TCREUR_Public/141219.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, December 19, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 251

                            Headlines

B E L G I U M

ETHIAS SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Subordinated Debt Rating


B U L G A R I A

PLOVDIV CITY: S&P Cuts Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB+'
SOFIA CITY: S&P Lowers Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB+'
STARA ZAGORA: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB+' ICR
UNICREDIT BULBANK: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+'


I C E L A N D

KAUPTHING BANK: Iceland Mulls Unfreezing Assets


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO VI: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
CVC CORDATUS IV: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes


I T A L Y

WASTE ITALIA: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating to 5-Yr. Secured Notes


K A Z A K H S T A N

TEMIRBANK JSC: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'


N E T H E R L A N D S

HALCYON LOAN: S&P Assigns 'B- (sf)' Rating to Class F Notes
STICHTING HOLLAND: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class D Notes
UNITED GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable


R O M A N I A

MEDIAFAX GROUP: Enters Insolvency; KPMG Named Administrator


R U S S I A

BANK TAVRICHESKY: S&P Puts 'B-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
MECHEL OAO: Net Loss Widens to US$575-Mil. in Third Quarter 2014
TRANSTELECOM COMPANY: Fitch Corrects Dec. 15 Rating Release


U K R A I N E

MRIYA AGRO: CFO Resigns Amid US$1-Bil. Debt Restructuring


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Fails Bank of England Stress Test
EUROSAIL-UK 2007-4BL: Fitch Lifts Rating on Class D1a Notes to CC
JJB SPORTS: Ex-Chief Sentenced to Four Years in Prison
MORSTON ASSETS: Fails to Secure Funding, Administrators Appointed
NANDAN CLEANTEC: Shares Suspended as it Goes Into Administration

RANGERS FOOTBALL: Manager Offers Resignation
TALL TREES GARDEN: Center Site to be Sold by ES Group
TURNSTONE MIDCO 2: Fitch Affirms 'B+' IDR; Outlook Stable


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Macy's for Sale


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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ETHIAS SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Subordinated Debt Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ethias S.A.'s Insurer Financial
Strength (IFS) rating at 'BBB+' and Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BBB'.  The Outlooks are Stable. Concurrently,
Fitch has also affirmed Ethias's subordinated debt at 'BB+'.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation reflects Fitch's view that Ethias's risk-adjusted
capitalization will remain strong despite the unfavorable outcome
of the company's dispute with the Belgian tax authorities,
announced on November 28, 2014.  Ethias will have to book a loss
of EUR377 million as a result of the outcome but Fitch expects
the company to return to profitability in 2015, given its robust
underlying underwriting performance.

Ethias expects to transfer the full disputed amount of EUR377m to
loss reserves in 2014, despite the possibility of seeking further
appeals on points of law.  Fitch expects the resulting loss to be
partly offset by a robust performance of the underlying business
and realisation of capital gains.  In 2013, operating
profitability was strong at EUR226m before dividends (2012:
EUR220m) with a strong technical profitability in non-life
insurance, reflected in a combined ratio of 91% (2012: 92%).

Despite the loss, Fitch expects regulatory solvency to remain
robust at about 175% at end-2014 (end-2013: 190%) and risk-
adjusted capitalization to remain supportive of the rating.
Fitch believes that Ethias will rebuild its solvency margin over
the next 12-24 months, predominantly supported by retained
earnings, after dividends to its holding company, Vitrufin.

Rating Sensitivities

A reduction in the ratio of risky assets to equity to below 90%
(end-2013: 144%), with the non-life combined ratio maintained
below 95% and capital at a strong level, could lead to an
upgrade.

Key triggers for a downgrade include a decline in the Solvency I
ratio to 150% without the ability to recover within a short
period of time (end-2013: 190%) or failure to maintain an
adequate level of profitability reflected in a combined ratio
consistently above 100% (2013: 91%).

The rating actions are:

Ethias S.A.:

IFS rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
Undated subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB+'
Ethias Droit Commun AAM:
IFS rating: affirmed at 'BBB+'; Outlook Stable



===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


PLOVDIV CITY: S&P Cuts Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on the City of Plovdiv to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The
outlook is stable.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation
1060/2009 [EU CRA Regulation]), the ratings on Plovdiv are
subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of
the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a
pre-established calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation,
deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in
limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed
explanation of the reasons for the deviation.  In this case, the
deviation has been caused by the lowering to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' of
the long-term rating on Bulgaria on Dec. 12, 2014.

RATIONALE

The downgrade reflects S&P's similar action on Bulgaria.

Under S&P's methodology, a local or regional government (LRG) can
be rated higher than its sovereign if it believes that it
exhibits certain characteristics, as described in "Ratings Above
The Sovereign -- Corporate And Government Ratings: Methodology
And Assumptions," published Nov. 19, 2013.

S&P does not currently believe that Bulgarian LRGs, including
Plovdiv, meet these conditions.  Consequently, S&P do not rate
Plovdiv higher than Bulgaria.

S&P assess Plovdiv's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'bbb-'.
The SACP benefits from Plovdiv's low but increasing tax-supported
debt burden with low contingent liabilities.  S&P also takes into
account the city's average budgetary performance and its adequate
liquidity, thanks to large accumulated cash reserves.  S&P
regards Plovdiv's budgetary flexibility as average in an
international comparison.  S&P's assessment of the SACP is
constrained by its view of the evolving but unbalanced
institutional framework for municipalities in Bulgaria, as well
as S&P's assessment of Plovdiv's financial management as weak,
and the weak status of Plovdiv's economy in an international
comparison.

S&P might revise downward Plovdiv's SACP if it notices a
weakening of the institutional framework under which Bulgarian
local governments operate.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects that on Bulgaria.  Any rating action
S&P takes on the sovereign would likely be followed by a similar
action on Plovdiv, as long as the city's financial and economic
developments remain aligned with S&P's base-case scenario.

A rating upgrade for the city of Plovdiv is contingent on a
positive rating action on Bulgaria, as S&P do not rate Bulgarian
municipalities above the sovereign.

A downgrade stemming from a deterioration of Plovdiv's SACP is
unlikely, since the SACP on the city is higher than its issuer
credit rating.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Rating Assessment Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the rationale and outlook.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded
                              To                 From
Plovdiv (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating         BB+/Stable/--      BBB-/Stable/--
Senior Unsecured             BB+                BBB-


SOFIA CITY: S&P Lowers Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on the City of Sofia to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The
outlook is stable.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation
1060/2009 [EU CRA Regulation]), the ratings on Sofia are subject
to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU
CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a pre-
established calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations
from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited
circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation
of the reasons for the deviation.  In this case, the deviation
has been caused by the lowering to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' of the long-
term rating on Bulgaria on Dec. 12, 2014.

Rationale

The downgrade of Sofia reflects the similar action S&P took on
Bulgaria.

Under S&P's methodology, a local or regional government (LRG) can
be rated higher than its sovereign if it believes that it
exhibits certain characteristics, as described in "Ratings Above
The Sovereign--Corporate And Government Ratings: Methodology And
Assumptions," published Nov. 19, 2013.  S&P do not currently
believe that Bulgarian LRGs, including Sofia, meet these
conditions.  Consequently, S&P do not see a possibility that it
could rate Sofia higher than Bulgaria.

Based on Sofia's intrinsic credit strengths and in accordance
with S&P's criteria, it assess Sofia's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) at 'bbb'.  The SACP is not a rating but a means of
assessing the intrinsic creditworthiness of a LRG under the
assumption that there is no sovereign rating cap.

The SACP on Sofia reflects S&P's view of the city's exceptional
liquidity and strong budgetary flexibility, based on its
significant autonomy in managing local revenues.  This
flexibility is somewhat constrained, however, by the city
government's reluctance to raise taxes and charges ahead of
municipal elections in the third quarter of 2015.  Sofia's
economic wealth is average compared with international peers, in
S&P's view.

The SACP is constrained by Sofia's evolving but unbalanced
institutional framework.  Combined with weak, albeit
strengthening financial management, this limits the
predictability of the city's financial performance.  A large
capital investment program will likely keep S&P's assessment of
the city's budgetary performance at average, with widening
deficits after capital accounts.  It will also see the city's
debt burden remain high, including relatively high exposure to
market risks and high contingent liabilities relating to its
exposures to municipal companies and a municipal bank.

S&P might revise the SACP downward if it notices a weakening of
the institutional framework under which Bulgarian local
governments operate.

Outlook

The stable outlook mirrors that on Bulgaria.  Any rating action
S&P takes on the sovereign would likely be followed by a similar
action on Sofia as long as the city's intrinsic credit
characteristics remain aligned with our base-case scenario.

There is no intrinsic upside scenario for Sofia because, under
S&P's criteria, it does not currently rate Bulgarian
municipalities above the sovereign.  S&P views a downside
scenario as highly unlikely because the SACP on the city is
higher than the credit rating.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded
                              To                 From
Sofia (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating         BB+/Stable/--      BBB-/Stable/--


STARA ZAGORA: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB+' ICR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on the
Bulgarian city of Stara Zagora to stable from positive.  At the
same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit rating
on Stara Zagora.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation
1060/2009 [EU CRA Regulation]), the ratings on Stara Zagora are
subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of
the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with a
pre-established calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation,
deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in
limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed
explanation of the reasons for the deviation.  In this case, the
deviation has been caused by the lowering to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' of
the long-term rating on Bulgaria on Dec. 12, 2014.

Rationale

The outlook revision reflects S&P's downgrade of Bulgaria.

Under S&P's methodology, a local or regional government (LRG) can
be rated higher than its sovereign if it considers that it
exhibits certain characteristics, as described in "Ratings Above
The Sovereign--Corporate And Government Ratings: Methodology And
Assumptions," published Nov. 19, 2013.

S&P does not currently consider that Bulgarian LRGs, including
Stara Zagora, meet these conditions.  Consequently, S&P do not
see a possibility that it could rate Stara Zagora higher than
Bulgaria. Stara Zagora's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
remains 'bb+'.

The rating on Stara Zagora is constrained by the evolving but
unbalanced institutional framework under which Bulgarian cities
operate and Bulgaria's relatively weak economy and low wealth
levels, compared with international peers.  Although S&P
acknowledges that Stara Zagora has strengthened its budgeting
procedures, it still considers its financial management weak due
to its limited track record of maintaining tight fiscal policy.

The rating is supported by Stara Zagora's very low debt burden
and low contingent liabilities.  S&P views the city's liquidity
position as adequate.  S&P also considers that the city has
average budgetary flexibility, mostly through its high degree of
autonomy in setting taxes, which is partly offset by restricted
expenditure flexibility and average budgetary performance.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Stara Zagora mirrors that on Bulgaria.

S&P could raise the rating on Stara Zagora, if it raised the
rating on Bulgaria and at the same time, the city extends the
maturity of its debt as planned and remains committed to keeping
the debt burden modest, as targeted in its three-year budget.
This would give it a slight deficit after capital accounts and
sound liquidity on average over the next 18 months.

S&P could lower the rating on the city if it lowered the rating
on Bulgaria.  Alternatively, S&P could lower the rating on the
city, even if the sovereign rating remained unchanged, if within
the next 18 months the city materially deviated from its
financial targets and reported persistent deficits after capital
accounts, leading to a rising debt burden and pressure on the
city's liquidity position.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action

                               To                 From
Stara Zagora (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating          BB+/Stable/--      BB+/Positive/--
Senior Unsecured              BB+


UNICREDIT BULBANK: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its
long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Bulgaria-
based UniCredit Bulbank AD to 'BB+/B' from 'BBB-/A-3'.  The
outlook is stable.

The rating action on UniCredit Bulbank follows the downgrade of
Bulgaria on Dec. 12, 2014.  S&P caps its ratings on UniCredit
Bulbank at the level of the sovereign ratings on Bulgaria.  The
downgrade of Bulgaria reflects S&P's view that support to
troubled banks has pushed up Bulgaria's general government debt.
S&P projects weak real and nominal economic growth over 2014 to
2016 that will challenge Bulgaria's fiscal consolidation and
asset quality.  Moreover, the current coalition government faces
tough choices in its efforts to balance fiscal prudence with
measures aimed at alleviating high unemployment and weaker
economic prospects.

S&P considers UniCredit Bulbank to be a "strategically important"
subsidiary of UniCredit Bank Austria AG (BBB+/Negative/A-2),
which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Italy-based UniCredit SpA.
Under S&P's group rating methodology, and in the absence of a
sovereign rating constraint, it could rate UniCredit Bulbank up
to three notches higher than its stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) of 'bb+', subject to S&P's cap of one notch below the
long-term rating on UniCredit Bank Austria.  However, because S&P
do not rate any banks in Bulgaria above the sovereign, the long-
term rating on UniCredit Bulbank is constrained by the 'BB+'
long-term sovereign credit rating on Bulgaria.  Therefore, S&P no
longer incorporates any notches of uplift to reflect the
likelihood of group support.

The stable outlook on UniCredit Bulbank reflects that on Bulgaria
and S&P's expectation that the bank's financial profile will
remain generally unchanged over the next two years.  Moreover,
S&P considers that further pressure on asset quality will not
affect the bank's ability to generate capital and earnings.

Any negative rating action on Bulgaria would result in a similar
action on UniCredit Bulbank.  In addition, in the event of a
negative rating action on UniCredit SpA or UniCredit Bank
Austria, S&P would review its ratings on UniCredit Bulbank.  In
particular, S&P would assess potential adverse effects on
UniCredit Bulbank's SACP, owing to contagion risk stemming from
the UniCredit group.

Conversely, if S&P upgraded Bulgaria, it could take a similar
rating action on UniCredit Bulbank if it remains a "strategically
important" subsidiary of UniCredit Bank Austria.  The likelihood
of an upgrade at this time is unlikely, however.



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KAUPTHING BANK: Iceland Mulls Unfreezing Assets
-----------------------------------------------
Matt Jarzemsky and Charles Duxbury at The Wall Street Journal
report that Iceland's government signaled last week that it is
closing in on a plan that would unfreeze the assets of three
failed banks for creditors owed tens of billions of dollars.

According to the Journal, people familiar with the talks said at
a meeting on Dec. 9, a government lawyer told some creditors that
Iceland would propose a plan early next year to restructure the
debt of Kaupthing Bank hf, Glitnir Bank hf and Landsbanki.
The banks, formerly the country's three largest, collapsed in
2008 after their debt-fueled overseas expansion fell apart amid
the global financial crisis, the Journal recounts.

The Journal relates that one of the people said the creditors
have proposed a repayment plan to Iceland's central bank that
would give them some of the proceeds from the bank's asset sales,
a note guaranteeing a portion of future asset-sale proceeds and
an equity stake in the failed banks that would give them some
measure of control over the future sale of assets.

According to the Journal, people familiar with the matter said
hedge-fund firms Davidson Kempner Capital Management, Halcyon
Asset Management LLC, and Centerbridge Partners LP are among the
banks' creditors.  Many of the creditors bought up the debt at a
discount after the banks failed, the Journal notes.

The Dec. 9 meeting suggests the government may be willing to
relax those controls, which would allow the non-Icelandic
creditors to be paid, the Journal states.  Advisers for the
creditors were given the opportunity to offer input on what
they'd like to see in the restructuring plan, the Journal says
citing people with knowledge of the meeting.

                     About Kaupthing Bank

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Iceland Kaupthing Bank --
http://www.kaupthing.com/-- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups.  With operations
in more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of
services including retail banking, corporate finance, asset
management, brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private
wealth management.  Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank.  In October 2008, the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on Nov. 30,
2008, Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf, filed a
petition under Chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York commencing the Debtor's Chapter 15 case ancillary to
the Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the
Icelandic Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the
Bankruptcy Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.



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AVOCA CLO VI: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Avoca CLO VI plc notes:

  EUR160.1 million Class A1 (ISIN XS0272579763): affirmed at
  'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR64 million Class A2 (ISIN XS0272580266): affirmed at
  'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR19.4 million Class B (ISIN XS0272580779): affirmed at
  'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR31.5 million Class C (ISIN XS0272580936): affirmed at 'Asf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR20 million Class D (ISIN XS0272582395): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR23.9m Class E (ISIN XS0272583286): affirmed at 'BBsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR10 million Class F (ISIN XS0272583955): affirmed at 'Bsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR7 million Class V (ISIN XS0272586891): affirmed at 'BBBsf';
  Outlook Stable

Avoca CLO VI plc is a managed cash arbitrage securitization of
secured leveraged loans, primarily domiciled in Europe.  The
transaction closed in 2006 and is actively managed by KKR Credit
Advisors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the notes reflects the significant
deleveraging, which balanced out the portfolio loss from
restructuring the defaulted assets.  The transaction exited the
reinvestment period in January 2013.  Instead of being
reinvested, the unscheduled proceeds were used to redeem the
class A1 note.  As a result, the class A1 has been paid down by
EUR124m and credit enhancement increased for class A1 to class E
notes.  The credit enhancement of the class F note had decreased
by 0.36%.  This is due to the 8.4m portfolio loss after
restructuring the two defaulted issuers Yell and Vivarte.

The assets performance has been stable.  All collateral quality
tests and portfolio profile tests are passing.  There is no
defaulted asset in the portfolio.  Compared with last review, the
weighted average spread decreased to 3.68% from 3.92%, the
weighted average life was unchanged at 4.25.  The weighted
average rating factor increased to 29.2 from 28.4.  The largest
country exposure changed from France at the last review to United
Kingdom. The peripheral exposure which is represented by Spain
and Italy increased by 0.5% to 10.5%.

The class V note is a combination of class D note and the equity
tranche.  The affirmation reflects the affirmation of the class D
note.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Reducing the expected recovery rates by 25% would likely result
in a downgrade of the mezzanine and junior notes by two notches
or a category.  Increasing the default probability by 25% would
indicate a potential downgrade on classes B to D by a notch and
classes E and F by one category.  In both scenarios the senior
notes' ratings are not affected.


CVC CORDATUS IV: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned CVC Cordatus Loan Fund IV Limited
notes final ratings:

Class A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B2: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class F: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
Subordinated notes: not rated

CVC Cordatus Loan Fund IV Limited is a cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Average Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B' category.  Fitch has credit opinions on all obligors in the
indicative portfolio.  The covenanted minimum Fitch weighted
average rating factor (WARF) for assigning final ratings is 34.0.
The WARF of the identified portfolio is 33.6.

High Recovery Expectation

At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations.  Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets
as more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets.  Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to all but one of
the assets in the identified portfolio.  The covenanted minimum
weighted average recovery rate (WARR) for assigning final ratings
is 66.0%.  The WARR of the identified portfolio is 65.7%.

Unhedged Non-euro Assets Exposure

The transaction is allowed to invest up to 2.5% of the portfolio
in non-euro-denominated assets.  Unhedged non-euro assets are
limited to a maximum exposure of 2.5% of the portfolio subject to
principal haircuts.  The manager can only invest in unhedged
assets if, after the applicable haircuts, the aggregate balance
of the assets is above the reinvestment target par balance.

Partial Interest Rate Hedge

Between 0% and 12.5% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed
rate assets, while fixed rate liabilities account for 6.0%.
Therefore, the transaction is partially hedged against rising
interest rates.

Interest Diversion Post Reinvestment

Following the end of the reinvestment period, a breach of the
interest diversion test will lead to 50% of interest proceeds
being used for the sequential repayment of principal to the
notes.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Net proceeds from the notes will be used to purchase a EUR388.6
million portfolio of European leveraged loans and bonds.  The
portfolio will be managed by CVC Credit Partners Group Limited.
The transaction will have a four year re-investment period
scheduled to end in 2019.

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval.  Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings.  Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that confirmation is considered to be given if
Fitch declines to comment.



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WASTE ITALIA: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating to 5-Yr. Secured Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Waste Italia's five-year, 10.50%
senior secured notes a final rating of 'B-'/'RR4'.  Fitch has
also assigned Waste Italia SpA a final Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) of 'B-' with a Stable Outlook.

The assignment of the final ratings follows a review of final
documentation and the final transaction structure, the completion
of the Geotea acquisition and the fulfillment of the conditions
precedent for using the newly established super-senior revolving
credit facility.

While the transaction broadly conforms with the information Fitch
had received when it assigned expected ratings, there have been
some changes and developments in the structure of the transaction
and in some of the key terms of the notes, including:

   -- The bond priced significantly more expensive at 10.5% and
      with an offering price of 92.294%, leading to a reduction
      of liquidity available for general corporate purposes to
      EUR0.5 million from an originally envisaged EUR10 million.

   -- Kinexia S.p.A. (the parent company) has issued the
      EUR10 milllion convertible bond and in addition has
      contributed another EUR5 million as part of the agreement
      relating to the RCF, thus partly offsetting the lower
      liquidity from the notes issue.

   -- The absolute amounts and the percentages of the excess cash
      flow offer mechanism have been revised upwards.  For 2015,
      the excess cash flow offer amount is now EUR5 million
     (previously EUR2.5 million), for 2016 it is EUR7.5 million
     (previously EUR5 million) or 75% (previously 50%) of excess
      cash flow and for each of the subsequent two years
      EUR15 million (previously EUR15 million) or 75% of
      excess cash flow (previously 50%).

   -- The super senior headroom (the amount of debt permitted to
      rank ahead of the notes) has been reduced to EUR15 million
      from EUR25 million.  With the current level of the RCF of
      EUR15 million, there is no super senior headroom left.

The changes to the terms of the notes are viewed as slightly more
creditor friendly and partly compensate for the lower coverage
ratios resulting from the significantly higher coupon on the
EUR200m notes.

Fitch views the overall diversification and scale of Waste Italia
as remaining limited following the acquisition of Geotea and the
business plan as entailing substantial execution risks.
Moreover, the company has to establish a record of providing
bondholders with transparent and comparable information.  The
group now has a sizeable bullet maturity to manage in 2019,
although excess cash flow amounts to be used for excess cash-flow
offers have increased.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Market Position & Supportive Market Segment

Waste Italia has a strong market position in special non-
hazardous waste in north west Italy and volumes have historically
displayed greater stability than other segments such as hazardous
or urban waste.  Industrial customers remain responsible for
waste up to disposal underlining the importance of strong
customer relationships.  Although contract lives are relatively
short (typically 6-12 months), a presence throughout the value
chain is a competitive advantage and contract renewal rates are
around 98%. However, special waste is unregulated and Waste
Italia is relatively undiversified by geography or by technology.
While EU waste policy favors incineration over landfill, Italian
landfill looks set to continue to grow, based on cost advantages
and the difficulty in obtaining permits for incineration.  With
the acquisition of Geotea, Waste Italia has also entered the
market for urban waste and for hazardous waste, albeit at low
relative shares.

Replacing Landfill Capacity Key For Cash Flow

Fitch estimates landfill accounting for approximately two-thirds
of EBITDA, replenishing capacity is central to generating future
cash flow to either grow the business or reduce net leverage
toward the notes' maturity.  This can be achieved organically and
25% additional capacity was permitted in 1H14 at Albonese or via
acquisitive growth.  The acquisition of Geotea increased the
remaining landfill life to 6.9 from 3 years.  The company's
ability to maintain long-term landfill capacity is central to its
credit profile, but we note that this is subject to a successful
permit process, which is outside the company's control.  Waste
Italia has been active in this business for a considerable time
and is experienced in dealing with the permit process.

Additional Cash Flow Sensitivities

In addition to the available landfill capacity, cash flows are
sensitive to waste volumes which trend with Italian economic
activity, and, in a highly fragmented market, competitive pricing
pressures.  However, Waste Italia's partnership structure outside
north west Italy gives some flexibility to the cost base.  With
trade receivables averaging around 30% of revenues, there is also
customer counterparty risk.  Waste Italia reviewed payment terms
in 2013 and now requires customer payment within 60 days.  Beyond
maintenance capex of EUR6m p.a. to maintain landfill life, growth
capex is fully discretionary.

RCF and Refinancing Provide Liquidity

The shareholder capital contribution now amounts to EUR49.5m from
the parent company, Kinexia.  Together with the proceeds from the
notes, the funds are used to fund recent acquisitions, in
particular landfill companies, Faeco (EUR40.6 million) and Geotea
(EUR84.3 million).  The acquisition of Geotea has recently
completed.

Liquidity is also provided by the EUR15 million RCF that has been
put in place and Waste Italia has informed Fitch that all
conditions precedent have been met.  The super senior debt that
could be raised and rank ahead of the notes without being subject
to a fixed charge or leverage test has been reduced to EUR15
million.

However, there are some restrictions on the RCF.  It contains a
net debt/EBITDA based springing covenant that is tested once
utilization exceeds 30% at the end of a quarter.  Breaches do not
constitute an event of default but only lead to a draw-stop under
the RCF while breaches can be cured via equity injections.  The
RCF is restricted in its use that it must not be used to fund
excess cash-flow offers and repayment of the notes leads to a
mandatory repayment obligation, protecting its super-senior
status at all times.

The group also uses non-recourse factoring; but the programs are
moderate (EUR10.1 million for Waste Italia and EUR1.4 million for
Faeco).  Waste Italia does not plan to pay dividends and Fitch
has assumed no dividend payments in Fitch's rating case.

Capital Structure and Corporate Governance

While Fitch views Waste Italia's strategy to enhance the lifetime
of the remaining landfill capacity and diversification into other
waste treatment areas and types of waste as a means of defending
and improving its business profile, the pace of expansion in 2014
is regarded as aggressive.  Fitch calculates FFO adjusted net
leverage on a pro-forma basis for 2014 at 4.6x.  However, de-
leveraging is strongly dependent on further growth, which
requires both volumes and prices to increase.  Fitch views some
volume increases as possible, but in a competitive and low
inflation environment, is cautious on pricing.  Moreover, Fitch
considers there is potential execution risk in strategy and
regards the sizeable long-term bullet maturity as not fully
matching the decreasing landfill capacity that would organically
decrease in the absence of new permissions.

In Fitch's ratings case, Fitch forecasts FFO adjusted net
leverage to be around 4.4x in 2015 and 2016.  Corporate
governance aspects resulting from the relationship with Kinexia,
in particular some management overlap and a high level of debt at
Kinexia's other subsidiaries, are a potential risk.  However,
this is mitigated by adequate contractual protection in the
proposed terms and conditions of the bond.  The terms of the bond
include a mandatory cash flow offer of EUR5 million for the year
2015, the greater of EUR7.5 million and 75% of excess cash flow
for 2016 and the greater of EUR15 million and 75% of excess cash
flow for 2017 and 2018.  Excess cash flow is defined as EBITDA
less changes in working capital, capital spending, cash interest
and tax.

Coverage Ratios Low based on High-Coupons

Due to the high coupon at 10.5%, FFO based coverage ratios are
relatively low.  Fitch expects FFO interest coverage to be around
2.0x to 2.3x for the next two years, which is below our
previously stated negative rating sensitivity of 2.5x.  However,
Fitch expects this to be temporary with the ratio recovering to a
level above 2.5x in 2017 at the latest.  The lower ratio is
mitigated by the additional cash contributed by Kinexia (EUR5
million) and the slightly more creditor friendly terms compared
to when the expected ratings were assigned.

Recoveries

For its recovery analysis, Fitch used the consolidated 2013
EBITDA of EUR47 million.  To this, Fitch applied a discount of
15% and a distressed multiple of 3.5x.  Prior ranking debt
predominantly exists in the form of capital leases, factoring and
the EUR15 million super senior RCF.  After applying the waterfall
of proceeds based on the above assumptions, Fitch computes
recoveries in the range of 31-50% (RR4), resulting in no notching
for the senior secured notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- FFO adjusted net leverage sustainably below 4x (gross below
      4.5x) and FFO interest coverage above 3.5x on a sustained
      basis.

   -- Successful implementation of the business plan, including
      receipt of landfill permissions as planned and reaching
      EBITDA of at least EUR60 million.

   -- Further diversification of revenue streams, lower reliance
      on landfill.

   -- Faster than anticipated reduction of total debt, bringing
      the capital structure more in line with the remaining
      landfill capacity time.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Significantly weaker than expected operating performance.

   -- Substantial landfill permitting delay, potentially at Verde
      Imagna, resulting in remaining useful life of 3.5 years or
      less.

   -- Significant deterioration of key credit ratios (FFO
      adjusted net leverage above 5x, , negative free cash flow
      and an expectation that the FFO interest coverage ratio
      will not recover to 2.5x by 2017.

   -- Changes in financial policy, leading to substantial
      dividend outflows and to the loss of cash reserves to fund
      landfill capacity or deleveraging.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


TEMIRBANK JSC: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Kazakhstan-
based Temirbank JSC to 'B/B' from 'B-/C'.  The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P raised its Kazakhstan national scale rating
on Temirbank to 'kzBB' from 'kzBB-'.

The upgrade reflects the announcement that Alliance Bank JSC's
debt restructuring plan, which includes a merger with Temirbank
and ForteBank JSC, was approved by the court on Dec. 12, 2014.
This plan leads to a substantial reduction of Alliance Bank's
indebtedness and restoration of its solvency.
By Jan. 31, 2015, Alliance Bank's merger with Temirbank and
ForteBank is expected to be complete.  Temirbank will become a
wholly-owned and fully integrated subsidiary of Alliance Bank.

S&P therefore will consider Temirbank as a "core" subsidiary of
Alliance Bank. According to S&P's Group Rating Methodology,
"core" subsidiaries are rated at the level of the group credit
profile, which S&P assess at 'b'.  As S&P assess Temirbank's
stand-alone credit profile at 'b-', the ratings benefit from one
notch of uplift, as per S&P's criteria.

Temirbank's core status within the combined Alliance Bank Group
reflects S&P's treatment of this combination as a merger rather
than an acquisition by Alliance Bank of the other two banks.  S&P
expects that Temirbank and ForteBank will cease to exist as legal
entities in early 2015.  S&P expects the integration of the three
banks to take place in 2015-2016, resulting in a common
information technology platform, risk management systems, and
policies.

The new bank will likely be rebranded as Forte Bank in 2015, as
the reputation of the Alliance Bank and Temirbank brands have
been tarnished by years of financial difficulties following debt
restructurings.

The raising of the national scale rating to 'kzBB' from 'kzBB-'
and the upgrade of the subordinated debt reflects solely those
ratings' relationship to the long-term global scale rating.

The stable outlook on Temirbank reflects that on Alliance Bank,
given Temirbank's "core" status.

The stable outlook on Alliance Bank reflects S&P's view that,
following the restructuring and merger with Temirbank and
ForteBank, the new bank will maintain a stable competitive
position in Kazakhstan's banking sector, supported by its
restored capitalization and profitability.

S&P expects Temirbank to keep its "core" status within the
Alliance Bank Group and that the ratings and outlook on Temirbank
will therefore move in tandem with the group credit profile.
After the court decision, S&P sees only a marginal risk that the
combination of the three banks and the full integration of
Temirbank and ForteBank into Alliance Bank will not go through.
But if this risk materializes, S&P would reassess its view of the
group support Temirbank receives.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


HALCYON LOAN: S&P Assigns 'B- (sf)' Rating to Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has assigned credit ratings to
Halcyon Loan Advisors European Funding 2014 B.V.'s class A, B, C,
D, E, and F senior secured floating-rate notes.  At closing,
Halcyon Loan Advisors European Funding 2014 also issued unrated
subordinated notes.

Halcyon Loan Advisors European Funding 2014 is a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction securitizing a
portfolio of primarily senior secured loans granted to
speculative-grade European corporates.  Halcyon Loan Advisors
(U.K.) LLP manages the transaction.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes pay quarterly
interest unless there is a frequency switch event.  Following
this, the notes permanently switch to semiannual payment.

The portfolio's reinvestment period ends four years after the
effective date, and the portfolio's maximum average maturity date
is eight years after the effective date.

At the end of the ramp-up period, S&P understands that the
portfolio will represent a well-diversified pool of corporate
credits, with a fairly uniform exposure to all of the credits.
Therefore, S&P has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by
applying its criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt
obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used a portfolio target par
amount of EUR300.00 million, using the covenanted weighted-
average spread (4.15%), and the covenanted weighted-average
recovery rates at each rating level.

Elavon Financial Services Ltd. is the bank account provider and
custodian.  The participants' downgrade remedies are in line with
S&P's current counterparty criteria.

The issuer is bankruptcy-remote under S&P's European legal
criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

Halcyon Loan Advisors European Funding 2014 B.V.
EUR309.9 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate
and Deferrable Notes

Class               Rating              Amount
                                      (mil. EUR)

A                   AAA (sf)            174.60
B                   AA (sf)              39.80
C                   A (sf)               19.00
D                   BBB (sf)             16.40
E                   BB (sf)              19.30
F                   B- (sf)               9.80
Sub loan            NR                   31.00

NR--Not rated.


STICHTING HOLLAND: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed all four tranches of Stichting Holland
Homes III, a Dutch RMBS transaction fully backed by mortgage
loans originated by DBV Levensverzekeringsmaatschappij B.V. (DBV)
(now part of SNS Bank N.V. [BBB+/Negative/F2]).  The loans in the
portfolio are serviced by SNS, who has appointed Stater Nederland
(RPS1-) as a sub-servicer.  The rating actions are:

Class A (ISIN XS0233450138) affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0233451615) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0233452936) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0233453660) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Sound Asset Performance

This transaction only reports defaults that incurred a loss for
the structure.  This number remains very limited despite a
seasoning of nine years.  The relatively low original loan to
value (OLTV) in comparison to rest of the Dutch market (weighted
average combined loan to value [CLTV] of 60.2%) has resulted in
limited arrears throughout the transaction's life.  As of the
September 2014 payment date no loans were in arrears by more than
three months, while the collateral in arrears by less than three
months was below 1% of the current pool balance.  Hence, there is
limited stock of arrears that could roll into default.

Structure Providing Liquidity

The transaction has a fully funded reserve fund (RF) of 1.16% of
the current note balance, which will stop amortizing as soon as
it reaches its floor of 0.5% of the initial note balance (EUR3.75
million). The RF can be used to cover shortfalls on senior fees,
interest payment on all classes and replenishment of the
principal deficiency ledgers for all collateralized tranches.

In addition to the RF, the transaction features a liquidity
facility (LF) equivalent to 2% of the current note balance and
floored at 0.5% of the initial note balance.  The facility can be
used to cover shortfalls in interest payments on the notes after
the full utilization of the RF.

Finally, the deal uses a combination of an interest rate swap and
a cash flow swap to hedge against the mismatch between interest
rate received and due.  This cash flow swap agreement provides
the structure with 30 basis points (bp) guaranteed excess spread
after note interest and servicing fees.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The transaction has a high proportion of interest only (IO)
loans. If the borrowers fail to repay the entire principal at
maturity, this could lead to insufficient principal receipts and
shortfalls in principal payments, eroding the liquidity within
the transaction.


UNITED GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Netherlands-based telecom and cable
investment holding company United Group B.V.  The outlook is
stable.

The affirmation follows United Group's recent announcement that
it has concluded an agreement to acquire Slovenian mobile
operator Tusmobil for EUR110 million, of which EUR84 million will
be cash payable at closing.  S&P calculates that the EBITDA
multiple for this transaction, including initial cost synergies,
is about 7x -- increasing the group's pro forma adjusted leverage
in 2014 to slightly more than 6x.  S&P's debt calculation is
adjusted for the EUR175 million payment-in-kind loan at a top
holding company, operating lease liabilities, and deferred
acquisition consideration.  S&P forecasts, however, that United
Group will deleverage very quickly to about 5.4x in our 2015 base
case.

In S&P's view, the group's remaining organic growth opportunities
in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina -- as a result of the
company's footprint expansion and increasing pay-TV and broadband
penetration in these countries -- will be the main driver for
continued revenue and EBITDA expansion, and S&P expects the
company will deleverage to well below 6x in 2015.  Therefore, S&P
sees sufficient headroom under its base case for potential
depreciation of Serbian dinar (RSD) versus the euro and small
bolt-on acquisitions.  S&P also understands that the company will
likely offset dinar depreciation by increasing prices, in line
with the price increases in 2013.

S&P thinks, however, that given the company's meaningful leverage
after this acquisition and weak free cash flow generation, it has
very limited headroom under the current rating to make an
additional big acquisition or recapitalization over the short
term.  S&P has not assumed either in its base-case scenario.

"We think that the acquisition of Tusmobil could assist Slovenian
subsidiary Telemach's position in the Slovenian telecom market,
especially over the long term, as it will now be one of the two
main players in the market to offer fully integrated fixed and
mobile services.  This is notably on the back of operating in a
highly competitive Slovenian fixed-line market, with a relatively
high penetration of fiber.  We think, however, that the
transaction includes some initial operating risks, notably
related to a potential peak in capital expenditure (capex)
required by Tusmobil in order to catch up with its key
competitors, as it seems to be lagging behind in its network
quality due to previous underinvestment.  We also think the
acquisition could entail risks related to higher-than-anticipated
integration costs.  The two main reasons for this are the very
different branding of the cable and the mobile asset (making it
potentially more costly to rebrand, and the fact that this is
United Group's first mobile network-based asset," S&P said.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of about 14% in 2014, excluding Tusmobil and
      about 45%-47% including consolidation of Tusmobil,
      resulting mainly from continued meaningful revenue growth
      units (RGU) growth in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
      growth in revenues from content, and an acquisition of a
      cable asset in Slovenia.

   -- Organic revenue growth of about 5%-6% in 2015 resulting
      from continued RGU growth, but higher pricing pressures in
      Serbia (partially due to foreign exchange depreciation),
      increased competitive pressures in Slovenia, and the
negative impact of a reduction in mobile termination rates in
Slovenia.

   -- Slightly declining margins due to the addition of Tusmobil
      to about 41% (reported) pro forma 2014, increasing to about
      42%-43% in 2015.  A very high capex-to-sales ratio of 24%-
      26% in 2014-2015 due to continued network expansion
      including Tusmobil's 4G network and high degree of customer
      premises equipment.

   -- Continued bolt-on acquisitions of about EUR30 million in
      2015 (excluding Tusmobil).

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of 6.2x in 2014, declining to about 5.4x in
      2015, including the accrual of the payment-in-kind interest
      and full consolidation of Tusmobil;

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 10%-11%; and

   -- FFO cash interest coverage of about 3.5x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's anticipation that United Group
will continue to deliver solid organic growth over the next two
years and at least break-even free operating cash flow.  S&P
anticipates that this will help the group to quickly reduce debt
to EBITDA to comfortably less than 6x in 2015, with headroom for
potential foreign exchange volatility and small bolt-on
acquisitions.

S&P may lower the rating if the company meaningfully
underperforms compared with S&P's current growth assumptions, or
is exposed to meaningfully higher integration costs following the
acquisition of Tusmobil, resulting in significant cash burn and
adjusted leverage at more than 6x in 2015.  S&P could also lower
the rating if EBITDA cash interest coverage were to fall below
2x.

Additionally, if S&P sees a material increase in the level of
priority ranking liabilities, it could have a negative impact on
the company's issue rating

S&P is unlikely to raise the rating over the next two years,
given its view of the company's limited size, country-related
risks, and its view that the capital structure will likely remain
highly leveraged due to the group's aggressive financial policy.
Additionally, the rating will likely remain constrained by the
company's limited free cash flow generation due to its ambitious
growth appetite, which S&P anticipates will result in continued
high capex and bolt-on acquisitions.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


MEDIAFAX GROUP: Enters Insolvency; KPMG Named Administrator
-----------------------------------------------------------
Otilia Haraga at Business Review reports that Mediafax Group,
owned by media mogul Adrian Sarbu, has officially entered
insolvency, according to the ruling of The Bucharest Court, after
submitting an official request.

The Bucharest Court has nominated KPMG Restructuring as temporary
legal administrator, with a fee of RON5,000, Business Review
says, citing paginademedia.ro.

Mediafax Group requested its own insolvency on Nov. 27, Business
Review recounts.  The company is being investigated under
accusations of tax evasion and money laundering, Business Review
relates.

Mediafax Group posted in 2013 a turnover of EUR17.5 million and
losses of EUR2.6 million, Business Review discloses.

Romania-based Mediafax Group includes Mediafax newswire, the
Gandul.info website, the magazine Business Magazin and the
business daily Ziarul Financiar.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK TAVRICHESKY: S&P Puts 'B-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B-' long-term
corporate credit rating and its 'ruBBB-' Russia national scale
rating on Russia-based Bank Tavrichesky on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'C' short-term rating on the
bank.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view that Bank
Tavrichesky may face increasing difficulty meeting the regulatory
capital requirements of the Bank of Russia in the next 90 days.
In particular, this may come from the rapid devaluation of the
Russian ruble (RUB) and the resulting revaluation of foreign
currency denominated assets that increase risk-weighted assets.
S&P currently considers Bank Tavrichesky to be at risk with
regulatory capital adequacy, as measured by the central bank's N1
ratio of 10.07% as of Dec. 1, 2014, just 7 basis points (bps)
above the minimum.

S&P understands that Bank Tavrichesky takes proactive measures to
boost its regulatory capital, with plans to attract two
subordinated loans from its minority shareholder Norwegian
Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge, with a value of approximately RUB362
million and RUB540 million.  The bank has also planned an equity
injection for the end of March 2015 of RUB504 million.  While the
bank expects the first subordinated debt to come before the end
of 2014, S&P notes that this will be only a minor relief for the
bank, providing an effect within only 70 bps in terms of the N1
ratio, according to S&P's estimates.  Because S&P focuses on
strong forms of capital, it foresees no immediate impact on its
risk-adjusted capital ratio.  Consequently, S&P believes that a
necessary capital buffer will be built only after a further Tier
1 capital injection takes place or after market conditions
stabilize.

If S&P assumes that all of the planned capital strengthening
occurs, although there would be less pressure on Bank
Tavrichesky's capital position, the created capital buffer may
not be sufficient to ward off the rising asset quality issues S&P
expects in 2015 and the ruble's persistent weakness.

Indeed, S&P observes, that according to reporting forms under
Russian accounting standards, the amount of accrued but not paid
interest steadily increased through 2014 to 3.3% on Nov. 1, 2014,
from 1.1% of the gross loan book on Jan. 1, 2014 -- a high level
compared with Russian peers.  S&P also notes that the bulk of
this increase was due to one large group of borrowers.  While the
bank expects to collect this interest in the first quarter of
2015, S&P notes that this exposure may be subject to impairment
charges, further squeezing capital ratios.

S&P also considers that intensifying pressure on capital is due
to some fundamental pressures on the bank's business model, with
high related-party lending and high foreign-currency mismatches.
S&P considers that capital alone is unlikely to materially
alleviate pressure in the longer term on the financial profile if
these fundamental business model vulnerabilities remain.

The resolution of the CreditWatch will depend on Bank
Tavrichesky's ability to maintain a substantial buffer close to
100 bps above the regulatory capital ratio of the Bank of Russia.
S&P will also considers the evolution of the bank's asset quality
and the resilience of the business model in resolving the
CreditWatch.  S&P expects to have a better understanding of these
matters in 90 days, because it will have greater clarity on the
timing of capital injections and collection of accrued interest
from the borrowers.

S&P could lower the ratings by at least one notch if it sees that
Bank Tavrichesky remains close to breaching the regulatory
capital adequacy ratio, if S&P observes the bank's inability to
collect the accrued interest resulting in deterioration of asset
quality, or if S&P sees risks of instability in the business
model throughout what S&P views as a complicated 2015 for Russian
banks.


MECHEL OAO: Net Loss Widens to US$575-Mil. in Third Quarter 2014
----------------------------------------------------------------
Yuliya Fedorinova at Bloomberg News reports that OAO Mechel said
its third-quarter net loss grew ninefold from three months
earlier as foreign loans were revalued in ruble terms after the
currency slumped and coking-coal prices declined for Russia's
largest producer.

According to Bloomberg, the company on Dec. 9 said in a filing
the net loss was US$575 million compared with US$63 million in
the second quarter.

Mechel, controlled by former billionaire Igor Zyuzin, has lost
almost three-quarters of its market value this year as it
struggles to repay debt to lenders including state-run VTB Bank
and OAO Sberbank after local coking coal prices excluding
transport slid about 40%, Bloomberg relates.  VTB demanded Mechel
repay RUR47 billion (US$867 million) after the second largest
Russian lender won a court decision to collect overdue debt,
Bloomberg relays.

According to Bloomberg, Mechel Chief Financial Officer Andrey
Slivchenko said on a conference call on Dec. 9 the company agreed
with OAO Gazprombank on a "compromise" debt restructuring and
submitted a draft of the deal to VTB and Sberbank.
Mr. Slivchenko, as cited by Bloomberg, said the company is also
in talks with international banks and hopes to reach agreement
with all lenders.

The company's nine-month net loss was US$1.2 billion, compared
with US$2.25 billion a year earlier, Bloomberg states.

Mechel is a metals and mining group.


TRANSTELECOM COMPANY: Fitch Corrects Dec. 15 Rating Release
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings corrects the version of a ratings release published
on Dec. 15, 2014 to include the affirmation of the Short-term
IDR.

Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Transtelecom Company's (TTK)
foreign and local currency Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR)
at 'B+' and National Long-term rating at 'A-(rus)' and maintained
a Negative Outlook on these ratings.  TTK's senior unsecured debt
has been affirmed at 'B+'/'RR4' and domestic senior unsecured
debt at 'A-(rus)'.  The Short-term IDR has been affirmed at 'B'.

The Negative Outlook reflects significant execution risks of the
company's strategy to increase broadband customer penetration on
already covered territories and improve margins and cash flow
generation.  Average revenue per user (ARPU) and penetration
growth may be susceptible to the deteriorating macroeconomic
outlook for Russia.

TTK operates a large-capacity fibre backbone network laid along
Russian railways.  It holds established positions in the inter-
operator segment, and pursues a strategy of diversifying into
end-user broadband services.  The company operates under an
asset-light business model and depends on its shareholder for
leasing the core fibre network.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Change in Broadband Strategy will Lead to Deleveraging

The company significantly curtailed its broadband expansion
ambitions in mid-2014 aiming to improve cash flows and reduce
leverage.  In Fitch's view, the new strategy should allow the
company to delever to approximately 4x funds from operations
(FFO) adjusted net leverage by end-2015.  However, the margin for
error within the current rating level is small.  A failure to
increase customer penetration of covered territories on a par
with peers in similar locations and/or ARPU pressure on the back
of difficult macroeconomic situation in Russia may compromise
deleveraging efforts.

The new strategy envisions an abrupt end to new broadband
development.  Instead, continuing marketing efforts to sell newly
built broadband lines should lead to a steady increase in
customer penetration.  In view of a fast network expansion on
previously uncovered territories in 2012-2014, Fitch believes
these are realistic expectations.  Customer growth should improve
operating cash flow and, coupled with a dramatically reduced
capex, would pave the way for deleveraging.  However, a change of
strategy entails substantial execution risks reflected in the
Negative Outlook.

A change in strategy was driven by the unfavorable regulatory
situation and rising interest rates which reduces the number of
commercially attractive broadband development projects,
particularly small ones.  Rostlelecom (BBB-/Stable), the fixed-
line incumbent, was chosen as the only operator for a government-
sponsored project to bridge the digital divide in less developed
Russian territories.  This promises to significantly increase
competition in TTK's targeted areas -- the company was going to
capitalize on its backbone infrastructure laid along railways
across the country by building short network extensions to
underpenetrated territories.

Focus on Profitability, Cost Efficiency

Fitch expects that TTK's margins in the broadband segment should
improve with the end of one-off roll-out, connection and
marketing costs, and sign-up promotions.  The company's broadband
and pay-TV subscriber base exceeded 1.7 million and is growing
which provides for a reasonably large size necessary for
sustainably profitable operations.

The company remains focused on improving cost efficiency, which
will contribute to stronger margins.  In absolute terms, EBITDA
generation should grow.  However, TTK operates with a mix of low-
margin segments that are likely to demonstrate significant
revenue volatility with an impact on headline reported margins.

Leverage, Cash Flows to Improve

An end of the active development phase will turn TTK into a
strongly cash flow positive company which would allow
deleveraging from both absolute debt reduction and stronger
EBITDA and cash flow with a positive impact on metrics.  TTK's
leverage is high, reported at 4.8x FFO adjusted net leverage and
3.3x net debt/EBITDA at end-2013.  Fitch expects these metrics to
improve to 4.3x and 3.2x respectively by end-2014, and further
down to 2.8x and 4.0x respectively by end-2015.  An abrupt end of
the massive capex program in mid-2014 will only have a full
impact in 2015 as the company will continue to settle accounts
payable to contractors for accrued capex until end-2014.

A significant factor behind a leverage rise was a delayed revenue
recognition of Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRU) network capacity
sales under IFRS standards.  IRU contracts are concluded on 'take
or pay' terms for a relatively long period of time, typically 10
years.  Contract costs are primarily related to putting in place
necessary network capacity, and buyers make a bulk of their
payments at the start of the service.  However, these
disbursements are treated as pre-payments amortizing through the
profit and loss statement over the contract life under IFRS
rules. This treatment does not have an impact on cash flows,
however, dramatically reduces reported revenue at an early
contract phase, with reported IRU sales in later periods being
non-cash.  Whereas TTK achieved its targets in terms of IRU
volume sales, only a fraction of these was reflected in its
reported revenues.

Outperformance in the Shrinking Inter-Operator Segment

TTK has outperformed its competitors in a shrinking inter-
operator wholesale market reporting market share gains.  Fitch
expects some outperformance to continue in the short to medium
term but it is not sustainable in the long run and the segment
revenue will remain under pressure.  Counter-intuitively, an
economic slowdown in Russia may mitigate this negative trend.
Large telecoms operators tend to skimp on investing into new
backbone infrastructure and prefer to continue relying on leasing
network capacity from independent providers such as Transtelecom.

Relationship with Shareholder

Fitch rates TTK on a standalone basis.  Legal ties are weak
between TTK and its parent JSC Russian Railways (RZD)
('BBB'/Negative) as the latter does not guarantee TTK's debt.
Owning a telecoms company is not strategic for a railway
operator. However, operating ties are strong and RZD is likely to
retain control over TTK in the medium term at least.  Any
divestment plans are likely to be limited to selling a minority
stake in the company.

TTK provides critical telecom and maintenance services to RZD.
Replacing it as a core telecoms operator is not a feasible option
for the railway monopoly, at least not in the span of three to
five years.

Liquidity

At end-1H14 the company had sufficient liquidity to cover its
debt maturities until the end of this year.  TTK's 2015 debt
maturities of approximately RUB3.6bn will be covered by positive
free cash flow and RUB3bn of new debt that the company expects to
raise by end-2014.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Insufficient broadband growth, ARPU declines and/or
additional pressures in the inter-operator segment leading to a
sustained rise in leverage to above 3.0x net debt/EBITDA and 4.0x
FFO adjusted net leverage without a clear path for deleveraging
will likely lead to a downgrade.  Liquidity and refinancing
pressures may also be negative.

Positive: Ratings may be stabilized if the company manages to
improve EBITDA generation in the broadband segment and reduce
leverage to below downgrade triggers.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


MRIYA AGRO: CFO Resigns Amid US$1-Bil. Debt Restructuring
---------------------------------------------------------
Julie Miecamp and Daryna Krasnolutska at Bloomberg News report
that Mriya Agro Holding Plc's said its chief financial officer is
leaving the company as it seeks to restructure US$1 billion of
debt.

Oleksander Cherniavskiy's departure follows the Ukranian
agricultural group's offer to cede control to creditors,
Bloomberg says, citing an e-mailed statement from Mriya.  Tension
between management and lenders has been growing since Mriya said
in August it missed payments on some of its obligations,
Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Mriya said on Dec. 16 that creditors
should reach an agreement on the restructuring by year-end, or
the group would have to cut jobs and start bankruptcy proceedings
for some units.

The company is struggling as Ukraine's conflict with pro-Russian
rebels in eastern regions pushes the country's economy into the
deepest recession since 2009, Bloomberg states.

"We understand that economically Mriya belongs to lenders," Chief
Executive Officer Vladyslav Luhovskiy, as cited by Bloomberg,
said on the company's website.  "A number of legal processes,
initiated by our lenders as well as absence of lender's
consolidated position on restructuring terms doesn't allow the
group to survive in current situation."

Mriya Agro Holding Plc is a Ukraine-based agricultural producer.

                         *     *     *

AS reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 3,
2014, Fitch Ratings downgraded Ukraine-based agricultural
producer Mriya Agro Holding Public Limited's Long-term foreign
currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'RD' (Restricted Default)
from 'C'.

The downgrade to 'RD' follows the uncured default on a coupon
payment in Sept. 2014, following the expiry of a 30-day grace
period, and no subsequent coupon payment or public announcement
about material progress of debt restructuring discussions with
its creditors.  As a result Fitch believes that a distressed debt
exchange (DDE) is inevitable, which is likely to lead to
significant losses for Mriya's bondholders and other creditors.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Fails Bank of England Stress Test
----------------------------------------------------
John-Paul Ford Rojas at Belfast Telegraph reports that the
Co-operative Bank has failed a Bank of England test to see how
lenders would cope with severe economic stress.

The troubled Co-op must cut its loan book by GBP5.5 billion,
Belfast Telegraph says.

According to Belfast Telegraph, the Bank, which is led by
Mark Carney, found that a severe downturn with house prices
plunging 35% would wipe out the Co-op's capital because of the
effect on its risky commercial property and sub-prime home loans.

The test examined how lenders' balance sheets would stand up to a
potential Doomsday scenario of economic crisis by calculating the
ratio of capital against loan assets on their balance sheets in
such an event, Belfast Telegraph discloses.

The Co-operative Bank is a retail and commercial bank in the
United Kingdom, with its headquarters in Balloon Street,
Manchester.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 25,
2014, Moody's Investors Service downgraded by one notch to Caa2
the Co-Operative Bank Plc's senior unsecured debt and deposit
ratings, and maintained the negative outlook on the ratings.  The
bank's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was
affirmed at E, which is equivalent to a baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ca.  The BFSR has a stable outlook.


EUROSAIL-UK 2007-4BL: Fitch Lifts Rating on Class D1a Notes to CC
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn its rating on Eurosail-UK 2007-4BL
PLC's class A3a, A3c and B1a notes and assigned ratings to the
new class A3, A4, A5 and B1a notes.  The agency has also upgraded
Class A2a, C1a and D1a notes and affirmed Class E1c following the
transaction restructuring.

The transaction is a securitization of first-charge, near-prime
and sub-prime residential mortgages originated by Southern
Pacific Mortgage Limited, Preferred Mortgages Limited, Alliance
and Leicester Plc and Matlock Bank Limited.

Following the bankruptcy of the transaction's EUR/GBP currency
swap provider, Lehman Brothers, a stipulated claim amount of
USD175 million had been agreed with the issuer.  Up until
November 12, 2014, the issuer had received USD89.8 million of
these claims and the remaining amount was monetized in an auction
on November 13, 2014, resulting in sales proceeds worth USD26
million.

The aggregated proceeds of USD116 million received by the issuer
represent approximately 66% of the stipulated claim amount, all
of which were converted into GBP74 million.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Currency Exposure Removed

The first phase of restructuring involved a redenomination of the
class A2a, A3a, B1a, C1a and D1a notes to GBP from EUR at the
spot rate of GBP0.78625 to EUR1.

Following redenomination on the September 2014 interest payment
date (IPD), on the December 2014 IPD, cash recoveries from the
terminated hedging agreement, supplemented by a reserve fund of
GBP3.3 million were applied towards restructuring costs.  A
payment to residual certificate holders was also made.  The
issuer also made a partial redemption on each of the classes A3a,
A3c, B1a, C1a, D1a and E1c.  Following these payments, the
reserve fund was brought back to the same level of GBP3.3
million.

The class B1a notes incurred a write-up of 7.7% (GBP3.1 million)
in order to restore the balance between mortgage assets and
notes.  The write up comes as a result of excess proceeds being
available from claims received from the swap termination, which
were sufficient to cover the under-collateralization following
redenomination.

Revised Capital Structure

In the second phase of restructuring, the existing class A3a and
A3c notes were cancelled and simultaneously, new A3, A4 and A5
notes have been issued, such that their aggregate balance is
equivalent to that of the combined balance of pre-restructured
class A3a and A3c notes.

The current level of credit support available to the A2, A3, A4,
A5, B1a, C1a, D1a, and E1c notes is 78%, 43%, 34%, 29%, 19%, 9%,
3% and 1% respectively.  The credit enhancement is provided by a
GBP3.3m reserve fund that is permitted to amortize once it
reaches 2% of the outstanding note balance (currently 0.84%) with
no floor.  The amortization of the reserve fund is subject to,
amongst other conditions, three-months plus arrears (excluding
delinquencies owing to outstanding fees and charges) not
exceeding 17.5% of the current portfolio balance.

Fitch has conducted a full asset and cashflow analysis of the
transaction resulting in upgrades and affirmations of the
existing notes.  Simultaneously, the ratings on the class A3a,
A3c and B1a notes were withdrawn and ratings of 'AAAsf', 'AAsf',
'AA-sf' and 'BBB+sf' were assigned to the class A3, A4, A5 and
B1a notes respectively, reflecting the net positive impact of the
transaction restructuring.  As a comparison the previous class
A3a and A3c note were rated 'CCsf'.

Liquidity Support

From the December 2014 IPD, principal receipts up to a cumulative
amount of GBP2.5 million will be diverted towards the
establishment of a liquidity reserve.  This liquidity reserve
will be available to cover interest shortfalls on the class A2
and A3 notes.  It will amortize to 1% of the sum of the balance
of class A2 and A3 notes from December 2015 provided that it is
fully funded in the prior period.  Other amortization triggers
also include: no requirements for drawings on the then current
payment date, three months plus arrears excluding repossessions
below 22.5% of the outstanding portfolio balance, cumulative
balance of loans with properties in possession below 17.5% of the
original pool balance and cumulative loss below GBP19.5 million
from day of restructuring.

Following a full depletion of the liquidity reserve, the
transaction structure will allow principal collections to be
diverted to cover interest shortfalls on the class A2, A3, A4 and
A5 notes.

Margin Increase

Following restructuring, the margin on the class A3, A4, and A5
notes is 95bps, higher than that paid on the class A3a and A3c
notes prior to restructuring.  The margin on the A2, B1a and C1a
also increased from 16bps, 36bps and 65bps to 30bps, 100bps and
125bps respectively.

Fitch's analysis showed that the level of credit enhancement,
along with other transaction features sufficiently mitigate this
increased cost of the structure.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch believes that a sudden sharp increase in interest rates
will put a strain on borrower affordability, particularly given
the weaker profile of the underlying non-conforming borrowers.
If defaults and associated losses increase beyond the agency's
stresses, the junior tranches may be downgraded.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

  Class A2a (XS 0311680747): upgraded to 'AAAsf' from 'BBsf';
  Outlook Stable

  Class A3a (XS 0311702657): Withdrawn

  Class A3c (XS 0311704356): Withdrawn

  Class A3 (XS 1150797600): assigned 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  Class A4 (X S1150799481): assigned 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  Class A5 (XS1150799721): assigned 'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable

  Class B1a (XS0311705759): Withdrawn

  Class B1a (XS0311705759): assigned 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable

  Class C1a (X50311708696): upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'Csf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class D1a (XS0311713001): upgraded to 'CCsf' from 'Csf',
  Recovery Estimate of 50%

  Class E1c (XS0311717416): affirmed at 'Csf'; Recovery Estimate
  of 0%


JJB SPORTS: Ex-Chief Sentenced to Four Years in Prison
------------------------------------------------------
Irish Times reports that the former chief executive of failed
retailer JJB Sports, once a British household name, was sentenced
to four years in prison for a GBP1 million fraud.

Christopher Ronnie's sentence was for three offences of fraud,
the Serious Fraud Office said, according to Irish Times.

The report notes that Mr. Ronnie was also sentenced to one year
in prison for two offences of furnishing false information, but
that sentence will run concurrently with the fraud sentence.

JJB Sports was founded by former professional footballer Dave
Whelan in the 1970s and became one of Britain's largest
sportswear retailers, the report discloses.

But it went into administration in 2012 with the loss of more
than 2,000 jobs following mounting losses and debts, the report
relates.

The SFO said David Ball and David Barrington, beneficial owners
of Fashion and Sport Ltd, a supplier to JJB, were also each
sentenced to 18 months in prison for two offences of attempting
to pervert the course of justice, the report relates.

The report discloses that the trio were convicted last month as a
result of an SFO investigation into JJB.

The five-year investigation centred on Ronnie's failure to
declare three cash payments made from the JJB suppliers in 2007
and 2008 as well as attempts to destroy evidence and mislead the
SFO, the report relays.

"It was very greedy . . . this was a flagrant and disgraceful
breach of your duty as a CEO of a Plc.  It was dishonest in the
extreme," said Judge Nickolas Loraine-Smith, when sentencing Mr.
Ronnie, the report notes.

The report relays that the Serious Fraud Office said the trio hid
information regarding their dealings from both JJB's board of
directors and the SFO.

The SFO is bringing a separate case against JJB's former chairman
David Jones and his son Stuart, who was head of marketing, the
report notes.

That case center on alleged forgery and misleading statements
made to the market in 2009, the report recalls.  An April trial
was abandoned due to David Jones's ill health, the report says.
A new trial date has been set for February, the report adds.


MORSTON ASSETS: Fails to Secure Funding, Administrators Appointed
-----------------------------------------------------------------
ED24 reports that Rob Croxen, Allan Graham and Blair Nimmo,
restructuring partners at KPMG, were appointed administrator to
Norfolk-based Morston Assets Limited and also as administrators
and fixed charge receivers over certain of the Group's
subsidiaries and properties.

"Unfortunately, after many months attempting to raise finance in
order to complete regeneration and development projects, new
funds have not been secured.  The directors felt that there was
no other option but to put the business into administration in
order to protect current projects and to preserve value for
creditors," the report quoted Mr. Croxen as saying.

The report notes that administrators have been appointed to
Morston Assets Limited, Morston Archway Limited and Morston
Management Limited which do not own any properties.  They have
also been appointed to Morston Whitecross Limited which owns
properties in Whitecross and Falkirk, Yours Communities
Coatbridge 1 and 2 Limited, the report relates.

The company employs 28 people and specializes in mixed use
regeneration and development projects throughout the UK.  It was
also heavily involved in a number of projects in West Norfolk
including Morston Point, Horsleys Chase, Saddlebow Road, and
Willows Business Park as well as Morston House in Holt.  It also
owns land on the proposed Nar-Ouse development project, however
the move will not affect neighbouring West Norfolk council
schemes for new housing.


NANDAN CLEANTEC: Shares Suspended as it Goes Into Administration
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alliance News reports that Nandan Cleantec PLC shares were
suspended from trading on AIM at the company's request, after it
ran out of money and the board put the company into
administration.

In a statement, biofuel producer Nandan said it intends to
appoint Bijal Shah of RE10 and Paresh Shah of Parker Wood as
joint administrators, according to Alliance News.  Arden Partners
has stepped down as the company's nominated adviser with
immediate effect, the report notes.

"The company has continued to experience significant restrictions
around working capital availability.  Although the directors have
sought further financing to allow the company to continue
trading, such financing has not been forthcoming," the company
said, the report notes.

Nandan shares were suspended before the market opened.


RANGERS FOOTBALL: Manager Offers Resignation
--------------------------------------------
98fm.com reports that Rangers Football Club PLC Manager Ally
McCoist has offered his resignation.

The club has confirmed to the Stock Exchange that McCoist has
entered a 12-month notice period, according to 98fm.com.

"The company announces that Alastair McCoist, manager of the
first team squad, has resigned," said the statement obtained by
the news agency.

"His service contract dated December 28, 2010, which was
subsequently amended, has a 12-month notice period," the
statement added.

The report relates that Mr. McCoist will receive a salary
increase as he serves the yearlong notice period.

"The directors will hold discussions with Mr. McCoist to seek an
amicable solution in the best interests of the company, and
expect to be in a position to make a further announcement before
the end of the week," the statement said, the report discloses.

"During the notice period, Mr. McCoist's salary will increase
significantly to GBP750,000 per annum," the statement added.

The former Rangers striker has been in charge since July 2011,
the report relates.

Mr. McCoist guided the club to Scottish football's second tier
after they went into administration and was banished to the
bottom division, the report says.

                   About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


TALL TREES GARDEN: Center Site to be Sold by ES Group
-----------------------------------------------------
Hortweek reports that property consultants ES Group has put the
property of Tall Trees Garden Centre and Nottingham Aquatic
Centre up for sale under a best bid system.

The client will sell to whichever offer it wants to take forward,
according to Hortweek.

The report notes that ES Group said the business closed in August
after going into administration and the property rather than the
business is for sale.

Joint administrators were Christopher Farrington and Dominic Wong
of Deloitte LLP, the report discloses.  The business was 35 years
old and the site is 1ha in size, with a GBP500,000 turnover, the
report relays.


TURNSTONE MIDCO 2: Fitch Affirms 'B+' IDR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed UK-based primary care dental services
provider Turnstone Midco 2 Limited's (Integrated Dental Holdings,
IDH) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B+'.  The Outlook
on the Long-term IDR is Stable.

The affirmation reflects IDH's solid market position as the
number one player in the UK National Health Service (NHS) dental
sector and its solid profit generation.  IDH is more than double
the size of its next biggest competitor, Oasis Healthcare, and
benefits from economies of scale, vertical integration into
dental supply services and close relationship with the NHS.

The ratings are constrained by the group's high adjusted
leverage, forthcoming regulatory reform, lack of geographic
diversification, slightly heightened integration risk and its
exposure to NHS contracts together with pricing pressure.

The Stable Outlook is underpinned by IDH's stable cashflow driven
by long term evergreen contracts accounting for around 70% of
revenue, its successful track record of acquiring and integrating
small dental practices and steady prospects of deleveraging.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weakened Credit Metrics

IDH's leverage is very high.  Fitch expects it to continue de-
leveraging over the rating horizon, albeit at a slower rate than
Fitch originally forecasts in May 2013.  Fitch now expects pro-
forma funds from operations adjusted net leverage to reach a high
of 6.8x at FY15 (ending March) to around 5.9x at FY16 as opposed
to about 5.0x, due to the debt-funded acquisition of Dental
Directory, which is mitigated by expected cost savings from
vertical integration.

Industry Consolidation Driving Growth

IDH's growth will primarily be driven by acquisitions and to a
lesser extend from the private sector as organic growth continues
to be constrained by pricing pressure within its NHS contracts.
Underlying growth was very low for 1H14 driven by private fee
increases, additional services and increased volumes.  Fitch's
expectation that NHS spending will remain subdued supports the
rating.

Rebranding Enhances Leading Position

The rating assumes that the introduction of its new 'my dentist'
brand will boost IDH's corporate image in the fragmented UK NHS
dental sector worth GBP3.6 billion in 2013/2014, in which it
enjoys a leading market position. If successful, the new brand;
currently being introduced into 15% of the IDH portfolio, will be
rolled out to the entire estate by end FY16.  This will further
improve its market position in which it holds around 5% of UK
market share. IDH had 621 practices as at September 2014, which
is more than double the number than its closest peer, Oasis
Dental Care.

Acquisition Risk Manageable

Fitch believes management has the ability to control slightly
heightened integration risk following the larger acquisition of
leading dental supply business, Dental Directory in April 2014,
given its track record so far.  Fitch do not envisage any further
large purchases and the group continues to successfully implement
its strategy to acquire about 40 to 60 small practices per annum
spending around GBP1m per transaction for EBITDA multiples of
around 4.5-6.0x.

Regulatory Reforms Broadly Neutral

The ratings also reflect the risks associated with the regulatory
reforms in the dentistry market in the UK.  Fitch recognizes the
risk that the reimbursement method from the NHS to private dental
service providers is likely to change.  However, any changes in
contracts are only likely to be introduced around 2017.
Protection of the value of the contract is also provided by the
current involvement of IDH in the government's pilot scheme in
the design of contracts, as well as by its incumbent position.

Free Cash Flow Improving

Fitch expects free cash flow as a percentage of revenues to
improve to 1.5% at FY15 from -2.4% at FY14 and to return to more
normalized levels of around 5% by FY17.  It was negative in FY14
due to increased interest expenses and increased capex for the
upgrade of equipment, IT infrastructure and refurbishment of
newly acquired practices.  Additionally, the company also
incurred one-off costs in relation to the refinancing of its
capital structure in May 2013.

Senior Debt Recovery Prospects

In Fitch's assumptions, it has taken the higher value derived
from a going concern scenario, due to the high value associated
with NHS contracts in the practices acquired by IDH.  As a
result, the senior secured bondholders receive an above average
recovery of 'BB-'/'RR3'.  Fitch considers the position of senior
bondholders weaker thus supporting recoveries at 'B-'/'RR6' in a
distressed scenario.

LIQUIDITY & DEBT STRUCTURE

Fitch believes IDH's liquidity is satisfactory, with GBP7 million
of readily available cash available as at September 2014 together
with GBP87 million of an undrawn committed revolving credit
facility (RCF) available and no short-term debt maturities due.
IDH has a positive working capital position and therefore Fitch
do not adjust its definition of cash available for debt service.
The maturity profile is well spread with the senior secured and
second lien notes due in 2018 and 2019, respectively.  IDH also
has a GBP100 million super senior RCF due in June 2018 with a
covenant requirement for gross leverage to stay below 2.3x.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- IDH's ability to increase its diversification and scale via
      acquisitions without diluting profits or FCF, while
      maintaining FFO adjusted net leverage below 4.5x on a
      sustained basis.

  -- FFO fixed charge coverage above 2.5x.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Reduced free cash flow in the low single digits as a % of
      sales, as a result of an unsuccessful acquisition strategy.

   -- Weaker credit metrics such as FFO adjusted net leverage
      above 6.0x or FFO fixed charge coverage below 2.0x on a
      sustained basis.

Full List of Rating Actions:

Turnstone Midco 2 Limited
  Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook Stable

IDH Finance plc
  Senior secured fixed rate notes; affirmed at 'BB-'/'RR3'
  Senior secured FRN; affirmed at 'BB-'/'RR3'
  Second lien notes; affirmed at 'B-'/'RR6'



===============
X X X X X X X X
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* BOOK REVIEW: Macy's for Sale
------------------------------
Author: Isadore Barmash
Paperback: 180 pages
List price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/as56m0

Isadore Barmash writes in his Prologue, "This book tells the
story of Macy's managers and their leveraged buyout, the newest
and most controversial device in the modern financial armament"
when it took place in the 1980s. At the center of Barmash's story
is Edward S. Finkelstein, Macy's chairman of the board and chief
executive office. Sixty years old at the time, Finkelstein had
worked for Macy's for thirty-five years. Looking back over his
long career dedicated to the department store as he neared
retirement, Finkelstein was dismayed when he realized that even
with his generous stock options, he owned less than one percent
of Macy's stock. In the years leading up to his unexpected, bold
takeover, Finkelstein had made over Macy's from a run-of-the-mill
clothing retailer into a highly profitable business in the lead
of the lucrative and growing fashion and "lifestyle" field.

To aid him in accomplishing the takeover and share the rewards
with him, Finkelstein had brought together more than three
hundred of Macy's top executives. To gain his support for his
planned takeover, Finkelstein told them, "The ones who have done
the job at Macy's are the ones who ought to own Macy's." Opposing
Finkelstein and his group were the Straus family who owned the
lion's share of Macy's and employees and shareholders who had an
emotional attachment to Macy's as it had been for generations,
"Mother Macy's" as it was known. But the opponents were no match
for Finkelstein's carefully laid plans and carefully cultivated
alliances with the executives. At the 1985 meeting, the
shareholders voted in favor of the takeover by roughly eighty
percent, with less than two percent opposing it.

The takeover is dealt with largely in the opening chapter. For
the most part, Barmash follows the decision making by
Finkelstein, the reorganization of the national company with a
number of branches, the activities of key individuals besides
Finkelstein, 160Macy's moves in the competitive field of clothing
retailing, and attempts by the new Macy's owners led by
Finkelstein to build on their successful takeover by making other
acquisitions. Barmash allows at the beginning that it is an
"unauthorized book, written without the cooperation of the buying
group." But as he quickly adds, his coverage of Macy's as a
business journalist and his independent research for over a year
gave him enough knowledge to write a relevant and substantive
book. The reader will have no doubt of this. Barmash's narrative,
profiles of individuals, and analysis of events, intentions, and
consequences ring true, and have not been contradicted by
individuals he writes about, subsequent events, or exposure of
material not public at the time the book was written.

First published in 1989, the author places the Macy's buyout in
the context of the business environment at the time: the
aggressive, largely laissez-faire, Reagan era. Without being
judgmental, the author describes how numerous corporations were
awakened from their longtime inertia, while many individuals were
feeling betrayed, losing jobs, and facing uncertain futures.
Isadore Barmash, a veteran business journalist and author, was
associated with the New York Times for more than a quarter-
century as business-financial writer and editor. He also
contributed many articles for national media, Reuters America,
and the Nihon Kenzai Shimbun of Japan. He has published 13 books,
including a novel and is listed in the 57th edition of Who's Who
in America.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *