

The RWP on Garanti's ratings reflects Fitch's view that BBVA will
likely have a high propensity to support Garanti following the
increase in its stake.  This view takes into account (i) BBVA's
expected control of Garanti (achieved through its partnership
with minority local shareholder Dogus Group) and hence its
consolidation in BBVA's accounts; and (ii) the expected high
strategic importance of Garanti for the group, in part reflected
in the significant investment (EUR1.99bn) to be made in
increasing BBVA's stake.

At the same time, Fitch expects to maintain a two-notch
differential between BBVA's and Garanti's Long-term IDRs, after
the RWP has been resolved in the wake of the stake increase. This
reflects (i) BBVA's only minority stake in Garanti; (ii)
Garanti's significant relative size, with its equity and loan
portfolio equal, respectively, to 19% and 16% of those of BBVA at
end-3Q14; and (iii) the initially limited integration of Garanti
into the broader BBVA group.

Rating Sensitivities -- IDRS, Senior Debt Rating, Support Rating,
National Rating of Garanti

Fitch expects to upgrade Garanti's ratings following the increase
of BBVA's stake, currently expected in 1H15.  Garanti's Long-term
IDRs will likely be upgraded by one notch to 'BBB'.

Garanti's Long-term local currency rating could be upgraded by a
further notch to 'BBB+' if over time BBVA's commitment to Garanti
is confirmed through a track record of support, greater
integration and continued high strategic importance.  However,
Garanti's Long-term foreign currency rating could only be
upgraded further if Turkey's Country Ceiling of 'BBB' is also

From the 'BBB' level, Garanti's Long-term IDRs could be
downgraded if (i) BBVA is downgraded; (ii) Garanti becomes less
strategically important for BBVA; or (iii) (specific to Garanti's
Long-term foreign currency IDR) Turkey's Country Ceiling is
downgraded. However, Fitch would view each of these scenarios as

Key Rating Drivers and Sensitivities -- Garanti Subsidiaries

The RWP on the ratings of Garanti Faktoring and Garanti Finansal
Kiralama reflects Fitch's expectation they will continue to be
aligned with Garanti following the expected upgrade of the

Key Rating Drivers -- Support Rating Floors

The downward revision of the SRFs of Garanti, Isbank and Akbank
reflects a reassessment of the Turkish sovereign's ability to
provide support to these banks in FC. This reflects the growing
and sizable FC wholesale funding of the three banks and the
moderate FC reserves of the sovereign.

At end-3Q14, Fitch estimates that the three banks' combined FC
non-deposit liabilities (excluding amounts owed to other Turkish
banks) comprised USD51 billion.  The banks' short-term FC
liquidity positions are reasonable as FC liquidity (defined as
cash, short-term placements in foreign banks, unpledged
government FC securities, placements in the Central Bank's
reserve option mechanism and net receivables under FC swaps)
provided 75%-90% coverage of short-term FC non-deposit
liabilities.  Fitch's base case expectation is for Turkish banks
to retain access to FC wholesale funding and to be able to roll
over existing liabilities on largely favorable terms. This
expectation is reflected in the banks' 'bbb-' Viability Ratings.

However, in an extreme scenario involving a prolonged closure of
FC wholesale markets for Turkish banks, Fitch believes the
ability of the Turkish sovereign to provide FC support to the
banking sector could be constrained.  At end-3Q14, Fitch
estimates the total FC wholesale liabilities (long- and short-
term) of Garanti, Isbank and Akbank, net of available FC
liquidity (as defined above), at USD28 billion, and those of the
banking sector as a whole at USD40 billion-USD50 billion.  In
Fitch's view, this is a sizable amount relative to the Central
Bank's FC reserves, which, net of funds placed by banks under the
reserve option mechanism, comprised about USD80 billion. Fitch
believes foreign-owned banks could also represent a source of
significant claims on the Central Bank's FC reserves, as parent
institutions would likely expect subsidiaries to utilize
available domestic FC funding before providing support.

The affirmation of Finansbank's SRF at 'BB-' reflects the bank's
already lower level of wholesale funding, the small size of the
bank relative to its peers and its moderate FC non-deposit
funding (about USD2bn, net of available FC liquidity).

The 'BB-' SRFs of the four banks reflect (i) Fitch's view of the
high propensity of the authorities to provide support, in case of
need; and (ii) the sovereign's fairly strong ability to provide
support in local currency, including capital support, as
reflected in its 'BBB' Long-term local currency IDR and moderate
levels of government debt.

The SRFs of Turkey's systemically important banks were affirmed
at 'BBB-' on 24 November 2014 (see 'Fitch Affirms 3 State-Owned
Turkish Banks' available at

Rating Sensitivities -- Support Rating Floors

Fitch expects to withdraw Garanti's SRF following the increase in
BBVA's stake, as institutional support will become the more
likely source of external support for the bank. Fitch does not
assign SRFs to banks whose IDRs are driven by institutional

The SRFs of Isbank, Akbank and Finansbank could be downgraded if
either (i) the Turkish sovereign is downgraded; (ii) the FC
positions of the banks, or more generally Turkey's external
finances, deteriorate considerably, or (iii) Fitch believes the
sovereign's propensity to support the banks has reduced.  The
introduction of bank resolution legislation in Turkey aimed at
limiting sovereign support for failed banks could negatively
impact Fitch's view of support propensity, and hence the banks'
SRs and SRFs; however, Fitch does not expect this in the short

Upgrades of the banks' SRFs are unlikely unless there is a marked
strengthening of the sovereign's ability to support the banks in

The rating actions are as follows:

Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S.:

  Long-term foreign currency (FC) and local currency (LC) IDRs of
  'BBB-' placed on RWP

  Short-term FC and LC IDRs of 'F3' placed on RWP

  National Long-term rating of 'AA+(tur)' placed on RWP

  Support Rating of '3' placed on RWP

  Support Rating Floor revised to 'BB-' from ''BB+'

  Viability Rating of 'bbb-' unaffected

  Senior unsecured debt: 'BBB-', placed on RWP

Garanti Faktoring A.S. and Garanti Finansal Kiralama A.S.:

  Long-term FC and LC IDR of 'BBB-' placed on RWP

  Short-term FC and LC IDR of 'F3' placed on RWP

  Support rating of '2' affirmed

  National Long-term rating of 'AA+(tur)' placed on RWP

Turkiye Is Bankasi A.S., Akbank T.A.S.

  Support Rating Floor revised to 'BB-' from 'BB+'

  All other ratings unaffected

Finansbank A.S.

  Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'BB-'

  All other ratings unaffected


ORANTA: Regulator to Take Business Out of Administration
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the National Commission for
Regulation of Financial Services Markets intends to take the
Oranta insurance company out of the provisional administration
and withdraw the bankruptcy commissioner Andrii Bachan on Dec. 5.

According to Ukrainian News Agency, during the work of the
commissioner, Oranta redeemed a large loan, cut non-production
expenditures and improved the system of insurance compensations

At the same time, the insurance reserves of the company rose by
10.5% to UAH307.3 million, Ukrainian News Agency discloses.

For January to September 2014, the company attracted UAH291.6
million of insurance premiums, Ukrainian News Agency relays.

Oranta insurance company is based in Kyiv.  The company is
engaged in risk insurance.

VRB BANK: Among List of Ukraine's Insolvent Banks
Volodymyr Verbyany at Bloomberg News reports that Ukrainian
central bank has designated VBR Bank as insolvent.

The central bank said Oleksandr Yanukovych, son of ousted
Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, is VBR's sole shareholder,
Bloomberg discloses.

VBR ranked 31st out of 166 Ukrainian banks, with assets of UAH5.6
billion as of October 1, 2014.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *