TCREUR_Public/150212.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, February 12, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 31

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A


OESTERREICHISCHE: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Rating to 'B'


F R A N C E

LES EDITIONS JALOU: Placed Into Receivership


G R E E C E

ALPHA BANK: S&P Retains 'CCC+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
ATHENS: Moody's Puts 'Caa1' Issuer Rating for Downgrade
EUROBANK ERGASIAS: Moody's Reviews B3 Bond Rating for Downgrade
HELLENIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Puts Ba3 CFR for Downgrade
NATIONAL BANK: Fitch Puts 'B-' IDR on CreditWatch Negative

PIRAEUS BANK: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Rating to 'Caa2'
PUBLIC POWER: S&P Lowers Rating to 'B-' on Liquidity Constraints


I R E L A N D

RMF EURO III: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR10.5MM Notes to Ba1


N E T H E R L A N D S

FAXTOR ABS 2003-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
PIGMENTS II: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
RENOIR CDO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B3'


R U S S I A

MORTGAGE AGENT 3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to BB+
MORTGAGE AGENT 2011-2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to BB+


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: S&P Affirms 'B/B' CCR; Outlook Remains Positive
AYT GOYA HIPOTECARIO: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating to Ba1


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

B. ENDEAVOUR SHIPPING: Recognition Hearing Set for March 5
CATERHAM F1: Asset Auction Scheduled for March
CITY LINK: Dartford MP Welcomes Jobs Boost for Former Workers
DYFED CLEANING: Enters Administration, Seeks Buyer
DYTECNA LTD: In Administration, Seeks Buyer

EUROSAIL-UK PLC: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR36MM Certs. to Caa2
HERO ACQUISITIONS: Moody's Raises CFR to 'B1' Following IPO
INDUS PLC: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on GBP0.1MM Cl. X Notes
JAKEM LTD: In Liquidation, Sells Kingsbarn Equestrian Center
MARUSSIA F1: Denies ManorGP's Request

MAX PETROLEUM: Could Become Insolvent Without Restructuring
MEIF RENEWABLE: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to GBP190MM Sr. Notes
T BADEN: In Administration, Cuts 180 Jobs

TOWERGATE FINANCE: Restructuring Deal No Impact on Fitch's C IDR
USC: Mike Ashley Faces Legal Action After Staff Were Given Notice


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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OESTERREICHISCHE: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Oesterreichische Volksbanken-
Aktiengesellschaft's (OeVAG) Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'B' from 'BBB-' and Short-term IDR to 'B' from 'F3', and
maintained the IDRs on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

Fitch downgraded OeVAG's Long-term IDR to 'BBB-' in October 2014
following the decision of OeVAG's board to spin off the bank's
non-core business from Volksbanken-Verbund (VB-Verbund;
A/Negative/bb-/RWP).  At this time, there was limited information
on OeVAG's future set-up.  The bank's Long-term IDR remained
within investment grade to reflect the possibility of further
state support being available following the spin-off.

The downgrade to 'B'/RWN reflects Fitch's expectation that state
support for OeVAG can no longer be relied upon, in light of
subsequent information regarding the structure of the planned
spin-off.  It also reflects the implementation of the EU's Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive and its bail-in provisions into
Austrian national law on January 1, 2015, which significantly
increase the risk that OeVAG's creditors may be subject to some
form of bail-in if further state support was required as long as
OeVAG has its banking licence.

According to the spin-off plan, OeVAG will leave VB-Verbund's
mutual support scheme and return its bank licence during 2015 and
focus exclusively on the orderly wind-down of its non-core assets
as a partly-regulated wind-down institution, without any
additional state support.  The downgrade reflects Fitch's
assessment that state support can no longer be relied on for
OeVAG, meaning that its IDRs are now driven by Fitch's view of
the likelihood of institutional support from VB-Verbund.
However, the latter's ability to support is constrained, as
expressed by its Viability Rating of 'bb-'/RWP.

OeVAG's remaining core assets and central clearing and support
functions for VB-Verbund's members will be transferred to one of
VB-Verbund's primary banks (most likely the largest of the group,
Volksbank Wien-Baden AG; A/Negative).  OeVAG intends to implement
most of these transformations by end-1H15.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

OeVAG's Long-term IDR is now linked to VB-Verbund's Viability
Rating of 'bb-'/RWP.  Fitch do not notch from VB-Verbund's Long-
term IDR as this is driven by state support and we do not believe
that the state will provide further support to OeVAG, either
directly or indirectly via VB-Verbund.  Fitch believes that VB-
Verbund will still be incentivised to support OeVAG if needed,
while OeVAG remains a part of the co-operative group and its
mutual support mechanism.

The RWN on OeVAG's Long-term IDR reflects our expectation that
VB-Verbund will no longer provide support to OeVAG once it is
spun off, and that any contingent liabilities following the spin-
off will be negligible.

The two-notch difference between VB-Verbund's VR and OeVAG's
Long-term IDR reflects the large size of OeVAG relative to VB-
Verbund group as a whole.  The RWP on VB-Verbund's VR is driven
by our expectation of the benefits of OeVAG's planned spin-off on
VB-Verbund's standalone profile and consequently does not apply
to OeVAG's Long-term IDR.  The 'B' support-driven Long-term IDR
is consistent with a Support Rating of '4'.

The revision of OeVAG's Support Rating Floor to 'No Floor', and
its subsequent withdrawal, reflects our view that state support
can no longer be relied upon.

VB-Verbund's ratings are unaffected by these rating actions.

Fitch does not typically assign VRs to banks in orderly wind
down, such as OeVAG, because in our view they have no viable
standalone business model, and could not operate without
receiving or being expected to receive external support.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch has maintained the RWN on OeVAG's IDRs to reflect its
expectation that support for OeVAG will be unlikely once it
leaves the mutual support mechanism.  Fitch therefore expects to
resolve the RWN on OeVAG's ratings when the bank executes its
planned exit from VB-Verbund's mutual support scheme, expected in
1H15. However, the resolution of the RWN could extend beyond the
typical six-month horizon, as technical, legal and regulatory
aspects may delay the process beyond the expected timeline.

In resolving the RWN, Fitch will in particular assess OeVAG's new
ownership structure, asset wind-down profile and performance
implications, and funding structure, as well as any residual
explicit or implicit state or institutional (VB-Verbund) support,
which Fitch considers will be unlikely.  Assuming that no
external support can be relied upon, Fitch will likely assess
OeVAG as a non-bank financial institution.  In this case a multi-
notch downgrade could be possible, reflected in the RWN on
OeVAG's Short-term IDR.

OeVAG's senior debt ratings are aligned with its Long-term IDR.
Fitch has placed these instruments on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE)
to reflect the uncertainty as to whether they will be allocated
to VB-Verbund's future central institution, in which case their
ratings would be upgraded to the level of VB-Verbund's IDRs, or
if they will be spun off with OeVAG, in which case a further
downgrade of the debt ratings in line with OeVAG's Long-term IDR
would be likely.  Fitch will resolve the RWE when this allocation
has been formally decided, which it expects to occur at the time
of OeVAG's spin-off at the latest.

The rating actions are:

Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'BBB-' and maintained on
RWN

Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3' and maintained on RWN

Support Rating: downgraded to '4' from '2' and maintained on RWN

Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BBB-' and
withdrawn

Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'B'/'B' from 'BBB-'/'F3'
and revised to RWE

Market linked securities: downgraded to 'B emr' from 'BBB- emr'
and revised to RWE



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F R A N C E
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LES EDITIONS JALOU: Placed Into Receivership
--------------------------------------------
wwd.com reports that Les Editions Jalou, publisher of L'Officiel,
has been placed into receivership following a court decision
ordering it to pay EUR4.2 million, or US$5.1 million at current
exchange, to its former Russian licensee following the early
termination of their contract.

"Editions Jalou challenges the validity of its former Russian
licensee's claims and has decided to lodge an appeal.
Consequently, and as a precaution, the management of the company
has chosen to go into technical receivership pending the
decision," Jalou Media Group said, according to wwd.com.

The report notes that Edouard de Lamaze, lawyer for Jalou Media
Group, said it would seek to get the Paris Court of Appeal to
reverse the decision.  The group alleges the Russian licensee
failed to respect the conditions of their agreement, prompting it
to terminate the license a year early, the report relates.

Benjamin Eymere, Editions Jalou's managing director, noted the
family-owned group has entered 10 new markets in the last two
years, increasing its revenues to EUR33 million euros, or US$43.8
million, in 2014 from EUR24 million, or US$30.9 million, in 2012,
the report discloses.  All dollar rates are calculated at average
exchange for the period concerned.

"We have more than 600 advertising clients in the luxury sector
and we print 24 million copies per year under the L'Officiel
banner for 70 million readers.  We are taking all necessary
measures to ensure that normal business activity and our
development projects continue unchanged," the report quoted Mr.
Eymere as saying.

The family-owned group also comprises magazines including
Jalouse, L'Optimum, L'Officiel Hommes, L'Officiel Art and La
Revue des Montres.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


ALPHA BANK: S&P Retains 'CCC+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that its 'CCC+' long-term
counterparty credit ratings on Greece-based Alpha Bank A.E.
(Alpha), Eurobank Ergasias S.A. (Eurobank), National Bank of
Greece S.A. (NBG), and Piraeus Bank S.A. (Piraeus) remain on
CreditWatch with negative implications, where we initially placed
them on Jan. 30, 2015.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'C' short-term counterparty
credit ratings and subordinated debt ratings on the four banks.

The CreditWatch status reflects the possibility that S&P could
downgrade the four banks if it anticipates the European
authorities' and the ECB's support for Greek banks will no longer
be available, or will not be sufficient to cover the four banks'
financing needs.

"We are maintaining the CreditWatch following the ECB's decision
to revoke the waiver on minimum credit rating requirements for
marketable instruments issued or guaranteed by the Hellenic
Republic, starting from Feb. 11, 2015.  This waiver previously
allowed these instruments to be used as collateral in Eurosystem
monetary policy operations, despite them not meeting minimum
credit rating requirements.  Liquidity needs of Greek banks that
do not have sufficient alternative collateral can be satisfied by
the Bank of Greece, Greece's National Central Bank, via its
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility," S&P said.

S&P understands that the Greek banks will be able to switch their
current ECB funding collateralized by Greek government bonds and
government-guaranteed bonds -- amounting to about EUR50
billion -- to ELA facilities with the Bank of Greece (Greece's
national central bank).  S&P also anticipates that Greek banks
will likely rely further on ELA financing over the coming days
and weeks as deposit outflows persist on the uncertain outcome of
negotiations between the new Greek government and its official
creditors.

S&P also understands that the Greek banks' ability to continue
accessing liquidity facilities provided by European liquidity
support mechanisms, including the ELA, depends on the governing
council of the ECB.  The governing council can restrict ELA
operations provided by the Bank of Greece if it considers that
these operations interfere with the objectives and tasks of the
Eurosystem.

S&P continues to assess the stand-alone credit profiles (SACPs)
of Alpha, Eurobank, NBG and Piraeus at 'ccc-'.  The SACPs
continue to incorporate S&P's view of the four banks' "adequate"
business position, "very weak" capital and earnings, "moderate"
risk position, "adequate" funding, and "very weak" liquidity.
The ratings on the four banks also continue to incorporate two
notches of additional short-term support.

The CreditWatch status reflects the possibility that S&P could
lower the long-term ratings on the four banks if it anticipates
they will lose access to the liquidity provided by the European
liquidity support mechanisms, or if S&P foresees such support
being insufficient to meet the four banks' financing needs.  In
S&P's view, if the process of reaching an agreement between the
Greek government and its official creditors is prolonged, this
could lead to further pressure on Greece's financial stability in
the form of deposit withdrawals.  In a worst-case scenario,
reduced financial stability could result in the imposition of
capital controls.  If capital controls were to be imposed, S&P
could lower the ratings on the four banks.

Conversely, S&P could affirm the ratings and remove them from
CreditWatch if S&P believes that the Greek banks will likely
retain permanent and sufficient support from the European
authorities and the ECB such that they can meet their financial
commitments in a timely manner.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch Update

Alpha Bank A.E.
Eurobank Ergasias S.A
National Bank of Greece S.A.
Piraeus Bank S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating             CCC+/Watch Neg/C

N.B. This does not include all ratings affected.


ATHENS: Moody's Puts 'Caa1' Issuer Rating for Downgrade
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service EMEA Limited has placed the Caa1 issuer
rating of the City of Athens on review for downgrade.

This rating action follows Moody's placement of Greece's Caa1
government bond rating on review for downgrade on 6 February
2015.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's rating action on the city of Athens reflects the high
level of uncertainty over the outcome of the negotiations between
Greece and its official creditors over the terms of Greece's
support program and its implications on the city's finances.

The rating action takes into account the close operational and
financial linkages between the city and the Greek government.
Municipalities in Greece, including the city of Athens, cannot
act independently from the sovereign and do not have enough
financial flexibility to permit their credit quality to be
stronger than that of the sovereign itself. In addition, the
institutional linkages intensify the close ties between the two
levels of government through the sovereign's ability to change
the institutional framework under which Greek municipalities
operate.

Although Athens has good autonomy in management, Moody's notes
that the city relies on central government transfers for
operation and capital investment, and has a local economic base
that is highly integrated with that of the national economy. The
city derives around 40% of its operating revenues from central
government transfers (representing its second largest source of
income) and capital investments are almost entirely funded by
government grants and EU funds.

Focus of the Review

The review will focus on growing systemic risks, as reflected in
the sovereign bond rating and related impact the sovereign review
might have on the city's finances. The conclusion of the review
for downgrade will be linked to the conclusion of the review at
the sovereign level.

What Could Change the Ratings UP/DOWN

Should the sovereign credit quality deteriorate, the issuer
rating of the City of Athens is likely to follow the sovereign
rating action.

In turn, if systemic pressures decrease, the review on the City
of Athens's rating will likely lead to a confirmation of its
current rating.

Specific economic indicators as required by EU regulation are not
applicable for this entity.

On February 5, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Athens, City of. The main points raised during the
discussion were: The systemic risk in which the issuer operates
has materially increased.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.


EUROBANK ERGASIAS: Moody's Reviews B3 Bond Rating for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken the following rating actions:

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by Eurobank Ergasias S.A., under
  its Covered Bonds I programme: downgraded to B2, rating placed
  on review for downgrade

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by Eurobank Ergasias S.A., under
  its Covered Bonds II programme: B3 rating placed on review for
  downgrade

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by National Bank of Greece S.A.,
  under its Global Covered Bonds programme: B1 rating placed on
  review for downgrade

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by National Bank of Greece S.A.,
  under its Covered Bonds II programme: Ba3 rating placed on
  review for downgrade

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by Alpha Bank AE, under its
  Direct Issuance Global programme: B1 rating placed on review
  for downgrade

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the covered bond ratings referenced above
follows the rating actions on the issuer ratings:

  Eurobank Ergasias S.A.: deposits Caa3 on review for downgrade;
  bank financial strength rating E/stable, baseline credit
  assessment caa3.

  National Bank of Greece S.A.: deposits Caa2 on review for
  downgrade; bank financial strength rating E/stable, baseline
  credit assessment caa2.

  Alpha Bank AE: deposits Caa2, on review for downgrade; bank
  financial strength rating E/stable, baseline credit assessment
  caa2.

During the rating review Moody's will examine whether the timely
payment indicator (TPI) framework caps the covered bond ratings
at a lower level and to which extent the issuers will provide
sufficient levels of overcollateralisation (OC), as appropriate
in voluntary and/or committed form.

Key Rating Assumptions/Factors

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability
that the issuer will cease making payments under the covered
bonds (a CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the
cover pool assets following a CB anchor event.

The cover pool losses for Eurobank Ergasias S.A. Mortgage Covered
Bonds I are 23.2%. This is an estimate of the losses Moody's
currently models following a CB anchor event. Moody's splits
cover pool losses between market risk of 16.2% and collateral
risk of 6.9%. Market risk measures losses stemming from
refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and currency
mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal risks).
Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly from cover
pool assets' credit quality. Moody's derives collateral risk from
the collateral score, which for Eurobank Ergasias S.A. Mortgage
Covered Bonds I is currently 10.4%.

The OC in the cover pool is 14.3%, of which the issuer provides
5.3% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level consistent with
the B2 rating target is 1.5%. These numbers show that Moody's is
not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on the most recent
Performance Overview based on data as of 30 September 2014.

The cover pool losses for Eurobank Ergasias S.A. Mortgage Covered
Bonds II are 53.7%. This is an estimate of the losses Moody's
currently models following a CB anchor event. Moody's splits
cover pool losses between market risk of 35.3% and collateral
risk of 18.4%. Market risk measures losses stemming from
refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and currency
mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal risks).
Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly from cover
pool assets' credit quality. Moody's derives collateral risk from
the collateral score, which for Eurobank Ergasias S.A. Mortgage
Covered Bonds II is currently 27.5%.

The OC in the cover pool is 43.9%, of which the issuer provides
5.3% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level consistent with
the B3 rating target is 23.5%. These numbers show that Moody's is
relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on the most recent
Performance Overview based on data as of 30 September 2014.

The cover pool losses for National Bank of Greece S.A. Global
Covered Bond Programme are 25.6%. This is an estimate of the
losses Moody's currently models following a CB anchor event.
Moody's splits cover pool losses between market risk of 17.8% and
collateral risk of 7.8%. Market risk measures losses stemming
from refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and
currency mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal
risks). Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly from
cover pool assets' credit quality. Moody's derives collateral
risk from the collateral score, which for National Bank of Greece
S.A. Global Covered Bond Programme is currently 11.6%.

The OC in the cover pool is 116.4%, of which the issuer provides
5.3% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level consistent with
the B1 rating target is 1.5%. These numbers show that Moody's is
not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on the most recent
Performance Overview based on data as of 30 September 2014.

The cover pool losses for National Bank of Greece S. A. Covered
Bond Programme II are 21.1%. This is an estimate of the losses
Moody's currently models following a CB anchor event. Moody's
splits cover pool losses between market risk of 11.8% and
collateral risk of 9.3%. Market risk measures losses stemming
from refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and
currency mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal
risks). Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly from
cover pool assets' credit quality. Moody's derives collateral
risk from the collateral score, which for National Bank of Greece
S. A. Covered Bond Programme II is currently 14.0%.

The OC in the cover pool is 29.9%, of which the issuer provides
5.3% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level consistent with
the Ba3 rating target is 1%. These numbers show that Moody's is
not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on the most recent
Performance Overview based on data as of 30 September 2014.

The cover pool losses for Alpha Bank Direct Issuance Global
Covered Bond Programme are 24.1%. This is an estimate of the
losses Moody's currently models following a CB anchor event.
Moody's splits cover pool losses between market risk of 16.6% and
collateral risk of 7.4%. Market risk measures losses stemming
from refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and
currency mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal
risks). Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly from
cover pool assets' credit quality. Moody's derives collateral
risk from the collateral score, which for Alpha Bank Direct
Issuance Global Covered Bond Programme is currently 11.1%.

The OC in the cover pool is 23.2%, of which the issuer provides
5.3% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level consistent with
the B1 rating target is 1%. These numbers show that Moody's is
not relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on the most recent
Performance Overview based on data as of September 30, 2014.

The cover pool losses are an estimate of the losses Moody's
currently models following a CB anchor event. Moody's splits
cover pool losses between market risk and collateral risk. Market
risk measures losses stemming from refinancing risk and risks
related to interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses
may also include certain legal risks). Collateral risk measures
losses resulting directly from the cover pool assets' credit
quality. Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral
score.

For further details on cover pool losses, collateral risk, market
risk, collateral score and TPI Leeway across covered bond
programmes rated by Moody's please refer to "Moody's Global
Covered Bonds Monitoring Overview", published quarterly.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which measures the likelihood of timely payments to
covered bondholders following a CB anchor event. The TPI
framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain number of
notches above the CB anchor.

Moody's have assigned the following TPI's to the programmes:

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by Eurobank Ergasias S.A. under
  its Covered Bonds I programme: Very Improbable

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by Eurobank Ergasias S.A. under
  its Covered Bonds II programme: Very Improbable

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by National Bank of Greece S.A.
  under its Global Covered Bonds programme: Very Improbable

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by National Bank of Greece S.A.
  under its Covered Bonds II programme: Improbable

  Mortgage covered bonds issued by Alpha Bank AE under its Direct
  Issuance Global programme: Very Improbable

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the
Ratings:

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond
programme's rating robustness. A change in the level of the CB
anchor could lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the covered
bonds. The TPI Leeway measures the number of notches by which
Moody's might lower the CB anchor before the rating agency
downgrades the covered bonds because of TPI framework
constraints.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (1) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting both the CB Anchor and the TPI; (2) a
multiple-notch downgrade of the CB Anchor; or (3) a material
reduction of the value of the cover pool.

Rating Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in March 2014.

Moody's published a Request for Comment (RFC) on January 8, 2015.
In the RFC, Moody's propose an adjustment to the anchor point
Moody's use in Moody's covered bond analysis. The proposed
changes in this RFC apply to all new and existing ratings for
covered bonds. If Moody's adopt the proposed changes, Moody's
expect more covered bond ratings to be positively affected than
negatively affected. However, in light of the banking RFC (see
RFC published on 9 September 2014 by Moody's Banking group) and
the CR rating RFC , measure (see RFC published on 8 January 2015
by Moody's Banking group) Moody's are not in a position to fully
assess and disclose the exact impact of the proposed changes to
Moody's covered bond methodology.


HELLENIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Puts Ba3 CFR for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR) and the Ba3-PD probability of
default rating (PDR) of Hellenic Telecommunications Organization
S.A. (OTE). Concurrently, the rating agency has placed on review
for downgrade the provisional (P)Ba3 senior unsecured ratings of
the global medium-term note program (GMTN) and the Ba3 rating of
the global bonds issued by OTE PLC (OTE's fully and
unconditionally guaranteed subsidiary).

This rating action follows Moody's decision to place the
Government of Greece's Caa1 government bond ratings on review for
downgrade.

"While OTE has taken steps to insulate itself from the Greek
economy, the company is predominantly a Greek business with
approximately 70% of its revenues generated in Greece," says
Carlos Winzer, a Moody's Senior Vice President and lead analyst
for OTE. "As such, its ratings remain closely linked to
conditions in its domestic environment. The government bond
rating exerts pressure on OTE's rating."

Ratings Rationale

The action reflects Moody's recent decision to place Greece's
Caa1 government bond rating on review for downgrade, as well as
the likely risk of further downward on OTE's business and
financial prospects that would likely accompany further
deterioration in the Greek economic environment.

OTE remains exposed to developments in the domestic Greek market
despite demonstrating a degree of resilience through the recent
period of sovereign stress and having taken steps to further
insulate itself from the Greek economy. In this regard, the
company has limited exposure to domestic banks and enhanced
international banking relationships. The rating agency notes that
the impact of any disruption in the Greek banking system on OTE
will likely be limited as it has no Greek bank debt exposure.

Whilst these factors allow OTE's ratings to be positioned higher
than the government's bond rating, at the Ba3 sovereign ceiling,
the increased uncertainty over whether Greece's new government
will come to an agreement with its official creditors in time to
meet its near-term funding and liquidity needs exerts negative
pressure on Greece's sovereign creditworthiness and, in turn,
OTE's ratings.

OTE's Ba3 CFR is currently four notches above the Caa1 Greek
government bond rating, to reflect the company's underlying
characteristics and credit strength. However, given the company's
high exposure (over 70% revenues are generated in Greece) to the
country, its creditworthiness could weaken if the sovereign
rating comes under further pressures in the absence of a timely
agreement with official creditors.

At Ba3, OTE's ratings reflect (1) the fact that a non-Greek
financial subsidiary (OTE PLC, which is domiciled in the UK and
subject to English law) issues its debt; (2) the fact that around
30% of OTE's revenues and 25% of its EBITDA are generated outside
of Greece; (3) Moody's expectation that OTE will maintain
substantial cash balances of around EUR1.15 billion to pre-fund
future bond maturities; and (4) the implicit support it receives
from its largest shareholder, Deutsche Telekom AG (Baa1 stable).

What Could Change the Ratings Up/Down

Given the review for downgrade and in the absence of a more
explicit statement of support from Deutsche Telekom, Moody's
currently expects no upward pressure on OTE's ratings in the
short term.

A rating downgrade could occur if: (1) Greece's government bond
ratings were to be downgraded; (2) conditions in the domestic
environment were to deteriorate further as a result of a
weakening of Greece's credit profile or a material increase in
the risk of Greece exiting the euro area; and/or (3) unexpected
pressure were to be exerted on OTE's liquidity, particularly as a
result of a failure by the company to maintain comfortable cash
balances.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. (OTE) is the
leading telecommunications operator in Greece, servicing 2.8
million retail fixed access lines, 1.3 million retail fixed-line
broadband connections, 321,000 TV subscribers and 7.4 million
mobile customers in Greece as of September 2014. In addition to
its wireless operations in Greece, OTE offers mobile telephony
services to customers in Albania (2.0 million customers) and
Romania (6.0 million customers) through Cosmote, Greece's leading
provider of mobile telecommunications services. In addition, OTE
offers wireline services in Romania through RomTelecom. OTE is
also involved in a range of other activities in Greece, notably
in real-estate. OTE owns 100% of Germanos, the largest
distributor of technology-related products in southeast Europe.
OTE's major shareholder is Deutsche Telekom with an equity stake
of 40%.

List of Affected Ratings

On Review for Downgrade:

Issuer: Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A.

  Probability of Default Rating, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
  currently Ba3-PD

  Corporate Family Rating (Local Currency), Placed on Review for
  Downgrade, currently Ba3

Issuer: OTE PLC

  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review for
  Downgrade, currently (P)Ba3

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review for
  Downgrade, currently Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A.

  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: OTE PLC

  Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable


NATIONAL BANK: Fitch Puts 'B-' IDR on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Greece-based National Bank of Greece
S.A. (NBG), Piraeus Bank, S.A. (Piraeus), Alpha Bank AE (Alpha)
and Eurobank Ergasias S.A.'s (Eurobank) Long-term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDR) of 'B-' and Viability Ratings (VR) of 'b-' on
Rating Watch Negative (RWN).  The banks' Short-term IDRs of 'B'
have also been placed on RWN.

The RWN reflects downside rating potential due to rising funding
and liquidity risks, as Fitch assumes that the negotiations
between the Greek government and its official creditors will be
very challenging.  In Fitch's view, this will likely translate
into continued deposit outflows for Greek banks that could
potentially trigger imposition of capital controls, in particular
if access to emergency funding was at any time restricted by the
European Central Bank (ECB).

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND VRS

NBG's, Piraeus's, Alpha's and Eurobank's IDRs and senior debt
ratings are based on their standalone credit profiles, as
captured in the VRs.  The ratings are highly influenced by the
banks' weak asset quality, exceptionally challenging economic and
operating conditions, and weak funding and liquidity profiles, on
which there is heightened pressure while the recently-formed
Greek government seeks a new agreement with official creditors.

Non-performing loan (NPL) ratios were a high 23.4% for NBG, 33%
for Eurobank, 33.6% for Alpha and 39% for Piraeus as of end-3Q14.
Unreserved NPLs remained well above their capital, putting
solvency at risk under any further stress; and most of these
banks also retained sizeable stocks of loans in arrears that may
become NPLs in light of the weak economy.  Add-on risks to Greek
banks' asset quality may come from any delays or discontinuation
around the implementation of reforms to facilitate asset
recoveries, and/or exposure to the Swiss franc appreciation.

The banks' 'B-' ratings indicate that a material default risk is
present, but that a limited margin of safety remains as they are
able to access central bank funds.  In December 2014, the system
lost EUR4bn of deposits (or 2.4% of the total as of end-November
2014) and interbank repo markets, which most of the banks used
heavily until December to secure funds against EFSF bonds, have
become unreliable.  As a result, ECB funding increased to EUR56bn
(14% of system assets) by year-end.  Fitch believes deposit
withdrawals accelerated in January and assume deposit levels now
to be at least 8% lower than at end-November 2014.

We view the ECB's decision on Feb. 4, 2015, to accelerate the
termination of the collateral eligibility waiver in respect of
both government bonds and bank-issued government-guaranteed bonds
as negative because i) emergency liquidity assistance (ELA)
funding from the Bank of Greece can be relatively quickly curbed
or prevented by the ECB if specific ELA procedures are not met,
creating event risk; and ii) it signals that the ECB may adopt a
strict approach to applying relevant policies and procedures.
Fitch also believes that switching to ELA may increase Greek
banks' funding costs, potentially affecting their earnings,
especially if negative deposit trends are prolonged over time.

Nonetheless, Fitch understands that the ELA capacity has been
increased to offset the reduction in ECB facilities.  Fitch
estimates that ELA usage will increase to at least approximately
EUR50bn once funding switches from the ECB on Feb. 11, on top of
which EUR38bn of EFSF debt instruments remain eligible at the
ECB.

The banks' ratings assume that the ECB will allow ELA funding to
be provided by the Bank of Greece for as long as i) there is a
reasonable probability of Greece reaching an agreement with its
official creditors, which is Fitch's base case; and ii) deposit
flight does not make banks' ELA reliance so heavy as to
contradict ELA procedures, which include that ELA is only made
available to solvent banks facing temporary liquidity problems.

The senior debt ratings are aligned with the banks' IDRs and have
'RR4' Recovery Ratings.  This reflects Fitch's assumptions so far
that recoveries in the event of a default are likely to be
average.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND VRS

The RWN on the banks' IDRs, VRs and senior debt ratings reflects
Fitch's opinion that rising funding and liquidity risks mean
there is a heightened probability of the ratings being
downgraded.

Fitch believes that even if the upcoming meetings of the European
Council and Eurogroup succeed in establishing a framework for
negotiations between the Greek government and its official
creditors, reaching a new agreement is likely to be a protracted
and complicated process.  This represents a heightened risk to
the stability of the banks' deposit levels (and hence liquidity
profiles) that could eventually jeopardize the continued approval
of ELA funds and/or force the authorities to impose restrictions
on the banking sector to curb deposit outflows.

The ratings and Recovery Ratings of senior debt issued by the
banks and/or their respective issuing vehicles have also been
placed on RWN to highlight the risk of a downgrade if funding and
liquidity pressures result in a higher level of assets pledged,
higher collateral constraints and/or weaker recovery prospects.
Recovery prospects for senior debt are also likely to be affected
by depositor preference in view of the implementation of the Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).

The RWN is likely to be resolved upon further clarity around the
outcome of the political negotiations and the impact on banks'
funding and liquidity profiles.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Greek banks' Support Ratings of '5' and SRFs of 'No Floor'
reflect our expectation that while future support from the state
is possible, it cannot be relied upon given the limited resources
at Greece's disposal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

In Fitch's opinion, Greek banks' SRs and SRFs are unlikely to be
revised upwards given the limited ability of the Greek
authorities to provide support.  In addition, Fitch believes
there is intent to reduce the propensity of state support for
financial institutions in the EU, as evidenced by a series of
legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives, including the
BRRD and the Single Resolution Mechanism.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND
OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital instruments issued by
NBG, Alpha and Eurobank are notched down from these banks' VRs of
'b-', in accordance with Fitch's assessment of each instrument's
non-performance and relative loss severity risk profiles.  The
banks' subordinated debt is notched twice from VRs due to weak
recovery prospects, as reflected by the affirmation of the 'RR6'
Recovery Rating.  The 'CC' rating on these instruments has also
been placed on RWN, in line with the VRs.

Hybrid capital, which is currently not performing, has been
affirmed at 'C'/'RR6' to reflect the fact that loss absorption
has been triggered and, if they return to performing status,
economic losses are likely to be/have been severe.

The ratings of subordinated debt and hybrid capital are sensitive
to changes to the banks' VRs and performing status.  Recovery
Ratings are primarily sensitive to valuation and availability of
free assets and the breakdown between unsecured and secured
liabilities.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - STATE GUARANTEED DEBT

The state-guaranteed debt of NBG, Alpha and Eurobank has been
affirmed at 'B', in line with Greece's Long-term IDR
(B/Negative). The state-guaranteed debt issuances are senior
unsecured instruments that bear the full guarantee of the Greek
state. Consequently, their ratings are the highest of the
issuer's Long-term IDR and Greece's Long-term foreign currency
IDR.  These banks' state-guaranteed debt ratings are sensitive to
any changes to Greece's sovereign ratings.

The rating actions are:

NBG:

Long-term IDR: 'B-'; placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: 'B'; placed on RWN
VR: 'b-'; placed on RWN
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
SRF: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior notes: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on RWN
Short-term senior notes: 'B'; placed on RWN
Hybrid capital: affirmed at 'C'/'RR6'
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'B'

NBG Finance plc:

Long-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on
   RWN
Short-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; placed on RWN

Piraeus Bank:

Long-term IDR: 'B-'; placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: 'B'; placed on RWN
VR: 'b-'; placed on RWN
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
SRF: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Long-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on
  RWN
Short-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; placed on RWN
Commercial paper: 'B'; placed on RWN

Piraeus Group Finance PLC:

Long-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on
  RWN
Short-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; placed on RWN

Alpha Bank:

Long-term IDR: 'B-'; placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: 'B'; placed on RWN
VR: 'b-'; placed on RWN
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
SRF: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Long-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on
  RWN
Short-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; placed on RWN
Market-linked senior notes: 'B-emr'/'RR4'; placed on RWN
Hybrid capital: affirmed at 'C'/'RR6'
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'B'

Alpha Credit Group PLC:

Long-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on
  RWN
Short-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; placed on RWN
Subordinated notes: 'CC'/'RR6'; placed on RWN

Eurobank:

Long-term IDR: 'B-'; placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: 'B'; placed on RWN
VR: 'b-'; placed on RWN
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
SRF: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior notes: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on RWN
Short-term senior notes: 'B'; placed on RWN
Market-linked senior notes: 'B-emr'/'RR4'; placed on RWN
Commercial paper: 'B'; placed on RWN
Subordinated notes: 'CC'/'RR6'; placed on RWN
Hybrid capital: affirmed at 'C'/'RR6'
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'B'

ERB Hellas PLC:

Long-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on
  RWN
Short-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; placed on RWN
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'B'

ERB Hellas (Cayman Islands) Ltd.:

Long-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B-'/'RR4'; placed on
  RWN
Short-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; placed on RWN
State-guaranteed debt: affirmed at 'B'


PIRAEUS BANK: Moody's Lowers Long-Term Deposit Rating to 'Caa2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term deposit
and senior debt ratings of five Greek banks: Piraeus Bank SA (to
Caa2 from Caa1), National Bank of Greece SA (to Caa2 from Caa1),
Alpha Bank AE (to Caa2 from Caa1), Eurobank Ergasias SA (to Caa3
from Caa2) and Attica Bank SA (to Caa3 from Caa2). All ratings
were placed on review for further downgrade. The rating actions
follow Moody's decision to place Greece's Caa1 sovereign rating
on review for downgrade on February 6, 2015.

The bank rating downgrades are driven by Moody's view of a
reduced likelihood of systemic support given 1) the heightened
uncertainty about the government's ability to come to an
agreement with official creditors in time to meet its own
liquidity and funding needs, and 2) the likely reduction in the
Hellenic Financial Stability Fund's (HFSF) capacity to support
the banks in case of need.

The rating review will assess the acute funding and liquidity
pressures facing these banks. In addition, the review will assess
banks' direct exposure to the sovereign and the impact of the
weakened operating environment on asset quality and solvency.

Ratings Rationale

Rating Downgrade Driven by Uncertainty Surrounding the Country's
Support Programme and the Hfsf's Capacity to Support the Banks

The one notch downgrade of deposit and senior debt ratings is
driven by Moody's view of a lower likelihood of systemic support,
owing to the heightened uncertainty regarding the new
government's ability to reach an agreement with its lenders
before the end of the current support program, which expires at
the end of February. A possible deadlock in the government's
negotiations with official creditors could place at risk its own
liquidity and funding needs, limiting its ability to support the
banks in case if need.

Furthermore, Moody's considers that there is uncertainty
regarding the full renewal/extension of the state-owned HFSF,
which has a mandate to ensure the stability of the banking system
and forms an integral part of the support program. Moody's
considers that there is a material risk that the bulk of the
HFSF's reserves of around EUR11.5 billion could be either used to
finance government needs or returned back to the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), reducing the capacity of the
HFSF to support the banks if needed.

Rating Review Triggered By the Deterioration in the Banks'
Funding And Liquidity Profiles

The primary driver of the review for downgrade is the weakening
of banks' funding and liquidity, owing to 1) significant private-
sector deposit outflows since December 2014, and 2) international
banks' reduced appetite to engage in repo transactions with Greek
banks. As a result, Greek banks' dependence on Eurosystem
funding, both in the form of European Central Bank (ECB) funding
and higher cost emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) from the
Bank of Greece, has increased significantly.

Moody's also considers that the ECB decision on February 4 to
stop accepting Greek Government Bonds (GGBs) and Greek Government
Guarantees as collateral for ECB funding purposes elevates the
downside risks for Greek banks' funding and liquidity. Although
the rating agency estimates that the banks' ELA collateral buffer
(which remains unaffected by this decision) represents more than
a third of the EUR150 billion total deposit base, the
availability of ELA remains contingent to ECB's governing council
approval every two weeks, rendering the banks' liquidity
susceptible to government related developments.

According to official figures from the Bank of Greece, ECB
funding for the system increased to EUR56 billion as of end-
December 2014, from around EUR45 billion as of end-November 2014.
Moody's expects this balance to have increased to around EUR75
billion in January 2015 and notes that following the ECB's
decision on February 4, around EUR50 billion of ECB funding will
switch to ELA, increasing ELA from approximately EUR5 billion
currently.

High Linkages Between the Sovereign and Banks

Additional factors driving the rating review relate to Greek
banks' high exposure to GGBs, treasury bills (T-bills) and other
sovereign-related securities, which Moody's expects to continue
to increase during the negotiations between the new government
and its official sector lenders. While sovereign exposures have
declined significantly since the GGBs debt-swap in 2012 (private-
sector involvement or PSI), Moody's estimates that these continue
to comprise more than 40% of the banks' core Tier 1 capital as of
September 2014.

The rating review will also take into account the deterioration
in the operating environment and associated risks for banks' non-
performing loans and solvency.

Focus of the Review

The rating review will focus on the risk of further negative
funding and liquidity developments, including continued deposit
outflows in the context of the ECB's decision to limit Greek
banks' access to ECB funding and the ongoing availability of ELA.
This assessment will be conducted on a bank-by-bank basis, taking
into account differences in the banks' liquidity buffers and
financial profiles. Likewise, the rating review will take into
consideration the credit implications of the sovereign rating
review for the banks' government exposures and also any pressure
on banks' asset quality and solvency.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down

Increased risks related to deposit outflows, which further
amplify the banks' reliance on central bank funding, could prompt
Moody's to downgrade the banks' ratings, as could uncertainty
regarding the continued availability of central bank funding. In
addition, the ratings could also be downgraded if the rating
agency considers that potential asset-quality deterioration will
consume capital, compromising banks' solvency.

As signaled by the review for downgrade, upside potential for
Greek banks' ratings is currently limited.

The specific rating changes implemented are as follows:

Issuer: Alpha Bank AE

  Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings Downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1;
  Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

  Bank Financial Strength Rating, Affirmed E/Stable - (Baseline
  Credit Assessment caa2)

   Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
   (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1; Placed Under Review for further
   Downgrade

   Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
   (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1; Placed Under Review for further
   Downgrade

   Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently (P)Caa3

   Short-term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Issuer: Alpha Credit Group plc

   Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
   (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1; Placed Under Review for further
   Downgrade

   Backed Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review
   for Downgrade, currently (P)Caa3

   Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Downgraded to
   Caa2 from Caa1; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

   Backed Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review
   for Downgrade, currently Caa3

   Backed Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

   Backed Short-term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Issuer: Alpha Group Jersey Limited

   Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
   (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1; Placed Under Review for further
   Downgrade

   Backed Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review
   for Downgrade, currently (P)Caa3

   Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently Ca (hyb)

Issuer: Emporiki Group Finance Plc

   Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Downgraded to
   Caa2 from Caa1; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

Issuer: Attica Bank S.A.

   Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2;
   Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

   Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

   Bank Financial Strength Rating, Affirmed E/Stable - (Baseline
  Credit Assessment caa3)

Issuer: Attica Funds plc

  Backed Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review
  for Downgrade, currently Ca

Issuer: Eurobank Ergasias S.A.

  Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings Downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2;
  Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

  Bank Financial Strength Rating, Affirmed E/Stable - (Baseline
  Credit Assessment caa3)

  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
  (P)Caa3 from (P)Caa2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to (P)Caa3
  from (P)Caa2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review for
  Downgrade, currently (P)Ca

  Backed Short-term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

  Short-term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Issuer: EFG Hellas Funding Limited

  Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Placed on Review for
  Downgrade, currently Ca (hyb)

Issuer: ERB Hellas (Cayman Islands) Limited

  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Downgraded to
  Caa3 from Caa2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
  (P)Caa3 from (P)Caa2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Backed Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review
  for Downgrade, currently (P)Ca

  Backed Short-term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Issuer: ERB Hellas PLC

  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Downgraded to
  Caa3 from Caa2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Backed Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review
  for Downgrade, currently Ca

  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
  (P)Caa3 from (P)Caa2; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Backed Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review
  for Downgrade, currently (P)Ca

  Backed Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

  Backed Short-term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Issuer: National Bank of Greece S.A.

  Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings Downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1;
  Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

  Bank Financial Strength Rating, Affirmed E/Stable - (Baseline
  Credit Assessment caa2)

  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Government
  Guaranteed), Placed Under Review for Downgrade, currently Caa1

  Backed Short-term Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture,
  Affirmed NP

  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
  (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Placed on Review for Downgrade,
  currently Ca (hyb)

  Backed Short-term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

Issuer: National Bank of Greece Funding Limited

  Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Placed on Review for
  Downgrade, currently Ca (hyb)

Issuer: NBG Finance plc

  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Downgraded to
  Caa2 from Caa1; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Backed Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review
  for Downgrade, currently Caa3

  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
  (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

  Backed Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review
  for Downgrade, currently (P)Caa3

Issuer: Piraeus Bank S.A.

  Long-term Bank Deposit Ratings Downgraded to Caa2 from Caa1;
  Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

   Short-term Bank Deposit Ratings, Affirmed NP

   Bank Financial Strength Rating, Affirmed E/Stable - (Baseline
   Credit Assessment caa2)

   Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
   (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1; Placed Under Review for further
   Downgrade

   Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently (P)Caa3

Issuer: Piraeus Group Capital Limited

   Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Placed on Review for
   Downgrade, currently Ca (hyb)

Issuer: Piraeus Group Finance Plc

   Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture Downgraded to
   Caa2 from Caa1; Placed Under Review for further Downgrade

   Backed Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Placed on Review
   for Downgrade, currently Caa3

   Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program Downgraded to
   (P)Caa2 from (P)Caa1; Placed Under Review for further
   Downgrade

   Backed Subordinated Medium-Term Note Program, Placed on Review
   for Downgrade, currently (P)Caa3

   Backed Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP

   Backed Short-term Program, Affirmed (P)NP

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in July 2014.

All banks affected by the rating actions are headquartered in
Athens, Greece:

  -- National Bank of Greece SA reported total assets of EUR113.3
     billion as of September 2014

  -- Piraeus Bank SA reported total assets of EUR86.4 billion as
     of September 2014

  -- Eurobank Ergasias SA reported total assets of EUR74.3
     billion as of September 2014

  -- Alpha Bank SA reported total assets of EUR72.4 billion as of
     September 2014

  -- Attica Bank SA reported total assets of EUR3.9 billion as of
     September 2014.


PUBLIC POWER: S&P Lowers Rating to 'B-' on Liquidity Constraints
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its rating on Greece-
based utility Public Power Corp. S.A. (PPC) to 'B-' from 'B' and
placed it on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that Greece's liquidity
constraints and economic situation have worsened following the
ECB's decision to lift the waiver on the eligibility of Greek
government and government-related bonds in euro-system
operations. This transferred the responsibility of lender-of-
last-resort financing from the ECB to the Bank of Greece.  In
S&P's view, this could lead to further pressure on financial
stability in the form of deposit withdrawals.  Moreover, in a
worst-case scenario, there could be the imposition of capital
controls and a loss of access to lender-of-last-resort financing,
potentially resulting in Greece's exclusion from the Economic and
Monetary Union.

S&P sees these risks as having meaningful implications to PPC's
operations.  Most notably, S&P believes they could affect PPC's
ability to refinance its short-term maturities, maintain existing
credit lines (which include a material adverse conditions
clause), and collect cash from its customers at a time when
deposit withdrawals could increase.  S&P believes these factors
could lead to a faster-than-anticipated deterioration of the
utility's liquidity.

More particularly, S&P views the exercise of a material adverse
conditions (MAC) clause as unpredictable, given that a number of
credit lines -- notably those provided by German government-
related development bank KfW and the European Investment Bank
(both rated AAA/Stable/A-1+)--include a MAC clause.  S&P
understands that exercising this clause would trigger the early
repayment of loans and the cancellation of undrawn credit lines,
which could ultimately trigger an event of default on the
outstanding bonds given the cross-default provisions.  In this
context, in S&P's analysis of PPC it has revised its liquidity
qualifier to "less-than-adequate" from "adequate".

S&P continues to view PPC as "important" to Greece.  The utility
is the country's dominant power generator and sole power
transporter and distributor.  In addition, PPC is the only
electricity supplier of last resort in Greece.  As such, it
provides public services such as discounted tariffs for low-
income households.  PPC is also of key social and economic
importance for the government, being one of the largest Greek
employers.

The Greek state remains the controlling shareholder of PPC, with
a 51% stake, and acts as the guarantor of most of PPC's debt from
the European Investment Bank (40% of the total PPC debt).  An
acceleration of the debt could therefore imply an additional
liability for the Greek Government.

These risks are in addition to the ones S&P already factored into
its rating on PPC, including:

   -- Potential material changes and delays in certain reforms to
      the electricity market in Greece;

   -- Risks relating to the group's increasing cost structure,
      together with deflationary trends in tariffs;

   -- The increasing risks related to the performance of bad debt
      provisions and to the group's ability to collect cash from
      customers; and

   -- Cancellation of the group's planned restructuring,
      including the privatization of the transmission network and
      spin-off of one-third of its generation and supply
      activities. S&P recognizes that such transactions would
      require the right timing and market conditions to optimize
      terms and value and that such conditions are unlikely in
      the short to medium term.

S&P believes the materialization of these risks would
significantly weaken the group's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP).

S&P now views PPC's liquidity as "less-than-adequate" under S&P's
criteria, reflecting the increasing risks of fast deterioration
of its liquidity position, in case of MAC clause exercise,
imposition of capital controls and lack of access to new
financing in this changing sovereign environment.

Based on the latest information available, S&P factors into its
liquidity assessment these sources of cash:

   -- About EUR330 million in available cash reported on
      Sept. 30, 2014.

   -- About EUR1 billion available under committed credit
      facilities with the EIB (EUR220 million for PPC and EUR235
      million for PPC's transmission network [IPTO]) and with a
      consortium led by the German development bank KfW
      (EUR625 million).

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) of about EUR900 million.

Against these sources, S&P sees these liquidity uses (as of
Sept. 30, 2014):

   -- Short-term debt maturities of EUR650 million, half of which
      relate to the financing of IPTO (S&P understands from the
      company that EUR274 million was since extended to year-end
      2015, with the aim to be refinanced via a five-year
      syndicated facility).

   -- S&P's estimate of approximately EUR700 million in capital
      expenditures, with no flexibility to defer or cut them.

   -- Further deterioration of working capital needs in 2015,
      which S&P estimates to be about EUR200 million.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the increased uncertainties
and risks associated with the situation the sovereign is facing.
It also reflects S&P's view that PPC could be under increasing
liquidity pressure if there isn't rapid improvement in operating
conditions and the financing environment.  S&P aims to update its
CreditWatch status once there are more details on the Greek
government's negotiations with official creditors, which
ultimately will likely have implications on PPC's liquidity and
its operating environment.

S&P could lower the rating again if PPC's liquidity position
deteriorates, through cancellation of credit lines or a Greek
banking system liquidity crisis restricts PPC's access to its
cash; if the group fails to secure additional credit facilities
to finance its future investments as well as debt maturities; or
if PPC's cash flow generation narrows further.  Ultimately, S&P
believes Greece's exclusion from the Economic and Monetary Union
would likely lead PPC to default.

S&P could affirm its ratings if we anticipate that liquidity
risks are abating.



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I R E L A N D
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RMF EURO III: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR10.5MM Notes to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has upgraded the
ratings on the following notes issued by RMF Euro CDO III PLC:

  EUR23.3 Million Class IV Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
  Notes, due 2021, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Jul 10,
  2014 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  EUR10.5 Million (Current balance outstanding EUR 4.8M) Class V
  Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes, due 2021, Upgraded to
  Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2014 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued
by RMF Euro CDO III PLC:

  EUR20.1 Million (Current balance outstanding EUR 18.9M) Class
  II Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due 2021, Affirmed Aaa
  (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR14.7 Million Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
  Notes, due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2014
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

RMF Euro CDO III PLC, issued in August 2005, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high
yield senior secured European and US loans, managed by Man GLG
Credit Advisers AG. This transaction ended its reinvestment
period in August 2011.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the upgrade of the notes is primarily a
result of continued deleveraging of the senior notes and
subsequent increase in the overcollateralization (the "OC
ratios"). Moody's notes that on the January 2015 payment date,
the Class I notes have been paid in full by EUR17.6 million (or
7% of their original balance) and Class II notes have amortized
by EUR1.13M, or 5.6% of their original balance. As a result of
this deleveraging, the OC ratios of the senior notes have
significantly increased. As per the latest trustee report dated
January 2015, the Class I/II, Class III, Class IV and Class V OC
ratios are 418.07%, 235.55%, 139.22% and 128.36%, respectively,
versus June 2014 levels of 258.24%, 185.83%, 128.65% and 120.95%.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of approximately
EUR79.7 million, defaulted par of EUR4.1 million, a weighted
average default probability of 27.6% (consistent with a WARF of
4,249 with a weighted average life of 3.6 years), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.21% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 14 and a weighted average
spread of 4%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 92.04% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
15%. In each case, historical and market performance and a
collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model
generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-case
results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy and 2) the concentration of lowly- rated debt
maturing between 2015 and 2016, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

3) Around 46.8% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in October 2009.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


FAXTOR ABS 2003-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on 2 Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by Faxtor ABS
2003-1 B.V.:

  EUR23 Million Class A-2E Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Aa2
  (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2014 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR9 Million Class A-2F Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed Aa2 (sf);
  previously on Jun 27, 2014 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR7.5 Million Class A-3E Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to Ba1
  (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2014 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  EUR15 Million Class A-3F Fixed Rate Notes, Upgraded to Ba1
  (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2014 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  EUR5.5 Million Class BE Floating Rate Notes, Affirmed Caa3
  (sf); previously on Jun 27, 2014 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

  EUR9.5 Million Class BF Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf);
  previously on Jun 27, 2014 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the notes are a result of the material
improvement in the credit quality of the collateral as well as
the deleveraging of the Class A notes.

Since the last rating action in June 2014, 31% of the portfolio
aggregate amount was upgraded by an average of 1.85 notch. Also
Moody's notes that on the 23 January 2015, 4 European structured
finance transactions included in the portfolio and representing
16% of the collateral, were placed on review for upgrade
following the revision of the methodology on country ceilings and
the new ceiling applied to euro area countries. For more
information on the underlying rating action please refer to the
action "Moody's takes rating actions on Irish, Italian,
Portuguese, Spanish ABS/RMBS deals" published on Moodys.com.
Additionally the amount of assets rated within the Caa range by
Moody's has remained stable at 29% of the portfolio performing
par while the defaulted assets have decreased to EUR6.6 million
as reported in the December 2014 trustee report.

Since the interest payment of May 2014 the Classes A-2 have
repaid EUR3.2 million or 10% of the tranche original balance. The
amortization of the Classes A-2 has also improved the
overcollateralization ratios ("OC ratios") across the capital
structure. As per the December 2014 trustee report, the Class A
and Class B overcollateralization ratios are reported at 156.40%
and 105.62% respectively, compared to 141.47% and 99.15% as per
the May 2014 trustee report.

Moody's notes that the interest coverage test fails to pass its
trigger and that at the last interest payment in November 2014,
the interest payment to Classes A-3 was made partially using cash
from the principal proceeds.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes:

Amounts of defaulted assets - Moody's considered a model run
where all the Caa assets in the portfolio were assumed to be
defaulted. The model outputs for these runs are consistent with
the ratings.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties due to or
because of embedded ambiguities.

* Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high prepayment
levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager. Fast
amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Recoveries
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


PIGMENTS II: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Corporate Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B1 Corporate Family
Rating (CFR) and B2-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to
Pigments II BV, the ultimate holding company for the Esmalglass-
Itaca Group ("E-I"). Concurrently, Moody's assigned a provisional
(P)B1 (LGD 3) rating to the group's EUR250 million senior secured
Term Loan B, the EUR40 million senior secured Revolving Credit
Facility as well as the EUR15 million senior secured capex and
acquisition facility. The outlook on all ratings is stable. This
is the first time that Moody's has rated Esmalglass-Itaca Group.

The proceeds from the term loan will be used, together with cash
on balance sheet, to (i) effect a refinancing of the group's
current net debt; to (ii) finance the acquisition of Fritta Group
as well as to (iii) cover transaction related fees and expenses.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect the agency's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings to the group's proposed senior secured
loans. Definitive ratings may differ from provisional ratings.

Ratings Rationale

The assigned B1 CFR balances E-I's high profitability, exposure
to growing end customer industries in combination with solid
geographic diversification and moderate financial leverage at the
outset with its small scale and lack of track record in
sustaining high profitability levels amid significant competition
and price pressure for its inkjet ink products.

E-I's rating is supported by the company's niche market
leadership in the production of intermediate products for the
ceramic tile industry with in segments dominant market share.
Moody's believe that E-I's market position is protected by solid
entry barriers relating to technological know-how and R&D
capabilities. Demand fundamentals are positive for E-I's products
on the back of an overall growing global construction market,
some benefits from substitution as well as solid geographic and
customer diversification, which should to some part balance the
inherent cyclicality of the construction industry. With regards
to the group's financial profile, the rating positively reflects
high profitability levels with EBITDA margins in excess of 20%,
albeit with a short track record in sustaining these high
margins, as well as moderate financial leverage estimated at just
above 3 times debt/EBITDA as adjusted by Moody's pro forma for
the transaction.

The rating also reflects the small scale of the group with sales
of EUR332 million and a reported EBITDA of EUR69 million expected
for 2014. Main weakness in that respect relates to the narrow
product focus and to a lesser extent the limited number of full
scale production plants with only one plant dedicated to inkjet
inks. Moody's believe that E-I is active in a highly competitive
market environment which requires careful volume and price
management, in particular for its newest product group of inkjet
inks to defend current profitability of the group. In that
respect, the rating also reflects the fairly short track record
in generating EBITDA margins of around 20%. Moody's deem input
cost inflation another risk factor for the group's profitability,
as E-I is reliant on selling price increases to recover higher
costs for major raw materials, including metal oxides and
specialty chemicals.

Liquidity

Following the proposed refinancing, Moody's anticipate that E-I's
liquidity profile will be solid. Internal cash sources include
cash on hand of around EUR15 million pro forma for the
refinancing and annual operating cash flow before working capital
requirements of EUR50 million-EUR60 million. In addition, Moody's
note that E-I will have access to a revolving credit facility
amounting to EUR40 million. These sources should be sufficient to
fund working cash requirements, estimated at around 3% of sales,
as well as capex and all other basic cash requirements (including
intra-year working capital swings). Moody's expect that E-I will
continue to generate positive amounts of free cash flows. Moody's
note positively that following the proposed refinancing, E-I will
not have any material debt maturities apart from contractual cash
sweep mechanisms before 2021, when the RCF will mature.

Outlook

The stable outlook on the rating reflects Moody's expectation
that E-I will maintain its current profitability levels with
EBITDA margins around 20% and continue to generate positive free
cash flow. The stable outlook is also based on Moody's
expectation that E-I preserves a sufficient liquidity cushion
supported by positive free cash flow generation and the absence
of material debt financed acquisitions and shareholder
distributions.

What Could Change The Ratings -- Up/Down

Positive rating pressure could build up if E-I is able to sustain
profitability margins at current levels by defending prices for
its most important product group of inkjet inks and supported by
raising production efficiencies. In terms of leverage, Moody's
would expect the group's debt/EBITDA as adjusted by Moody's to
decline towards 2x with a track record building of a moderate
financial policy such as by applying free cash generated towards
debt repayment purposes. However, an upgrade to Ba3 would also
require a further strengthening of the business profile through
an extension of the group's scale by anticipated organic growth
and potential bolt-on acquisitions as well as a further
diversification geographically and product wise.

Moody's could consider downgrading E-I if the group's
profitability were to come under pressure, resulting in EBITDA
margins declining below the high teen percentages with
debt/EBITDA trending towards 4x. Also, a deterioration in
liquidity could result in rating pressure building.

Structural Considerations

The differentiation between the Corporate Family Rating and the
Probability of Default Rating reflects the all bank debt
structure and the higher recovery expectations under this type of
structure. The lenders under the senior secured term loan as well
as the revolving credit facility and the capex and acquisition
facility will obtain guarantees from guarantors representing at
least 80% of group EBITDA and / or assets and a materially all
asset pledge over the same assets. As all senior secured bank
debt ranks pari passu and there is no material subordinated debt
to absorb first losses, the senior secured bank debt is rated at
the same level as the CFR in line with Moody's Loss Given Default
methodology.

Assignments:

Issuer: Pigments II B.V.

  Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B1

  Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B2-PD

  Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility (Local Currency), Assigned
  (P)B1

  Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility (Local Currency), Assigned
  a range of LGD3

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Chemical
Industry Rating Methodology published in December 2013. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

The Esmalglass-Itaca Group ("E-I") is a world leading
manufacturer of intermediate products for the global ceramic tile
industry. Moody's expect the group to report sales of around
EUR332 million and EBITDA of EUR69 million in 2014 (21% reported
EBITDA margin). Headquartered in Spain, the group produces a full
range of products which determine the key properties of floor and
wall tiles including surface colors, glazing products and body
coloring products.



RENOIR CDO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class C Notes to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by Renoir CDO
B.V.:

  EUR230 Million (currently EUR61.4M rated balance outstanding)
  Class A Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
  Aug 24, 2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  EUR10.5 Million Class B Deferrable Floating rate Notes,
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Aug 24, 2012 Downgraded to
  Caa1 (sf)

  EUR14.8 Million Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
  Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Dec 31, 2009 Downgraded to
  Caa3 (sf)

  EUR4.25 Million Class D-1 Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes, Affirmed
  Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  EUR5.05 Million Class D-2 Deferrable Floating Rate Notes,
  Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to
  Ca(sf)

  EUR8.5 Million Combination Notes, Affirmed Ca (sf); previously
  on Mar 11, 2009 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the notes are a result of the material
improvement in the credit quality of the collateral and the
deleveraging of the Class A notes.

In the last 12 months more than 67% of the assets in the
portfolio have been upgraded and on average the magnitude of the
upgrades was 2.8 notches. In particular Moody's notes that on the
23rd of January 2015 the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Irish
assets included in the portfolio, representing 33% of the
collateral, were upgraded or left on review for upgrade following
the revision of the methodology on country ceilings and the new
ceilings applied to euro area countries. For more information on
the underlying rating action please refer to the action "Moody's
takes rating actions on Irish, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish
ABS/RMBS deals" published on Moodys.com. Additionally the amount
of assets rated within the Caa range by Moody's has decreased to
8.7% from 15% of the portfolio performing par while the defaulted
assets have remained stable at the current EUR 15.7m as reported
in the November 2014 trustee report.

Since the interest payment of January 2014 the Class A has repaid
EUR31.5 million or 13.7% of the tranche original balance. The
amortization of class A has also improved the
overcollateralization ratios ("OC ratios") across the capital
structure. As per the December 2014 trustee report, the Class
A/B, Class C and Class D overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 126.3%, 106.2% and 94.7% respectively, compared to
116.2%, 102.5% and 93.8% as per the January 2014 trustee report.
Moody's underlines that for the first time since 2009 the Class C
OC test is passing thus reverting the interest deferral on the
class D.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating SF CDOs" published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes:

Amounts of defaulted assets - Moody's considered a model run
where all the Caa assets in the portfolio were assumed to be
defaulted. The model outputs for these runs are consistent with
the ratings.

Weighted average spread (WAS) - Moody's considered a model run
where the WAS generated by the collateral was reduced to 1% from
1.45%. The model outputs for these runs are consistent with the
ratings.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties due to or
because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high prepayment
levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager. Fast
amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the notes
beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Recoveries
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


MORTGAGE AGENT 3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from
'BBB- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit
rating on 'Mortgage Agent Absolut 3' LLC's class A notes.

On Dec, 30, 2014, S&P placed its rating on the class A notes
issued by 'Mortgage Agent Absolut 3' on CreditWatch negative
following S&P's Dec. 23, 2014 CreditWatch negative placement of
its long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating on the
Russian Federation.

The downgrade follows the application of S&P's updated criteria
for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating.  S&P applied its RAS criteria
to test the transaction structure's ability to withstand a
sovereign default stress, or a "severe" stress as defined by the
criteria, in a 'BBB-' rating scenario, following S&P's Jan. 26,
2015 lowering to 'BB+' of its long-term sovereign foreign
currency rating on Russia.  At closing in December 2014, S&P's
'BBB- (sf)' rating was constrained by the results of its cash
flow analysis.  S&P's analysis for rating above the sovereign has
shown that the available credit enhancement for the class A notes
is not sufficient to withstand a severe stress scenario under
S&P's RAS criteria.  Consequently, as under S&P's RAS criteria it
cannot assign any ratings uplift above the sovereign rating, S&P
has lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its rating on the class A notes.

The transaction is exposed to counterparty risk from VTB Bank JSC
as the issuer account bank.  On Feb. 4, 2015, S&P lowered to
'BB+' from 'BBB-' its long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on VTB
Bank. Based on the transaction documents, the issuer managing
company has to replace VTB Bank, in its role of the issuer
account bank, within 60 calendar days upon the loss of a 'BBB-'
rating.  Should the managing company fail to replace VTB Bank,
under S&P's current counterparty criteria, its rating on the
class A notes will be capped at its long-term ICR on VTB Bank.

'Mortgage Agent Absolut 3' is a Russian residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction that securitizes a portfolio
of ruble-denominated mortgage loans.


MORTGAGE AGENT 2011-2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from
'BBB- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit
rating on the class A2 notes issued by CJSC 'Mortgage Agent of
AHML 2011-2'.

On Dec. 30, 2014, S&P placed its rating on the class A2 notes
issued by CJSC 'Mortgage Agent of AHML 2011-2' on CreditWatch
negative following S&P's Dec. 30, 2014 CreditWatch negative
placement of its long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on Agency
for Housing Mortgage Lending OJSC (AHML).

The downgrade follows S&P's Jan. 30, 2015 lowering to 'BB+' of
its long-term ICR on AHML that acts as an originator, master
servicer, and financial aid provider to the issuer, and S&P's
Feb. 4, 2015 lowering to 'BB+' of its long-term ICR on VTB Bank
JSC that is an issuer account bank.

S&P's current counterparty criteria cap its rating on the class
A2 notes at the long-term ICR on AHML in its capacity as the
master servicer and financial aid provider.  S&P's lowering to
'BB+' of its long-term ICR on AHML has therefore capped at 'BB+
(sf)' its rating on the class A2 notes.  At the same time, under
S&P's current counterparty criteria, its lowering to 'BB+' of its
long-term ICR on VTB Bank has also capped at 'BB+ (sf)' its
rating on the class A2 notes.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB+
(sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its
rating on the class A2 notes.

In S&P's view, the transaction's collateral performance has been
consistently good since closing, with the percentage of defaulted
loans (defined in this transaction as 90+ day delinquencies)
staying under 2.0% to date.

CJSC 'Mortgage Agent of AHML 2011-2' is a Russian residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction originated by AHML,
which securitizes a portfolio of ruble-denominated residential
mortgages.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: S&P Affirms 'B/B' CCR; Outlook Remains Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'B/B' long- and short-term corporate credit ratings and on Spain-
based engineering and construction company Abengoa S.A.  The
outlook remains positive.

S&P understands that Abengoa remains committed to reducing its
stake in its yield company to below 50%, which S&P thinks will
lead to reduced consolidated leverage and improved credit ratios.
Abengoa has sold a further 13% of the yield company, resulting in
an overall stake of 51%, and also executed a second sale of
concession business to the yield company.  Altogether, the cash
inflow from these transactions has been about EUR390 million in
the first two months of 2015.  At the same time, Abengoa has
partnered with investment group EIG and created a new entity,
APW-1, which will finance most of Abengoa's construction projects
going forward.

Once Abengoa has executed the reduction of its stake in the yield
company below 50%, S&P anticipates that credit ratios could be at
the stronger end of its "highly leveraged" assessment thanks to
reduced consolidated debt, a lower interest burden on Abengoa,
and the possible use of disposal proceeds to lower corporate
debt. Management has demonstrated a clear willingness to execute
this strategy.  S&P's current understanding is that the debt to
be deconsolidated amounts to around EUR3.1 billion.  Management
is also planning to sell more of the concession business, with
related debt of EUR1,030 million, in the near term.

Abengoa plans to hold a 45% interest in the newly created entity,
APW-1, with the remainder held by EIG.  In S&P's view, this
should reduce Abengoa's capital expenditure burden for the
concession business and support free operating cash flow (FOCF)
over time. This transaction in itself does not imply any major
imminent improvement of Abengoa's debt level or credit ratios,
because the deconsolidation relates to a portfolio of recently
started projects with debt of around EUR250 million; however, S&P
also understands that Abengoa will receive about EUR600 million
in cash proceeds when the APW-1 partnership has been finalized.

Although the positive outlook captures the possibility that the
yield company is deconsolidated, S&P's base case still assumes no
change to Abengoa's scope of consolidation.  Furthermore, S&P
currently do not envisage changing its analytical approach by
deconsolidating any nonrecourse debt that Abengoa reports on its
balance sheet.  However, when all transactions as announced by
the company are executed, S&P thinks this will lead to an
important reduction in the company's gross debt level.

S&P notes amounts available on a nonrecourse basis for capital
expenditure in concessions, but this liquidity cannot be used for
general corporate purposes.  It matches financing needs for
projects well, however.

The incurrence covenant on Abengoa's senior unsecured notes
specifies debt-to-EBITDA ratios of less than 3x, where debt and
EBITDA exclude nonrecourse subsidiaries.  However, debt is netted
against total consolidated cash and short-term financial
investments, including those held by nonrecourse subsidiaries.
Furthermore, the syndicated bank facility renewed in September
2014 includes a more demanding ratio of 2.5x net debt to EBITDA
from June 30, 2015.  As of Sept. 31, 2014, the ratio was 2.15x.
S&P understands from the management that Abengoa was in
compliance with this covenant at year-end 2014.  S&P's base case
assumes that Abengoa should be able to continue to meet those
ratios.

The positive outlook on Abengoa reflects S&P's view of a one-in-
three possibility that Abengoa's financial risk profile will
improve within the next six months, following management's plan
to reduce ownership in its yield company.  This could lead to a
reduction in reported consolidated debt, implying credit ratios
at the upper end of the "highly leveraged" category.  S&P expects
the group to continually place mature projects in the yield
company. If these measures prove successful over the coming
months, S&P could raise its long-term rating on Abengoa by one
notch, assuming the group's liquidity remains at least
"adequate."

S&P could raise the rating in the near term if it continues to
observe Abengoa placing a material part of its concessions
business in its yield company, and if at the same time it
successfully executes its plan to reduce the stake in the yield
company to below 50%.  This would likely require credit ratios at
the higher end of the "highly leveraged" financial risk profile
category.  Furthermore, S&P is unlikely to take any positive
rating action until transaction been executed.  An upgrade would
also assume that management will maintain at least "adequate"
liquidity.  Even if S&P didn't analytically deconsolidate the
yield company, an upgrade could still be possible if it observed
that the more stable concession business had a positive impact on
the company's business risk profile.

S&P would be likely to revise the outlook to stable if management
does not successfully execute its plans to reduce the stake in
the yield company, and FFO to debt remains around 4%-6%.  S&P
could also revise the outlook to stable if Abengoa doesn't
continue to place its concession business in the yield company.


AYT GOYA HIPOTECARIO: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of the
senior notes and upgraded junior notes in a Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction AyT Goya
Hipotecario IV, FTA.

Issuer: AyT Goya Hipotecario IV, FTA

  EUR1,066 million Class A Notes, Downgraded to A2 (sf);
  previously on Jan 23, 2015 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
  Possible Upgrade

  EUR234 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
  on Jan 23, 2015 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
  Upgrade

The rating action concludes the review of Classes A and B notes
placed on review on January 23, 2015 because of reduced country
risk for Spanish transactions as reflected in the upgrade of the
local-currency country risk ceilings to Aa2 from A1 on January
20, 2015.

Ratings Rationale

The Class A downgrade, primarily reflects the linkage to Issuer
Account Bank Barclays Bank, S.A (NR). On the 23rd January 2015,
Ahorro y Titulizacion, S.G.F.T., S.A ("AyT") moved the Treasury
Account functions to Barclays Bank, S.A from Barclays Bank Plc
(A2/P-1). On the 2nd of January 2015 Caixabank (Baa3/P-3)
acquired Barclays Bank, S.A. Currently Barclays Bank, S.A is an
unrated subsidiary of Caixabank.

Moody's has assessed the probability and impact of a default of
Barclays Bank, S.A on the ability of the Issuer to meet its
obligations under the transaction, including the impact of the
loss of any cash held by Barclays Bank, S.A should it default and
any loss that may be incurred after that time due to any delay in
redirecting payments to new accounts or taking any other
appropriate action. Moody's concludes that Class A falls into the
strong linkage category, and therefore the maximum achievable
rating is A2 (sf).

The main drivers behind Class B's upgrade are (1) the reduced
country risk as reflected by the increase in the maximum
achievable rating in Spain, and principally (2) reduction in
MILAN and (3) reduction in the expected loss (EL) assumption.

Increased Local-Currency Country Ceilings

The country ceilings reflect a range of risks that issuers in any
jurisdiction are exposed to, including economic, legal and
political risks. On 20 January 2015, Moody's announced a six-
notch uplift between a government bond rating and its country
risk ceiling for Spain. As a result, the maximum achievable
ratings for structured finance transactions was increased to Aa2
from A1 for Spain.

Reduction in Milan CE

Moody's has revised its MILAN CE assumption to 14.1% from 15.0%,
reflecting the change in performance.

The downward revision to the Milan CE, together with the relevant
revised country ceiling define the transaction's loss
distribution and is an integral part in determining the affected
notes' rating through Moody's cash flow models.

Revision of Expected Loss

As part of the rating action, Moody's reviewed the collateral
performance of AyT Goya Hipotecario IV, FTA and incorporated the
revision of EL assumptions into its analysis. Moody's has
reassessed its lifetime loss expectation taking into account the
better collateral performance than expected. As a result, Moody's
decreased its Expected Loss of the original pool balance to 2.73%
from 3.50%.

Exposure to Counterparties

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties including the roles of
servicer, account bank, and swap provider.

The rating action takes also into account commingling exposure to
Barclays Bank, S.A.

Moody's also assessed the exposure to Barclays Bank Plc (A2/P-1)
acting as swap counterparty in when revising ratings.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
January 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
rating include:

  (1) further reduction in sovereign risk,
  (2) performance of the underlying collateral that is better
      than Moody's expected,
  (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and (4) improvements
      in the credit quality of the transaction counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
rating include:

  (1) an increase in sovereign risk,
  (2) performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
      Moody's expects,
  (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement
      and
  (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
      counterparties.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


B. ENDEAVOUR SHIPPING: Recognition Hearing Set for March 5
----------------------------------------------------------
The hearing to consider approval of Peter Kubik and Andrew
Andronikou's petition for recognition of B. Endeavour Shipping
Company Limited's insolvency proceeding in the United Kingdom as
a "foreign main proceeding" under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code will be held on March 5, 2015, at 9:45 a.m.

                        About B. Endeavour

B. Endeavour Shipping Company is a company incorporated in Cyprus
whose sole asset is a 62,000 deadweight tonnage Panamax Tanker
named "Ice Base," valued at approximately $28.1 million.  Ice
Base transports liquid natural gas and oil and operates
principally in the territorial waters of the United States,
including New York
harbor.

B. Endeavour is a unit of Baltic Tankers Holding Ltd., which owns
five other Cyprus companies, each of which owns a 37,000 DWT
product carrier that operates principally in the waters of Europe
and the Baltic area.  Baltic Tankers is owned by Northsea Base
Investment (NSBI).  Hamilton Corporation, NSBI's sole
shareholder, is owned by certain family trusts.  Marine Cross
Services Limited, a London-based shipping agent, handles day-to-
day financial administration and management.

On Jan. 15, 2015, B. Endeavour and its five affiliates were
placed into administration in London, England after defaulting on
debt to BNP Paribas S.A.  Peter Kubik and Andrew Andronikou of
UHY Hacker Young LLP, were appointed joint administrators.
Felicity Toube QC serves as counsel.

The joint administrators on Feb. 3, 2015, filed a Chapter 15
bankruptcy petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 15-10246) for B.
Endeavour in Manhattan, in New York, to seek U.S. recognition of
the UK proceeding.  Judge Robert E. Gerber presides over the
case.  Geoffrey T. Raicht, Esq., at Proskauer Rose LLP, serves as
counsel in the U.S. case.


CATERHAM F1: Asset Auction Scheduled for March
----------------------------------------------
Zach Doell at Boldride reports that all of Caterham Formula One
racing team's assets will head to auction in March.

The Wyles Hardy & Co. auction site lists many of the team's
assets, which include the obligatory office furniture, desktop
computers, work benches, and engineering machinery, Boldride
discloses.

According to Boldride, a few 2014 Caterham F1 show cars are also
up for sale, as well as body panels and racing components, pit-
lane equipment, giant race and hospitality trailers, an F1 race
simulator with a 200 degree field of view, and a Dell
supercomputer.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on
October 23, 2014, The Financial Times related that Caterham fell
into administration, threatening the future of the racing
franchise.  London-based accountants Smith & Williamson were
appointed administrators to Caterham on Oct. 17, 2014, the FT
disclosed.  The lack of success prompted team owner Tony
Fernandes the AirAsia tycoon and chairman of Queens Park Rangers
football club, to sell the franchise and the manufacturing
company to a consortium of investors, according to the FT.
However, the new owners -- whose identity remains unclear -- have
struggled to raise sufficient financing, leaving Caterham owing
millions to its suppliers, the FT said.  Smith & Williamson is in
discussions about a sale of the company, the FT noted.

Caterham F1 is a racing team.


CITY LINK: Dartford MP Welcomes Jobs Boost for Former Workers
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Reporter discloses that parcel delivery company DPD will
offer employment to at least six former City Link workers.

DPD confirmed it had already recruited four former City Link
staff who lost their jobs when the company went into
administration on Christmas Eve, and expects to take on at least
another two, according to The Reporter.

The report notes that Dartford Member of Parliament Gareth
Johnson has welcomed the jobs boost.

"DPD is a growing company, investing in technology and
infrastructure and creating jobs in our region.  I was delighted
to hear that six former City Link workers have found new jobs
with DPD in Dartford and I will continue to do all I can to help
those in our area affected by City Link's sudden closure," the
report quoted Mr. Johnson as saying.

The report notes that Mr. Johnson visited DPD's depot in
Wilmington, which opened in October and created 55 new jobs.

The report discloses that DPD's general manager in Dartford, Dan
Hadley, said: "It was great to have Gareth come down for a look
around the depot and to be able to pass on the good news about
the former City Link staff.

"We're a rapidly growing company and our new purpose built depot
in Dartford gives us a huge advantage in terms of location and
sorter technology, meaning we can increase the number of parcels
we handle and service more routes cost effectively," Mr. Hadley
said, the report relays.

"It is a key location for us with Bluewater nearby and the new
depot means we can provide an outstanding service to DPD
customers in the area," Mr. Hadley added.


DYFED CLEANING: Enters Administration, Seeks Buyer
--------------------------------------------------
Western Telegraph reports that Dyfed Cleaning Services, a laundry
firm that has branches in Milford Haven and Haverfordwest, has
gone into administration.

Administrators at business rescue and recovery specialists
Begbies Traynor have been appointed to pursue the sale of the
business, according to Western Telegraph.

The report notes that the firm, which was adversely hit by a
significant fire two years ago, is operating as usual as a buyer
is sought.

Joint administrators Steve Wade -- steve.wade@begbies-traynor.com
-- and David Hill -- dave.hill@begbies-traynor.com -- from
Begbies Traynor's Cardiff offices were appointed on January 29.

The report notes that Mr. Wade said the company's main office, in
Port Talbot, together with a distribution site and three
additional operations in West Wales, would be of interest to a
number of national operators and a quick sale was expected.

"We have secured the immediate future of some 70 employees and
it's very much business as usual as we go to the next stage," the
report quoted Mr. Wade as saying.

The Port Talbot site was hit by a fire in January 2013, which
extensively damaged the building, the report recalls.

The report discloses that Mr. Wade said: "Turnover has been hit
hard since the fire, but the business continued to trade.  The
business also received the support of many of their suppliers
during what was a very troubled time, and though the business has
continued to move forward, administration eventually became
inevitable due to a number of external forces."

Dyfed Cleaning Services is one of the largest and longest
established commercial laundries in south Wales, offering a range
of linen, laundry and work wear cleaning services for businesses
and leisure facilities.  The company also has a number of dry
cleaning and launderette outlets in west Wales, as well as a
distribution site in Haverfordwest.


DYTECNA LTD: In Administration, Seeks Buyer
-------------------------------------------
Rachel Constantine at Business Sale reports that Dytecna Ltd, an
engineering group with headquarters in Worcestershire, has gone
into administration, and is now for sale.

Dytecna Ltd, which has three sites across the UK including its
head office on Malvern Hills Science Park, has called in
administrators Philip Watkins -- philip.watkins@frpadvisory.com
-- and Geoff Rowley -- geoff.rowkey@frpadvisory.com -- of FRP
Advisory, according to Business Sale.  The business focuses on
technology, manufacturing and support services for the defense
sector and employs 150 staff, the report notes.

The report notes that the firm has called in administrators after
a recent drop in trade put pressure on its ability to continue
business under its current financial structure and it failed to
secure further investment.

"We are highly focused on working with Dytecna's staff, customers
and suppliers and engaging with interested parties, while seeking
a suitable buyer.  Dytecna has enjoyed a good working
relationship with a number of loyal clients over the years.  In
line with trading conditions affecting similar firms in its
sector, the business has had to manage unsustainable pressure on
its cash flow," the report quoted Mr. Watkins as saying.

"The business maintains a strong order book and will aim to
continue to deliver the high level of service for which the
business is known.  We would invite interested parties to make
early contact," Mr. Watkins added.

The report relays that financial accounts for January 1, 2013 to
March 31, 2014 indicate a turnover of GBP22.4 million with pre-
tax profits of GBP271,799.


EUROSAIL-UK PLC: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR36MM Certs. to Caa2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four notes
in Eurosail-UK 2007-4BL PLC following the execution of a
restructuring.

Issuer: Eurosail-UK 2007-4BL PLC

  EUR230 million A2a Certificate, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
  previously on Dec 21, 2010 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  EUR52 million B1a Certificate, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously
  on Nov 25, 2008 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

  EUR55 million C1a Certificate, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
  previously on Dec 21, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

  EUR36 million D1a Certificate, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf);
  previously on Dec 21, 2010 Downgraded to Ca (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The restructuring, implemented in two stages in November 2014 and
in December 2014, included the redenomination of all notes, the
application of cash receipts relating to the claims against the
original swap counterparties and the split of the old class A3
into the new classes A3, A4 and A5. Moody's maintains its ratings
for the classes of notes that keep the same ISIN following the
restructuring, namely the classes A2a, B1a, C1a, D1a and E1c. For
additional restructuring items, please refer to the end of this
press release.

The rating upgrades of the four classes of notes reflect the
redenomination from euro (EUR) to British pound sterling (GBP)
and partial repayment of the mezzanine and junior notes through
the application of cash receipts.

Prior to the restructuring the deal was exposed to foreign-
exchange risk, present since the event of default on the swap
agreement that the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc. triggered in 2008. The redenomination have eliminated the
cross-currency risk and the potential for future build-up of
under-collateralization that the depreciation of GBP to EUR could
cause. All classes of the notes were redenominated to GBP from
EUR at a conversion rate of 1.27 EUR/GBP. The class B1a also
benefited from a write-up of GBP3.1 million.

The cash receipts relating to the claims against the swap
counterparties have been applied towards the repayment of the
outstanding notes except for the class A2a.

Other Considerations

Moody's review of transaction's collateral indicated stable
performance, the rating agency has maintained it expected loss
assumption at 8.5% of the original pool balance and MILAN at
26.5%.

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
of the notes to the issuer account bank Danske Bank A/S (A3/P-2),
acting through its London branch.

List of Additional Restructuring Items

Amendment to the margin of the notes:

The margins of some classes of the notes were increased, namely
to 30bps from 16bps for the class A2a, to 100bps from 36bps for
the class B1a, and to 125bps from 65bps for the class C1a.

Introduction of liquidity reserve fund:

The issuer will establish the liquidity reserve fun through
capturing principal payments to cover interest shortfall on the
class A2a and A3 notes. Liquidity reserve fund target is GBP 2.5
million.

Amendment of reserve fund level and required target amount:

The reserve fund will be allowed to amortize to 2% of the
outstanding notes balance without a floor, subject to certain
conditions. The major conditions are: the reserve fund being at
its required target, the class A2a notes have fully repaid, and
delinquencies which are 90 days or more overdue not exceeding
22.5% of the outstanding mortgage balance.

Waiver of account bank trigger breach:

The noteholders agreed to waive the trigger breach of Danske Bank
A/S acting as the transaction's account bank. As a result, Danske
Bank A/S will continue to act as the transaction's account bank,
even though it has a short-term rating of Prime-2, below the
Prime-1 rating originally required for the issuer account bank.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
January 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

Upward pressure could develop on the ratings following (1)
stronger underlying asset performance, beyond Moody's
expectations; (2) further deleveraging with a build-up of credit
enhancement; or (3) the improvement of the creditworthiness of
the transaction's main counterparties.

Downward pressure could develop on the ratings following (1)
underlying collateral performance that is worse than Moody's
expects; or (2) deterioration in the creditworthiness of the
transaction's main counterparties.


HERO ACQUISITIONS: Moody's Raises CFR to 'B1' Following IPO
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to B1 from B2 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and affirmed the B1-PD probability
of default (PDR) rating of Hero Acquisitions Limited (HSS or the
company). Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded to B1 from B2 the
GBP200 million senior secured notes maturing in 2019 issued by
HSS Financing plc, a subsidiary of HSS. The rating outlook is
stable.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action follows the London initial primary offering
(IPO) of HSS Hire Group plc (the new top holding company of the
Hero Acquisitions Limited group of companies), with 35% of the
share capital now in public ownership. Net IPO proceeds of
GBP89.5 million (net of GBP13.5 million of transaction fees) will
be used to redeem GBP64 million of the GBP200 million senior
secured notes and fund a GBP4.5 million redemption premium, and
to repay GBP21 million of drawings under the GBP60 million
revolving credit facility (RCF). Funds managed by Exponent
(Exponent) and co-Investors acquired 79% of HSS in October 2012.
Pro-forma for the IPO, their shareholding will decrease to 50.4%
assuming no exercise of the over-allotment option.

"The upgrade of HSS's CFR to B1 reflects (1) the company's
improved credit metrics post IPO, (2) good execution in
implementing the hub-and-spoke distribution model through the
roll-out of local format branches enhancing utilization with a
more limited capex spend, and (3) the good growth prospects for
the UK tool and equipment rental market", says Sebastien
Cieniewski, Moody's lead analyst for HSS. However, Moody's notes
that the ratings remain constrained by (1) the cyclicality of the
tool and equipment rental industry, (2) the geographical
concentration of HSS's operations within the UK and Ireland, and
(3) the limited prospects for de-leveraging over the rating
horizon based on HSS's anticipated large capex spend over the
next 24 months to be funded by operating cash flows and drawings
under the RCF.

Pro-forma for the IPO, HSS's adjusted gross leverage ratio (as
adjusted by Moody's mainly for operating leases) as of 27
September 2014 will improve to 3.0x from 4.0x prior to the
transaction.

However, Moody's does not expect significant de-leveraging over
the rating horizon based on the company's large capex investments
which will result in negative free cash flow over the medium term
to be funded by internally generated cash flows and drawings
under the RCF and finance leases. In 2014, HSS forecasted a high
capex spend of approximately GBP75-80 million which is expected
to be maintained at a high GBP77 million in 2015. The company has
been investing significantly in fleet hire expansion over the
last 2 years with the ratio of hire fleet capex to hire fleet
depreciation at c.2.0x. Part of the total capex is also used to
further implement HSS's hub-and-spoke distribution system through
the roll-out of low cost local format branches. The company
forecasted 43 openings in 2014 with around 50 openings per annum
going forward.

The high level of capex was driven by high demand for HSS's
services. The European Rental Association (ERA) estimates that
the UK equipment rental will grow at 9.7% in 2014 and will
continue growing at around 4.4% in 2015 and 4.2% in 2016 -- a
credit positive for HSS.

Moody's recognises the fact that HSS has been outperforming the
UK equipment rental market gaining market share to 4.7% as of
September 2014 from 3.6% in December 2011. More recently, in the
9-month period to September 27, 2014, HSS generated revenues of
GBP208.5 million -- a 27.8% increase compared to the same period
last year -- mainly driven by organic growth (18.6%) and
acquisitions to a lesser extent (9.3%). Organic growth was
supported by the roll-out of 14 new local format branches and
significant capex investment of GBP60.7 million during Q1-Q3 2014
to increase hire fleet stock.

HSS benefits from an adequate liquidity position. The company's
limited cash balance of GBP5.2 million as of 27 September 2014 is
mitigated by the relatively large GBP60 million RCF which can be
upsized to reach up to 100% of HSS's last twelve months (LTM)
EBITDA capped at GBP80 million. Pro-forma for the IPO, the RCF is
assumed to be fully undrawn as at 27 September 2014, however,
Moody's expects that HSS will increasingly draw under the RCF to
fund its large capex plan.

The PDR at B1-PD, at the same level as the CFR, reflects Moody's
assumption of a 50% family recovery rate given the mix of bank
debt and bonds in the capital structure. The GBP60 million RCF
has a springing leverage covenant only that also acts as a draw
stop, tested only once 25% of the facility is drawn. The senior
secured notes are rated B1, at the same level as the CFR.

Rating Outlook

HSS' stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation of sustained
revenue growth over the medium-term due to favorable macro-
economic conditions in the UK. The outlook also reflects the
expectation that the company will maintain a prudent acquisition
strategy and benefit from significant availability under its RCF.

What Could Change the Rating -- UP

Upwards pressure could arise if the company (1) shows good
execution in the development of its hub-and-spoke distribution
system through the roll-out of local stores gaining significant
size within the UK rental market, (2) reduces debt to EBITDA
towards 2.0 times on a sustainable basis, (3) and improves EBITDA
to interest above 5.0 times. Moody's would also expect the
company to enhance its liquidity position through increased
external sources of liquidity.

What Could Change the Rating -- DOWN

Conversely, negative pressure could arise on the ratings if (1)
debt to EBITDA reverts towards 3.5 times on a sustained basis,
(2) EBITDA to interest decreases to below 3.5 times, or (3) the
company's liquidity profile weakens.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Equipment and
Transportation Rental Industry published in December 2014. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Surrey, United Kingdom, Hero Acquisitions
Limited is a provider of tool and equipment hire and related
services in the United Kingdom and Ireland. The company operates
mainly in the B2B market, and generated GBP271 million of
revenues in LTM September 27, 2014.


INDUS PLC: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on GBP0.1MM Cl. X Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of Classes A and B
and affirmed the rating of Class X Notes issued by Indus (Eclipse
2007-1) plc.

  GBP729 million (current outstanding balance of GBP109M) A
  Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013
  Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  GBP48 million (current outstanding balance of GBP47M) B Notes,
  Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
  B3 (sf)

  GBP0.1 million (current outstanding balance of GBP0.08M) X
  Notes, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 28, 2013 Affirmed
  B1 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class C, Class D and the Class E Notes.

Ratings Rationale

The upgrade action reflects the lowering of Moody's loss
expectation for the pool since the last review. This is primarily
due to Moody's expectation that the Criterion Loan (61% of
current pool excluding Workspace Portfolio Loan) will repay
without a loss. The collateral benefits from its prime West End
London office and retail market location which has experienced
strong rental growth and yield compression over the past few
years. An updated valuation was recently reported at GBP 260
million, a 44% increase over the 2012 reported value. This
reflects an UW whole loan LTV ratio (inclusive of swap mark to
market) of approximately 64%.

Additionally, since the last review credit enhancement on senior
notes have increased because GBP21.9 million of recovery proceeds
were distributed and a further 8.2 million are expected to be
distributed at the next IPD following 1) the repayment of two
loans (one with loss); 2) disposal proceeds and 3) a partial loan
repayment following a borrower control change. The Workspace
Portfolio loan is expected to repay with a loss of 16 million at
the next IPD.

The rating on the Class X Notes is affirmed because the current
rating is commensurate with the updated risk assessment. The
Class X Notes reference the underlying loan pool. As such, the
key rating parameters that influence the expected loss on the
referenced loan pool also influences the ratings on the Class X
Notes. The rating of the Class X Notes was based on the
methodology described in Moody's Approach to Rating Structured
Finance Interest-Only Securities published in February 2012.

Moody's upgrade reflects a base expected loss in the range of 0%-
10% of the current balance excluding Workspace Portfolio Loan,
compared with 20%-30% at the last review. Moody's derives this
loss expectation from the analysis of the default probability of
the securitized loans (both during the term and maturity) and its
value assessment of the collateral.

Realised losses have remained stable at 5% of the original
securitized balance since the last review. However, these will
increase after allocation of losses from the Workspace Portfolio
Loan. Moody's estimate of the base expected loss is now in the
range of 0%-10% of the original pool balance compared with 10%-
20% at the last review.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA CMBS Transactions published in December
2013.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2014-16 Central Scenarios published in March 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The rating is very sensitive to the performance of the Criterion
loan. The main factor that could lead to a downgrade of the
rating is failure of the Criterion loan to repay in full.

Tha main factor that could lead to an upgrade of the rating is an
increase in the property values backing the underlying loans
leading to loan recoveries higher than Moody's expectation.
However, the ratings of Class A is capped at Aa2 (sf) due to
operational risk.

Moody's Portfolio Analysis

Indus (Eclipse 2007-1) plc closed in 2007 and represents the
securitization of initially 19 mortgage loans originated by
Barclays Bank Plc. As of the October 28 IPD, the transaction
balance has declined by 75% to GBP225.2 million from GBP894.4
million at closing due to the pay off of 14 loans originally in
the pool and a GPB10 million partial repayment on the NOS
Portfolio Loan. Since last review, the balance has declined by 9%
from GBP247.1 million to GBP225.2 million. Excluding Workspace
Portfolio, four loans remain in the pool, which are secured by
first-ranking legal mortgages over 230 commercial properties. The
pool exhibits an average concentration in terms of property type
(63% office, based on underwriter market value) and geographic
location (100% in the UK). Moody's uses a variation of Herf to
measure diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents
greater diversity. Large multi-borrower transactions typically
have a Herf of less than 10 with an average of around 5. The
remaining pool has a Herf of 2.2, lower than the Herf of 7.9 at
closing.

Large losses will be realized on the Workspace Portfolio Loan
(11.5% of the pool) which was secured by eight managed workspace
properties involving a mix of warehouses, light industrial and
office accommodation at closing. All eight properties have been
sold for a total of GBP10.9 million and the proceeds of GBP8.2
million will be applied at the next IPD.

Moody's notes that for the currently outstanding pool of four
loans, Moody's weighted average LTV is 92% which translates into
a high probability of default at maturity (50% - 75%). Moody's
expects a loss on the pool in the range of 0% - 10%.

Summary of Moody's Loan Assumptions

Below are Moody's key assumptions for the top 2 loans.

Criterion Loan - LTV: 90% (Whole)/ 80% (A-Loan); Total Default
probability Medium; Expected Loss 0%-5%.

The largest loan in the pool, Criterion Loan, represents 61% of
the current securitized loan balance excluding the Workspace
Portfolio Loan, and matures in July 2015. The whole loan is split
into a securitized senior loan and a junior loan outside of the
securitization. An interest rate swap covering the whole loan
amount matures only in January 2022 and has currently a
significant negative mark-to-market value for the borrower.

The loan is secured by an asset in Picadilly Circus, London,
which has a mix of retail and office use. Moody's value
assessment for the property has increased in line with the strong
performance of the prime London property market and the current
Moody's LTV is 90% on the whole loan including the mark-to-market
exposure of the long dated interest rate swap, which ranks senior
to the securitized loan. The loan was previously in breach of the
LTV covenant which was waived until July 2014 in exchange of the
borrower meeting any shortfalls from their own equity. According
to the latest valuation in November 2014, the whole loan LTV on
the loan decreased from 90% to 64% against the covenant of 85%.
The increase in value is primarily driven by cap rate compression
backed by reversionary potential. Moody's expect the loan to
fully repay.

NOS Portfolio Loan - LTV: 104%; Total Default probability High;
Expected Loss 10%-20%.

The second largest loan, NOS Portfolio Loan, represents 28% of
the current securitized loan balance excluding the Workspace
Portfolio Loan, and matures in January 2017. The loan is secured
by 227 small secondary retail units spread across the UK. The
tenants are mostly small local businesses. The portfolio vacancy
has remained close to 20%. Moody's LTV ratio decrease to 104%
from 128% in the previous review, is primarily driven by an
unexpected repayment of GBP 10 million, through equity generated
from sale of sponsor share in the borrower.


JAKEM LTD: In Liquidation, Sells Kingsbarn Equestrian Center
------------------------------------------------------------
Horse & Hand reports that Kingsbarn Equestrian Center is on the
market with rural property specialists Baird Lumsden for around
GBP650,000 after the company behind the centre, Jakem Ltd, was
put into liquidation.

The company describes it as "an extensive equestrian facility in
a prime central belt location," according to Horse & Hand.

The report notes that Duncan Ferguson from Baird Lumsden said
there was "significant ongoing interest" in the property.

Last year, Horse & Hand confirmed that showjumping shows at the
center had been reallocated due to the liquidation, which
followed a dispute between center owner Jackie Kemp and a
stakeholder.

The company reportedly has six-figure debts, as well as owing
thousands to Falkirk Council, the report notes.

A spokesman for BS said showjumpers in Scotland should not be at
a loss, the report relays.

"We've had more centres come on board in the past 18 months so we
have more venues than previously in Scotland," the report quoted
the spokesman as saying.

The final court hearing for Jakem Ltd took place last month, and
the company was placed into liquidation, the report discloses.
On January 19, liquidators Grainger Corporate Rescue appointed
Baird Lumsden to sell the property.

"Hopefully as a result of the process, the centre will come out
the other side and find a buyer to get it up and running again,"
said a spokesman from Grainger Corporate Rescue.

The report discloses that the center originally opened in 2007 --
costing GBP10 million to build -- owned by Stewart Aitken, but
went into administration in 2009.  Ms. Kemp reopened the center
under Jakem Ltd the same year, the report notes.

Late last year, Ms. Kemp was under investigation by the Scottish
SPCA after a social media campaign, entitled "Let's stop this
horse cruelty" was set up, the report relays.

The center is set in around 44 acres.  It has a 75m x 60m
international indoor arena, 75 indoor stables and 89 outdoor
stables.  There are also offices, a cafe and feed store, as well
as potential development site, subject to planning permission.


MARUSSIA F1: Denies ManorGP's Request
-------------------------------------
ESP Formula One reports that the Formula One team formerly known
as Marussia has suffered a setback to its hopes of entering this
year's championship, after the F1 Strategy Group said its
application "lacked substance" and was "speculative."

The team missed the last three races of last season after going
into administration, but ManorGP -- which has raced under the
Marussia and Virgin names since entering F1 -- is in negotiations
with proposed new investors, according to ESP Formula One.

The report notes that ManorGP is seeking dispensation to enter
this year's championship with last year's car despite alterations
to the rules governing the design of the chassis and wings.

To do so, the team needed majority approval from the F1 Strategy
Group comprising the FIA -- motorsport's governing body -- plus
the F1 commercial rights holder headed by Bernie Ecclestone, and
the top six teams of Ferrari, Mercedes, Red Bull, McLaren,
Williams and Force India, the report relates.

Force India was among those to vote against on Feb. 5.

"During the meeting, it emerged there were compliance issues and
that the application lacked substance," Force India deputy the
report quoted principal Bob Fernley as saying.  "The speculative
submission contained no supporting documentation to reinforce the
case for offering special dispensation.  For example, no details
were supplied of who the new owners would be or the operational
structures that would be put in place," the report quoted Mr.
Fernley as saying.

However, ManorGP's Graeme Lowdon, who was chief executive of the
team before it entered administration, said he was surprised by
Mr. Fernley's comments, the report relates.

"We did not make any application to Feb. 6's Strategy Group
meeting and nor were we asked to," Mr. Lowdon said, the report
relates.

"Instead, we are proceeding with our clear process regarding
compliance and building our operation.  We are doing everything
possible to adhere to the process set out for us to return to the
2015 grid," Mr. Lowdon added.

The report discloses that Mr. Lowdon said that "given the
confidential nature of the negotiations underway, neither they
(the investors) nor the team are able to provide further details
regarding the team's new investors, however those investors have
either met with or spoken to the key F1 bodies."

Manor is provisionally entered on the 2015 team list, with the
season to start March 15 in Melbourne, Australia, the report
adds.

Marussia Formula One Team is based in Banbury.


MAX PETROLEUM: Could Become Insolvent Without Restructuring
-----------------------------------------------------------
Energy Voice reports that Max Petroleum said it could become
insolvent without debt restructuring and additional financing.

The company said the fall in oil price has had a "very severe"
impact on the company's forecast liquidity position for the year
ahead, according to Energy Voice.

As a result, its business had been rendered unviable unless
further material investment is made into the company, the report
notes.

The report relates that this would be in addition to a
comprehensive debt restructuring agreed with Sberbank, which have
so far been unsuccessful.

"While, as a result of the above, the Subscription by AGR Energy
will not proceed, Max Petroleum continues negotiations with
Sberbank regarding an appropriate debt restructuring and with AGR
Energy regarding an equity investment that, together with the
debt restructuring, would render the Company viable at current
oil prices," the report quoted a spokesman as saying.

"The directors of Max Petroleum currently believe that there is a
reasonable prospect that ongoing discussions could result in a
sufficient refinancing of the Company and, on that basis, have
not put the Company into administration," the spokesman as
saying, the report relates.

"However, there is only a short period remaining to achieve such
a refinancing and if current efforts are unsuccessful then the
consequences will be negative for all stakeholders in the
company," the spokesman adds.

A further announcement is expected to be made by the company in
due course.


MEIF RENEWABLE: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to GBP190MM Sr. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned MEIF Renewable Energy UK plc's (MEIF
Renewable; BB/Stable) GBP190 million 6.75% senior secured notes
due Feb. 1, 2020 a final rating of 'BB'.

MEIF Renewable's ratings benefit from a favorable regulatory
framework, modest diversity of operations, long-term contracted
fuel supplies, and a financial profile comparable to that of
similarly rated peers.  The ratings also take into account the
company's exposure to wholesale electricity price volatility and
declining electricity output from its landfill gas division,
which is less predictable compared to conventional gas, as well
as the debt funding with bullet maturity in 2020 and restrictive
covenants.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Supportive Regulatory Framework

A favorable regulatory framework for renewable energy in the UK
is the key factor supporting MEIF Renewable's business and
financial profiles and, as a result, its ratings.  The framework
has generous renewable incentive schemes underpinned by
challenging medium-term targets for industry-wide renewable
energy production. In Fitch's view, the incentive mechanism in
the UK represents a transparent and reliable source of revenues
for MEIF Renewable.

The company's revenues are predominantly governed by the
Renewable Obligation (RO) regime.  Only 1% of its revenue in the
year ended March 31, 2014 was generated under the legacy Non-
Fossil Fuel Obligation/ Scottish Renewable Obligation (NFFO/SRO)
regime, which will switch to the more favorable RO regime in 2017
and 2018.  The RO incentive regime provides significantly higher
all-in prices per MWh than the NFFO feed-in tariff.  Under the RO
scheme the company receives payments related to the regulatory
renewable energy incentive and support mechanism, in addition to
the payment based on the wholesale market electricity price.  The
payments linked to the RO regime accounted for about 50% of the
company's revenue in the year to 30 September 2014, contributing
to the stability of its cash flow generation.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

MEIF Renewable's business profile benefits from modest diversity
of operations across technologies, number of plants/sites and
sources of fuel used for generation compared with some of its
peers of similar scale that tend to focus on one technology or
source of renewable energy generation.  However, its individual
sites and overall size are small.

The company operates five biomass-fired power stations and 25
landfill sites, with a total net installed capacity of 174MW at
end-September 2014.  The assets are only located in the UK.  The
company is a large biomass-fuelled independent power generator in
the UK, with its biomass plants accounting for almost two-thirds
of its total net installed capacity.

MEIF Renewable's EBITDA is fairly well balanced across two main
divisions and their assets.  The biomass business accounts for
about 60% of the company's EBITDA, while the landfill gas
division contributes about 40%.  The largest biomass power
station - Thetford - represents about 20% of the company's net
installed capacity, demonstrating some concentration.

Landfill Gas Output to Decline

The output of landfill gas and, as a result, electricity
generation by power gas engines can be less predictable and
challenging to forecast compared to conventional gas.  It is
generally declining, especially in closed landfills and the
company seeks to manage its opex and capex accordingly.  Fitch
expects the larger biomass business to offset electricity output
fluctuations from the landfill gas division resulting in fairly
predictable total power generation.

Contracted Fuel Supplies

Fuel costs are one of the key determinants of MEIF Renewable's
profitability as they comprised almost half of the company's
operating expenses (including biomass fuel costs and royalties
payments for the use of landfill sites) in FY14.

Fitch believes that MEIF Renewable's exposure to the fuel supply
and price risks is mitigated by its medium-to-long term contracts
for fuel supplies (including landfill gas), reasonably
diversified supplier base and by the close proximity of its
biomass stations to abundant fuel supplies.  Prices in most of
the biomass contracts are fixed for their duration and linked to
the RPI.  It is further offset by the fact that 95% and 81% of
projected biomass fuel requirements for FY15 and FY16 have
already been contracted (and over half of biomass fuel needs are
contracted for FY17 and FY18), while 89% of expected gas volumes
from landfill sites are contracted through to March 31, 2020.

MEIF Renewable's long-term relationships with its suppliers, in
particular in the biomass division, are supported by fuel being
sourced from waste products that mainly have limited alternative
use.

Wholesale Electricity Price Volatility

Although supported by the UK regulatory framework for renewable
energy, MEIF Renewable's revenue and, as a result, cash flow
generation is also dependent on the development of the wholesale
power market.  A substantial portion of the company's revenue
(41.5% in the year to Sept. 30, 2014) is driven by payments for
electricity based on the wholesale electricity market price.

The company's power purchase agreements offer limited protection
against wholesale electricity price fluctuations as the
electricity price for its biomass division is fixed every 12
months in advance and the electricity price for its landfill gas
division is fixed every six months in advance based on the
average market rates prevailing in a certain period prior to the
fixing date.

Fitch assumes largely flat wholesale power prices over the
forecast period of 2015-2019, based on forward market prices.
Any significant drop in power prices is likely to weaken the
company's financial profile, as electricity output produced from
its landfill gas division is in long-term decline.

Financials Comparable to Peers

MEIF Renewable's credit metrics are comparable with those of its
'BB' category-rated utility peers, while Fitch assess its
business profile as fairly strong for this rating level.
Following the GBP190 million secured bonds issue, Fitch expects
funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage to increase
to 4.4x in FY15 from 3.75x in FY14 and FFO adjusted net leverage
to rise to 3.7x from 3.3x, respectively.  These forecasts take
into account a new shareholder loan, which lacks both provisions
for events of default and acceleration rights, enabling its
exclusion from the Restricted Group's IDR perimeter in our
analysis.

The company's ability to pay dividends will be limited by the
consolidated net leverage ratio stipulated in the bond
documentation (eg net debt/EBITDA below 3.25x prior to the date
that is three years from the bond issue and 2.5x thereafter).
Fitch expects that the decrease of the net leverage threshold to
2.5x from 3.25x will prompt the company to commit to medium-term
de-leveraging.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Senior Secured Notes

While there is no immediate liquidity risk, the company will face
large bullet maturities in 2020 but Fitch expects adequate
landfill gas and biomass power production to facilitate
refinancing.  Fitch also anticipates that the company will pursue
a proactive refinancing policy.  Following the notes issue, MEIF
Renewable's debt comprises only senior secured notes for GBP190
million due in 2020 and a remaining portion of a subordinated
shareholder loan of GBP112.9 million, which is expected to fall
due in 2021.

The proceeds of the senior secured bond issue are expected to be
primarily used for the repayment of all the current external debt
and additional shareholder distribution, ie partial repayment
(GBP78.3 million) of the new shareholder loan (GBP191.2 million)
received by the company as part of its structural reorganization.

MEIF Renewable's estimated cash position was GBP22.8 million at
end-December 2014 (excluding restricted cash of GBP5.3 million
which will be released after repayment of the existing
facilities).  The company is also expected to have access to a
GBP20 million revolving credit facility due 4.5 years after the
notes' issue date.

Dividends Limit Free Cash Flow

Given low capex and working capital requirements, Fitch expects
the company to be free cash flow positive although a large
portion is likely to be distributed as dividends, subject to the
net leverage covenant stipulated in the bond documentation.

Shareholder Loan

Fitch excluded the new shareholder loan from the Restricted
Group's IDR perimeter in our analysis as it is subordinated to
all current and future indebtedness of the company (including
senior secured notes), matures one year after the maturity of the
senior secured notes, and its interest should only be paid in
cash if permitted by the restricted payment tests specified in
the inter-creditor agreement and the senior secured notes
documentation.  In our financial forecast we treated potential
cash interest payments under the shareholder loan as part of
dividends.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- MEIF Renewable's debt comprises senior secured notes for
      GBP190 million due in 2020 and a remaining portion of a
      subordinated shareholder loan of GBP112.9 million, which is
      expected to fall due in 2021.

   -- Fitch excluded the new shareholder loan from the Restricted
      Group's IDR perimeter in its analysis.

   -- Fitch assumed largely flat wholesale power prices over
      2015-2019, based on forward market prices.

   -- The company's ability to pay dividends will be limited by
      the consolidated net leverage ratio stipulated in the bond
      documentation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- Increased wholesale prices or electricity output above
      Fitch's expectations leading to expected FFO adjusted gross
      leverage below 2.5x and FFO gross interest cover above 4x
      (FY14: 3.2) on a sustained basis.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Recoverable landfill gas depletion faster than Fitch
      assumes or wholesale prices substantially lower than
      forward prices such that expected FFO adjusted net leverage
      is around 4x and FFO gross interest cover below 2.5x on a
      sustained basis.

   -- Changes to the regulatory framework resulting in a less
      supportive mechanism for the company's operations.


T BADEN: In Administration, Cuts 180 Jobs
-----------------------------------------
BBC News reports that T Baden Hardstaff Ltd, a haulage and
engineering company, has gone into administration with the loss
of 180 jobs in Nottinghamshire.

KPMG was appointed administrators and made 180 of the 232
employees redundant, blaming a difficult climate, according to
BBC News.  The report notes that it is now seeking buyers of
parts of the business.

The company, based in Gotham, near Nottingham and founded in
1861, has four separate businesses: Hardstaff Haulage; lorry
repair firm Charnwood Truck Services; safety barrier manufacturer
Hardstaff Traffic Barrier Services; and natural gas supplier
Portal Gas Services, the report relates.

Traffic Barrier Services is still trading and a buyer is being
sought, the report notes.

The 150-year-old firm T Baden Hardstaff Ltd specialises in road
haulage as well as maintenance of commercial fleets under the
names Hardstaff Haulage and Charnwood Truck Services.


TOWERGATE FINANCE: Restructuring Deal No Impact on Fitch's C IDR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says there is no impact on Towergate Finance plc's
ratings following the announcement of a new financial
restructuring deal, providing unsecured bondholders with a
controlling equity stake.

Fitch downgraded Towergate's IDR to 'C', on Feb. 3, 2015,
following the announcement of an agreement with senior secured
creditors for the implementation of a financial restructuring
under a UK scheme of arrangement.

On Feb. 6, the insurance intermediary announced that unsecured
creditors have subsequently reached a new agreement with senior
secured lenders.  If approved, the new arrangement will result in
senior secured creditors receiving GBP425 million of senior
secured notes, GBP250 million of cash and 19.4% of the company's
ordinary equity. The GBP250 million cash will come from the
unsecured creditors in exchange for an 80.6% equity stake in the
restructured business.

As before, the senior secured creditors have agreed to provide
GBP75 million of new financing in the form of super senior notes.
The unsecured creditors will also inject a further GBP50 million
capital contribution into the business, providing a total GBP125
million of additional liquidity for the group.

Under the original proposal put forward by senior secured
creditors, their existing holding was to convert to GBP375
million of new senior secured notes, GBP150 million of
subordinated PIK notes and 100% of the ordinary share capital of
the new group holding company, as well as injecting GBP75 million
in the form of new super senior notes. Unsecured creditors could
have been left with nothing.

The agreement will be implemented via two parallel UK schemes of
arrangement, one in respect of the original senior secured
creditor deal, the other in respect of the new senior unsecured
creditors' agreement.  This means that if the senior unsecured
deal fails to gain regulatory approval, the company can revert to
the original arrangement with secured creditors.  Fitch expects
the new senior unsecured creditors deal to be executed by the end
of 1Q15.


USC: Mike Ashley Faces Legal Action After Staff Were Given Notice
-----------------------------------------------------------------
International Business Times reports that former staff of
clothing brand USC, which is owned by sportswear to football
clubs tycoon Mike Ashley, have begun legal action against the
then parent company Sports Direct, claiming they were given just
15 minutes consultation before being unceremoniously sacked.

Some 79 former USC staffers as well as 166 agency employees
claimed they were given the nosebleed consultations, as opposed
to the legal 90-day notice period, according to International
Business Times.

USC, which was owned by Sports Direct at the time, was placed
into administration in January, before being purchased by
Republic, another firm owned by Ashley, the report notes.

The Herald has reported that Thompsons Solicitors has agreed to
represent the workers on a no win, no fee basis, the report
discloses.

The Herald said lawyers estimate compensation could run into the
tens of thousands of pounds, but will likely be covered by the
taxpayer-funded Insolvency Service, the report relays.  This is
because the firm was placed by Ashley into administration.

Labour MP Brian Donohoe for Dundonald, where the plant was based,
and Glasgow South MP Ian Davidson, chairman of the Scottish
Affairs Select Committee, have received complaints from the ex-
staff, the report notes.

"Fifteen minutes consultation, that's all I am worth," stated one
of USC's former employees in a complaint, the report says.

Mr. Donohue is urging the Department of Business, Innovation and
Skills to call Ashley to explain the events, the report adds.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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