TCREUR_Public/150216.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Monday, February 16, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 33





GRAND CITY: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Subordinated Hybrid Notes


ALPHA BANK: Fitch Puts Covered Bonds on Rating Watch Negative
GREECE: Extends Bailout Talks with European Finance Ministers


FOSSETT BROTHERS: Faces Uphill Struggle to Survive, Judge Says
PERMANENT TSB: On Track to Secure EU Nod for Restructuring Plan


ASR MEDIA: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to EUR175MM Secured Loan
ROTTAPHARM SPA: S&P Keeps 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative


DTEK ENERGY: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'Caa3'


BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES: Moody's Confirms B1 Unsec. Debt Rating


BANKIA SA: Must Set Aside EUR800MM to Cover Possible Legal Claims
BBVA RMBS 1: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR120MM B Notes to Ba2
HIPOCAT 7: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class D Notes


UBS GROUP: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to High- & Low-Trigger Notes


UKRAINE: Seeks Talks to Expand IMF-Lead Bailout to US$40-Bil.

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DFS FURNITURE: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
HAWES SIGNS: Proposes Company Voluntary Arrangement; Cuts 57 Jobs
PELAMIS WAVE: Owed More Than GBP15MM at Time of Administration
TOWERGATE FINANCE: Moody's Puts Caa2 Secured Rating for Upgrade


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on EU Synthetic CDO Tranches



Moody's Investors Service said that it is continuing its review
for downgrade of the ratings of four euro area banking groups and
their backed subsidiaries and issuing entities. The rating review
was initiated on October 30, 2014, prompted by the capital
shortfalls identified during the European Central Bank's (ECB)
Comprehensive Assessment of 130 euro area banks that was
concluded on October 26, 2014.

During the extended review period for the four banks, Moody's
expects (1) to obtain greater clarity regarding the approval
status of the banks' capital replenishment plans by the ECB
(i.e., the supervisor in charge since November 2014); and (2) to
assess the likelihood of these entities successfully executing
the replenishment plans and addressing their capital shortfalls
within the permitted timeframe. Moody's expects to conclude the
reviews within the next three months.

Moody's believes that the four banks (listed below) -- whose
ratings remain under review and which failed to comply with one
or more parts of the ECB's review -- face challenges and varying
degrees of uncertainty with regard to replenishing their capital
within the 6-9 month timeframe permitted by the ECB. Failure to
remediate the shortfall could prompt supervisory measures
including the bailing-in of subordinated debt or other
restructuring measures, which could affect all creditors. For
further information, please refer to Moody's press release
"Moody's takes rating actions on six EU banks post ECB
Comprehensive Assessment", published on October 30, 2014.

The extended rating review affects the following banks:

-- Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG (VBAG), with long-term senior
    ratings of B2 and subordinated ratings of Ca on review for

-- Permanent tsb p.l.c. (PTSB), with long-term deposit ratings
    of B3, senior unsecured debt ratings of Caa1 and subordinated
    ratings provisional (P)Ca on review for downgrade

-- Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (MPS), with long-term
    senior ratings of B1, and subordinated and junior
    subordinated ratings of Ca and Ca(hyb), respectively, on
    review for downgrade

-- Banca Carige S.p.A. (Carige), with long-term ratings of Caa1
    on review for downgrade

Moody's initial rating action on October 30, 2014 focused on the
six banking groups that failed to comply with the ECB's
assessment, with the rating agency's attention centered on the
varying degrees of difficulties faced by these banks in filling
the identified capital shortfalls. At that time, Moody's affirmed
the ratings of one of the six banks -- Banca Popolare di Milano
S.C.a r.l. (deposits B1 negative, BFSR E+ stable/BCA b2), while
the review for downgrade of Banco Comercial Portugues S.A.'s
ratings was concluded with a confirmation of the bank's ratings.
For further information, please refer to the press release
"Moody's confirms Banco Comercial Portugues' B1 senior unsecured
debt and deposit ratings; outlook negative", published on
February 12, 2015.

Ratings Rationale

The four banks affected by the extended rating review have failed
to comply with capital thresholds under the Asset Quality Review
"Base" and/or "Adverse" scenario stress tests that were part of
the ECB's Comprehensive Assessment which comprised a review of
(1) the balance sheets of the euro area's 130 largest banks; and
(2) the resilience of these banks to market shocks. Each of these
four banks were found to have a considerable capital shortfall
under the ECB's guidelines and were required to submit plans to
the ECB during November 2014 for closing the identified capital
gaps. Further, Moody's understands that the four banks must
complete their recapitalization within a 6-9 month timeframe,
i.e., by July 2015. The ECB is likely to apply stringent criteria
in its assessment of the adequacy of each plan, thereby
principally placing emphasis on the use of private sources for
any new capital.

In Moody's opinion, the inability of these four banks to remedy
the capital shortfall within the required timeframe would
increase the likelihood of bail-in. In the event that a bank
needed to resort to government support, the EU rules governing
state aid would require debt to be bailed-in, particularly
subordinated debt.

Given the magnitude of the capital shortfalls identified in a few
cases, Moody's does not rule out the possibility of authorities
resorting to even more extensive bank restructuring measures
which could affect all creditors. These risks are reflected in
the reviews for downgrades of the ratings of the four banks.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Evidence indicating the inability of any of the four banks to
raise sufficient capital will likely trigger a lowering of the
BCAs within the standalone E BFSR category, which, in turn, would
negatively affect the ratings of senior and junior instruments.
The review could be concluded with a confirmation of ratings at
the current level for those banks producing credible plans to
address their respective capital shortfalls.

Positive rating pressure would be subject to banks achieving
capital metrics that are above expectations with regard to
magnitude and timeliness, and such metrics would need to include
a satisfactory buffer that exceeds the new minimum requirements
as indicated by the results of the ECB's Comprehensive

For VBAG, there is further potential for rating downgrades if the
expected restructuring of the bank proves insufficient to
indicate that senior creditors will be repaid in full and in a
timely fashion. Further downgrades may be additionally driven by
the loss severity for junior creditors that the restructuring and
breakup of VBAG may entail, driven by potential costs of its
planned restructuring and unwinding. Upward pressure on VBAG's
ratings would be subject to further material support for

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in July 2014.

Fitch Ratings issued a correction to its February 10, 2015,
rating release.  The announcement corrects the version published
on February 10, 2015 to clarify why Fitch did not assign a
Recovery Rating to OeVAG's rated securities.

Fitch Ratings has downgraded Oesterreichische Volksbanken-
Aktiengesellschaft's (OeVAG) Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) to 'B' from 'BBB-' and Short-term IDR to 'B' from 'F3', and
maintained the IDRs on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

Fitch downgraded OeVAG's Long-term IDR to 'BBB-' in October 2014
following the decision of OeVAG's board to spin off the bank's
non-core business from Volksbanken-Verbund (VB-Verbund;
A/Negative/bb-/RWP). At this time, there was limited information
on OeVAG's future set-up. The bank's Long-term IDR remained
within investment grade to reflect the possibility of further
state support being available following the spin-off.

The downgrade to 'B'/RWN reflects Fitch's expectation that state
support for OeVAG can no longer be relied upon, in light of
subsequent information regarding the structure of the planned
spin-off. It also reflects the implementation of the EU's Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive and its bail-in provisions into
Austrian national law on January 1, 2015, which significantly
increase the risk that OeVAG's creditors may be subject to some
form of bail-in if further state support was required as long as
OeVAG has its banking licence.

According to the spin-off plan, OeVAG will leave VB-Verbund's
mutual support scheme and return its bank license during 2015 and
focus exclusively on the orderly wind-down of its non-core assets
as a partly-regulated wind-down institution, without any
additional state support. The downgrade reflects Fitch's
assessment that state support can no longer be relied on for
OeVAG, meaning that its IDRs are now driven by Fitch's view of
the likelihood of institutional support from VB-Verbund. However,
the latter's ability to support is constrained, as expressed by
its Viability Rating of 'bb-'/RWP.

OeVAG's remaining core assets and central clearing and support
functions for VB-Verbund's members will be transferred to one of
VB-Verbund's primary banks (most likely the largest of the group,
Volksbank Wien-Baden AG; A/Negative). OeVAG intends to implement
most of these transformations by end-1H15.


OeVAG's Long-term IDR is now linked to VB-Verbund's Viability
Rating of 'bb-'/RWP. Fitch does not notch from VB-Verbund's Long-
term IDR as this is driven by state support and we do not believe
that the state will provide further support to OeVAG, either
directly or indirectly via VB-Verbund. Fitch believes that VB-
Verbund will still be incentivized to support OeVAG if needed,
while OeVAG remains a part of the co-operative group and its
mutual support mechanism.

The RWN on OeVAG's Long-term IDR reflects Fitch's expectation
that VB-Verbund will no longer provide support to OeVAG once it
is spun off, and that any contingent liabilities following the
spin-off will be negligible.

The two-notch difference between VB-Verbund's VR and OeVAG's
Long-term IDR reflects the large size of OeVAG relative to VB-
Verbund group as a whole. The RWP on VB-Verbund's VR is driven by
our expectation of the benefits of OeVAG's planned spin-off on
VB-Verbund's standalone profile, and consequently does not apply
to OeVAG's Long-term IDR. The 'B' support-driven Long-term IDR is
consistent with a Support Rating of '4'.

The revision of OeVAG's Support Rating Floor to 'No Floor', and
its subsequent withdrawal, reflects our view that state support
can no longer be relied upon.

VB-Verbund's ratings are unaffected by these rating actions.

Fitch does not typically assign VRs to banks in orderly wind
down, such as OeVAG, because in our view they have no viable
standalone business model, and could not operate without
receiving or being expected to receive external support.

Fitch typically assigns Recovery Ratings to the rated securities
of issuers with Long-term IDRs of 'B+' or lower, as is the case
for OeVAG. However, in light of the significant restructuring
that OeVAG is currently undergoing, sufficient detailed
information regarding OeVAG's likely balance sheet structure is
not yet available. As a result, Fitch does not possess the
necessary information to make a meaningful determination of the
Recovery Rating at this time. Fitch expects to be able to assign
a Recovery Rating to OeVAG's rated securities once more detailed
information is available, most likely at the time of OeVAG's
spin-off planned for 1H15.


Fitch has maintained the RWN on OeVAG's IDRs to reflect its
expectation that support for OeVAG will be unlikely once it
leaves the mutual support mechanism. We therefore expect to
resolve the RWN on OeVAG's ratings when the bank executes its
planned exit from VB-Verbund's mutual support scheme, expected in
1H15. However, the resolution of the RWN could extend beyond the
typical six-month horizon, as technical, legal and regulatory
aspects may delay the process beyond the expected timeline.

In resolving the RWN, Fitch will in particular assess OeVAG's new
ownership structure, asset wind-down profile and performance
implications, and funding structure, as well as any residual
explicit or implicit state or institutional (VB-Verbund) support,
which it considers will be unlikely. Assuming that no external
support can be relied upon, Fitch will likely assess OeVAG as a
non-bank financial institution. In this case, a multi-notch
downgrade could be possible, reflected in the RWN on OeVAG's
Short-term IDR.

"OeVAG's senior debt ratings are aligned with its Long-term IDR.
We have placed these instruments on Rating Watch Evolving (RWE)
to reflect the uncertainty as to whether they will be allocated
to VB-Verbund's future central institution, in which case their
ratings would be upgraded to the level of VB-Verbund's IDRs, or
if they will be spun off with OeVAG, in which case a further
downgrade of the debt ratings in line with OeVAG's Long-term IDR
would be likely. We will resolve the RWE when this allocation has
been formally decided, which we expect to occur at the time of
OeVAG's spin-off at the latest," Fitch says.

The rating actions are as follows:

  Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'BBB-' and maintained on

  Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3' and maintained on

  Support Rating: downgraded to '4' from '2' and maintained on

  Support Rating Floor: revised to 'No Floor' from 'BBB-' and

  Senior unsecured notes: downgraded to 'B'/'B' from 'BBB-'/'F3'
  and revised to RWE

  Market linked securities: downgraded to 'B emr' from 'BBB- emr'
  and revised to RWE


GRAND CITY: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to Subordinated Hybrid Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB' long-term
issue rating to the proposed perpetual, optionally deferrable,
subordinated hybrid notes to be issued by Grand City Properties
S.A. (GCP; BBB-/Stable/--).

The completion and size of the transaction will be subject to
market conditions, but S&P anticipates that it will be benchmark
size.  GCP plans to use the proceeds to fund the company's growth

S&P classifies the proposed notes as having "intermediate" equity
content until their first call dates in 2022 because they meet
S&P's criteria in terms of their subordination, permanence, and
optional deferability during this period.

Consequently, in S&P's calculation of GCP's credit ratios, it
will treat 50% of the principal outstanding and accrued interest
under the hybrids as equity rather than debt.  S&P will also
treat 50% of the related payments on these notes as equivalent to
a common dividend.  Both approaches are in line with S&P's hybrid
capital criteria.

S&P arrives at its 'BB' issue rating on the proposed notes by
deducting two notches from its 'BBB-' issuer credit rating (ICR)
on GCP.  Under S&P's methodology:

   -- It deducts one notch for the subordination of the proposed
      notes, because the ICR on GCP is investment grade (that is,
      'BBB-' or above); and

   -- S&P deducts an additional notch for payment flexibility to
      reflect that the deferral of interest is optional.

The latter is capped at one notch because S&P considers that
there is a relatively low likelihood that GCP will defer interest
payments.  Should S&P's view on this likelihood change, it may
significantly increase the number of downward notches that S&P
applies to the issue ratings.


ALPHA BANK: Fitch Puts Covered Bonds on Rating Watch Negative
Fitch Ratings has placed the mortgage covered bonds issued by
Alpha Bank AE (Alpha, B-/RWN/B, Viability Rating (VR): b-/RWN),
Eurobank Ergasias S.A. (B-/RWN/B, VR: b-/RWN), National Bank of
Greece S.A. (NBG, B-/RWN/B; VR: b-/RWN) and Piraeus Bank S.A.
(Piraeus, B-/RWN/B, VR: b-/RWN) on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The rating action follows the RWN placed on the Greek banks'
Issuer Default Ratings (IDR). The RWN on the Greek covered bond
programs will be resolved upon the resolution of the RWN on the
banks' IDRs.


The RWN on Alpha, Eurobank, NBG and Piraeus's outstanding covered
bonds directly reflects the RWN on the banks' IDR as the current
ratings of the bonds do not include any buffer against a
downgrade of the IDRs.

The 'B+' rating of Alpha and Eurobank's covered bonds is based on
the issuers' 'B-' IDRs, an IDR uplift of 1, a Discontinuity Cap
(D-Cap) of 0 (full discontinuity) and the 95% legal maximum AP
that Fitch takes into account in its analysis, which allows a
one-notch uplift on a recovery basis from the 'B' tested rating
on a probability of default (PD) basis. The 95% legal maximum AP
is also the breakeven AP for the 'B+' rating of both programs.

The 'BB-' rating of NBG Programme I is based on NBG's IDR of 'B-
', an IDR uplift of 1, a D-Cap of 0 and the 70% committed AP
disclosed in the program investor report (as of December 2014).
This level of AP is adequate to achieve recoveries of at least
71% should the covered bonds default, allowing a two-notch uplift
to 'BB-' from the 'B' tested rating on a PD basis. The breakeven
AP for the 'BB-' rating is 78%.

The 'B+' ratings of Piraeus and NBG Programme II is based on the
issuers' 'B-' IDRs, an IDR uplift of 1, a D-Cap of 3 (moderate
high) and the AP that Fitch relies upon (61.3% for Piraeus and
80% for NBG Programme II) disclosed in the programs' investor
reports dated January 2015 and December 2014, respectively. Those
levels of AP, which are below the Fitch breakeven AP for the 'B+'
rating of 95%, allows a one-notch uplift on a recovery basis
being recovery prospects on the covered bonds assumed to be in
default in excess of 51% for a 'B+' rating.


The rating of the covered bonds issued by Alpha, Eurobank, NBG
(Programme I and II) and Piraeus are sensitive to downward
movements on the respective IDRs.

The 'B+' rating of Alpha, Eurobank, NBG Programme II and Piraeus
covered bonds are also vulnerable to downgrade if (i) the Country
Ceiling (CC) is revised below 'B+'; or (ii) the number of notches
represented by the IDR uplift and the D-Cap moves to 0.

The 'BB-' rating of NBG Programme I is vulnerable to downgrade if
(i) the CC is revised below 'BB-', (ii) the number of notches
represented by the IDR uplift and the D-Cap is reduced to 0; or
(iii) the program AP goes above the 78% breakeven AP for the 'BB-
' rating.

The Fitch breakeven OC for the covered bond rating will be
affected, amongst others, by the profile of the cover assets
relative to outstanding covered bonds, which can change over
time, even in the absence of new issuance. Therefore the
breakeven OC to maintain the covered bond rating cannot be
assumed to remain stable over time.

The rating actions are as follows:

Alpha: 'B+' covered bonds rating placed on RWN
Eurobank: 'B+' covered bond ratings placed on RWN
NBG Programme I: 'BB-' covered bonds rating placed on RWN
NBG Programme II: 'B+' covered bond rating placed on RWN
Piraeus: 'B+' covered bond rating placed on RWN from RWE

GREECE: Extends Bailout Talks with European Finance Ministers
Nikolaos Chrysoloras, Eleni Chrepa and Rebecca Christie at
Bloomberg News report that Greece and its official creditors were
extending talks over the weekend aimed at reaching a deal at a
meeting of finance ministers in Brussels today, Feb. 16, on
future financing for Europe's most-indebted country.

While negotiators sought an agreement, government leaders back
home reiterated their markers, Bloomberg notes.  Gabriel
Sakellaridis told Skai TV on Feb. 15 for Greece, that means no
discussions to continue its current bailout program, Bloomberg
relates.  French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, meantime, said
that even as officials hold talks over Greece's debt load, they
aren't willing to write it off, Bloomberg relays.

Meetings dragged on in Athens, where the government held
preparative discussions, and Brussels, where officials from
Greece's Finance and Foreign Ministries held "technical" talks
with the European Union, International Monetary Fund and European
Central Bank, with the goal of laying the groundwork for a
successor program, Bloomberg recounts.  Greek Prime Minister
Alexis Tsipras said it's too early to say if there's a deal in
the making, Bloomberg notes.

Greece is seeking a bridge agreement for the next six months that
will replace its current bailout, Bloomberg discloses.
Mr. Tsipras, as cited by Bloomberg, said in a press conference
after the Feb. 12 EU summit said the agreement will secure its
financing needs to give officials time to discuss "a new deal"
with the euro area.


FOSSETT BROTHERS: Faces Uphill Struggle to Survive, Judge Says
Ray Managh at The Irish Times reports that Circuit Court
President Mr. Justice Raymond Groarke said Fossett Brothers
Circus, which failed to pay VAT for eight years, was facing an
uphill struggle to survive.

According to The Irish Times, Justice Raymond Groarke said he was
not impressed by the "perseverance in lack of candor" by
Robert Fossett, one of the two director brothers who ran the

He told barrister Stephen Hannaphy, counsel for the examiner who
prepared a scheme of arrangement aimed at saving the company,
that he would allow a further seven days for the preparation of a
proper corporate structure for the company, The Irish Times

Judge Groarke, as cited by The Irish Times, said that
Mr. Fossett, in his affidavit in which he outlined mistakes about
VAT payments, was blaming the company auditor which the court did
not accept.

He said he could not conclude on the evidence presented to him
that it would meet the requirements of the Companies Act
legislation for allowing the company's survival, The Irish Times

The court heard that the company owed the Revenue EUR333,000,
including EUR181,000 VAT, The Irish Times discloses.  Prior to
the examinership having been put in place, the Circuit Civil
Court had been told the VAT debt was just EUR84,000, The Irish
Times notes.

The judge told Mr. Hannaphy that the court had to decide whether
it should give his clients an opportunity to put a corporate
structure in place to see if they could persuade him that he
should allow this company to survive, The Irish Times states.

Referring to the potential for saving 16 jobs Judge Groarke, as
cited by The Irish Times, said: "This company has been in
existence for 127 years and is part of all of our childhoods."

Judge Groarke, The Irish Times says, adjourned the proceedings
until Feb. 19 but told counsel: "You have an uphill struggle."

Arthur Cunningham, counsel for the Revenue Commissioners who
opposed the examiner's scheme, said the scheme envisaged an
investment by the Fossetts of EUR38,000 which, after the payment
of litigation and examinership fees and other expenses, would
leave only EUR6,000 cash available to the company to pay its
debts as they became due, The Irish Times relays.

Mr. Cunningham said the proposed scheme did not have a reasonable
prospect of survival for the company, The Irish Times notes.

The famous family business could trace its origins back to the
1880s to a circus troupe started by Cork man George Lowe who had
toured Ireland with a travelling troupe before emigrating to the
United States.

PERMANENT TSB: On Track to Secure EU Nod for Restructuring Plan
Joe Brennan at Bloomberg News reports that Permanent TSB Group
Holdings Plc, the bailed-out Irish lender, is on track to secure
European Commission approval for a restructuring plan.

According to Bloomberg, a person with knowledge of the matter
said the bank, based in Dublin, and Ireland's government agreed
to the terms of the plan with the Commission, subject to legal
documentation being completed.

"We are in contact with the Irish authorities on PTSB in the
context of its restructuring plan," Bloomberg quotes
Ricardo Cardoso, a European Commission spokesman, as saying in an
e-mail, declining to comment further.

Permanent TSB, which received a net EUR2.7 billion (US$3.1
billion) government bailout in 2011, is alone among Ireland's
three surviving rescued banks not to have a state-aid
restructuring plan approved by the EU, Bloomberg recounts.

The bank failed Europe-wide stress tests last year, and Chief
Executive Officer Jeremy Masding said in November that approval
of the blueprint is key to raising capital from investors,
Bloomberg relays.

Mr. Masding told lawmakers in Dublin in November he plans to
raise EUR100 million to EUR150 million to shore up the group's
capital, Bloomberg discloses.  According to Bloomberg, a person
with knowledge of the matter said in December, the bank, which
has until the end of July to raise the money, may raise as much
as EUR400 million in a share sale, Bloomberg notes.

Permanent TSB Group Holdings p.l.c., formerly Irish Life and
Permanent, Plc is a provider of personal financial services in


ASR MEDIA: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to EUR175MM Secured Loan
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB+' long-term
issue rating to the EUR175 million senior secured floating-rate
loan due 2020 issued by ASR Media and Sponsorship S.r.l (ASR
Media), a bankruptcy-remote financing vehicle for Italian
football club AS Roma (TeamCo).  The outlook is stable.

The rating mainly reflects the transaction's materially volatile
cash flow available for service debt (CFADS), owing to the
exposure of the transaction to market risk.

ASR Media owns TeamCo's brand and has licensed it to Soccer
S.a.s. di Brand Management S.r.l (Soccer), a limited partnership
which operates TeamCo's marketing, advertising, and sponsorship
business.  Soccer has leased the brand further to TeamCo for a
20-year period.  ASR Media has taken over all existing contracts
associated with media and sponsorship rights and will service its
debt based on revenues generated via these contracts.

S&P assess the operations phase stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
at 'bb+'.  It reflects the transaction's materially volatile
CFADS due to the exposure of the transaction to market risk--the
majority of revenues are derived from the media and sponsorship
contracts received by ASR Media and linked to the on-field
performance of AS Roma.  Each year poses the risk that AS Roma
could be relegated from Serie A, the top Italian football league.
In S&P's view, relegation could reduce CFADS by about 40%.  This
is partly offset by the minimal operating risk, which
predominantly relates to managing contracts.

