TCREUR_Public/150206.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, February 6, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 26

                            Headlines

F R A N C E

LABCO SA: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
SOCIETE NATIONALE: Two Companies Join Bidding Race


G E R M A N Y

HOLZ-IMPEX HS: Insolvency Proceedings Begins
SOLAR-FABRIK AG: Court Arranges Provisional Protective Measures
PATERNOSTER HOLDING: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

CLARE ISLAND: Moody's Affirms B3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
SPYKER NV: Obtains Bridge Funding; Wins Bankruptcy Appeal


R U S S I A

GAZPROM OAO: S&P Lowers Foreign Currency Ratings to 'BB+/B'
MOSVODOKANAL JSC: S&P Lowers CCRs to 'BB+/B'; Outlook Negative
RUSSIA: Must Cut Interest Rates or Face Wave of Bankruptcies
VTB BANK: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB+/B'


S P A I N

SNIACE SA: Court Approves Insolvency Settlement Proposal


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AFREN PLC: S&P Lowers CCR to 'SD' on Payment Deferral
ALLIEDPRA INTERNATIONAL: Goes Into Liquidation
AMA TRADINGS: Court Winds Up Firm Over GBP1.56 Million Fraud
ANGLO HOLT: Goes Into Administration, 52 Jobs Cuts
CASTMASTER ROLL: Owes Creditors GBP500,000, Cuts 80 Jobs

COPENSHIP: Dry Bulk Market Losses Prompt Bankruptcy
ETHEL AUSTIN: Union Loses Compensation Bid
GILBERT WEBB: High Court Enters Liquidation Order
HEREFORD UNITED: Had Around 900 Creditors
HOUSTON'S OF CUPAR: In Liquidation, Owes More Than GBP300,000

IMPERIAL ESCROW: High Court Winds Up Business
LUCY ENTERPRISES: In Liquidation Following Fire
MARUSSIA F1: Intends to Come Out of Administration on February 19
RECONDITIONED ENGINES: Court Shuts 3 Engine Reconditioning Firms


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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LABCO SA: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Labco S.A. B2 Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) and B2-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR)
following the company's announcement of a proposed tap issue of
EUR100 million senior secured notes. Concurrently, Moody's has
affirmed the B3 rating on the senior secured notes due 2018. The
rating outlook remains stable.

The proceeds from the tap issue will be used to repay the
majority of the drawn debt under the existing EUR128.25 million
revolving credit facility which has been utilized to fund
acquisitions including that of medical imaging and diagnostic
company SDN S.p.A. ("SDN"), closed on 30 July 2014.

Ratings Rationale

The B2 Corporate Family Rating reflects Labco's (i) leading
market position in the French clinical testing market
complemented by still limited albeit growing diversification in
neighboring countries such as Spain and Italy, (ii) its
acquisition driven strategy within the backdrop of a
consolidating market for laboratories, (iii) continued pricing
pressures deriving from government driven cuts to tariffs and
health care spend and (iv) high leverage because of debt funded
acquisitions.

Based on the last twelve months to September 30, 2014, leverage
was high and relatively unchanged from previous years with
Moody's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA of 6.2x. However, Moody's
forecasts leverage to decrease towards 5.8x in 2015 because of
the full year contribution to cash flows of recently acquired
companies, notably SDN. The acquisition of SDN closed in July
2014 for a purchase price of EUR115 million; the company is an
Italian leading provider of medical imaging and laboratory
diagnostic services that will contribute around 13% to the
group's pro forma EBITDA.

Liquidity

Moody's consider Labco's liquidity to be adequate. As of 30
September 2014 Labco had EUR82.7 million of cash and EUR80
million drawn under the EUR128.25 million RCF maturing in 2017.
Following the proposed tap issue, Labco is expected to have full
availability under the EUR128.25 million RCF. Headroom under the
maintenance covenants of the RCF is adequate following a reset in
October 2014. Furthermore, there are no material debt maturities
before 2018 when the B3 rated senior secured notes come due. The
rating on the existing notes is one notch below the corporate
family rating reflecting their subordination to a sizeable super
senior RCF.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Labco will
generate positive free cash flows in the next 12 to 18 months and
that Moody's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA will not exceed 6.0x in
2015. The stable outlook also assumes that Labco will continue to
maintain a disciplined M&A strategy.

What Could Change The Rating Up

Although the upgrade is unlikely in the near term, positive
pressure could be exerted on Labco's ratings if (1) the company's
leverage ratio were to improve to around 5.0x; and (2) the
company were able to continue to demonstrate sustained free cash
flow generation and improved profitability.

What Could Change the Rating Down

Negative pressure on Labco's ratings could arise if (1) leverage
were to exceed 6.0x for longer than Moody's expected; (2) its
liquidity profile were to weaken; or (3) its profitability were
to significantly deteriorate due to technology threats,
competitive or pricing pressures.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Paris, France, Labco S.A. is a pan-European
network of medical laboratories. The company provides routine and
semi-routine clinical testing services for individual patients
through a network of 169 laboratories (excluding collection
points) in seven European countries The company reported total
revenue of EUR591.2 million in FYE December 2013, proforma for
the acquisition of SDN. The company's shareholders are the
founders of the company (16.73%), laboratory doctors (17.1%),
existing and former senior management and affiliates (24.47%),
and financial investors (41.7%), the largest being 3i Group plc
with c.17.7% of Labco's share capital.


SOCIETE NATIONALE: Two Companies Join Bidding Race
--------------------------------------------------
Andrew Spurrier at IHS Maritime 360 reports that Greece's Attica
group, parent of Superfast Ferries and Blue Star Ferries, is
understood to have joined the bidding for SNCM (Societe Nationale
Maritime Corse Mediterranee).

There was no immediate confirmation from Attica but SNCM
announced on Feb. 5 that an unnamed Greek company had submitted a
bid for the bankrupt company, IHS Maritime 360 relays.

The court-appointed administrators in charge of the company's
affairs said that they had received five firm offers for the
company and two letters of intent following the expiry of the
extended deadline for offers on Feb. 2, IHS Maritime 360 relates.

According to IHS Maritime 360, the three declared bidders are:
the Mexican ferry company Baja Ferries, headed by Franco-Tunisian
businessman Daniel Berrebi, a group of investors led by former
chairman of the port of Marseilles, Christian Garin, and Corsican
transport company boss Patrick Rocca.

Other potential bidders are Swiss businessman Paul Moulia and, in
addition to Attica, another unidentified Greek company, IHS
Maritime 360 says, citing French press reports.

SNCM said on Feb. 4 that all the bids were for the whole of the
company's activities, comprising its Corsican and North African
ferry businesses, but that all were conditional on approvals from
the European Commission, the Corsican authorities, and the
Marseilles court of commerce, IHS Maritime 360 notes.

SNCM is a France-Corsica ferry operator.  The company is 66%
owned by Transdev, a public transport joint venture between water
and waste group Veolia Environnement and state-bank CDC.



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G E R M A N Y
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HOLZ-IMPEX HS: Insolvency Proceedings Begins
--------------------------------------------
EUWID reports that Holz-Impex HS is insolvent. Proceedings
against the timber trader, which specialises in particular in
Siberian larch and planed goods made from Nordic pine, commenced
at the district court in Dusseldorf on Dec. 8, 2014, according to
the report.

According to EUWID, Business had already been terminated at the
time of filing for insolvency in March 2014, which is why only
one expert was appointed at that time and the event not
publicised.

During the commencement of insolvency proceedings, lawyer Ralf
Zimmermann -- rechtsanwaelte@kebekus-zimmermann.de -- from the
law firm Kebekus & Zimmermann GbR in Dusseldorf was appointed as
insolvency administrator, EUWID dicloses.

Holz Impex HS is a German import and timber-trading company.
Among the range offered by Holz Impex HS were rough-planed
boards, undedged sawnwood, decking, planed goods and to a lesser
extent window scantlings, which were primarily delivered to
clients as transfer orders from Russian and in some cases
Scandinavian producers.


SOLAR-FABRIK AG: Court Arranges Provisional Protective Measures
---------------------------------------------------------------
A local court in Freiburg decided on Feb. 4, 2015 to arrange
provisional protective measures regarding the assets of Solar-
Fabrik AG, in response to the application submitted by the
Management Board on Feb. 2 for the opening of the insolvency
proceedings.  In a further application, similar measures were
also arranged regarding the assets of the wholly owned subsidiary
Solar-Fabrik Wismar GmbH.

The local court ordered Dr. Thomas Kaiser, Freiburg, of the law
firm Kaiser & Sozien to provisional Trustees on the assets of the
Solar-Fabrik AG and Dr. Uwe Rottler, Freiburg, of the law firm
Kaiser & Sozien to provisional Trustees on the assets of the
Solar-Fabrik Wismar GmbH ordered.

Following the decision of the Supervisory Board on Jan. 29, 2015,
the appointment of Thomas Oberle as a member of the management
board of Solar-Fabrik AG becomes effective at this time.

Solar-Fabrik AG -- http://www.solar-fabrik.de/home/?L=1-- is a
German PV module manufacturer.


PATERNOSTER HOLDING: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to Paternoster Holding III GmbH
(Pater III), the parent company of Germany-based component
manufacturer Wittur International Holding GmbH (Wittur).  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary 'B' issue rating
to the EUR285 million senior secured facilities (comprising a
EUR65 million revolving credit facility [RCF] and a EUR220
million term loan), in line with S&P's preliminary corporate
credit rating.  The facilities will be issued by Paternoster
Holding IV GmbH (Pater IV), an intermediate holding company
between Pater III and Wittur.  The preliminary recovery rating on
these facilities is '3', indicating S&P's expectation of recovery
prospects at the higher end of our meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
range.

S&P also assigned its preliminary 'CCC+' issue rating to the
EUR200 million senior notes due in 2023 and issued by Pater III,
two notches below the corporate credit rating.  The preliminary
recovery rating on these notes is '6', reflecting their unsecured
status and subordination to the senior secured debt facilities.

All the ratings depend on S&P's review of the final transaction
documentation.  If S&P do not receive the final documentation
within a reasonable time frame, or if the final documentation
departs from materials S&P has reviewed, it reserves the right to
withdraw or revise its ratings.  Potential changes include, but
are not limited to, use of loan proceeds, maturity, size, and
conditions of the term loan, financial and other covenants,
security, and debt ranking.

Importantly, the preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assumption
that the final documentation of the shareholder loan between
Paternoster Holding I GmbH and its Luxembourg-based holding
company Elevate (BC) S.ar.l. will meet S&P's requirements for
treatment as equity under its criteria.

The preliminary ratings on Pater III incorporate S&P's assumption
that the following steps will be completed in the next few
months:

   -- Funds advised and managed by the private equity firm Bain
      Capital will acquire 100% of Wittur's share capital for
      approximately EUR620 million, including repayment of
      exiting net debt and fees and expenses.  The LBO is
      scheduled to close in March 2015.

   -- After the transaction closes, Bain Capital will own about
      85% of the group and management will own the remaining 15%.
      Pater IV will issue the EUR220 million seven-year floating-
      rate senior secured loan and the EUR65 million six-year
      RCF.

   -- Pater III will issue the EUR200 million eight-year fixed-
      rate senior notes.

   -- From the proceeds, the group will repay all its debt and
      pay EUR464 million to its previous owners.

S&P bases its analysis on the credit metrics of Wittur, given
that it is the group's main operating entity.  The preliminary
ratings reflect S&P's view of Wittur's business risk profile as
"weak" and its financial risk profile as "highly leveraged," as
S&P's criteria define these terms.

S&P's assessment of Wittur's business risk profile reflects its
positioning in a fragmented niche industry in the capital goods
sector, as well as its limited product diversification and strong
customer concentration.  S&P's assessment is constrained by
Wittur's relatively small scale.  Still, S&P views positively the
company's strong market positions in its niche business line, its
good reputation, the growth potential of its end markets, and the
strength and long-standing nature of its customer relations.  The
business risk profile is also supported by the company's
international manufacturing footprint and management's focus on
cost optimization.

S&P's assessment of Wittur's financial risk profile reflects
S&P's expectation that the company's adjusted gross debt-to-
EBITDA ratio will exceed 6x in 2015 and be slightly below 6x in
2016.  At year-end 2015, S&P estimates that Pater III's adjusted
debt will be about EUR475 million.  This comprises the EUR420
million new debt to be issued at the LBO's closing, a pension
deficit of about EUR9 million, operating leases of about EUR5
million, and vendor financing structured as a deferred
consideration of about EUR40 million.  S&P treats the vendor
loans as debt because the draft documentation does not meet its
criteria for equity treatment.

Importantly, the preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assumption
that the final documentation of the shareholder loan between
Paternoster Holding I GmbH and its Luxembourg-based holding
company Elevate (BC) S.ar.l. will meet S&P's requirements for
treatment as equity under its criteria.  Failure to satisfy these
requirements could prompt S&P to lower its ratings on Pater III.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Modest GDP growth in Europe of 1% in 2015 and 1.4% in 2016.
      China's economy will likely be more dynamic, with GDP
      growth of about 7% annually in 2015 and 2016.

   -- Group annual revenue growth of about 5% in 2015 and
      approximately 7% in 2016.

   -- 10-30 basis points in annual EBITDA margin improvements
      over 2015 and 2016, with adjusted EBITDA margin trending
      upward to 13%-14%.

   -- Annual capital expenditures of just EUR11.5 million.

   -- No dividends or sizable acquisitions.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these adjusted credit
measures for Wittur:

   -- Debt to EBITDA exceeding 6x for 2015 and at less than 6x in
      2016.

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt at about 5% for 2015
      and 2016.

   -- EBITDA interest coverage of between 2.0x and 2.5x in 2015
      and 2016.

The stable outlook reflects Wittur's strong niche market position
in an industry with favorable growth prospects.  S&P also expects
that Wittur will improve its EBITDA margin over the next few
years.  Under S&P's base case, it assumes that debt to EBITDA
will improve to less than 6x by end of 2016.  In addition, S&P
projects that the FFO and EBITDA cash interest coverage ratios
will remain above 2x and that Wittur will continue to generate
positive FOCF.

S&P could lower the ratings if Wittur's liquidity weakened
following a sudden drop in demand from one of its main customers,
or it had reputational or quality problems.  S&P could also
consider a downgrade if the documentation for Bain Capital's
shareholder loan did not satisfy our criteria for treatment as
equity, or if Wittur's operating performance deteriorated,
leading to an increase in adjusted debt to EBITDA to above 7x
without near-term prospects of reduction.  A downgrade could also
result from Wittur's inability to maintain FFO and EBITDA cash
interest coverage ratios above 2x or if FOCF was to turn
negative.

S&P could raise the ratings if Wittur's debt to EBITDA fell below
5x, although S&P thinks this is highly unlikely in the short
term.



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N E T H E R L A N D S
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CLARE ISLAND: Moody's Affirms B3 Ratings on 2 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken various rating actions on the
following notes issued by Clare Island B.V.:

EUR110.5 Million (current outstanding balance EUR79.4M) Class II
Senior Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
Dec 16, 2013 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

EUR15 Million Class III-A Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded
to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2013 Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

EUR17 Million Class III-B Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2013 Confirmed at
Ba2 (sf)

EUR8.3 Million Class IV-A Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed
B3 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2013 Affirmed B3 (sf)

EUR18.2 Million Class IV-B Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Dec 16, 2013 Affirmed B3 (sf)

Clare Island B.V., issued in March 2002, is a Collateralised Loan
Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of high yield European
loans. It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans. This
transaction passed its reinvestment period in March 2010.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
result from the deleveraging since last rating action in December
2013.

Since the last rating action, the classes I and II notes have
paid down EUR97.7 million. The class I has now been fully
redeemed and therefore its rating has been withdrawn. The class
II has a outstanding notional amount of EUR79.4 million which
represents 71.9% of its initial balance. As a result of such
deleveraging, the over-collateralization (OC) ratios have
increased. As of the trustee report dated November 2014, the
Senior, Class III and Class IV OC ratios are reported at 191.4%,
136.4%, and 110.2%, respectively, versus December 2013 levels of
142.9%, 121.0% and 107.4% respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR142.0 million, principal proceeds balance of
EUR7.6 million, defaulted par of EUR3.9 million, a weighted
average default probability of 24.4% (consistent with a WARF of
3795), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.9% for
a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 19 and a
weighted average spread of 4.1%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% for the 93.9% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% for the remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were within two notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy and 2) the exposure to concentration of lowly-
rated debt maturing in 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral manager or
be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Around 40% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


SPYKER NV: Obtains Bridge Funding; Wins Bankruptcy Appeal
---------------------------------------------------------
Justin Cupler at Insider Car News reports that Spyker has
received the bridge funding it was expecting and won an appeal to
convert the bankruptcy back to a moratorium of payment.

The conversion is retroactive, Insider Car News says, citing
legal documents.

With the bridge funding, Spyker plans to be out of its moratorium
of payment status "in a matter of weeks", Insider Car News notes.

Additionally, the brand plans to restart its B6 Ventor -- an
entry-level sports car -- venture and it plans to pursue merging
with a U.S.-based manufacturer of electric aircraft that will
hopefully spawn all-electric Spyker cars in the future, Insider
Car News discloses.

Spyker NV -- http://www.spykernv.com/-- is a Netherlands-based
holding company engaged in the automobile industry sector. As of
December 31, 2011, the Company, formerly Swedish Automobile NV,
operated within one business segment, namely Spyker Sports Car.
The Spyker Sports Car segment comprises the design, development,
production and sale of motorcars and Grand Turismo (GT) racing
under the Spyker brand name.  The Company markets its products in
Europe and the Middle East, the United States and Asia.  As of
December 31, 2011, the Company had such wholly owned
subsidiaries, as Spyker Automobielen B.V., Spyker Squadron B.V.,
Spyker Events & Branding N.V., Spyker Holding B.V., Spyker of
North Americal LLc and Spyker Cars UK Ltd, as well as owned 51%
shares of Spyker of China Ltd and had shareholding in other
companies.

On December 18, 2014, Spyker, one-time owner of Sweden's Saab,
declared bankruptcy on after failing to secure a critical
bridging loan it had hoped would help it refinance and
restructure.



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R U S S I A
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GAZPROM OAO: S&P Lowers Foreign Currency Ratings to 'BB+/B'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has taken various
actions on Russian corporations in the commodity exports,
telecom, and infrastructure and utility sectors following the
downgrade of Russia on Jan. 26, 2015.  At the same time, S&P
removed all the ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them
with negative implications on Dec. 30, 2014.

These actions are on S&P's long- and short-term corporate credit
ratings and issue ratings on debt, unless otherwise stated:

Commodity producers (exporters):

   -- S&P lowered the foreign currency (FC) ratings on Gazprom
      OAO to 'BB+/B' from 'BBB-/A-3' and the local currency (LC)
      ratings to 'BBB-/A-3' from 'BBB/A-2'.  The outlooks are
      negative.  S&P lowered its ratings on Gazprom Neft JSC and
      OAO Novatek to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The outlooks are
      negative.  S&P has also lowered its national scale ratings
      on these companies to 'ruAA+' from 'ruAAA'.

   -- S&P lowered its ratings on Oil Company Rosneft OJSC to
      'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The outlook is negative.

   -- S&P affirmed its 'BBB-' and 'ruAAA' ratings on OAO LUKOIL
      and Uralkali OJSC.  The outlooks are negative.

   -- S&P affirmed its 'BB+' and 'ruAA+' ratings on NLMK OJSC.
      The outlook is stable.

   -- At the same time, S&P revised its outlooks on OAO
      Severstal, Polyus Gold International Ltd., and Eurasia
      Drilling to negative from stable and affirmed S&P's 'BB+'
      ratings.

   -- S&P also revised its outlook on Alrosa OJSC to negative
      from stable and affirmed its 'BB-/B' ratings.

Telecom operators:

   -- S&P lowered its ratings on Mobile TeleSystems OJSC (MTS) to
      'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The outlook is negative.

   -- S&P lowered its FC rating on MegaFon OJSC to 'BB+' from
      'BBB-' and affirmed the 'BBB-' LC rating.  The outlooks are
      negative.  The 'ruAAA' Russia national scale rating was
      affirmed.

   -- S&P revised its outlook on Rostelecom OJSC to negative from
      stable and affirmed its 'BB+' rating.

Infrastructure and utility companies:

   -- S&P lowered its FC rating on OAO AK Transneft to 'BB+ from
      BBB-' and the LC rating to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'.  The outlooks
      are negative.

   -- S&P lowered its FC rating on Russian Railways JSC and its
      subsidiaries to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and S&P's LC ratings to
      'BBB-' from 'BBB'.  The outlooks are negative.  S&P
      affirmed its 'ruAAA' national scale rating on Russian
      Railways.

   -- S&P lowered its ratings on JSC Federal Passenger Company to
      'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The outlook is negative.

   -- S&P lowered its ratings on Federal Grid Co. of the Unified
      Energy System to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The outlook is
      negative.  S&P also lowered its Russia national scale
      rating to 'ruAA+' from 'ruAAA'.

   -- S&P lowered its ratings on JSC Rosseti to 'BB+/B' from
      'BBB-/A-3'.  The outlook is negative.  The Russia national
       scale rating was lowered to 'ruAA+' from 'ruAAA'.

   -- S&P lowered its ratings on RusHydro (OJSC) to 'BB/B' from
      'BB+/B'.  The outlook is stable.  The Russia national scale
      rating was lowered to 'ruAA' from 'ruAA+'.

   -- S&P lowered its ratings on Interregional Distributive Grid
      Co. of Center JSC to 'BB-/B' from 'BB/B'.  The outlook is
      stable.  The Russia national scale rating was lowered to
      'ruAA-' from 'ruAA'.

   -- S&P lowered its ratings on Moscow United Electric Grid Co.
      JSC to 'BB-' from 'BB'.  The outlook is stable.  The Russia
      national scale rating was lowered to 'ruAA-' from 'ruAA'.

   -- S&P revised its outlooks on AO Sovcomflot and DME Ltd. to
      negative from stable and affirmed the respective 'BB+' and
      'BB+/B' ratings.

For the Russian exporters, the rating actions reflect S&P's
analysis of whether these companies could withstand a sovereign
default and be rated higher than the sovereign.  As a result of
this analysis, S&P affirmed its ratings on LUKOIL, Uralkali, and
NLMK, primarily to reflect S&P's view that, even in a stress
scenario, these companies' stressed foreign-currency-denominated
revenues could allow them to continue servicing their foreign
currency debt.  S&P takes into account their solid liquidity,
including manageable debt maturity profiles compared with their
cash balances, and free cash flow generation capacity.  These
companies join the list of other Russian companies, namely
Norilsk Nickel and PhosAgro, which in our view, could survive a
default of Russia.

At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings on Gazprom,
Gazpromneft, and NOVATEK because S&P thinks these companies are
unlikely to withstand a sovereign default.  In the case of
Gazprom and its subsidiary Gazprom Neft, this is largely because
of likely negative intervention from the government, which these
financially strong companies could be subject to if the sovereign
runs into financial difficulty.  NOVATEK does not pass S&P's
stress test primarily because of its focus on the Russian market
and lower amount of hard currency revenues.

S&P's one-notch downgrade of Rosneft stems from S&P's view that
the company's stand-alone credit profile (SACP), which S&P
continues to assess at 'bb', is weaker than that of Gazprom,
Gazprom Neft, or NOVATEK.  At the same time, S&P revised the
outlook on Severstal to negative because the company has a lower
share of exports than its peer NLMK.

S&P lowered its foreign currency ratings on Russian non-exporters
previously rated 'BBB-' because S&P believes these companies
would unlikely survive an event that restricts the free flow of
cash, such as a moratorium on external debt repayment, limited
access to foreign currency, or a sovereign default.  That said,
S&P affirmed its local currency ratings on some companies with
little or no debt denominated in hard currency.

COMMODITY EXPORTERS:

Gazprom OAO

The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  Although S&P
thinks that, on a stand-alone basis, Gazprom could withstand a
sovereign default, S&P sees a high likelihood of negative
government intervention on the sovereign's hypothetical path to
default.  S&P continues to assess Gazprom's SACP at 'bbb-' and
the likelihood of extraordinary support for Gazprom as "extremely
high," based on Gazprom's "critical" role for, and very "strong"
link with, the government.  As per S&P's criteria, a company that
has strong linkages with the government cannot be rated higher
than the sovereign.  This is because S&P assumes that the
government could use its power to intervene negatively, which
could include burdening the company with additional taxes,
dividends, or other liabilities.

The negative outlook on Gazprom mirrors that on the sovereign
rating.

Gazprom Neft JSC

The downgrade of Gazprom Neft follows that of Russia and Gazprom.
Although S&P maintains its assessment of Gazprom Neft's SACP at
'bbb-', the rating continues to be capped by that on the parent
Gazprom.

The negative outlook on Gazprom Neft mirrors that on Gazprom.

Oil Company Rosneft OJSC

The downgrade follows a similar action on the sovereign.  S&P
continues to see a "very high" likelihood that the Russian
government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to Rosneft if the company experiences financial distress.
However, because S&P assess Rosneft's SACP at 'bb', the downgrade
of Russia triggered the one-notch downgrade of Rosneft, according
to S&P's criteria for rating government-related entities (GREs).

The negative outlook on Rosneft mirrors that on the sovereign.

OAO LUKOIL

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that LUKOIL could withstand a
sovereign default and therefore could be rated one notch above
the foreign currency rating and T&C assessment on Russia.  S&P
thinks LUKOIL's sizeable hard currency revenue stream from
exports, and some flexibility on capital expenditures and
dividends, could allow it to service its foreign currency debt
even if Russia were to default.  That said, S&P could change its
approach if the company's hard currency liquidity resources
declined while its hard currency short-term maturities increased.

The negative outlook on LUKOIL mirrors that on Russia.

OAO NOVATEK

The downgrade reflects the lowering of the sovereign ratings
rather than S&P's view of NOVATEK's stand-alone credit quality.
S&P believes that in the event of a sovereign default, NOVATEK's
capacity to service its obligations, in particular debt
denominated in foreign currency, could be materially impaired.
Importantly, the company sells all of its gas and a portion of
its liquids in the domestic market.  S&P therefore believes that
a severe sovereign stress would hamper its operations to a
greater extent than companies where the majority of revenues come
from exports.  S&P notes that NOVATEK's share of export revenues
will likely increase meaningfully in the coming years as
production from its joint ventures, Sever, Energia, and
Terneftegaz, ramps up.  Consequently, S&P will periodically
review this stress test, particularly if sanctions were lifted.
NOVATEK's current placement on the sanction list is, in S&P's
view, an obstacle to current and future access to capital for
Yamal or other projects.

The negative outlook mirrors that on Russia.

OAO Severstal

Although S&P affirmed its ratings on Severstal, S&P revised the
outlook to negative from stable.  This reflects S&P's view that
Severstal cannot be rated higher than the T&C assessment on
Russia, as per S&P's criteria, because it generates only one-
third of its revenues from exports.

At the same, S&P continues to assess Severstal's SACP at 'bb+',
reflecting the company's high margins, low and decreasing debt
leverage, and sound liquidity.

NLMK OJSC

The rating affirmation and stable outlook on Russian steel
producer NLMK reflect S&P's view that the company could withstand
a sovereign default.  This is because more than half of the
company's revenues are generated from exports in hard currency,
whereas its costs are largely in local currency.  NLMK has
significantly benefited from the Russian ruble devaluation, which
has further supported its already high margins and strong credit
ratios.  The company also has a material liquidity cushion.

Eurasia Drilling Co.

The outlook revision follows the rating action on Russia.  As per
S&P's criteria, Eurasia, being a non-exporter, cannot be rated
higher than the sovereign rating and the T&C assessment on
Russia. Therefore, S&P revised the outlook on Eurasia Drilling to
negative, which mirrors the outlook on Russia.  S&P maintains its
assessment of Eurasia's SACP at 'bb+', supported by the company's
strong credit metrics and leading positions in the Russian
oilfield services market.

Alrosa OJSC

The outlook revision reflects the negative outlook on Russia,
indicating that the rating could be lowered if Russia is
downgraded.

S&P's assessment of Alrosa's SACP remains unchanged at 'b+'.  S&P
continues to see a "moderate" likelihood that the Russian
government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to Alrosa in the event of financial distress.

Polyus Gold International Ltd.

The outlook revision primarily reflects S&P's view that Polyus
Gold cannot be rated higher than the 'BB+' T&C assessment on
Russia because it does not currently export its products.  It
also takes into account the heightened risk that Polyus, whose
assets are in Russia where it also generates all its revenues,
might be susceptible to Russia's economic slowdown over the
medium term.  In S&P's view, the demand for gold is less likely
to be affected by deterioration of the domestic economy.
However, the company has a limited track record of exporting its
products and maintaining cash balances in offshore accounts.

S&P could lower the rating on Polyus over the coming 12 months if
the sovereign rating were lowered, with potential implications on
Polyus' liquidity.  Moreover, S&P would consider a downgrade if
Polyus' adjusted ratio of funds from operations to debt dropped
below 30%, without near-term prospects of improvement, or if its
discretionary cash flow was negative.  This could be triggered by
a deviation from Polyus' currently moderate financial policy,
such as through a material acquisition or dividend.

Uralkali OJSC

The rating affirmation on Uralkali reflects two major factors:

   -- First, S&P believes that Uralkali should be able to
      withstand a hypothetical sovereign default scenario, as
      described in "Ratings Above The Sovereign--Corporate And
      Government Ratings: Methodology And Assumptions," published
      Nov. 19, 2013.  Those criteria allow S&P to rate Uralkali
      up to one notch above the sovereign credit rating and T&C
      assessment.  This reflects, among other factors, the
      company's strong export focus, with about 75% of revenues
      from exports.  S&P also considers that most of its cash
      will likely remain in dollars.

   -- Second, S&P assumes that Uralkali's EBITDA will be high (at
      least US$1.65 billion) in 2015 and 2016, helped by a weak
      ruble, which cuts costs substantially; virtually flat
      export potash prices; and volumes of at least 10.5 million
      tons (compared with 12 million in 2014).  The lower volumes
      take into account S&P's assumption that the S-2 mine, where
      operations stopped at the end 2014 because of a brine
      inflow, will not be producing.  Moreover, S&P believes the
      company will reduce leverage in 2015 to below the maximum
      set in its financial policy. As a result, net debt to
      EBITDA should be below 2x, after likely exceeding this
      level in 2014.  S&P also anticipates strong discretionary
      cash flow from 2015 and the retention of large cash dollar
      balances at all times, while the company proactively
      refinances much of the significant debt maturing in 2015
      and 2016 with long-term committed bank lines.

The negative outlook reflects risks to S&P's base case and modest
rating leeway, notably since we believe Uralkali's credit metrics
were weak for the rating in 2014.

TELECOM OPERATORS:

Mobile TeleSystems (OJSC) (MTS)

The downgrade and assignment of a negative outlook follow the
rating action on the sovereign, and reflect that S&P do not
expect MTS to be able to withstand a sovereign default.  This is
because MTS does not have any export revenues; it generates about
90% of its revenues in Russia.  That said, S&P maintains its
assessment of MTS' SACP at 'bbb-', supported by a "satisfactory"
business risk profile and a "modest" financial risk profile.

MegaFon OJSC

The lowering of S&P's foreign currency rating on MegaFon follows
the rating action on Russia and the downward revision of S&P's
T&C assessment.  As a non-exporter, MegaFon cannot be rated
higher than the sovereign, according to S&P's criteria.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed the 'BBB-' local currency rating
because S&P believes that MegaFon will be able to service its
local currency liabilities in case of a sovereign default.
MegaFon's foreign-currency-denominated debt, whose share is low,
is related to facilities backed by export credit agencies and
long-term funding for equipment purchases.  In S&P's view, the
repayment of this debt is unlikely to be accelerated in such a
scenario.  In addition, MegaFon has meaningful hard currency cash
balances outside Russia, which S&P assumes the company will keep.

Nonetheless, S&P notes the strength of MegaFon's metrics, with
above-average profitability, adjusted debt to EBITDA of about
1.0x, and a solid liquidity position, supported by significant
cash balances and availability of committed lines.  MegaFon
generates positive FOCF, and we do not foresee any debt increase
in S&P's base case, even assuming a marginal weakening of credit
metrics related to weaker Russian economic growth.

Rostelecom OJSC

The affirmation reflects S&P's assessment of Rostelecom's SACP at
'bb+', which continues to reflect the company's leading positions
in the Russian fixed-line telephony market and moderate debt
leverage.  However, S&P revised the outlook to negative because
of its view that the company could not withstand a sovereign
default. In S&P's view, Rostelecom might not have sufficient
liquidity in a sovereign default scenario to service its debt
obligations.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND UTILITY COMPANIES:

OAO AK Transneft

The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  S&P continues
to see an "extremely high" likelihood that the Russian government
would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to
Transneft in the event of financial distress, and S&P assess
Transneft's SACP at 'bbb'.

The foreign currency rating on Transneft will continue to be
capped by the foreign currency long-term sovereign rating and T&C
assessment on Russia.  The local currency rating on Transneft
will remain in line with the long-term local currency rating on
Russia.

The negative outlook reflects that on the sovereign.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs and rating above the
sovereign, a one-notch downgrade of Russia will result in a
similar rating action on Transneft, all else being equal.

Russian Railways JSC

The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  S&P continues
to see an "extremely high" likelihood that the Russian government
would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to
Russian Railways in the event of financial distress, and assess
the company's SACP at 'bbb-'.

The negative outlook reflects that on the sovereign.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs and rating above the
sovereign, a one-notch downgrade of Russia will result in a
similar rating action on Russian Railways, all else being equal.
S&P assumes that the foreign currency rating on the company will
remain capped by the foreign currency long-term sovereign rating
and T&C assessment on Russia.  The local currency rating on
Russian Railways will stay in line with the long-term local
currency sovereign rating.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the outlook on the
sovereign rating were revised to stable.

JSC Federal Passenger Company (FPC)

The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  S&P continues
to see a "high" likelihood that the Russian government would
provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to FPC in the
event of financial distress, and assess the company's SACP at
'bb+'.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the ratings
on FPC will remain capped by the foreign currency sovereign
ratings on Russia.  In accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs
and rating above the sovereign, the lowering of the foreign
currency sovereign ratings by one notch will result in a similar
rating action on FPC.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the outlook on the
sovereign rating were revised to stable.

Federal Grid Co. of the Unified Energy System (FGC)

The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  S&P continues
to see a "very high" likelihood that the Russian government would
provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to FGC in the
event of financial distress, and assess the company's SACP at
'bb+'.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the ratings
on FGC will continue to be capped by the foreign currency
sovereign ratings on Russia.  In accordance with S&P's criteria
for GREs, the lowering of the foreign currency sovereign ratings
by one notch will likely result in a similar rating action on
FGC, all else being equal.

JSC Rosseti

The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  S&P continues
to see a "very high" likelihood that the Russian government would
provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to Rosseti in
the event of financial distress, and assess the company's SACP at
'bb-'.

The negative outlook mirrors that on Russia.  In line with S&P's
criteria for GREs, if the local currency sovereign rating is
lowered by one notch, all else being equal, it will result in a
similar rating action on Rosseti.

RusHydro (OJSC)

The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  S&P continues
to see a "moderately high" likelihood that the Russian government
would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to
RusHydro in the event of financial distress.

The stable outlook reflects RusHydro's good competitive position,
supported by its low cost base, thanks to a significant hydro
generation asset base, proven access to capital markets, and the
"moderately high" likelihood of extraordinary financial support
from the government.  These factors, S&P believes, should offset
the execution and funding risks associated with the group's
ambitious investment program, negative FOCF, pressure from the
regulatory framework, and weak profitability of its thermal power
generation subsidiary RAO Energy System of East.

Given that S&P assess RusHydro's SACP at 'bb', S&P expects
RusHydro to maintain a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA
ratio of less than 3.0x over the next two years, as well as
adequate liquidity and some flexibility in its investment
program.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs, if the local currency
long-term sovereign rating is lowered by one notch, this is
unlikely to result in a similar rating action on RusHydro, all
else being equal.

Interregional Distributive Grid Co. of Center JSC (IDGC of
Center) The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  S&P
continues to see a "moderate" likelihood that the Russian
government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to IDGC of Center in the event of financial distress.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that the risks related
to IDGC of Center's negative FOCF generation, sizable investment
program, ability to collect receivables, and cost overruns will
be mitigated by the company's moderate projected leverage,
adequate liquidity management, and state support.  S&P assumes
the company will maintain its adequate liquidity and debt
maturity profiles. The outlook also reflects S&P's expectations
that the company will remain largely state controlled over the
medium term, and that its strategic importance to the local
governments it serves will not diminish.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs, if the local currency
long-term sovereign rating is lowered by one notch, this is
unlikely to result in a similar rating action on IDGC of Center,
all else being equal.

Given the SACP assessment of 'bb-', S&P expects IDGC of Center
will maintain a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio
of less than 3.0x, with very temporary deviations of up to 3.5x.

Moscow United Electric Grid Co. JSC (MOESK)

The downgrade follows a similar action on Russia.  S&P continues
to see a "moderate" likelihood that the Russian government would
provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to MOESK in
the event of financial distress, and assess the company's SACP at
'bb-'.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that MOESK's strong
competitive position, currently low financial leverage, and
demonstrated access to local capital markets should offset the
risks associated with an ambitious capital expenditure program
and projected negative cash flow generation.  S&P also assumes
MOESK will maintain both adequate liquidity and its debt maturity
profile.  To be in line with an SACP of 'bb-', S&P expects
MOESK's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio to be
less than 3.0x on a sustainable basis, with very temporary
deviations of up to 3.5x.

In accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs, if the local currency
long-term sovereign rating is lowered by one notch, this is
unlikely to result in a similar rating action on MOESK, all else
being equal.

AO Sovcomflot

The outlook revision follows S&P's rating action on Russia and
S&P's review of Sovcomflot's liquidity in the context of its
large vessel newbuilding program and the resulting ongoing
funding needs, and its regular or mandatory debt repayments,
which combined weigh on the company's liquidity profile.  S&P
currently assess Sovcomflot's liquidity profile as "adequate," as
defined in S&P's criteria.  S&P notes, however, that Sovcomflot's
liquidity is highly dependent on the company performing in line
with S&P's base-case scenario and that it has ready,
uninterrupted access to ship financing, in particular given the
accelerating capital expenditure requirements for vessels due for
delivery in 2015-2017.

S&P understands that Sovcomflot is taking proactive measures to
bolster its liquidity sources, such as a rollover of bullet loans
to extend its debt maturity profile, disposals of ageing vessels,
securing financing for vessels on order, and spreading out its
payment schedule to shipyards.  S&P believes that these measures,
if completed, will improve the company's liquidity coverage,
which is essential, in particular, if its performance were below
that in S&P's base case.

The negative outlook reflects that on the sovereign rating and
Sovcomflot's tightening liquidity coverage.  S&P could lower the
rating on Sovcomflot if S&P lowered the rating on Russia, all
else remaining equal.  S&P could also lower the rating if it saw
a lower likelihood of support for Sovcomflot from the government
or if Sovcomflot's SACP deteriorated, such that the ratio of
liquidity sources to uses fell to less than 1.2x.  This could
happen, for example, if Sovcomflot were unlikely to retain ready
access to ship financing, experienced delays in obtaining
necessary funding, or generated significantly lower EBITDA than
in our base case, due for instance to lower-than-anticipated
charter rates.

DME Ltd.

The outlook revision is to reflect the negative outlook on Russia
and indicates that S&P could lower the rating on DME if it
revised the T&C assessment downward.  It also reflects the
increased risk of declining passenger numbers at the airport as a
result of the economic slowdown in Russia, which could lead to
weaker profitability for DME in the next 12-18 months.  S&P
considers that the depreciation of the ruble, primarily against
the U.S. dollar and the euro, is likely to continue to dampen
Russian consumer demand for travelling abroad, as has been the
case in recent months.  S&P's updated forecast for DME in 2015
anticipates a decline of about 15% in international passengers at
Domodedovo and domestic passenger growth staying flat,
translating into an overall passenger traffic decline of about
8%.  An advantage for DME is that it generates about 45% of its
revenues in foreign currency, helping it to service foreign-
currency-denominated debt, and the lion's share of its cash
balances is held at foreign banks.

S&P could lower the ratings on DME and its subsidiaries in the
next 12 months if S&P was to revise the T&C assessment on Russia
downward and there were no clear signs of stabilization in the
country's economy.  These factors would indicate to S&P limited
prospects for improvement in traffic growth at the airport, and
therefore a weaker operating performance.  S&P could also
downgrade DME if it it believed that its ratio of funds from
operations to debt could fall below 45% on a sustained basis.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it revised the outlook
on Russia to stable.  S&P views the likelihood of an upgrade as
limited in the short term, due to the political and regulatory
risks associated with doing business in Russia.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action

                            To                 From
OAO LUKOIL
Uralkali OJSC
Corporate Credit Rating    BBB-/Negative/--   BBB-/Watch Neg /--
Russia National Scale      ruAAA              ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

OAO Severstal
Corporate Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/--     BB+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale      ruAA+               ruAA+

Rostelecom OJSC
AO Sovcomflot
Polyus Gold International Ltd.
Corporate Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/--     BB+/Stable/--

Alrosa OJSC
Corporate Credit Rating    BB-/Negative/B      BB-/Stable/B

Eurasia Drilling Co.
Corporate Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Stable/B
Russia National Scale      ruAA+               ruAA+

DME Ltd.
Corporate Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Stable/B

Ratings Affirmed

NLMK OJSC
Corporate Credit Rating    BB+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale      ruAA+

Downgraded
                            To                  From
Gazprom OAO
Corporate Credit Rating
  Foreign currency        BB+/Negative/B      BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
  Local currency          BBB-/Negative/A-3   BBB/Watch Neg/A-2

Gazprom Neft JSC
Corporate Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--
Russia National Scale     ruAA+               ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

OAO NOVATEK
Corporate Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--
Russia National Scale     ruAA+               ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

Oil Company Rosneft OJSC
Corporate Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--

OAO AK Transneft
Corporate Credit Rating
  Foreign currency         BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--
  Local currency           BBB-/Negative/--    BBB/Watch Neg/--

Russian Railways JSC
Corporate Credit Rating
  Foreign currency         BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--
  Local currency           BBB-/Negative/--    BBB/Watch Neg/--
Russia National Scale     ruAAA               ruAAA

MegaFon OJSC
Corporate Credit Rating
  Foreign Currency         BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--
  Local Currency           BBB-/Negative/--    BBB-/Watch Neg/--
Russia National Scale     ruAAA               ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

Federal Grid Co. of the Unified Energy System
Corporate Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--
Russia National Scale     ruAA+               ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

JSC Rosseti
Corporate Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B      BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale     ruAA+               ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

Mobile TeleSystems (OJSC)
Corporate Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--

JSC Federal Passenger Company
Corporate Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/--     BBB-/Watch Neg/--

RusHydro (OJSC)
Corporate Credit Rating   BB/Stable/B         BB+/Watch Neg/B
Russia National Scale     ruAA                ruAA+/Watch Neg/--

Interregional Distributive Grid Co. of Center JSC
Corporate Credit Rating   BB-/Stable/B        BB/Watch Neg/B

Russia National Scale     ruAA-               ruAA/Watch Neg/--

Moscow United Electric Grid Co. JSC
Corporate Credit Rating   BB-/Stable/--       BB/Watch Neg/--

Russia National Scale     ruAA-               ruAA/Watch Neg/--

NB: This list does not include all the ratings affected.


MOSVODOKANAL JSC: S&P Lowers CCRs to 'BB+/B'; Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
corporate credit ratings on Mosvodokanal JSC to 'BB+/B' from
'BBB-/A-3'.  At the same time, S&P lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Vodokanal St. Petersburg to 'BB' from
'BB+' and affirmed the 'B' short-term rating.  The outlook on the
ratings on both Russian water utility companies is negative.

S&P also lowered the Russia national scale rating on Mosvodokanal
to 'ruAA+' from 'ruAAA' and the Russia national scale rating on
Vodokanal St. Petersburg to 'ruAA' from 'ruAA+'.

At the same time, S&P removed all ratings from CreditWatch with
negative implications, where they had been placed on Dec. 30,
2014.

The rating action on Mosvodokanal followed a similar rating
action on the City of Moscow.  In S&P's view, there is still a
very high likelihood that the city government would provide
timely and sufficient extraordinary support to Mosvodokanal in
the event of financial distress.  S&P continues to assess
Mosvodokanal's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) as 'bb+'.

The rating action on Vodokanal St. Petersburg follows a similar
rating action on the City of St. Petersburg.  In S&P's view,
there is still a very high likelihood that the city government
would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary support to the
company in the event of financial distress.  S&P continues to
assess Vodokanal St. Petersburg's SACP as 'bb-'.

The negative outlook on both companies reflects that on their
respective cities.  In accordance with S&P's criteria for
government-related entities (GREs), if it was to lower its rating
on the related city by one notch, S&P would likely take a similar
rating action on the company, all else being equal.

RATINGS LIST
                           To                 From
Mosvodokanal JSC
Corporate Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B     BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale     ruAA+/--/--        ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

Vodokanal St. Petersburg
Corporate Credit Rating   BB/Negative/B      BB+/Watch Neg/B
Russia National Scale     ruAA/--/--         ruAA+/Watch Neg
Senior Unsecured          BB                 BB+/Watch Neg


RUSSIA: Must Cut Interest Rates or Face Wave of Bankruptcies
------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia Harrison at CNN Money reports that Anatoly Aksakov,
president of Russia's regional banking association and deputy
chairman of parliament's financial markets committee, on Jan. 12
said Russia will be hit by a wave of bankruptcies unless it cuts
interest rates very soon.

"Bankers believe that keeping the situation as it stands will
cause a wave of bankruptcies, not only credit institutions but
also a number of businesses and companies," CNN quotes Mr.
Aksakov as saying in a letter to the central bank.

Mr. Aksakov, as cited by CNN Money, said lower rates would allow
banks to lend more to companies and individuals.

The comments signal deepening stress in Russia's financial
sector, CNN Money states.

The government has attempted to shore up the banking sector with
a series of handouts, spending billions to prop up lenders
including VTB, Gazprombank and the failed Trust Bank, CNN Money
discloses.

BNP Paribas on Jan. 12 said Russia's banks may need an
overwhelming amount of support this year, CNN Money notes.


VTB BANK: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Rating to 'BB+/B'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had taken various
negative rating actions on 20 Russia-related financial
institutions and four Russia-related privately-owned entities.

GOVERNMENT-RELATED ENTITIES

S&P downgraded the following government-related entities (GREs)
and members of GRE groups.  The downgrades reflect the
government's decreasing capacity to provide timely and sufficient
extraordinary support to these GREs, as well as possible
pressures on their financial profiles owing to the worsening
operating and economic environment in Russia.

S&P downgraded VTB Bank JSC, a GRE with very high likelihood of
support, to 'BB+/B' and 'ruAA+'.  The ratings on these core group
members are equalized with those on VTB Bank JSC:

   -- Bank of Moscow OJSC
   -- VTB-Leasing
   -- VTB-Leasing Finance
   -- VTB Capital PLC
   -- VTB Insurance Ltd.

The following have high strategic importance to the VTB group,
and the ratings on these group members are one notch below those
on VTB Bank JSC:

   -- VTB Bank (Kazakhstan)
   -- VTB Bank (Austria) AG
   -- VTB Bank (France) SA

S&P downgraded Gazprombank, a GRE with high likelihood of
support, and its core group member Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd.
to 'BB+/B'.

S&P downgraded VEB-leasing OJSC, a core member of the
Vnesheconombank group, to 'BB+/B'.

S&P downgraded TENEX-Service, a member of Atomic Energy Power
group with high strategic importance), to 'BB/B', following the
downgrade of the parent Atomic Energy Power Corp. JSC on Jan. 29,
2015.

The outlooks on all these entities are negative, mirroring the
outlook on either the sovereign or the parent, and indicating the
risk of lower capacity from the government to support banks.  The
outlook on Gazprombank also reflects increasing pressure on the
entity's financial profile, notably on its capital position.

MEMBERS OF LARGE FOREIGN GROUPS OPERATING IN RUSSIA

S&P downgraded the following members of large foreign groups
operating in Russia because of S&P's view of the increasing
operating environment risks in Russia and the fact that these
entities do not meet S&P's criteria for being rated higher than
Russia, given that they are predominantly exposed to the Russian
market, remain vulnerable to economic and operating conditions in
Russia and transfer and convertibility risk, and are considered
to be either "highly strategic" or "strategic" rather than "core"
subsidiaries of their respective parents.  S&P therefore caps the
long- and short-term ratings on the following entities at the
level of S&P's foreign currency sovereign ratings on Russia:

   -- Raiffeisenbank ZAO
   -- BNP Paribas ZAO
   -- ZAO Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Eurasia)
   -- JSC Sumitomo Mitsui Rus Bank
   -- ZAO UniCredit Bank
   -- ZAO INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA
   -- Rusfinance Bank

The outlooks on all these entities are negative, mirroring the
outlook on the sovereign, and indicating the increasing
challenges of the Russian operating environment.

PRIVATELY OWNED BANKS

Although S&P acknowledges that the government is taking extensive
measures to support large and midsize public and private banks
through additional liquidity and capital injections, S&P believes
that the government's capacity to provide timely and sufficient
extraordinary support to banks might diminish further in the
future if public finances continue to deteriorate.  S&P therefore
has lowered the ratings on these private banks, which S&P
considers to have high systemic importance:

   -- S&P downgraded JSC Alfa-Bank to 'BB/B'.  S&P no longer
      incorporate any notches for timely and sufficient
      extraordinary government support into S&P's ratings of
      Alfa-Bank.

   -- S&P downgraded ABH Financial Ltd., the Cyprus-based
      nonoperating holding company that owns Alfa-Bank, to
      'B+/B'. The two-notch rating differential is due to
      structural subordination.

The outlooks on these two entities are negative, reflecting the
possibility of a further downgrade in the next 12-24 months if
S&P sees that the bank's financial profile is significantly
deteriorating due to tougher operating conditions, notably its
asset quality.  S&P notes at the same time that Alfa-Bank has so
far proven more resilient to the deteriorating environment than
peers, and S&P expects this trend to continue in 2015.

S&P revised its outlooks on two privately owned Russian banks
that S&P considers to have moderate systemic importance to
negative from stable:

   -- CREDIT BANK OF MOSCOW
   -- Promsvyazbank OJSC

The negative outlook on these two entities reflects the high
chance of a downgrade because of reducing extraordinary
government support in the case of another sovereign downgrade.
S&P is affirming the ratings on these two entities.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded; CreditWatch Action
                              To               From
VTB Bank JSC
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

Bank of Moscow OJSC
VTB-Leasing
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

VTB-Leasing Finance
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

VTB Capital PLC
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3

VTB Insurance Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local currency               BB+/Negative/--  BBB-/Watch Neg/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local currency               BB+/Negative/--  BBB-/Watch Neg/--
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

VTB Bank (Kazakhstan)
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB/Negative/B    BB+/Watch Neg/B
Kazakhstan National Scale    kzA+             kzAA-/Watch Neg/--

VTB Bank (Austria) AG
VTB Bank (France) SA
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB/Negative/B     BB+/Watch Neg/B

Gazprombank
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3

VEB-leasing OJSC
Counterparty Credit Rating
Foreign Currency             BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Local Currency               BBB-/Negative/A-3BBB/Watch Neg/A-2

Russia National Scale        ruAAA             ruAAA

TENEX-Service
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB/Negative/B    BB+/Watch Neg/B
Russia National Scale        ruAA             ruAA+/Watch Neg/--

Raiffeisenbank ZAO
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

BNP Paribas ZAO
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

ZAO Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (Eurasia)
JSC Sumitomo Mitsui Rus Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

ZAO UniCredit Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3

ZAO INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

Rusfinance Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB+/Negative/B   BBB-/Watch Neg/A-3
Russia National Scale        ruAA+            ruAAA/Watch Neg/--

JSC Alfa-Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB/Negative/B    BB+/Watch Neg/B
Russia National Scale        ruAA             ruAA+/Watch Neg/--

ABH Financial Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating   B+/Negative/B     BB-/Watch Neg/B

Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action

CREDIT BANK OF MOSCOW
Promsvyazbank OJSC
Counterparty Credit Rating   BB-/Negative/B    BB-/Stable/B

Note: This list does not include all the ratings affected.