The project's revenue growth forecast over the medium-to-long
term is based on aggressive expansion assumptions, in particular
for sponsorship and advertising.  However, AS Roma is one of the
most successful Italian and European football clubs and its
recent performance has been strong (it qualified for the
2014/2015 Champion's League).  S&P expects TeamCo and Soccer's
global partnerships with international companies such as Creative
Artists Agency (CAA), Disney, and Nike to increase brand
recognition and the fan base in overseas markets.

"We assess the preliminary operations phase SACP at 'bb',
reflecting our expectation that the transaction will generate a
minimum annual debt service coverage ratio (ADSCR) of 4.6x and an
average ADSCR of 8.2x during 2015-2020.  In our base case, we
have assumed more conservative growth from broadcasting and media
revenues and sponsorships than the sponsor, based on our forecast
that TeamCo will achieve at least sixth place in Serie A on
average over the forecast period.  The preliminary operations
phase SACP is constrained by our assessment of the initial senior
debt period, where ADSCRs are lower than in the post-refinancing
period.  This is because we expect higher revenues to be
generated in later years, which will largely offset the higher
cost of debt assumed after refinancing," S&P said.

"Although the project is exposed to the risk of refinancing of
73% of the facility in 2020, the 15-year lease/license "tail"
mitigates this.  After the refinancing that we assume will take
place in 2020, we expect a base-case project life coverage ratio
(PLCR) of 9.4x, with revenue growth in line with Standard &
Poor's long-term inflation assumptions for Italy for the
remainder of the license/lease.  Therefore, the operations phase
SACP for the assessment of the refinancing period is the same as
for the initial financing," S&P added.

The operations phase SACP of 'bb+' is one notch above the
preliminary operations phase SACP because of the strong ADSCRs
under S&P's downside scenario, and substantial debt-servicing

Although the transaction is weak-linked to its financial
counterparties (mainly bank account providers and swap
providers), none of the counterparties to the project currently
constrain the rating; each counterparty is either replaceable or
is rated higher than the project's debt.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that ASR Media will
generate revenue supporting a minimum ADSCR of higher than 4x
(which S&P currently expects at about 4.6x).

A positive outlook or rating upgrade is unlikely, given the high
uncertainty related to the on-field performance of AS Roma, and
consequences of a potential relegation, which could be more
severe than for other football teams.

S&P may lower the rating if it expects higher cash flow
volatility than currently anticipated due to AS Roma's poor on-
field performance or inability to enter into the currently
expected sponsorships and advertising contracts, leading S&P to
forecast ADSCRs below 4x.  S&P could also take a negative rating
action if the facility is not refinanced, or a credible plan for
refinancing of EUR128.4 million due in 2020 is not presented 12
months before the refinancing date.

ROTTAPHARM SPA: S&P Keeps 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
Standard & Poor's Rating Services said that it had kept its 'BB-'
long-term corporate rating on the Italian pharmaceuticals group
Rottapharm SpA on CreditWatch, where it was placed on Aug. 8,
2014, and maintained on Nov. 12, 2014.

S&P's 'BB-' issue rating on the EUR400 million senior unsecured
notes due 2019 issued by Rottapharm Ltd., a subsidiary of
Rottapharm, also remains on CreditWatch with negative
implications, until more information on the future capital
structure is provided.  The recovery rating on the notes remains
at '4'.

The original CreditWatch placement followed the announced
takeover bid of Rottapharm by Swedish health care group Meda AB.
Although Meda announced the completion of the transaction on
Oct. 10, 2014, S&P still lacks visibility on the combined group's
credit profile.

S&P now expects to apply its Group Rating Methodology in its
assessment of Rottapharm's creditworthiness.  S&P's assessment
will include establishing a group credit profile and defining
Rottapharm's status within the group.  Although the combined
group's business risk profile will be more robust than that of
Rottapharm alone, thanks to enhanced scale and diversification,
S&P believes that the application of its group rating methodology
could have a negative impact on the rating because the combined
group's financial risk profile will likely become "highly
leveraged" once S&P includes the acquisition debt, owing to the
bid's cash component of about EUR2 billion, including deferred

Meda reported debt to EBITDA of about 4x at year-end 2013, and
S&P expects the acquisition to increase this ratio to about 6x.
S&P acknowledges the new combined group's ability to generate
free cash flows, but it believes it could take a few years for
the new group's leverage to drop below 5x.  These factors are
likely to place the new group in S&P's category for a "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile.  S&P therefore sees potential
for a negative rating action on Rottapharm, as per its group
rating methodology.

S&P plans to resolve the CreditWatch within the coming 90 days or
as soon as it get greater visibility on the combined group's
credit profile.  Another important factor of S&P's assessment
will be Meda's stance vis a vis Rottapharm's outstanding debt, as
S&P currently don't know if Meda will refinance it, maintain it
as is, or guarantee it.


DTEK ENERGY: Moody's Lowers Corporate Family Rating to 'Caa3'
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and to Caa3-PD from Caa2-PD the
probability of default rating (PDR) of DTEK ENERGY B.V. (DTEK).
Moody's has also downgraded to Caa3 from Caa2 the senior
unsecured bond ratings of DTEK Finance B.V. and DTEK Finance Plc,
fully owned finance subsidiaries of DTEK. The outlook on all
ratings remains negative.

The downgrade of the ratings reflects the increasing liquidity
risk DTEK is facing over the next 12 months owing to its exposure
to Ukraine's weak operating environment and the high foreign
currency risk.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of DTEK's ratings reflects Moody's view that the
company's liquidity will be sufficiently stressed over the next
12 months as to materially increase the risk that the company
will not meet all of its debt obligations on a timely basis in
accordance with the original terms. In particular, Moody's notes
the risk to the repayment of the USD200 million Notes due
April 28, 2015 issued by DTEK Finance B.V.

Moody's estimates that at the end of 2014, DTEK's cash and cash
equivalents do not cover its short-term debt obligations,
excluding short-term cash-pledged facilities. Furthermore, with
predominantly foreign-currency denominated debt and largely
local-currency cash balances, the risk of further local currency
depreciation heightens the risk of cash insufficiency. Moody's
also notes DTEK's practice to retain a significant part of its
cash with First Ukrainian International Bank, PJSC (foreign
currency and local deposit ratings Ca and Caa3, respectively,
outlook negative), a related party Ukrainian bank exposed to high
risk of financial distress.

DTEK's cash generation is unlikely to close the liquidity gap
because its business of a Ukraine-focused integrated electric
utility is highly exposed to Ukraine's weak operating
environment. Furthermore, DTEK has sizable assets in the areas
subject to military actions, and has socially important
obligations it needs to meet. Consequently, DTEK is dependent on
access to external funding, which remains limited for the
company, similar to other Ukrainian companies, given continuing
political instability and geopolitical tensions. Moody's estimate
that currently DTEK has no material availability, if any, under
committed bank facilities. At the same time, Moody's understand
that the company is in contact with foreign banks to negotiate
new long-term facilities.

In addition to the risk of having insufficient cash, Moody's also
notes the increasing risk of stressed financial covenants, given
the currency mismatch between DTEK's foreign-currency denominated
debt and limited export revenues.

The company's ratings continue to be constrained by the fact that
DTEK's capacity to service its foreign currency debt is subject
to any actions that may be taken by the Ukrainian government to
preserve the country's foreign-exchange reserves and earnings.

On the positive side, DTEK's ownership of a large, vertically
integrated utility group that is not overleveraged compared to
its utility peers provides some support to the value of the

The outlook on the ratings is negative, which reflects (1) the
increased liquidity risks over the next 12 months; (2) the
pressures of the weak economic environment reflected in Ukraine's
sovereign rating of Caa3 with the negative outlook and the
consequent risk of a downgrade of the foreign-currency bond
country ceiling.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

Given the negative outlook, Moody's does not expect upward
pressure on DTEK's ratings until the company manages to improve
its liquidity position so that it is able to meet debt payments
on a timely basis. At the same time, Moody's notes that, as
DTEK's integrated electric utility business is focused on
Ukraine, the company's ratings remain dependent on further
developments at the sovereign level.

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on DTEK's ratings
if DTEK fails to improve its liquidity or if there is a downgrade
of Ukraine's sovereign rating and/or lowering of the foreign-
currency bond country ceiling.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Unregulated
Utilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in October
2014. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Kyiv, DTEK ENERGY B.V. (previously DTEK Holdings
B.V. before completion of restructuring and name change on
September 22, 2014) is one of the major energy companies in
Ukraine and part of a financial and industrial group System
Capital Management (SCM). DTEK generated revenue of UAH92.8
billion, or US$11.6 billion, including heat tariff compensation,
in 2013. DTEK's H1 2014 revenue, including heat tariff
compensation, was UAH44.3 billion, or US$4.4 billion.


BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES: Moody's Confirms B1 Unsec. Debt Rating
Moody's Investor Service has confirmed the B1 long-term senior
unsecured debt and deposit ratings of Banco Comercial Portugues,
S.A. (BCP) and its supported enties with a negative outlook. At
the same time, the rating agency has affirmed the standalone bank
financial strength rating of E (equivalent to a caa2 baseline
credit assessment [BCA]). Concurrently, the bank's Caa3
subordinated ratings were confirmed and now carry a stable
outlook. The bank's Not-Prime short-term ratings and the C(hyb)
preference stock rating were not affected by the action and
remain unchanged.

This rating action was prompted by the publication of BCP's
financial results for 2014 published on February 3, 2015. Based
on the bank's results announcement, it is Moody's understanding
that BCP is highly likely to have satisfied supervisory
expectations for improving its capitalization from own resources.
During the European Central Bank's (ECB) Comprehensive Assessment
in 2014, a capital shortfall was identified for BCP which the
bank has to close before mid-2015. Moody's confirmation of BCP's
senior unsecured debt and deposit and subordinated debt ratings
at their current levels acknowledges the continued risks faced by
the bank in a challenging operating environment, and the rating
agency notes that these risks are adequately captured in the
bank's current rating levels.

The rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
October 30, 2014, which was prompted by the capital shortfalls
identified during the ECB's Comprehensive Assessment of the euro
area's 130 largest banks that was concluded on October 26, 2014.

Ratings Rationale

Rationale For The Confirmation/Affirmation

The confirmation of BCP's B1 long-term senior unsecured debt and
deposit ratings and Caa3 subordinated debt rating and the
affirmation of BCP's standalone bank financial strength rating of
E (equivalent to a caa2 BCA) reflects Moody's assessment that the
bank is highly likely to have closed the EUR1.1 billion capital
gap identified by the ECB's assessment before the mid-2015
deadline, thereby lowering the risk of supervisory intervention
and, therefore, risks to creditors.

BCP was required to cover the EUR1.1 billion (or 251 bps) capital
shortfall identified under the ECB's "adverse" scenario. BCP's
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 12.22% at end-December 2013
was significantly affected by the Asset Quality Review (AQR) that
reduced the ratio by 196 bps to 10.26%. The ratio under the ECB's
"base" scenario stood at 8.84%, and was at 2.99% under the ECB's
"adverse" scenario, which is significantly below the 5.5% minimum

Subsequent to the release of the Comprehensive Assessment results
by the ECB, BCP announced a set of measures that aimed to offset
the capital gap, bringing the CET1 to 5.55%, which is just above
the minimum requirement. These measures included (1) the sale of
its 49% stake in its non-life insurance company in May 2014 and
the agreement with the buyer to distribute excess capital of this
company as a dividend to shareholders in 2014; (2) the sale of a
securitization program in October 2014; and (3) a target of
EUR946 million for year-end 2014 operating profits versus the
ECB's estimate of EUR372 million under the ECB's "adverse"
scenario. Moody's notes that the bank has reported a year-end
2014 pre-provision income of EUR1.062 billion, which should be
sufficient to comply with supervisory expectations. In its
financial results announcement, the bank confirmed that it is not
required to sell any strategic assets or raise capital. The
phased-in Basel III CET1 ratio reported by BCP stood at 12.0% as
of year-end 2014, and the fully loaded CET1 ratio was at 8.9%,
despite a full-year loss of EUR218 million caused by weak
recurring revenues and a high level of credit impairments.

In addition, Moody's says that BCP's current ratings adequately
capture continued challenges that the bank is facing such as weak
risk-absorption capacity despite the broad public-sector support
received in 2012, its very weak profitability ratios and the high
level of non-performing loans in its domestic portfolio.

Rationale For The Outlook

The negative outlook on BCP's long-term debt and deposit ratings
takes into account the recent adoption of the Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM) regulation in the EU. In particular, this regulation
reflects that -- with the legislation underlying the new
resolution framework now in place and the explicit inclusion of
burden-sharing with unsecured creditors as a means of reducing
the public cost of bank resolutions -- the balance of risk for
banks' senior unsecured creditors has shifted to the downside.
Although Moody's support assumptions are unchanged for now, the
probability has risen that they will be revised downwards to
reflect the new framework.

The outlook on BCP's Caa3 subordinated debt rating is stable. In
accordance with Moody's notching guidelines, BCP's subordinated
debt is rated one notch below the bank's BCA. As such, the stable
outlook on this rating is consistent with Moody's view on the
bank's caa2 BCA.

What Could Move The Ratings UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on BCP's ratings could be driven by clear
visibility of a sustainable recovery in its recurring earnings
and capacity to generate capital. Any significant GDP growth
beyond Moody's central scenario of 1.3% in 2015 could also have
positive rating implications.

Downward pressure on BCP's ratings could develop if (1) asset-
quality and profitability indicators deteriorate beyond Moody's
expectations, leading to significant pressure on the bank's
capital base; (2) operating conditions fall short of the rating
agency's expectations; and/or (3) the bank's liquidity profile
deteriorates significantly.

As BCP's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the BCA, any
change to the BCA would likely also affect these ratings.
Furthermore, any change in Moody's systemic support assumptions
may directly impact the bank's senior debt ratings.

List of Affected Ratings


Issuer: Banco Comercial Portugues, S.A.

  Long-term Bank Deposit Rating, Confirmed at B1 negative

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at B1

  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at (P)B1

  Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at (P)Caa3

Issuer: Banco Comercial Portugues, SA, Macao Br

  Long-term Bank Deposit Rating , Confirmed at B1 negative

  Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at (P)B1

  Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at (P)Caa3

Issuer: BCP Finance Bank, Ltd.

  Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at B1

  Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at Caa3

  Backed Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at

   Backed Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Confirmed at

Issuer: BCP Finance Company

  Backed Subordinate Shelf, Confirmed at (P)Caa3


Issuer: Banco Comercial Portugues, S.A.

  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Maintained caa2

  Baseline Credit Assessment, Maintained caa2

  Bank Financial Strength Rating, Affirmed E

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Banco Comercial Portugues, S.A.

  Outlook, Changed To Negative(m) From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Banco Comercial Portugues, SA, Macao Br

  Outlook, Changed To Negative(m) From Rating Under Review

Issuer: BCP Finance Bank, Ltd.

  Outlook, Changed To Negative(m) From Rating Under Review

Issuer: BCP Finance Company

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in July 2014.


BANKIA SA: Must Set Aside EUR800MM to Cover Possible Legal Claims
Tobias Buck at The Financial Times reports that a Spanish judge
on Feb. 13 ordered Bankia S.A. and its former management to set
aside EUR800 million to cover for possible claims arising from
the 2012 near-collapse of the Madrid-based lender.

According to the FT, aside from the bank and its parent company,
the ruling is also directed at a group of individuals linked to
Bankia's ill-fated flotation a year before its bailout.  These
include Rodrigo Rato, the former head of the International
Monetary Fund and the man who presided over Bankia's spectacular
demise as chairman, the FT notes.

The deposit will not have to be paid in cash but can take the
form of a guarantee, meaning neither Bankia nor any of the former
managers will take an immediate financial hit, the FT says.  But
the size of the deposit, equivalent to more than a third of the
EUR1.8 billion small shareholders invested in the bank's
flotation, gives an idea of the potential liabilities that lie in
store -- and for which Bankia has yet to make provisions,
according to the FT.

Bankia's financial troubles forced Madrid in June 2012 to seek an
EU-funded bailout for the country's entire banking system, the FT
recounts.  Bankia was rescued thanks to an injection of public
cash worth EUR22 billion, but the group's shareholders were
almost entirely wiped out, the FT relays.

After reporting the biggest full-year loss in Spanish corporate
history, EUR19.2 billion, Bankia's new management has succeeded
in bringing the lender back to profitability, the FT notes.  The
turnaround has allowed the Spanish state to start selling down
its majority stake in the bank earlier than expected, the FT

However, both the bank and its former managers face continuing
legal uncertainty as a result of the plethora of pending legal
cases connected to the near-collapse, the FT says.  The case
underpinning the Feb. 13 ruling deals with the bank's flotation
in 2011, which was heavily marketed to retail investors and
Bankia's own staff, according to the FT.  About 350,000 small
investors bought into the offering, which saw the bank listed at
a price of EUR3.75 a share, the FT discloses.  The nominal value
of Bankia stock was ultimately written down to EUR0.01, the FT

Bankia SA is a Spanish banking conglomerate that was formed in
December 2010, consolidating the operations of seven regional
savings banks.  As of 2012, Bankia is the fourth largest bank of
Spain with 12 million customers.

BBVA RMBS 1: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR120MM B Notes to Ba2
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of four notes,
confirmed the rating of two notes and affirmed the rating of one
note in the two Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions: BBVA RMBS 1, FTA and BBVA RMBS 2, FTA.

Ratings Rationale

The rating upgrades reflect (1) the increase in the Spanish
local-currency country ceiling to Aa2, (2) sufficiency of credit
enhancement in the affected transactions for the revised rating
levels and (3) in the case of BBVA RMBS 2, FTA a decrease in the
expected loss assumption due to a better collateral performance
than expected.

The confirmations and affirmations reflect that the current
credit enhancement is sufficient to maintain the current ratings.

Reduced Sovereign Risk

The country ceilings reflect a range of risks that issuers in any
jurisdiction are exposed to, including economic, legal and
political risks. On 20 January 2015, Moody's announced a six-
notch uplift between a government bond rating and its country
risk ceiling for Spain. As a result, the maximum achievable
rating for structured finance transactions was increased to Aa2
from A1 for Spain.

Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's has reassessed its lifetime loss expectation taking into
account the collateral performance of the transactions to date.
The assumption of 5.53% over Original Balance has not been
updated in BBVA RMBS 1, FTA as the performance of the underlying
asset portfolio remains in line with Moody's assumptions.
However, in BBVA RMBS 2, FTA the Expected Loss assumption as a
percentage over original balance has been decreased to 4.74% from
5.47% due to a better performance of the underlying assets than
expected. The 60+ days delinquencies have decreased to 1.82% from
2.06% over current balance compared to the last review in
September 2014. The 90+ days delinquencies have decreased to
0.72% from 0.91% in the same period.

The MILAN CE assumption has been kept at 17.1% for BBVA RMBS 1,
FTA and at 15% for BBVA RMBS 2, FTA.

Pro-rata versus sequential amortization of Class A Notes

There is a performance trigger in the two transactions that could
switch the amortization and loss allocation within the Class A
notes from currently sequential to pro-rata. This trigger will be
hit once the sum of the outstanding Class A notes is higher than
the performing portfolio balance (including loans up to 90+days
in arrears) plus the mortgage loan principal repayment income
amount received during the Determination Period. For BBVA RMBS 1,
FTA, the A2 and A3 notes will continue to amortize sequentially
in Moody's expected scenario. For BBVA RMBS 2, FTA Moody's
expects the Class A notes to continue to amortize sequentially
for some time even if it is expected that the trigger will be
breached in future.

Exposure to Counterparties

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties including the roles of
servicer, account bank and swap provider.

The rating action takes into account the servicer commingling
exposure to Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (Baa2/P-2) for
the two transactions. Moody's also assessed when revising ratings
the exposure to Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch (A3/(P)P-2)
acting as swap counterparty.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
January 2015.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is worse than
Moody's expects, (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 1, FTA

  EUR1400 Million A2 Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
  Jan 23, 2015 A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  EUR495 Million A3 Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
  Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  EUR120 Million B Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jan
  23, 2015 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 2, FTA

  EUR2400 Million A2 Notes, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on
  Jan 23, 2015 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  EUR387.5 Million A3 Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
  Jan 23, 2015 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  EUR1050 Million A4 Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
  Sep 24, 2014 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

  EUR112.5 Million B Notes, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep
  24, 2014 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

HIPOCAT 7: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class D Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
Hipocat 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class A2, B, C, and
D notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria) and S&P's updated
criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The affirmations follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received in
October 2014.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its
RMBS criteria.

As all of S&P's ratings in this transaction are below its long-
term rating on the Kingdom of Spain (BBB/Stable/A-2), S&P has not
applied its RAS criteria.

Interest on the class B notes will be deferred if the difference
between the outstanding balance of the class A notes and the
available funds, after payment of the B notes' interest, is
greater than the sum of the outstanding balance of the mortgages
and the amortization account.

Interest on the class C notes will be deferred if the difference
between the outstanding balance of the class A and B notes and
the available funds, after payment of the C notes' interest, is
greater than the sum of the outstanding balance of the mortgages
and the amortization account.

Interest on the class D notes will be deferred if the difference
between the outstanding balance of the class A, B, and C notes
and the available funds, after payment of the D notes' interest,
is greater than the sum of the outstanding balance of the
mortgages and the amortization account.

Credit enhancement for the class A2 notes has increased to 19.9%,
from 16.3% at S&P's previous review.

Class         Available credit
               enhancement (%)
A2                        19.9
B                         15.4
C                          6.9
D                          1.2

This transaction features a reserve fund, which currently
represents 1.3% of the outstanding performing balance of the
mortgage assets.  The reserve fund has been drawn to cover losses
and is currently at 18% of its required amount.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 4.7% are on average
in line with S&P's Spanish RMBS index.  Defaults are defined as
mortgage loans in arrears for more than 18 months in this
transaction.  Cumulative defaults are equal to 2.5%.  Prepayment
levels remain low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down
significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and an increase in the weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAA                55.74       27.24
AA                 44.15       22.25
A                  37.02       13.81
BBB                27.60        9.62
BB                 19.58        6.93
B                  16.92        4.62

The decrease in the WAFF is mainly due to the higher originator
adjustments S&P has applied (to account for the relatively poor
performance of the Hipocat transactions compared with the Spanish
market in general) only partially offsetting the lower arrears
projections.  The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the
application of S&P's revised market value decline assumptions.
The overall effect is an increase in the required credit coverage
for the 'AAA' to 'A' rating levels.

Taking into account the results of S&P's updated credit and cash
flow analysis, it considers the available credit enhancement for
the class A2, B, C, and D notes to be commensurate with S&P's
currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BBB-
(sf)' rating on the class A2 notes, its 'BB (sf)' rating on the
class B notes, S&P's 'B+ (sf)' rating on the class C notes, and
S&P's 'B- (sf)' rating on the class D notes.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and house prices leveling off in 2015.

On the back of improving but still depressed macroeconomic
conditions, S&P don't expect the performance of the transactions
in our Spanish RMBS index to improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth, high unemployment, and fiscal
tightening.  On the positive side, S&P expects interest rates to
remain low for the foreseeable future.

Hipocat 7 is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which closed in June
2004.  The transaction securitizes a pool of first-ranking
mortgage loans that Catalunya Banc (formerly named Caixa
Catalunya) originated.  The mortgage loans are mainly located in
Catalonia and the transaction comprises loans secured over owner-
occupied properties.


Class       Rating

Hipocat 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.4 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A2          BBB- (sf)
B           BB (sf)
C           B+ (sf)
D           B- (sf)


UBS GROUP: S&P Assigns 'BB' Rating to High- & Low-Trigger Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that, subject to a review
of the final documentation, it assigned its 'BB' long-term issue
credit ratings to the proposed high- and low-trigger, additional
Tier 1 notes that UBS Group AG intends to issue in the coming

UBS intends to comply with the new capital requirements under
Basel III and the Swiss regulations for systemically important
banks by 2019.  Notably, these notes constitute UBS' first public
issuance of additional Tier 1 instruments and the first public
issuance from the new group holding company, UBS Group AG.  UBS
Group AG has already issued additional Tier 1 instruments to
employees under its deferred contingent compensation plan.

S&P is assigning ratings to these notes in accordance with its
criteria for hybrid capital instruments.  The 'BB' ratings
reflect S&P's assessment of UBS' unsupported group credit profile
of 'a-' and its approach, which involves deducting:

   -- One notch because the notes are contractually subordinated;

   -- Two notches because the notes have Tier 1 regulatory
      capital status;

   -- One notch because the notes contain a contractual write-
      down clause; and

   -- One notch because the notes are issued by a nonoperating
      holding company (NOHC), where S&P sees potential structural
      subordination and S&P considers it unclear that the NOHC
      would avoid defaulting on this instrument if UBS AG was to
      default on an equivalent hybrid instrument.

Although the high-trigger instrument contains a going-concern
write-down trigger, S&P do not notch down further for this
because it expects that the bank will maintain a common equity
Tier 1 (CET1) ratio that is over 700 basis points above the 7%
trigger. At end-2014, UBS reported a 19.5% CET1 ratio, calculated
on a Basel III phase-in basis.  S&P would expect to lower the
rating on this instrument if it projects that the ratio will fall
within 700 basis points of the trigger within our two-year rating

S&P's view of these notes as having "intermediate" equity content
is based on several factors.  In particular, the low- and high-
trigger notes are perpetual, regulatory Tier 1 capital
instruments that have no step-up.  The payment of coupons is
fully discretionary.  In addition, the high-trigger notes can
absorb losses on a going-concern basis through the write-down


UKRAINE: Seeks Talks to Expand IMF-Lead Bailout to US$40-Bil.
Volodymyr Verbyany and Peter Laca at Bloomberg News report that
Ukraine Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko said in an interview in
Kiev the country plans talks with creditors to secure almost a
third of an aid package agreed to by international lenders and

Ukraine's government reached a preliminary accord to expand an
International Monetary Fund-led bailout to as much as US$40
billion to avert a default as the 10-month conflict in the
nation's east damages the economy and drains resources, Bloomberg

Ukraine, Bloomberg says, will seek talks with bondholders after
winning its second IMF deal in 10 months amid a pro-Russia
insurgency that rocked its industrial heartland, forced it into
the deepest recession since 2009 and depleted foreign reserves to
an 11-year low.  Bloomberg notes that while President Vladimir
Putin announced a cease-fire on Feb. 12, investors, such as Max
Wolman at Aberdeen Asset Management Plc, are skeptical after
previous peace efforts failed to stop the bloodshed in eastern

"We are inviting everyone, including Russia, for consultations,"
Bloomberg quotes Ms. Jaresko as saying on Feb. 12.  "We are
asking all our creditors to work with us on these consultations.
And during the consultations, we will be able to see how much of
the restructuring we will be accomplishing."

Ms. Jaresko, as cited by Bloomberg, said the bailout consists of
three parts, including US$17.5 billion from the IMF, about US$9.2
billion in new bilateral and multilateral funds, while "rest is
expected to come out of the debt operations".

"I can't confirm that this will only be reprofiling or that this
will be the restructuring," Bloomberg quotes Ms. Jaresko as
saying.  "It's something we have to talk to the creditors about."

U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DFS FURNITURE: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on upholstered furniture retailer DFS
Furniture Holdings PLC (DFS) on CreditWatch with positive

The 'B' issue rating on DFS' existing GBP310 million senior
secured notes was also placed on CreditWatch positive.  The
recovery rating remains at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of
meaningful recovery (50%-70%) in the event of a default.  S&P
expects to withdraw the issue and recovery ratings on these notes
after the IPO, when the notes will be refinanced with new

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement that DFS
Furniture plc, DFS' proposed new holding company, is planning an
IPO on the London Stock Exchange.  The company expects to use all
of the net proceeds of the IPO to reduce debt and, together with
existing cash resources and the proceeds of about GBP200 million
from the proposed new senior facilities, will repay all amounts
outstanding under its senior secured notes.  The CreditWatch
placement reflects the likelihood that S&P could raise the
ratings by one notch on completion of the IPO and planned debt

DFS plans to raise about GBP105 million from the IPO, which it
will use to reduce net debt and pay costs associated with the
IPO. S&P understands that the existing shareholders will sell a
proportion of their shares as part of the IPO, with a targeted
free float of at least 25%.  S&P forecasts that the debt
reduction, coupled with sound operating performance and earnings
growth in 2014, will strengthen DFS' financial risk profile.

Following the transaction, S&P anticipates that DFS' pro forma
Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage (including the operating
lease obligations adjustment) will fall below 5x and funds from
operations (FFO) to debt will exceed 12%.  Pro forma the
transaction, S&P anticipates that DFS' Standard & Poor's-adjusted
leverage will be about 4.5x, with adjusted EBITDA interest
coverage at about 3x and FFO to debt at about 13%.  Therefore,
after the IPO, DFS' adjusted debt to EBITDA will likely improve
to a level that is commensurate with an "aggressive" financial
risk profile.

Private equity financial sponsor Advent International Corporation
will continue to hold a substantial share in DFS after the IPO.
In light of the continued financial-sponsor ownership, a positive
rating action depends on DFS' and the sponsor's ability and
willingness to maintain adjusted debt to EBITDA below 5x on a
sustainable basis after the IPO.  Financial policy
considerations -- including leverage tolerance, appetite for
acquisitions, capital expenditure, and dividend policy -- will be
key rating drivers under the new capital structure.

Following the IPO announcement, and in view of the company's
intention of decreasing leverage, S&P has revised its financial
policy modifier to FS-6 (no impact) from FS-6 (minus one notch).
For the same reason, S&P now regards DFS' position relative to
peers' as neutral under our comparable rating analysis instead of
positive previously, and have removed the notch of uplift.

The current rating continues to reflect S&P's assessment of DFS'
business risk profile as "fair," supported by its leading
position in the U.K. furniture market, with strong brand
recognition, limited inventory risks, and an efficient supply
chain, whereby it manufactures about 30% of its products in its
own factories and sources about 30% directly from manufacturers
in China.  In S&P's opinion, weaknesses include DFS' exposure to
the discretionary spending trends of U.K. consumers, the U.K.
housing market, strong competition, and a relatively high level
of marketing expenses.  In addition, DFS' business model is
dependent on about two-thirds of its sales being made on
interest-free consumer credit provided by third-party lenders.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch after DFS completes the
IPO, which will likely occur over the next two months.

S&P will likely raise the ratings on DFS by one notch if the IPO
is successful and the group is able to reduce debt as planned.
Before resolving the CreditWatch, S&P will assess DFS' capital
structure and financial policies following the IPO and take into
account any potential changes to the group's use of the proceeds.

HAWES SIGNS: Proposes Company Voluntary Arrangement; Cuts 57 Jobs
Richard Stuart-Turner at PrintWeek reports that Hawes Signs has
laid off 57 workers and proposed a Company Voluntary Arrangement
(CVA) after losing almost GBP3 million worth of business in less
than two years.

The company, which is based at Moulton Park, Northampton, told a
number of administrative staff and about 20 fitters on Jan. 27
that they would be losing their jobs, PrintWeek says, citing the
Northampton Chronicle & Echo.

The newspaper report also said that some of the workers that had
been made redundant had not received wages for work carried out
in the past month, PrintWeek notes.

According to documents seen by PrintWeek, the firm recorded a
loss of GBP2.8 million in the 11-month period to November 30,
2014 due to increasing costs of sales and administrative expenses
and the loss of a major retail contract.

One creditor told PrintWeek that Hawes has proposed a CVA and
that business recovery firm Leonard Curtis was working with the

The creditors' meeting will take place on Tuesday, Feb. 18, at
11:00 a.m. at Leonard Curtis' Manchester office, PrintWeek
discloses.  The business will need 75% approval of creditors by
value to be able to enter the CVA, according to PrintWeek.

It is understood that the unsecured creditors list totals
GBP5,381,577 with the company offering to pay back 36.3p in the
pound over five years, PrintWeek notes A total of GBP1,430,865 is
owed to HMRC, PrintWeek states.

Hawes Signs provides the project management, design, manufacture,
installation and maintenance of brand identity and POS signs,
displays and graphics.

PELAMIS WAVE: Owed More Than GBP15MM at Time of Administration
Perry Gourley at The Scotsman reports that Pelamis owed more than
GBP15 million, including almost GBP13 million to Scottish
Enterprise, when it fell into administration at the end of last

With its assets -- including intellectual property connected to
its "sea-snake" wave energy device -- estimated to be worth just
GBP836,000 in total, unsecured creditors of the Edinburgh-based
firm are expected to suffer a major shortfall on their debts, The
Scotsman notes.

According to The Scotsman, a statement of the company's affairs
produced as part of the administration process said Scottish
Enterprise's debt was GBP8 million when the company went into
administration but after interest charges and fees the total
owed was GBP12.86 million.

Although Scottish Enterprise held a charge over the company's
assets, the statement estimated the amount it would be entitled
to would only be around GBP660,000, The Scotsman says.

Unsecured creditors are owed some GBP3.5 million, The Scotsman
discloses.  They include Edinburgh Council, the universities of
Dundee and Edinburgh, Orkney Ferries and PR firm Grayling, The
Scotsman states.

Intellectual property, patents and some other assets at Pelamis
were bought by Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) last month
after reaching a deal with administrators KPMG, The Scotsman

The purchase price has not yet been revealed, The Scotsman notes.

In their administrators' report, KPMG, as cited by The Scotsman,
said there had been 18 potential buyers who had expressed
interest in buying the business.

Although several early offers for all or part of the business
were received by an initial closing date in December, by the
final closing date only offers for the company's assets were on
the table and HIE was the highest bidder, The Scotsman

All 56 staff at the company were made redundant during the
administration which was sparked after the company failed to
secure the further investment needed to continue, The Scotsman

Pelamis Wave Power employs more than 50 staff in the design,
manufacture and operation of wave energy converters which it has
been testing at the European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) in

TOWERGATE FINANCE: Moody's Puts Caa2 Secured Rating for Upgrade
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade the
Caa2 ratings on Towergate Finance plc's senior secured notes and
revolving credit facility ("RCF").

This rating action follows Towergate's announcement on February
6, 2015 that it has entered into a binding agreement ("joint
agreement") with its senior secured and senior unsecured
creditors to implement a financial restructuring and
recapitalization of the group. Under the terms of the joint
agreement, senior secured creditors will exchange their existing
debt claims for GBP425 million of new senior secured notes,
GBP250 million of cash and 19.4% of the ordinary equity of the
new holding company for the group. As part of this new agreement,
the senior unsecured bondholders will become majority
shareholders, owning 80.6% of the ordinary share capital of the

Ratings Rationale

The review for upgrade reflects Moody's view that the terms of
the joint agreement are more favorable for senior secured
creditors than the terms of binding agreement announced by
Towergate on February 2, 2015. Under the joint agreement, in
consideration of each GBP1 of existing senior secured debt
principal, senior secured creditors will receive 59 pence of new
senior secured bonds, 35 pence of cash and 6% in ordinary equity.
Moody's will re-visit these ratings upon completion of the
exchange and expects any upgrade to be limited to one notch.

No rating action has been taken on the C-PD Probability of
Default Rating and Ca Corporate Family Rating (CFR) on Towergate
Holdings II Ltd, or on the C rating of the senior unsecured debt
issued by Towergate Finance plc. Upon completion of the exchange,
Moody's will re-evaluate the CFR on a forward looking basis,
incorporating the new capital structure and other material
changes in Towergate's business and financial profile. Notably,
reduced leverage and enhanced short-term liquidity will improve
the group's financial flexibility. However, Moody's expect this
benefit to be partially offset by tough trading conditions in the
UK, challenges associated with the group's change program, and
significant exceptional costs.

The following ratings have been placed on review for upgrade:

  Towergate Finance Plc Backed Senior secured notes at Caa2

  Towergate Finance Plc Backed Senior secured revolving credit
  facility at Caa2 (LGD2)

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Global Rating
Methodology for Insurance Brokers & Service Companies published
in February 2012. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.


* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on EU Synthetic CDO Tranches
After running its month-end SROC (synthetic rated
overcollateralization) figures, Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services today took various credit rating actions on 17 European
synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) tranches.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised and removed from CreditWatch positive its rating on
      one tranche;
   -- Raised its ratings on three tranches; and
   -- Placed on CreditWatch positive its rating on 13 tranches.

The rating actions are part of S&P's regular monthly review of
European synthetic CDOs.  The actions incorporate, among other
things, the effect of recent rating migration within reference
portfolios and recent credit events on corporate entities.


The SROC (synthetic rated overcollateralization; see "What Is
SROC?" below) has fallen below 100% during the December 2014
month-end run.  This indicates to S&P that the current credit
enhancement may not be sufficient to maintain the current tranche


The SROC has risen above 100% during the December 2014 month-end
run.  This indicates to S&P that the current credit enhancement
is sufficient to maintain the current tranche rating.


The tranche's current SROC exceeds 100%, which indicates to S&P
that the tranche's credit enhancement is greater than that
required to maintain the current rating.  Additionally, S&P's
analysis indicates that the current SROC would be greater than
100% at a higher rating level than currently assigned.


S&P has run SROC for the current portfolio and have projected
SROC 90 days into the future, while assuming no asset rating

S&P has lowered its ratings to the level at which SROC is above
or equal to 100%.  However, if the SROC is below 100% at a
certain rating level but greater than 100% in the projected 90-
day run, S&P may leave the rating on CreditWatch negative at the
revised rating level.


S&P has raised its ratings to the level at which SROC exceeds
100% and meets S&P's minimum cushion requirement.


S&P has affirmed its ratings on those tranches for which credit
enhancement is, in its opinion, still at a level commensurate
with their current ratings.


S&P has lowered its ratings to 'CC' where losses in a portfolio
have already exceeded the available credit enhancement or where,
in S&P's opinion, it is highly likely that this will occur once
it knows final valuations.  S&P has done so as it considers that
it is highly likely that the noteholders will not receive their
full principal.


S&P has lowered its ratings to 'D' where it has received
confirmation that losses from credit events in the underlying
portfolio have exceeded the available credit enhancement and
partially reduced the notes principal amount.  This means the
noteholders did not receive interest based on the full notional
of the notes.


For all of S&P's European synthetic CDO transactions, it applies
its corporate CDO criteria.  Therefore, S&P has run its analysis
on CDO Evaluator model 6.3, which includes the top obligor and
industry test SROCs.

In addition to the obligor and industry tests, and the Monte
Carlo default simulation results, S&P may consider certain
factors such as credit stability and rating sensitivity to
modeling parameters when assigning ratings to CDO tranches.  S&P
assess these factors case-by-case and may adjust the ratings to a
rating level that is different to that indicated by the
quantitative results alone.


One of the main steps in S&P's rating analysis is the review of
the credit quality of the portfolio referenced assets.  SROC is
one of the tools S&P uses when surveilling its ratings on
synthetic CDO tranches with reference portfolios.

SROC is a measure of the degree by which the credit enhancement
(or attachment point) of a tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate
assumed for a given rating scenario.  SROC helps capture what S&P
considers to be the major influences on portfolio performance:
Credit events, asset rating migration, asset amortization, and
time to maturity.  It is a comparable measure across different
tranches of the same rating.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

                 * * * End of Transmission * * *