=========
S P A I N
=========


SNIACE SA: Court Approves Insolvency Settlement Proposal
--------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that the Commercial Court in Madrid approves
insolvency settlement proposal for Sniace S.A., Celltech SLU, and
Viscocel SLU.

The Board of Directors of Sniace, S.A., during meeting held on
Sept. 6, 2013, unanimously agreed to request the Commercial Court
of Madrid to grant the declaration of bankruptcy of Sniace, S.A,
after it has reached the conviction that it is not feasible to
reach an agreement or to obtain new financial support after
having filed the communication -- ruled in article 5 bis of the
Creditors Meeting Law (Ley Concursal 22/2003, de 9 de Julio),
related to the Pre-Bankruptcy, last June 26, 2013 and in the
three months following said date. Likewise, the respective Boards
of Directors of the branch companies, Viscocel, S.L.U and
Celltech, S.L.U. have passed and adopted the same decision to
file the request to the Commercial Court of Madrid to grant the
declaration of bankruptcy.

Sniace SA -- http://www.sniace.com/-- is a Spain-based company
primarily active in the chemical sector.  The Company's main
activities are structured into five divisions: Cellulose,
Viscose, Electricity Generation, Biofuels and Forestry.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AFREN PLC: S&P Lowers CCR to 'SD' on Payment Deferral
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Afren PLC, a U.K.-headquartered oil
and gas exploration and production company, to 'SD' (selective
default) from 'CC'.

At the same time, S&P lowered its long-term issue rating on the
company's senior secured bonds maturing in 2016 to 'D' from 'CC'.
S&P also affirmed the 'CC' long-term issue rating on the
company's senior secured bonds maturing in 2019 and 2020.

S&P downgraded Afren because it failed to pay its obligations
under both its US$300 million revolving credit facility (Ebok
facility) and its bonds maturing in 2016 on time (S&P understands
the amount outstanding on the bond is US$253 million).  The
company obtained from the lenders of the US$300 million revolving
credit facility a deferral of the US$50 million amortization
payment due Jan. 31, 2015, to Feb. 27, 2015.  S&P also
understands Afren is using a 30-day grace period under the bonds
due 2016 to postpone payment of US$15 million of interest due on
Feb. 1, 2015.

S&P considers that the deferral of Afren's debt payment
obligations is tantamount to a default, and we think that there
is a high likelihood that Afren will fail to make the principal
and interest payments in February 2015.

Still, Afren has not defaulted on its other bonds maturing in
2019 and 2020, which account for more than 50% of its outstanding
total debt.  S&P has therefore lowered its long-term rating on
Afren to 'SD', reflecting its view of its default on some of its
debt instruments; rather than a default on all or a substantial
part of its debt.

S&P believes Afren's ability to continue to operate effectively
will be hampered, particularly because the appointments of key
managers are still pending after the dismissals of the CEO and
COO last year and because oil prices are currently low.  The
decline in oil prices is complicating Afren's liquidity and debt
restructuring, in S&P's view.

Seplat, a Nigerian exploration and production company, has
approached Afren regarding a potential merger.  Seplat has until
Feb. 13, 2015, to make a formal offer.  However, the deadline has
shifted twice, and S&P thinks it could be pushed back again in
the future.  S&P will take into account this potential major
development in any future rating actions.


ALLIEDPRA INTERNATIONAL: Goes Into Liquidation
----------------------------------------------
meetpie.com reports that Destination management company (DMC)
AlliedPRA's holding company AlliedPRA International has gone into
liquidation.

Begbies Traynor (Central) LLP were appointed as joint liquidators
of AlliedPRA International Limited at a general meeting on
Friday, January, 30, according to meetpie.com.

A meeting of creditors will be convened for Thursday, February
12, where a vote on the appointment will take place.  Begbies
Traynor added that no further announcements would be made ahead
of this meeting.

AlliedPRA International has subsidiaries in America, France,
Italy, Spain and Monaco.  The company is itself a subsidiary of
Allied International Holdings.

On February 2, AlliedPRA announced its European offices would
wind down operations and move to a 'partnership model' -- a
spokeswoman later admitted that there would be redundancies, the
report notes.

"The scale of business needed to maintain a consolidated DMC in
Europe is not achievable in today's economic climate, and
therefore to protect clients and deliver programs in the fashion
they expect and deserve, we are transitioning to a partnership
model.  This will allow us to better compete and serve the best
interest of our clients globally," the report quoted AlliedPRA's
North America President Denise Dornfeld as saying.

"We value our long-standing, respected client partnerships and
will ensure we make this transition as smooth as possible and
will keep key members of staff on our accounts.  As a valued DMC
partner, we are honoring every deposit acquired by AlliedPRA,"
Mr. Dornfeld added.


AMA TRADINGS: Court Winds Up Firm Over GBP1.56 Million Fraud
------------------------------------------------------------
Birmingham-based AMA Tradings Limited (AMA) was wound up in the
public interest on Jan. 13, 2015, at Manchester High Court, for
operating as a vehicle for fraud.

The petition to wind-up the company was presented by the
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills and followed
an investigation by the Insolvency Service Investigations showed
that AMA was initially incorporated as AMA Electronics Limited in
June 2012 and remained dormant until purchased by its current
director in March 2014, and the name changed to AMA and a set of
false accounts for the previous year were filed giving a vastly
inflated picture of AMA's finances, including that it had
combined profits of GBP1.6 million.

The company then made a number of attempts to obtain goods on
credit, including a BMW motor vehicle on finance.

In reality, AMA's bank account showed that there had only been
GBP1,000 through the account.

Investigators also found that a major waste management company
had received an email, purportedly from a supplier and advising
of a change to their bank details. The new account details were
those of AMA's bank account and resulted, on Oct. 15, 2014, in
the fraudulent diversion of GBP1.562 million into the account.
Before the fraud was uncovered, an amount of GBP594,398 was then
electronically transferred out in a series of 119 transactions
conducted on the same day.

The winding up petition was not defended by the company.

Commenting on the case, Scott Crighton, Group Leader with
Companies Investigations North, part of the Insolvency Service,
said:

"This company operated with complete disregard for the rules of
legitimate business.

"During its life, the company provided no services to justify its
existence and appears to have been used as nothing more than a
means of perpetrating fraud. Those responsible for such companies
should be aware that the Insolvency Service can and will come
after them with all the resources at its disposal."

AMA Tradings Ltd was incorporated on June 27, 2012 and was
ordered into compulsory liquidation on Jan. 13, 2015. The
petition to wind AMA up was issued on Nov. 27, 2014.

The company was based at 52 Blucher Street, Birmingham.


ANGLO HOLT: Goes Into Administration, 52 Jobs Cuts
--------------------------------------------------
Construction Enquirer reports that West Midlands-based contractor
Anglo Holt Construction has gone into administration.

Accountants from Baker Tilly are now in charge of the company
which has ceased trading with the loss of 52 jobs, according to
Construction Enquirer.

The report notes that the news follows days of uncertainty
surrounding the firm after its head office was closed and sites
shut.

Work was suspended on Anglo Holt's eight live contracts on Jan.
30 and 52 of the firm's 67 employees have now been made
redundant, the report relates.

"The company had been suffering cashflow difficulties as a result
of substantial contract losses over the last 18 months, leading
to a working capital shortfall and resulting in an inability to
meet supplier and subcontractor payments," the report quoted
Baker Tilly as saying.

The report notes that one subcontractor owed cash said: "It's
just so horribly predictable.  They stopped paying a few weeks
ago then started dodging us every time we asked for our money."

"Now this happens and all the suppliers will be the ones to miss
out again," the subcontractor added.

Credit reference agency Top Service has been monitoring the
company closely.

A spokeswoman said: "We have been receiving an increasing amount
of calls and managed to recover GBP70,000 for one of our clients
before the company went into administration," the report relays.

Latest accounts filed by the company for the year to April 2013
show it made a GBP237,000 pre-tax profit on a turnover of GBP44.5
million, the report relays.

The report notes that Administrator Guy Mander --
guy.mander@bakertilly.co.uk -- said: "The cashflow issues were
such that the directors had little choice but to place the
company into administration.

"We have appointed independent quantity surveyors to review the
company's contract base and we are currently liaising with the
various customers to seek value and the best overall position for
stakeholders on each contract," the report quoted Mr. Mander as
saying.

"Regrettably, we have had to make 52 staff redundant and our
specialist employee team has been assisting them both with making
their claims from the redundancy payments office and offering
general support and advice," Mr. Mander added.


CASTMASTER ROLL: Owes Creditors GBP500,000, Cuts 80 Jobs
--------------------------------------------------------
The Star reports that Castmaster Roll, a Sheffield manufacturing
firm that collapsed into administration with the loss of nearly
80 jobs, owes more than GBP500,000 to creditors.

More than 140 local and national companies are owed money in the
wake of the collapse of Castmaster Roll, based at the Eagle
Foundry in Attercliffe, according to The Star.

The report notes that the business went into administration in
October and as no new buyer could be found, all 78 workers have
lost their jobs and the firm's assets are being sold.

The firm had reported a trading loss for three years in a row
before going into administration, including a GBP400,000 loss for
the year ending January 31, 2014, the report relates.

The report discloses that details included in the papers of
administrator KPMG show GBP502,353 was owed to different
companies at the time of administration.

The Star relays that the firm's report said delayed and non-
payment of invoices had put the company under 'significant
pressure from its creditors' in the months prior to
administration.

A report also revealed that between KPMG's appointment in October
and December 5, it claimed costs of more than GBP324,000 for
handling the administration, The Star notes.

KPMG said it is uncertain how much money, if any, will be
returned to unsecured creditors as a sale of assets is yet to be
concluded, The Star discloses.

Administrators have also said they are 'continuing to assess the
causes of the company's failure,' The Star says.

It comes after Sheffield MP Clive Betts called for a 'thorough
investigation' into how Castmaster Roll failed, The Star relays.

The firm produced iron and steel quality rolls, discs and sleeves
for the manufacturing and food processing industry.  The
Stevenson Road site became a roll maker about 95 years ago.  It
was known as Davy Roll but, after going into receivership, was
reborn as Castmaster Roll in 2003, taken over by new owner Mel
Farrar.


COPENSHIP: Dry Bulk Market Losses Prompt Bankruptcy
---------------------------------------------------
Ole Mikkelsen at Reuters reports that Copenship Chief Executive
Michael Fenger said the company has filed for bankruptcy in
Copenhagen after losses in the dry bulk market.

Copenship had been operating over 50 chartered small-sized dry-
bulk vessels carrying goods such as grain, iron ore and timber,
Reuters discloses.

"We have done what we could to raise the funds to save the
company, but we have reached a point where there is not more to
do," Mr. Fenger was quotes saying in a text message to Reuters on
Feb. 4.

"First of all, we have found ourselves in an extremely bad dry
cargo market. Secondly, there are several counterparties that
have caused us losses, and then thirdly there are different
insurance cases that could hit us."

Insolvency administrator Per Astrup Madsen from Copenhagen law
firm Lett said the vessels will be handed back to owners, Reuters
relates.

Copenship is a privately-owned shipping company.


ETHEL AUSTIN: Union Loses Compensation Bid
------------------------------------------
Express & Star reports that the Union of Shop, Distributive and
Allied Workers (Usdaw) has lost the latest round of a legal bid
to win compensation for thousands of workers at two high-street
companies which went into administration.

Usdaw has been taking action on behalf of 3,200 former employees
of Woolworths and 1,200 ex-workers at Ethel Austin who did not
receive any money because they worked in stores with fewer than
20 staff, Express & Star discloses.

An opinion by the Advocate General of the European Court of
Justice on Feb. 5 went against Usdaw's case, although a final
decision will be made by the court later this year, Express &
Star relates.

"It is disappointing that we have not been able to persuade
Advocate General Wahl of the merits of our case, which is morally
and logically robust," Express & Star quotes John Hannett,
Usdaw's general secretary, as saying.  "However, this is only an
opinion and we are now pinning our hopes on the final judgment."

"We believe Advocate General Wahl is mistaken not to take account
of the internal structure of companies in giving his opinion and
has not considered mass insolvency situations."

Ethel Austin was a Liverpool clothing chain.  It went into
administration for the fifth time in January 2013.  Insolvency
practice XL Business Solutions was appointed to handle the
administration.


GILBERT WEBB: High Court Enters Liquidation Order
-------------------------------------------------
Gilbert Webb Estates Limited, which marketed residential-sized
plots of undeveloped land at a site in Cheshunt, Hertfordshire,
to the public for sale as an investment opportunity has been
ordered into liquidation by the High Court on grounds of public
interest following an Insolvency Service investigation.

The company was found to have continued a land banking scheme
previously carried on by Complete Building Systems Limited and
other companies whose affairs have also been investigated and
brought to an end by the Insolvency Service for ripping off the
public.

The investigation into Gilbert Webb Estates Limited showed that
the company targeted investors -- including recovering cancer
sufferers -- were misled into buying near-worthless plots of land
by claiming that investing in the land was more secure than
pension plans, equities or ISA's.

The company falsely claimed to be regulated by the FCA and that
investors could expect short term gains of between 200-400 per
cent.

The company's now defunct website claimed:

  "At Gilbert Webb Estates Ltd we have gathered together over 100
  years of collective experience in property acquisition,
  development and building together with our surveyors,
  architects and solicitors.

  "We adhere to the same principals (sic) used by major
  developers and construction companies. The one golden rule is
  location, location, location.

  "Our land brokers are fully conversant with all aspects of land
  acquisition, and development. We identify and after much
  deliberation purchase sites that hit our exacting selection
  criteria.

  "With a strong track record as a commodity and exceptionally
  high growth potential, analysts agree that strategically placed
  land should be included in every astute investor's portfolio."

The investigation found that the majority of the GBP1.5 million
received from investors, being some GBP959,000, was withdrawn in
cash from the company's account.

Welcoming the Court's winding up decision, Company Investigations
Supervisor Chris Mayhew said:

"This was a bare-faced scam on pensioners who have lost out
financially and otherwise, unlike those behind the company who
peddled near worthless plots of land to the public for
investment.

"Contrary to the company's claims, the only collective expertise
was the skill to part people from their money.

"The Insolvency Service has strong enforcement powers and we will
not hesitate to use them to take action against rotten companies
whose activities, as here, can devastate lives in particular
older and vulnerable investors who may suffer emotionally and
psychologically from the impact of incurring significant
financial loss and lose confidence to manage their own affairs."

Gilbert Webb Estates Ltd was incorporated on Feb. 29, 2012. The
registered office from incorporation to March 29, 2012 was 8
Stamford Drive, Bromley, Kent, BR2 OXF and thereafter 2nd Floor,
Berkeley Square House, Berkeley Square, London, W1J 6BD to
present date. The sole recorded director throughout has been Mr.
Bradley James Mortimer. No secretary is shown to have been
appointed. The company's share capital is shown to be 1 share of
GBP1 held by Mr Mortimer. No accounts or Annual Returns have been
filed.

The company's now defunct website was www.gilbertwebbestates.com


HEREFORD UNITED: Had Around 900 Creditors
-----------------------------------------
Paul Rogers at Hereford Times reports that the Hereford United
Football Club owed money to around 900 creditors, the Insolvency
Service have said.

Bristol-based Mitzi Mace is the official receiver and liquidator
dealing with the former club, the report says.

Hereford Times notes that 90 years of football at Edgar Street
came to an end just before Christmas when cash-strapped United
were wound up at the Royal Courts of Justice over unpaid debts.

Owner and chairman Andy Lonsdale had promised to invest
GBP1 million into Hereford United but he did not arrive at the
hearing, claiming he was stuck in traffic, according to the
report.

Hereford Times relates that Ade Daramy, Insolvency Service media
manager, said the company had about 900 creditors.

"A notice will be going out for a meeting of creditors," the
report quotes Mr. Daramy as saying.  "Some assets -- mainly
chairs and tables -- have been recovered but they are not likely
to generate much.

"At this stage, it does not appear there is much that can be
auctioned.  There are a few sports equipment and memorabilia that
may interest some fans, but there is nothing of substantial
value.

"They didn't own any of the buildings because they were leased."

Hereford Times says Mr. Daramy added the directors of the limited
company have been contacted and will have to provide individual
statements of what led to the company's liquidation and other
related matters, as required by law. "Once that has been done, we
can issue more up to date details," Mr. Daramy said.

Mr. Daramy also confirmed that, after the Insolvency Service's
investigations had been completed, the limited company would be
dissolved and deleted from Companys House's register, Hereford
Times adds.

Hereford United Football Club is an English association football
club based in the city of Hereford.


HOUSTON'S OF CUPAR: In Liquidation, Owes More Than GBP300,000
-------------------------------------------------------------
thecourier.co.uk reports that a north Fife steel fabrication
company has gone into liquidation with debts of more than
GBP300,000.

The demise of Houston's of Cupar has left the high-profile Dundee
businessman who tried to rescue the ailing company angry and
disappointed, according to thecourier.co.uk.

The report notes that Hermann Twickler, managing director of
PressureFab and a former Scottish Business Leader of the Year,
blamed the company's demise on a property leasing dispute which
he believed could have been avoided.

A petition to wind-up Houston's was granted at Dundee Sheriff
Court to Robert Duncan Kay, landlord of the Cupar factory, the
report relays.

Liquidator Matthew Purdon -- matt.henderson@jcca.co.uk -- of
Henderson, Johnston, Carmichael was appointed and has calculated
the firm's debts to creditors at GBP299,986 as part of a total
deficiency of GBP303,219, the report notes.  Mr. Henderson
considers there is no prospect of any creditor receiving a
dividend, the report relays.

The report discloses that Mr. Twickler took over the loss-making
Houston's in the winter of 2013, hoping its subsea engineering
experience would complement PressureFab's steel fabrication
capabilities and win more orders.

Houston's, which was to be renamed PressureFab Subsea was in
financial difficulties, and Mr. Twickler arranged emergency
funding to pay the wages of the 25 personnel and some of the
bills, the report notes.

The report relays that the subsidiary began to recover until Mr.
Twickler said he learned that the lease for the Cupar Muir
premises was not due to run out until 2019, four years later than
he had understood.

Negotiations to find a new tenant -- Houston's workforce had been
moved to the PressureFab factory in Dundee -- failed, and Mr. Kay
sued for GBP480,000 unpaid rent from Mr. Twickler for the
remainder of the six-year lease, the report relays.

The report discloses that Mr. Twickler said the sum was
impossible for Houston's to raise, prompting Mr. Kay to sue for
Houston's liquidation.

"I think the unpaid rental sum was unrealistic given that the
premises were re-let after a few months," the report quoted Mr.
Twickler as saying.

"I didn't know about the six-year lease when I took over, but the
deal had to be done quickly and there wasn't time for me to do
due diligence.  If the deal hadn't been done quickly 25 people
would have lost their jobs that Christmas," Mr. Twickler said,
the report relays.

"Through PresureFab, I provided nearly GBP400,000 of support to
Houston's because I wanted the company to succeed.  I committed
far more than the GBP28,000 stated as being due to me in the list
of creditors," Mr. Twickler said, the report notes.

Mr. Twickler added: "I still believe that it would have been
possible to save Houston's, and I am angry that this did not
happen.  I am also disappointed that more than 30 creditors have
lost money."

The biggest creditor was Gemini Corrosion Services of Montrose,
which was owed GBP58,257.  It declined to comment.


IMPERIAL ESCROW: High Court Winds Up Business
---------------------------------------------
An escrow service provider company, based in Nottingham, was
wound up by the High Court on Jan. 21, 2015, following an
investigation by the Insolvency Service.

Imperial Escrow Ltd offered an escrow facility for a small number
of clients, two of whom, Denver Trading AG, a Swiss registered
company, and Denver Trading Ltd, a Seychelles registered company
(collectively 'the Denver companies'), sold rare earth metal
oxides to members of the public as an investment product through
a network of UK based sales agent companies.

The Denver companies, along with Imperial Escrow Ltd, were placed
into provisional liquidation by the High Court on Dec. 19, 2013,
following petitions presented by the Secretary of State. The
Denver companies were subsequently compulsorily wound up on
Aug. 27, 2014, after it was found that serious misrepresentations
were made to members of the public as to prospective investment
returns from the purchase and onward sale of rare earth metal
oxides.

Imperial Escrow Ltd was used by the Denver companies to bank
their customer remittances. On collection of those remittances
transfers were made to Denver companies sales agents, usually
representing 40% to 50% of customer fees, and the remaining
balances were typically paid to offshore bank accounts controlled
by the individuals who managed and controlled the Denver
companies, Christopher John Sabin and Tobias Alexander Ridpath.

Commenting on the winding-up of the company, David Hill, a Chief
Investigator with the Insolvency Service, said:

"This formally brings to an end the activities of this company,
linked to companies that, in truth were peddling near worthless
investments.

"The Insolvency Service will not allow rogue companies to rip-off
vulnerable and honest people and will investigate abuses and
close down companies if they are found to be operating or about
to operate, against the public interest."

The sole director of Imperial Escrow Ltd, Rizvan Mian, acted on
the instructions of Mr. Sabin and Mr. Ridpath. At the date that
Imperial Escrow Ltd was placed into provisional liquidation, it
held GBP1.1 million in escrow accounts on behalf of the Denver
companies. The court was sufficiently concerned that those monies
were at risk from the continued trading of the company, so
ordering the company to be placed into provisional liquidation,
where control of those company's assets, including its bank
accounts, were transferred into the custody of the Official
Receiver.

Imperial Escrow Ltd claimed that the GBP1.1 million it held on
behalf of the Denver companies were monies that belonged to those
companies. However, Registrar Jones in the High Court said that
it was essential that the client funds were dealt with properly
after investigation by the Official Receiver.


LUCY ENTERPRISES: In Liquidation Following Fire
-----------------------------------------------
Daily Echo reports that the company which ran fashionable Poole
restaurant Cafe Shore is in liquidation, five months after the
business was wrecked by fire.

The Sandbanks business never reopened after the blaze which took
hold last August, according to Daily Echo.

Lucy Enterprises, which traded as Cafe Shore, is now in
liquidation and a creditors' meeting was held on Feb. 2.

The report notes that Cafe Shore was engulfed by smoke last
August when an electrical fault caused the blaze.

In a press release last August, Cafe Shore manager Emily Davies
thanked the fire service and her staff for their response to the
fire, the report relays.

"We are not sure when we will be 100 per cent up and running
again.  Communication at this point is vital.  We will be posting
official real time updates on our Facebook page," the report
quoted Mr. Davies as saying.

Despite management tweeting in September that the cafe would be
open for Christmas parties -- and that customers should "watch
this space for exciting developments" -- the business has still
not reopened, the report notes.

The report says that Mark Liddle of insolvency adviser entity,
the Mark Liddle Partnership, which is handling the liquidation,
said: "There was a fire last summer which made Cafe Shore cease
trading.  There was no generation of income. That's the reason
the company is going into liquidation."

Lucy Enterprises is not the first company running the cafe to be
wound up, the report says.

In March 2013, Cafe Shore Ltd went into liquidation with debts of
GBP404,000, the report discloses.  But Cafe Shore itself remained
open, run by Cafe Shore Holdings Ltd, under directors Ben and
Julia Brafman, who also own Lucy Enterprises, the report relays.

The report notes that Roger Williams, president of Poole Chamber
of Trade and Commerce, said the cafe's prominent location needed
a "venue of some substance."

"I would like to see a local operator take that on and try to
create something that would be beneficial to the tourist industry
and the local community alike," the report quoted Mr. Williams as
saying.


MARUSSIA F1: Intends to Come Out of Administration on February 19
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Danielle Joynson at Sports Mole reports that the Marussia Formula
One racing team has announced that it intends to come out of
administration on February 19.

Following financial struggles, the team plunged into
administration last October and missed the final three races of
the 2014 season, according to Sports Mole.

Since then, the Oxfordshire-based outfit has reportedly been in
talks with an interested party, and Marussia's return to the grid
looks positive, the report notes.

Joint administrator Geoff Rowley released a statement saying that
"investment into the business will be made" via a company
voluntary arrangement before the Australian Grand Prix in March,
he report relates.

According to Sky Sports News, Marussia are expected to receive
prize money in excess of GBP30 million from the 2014 campaign,
which has made them more attractive to a potential buyer, the
report adds.


RECONDITIONED ENGINES: Court Shuts 3 Engine Reconditioning Firms
----------------------------------------------------------------
Three connected companies who carried on business as vehicle
engine reconditioning and repairers were wound up by the High
Court on Jan. 19, 2015, following an investigation by the
Insolvency Service.

Reconditioned Engines Ltd (REL), Unique Engines Ltd (UEL), and
latterly 1ST Choice Engines Ltd, were the latest trading guises
in a long line of companies offering engine reconditioning and
repair services to the public, dating back to 1982. REL and UEL
both traded from the same premises at Units 9 to 11, Saxon Way,
Harmondsworth.

REL traded for a period of approximately 10 months, between
October 2012 and August 2013. REL's director, Roy Dart, gave an
undertaking to the High Court in June 2013 that he would seek to
place REL into voluntary liquidation by August 27, 2013. Mr Dart
failed to comply with that undertaking. The business of REL was
then effectively transferred to UEL, who continued to trade for a
matter of months before it was evicted from its trading premises
in October 2013 after it had failed to pay rent and other bills.
The company was abandoned at that time, with customers vehicles
left on site for the landlord and its agents, along with the
police, to repatriate to their owners.

In total, the 3 companies had generated over 350 complaints in
their brief trading histories, with common threads of complaint
across the companies, namely:

  * unwarranted inflation of quotes after vehicles were taken
    into respective companies' possession, work repaired to an
    unsatisfactory standard and excessive retention of vehicles

  * A number of those complaints featured allegations of threats,
    intimidation and assault on customers by respective company
    staff

1ST Choice Engines Ltd traded from premises at Unit 5, Perth
Industrial Estate, Slough, SL1 4XX, a large warehouse sized
building, where customer vehicles were kept whilst under repair.
The investigation found that the recorded director and
shareholder of the company, Gary Driscoll, played little or no
part in the management of the company. The company was instead
managed by Paul Dockerill.

1ST Choice Engines Ltd was placed into provisional liquidation on
Dec. 16, 2014, following a petition presented by the Secretary of
State. The Official Receiver was appointed provisional liquidator
at that time, and has administered the affairs of the company
since that time, with the business of the company shut down by
the Official Receiver on Dec. 17, 2014. On that same day, Thames
Valley Police executed search warrants at the business premises
and a number of other addresses, where arrests were made. They
subsequently issued a press release, which commented favourably
on the co-ordinated approach between Government agencies.

1st Choice Engines Limited and its predecessors REL and UEL all
used common websites to promote their business, including the
following:

    www.reconditioned-engines.co.uk
    www.saabengines.co.uk
    www.rangeroverengines.co.uk
    www.engine-shop.co.uk
    www.remanufactured-engines.co.uk

1st Choice Engines Ltd and its predecessors all operated the same
business model, whereby it offered lead in engine reconditioning
quotes substantially less than comparable businesses offering
engine reconditioning services, along with a relatively
inexpensive nationwide vehicle recovery to site service. However,
once customer vehicles were in the possession of the company this
led to a consistent pattern whereby those lead in quotes were
often doubled and more. The basis for those increases was
remarkably similar in many cases, irrespective of the actual
condition of the engines in need of repair. The practice of all
the companies was to significantly inflate final quotes without
due cause.

Where customers declined or refused to accept the falsely
inflated quotes, they were faced with their vehicle engines being
left dismantled in pieces in the boot and back seats of their
vehicles, along with a bill for the company having dismantled the
engine. Customers' vehicles were in essence held to ransom by the
company and customers were effectively left with little choice
other than to pay the inflated fees.

Those who did object to the company's sales practices and
questionable workmanship in those cases where the company claimed
to have undertaken repairs, often found themselves on the
receiving end of threats, intimidation and assault by staff.
Customers had little or no financial redress, as the company and
its predecessors operated on a cash basis.

Commenting on the winding up of the 3 companies, David Hill, a
chief investigator with the Insolvency Service, said,

"These companies operated in a way designed to draw in and then
rip-off investors.

"There should be no doubt that the Insolvency Service will
continue to take robust action whenever serious failings are
discovered and in particular against contemptible companies as in
this case, preying on customers."



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History
----------------------------------------------------
Author: Alfred L. Malabre, Jr.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 256 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/KNTLyr

Alfred Malabre's personal perspective on the U.S. economy over
the past four decades is firmly grounded in his experience and
knowledge. Economics Editor of The Wall Street Journal from 1969
to 1993 and author of its weekly "Outlook" column, Malabre was in
a singular position to follow the U.S. economy in recent decades,
have access to the major academic and political figures
responsible for economic affairs, and get behind the crucial
economic stories of the day. He brings to this critical overview
of the economy both a lively, often provocative, commentary on
the picture of the turns of the economy. To this he adds sharp
analysis and cogent explanation.

In general, Malabre does not put much stock in economists. "In
sum, the profession's record in the half century since Keynes and
White sat down at Bretton Woods [after World War II] provokes
dismay." Following this sour note, he refers to the belief of a
noted fellow economist that the Nobel Prize in this field should
be discontinued. In doing so, he also points out that the Nobel
for economics was not one originally endowed by Alfred Nobel, but
was one added at a later date funded by the central bank of
Sweden apparently in an effort to give the profession of
economists the prestige and notice of medicine, science,
literature and other Nobel categories.

Malabre's view of economists is widespread, although rarely
expressed in economic circles. It derives from the plain fact
that modern economists, even hugely influential ones such as John
Meynard Keynes, are wrong as many times as they are right. Their
economic theories have proved incomplete or shortsighted, if not
basically wrong-headed. For example, Malabre thinks of the
leading economist Milton Friedman and his "monetarist colleagues"
as "super salespeople, successfully merchandising.an economic
medicine that promised far more than it could deliver" from about
the 1960s through the Reagan years of the 1980s. But the author
not only cites how the economy has again and again disproved the
theories and exposed the irrelevance of wrong-headedness of the
policy recommendations of the most influential economists of the
day. Malabre also lays out abundant economic data and describes
contemporary marketplace and social activities to show how the
economy performs almost independently of the best analyses and
ideas of economists.

Malabre does not engage in his critiques of noted economists and
prevailing economic ideas of recent decades as an end in itself.
What emerges in all of his consistent, clear-eyed, unideological
analysis and commentary is his own broad, seasoned view of
economics-namely, the predominance of the business cycle. He
compares this with human nature, which is after all the substance
of economics often overlooked by professional and academic
economists with their focus on monetary policy, exchange rates,
inflation, and such. "The business cycle, like human nature, is
here to stay" is the lesson Malabre aims to impart to readers
interested in understanding the fundamental, abiding nature of
economics. In Lost Prophets, in language that is accessible and
jargon-free, this author, who has observed, written about, and
explained economics from all angles for several decades,
persuasively makes this point.

In addition to holding a top position at The Wall Street Journal,
Malabre is also the author of the books, Understanding the New
Economy and Beyond Our Means, which received the George S. Eccles
Prize from the Columbia Business School as the best economics
book of 1987.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *