TCREUR_Public/150218.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, February 18, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 35

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Moody's Extends Review of Ba1 Rating


D E N M A R K

NYKREDIT REALKREDIT: Fitch Rates Additional Tier 1 Notes BB+(EXP)
TDC A/S: Fitch Assigns 'BB+(EXP)' Rating to Hybrid Securities


G E R M A N Y

JUNO LTD: S&P Affirms 'D(sf)' Ratings on 3 Note Classes


G R E E C E

GREECE: Bailout Talks with EU Finance Ministers End in Acrimony
HELLENIC TELECOMS: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'


I R E L A N D

HARVEST CLO X: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
PREPS 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
RADISSON BLUE: Rhatigan Wants Court to Block Receivership


I T A L Y

BERICA 5 RESIDENTIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B-
TAURUS 2015-1: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class D Notes


K A Z A K H S T A N

BTA BANK: Fitch Raises Rating on USD750MM Sr. Unsec. Bond to 'B'
CENTRAS INSURANCE: A.M. Best Assigns "b" Issuer Credit Rating
KAZAKHTELECOM: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB' CCR
KAZMUNAYGAS NC: S&P Cuts LongTerm Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB+'
KOMMESK-OMIR INSURANCE: A.M. Best Assigns b+ Issuer Credit Rating


L U X E M B O U R G

ELEX ALPHA: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

BABSON EURO 2014-1: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on F Notes
DRYDEN 35: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class F Notes
DRYDEN 35: S&P Assigns Preliminary B- Rating to Class F Notes
QUEEN STREET II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes


P O R T U G A L

BANCO ESPIRITO: March 20 Deadline Set for Novo Banco Offers


R O M A N I A

PETROLUL PLOIESTI: Files Insolvency Request


R U S S I A

ALFA BANK: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB+'; Outlook Remains Negative
GAZ CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on EUR500MM Notes to 'BB+'
SUDOSTROITELNY BANK: Central Bank Revokes License


S W I T Z E R L A N D

* SWITZERLAND: Moody's Says Insurers Face Credit-Negative Effects


U K R A I N E

BANK NADRA: Placed in Temporary Administration
UKRAINE: Fitch Lowers Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'CC'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ACCUNOSTICS: To Go Into Administration, Cuts 30 Jobs
BIRMINGHAM INT'L: In Receivership; Club Not In Liquidation
IPR CAPITAL: Placed Into Provisional Liquidation
MANOR MOTORSPORT: Eyes Return to F1 Grid Using Modified Car
MATRIX COMPANY: Ordered Into Liquidation

MIKHAIL SHLOSBERG: February 26 Claims Filing Deadline Set
ON LINE PLATFORM: Provisional Liquidator Appointed
THOMAS COOK: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR400MM Sr. Notes
VIRIDIAN GROUP: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to EUR600MM Notes
VIRIDIAN GROUP: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+' on Post Refinancing


U Z B E K I S T A N

IPAK YULI: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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KOMMUNALKREDIT AUSTRIA: Moody's Extends Review of Ba1 Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service extended its review for downgrade of
Kommunalkredit Austria AG's (KA) Ba1 long-term debt and deposit
ratings following the extension of the partial sales process of
KA as announced in a recent press interview by Dr. Klaus
Liebscher, the CEO of KA's fiduciary owner,
Finanzmarktbeteiligung Aktiengesellschaft des Bundes (Fimbag,
unrated).

As part of the review, Moody's continues to (1) re-assess the
currently very high government (systemic) support probability for
KA; and (2) analyze the implications of the ongoing partial sale
process of KA, managed by Fimbag.

Moody's originally initiated the review on June 20, 2014
following a re-assessment of the likelihood of systemic support
for Austrian banks, which was extended on Sept. 16, 2014 because
of Fimbag's announced partial sale of KA.  Moody's expects to
conclude the review within the next three months.

Moody's extended review will focus on the rating agency's
expectations regarding the future availability of systemic
support for KA's outstanding senior unsecured debt and deposits.
In particular, depending on the nature of the future obligor of
KA's liabilities, a partial sale of KA by Austria (Aaa stable),
its 99.78% owner, may entail Moody's to re-assess the "very high"
support likelihood that the rating agency currently assumes for
KA.

During its extended review, Moody's expects to obtain more
clarity regarding (1) the success and likely closing of a partial
sale of KA and related strategic intentions of KA's future
owners; and (2) the treatment of KA's outstanding debt, if there
is a successful partial sale.  According to an earlier press
release by KA Finanz (KF; unrated), a wind-down entity previously
separated from KA, the remainder of KA's assets -- approximately
EUR4.7 billion as of June 30, 2014 based on Austrian local GAAP
-- could be merged into KF, if the bid is successful.

Until a sale is complete (i.e. signed), the treatment of KA's
liabilities is uncertain, in particular whether its current
liabilities would be transferred to KF, remain with KA, or be
assumed by an acquirer.

Concerning the further timetable of the sales process, Fimbag's
Dr. Liebscher publicly stated in January 2015 that the signing of
the KA sale is expected for mid to late-February. This coincides
with recent public disclosure by construction firm Strabag SE
(unrated), which considers participating in one of the bidder
consortiums. Strabag SE noted that "the current schedule provides
that last and final bids are to be submitted in the course of
February 2015, and that the closing with the successful bidder
should take place in the first half of 2015."

Absent a change in ownership, Moody's rating review will remain
focused on the ability and willingness of Austria to provide
capital support to KA, in case of need, under the European Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) framework.  The BRRD has
been fully implemented in Austria effective Jan. 1, 2015,
including all tools allowing for liability burden sharing in bank
resolution.

Given the review for downgrade of KA's long-term debt and deposit
ratings, Moody's does not currently expect any upward rating
pressure.  If the current sales process is completed resulting in
improved prospects for KA as a viable going-concern entity and
strengthened financial fundamentals, upward pressure on KA's
ratings might develop.

KA's long-term debt and deposit ratings could be downgraded if
Moody's assesses that a sale may result in a lower probability of
systemic support.  Or, irrespective of a change in ownership, if
the rating agency considers liability burden sharing more likely
and the potential for government support reduced under the BRRD
in the form it has recently been introduced in Austria.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in July 2014.



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D E N M A R K
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NYKREDIT REALKREDIT: Fitch Rates Additional Tier 1 Notes BB+(EXP)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Nykredit Realkredit AS's (A/Stable/F1)
planned issue of additional Tier 1 notes an expected rating of
'BB+(EXP)'.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes will be CRD IV-compliant perpetual non-cumulative
resettable additional Tier 1 instruments with a call option after
just above five years.  The notes are subject to temporary write-
down if the common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of Nykredit
Realkredit and/or Nykredit Realkredit Group and/or Nykredit
Holding Group falls below 7.125%, and any coupon payments may be
cancelled at the discretion of the bank.

The expected rating is five notches below Nykredit Realkredit's
'a' Viability Rating (VR) in accordance with Fitch's criteria for
assessing and rating bank subordinated and hybrid securities.
The notching reflects the notes' higher expected loss severity
relative to senior unsecured creditors (two notches) and higher
non-performance risk (three notches) given the fully
discretionary coupon payments.  Nykredit Realkredit's large
capital buffer above the 7.125% CET1 trigger and regulatory
minimum capital ratios is sufficient to limit the notching for
non-performance risk to three (which could otherwise result in
wider notching).

Given the securities are perpetual, their deep subordination,
coupon flexibility and going concern mandatory write-down of the
instruments, Fitch has assigned 100% equity credit.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As the notes are notched from Nykredit Realkredit's VR, their
ratings are primarily sensitive to a change in this rating.  The
notes' rating is also sensitive to a wider notching if Fitch
changes its assessment of the probability of the notes' non-
performance risk relative to the risk captured in Nykredit
Realkredit's VR.


TDC A/S: Fitch Assigns 'BB+(EXP)' Rating to Hybrid Securities
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Denmark-based telecoms group TDC A/S's
(TDC, BBB/Negative) proposed EUR500 million callable subordinated
capital securities (hybrids) an expected rating of 'BB+(EXP)'.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documentation confirming materially to the preliminary
documentation reviewed.

The proposed hybrid securities have a 1,000 year maturity and are
structured to be deeply subordinated and senior only to TDC's
ordinary shares. The coupon payments can be deferred at the
option of the issuer with a compounding of interest. As a result
of these features, the proposed securities are rated two notches
below TDC's 'BBB' Long-term IDR to reflect increased loss
severity and heightened risk of non-performance relative to
senior obligations.

The approach is in accordance with Fitch's criteria, "Treatment
and Notching of Hybrids in Non-Financial Corporate and REIT
Credit Analysis".

The hybrid securities qualify for 50% equity credit as they meet
Fitch's criteria with regard to subordination, effective maturity
of at least five years, full discretion to defer coupons for at
least five years and limited events of default, as well as the
absence of material covenants and look-back provisions.

TDC has an option to redeem the notes at its first call date and
then on every annual interest payment date thereafter. The coupon
will be reset every five years with a step-up of 25bp at the
first step-up date and an additional 75bps at the second step-up
date. Early call options are also permitted for tax, accounting,
rating agency and change-of-control reasons.

There is no look-back provision in the securities' documentation
that would remove the issuer's full discretion to unilaterally
defer coupon payments. Deferrals of coupon payments are
cumulative and the company will be obliged to make a mandatory
settlement of deferred interest payments under certain
circumstances, including a declaration or payment of a dividend
to shareholders.

The issue of hybrid securities forms part of the company's
funding strategy for its acquisition of Norwegian cable operator
GET for EUR1.69bn in October 2014.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Domestic Position

TDC owns both the Danish incumbent copper network and the
majority of the cable infrastructure in the country. This gives
the company a strong fixed line position compared with all other
European incumbents and helps the company to generate best-in-
class EBITDA margins of 49% in 2014 excluding the company's
operations in Norway and Sweden. This is reflected in Fitch-
calculated funds from operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage
downgrade guidance of 3.75x, which is at the higher end of the
rating category.

Increasing Competition and Regulation

Competition and regulation are expected to have a significant
negative impact on TDC's domestic business over the next three
years. The main points of pressure are likely to be driven by a
loss of mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) contacts,
continued losses in fixed line telephony and competitive pressure
in the B2B segment. Regulatory pressure on broadband wholesale
prices, retail roaming and cable TV is expected to amount to a
gross profit loss of DKK100 million-DKK150 million by 2015 or
approximately 0.5% of 2014 group revenues.

GET Acquisition

In September 2014, TDC announced the acquisition of the Norwegian
cable operator GET for EUR1.69 billion. The acquisition is to be
funded through a combination of debt, hybrid securities and a
reduction in dividend payments. The transaction aims to improve
TDC's growth profile, increase diversification and gain greater
exposure to cable. TDC also aims to generate revenue and cost
synergies of EUR22 million per annum by 2017.

Managing a Leverage Spike

The partially debt-funded nature of the GET transaction removed
any headroom TDC had within its 'BBB' rating. The acquisition
increased leverage; lifting the group's FFO adjusted net debt to
3.9x from 3.4x in 2014. Fitch expects TDC's leverage will decline
to 3.7x by 2017 and further thereafter. The deleveraging is
expected to be achieved with a combination of operating cash
flow, reduced dividends and the planned issue of hybrid bonds.
Given limited headroom within TDC's ratings, the execution of
both the company's operational and financial strategy, including
the planned hybrid bond issue, is key to meeting its deleveraging
trajectory.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our ratings case include:

-- An improvement in the rate of revenue decline within TDC
    Denmark from 4% YoY in 2014 to 1% by 2016.

-- A contraction of approximately 1.5 percentage points in
    EBITDA margin in 2015 reflecting the loss of MVNO contracts,
    regulatory and competitive pressure in Denmark.

-- Capex of DKK4.3bn in 2015 excluding spectrum costs and
    gradually reducing capital intensity from 18% to 17% over
    three years.

-- FFO adjusted net leverage declining from 4.0x in 2015 to 3.7x
    in 2017.

-- A reduction in dividends in line with the company's new
    dividend policy of approximately 60% of equity free cash
    flow.

-- They do not assume any improvement in operating performance
    as a result of potential market consolidation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to a downgrade
include:

-- FFO-adjusted net leverage exceeding 3.75x on a sustained
    basis.

-- A lack of progress in deleveraging during 2015, as a result
    of lower operational cash flow or a change in the funding
    strategy for the GET acquisition.

-- A marked deterioration in TDC's operating environment and/or
    unfavorable regulatory decisions.

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

-- FFO-adjusted net leverage sustainably below 3.0x, together
    with evidence of improved operational and financial
    performance could lead to an upgrade to 'BBB+'.

-- The Outlook could be revised to Stable upon expectations that
    FFO-adjusted net leverage will fall to below 3.75x on a
    sustainable basis combined with stabilizing EBITDA trends and
    no further deterioration in competitive and regulatory
    environments.



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G E R M A N Y
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JUNO LTD: S&P Affirms 'D(sf)' Ratings on 3 Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
JUNO (ECLIPSE 2007-2) Ltd.'s class B, C, D, and E notes.  At the
same time, S&P raised to 'A+ (sf)' from 'A (sf)' and placed on
CreditWatch negative its rating on the class A notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
portfolio performance under its European commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) criteria.

NEUMARKT (44% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan (EUR122.3 million) represents the senior
portion of a whole loan.  The whole loan was originally secured
on a shopping center and office complex in central Cologne,
Germany.

The security has been liquidated following the sale of the
property in August 2011.  The cash manager has yet to distribute
the final recoveries and apply losses (toward the notes).  S&P
understands that the liquidation loss amount cannot be finalized
until the collection of late recoveries.

Based on the latest quarterly surveillance report issued on
Jan. 12, 2015, the final distribution is likely to occur before
the end of Q2 2015.

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed principal losses on this loan
in its 'B' case rating stress scenario.

OBELISCO PORTFOLIO (30% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan (EUR82.1 million) was fully securitized at
closing.  The loan is now secured on 10 Italian properties.  Most
of the assets are office properties in Rome.  The loan matures in
December 2015.

The portfolio is multitenanted.  Its latest weighted-average
occupancy rate is reported at 81.93%.  The largest tenant and the
top five tenants account for about 26.59% and 61.35% of the
portfolio's income, respectively.  The reported weighted-average
lease term until the next break is two years and two months.

On the latest payment date, the servicer reported a loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio of 40.93%, based on a December 2013 valuation.  The
valuation reflects a 2.25% net initial yield, based on the most
recent reported net operating income.

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed principal losses on this loan
in its 'B' case rating stress scenario.  This is mainly because
S&P did not give credit to additional income sources over and
above the reported income, and S&P used average long-term
capitalization rates in its property analysis.

NORDHAUSEN (6% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan (EUR17.8 million) was fully securitized at
closing.  The loan is secured on a retail warehouse property in
Nordhausen/Thuringen, Germany.  The loan matures in August 2016.

The property is fully let to a single tenant with a lease ending
in three years and six months.

On the latest payment date, the servicer reported a LTV of
63.99%, based on a September 2012 valuation.

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed a full loan repayment in its
'B' case rating stress scenario.

LE CROISSANT (6% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan (EUR17.0 million) was fully securitized at
closing.  The loan is secured on an office property in Brussels,
Belgium.

The property is fully let to the European Commission with a lease
ending in five years and seven months.

The loan matured on Nov. 14, 2014, but failed to repay and
transferred to special servicing.  The loan is now in standstill.

On the latest payment date, the servicer reported an LTV ratio of
77.85%, based on an October 2009 valuation.

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed principal losses on this loan
in its 'B' case rating stress scenario.  This is because S&P
believes the property is over-rented.  S&P took this into account
into its 'B' case amount of recovery.

MONHEIM (5% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan (EUR14.0 million) was originally secured on
a single-tenanted office property in Monheim, Germany.

Following the property's sale in 2014, the calculation agent
determined that a liquidation loss amount of EUR188,328 has been
realized (with respect to this loan).  The cash manager has yet
to distribute the final recoveries and apply losses (toward the
notes).

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed principal losses (EUR188,328)
on this loan in its 'B' case rating stress scenario.

PRINS BOUDEWIJN (4% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan (EUR11.6 million) was fully securitized at
closing.  The loan is secured on an office property near Antwerp,
Belgium.  The loan failed to repay at loan maturity on Feb. 10,
2015.

The property is multitenanted.  The portfolio occupancy is at
90.87% and the weighted-average lease term to first lease break
is two years and seven months.

On the latest payment date, the servicer reported a LTV ratio of
86.98%, based on a September 2014 valuation.  The LTV ratio is in
breach of the covenant.  However, reserve funds are available to
cure the breach.

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed principal losses on this loan
in its 'B' case rating stress scenario.

SEAFORD PORTFOLIO (4% OF THE POOL)

The securitized loan (EUR11.2 million) was fully securitized at
closing.  The loan is secured on six logistics centers located
throughout Germany.

On the latest payment date, the servicer reported a LTV ratio of
143.09%, based on a November 2013 valuation.

In S&P's analysis, it has assumed principal losses on this loan
in its 'B' case rating stress scenario.

COUNTERPARTY RISK

On Feb. 3, 2015, S&P placed its long- and short-term ratings on
Barclays Bank PLC on CreditWatch negative.

S&P's current counterparty criteria allow it to rate the notes in
structured finance transactions above S&P's ratings on related
counterparties if a replacement framework exists and other
conditions are met.  The maximum ratings uplift depends on the
type of counterparty obligation.  In this transaction, Barclays
Bank is the cash deposit bank and the repurchase counterparty.
In accordance with S&P's current counterparty criteria, Barclays
Bank can support a maximum potential rating of 'A+ (sf)/Watch
Neg' on the notes in this transaction.

RATING ACTIONS

Standard & Poor's ratings address the timely payment of interest
and payment of principal no later than the legal final maturity
date in November 2022.

Although S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the
class A notes to adequately mitigate the risk of losses from the
remaining underlying pool of loans in higher stress scenarios,
S&P's rating on this class of notes remains constrained at 'A+
(sf)/Watch Neg' due to counterparty reasons.  S&P has therefore
raised to 'A+ (sf)' from 'A (sf)' and placed on CreditWatch
negative its rating on the class class A notes for counterparty
reasons.

S&P has affirmed its 'B- (sf)' rating on the class B notes, as it
believes this class of notes is vulnerable to principal losses in
its 'B' rating stress scenario.  S&P did not assign a 'CCC'
rating because this class of notes is not dependent upon
favorable business, financial, or economic conditions to fully
repay, in S&P's opinion.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C, D, and E
notes because they experienced losses on previous payment dates.

JUNO (ECLIPSE 2007-2) is a 2007-vintage synthetic transaction
backed by seven loans (down from 17 at closing), secured on
mixed-use commercial properties in Germany, Belgium, and Italy.

RATINGS LIST

JUNO (ECLIPSE 2007-2) Ltd.

EUR867.95 million commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes

                           Rating                 Rating
Class      Identifier      To                     From
A          48204PAA5       A+ (sf)/Watch Neg      A (sf)
B          48204PAE7       B- (sf)                B- (sf)
C          48204PAB3       D (sf)                 D (sf)
D          48204PAC1       D (sf)                 D (sf)
E          48204PAD9       D (sf)                 D (sf)



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G R E E C E
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GREECE: Bailout Talks with EU Finance Ministers End in Acrimony
---------------------------------------------------------------
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at The Telegraph reports that Greece is
on a collision course with the eurozone's creditor powers after
emergency talks ended in acrimony on Feb. 16, triggering the most
serious political crisis since the launch of the euro.

The Leftist Syriza government reacted with fury to eurozone
demands that it must stick to the country's discredited austerity
plan, describing the draft text as "absurd and unacceptable", The
Telegraph relays.

Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek finance minister, said Eurogroup
finance ministers had ignored a deal already agreed with the
European Commission for a four-month delay and a "new contract
for growth", returning instead to old demands, The Telegraph
relates.  "The only way to solve Greece is to treat us like
equals; not a debt colony," Mr. Varoufakis, as cited by The
Telegraph, said, predicting that EU authorities would soon have
to withdraw their latest "ultimatum."

"This program has failed to stabilize Greece, has generated a
major humanitarian crisis, and has led to a debt deflationary
spiral," The Telegraph quotes Mr. Varoufakis as saying,
nevertheless pledging to do whatever it takes to reach an
"honorable settlement."

The talks were halted after four hours of stormy exchanges,
risking a traumatic showdown that could precipitate the biggest
default in world history and force Greece out of the euro by the
end of the month, The Telegraph relays.

According to The Telegraph, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the head of the
Eurogroup, was unyielding in comments afterwards, demanding that
Greece "honor its obligations".  He said the ball is now in
Greece's court, The Telegraph notes.  "They have to make up their
minds," Mr. Dijsselbloem, as cited by The Telegraph, said,
leaving the door open for another meeting on Friday, Feb. 20.

For all the bluster, the Eurogroup text did say the creditors
would look "favorably" on a request for a six-month technical
extension to Greece's bail-out, even suggesting that Athens could
draw on EUR11 billion set aside for bank recapitalization, The
Telegraph relays.

Greece, The Telegraph says, must repay EUR22.5 billion this year,
starting with EUR4 billion owed to the International Monetary
Fund over the next six weeks.  The crunch comes in June, July and
August, when it has to pay back EUR11.4 billion, mostly to the
European Central Bank, according to The Telegraph.

Whether Greece can last even this long depends entirely on
liquidity support for the Greek financial system from the ECB,
The Telegraph states.  Frankfurt has already sent a warning
signal by refusing to accept Greek-backed bonds as collateral for
fresh loans at its normal lending window, but is still
maintaining emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) for Greek banks,
The Telegraph discloses.

The European Central Bank's governing council could cut this off
at any time by a two-thirds majority vote, a move that would lead
to a collapse of the Greek banks and force Greece out of the
euro, The Telegraph notes.

The crucial deadline for the ECB is Feb. 28 when the current
bail-out program expires, The Telegraph says.


HELLENIC TELECOMS: S&P Cuts Corporate Credit Rating to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Greek integrated telecommunications
operator Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. (OTE) to
'BB-' from 'BB' and placed the rating on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B'
short-term corporate credit rating on OTE.

In addition, S&P lowered its issue ratings on the debt issued by
OTE's wholly-owned financing vehicle, OTE PLC, to 'BB-' from 'BB'
and placed these ratings on CreditWatch negative.

The rating action on OTE follows S&P's lowering of the long-term
sovereign ratings on Greece by one notch to 'B-' from 'B'.  S&P
caps the long-term corporate credit rating on OTE at three
notches above the sovereign rating to reflect OTE's significant
country risk exposure to the Greek economy.  OTE generates about
70% of its revenues and about 75% of its EBITDA in Greece.  OTE
is also subject to pricing restrictions imposed by the Greek
regulator and generates moderate revenues from the Greek
government.  S&P would lower the cap on the rating on OTE to 'B'
if it assessed the likelihood that Greece might exit the eurozone
had increased to one-in-three or greater.

OTE's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is unchanged at 'bb',
primarily because S&P considers OTE unlikely to default in the
hypothetical stress scenarios that S&P anticipates would likely
accompany a sovereign default of Greece or an exit of Greece from
the eurozone.  S&P expects the company's solid balance sheet, its
strong track record of cost cutting, and its resilient free cash
flow generation, will protect it in a stress scenario, as will
its policy of holding almost all of its cash balances (EUR1.3
billion as of Sept. 30, 2014) at large international banks
outside Greece. S&P believes that OTE would be able to maintain
"adequate" liquidity in such a stress scenario.  OTE issued all
its currently outstanding debt outside Greece, primarily through
its U.K.-based financing subsidiary OTE PLC, which is governed by
English law.  As a result, in S&P's opinion, its financial debt
will not be exposed to redenomination risk if Greece exits the
eurozone.

S&P's assessment of OTE's SACP incorporates S&P's view of the
high country risk and weak macroeconomic conditions in Greece.
OTE currently faces constrained consumer, government, and
corporate spending, adverse regulation, and fierce competition.
This is partly offset by OTE's leading domestic market positions
in mobile and fixed-line services and S&P's expectation that the
company will continue to undertake cost-cutting measures that
will support its operating margins, despite falling revenues.

S&P also anticipates that OTE will continue to reduce its
leverage by using its free cash flow to pay down debt and
maintain a very solid balance sheet.  This is partly offset by
the lack of clarity regarding Greek companies' future access to
the capital markets and the risk that the company's credit
metrics and free cash flow generation could materially weaken
from the currently strong levels in case of an exit from the
eurozone.

OTE's SACP also reflects S&P's view that, compared with its
European rated peers, its assessments of OTE's business and
financial risk don't fully demonstrate the effect of the high
country risk in Greece.  While S&P thinks OTE's moderate network
investments benefit its solid free cash flow generation, S&P
considers that an increase in investment could be needed to
support OTE's competitive position in the long term.

In its base-case operating scenario for OTE, S&P assumes that:

   -- Greece will remain in the eurozone and that the Greek
      economy will emerge from several consecutive years of
      recession in 2015.  That said, the recovery will likely be
      weak and gradual;

   -- Revenues will drop by about 4% year-on-year in 2015,
      followed by a dip of about 2% in 2016, following a 3.5%
      year-on-year revenue decline in the first nine months of
      2014.  Continued high unemployment rates and constrained
      households incomes will likely cause consumers to remain
      cautious and put further pressure on pricing;

   -- Organic revenue will decline more slowly as regulatory
      pressure on mobile termination rates eases and because of
      some potential benefits from the take of long-term
      evolution (LTE; used to transmit wireless data), high-speed
      Internet broadband, and pay-TV services;

   -- Continued cost cuts, which will help OTE maintain EBITDA
      margins before restructuring costs of about 35%-36%;

   -- Annual capital expenditures, including spectrum costs, of
      EUR0.6 billion-EUR0.7 billion in 2015 and 2016;

   -- The acquisition of pay-TV operator Nova during the next two
      years; and

   -- The resumption of moderate dividend payments.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit metrics
for OTE:

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt strengthening toward
      50% in 2015 and 2016 on debt reduction and lower
      restructuring and interest costs, from about 34% on
      Sept. 30, 2014;

   -- Debt to EBITDA declining toward 1.5x in the next two years,
      from 2.0x on Sept. 30, 2014; and

   -- Free operating cash flow from continuing operations (after
      spectrum investments and restructuring costs) of about
      EUR0.4 billion a year in 2014-2015.

S&P does not factor into OTE's SACP additional support from the
company's 40% shareholder, Deutsche Telekom AG (DT), primarily
because S&P assess OTE as a nonstrategic subsidiary for DT under
S&P's criteria.  S&P's assessment is supported by the lack of
material support DT provided to OTE during the sovereign crisis
in 2011 and 2012.  S&P thinks DT is likely to continue taking an
opportunistic approach to providing support in the future.

S&P expects to update or resolve the CreditWatch after resolving
the CreditWatch placement on Greece and after reviewing the
group's operating and cash flow generation prospects.

S&P could lower the rating on OTE by two notches to 'B' if it was
to assess the likelihood of a eurozone exit had increased to one-
in-three or greater.  In addition, materially higher country
risks accompanied by a significantly weaker macroeconomic
environment and materially adverse implications for OTE's
operating prospects or liquidity could result in a one-notch
rating downgrade.

S&P could affirm the rating on OTE if country risk or the risks
of a eurozone exit moderated.  In addition, the ratings could
stabilize if S&P observed that DT's commitment to OTE had
strengthened.  Stronger support could take the form of a
substantial increase in DT's stake in OTE or other explicit forms
of financial support.

Furthermore, S&P could also affirm the rating on OTE if the
current sovereign credit rating on Greece were to be downgraded
for other reasons than an increasing likelihood of a eurozone
exit while at the same time S&P assessed OTE's SACP as at least
'bb-'.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


HARVEST CLO X: S&P Affirms 'B' Rating on Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
Harvest CLO X Ltd.'s class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes following
the transaction's effective date as of Jan. 12, 2015.

Most European cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
close before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level
of portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral
manager typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral
within the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to
reach the target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the
CLO transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted
level of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective
date" for a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on
which the transaction acquires the target level of portfolio
collateral, or the date defined in the transaction documents.
Most transaction documents contain provisions directing the
trustee to request the rating agencies that have issued ratings
upon closing to affirm the ratings issued on the closing date
after reviewing the effective date portfolio (typically referred
to as an "effective date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with
the transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support
to maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period."
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new-issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more
diverse portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to its effective date review are generally
based on the application of S&P's criteria to a combination of
purchased collateral, collateral committed to be purchased, and
the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P by the
collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions about
the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because not all
assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
full cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile
break-even default rate at each rating level, the application of
our supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated European cash flow CLO," S&P
added.

On an ongoing basis after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view,
the current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the
credit quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to
support the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as
S&P deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Harvest CLO X Ltd.
EUR466.5 Million Senior Secured Floating Rate and Deferrable
Notes

Ratings Affirmed

Class            Rating

A                AAA (sf)
B                AA+ (sf)
C                A (sf)
D                BBB (sf)
E                BB (sf)
F                B (sf)


PREPS 2006-1: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on 4 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed PREPS 2006-1 plc and PREPS 2007-1 plc,
as:

PREPS 2006-1 plc (PREPS 2006-1)

  EUR13,189,648 class B1 notes (ISIN: XS0261125677): affirmed at
  'Csf'; RE: 0%

  EUR2,967,671 class B2 notes (ISIN: XS0261127376): affirmed at
  'Csf'; RE: 0%

PREPS 2007-1 plc (PREPS 2007-1)

  EUR29,593,176 class A1 notes (ISIN: XS0289620709): affirmed at
  'Csf'; RE: 0%

  EUR35,000,000 class B1 notes (ISIN: XS0289620881): affirmed at
  'Csf'; RE: 0%

The transactions are cash securitizations of subordinated loans
to medium-sized enterprises located in up to eight jurisdictions:
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the UK.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

PREPS 2006-1

The affirmation of the class B1 and B2 notes at 'Csf' reflect
Fitch's view that default is inevitable.  The class A1 and A2
notes were fully repaid at the transaction's scheduled maturity
date in July 2013.

Since the companies' subordinated loans securitized in the pool
are bullet loans with the same tenor, they all became due on the
same scheduled maturity date.  As of the last payment date, 12
companies are still listed as constituents of the portfolio.  Of
these, 11 have defaulted and so their aggregate notional loan
amount of EUR55m does not constitute part of the portfolio.  The
agency also does not expect any recoveries from these defaulted
assets.

One company with valid, on-going loan contract but missed
payments has an aggregate outstanding portfolio loan amount of
EUR0.98m. Fitch lacks information on the recovery prospects of
this company. Therefore, the agency does not expect any further
payments to the benefit of the noteholders from this loan.

PREPS 2007-1

The affirmation of the class A1 and B1 notes at 'Csf' reflect
Fitch's view that default is inevitable.

PREPS 2007-1 reached scheduled maturity in March 2014.  Since the
companies' subordinated loans securitized in the pool are bullet
loans with the same tenor, they all became due on the same
scheduled maturity date.  The senior class A1 notes were not
repaid in full.  Beyond the scheduled maturity date, nine
companies are still listed as constituents of the portfolio.
Eight companies are insolvent and one has defaulted and so their
aggregate notional loan amount of EUR61 million does not
constitute as part of the portfolio.  The agency does not expect
any recoveries from defaulted assets through to their legal final
maturity in March 2016.

PREPS 2007-1 announced in December 2014 that it will receive an
additional purchase price of EUR1.25m from an earlier sale of a
subordinated loan agreement representing only 4.2% of the most
senior class of notes outstanding.  However, Fitch has maintained
the Recovery Estimate (RE) on the class A1 notes at 0% as the use
for interest payments rather than for principal payments on the
notes can be material.

Fitch assigns REs to all notes rated 'CCCsf' or below.  REs are
forward-looking recovery estimates, taking into account Fitch's
expectations for principal repayments on a distressed structured
finance security.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

After scheduled maturity, the transactions are primarily
sensitive to the recoveries from defaulted agreements (e.g. via
sales of rights and obligations arising from securitized
subordinated loans).  Fitch does not expect any recoveries due to
the junior, unsecured nature of the loans.  These risks are
reflected in the notes' ratings.


RADISSON BLUE: Rhatigan Wants Court to Block Receivership
---------------------------------------------------------
Irish Examiner reports that companies in the Rhatigan property
group claim an international equity fund is trying to get control
of some of its assets including the Radisson Blu Hotel in Golden
Lane, Dublin.

In Commercial Court proceedings, the Galway-based Rhatigan firms
want orders restraining Beltany Property Finance Ltd. from
enforcing the appointment of a receiver over the hotel arising
out of a letter for demand of repayment of EUR39.8 million in
loans and securities, Irish Examiner relates.

The case was admitted to the Commercial Court list on Feb. 16 by
Mr. Justice Brian McGovern on consent between the parties, Irish
Examiner discloses.

In an affidavit, Padraic Rhatigan, a director of the firms, said
the loans, originally taken out in 2007 with Ulster Bank, were
sold last year to Beltany, a subsidiary of the Goldman Sachs
group, Irish Examiner relays.

Mr. Rhatigan, as cited by Irish Examiner, said discussions
between Rhatigans and representatives of Beltany and Goldman
Sachs took place but broke down.

Mr. Rhatigan said a few hours after that meeting, solicitors for
Beltany wrote to the Rhatigans saying the hotel loan was payable
unconditionally as of Dec. 24 and the non-hotel facility was
being treated as a demand loan, Irish Examiner recounts.
On Dec. 31, their solicitors were told joint receivers had been
appointed over the Radisson Blu, Irish Examiner discloses.

The Rhatigan companies had found an alternative funder to
refinance the loans and as of Feb. 10, this was at an advanced
stage, Irish Examiner notes.

Mr. Rhatigan, as cited by Irish Examiner, said Beltany was asked
not to take any enforcement steps in relation to the appointment
of the hotel receiver but it only agreed to a qualified
undertaking.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BERICA 5 RESIDENTIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to B-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'AA- (sf)' credit
rating on Berica 5 Residential MBS S.r.l.'s class A notes.  At
the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on the class B and C
notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Italian residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria) and its updated
criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received in
January 2015.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its
RMBS criteria and its RAS criteria.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as 'moderate'.  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.  However, as all six of the
conditions in paragraph 48 of the RAS criteria are met, S&P can
assign ratings in this transaction up to a maximum of six notches
(two additional notches of uplift) above the sovereign rating,
subject to credit enhancement being sufficient to pass an
"extreme" stress.

As S&P's unsolicited long-term rating on the Republic of Italy is
'BBB-', S&P's RAS criteria cap at 'AA- (sf)' the maximum
potential rating in this transaction for the class A notes.  The
maximum potential rating for all other classes of notes is 'A
(sf)'.

At closing, there was a 364-day committed liquidity facility
provided by Banca Popolare di Vicenza ScpA, sized at EUR4
million. This can be used to provide liquidity support if the
available issuer funds at any payment date are insufficient to
meet senior fees, expenses, and interest on the class A, B, and C
notes.  The liquidity line's trigger for the class B and C notes
is set at 9.4% and 7.2%, respectively, of cumulative defaults in
the pool. In February 2012, as the liquidity provider was no
longer sufficiently rated, the liquidity line was fully drawn to
cash.

Credit enhancement has increased for the class A and B notes and
decreased for the class C notes since S&P's previous review.

Class         Available credit enhancement (%)
              January 2015         July 2012
A                     27.9              21.7
B                     11.9              10.5
C                      1.9               3.4

This transaction features a non-amortizing reserve fund (due to
the breach of the amortization triggers), which currently
represents 1.5% of the outstanding balance of the mortgage
assets.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 6.6% are on average
higher for this transaction than S&P's Italian RMBS index.
Defaults are defined as mortgage loans in arrears for more than
12 months in this transaction.  Cumulative defaults have
increased to 6.1% from 4.8% at S&P's previous review.  Prepayment
levels remain low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down
significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) (below the 'AAA' level) and a mixed
effect on the weighted-average loss severity (WALS).

  Rating level    WAFF (%)        WALS (%)
  AAA                 21.7             4.5
  AA                  18.1             2.6
  A                   14.9             2.0
  BBB                 11.5             2.0
  BB                   9.7             2.0
  B                    7.8             2.0

The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to the adjustment factors
for borrower citizenship and broker-originated loans.  The mixed
effect on the WALS is mainly due to the application of S&P's
revised market value decline assumptions and low loan-to-value
ratios.  The overall effect is a slight increase in the required
credit coverage for rating levels below 'AAA'.

Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria and its RMBS
criteria, S&P has determined that its assigned rating on each
class of notes in this transaction should be the lower of (i) the
rating as capped by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that
the class of notes can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.  In this
transaction, the rating on class A notes is constrained by the
rating on the sovereign.

Taking into account the results of S&P's updated credit and cash
flow analysis and the application of its RAS criteria, S&P
considers the available credit enhancement for the class A notes
to be commensurate with its currently assigned rating.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its 'AA- (sf)' rating on the class A notes.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class B
and C notes to be commensurate with lower ratings than those
currently assigned.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'BBB (sf)' from
'A (sf)' and to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its ratings on the
class B and C notes, respectively.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Italian residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 2.55% from 1.50%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation in 2015.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P don't
expect the performance of the transactions in S&P's Italian RMBS
index to significantly improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth, high unemployment, and fiscal
tightening.  On the positive side, S&P expects interest rates to
remain low for the foreseeable future.

Berica 5 Residential MBS is an Italian RMBS transaction, which
closed in December 2004 and securitizes first-ranking mortgage
loans.  Banca Popolare di Vicenza Scarl, Cassa di Risparmio di
Prato SpA, and Banca Nuova SpA (all part of the Banca Popolare di
Vicenza group) originated the pool, which comprises loans granted
to prime borrowers mainly located in the Veneto region.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

Berica 5 Residential MBS S.r.l.
EUR675.878 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed

A           AA- (sf)

Ratings Lowered

B           BBB (sf)          A (sf)
C           B- (sf)           BB+ (sf)


TAURUS 2015-1: Fitch Assigns 'BBsf' Rating to Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Taurus 2015-1 IT S.r.l. final ratings
as:

EUR206 million Class A due February 2027 (ISIN: IT0005085615):
'A+sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR Class X due February 2027 (ISIN: IT0005085706): not rated

EUR23 million Class B due February 2027 (ISIN: IT0005085664):
'Asf'; Outlook Stable

EUR34.3 million Class C due February 2027 (ISIN: IT0005085672):
'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR23.2 million Class D due February 2027 (ISIN: IT0005085680):
'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

The transaction is a securitization of three commercial real
estate loans totaling EUR301.5 million.  The loans were granted
by Bank of America N.A., Milan Branch (BANA) to three Italian
limited liability companies and two Italian funds to finance the
acquisition/refinance of certain Italian real estate assets: a
portfolio of five office properties and four telecom exchanges
(Calvino loan), two fashion outlet centers (Fashion District
loan) and three retail galleries (Globe loan).  The borrowers are
sponsored by Cerberus (Calvino loan), Blackstone (Fashion
District loan) and Orion (Globe loan).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings are based on Fitch's assessment of the underlying
collateral, available credit enhancement and the transaction's
sound legal structure.

Both the Globe and Fashion District properties benefit from
income diversification, each with over 140 tenants.  This
mitigates the short (3.8 year) weighted average lease term-to-
first break (WALTFB) for the Fashion District loan and Molfetta's
(one of properties underlying the Fashion District loan) moderate
vacancy. The Globe loan has strong occupancy (94%) on a 5.7 year
WALTFB.

The Calvino loan has high tenant concentration, with seven of the
nine buildings being exposed to single tenants.  With the WALTFB
at four years (8.4 years to lease expiry), securing renewals is
likely to be instrumental to the fulfillment of the sponsor's
disposal plan.  Fitch has not given benefit to this plan in its
analysis and assumes higher vacancy and lower rental values after
lease break dates.

Based on the location and property specifications, most assets
securing the loans are considered to be of average quality to
occupiers.  In particular, the Fashion District Mantova outlet,
the Globe shopping centers and the Calvino Milan and Rome assets
are expected to attract strong occupier demand.  Some Calvino
assets (Torino, Agrate and Assago) are perceived as less
attractive and are more likely to experience higher vacancy.

Fitch's rating analysis also considered what effect the
properties being held separately from the related licenses might
have on the recovery process.  More information on this is
available in the new issue report.

KEY PROPERTY ASSUMPTIONS (all by net rent)

'Bsf' weighted average (WA) capitalization (cap) rate: 7.8%
'Bsf' WA structural vacancy: 16.4%
'Bsf' WA rental value decline: 2%
'BBsf' WA cap rate: 8.3%
'BBsf' WA structural vacancy: 18.6%
'BBsf' WA rental value decline: 4.3%
'Asf' WA cap rate: 9.5%
'Asf' WA structural vacancy: 23%
'Asf' WA rental value decline: 11%
Class A/B/C/D
Current Rating: 'A+sf)'/'Asf'/'BBBsf'/'BBsf'
Deterioration in all factors by 1.1x:
'Asf'/'BBB+sf'/'BB+(EXP)sf'/'BB-sf'
Deterioration in all factors by 1.2x: 'BBB+sf'/'BBB-sf'/'BB-
sf'/'Bsf'



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BTA BANK: Fitch Raises Rating on USD750MM Sr. Unsec. Bond to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Kazakhstan-based BTA Bank's USD750
million senior unsecured bond (ISIN: XS0867478124) to 'B' from
'B-' following the transfer of the obligation to BTA's main
shareholder Kazkommertsbank (KKB; 'B'/Stable).  Fitch has also
maintained BTA's support-driven ratings on Rating Watch Positive
(RWP).

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - SENIOR UNSECURED
DEBT RATING

The senior unsecured bond rating is now aligned with the 'B'
rating on KKB's other senior unsecured debt obligations.  The
bonds have a maturity date of Dec. 21, 2022, and bear a coupon
rate of 5.5% payable semi-annually.

KKB became the obligor under the bond following the transfer of
the bond from BTA's balance sheet to that of KKB in November
2014. This was part of ongoing actions to more closely integrate
the operations of KKB and BTA.  The bond rating will be sensitive
to any changes in KKB's 'B' Long-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Rating (IDR).

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - BTA'S LONG-TERM
IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

BTA's 'B-' Long-term local and foreign-currency IDRs reflect
potential support from KKB based on (i) KKB's significant
directly owned equity stake in BTA (46.5% of share capital) and
operational control over BTA acquired in 2Q14; (ii) KKB's
intention to further integrate the two banks; and (iii) the fact
that BTA qualifies as a material subsidiary under the cross-
default clauses of KKB's eurobonds.

The one-notch difference between KKB's and BTA's ratings reflect
BTA's still weak balance sheet and its large size relative to KKB
(equal to 35% of consolidated assets at end-3Q14), which may in
certain circumstances constrain the ability and propensity of KKB
to provide support.

The RWP on BTA's Long-term IDRs and '5' Support Rating continues
to reflect Fitch's view that risks for BTA's creditors should
reduce moderately as a result of BTA's further integration with
KKB.  Completion of the integration may take more than six
months, the usual review period for Rating Watches.

BTA's IDRs are sensitive to the ratings of KKB.  A downgrade of
KKB would remove the upside potential for BTA's ratings.  An
upgrade of KKB could result in an upgrade of BTA.

The rating actions are:

BTA:

  Long-Term foreign and local currency IDR: 'B-', maintained on
  Rating Watch Positive

  Short Term foreign and local currency IDR: 'B', unaffected

  Viability Rating: 'ccc', unaffected

  Support Rating at '5': maintained on Rating Watch Positive

  Senior debt rating (ISIN: XS0867478124): upgraded to 'B' from
  'B-' upon transfer to KKB, Recovery Rating 'RR4'

KKB's ratings are unaffected by the rating action and as follows:

Kazkommertsbank:

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'B'; Outlook Stable

  Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: 'B'

  Viability Rating: 'b'

  Support Rating: '5'

  Support Rating Floor: 'B-'

  Long-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; Recovery Rating
  'RR4'

  Short-term senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'

  Subordinated debt rating: 'B-'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'

Kazkommerts International BV:

  Senior unsecured debt rating: 'B'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'

KAZKOMMERTS FINANCE BV:

  Perpetual debt rating: 'CCC'; Recovery Rating 'RR6'


CENTRAS INSURANCE: A.M. Best Assigns "b" Issuer Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Co. has assigned a financial strength rating of C++
(Marginal) and an issuer credit rating of "b" to JSC Insurance
Company Centras Insurance (Centras) (Kazakhstan).  The outlook
assigned to both ratings is stable.

The ratings reflect Centras' volatile risk-adjusted
capitalization, weak operating performance and marginal business
profile in the Kazakh insurance market.

Centras' risk-adjusted capitalization has been subject to
significant volatility in recent years due to a combination of
rapid premium growth and high operating losses.  Following the
breach of minimum regulatory capital requirements in 2013,
Centras received a KZT 319 million capital injection during the
first half of 2014, which along with the contraction in net
written premium (NWP) for the full year, is expected to improve
its risk-adjusted capitalization.  Given the challenging
operating conditions of the domestic insurance market and the
company's strategy to rapidly shift its business mix toward
voluntary lines of business, A.M. Best expects that Centras'
capital adequacy, as measured by Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio
(BCAR) model, is likely to be reliant on further shareholders'
contributions to support its expansion.

Centras' operating performance has weakened in recent years,
driven largely by its high operating expenses relative to NWP and
deteriorating loss experience, resulting from the increased
claims activity of its motor third-party liability (MTPL) and
property accounts.  The company's combined ratio has remained at
above 100% for a third consecutive year and has translated into
operating losses since 2013.  In the near-term, Centras' earnings
are unlikely to revert to their historical profitable levels,
reflecting the intense competition and weak pricing conditions of
the Kazakh market.

Centras maintains a marginal business profile.  The weakening
operating conditions in the Kazakh insurance market have resulted
in the company increasingly diversifying its portfolio away from
its core compulsory MTPL business, which accounted for 34% of
gross written premium in 2014 (2013: 41%).  With the negative
pressures underpinning the domestic market, A.M. Best believes
that Centras faces challenges with expanding its portfolio
profitability in view of its double-digit (net) annual growth
plans for the near-term.

Centras' marginal business profile means that the company has had
to change its strategic direction in response to regulatory
actions taken in recent years.  A.M. Best believes that Centras'
relatively small size and limited diversification, coupled with
the intense competitive environment, limit its ability to
stabilize its earnings should further regulatory changes take
place.

Positive rating actions will be subject to Centras demonstrating
the successful execution of its business plans, through the
generation of stable operating results whilst strengthening its
risk-adjusted capitalization.  A continued decline in
underwriting performance as a result of its expansion strategy
could result in negative rating actions.


KAZAKHTELECOM: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB' CCR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised the outlook on
Kazakhstan-based telecommunications operator Kazakhtelecom to
stable from positive.  S&P affirmed the 'BB' long-term foreign
and local currency corporate credit rating and the 'kzA+'
Kazakhstan national scale rating.

The outlook revision on Kazakhtelecom reflects S&P's view that a
positive rating action on the company will be unlikely in the
next 12 to 18 months.  The affirmation of the ratings on
Kazakhtelecom follows improvement in the company's management and
governance practices.  In S&P's opinion, Kazakhtelecom is
implementing its mobile business strategy in a more credible and
predictable way, and has secured a 10-year Kazakhstani tenge
(KZT)37 billion (approximately $200 million) loan from the Kazakh
Development Bank to support the rollout of its nationwide 4G
network, which will require meaningful investment.  S&P has
therefore revised its management and governance assessment on the
company to "fair" from "weak" and, as a result, S&P is raising
its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) on Kazakhtelecom to 'bb'
from 'bb-'.

S&P continues to view Kazakhtelecom as a government-related
entity (GRE) and view the likelihood of timely and sufficient
extraordinary financial support from the Kazakhstani government,
if needed, as "moderate."  Nevertheless, following the lowering
of the sovereign rating to 'BBB', S&P no longer confer a one-
notch uplift for state support into the long-term rating on
Kazakhtelecom, in accordance with S&P's criteria.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that
Kazakhtelecom's credit metrics will remain commensurate with the
revised 'bb' SACP, including a ratio of Standard & Poor's-
adjusted debt to EBITDA of below 2x, and that its liquidity will
remain adequate.

S&P could revise the outlook to negative if Kazakhtelecom's
leverage were to increase well above S&P's base-case scenario
expectations as a result of higher investments or extraordinary
dividend distribution.

S&P sees ratings upside as limited over the next 12 months
because this would be triggered by a one-notch upgrade of the
sovereign. Such an upgrade is unlikely because our outlook on the
long-term rating is negative.


KAZMUNAYGAS NC: S&P Cuts LongTerm Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit ratings on Kazakhstan-government-controlled
vertically integrated oil company KazMunayGas NC JSC (KMG) and
core subsidiary KazMunaiGas Exploration Production JSC (KMG EP)
to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P lowered the Kazakhstan national scale
rating to 'kzAA-' from 'kzAA'.

The rating actions follow the downgrade of Kazakhstan on Feb. 9,
2015.  The downgrade reflects KMG's status as a government-
related entity (GRE) with an "extremely high" likelihood of
receiving government support if in need.  S&P therefore
incorporates four notches of uplift into the long-term rating.

KMG is a 100% government-owned national oil company with stakes
in essentially all of Kazakhstan's oil-related assets and
priority access to new assets, which also benefit from vertical
integration into pipelines.

In line with S&P's methodology for rating GREs, it views KMG's
role in the country's economy as "critical."  In S&P's view, if
KMG were to default, this would have strong negative implications
for the government of Kazakhstan and for other GREs in the
country.  KMG holds stakes in all significant oil operations in
Kazakhstan.  It is one of the country's largest exporters and
taxpayers and has some social mandates such as supplying the
local market with fuel at fairly low prices and investing in
socially important projects.  Still, KMG is responsible for only
about 28% of the country's oil production (12% if only majority-
owned operations are included).

S&P views KMG's link to the Kazakhstan government as "very
strong" because the government and political support have helped
KMG obtain attractive financing terms for its investments in the
past, including refinery upgrade projects and a number of
acquisitions. The government's large liquidity reserves and low
debt underpin its ability to support KMG.  At the same time,
KMG's strong links with the government put pressure on its stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) because most of its capital
expenditure and acquisitions reflect its role as a national
champion in the oil and gas sector, but were financed with
company-level debt.

Most of KMG's majority-owned oil production assets are mature and
lack growth prospects, its refineries are relatively old, and the
company only has minority stakes in the country's most profitable
and young oil projects (such as 20% in Tengiz Chevroil and 10% in
Karachaganak).  At the same time, KMG's debt is relatively large
compared with the size of Kazakhstan's economy.  This puts
further pressure on the company's credit profile.

The negative outlook on KMG mirrors the outlook on Kazakhstan.

"If we were to lower our rating on Kazakhstan, we expect to lower
the rating on KMG.  This is because of the uplift we include in
the long-term rating on KMG to reflect our expectation of an
"extremely high" likelihood of government support for the
company," S&P said.

The rating on KMG has a substantial margin of safety against any
gradual deterioration in the company's stand-alone performance.
Pressure on the rating could emerge only if KMG's SACP were to
deteriorate to 'ccc+', such as in the event of extremely tight
liquidity.  However, this is not S&P's base-case scenario.

S&P would likely revise its outlook on KMG to stable following a
similar outlook revision the sovereign rating.


KOMMESK-OMIR INSURANCE: A.M. Best Assigns b+ Issuer Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best Co. has assigned a financial strength rating of C++
(Marginal) and an issuer credit rating of "b+" to Kommesk-Omir
Insurance Company JSC (Kommesk), (Kazakhstan).  The outlook
assigned to both ratings is stable.

The ratings reflect Kommesk's marginal business profile in the
Kazakh insurance market, volatile operating performance and
adequate risk-adjusted capitalization.

Kommesk maintains a marginal business profile as the 23rd insurer
in Kazakhstan (ranked on gross written premium) with a 1.5%
market share at year-end 2014.  The company's underwriting
portfolio is heavily weighted toward compulsory motor third-party
liability and health business, which combined account for more
than 50% of its premium volume.  However, due to the intense
competitive conditions and reduced profitability of its core
lines of business, Kommesk is expected to further penetrate the
voluntary third-party liability and motor hull lines of business
to support its growth.  Although the company's well-established
direct distribution network is likely to support its expansion,
for example, through prospects arising from cross-selling
opportunities, A.M. Best believes that Kommesk's marginal
business profile makes its earnings potentially susceptible to
sudden and unexpected changes in the operating environment,
typical within the Kazakh insurance market.

Kommesk's operating performance has been volatile, as
demonstrated by a return on capital ranging between 1.2% and 21%
over the past five years, partly due to the effect of fluctuating
premium volumes.  In particular, a change in regulation in 2012,
which required the company to transfer its workers' compensation
portfolio to the life sector, resulted in a rise in the expense
ratio to more than 50% (from 40.3% in 2011).  Additionally,
earnings have been subject to volatile claims experience, with
Kommesk producing loss ratios of between 42% and 64% over the
same period.  Given the ongoing intense competitive conditions of
the domestic insurance market in an already weakened operating
environment, the company is likely to face challenges achieving
stable and profitable growth of its earnings.

Kommesk's risk-adjusted capitalization is expected to remain at
an adequate level in 2015, as growth in its capital base is
likely to outpace capital requirements to support its
underwriting exposures.  The company's balance sheet is protected
by a conservative investment portfolio, consisting of mainly cash
and fixed income securities.  Additionally, Kommesk benefits from
a secure panel of reinsurers for its ceded business.

Positive rating actions will be subject to Kommesk stabilizing
its operating results as it expands within the retail segment of
the market.

Negative rating actions could occur if there were a decline in
Kommesk's earnings or deterioration in the quality of its asset
risk profile, resulting in the weakening of the company's risk-
adjusted capitalization.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ELEX ALPHA: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by eleX Alpha S.A.:

   -- EUR15 million Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
      Jul. 14, 2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued
by eleX Alpha S.A.:

   -- EUR60 million (Current balance outstanding EUR 38.19
      million) Class A-1 Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul. 14,
      2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR133.5 million (Current balance outstanding EUR 29.05
      million) Class A-2 Senior Secured Delayed Draw Floating
      Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
      Jul. 14, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR28.5 million Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul. 14, 2014
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR16.5 million Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jul. 14, 2014 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

   -- EUR16.5 million Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on
      Jul. 14, 2014 Affirmed B1 (sf)

eleX Alpha S.A., issued in December 2006, is a multi currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European leveraged loans.  The portfolio was
initially managed by DWS Finanz-Service GmbH which was succeeded
by Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management International GmbH and this
transaction ended its reinvestment period in March 2013.  It is
predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the upgrade of the Class C notes is
primarily a result of continued deleveraging of the senior notes
and subsequent increase in Class C overcollateralization ratio
(the "OC ratios").  Moody's notes that on the September 2014
payment date, the Class A-1 notes have amortized by
EUR2.25 million and GBP6.51 million, or approximately 19% of
their original balance, and Class A-2 notes have amortized by
EUR33.57M, or 25.1% of their original balance.

As a result of this deleveraging, the OC ratios of the senior
notes have significantly increased.  As per the latest trustee
report dated January 2015, the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and
Class E OC ratios are 158.52%, 136.30%, 118.09% and 104.18%,
respectively, versus August 2014 levels of 140.65%, 126.49%,
113.88% and 103.56%. Moody's notes that the principal account
balance, reported in the January 2015 trustee report, will be
used on the March 2015 payment date to further amortize Class A1
and Class A2 notes, thus increasing OC levels above the levels
mentioned above.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR102.9 million
and GBP28.4 million, defaulted par of EUR13.2 million, a weighted
average default probability of 21% (consistent with a WARF of
2,966 with a weighted average life of 4.38 years), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 47.43% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 24 and a weighted average
spread of 3.98%.  The GBP24.3 million denominated liabilities are
naturally hedged by the GBP28.4 million assets.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 92.66% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
15%.  In each case, historical and market performance and a
collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these default and
recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash
flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was " Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations "
published in February 2014.

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model
generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-case
results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy and 2) the concentration of lowly- rated debt
maturing between 2015 and 2016, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

  -- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

  -- Around 17.75% of the collateral pool consists of debt
     obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
     using credit estimates.  As part of its base case, Moody's
     as stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing
     a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the
     Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published
     in October 2009.

  -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
     the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to
     liquidation risk on those assets.  Moody's assumes that, at
     transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset
     will depend on the nature of the asset as well as the extent
     to which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities.
     Liquidation values higher than Moody's expectations would
     have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

  -- Foreign currency exposure: The deal has a significant
     exposure to non-EUR denominated assets.  Volatility in
     foreign exchange rates will have a direct impact on interest
     and principal proceeds available to the transaction, which
     can affect the expected loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BABSON EURO 2014-1: Fitch Affirms 'B-sf' Rating on F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Babson Euro CLO 2014-1 B.V., as:

EUR201.25 million Class A-1 notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR30 million Class A-2 notes: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR20.5 million Class B-1 notes: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR30 million Class B-2 notes: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR22.5 million Class C notes: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
EUR19 million Class D notes: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR31 million Class E notes: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
EUR14.5 million Class F notes: 'B-sf; Outlook Stable

Babson Euro CLO 2014-1 B.V. is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation.  Net proceeds from the issuance
of the notes were used to purchase a EUR412.5 million portfolio
of European leveraged loans and bonds.  The portfolio is managed
by Babson Capital Management (UK) Limited, formerly known as
Babson Capital Europe Limited.  The reinvestment period is
scheduled to end in 2018.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects the transaction's performance, which is
in line with Fitch's expectations.  Since closing, all notes have
experienced marginal increases in credit enhancement due to par
building.

The transaction went effective as of August 2014 and will remain
in its reinvestment period until 2018, during which the manager
can purchase and sell assets as long as collateral quality tests,
portfolio profile tests and coverage tests are satisfied or if
failing, maintained or improved.  Currently all coverage and
portfolio profile tests are passing.  An increase in the weighted
average rating factor (WARF) has been offset by increases in the
weighted average spread, as reflected in the choice of matrix
point, which had moved as of January 2015 from the matrix point
at the effective date.  The trigger levels for the WARF moved to
36.0, up from 35.0, for the weighted average spread (WAS) to
4.5%, up from 4.25% and for the weighted average recovery rate
(WARR) to 62.8, up from 62.0.  The weighted average coupon (WAC)
trigger remained at a minimum of 6.5%.  All covenant tests are
passing at the current matrix point with the WARF at 35.03, the
WAS 4.62%, the WARR 64.6 and the WAC at 8.92%.

The majority of the assets are rated in the 'B' category and are
well diversified with 137 assets from 111 obligors.  The largest
industry is chemicals with 11.3%, followed by food, beverage and
tobacco, as well as healthcare, both below 9%.  The largest
country exposure is to Germany with just below 20%, followed by
the US with 17% and the UK, France and Netherlands with just
below 12%.  European peripheral exposure is represented by Spain
and Italy and remains just below 9% with a maximum allowed
exposure of 10%.  There are 4.5% of assets rated 'CCC' by Fitch
in the portfolio.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As the loss rates for the current portfolio are below those
modelled for the stress portfolio, the sensitivities shown in the
new issue report still apply for this transaction.


DRYDEN 35: Moody's Assigns '(P)B2' Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following provisional
ratings to notes to be issued by Dryden 35 Euro CLO 2014 B.V.:

   -- EUR232,100,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate
      Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR15,800,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes
      due 2027, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR19,000,000 Class B-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2027, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR33,700,000 Class B-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes
      due 2027, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR31,900,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

   -- EUR21,200,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR27,100,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

   -- EUR14,500,000 Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2027, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions.  Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings.  A definitive rating may differ
from a provisional rating.

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2027.  The provisional ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure.  Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Pramerica
Investment Management Limited ("Pramerica"), has sufficient
experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing
this CLO.

Dryden CLO is a managed cash flow CLO.  At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
floating rate notes and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds.  The bond bucket gives the flexibility to
Dryden CLO to hold bonds if Volcker Rule is changed.  The
portfolio is expected to be 80% ramped up as of the closing date
and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors
domiciled in Western Europe.

Pramerica will manage the CLO.  It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR47.3 million of subordinated notes, which
will not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty.  The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change.  Pramerica's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014.  The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders.  Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

   - Par amount: EUR425,000,000

   - Diversity Score: 41

   - Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2690

   - Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.30%

   - Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 38%

   - Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Moody's has analyzed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries.  As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below.  For countries which are not member of
the European Union, the foreign currency country risk ceiling
applies at the same levels under this transaction.  Following the
effective date, and given the portfolio constraints and the
current sovereign ratings in Europe, such exposure may not exceed
15% of the total portfolio.  As a result and in conjunction with
the current foreign government bond ratings of the eligible
countries, as a worst case scenario, a maximum 5% of the pool
would be domiciled in countries with A3 and a maximum of 10% of
the pool would be domiciled in countries with Baa3 local or
foreign currency country ceiling each.  The remainder of the pool
will be domiciled in countries which currently have a local or
foreign currency country ceiling of Aaa or Aa1 to Aa3.  Given
this portfolio composition, the model was run with different
target par amounts depending on the target rating of each class
as further described in the methodology.  The portfolio haircuts
are a function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and
the target ratings of the rated notes and amount to 3.33% for the
Class A-1A and A-1B notes, 2.42% for the Class B-1A and B-1B
notes, 1.17% for the Class C notes, 0.33% for the Class D notes
and 0% for Classes E and F.

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes.  This sensitivity analysis includes increased
default probability relative to the base case.  Below is a
summary of the impact of an increase in default probability on
each of the rated notes, holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3094 from 2690)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

  - Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

  - Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

  - Class B-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

  - Class B-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

  - Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

  - Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

  - Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

  - Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3497 from 2690)

  - Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

  - Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

  - Class B-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

  - Class B-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

  - Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

  - Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

  - Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

  - Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Given that the transaction allows for corporate rescue loans
which do not bear a Moody's rating or Credit Estimate, Moody's
has also tested the sensitivity of the ratings of the notes to
changes in the recovery rate assumption for corporate rescue
loans within the portfolio (up to 5% in aggregate).  This
analysis includes haircuts to the 50% base recovery rate which we
assume for corporate rescue loans if they satisfy certain
criteria, including having a Moody's rating or Credit Estimate.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.


DRYDEN 35: S&P Assigns Preliminary B- Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned preliminary credit
ratings to Dryden 35 Euro CLO 2014  B.V.'s class A-1A, A-1B, B-
1A, B-1B, C, D, E, and F notes.  At closing, Dryden 35 Euro CLO
2014 will also issue an unrated subordinated class of notes.

S&P has assigned its preliminary ratings following its assessment
of the transaction's capital structure and the collateral
portfolio's credit quality, a cash flow analysis, and a review of
the transaction documents.  S&P understands that the portfolio at
closing will be diversified, primarily comprising broadly
syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans and senior
secured bonds.

S&P's preliminary ratings are commensurate with the available
credit enhancement for the rated notes.  S&P subjected the
preliminary capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class of
notes at each rating level.

In S&P's analysis, it used the target par amount of EUR425
million, the covenanted weighted-average spread of 4.30%, the
covenanted weighted-average coupon of 6.20%, and the covenanted
weighted-average recovery rates.  S&P applied various cash flow
stresses, using four different default patterns, in conjunction
with different interest rate stresses for each liability rating
category.

The transaction documents allow between 10% and 20% of assets
paying a fixed interest rate where no additional hedging is
required.  S&P tested the mix of fixed- and floating-rate assets
at the maximum and minimum levels under the transaction
documents. S&P also biased defaults toward fixed-rate assets
during low interest-rate environments and toward floating-rate
assets during high interest-rate environments.

S&P's analysis also shows that the credit enhancement available
to each rated class of notes is sufficient to withstand the
defaults applicable under the supplemental tests (not counting
excess spread) outlined in S&P's corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria.

S&P considers that the transaction's documented replacement and
remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its exposure to
counterparty risk under S&P's current counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's criteria for nonsovereign
ratings that exceed eurozone (European Economic and Monetary
Union) sovereign ratings, S&P considers the transaction's
exposure to country risk to be limited at the assigned
preliminary rating levels, as the concentration of the pool
comprising of assets in countries rated lower than 'A-' does not
exceed 10% of the aggregate collateral balance.

At closing, S&P considers that the transaction's legal structure
will be bankruptcy-remote, in line with S&P's European legal
criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its preliminary
ratings are commensurate with the available credit enhancement
for each class of notes.

Dryden 35 Euro CLO 2014 is a European cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction, comprising euro-denominated
senior secured loans and bonds issued by European borrowers.
Pramerica Investment Management Ltd. is the collateral manager.

RATINGS LIST

Preliminary Ratings Assigned

Dryden 35 Euro CLO 2014 B.V.
EUR442.60 Million Floating-Rate, Fixed-Rate, And Subordinated
Notes

Class                 Prelim.        Prelim.
                      rating          amount
                                    (mil. EUR)

A-1A                  AAA (sf)        232.10
A-1B                  AAA (sf)         15.80
B-1A                  AA (sf)          19.00
B-1B                  AA (sf)          33.70
C                     A (sf)           31.90
D                     BBB (sf)         21.20
E                     BB (sf)          27.10
F                     B- (sf)          14.50
Subordinated          NR               47.30

NR--Not rated.


QUEEN STREET II: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
classes of notes issued by Queen Street CLO II B.V.:

  -- EUR38.25 million Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
     May 2, 2014 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  -- EUR16.875 million Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
     May 2, 2014 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has also affirmed the ratings on the
following notes:

  -- EUR239.4 million (currently EUR114.753 million rated balance
     outstanding) Class A1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
     2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2014 Affirmed
     Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR59.85 million Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2014
     Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR34.875 million Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on May 2, 2014
     Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR18 million Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Ba3 (sf); previously on May 2,
     2014 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

Queen Street CLO II B.V., issued in June 2007, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European senior secured loans
managed by Ares Management Limited.  This transaction's
reinvestment period ended in August 2013.

According to Moody's, the rating actions are primarily a result
of the amortization of the portfolio and subsequent increase in
overcollateralization ratios.  Moody's notes that the rated
liabilities paid down by EUR71.5 million on the last semi-annual
payment dates, leading to a significant increase in the
overcollateralization ratios (or "OC ratios") of the senior
notes.  As per the trustee report dated January 2015, the Class
A/B, C, D, and E OC ratios are reported at 144.32%, 122.04%,
114.25%,and 106.98%, compared to March 2014 levels of 132.49%,
116.61%, 110.76% and 105.13% respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
EUR pool with performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR295.52 million and defaulted par of EUR 8.86 million, a
weighted average default probability of 20.33% (consistent with a
WARF of 2715 over a weighted average life of 4.87 years), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.24% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 27 and a weighted
average spread of 3.65%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 92.27% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%.  In
each case, historical and market performance and a collateral
manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors.
Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics
of the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis,
subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target rating of
each CLO liability it is analyzing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
that were within two notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

  -- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings.  Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

  -- Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO ESPIRITO: March 20 Deadline Set for Novo Banco Offers
-----------------------------------------------------------
Andrei Khalip at Reuters report that the Bank of Portugal has
trimmed down the list of potential bidders for Novo Banco -- the
successor to Banco Espirito Santo after a state rescue -- saying
that 15 out of 17 institutions that had expressed interest in the
sale met its requirements.

According to Reuters, the central bank said in a statement on
Feb. 16 it asked the 15 pre-qualified institutions to sign a
confidentiality agreement, after which they will have until
March 20 to present non-binding offers.  It did not provide any
names or details, Reuters notes.

Last August, the state rescued the bank with a EUR4.9 billion
package, mostly in public funds, after the business empire of the
bank's founding Espirito Santo family collapsed, Reuters
recounts.  The state, Reuters says, plans to sell Novo Banco this
year to recover the rescue funds.

So far, Portugal's Banco BPI and Spain's Santander and Banco
Popular have publicly said they are interested in Novo Banco,
Reuters relays.  Local media have said that China's Fosun and
U.S. private equity firm Apollo Global Management have also
expressed interest, Reuters relates.

                    About Banco Espirito Santo

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon, Portugal.  It is 20% owned by Espirito Santo Financial
Group.

In August 2014, Banco Espirito Santo was split into "good"
and "bad" banks as part of a EUR4.9 billion rescue of the
distressed Portuguese lender that protects taxpayers and senior
creditors but leaves shareholders and junior bondholders holding
only toxic assets.  A total of EUR4.9 billion in fresh capital
was
injected into this "good bank", which will subsequently be
offered for sale.  It has been renamed "Novo Banco", meaning new
bank, and will include all BES's branches, workers, deposits and
healthy credit portfolios.

In August 2014, Espirito Santo Financial Portugal, a unit fully
owned by Espirito Santo Financial Group, filed under Portuguese
corporate insolvency and recovery code.

Also in August 2014, Espirito Santo Financiere SA, another entity
of troubled Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo International
SA, filed for creditor protection in Luxembourg.

In July 2014, Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo
International SA filed for creditor protection in a Luxembourg
court, saying it is unable to meet its debt obligations.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


PETROLUL PLOIESTI: Files Insolvency Request
-------------------------------------------
Romania Insider reports that Romanian football club Petrolul
Ploiesti filed an insolvency request with the Prahova county
court on Feb. 4.

Petrolul, which is currently third in Romania's top football
league (Liga I) might thus become the sixth important football
club to enter insolvency, the report says.  If the court approves
its insolvency request, Petrolul will not be able to play in
European competitions next season, Romania Insider notes.

According to the report, Petrolul Ploiesti has won four domestic
league titles and three Romanian Cups, the last one in 2013. The
team finished third in Liga I, in the last two seasons and played
in the UEFA Europa League.

Romania Insider says five of Romania's largest football clubs
have entered insolvency so far. They are Dinamo Bucharest, Rapid
Bucharest, CFR Cluj, Universitatea Cluj, and Otelul Galati.  Four
of these clubs have played in European competitions in recent
years, the report discloses.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ALFA BANK: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'BB+'; Outlook Remains Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Russia's Alfa Bank to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.  The Rating
Outlook remains Negative.  At the same time, the agency has
downgraded the Viability Rating (VR) of Sberbank to 'bbb-' from
'bbb' and of Gazprombank (GPB) to 'bb-' from 'bb'.  The VR of
Russian Agricultural Bank (RusAg) has been affirmed at 'b-'.

The support-driven IDRs of Sberbank ('BBB-'/Negative), RusAg
('BB+'/Negative) and GPB ('BB+'/Negative) were reviewed, and
downgraded by one notch, earlier this year and are unaffected by
today's rating actions.

The affirmation of Sberbank's, GPB's and RusAg's debt applies to
all debt issued prior to 1 August 2014.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - ALFA BANK

The downgrade of Alfa's ratings reflects the weakening of the
Russian operating environment, and Fitch's view that it is
appropriate to maintain a one-notch differential between the
ratings of the bank and the Russian sovereign.  The Negative
Outlook reflects Fitch's view that economic recession (Fitch
expects GDP to contract by 4% in 2015), higher funding costs,
rouble devaluation, rising inflation and a potential increase in
loan impairment are likely to put pressure on Alfa's credit
profile in 2015.

At the same time, Alfa remains the highest-rated Russian
privately-owned bank, reflecting its good management and track
record of navigating through past Russian crises, and its
currently strong balance sheet and solid financial metrics.

Asset quality only moderately deteriorated in 2014: non-
performing loans (NPLs) increased to 2.2% of gross loans at end-
1H'14 from 1.2% at end-2013, and remained roughly stable in
2H'14, according to management.  The weaker Russian economy and
higher recent occurrences of corporate defaults and
restructurings suggest pressure on asset quality is likely to
increase in 2015.  However, the overall impairment reserve level,
equal to 5% of loans at end-1H'14, provides a significant buffer,
comparable to cumulative loan write-offs for 2009-1H'14.

Performance deteriorated in 1H'14 due to the increase in
impairment charges, associated with a few corporate defaults and
general deterioration in retail lending.  Fitch expects
profitability to deteriorate further in 2015 due to higher
impairment charges and significantly increased funding costs
following the sharp increase of the base rate by the Russian
Central Bank (CBR), although Alfa has some resilience due to its
high share of interest free current accounts.

Basel Tier 1 and total capital ratios stood at a reasonable 11.8%
and 16.5%, respectively, at end-1H'14.  Regulatory capitalization
is tighter (total ratio of 11% at end-2014), partly due to more
conservative loan reserve levels compared to IFRS, but also due
to the impact of rouble depreciation on risk-weighted assets in
2H'14.  Alfa did not take advantage of regulatory forbearance
measures offered by the Central Bank in calculating its year-end
regulatory ratios.

To support capitalization, Alfa may receive new equity from
shareholders and/or utilize state support, including potential
conversion of RUB39.4 billion of subordinated debt received in
the last crisis from Vnesheconombank (VEB) into preferred shares
or perpetual debt, or participation in the sector
recapitalization programs of the National Wealth Fund and the
Depositary Insurance Agency (DIA).

Alfa experienced about a 5% (FX adjusted) outflow of customer
funding in December.  Liquidity is still comfortable, with highly
liquid assets (cash, shorty-term interbank, unpledged liquid
securities) at end-2014 covering around 40% of customer accounts.
Wholesale repayments in 2015 are equal to a moderate 2.6% of
liabilities, while the bank was able to borrow on wholesale
markets in 2014, notwithstanding the challenging backdrop.

Alfa's owners have supported the bank in the past, and, in
Fitch's view, would have a strong propensity to do so again, if
required. Their ability to provide support is also likely to be
significant, as they seem to have little debt and significant
cash reserves following recent asset sales; however, Fitch does
not formally factor shareholder support into the ratings given
limited visibility on the shareholders' current position and
Alfa's significant size.  Given the bank's broad franchise, there
is also a moderate probability of support from the Russian
authorities.

A further marked deterioration in Russia's economic prospects, or
a weakening of Alfa's asset quality and capitalization, could
result in a downgrade of the bank's ratings.  A stabilization of
the operating environment, and a revision of the Outlook on the
sovereign ratings to Stable, could result in the Outlook on
Alfa's ratings also being revised to Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - ABHFL

The downgrade of ABH Financial Limited, Alfa's holding company,
reflects the downgrade of the bank.  ABHFL's ratings reflect
Fitch's view that default risk at the bank and the holding
company are likely to be highly correlated in view of the high
degree of fungibility of capital and liquidity within the group,
which is managed as a single entity.  The currently limited
volume of holding company debt to non-related parties also
supports the close alignment of its ratings with Alfa.

The one-notch difference between the bank and holding company
ratings reflects the absence of any regulation of the
consolidated group, the fact that the holding company is
incorporated in a different jurisdiction and the high level of
double leverage at the holding company.  The latter, defined by
Fitch as equity investments in subsidiaries divided by holdco
equity, stood at 150% at end-11M14, although would have been
lower if related party liabilities were excluded.

ABHFL's Long-term IDR is above the Cyprus Country Ceiling of 'B',
reflecting Fitch's view that the company's ability to repay/pay
interest on external liabilities is not dependent on the local
financial system.

An upgrade or downgrade of Alfa would be likely to result in a
similar rating action on ABHFL.  In addition, ABHFL could be
downgraded if its planned future debt issuance results in a
further marked increase in double leverage or gives rise to
significantly increased liquidity risks at the holdco level.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SBERBANK AND SBERBANK
LEASING

The downgrade of Sberbank's VR, and hence Long-term local
currency IDR, reflects the weakening of the Russian operating
environment, and Fitch's view that it is not appropriate to rate
the bank above the Russian sovereign.  The VR continues to factor
in Sberbank's dominant market positions, stable deposit base,
currently strong performance relative to the sector and solid
liquidity position. Capitalization remains adequate, but has
moderated as a result of the revaluation of foreign currency
assets.

Sberbank's asset quality is currently sound, with NPLs only
moderately up at 3.5% at end-3Q'14, 1.5x times covered by
reserves.  However, a more significant deterioration is likely
over the next 12-18 months as the economy enters recession.  The
bank's so far robust pre-impairment profitability (equal to 3.9%
of average assets in 9M14) is likely to dampen in 2015 on the
back of higher funding costs, which the bank is unlikely to fully
pass on to the borrowers, while bottom line results will probably
be additionally pressured by increasing impairment charges.

Sberbank's liquidity position is underpinned by a significant
cushion of liquid assets (both in local and in foreign currency)
and a granular and fairly stable deposit base (due to its 45%
share in system's retail deposits).  Sberbank faced a moderate
retail funding outflow (between 2% and 3% on FX-adjusted basis)
in December-January, which was offset by the inflow of corporate
accounts.  External wholesale funding comprised a low 5% of
Sberbank's end-2014 liabilities, and 2015 repayments are not
onerous.

Fitch estimates that the bank's FCC / risk-weighted assets ratio
fell from 10% at end-3Q'14 to around 9% by end-2014 as a result
of revaluation of foreign-currency-denominated risk-weighted
assets and an unrealized loss on the bank's securities portfolio
in December.  Regulatory capital ratios (total capital ratio was
just 10.6% at end-1M15) benefit from the regulatory forbearance
with respect to risk-weighted assets revaluation and will be
supported by the forthcoming conversion of a RUB500bn
subordinated loan from the Central Bank into Tier-1 compliant
perpetual, which should improve total regulatory capital ratio by
about 1 percentage point.  Sberbank is not included in the
government's recapitalization program that involves Depositary
Insurance Agency, but could receive support directly from the CBR
if needed, Fitch understands.

A downgrade of the sovereign ratings, a further marked
deterioration in Russia's economic prospects, or a weakening of
Sberbank's asset quality and capitalization, could result in a
downgrade of the bank's VR.  A stabilization of the operating
environment, and a revision of the Outlook on the sovereign
ratings to Stable, could help to stabilize the rating at its
current level.

The downgrade of Sberbank Leasing's Long-term local currency IDR
reflects the similar action on Sberbank.  Sberbank Leasing's
ratings are driven by Fitch's view of the high probability of
support from Sberbank, and are likely to move in tandem with the
latter's ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - GPB

The downgrade of Gazprombank's VR to 'bb-' from 'bb' reflects the
bank's reduced, and moderate, capitalization.  This, in Fitch's
view, makes the bank more vulnerable in case of a deterioration
in the bank's significant volume of potentially risky loan
exposures, or as a result of a more general weakening of asset
quality due to the more challenging environment.  The VR also
considers the bank's modest core profitability and considerable
exposure to non-banking assets.

At the same time, the VR also reflects the bank's prominent
market positions, its generally lower-risk lending focused on
larger and stronger Russian corporates and secured retail
products, its currently comfortable liquidity and access to
capital under recently announced Russian government programs.

The FCC / risk weighted assets (RWAs) ratio declined to 6.2% at
end-3Q'14 from 8.2% at end-2013, and Fitch expects this to have
fallen further at end-2014 as a result of the impact of rouble
devaluation on RWAs (35% of which comprised foreign currency
exposures at end-3Q'14).  Fitch views the bank's preferred
shares, into which Vnesheconombank converted its subordinated
debt in 4Q'14, as good quality loss absorbing capital, in
addition to the bank's FCC; however, these are equal to a
moderate 93 basis points (bps) of end-9M14 RWAs.

Core capital ratios are unlikely to recover significantly in 2015
given weakened internal capital generation (3% in 9M14).
However, regulatory capital should be strengthened as a result of
participation in government programs, in particular the RUB100
billion subordinated debt injection approved by the government.
At end-January 2015, the regulatory core tier 1 and total capital
ratios were 7.5% and 12.7%, respectively, benefitting from the
regulatory forbearance implemented by the Central Bank in respect
to securities valuations and RWA calculations for foreign
currency assets.

Although NPLs remain low (1% of gross loans at end-3Q'14), high-
risk exposures made up a significant 8% of the portfolio.  These
mostly comprised (i) moderately provisioned loans to an indebted
metals and mining group (equal to 32% of FCC) and (ii) weakly
secured direct and indirect exposures to Ukrainian entities with
uncertain recovery prospects (31% of FCC).  Gazprombank's capital
position is also undermined by equity investments (equal to 36%
of FCC) in mostly poorly performing non-banking assets.

Liquidity remains comfortable, although funding depends
significantly on large core deposits from major oil and gas
companies.  Highly-liquid assets at end-November 2014 were equal
to approximately 1.3x third-party wholesale debt, or 39% of the
total customer deposits.  Deposit outflows in December 2015 were
moderate.  Scheduled wholesale debt repayments in 2015, including
a USD1.7 billion Eurobonds, are equal to a moderate 5% of
liabilities.

The VR could be downgraded in case of a further weakening of
capitalization or significant loan losses.  A stabilization of
the operating environment and a gradual increase in the bank's
capital ratios would help to stabilize the VR at its current
level.

The downgrade of GPB's 'new-style' subordinated debt (with
principal/ coupon write-down feature) to 'B+' reflects the
downgrade of the VR.  The subordinated debt rating is notched
down once from the bank's VR; this incorporates zero notches for
incremental non-performance risk relative to the VR and a notch
for higher loss severity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - RUSAG's VR

The 'b-' VR of RusAg primarily reflects the bank's weak asset
quality, moderate capitalization, modest financial performance
and significant reliance on wholesale funding.

RusAg's asset quality is weak, with non-performing loans (NPLs,
loans over 90 days overdue) comprising a high 16.7% of the end-
1H'14 loan book.  Reserve coverage of these exposures was a
moderate 51%, with the unreserved part amounting to RUB117
billion, or 53% of Fitch Core Capital (FCC).  RusAg's
predominantly long-term loan book, with exposures often
structured with bullet repayments and subsidized interest rates
creates potential for further increases of credit losses in a
weakening operating environment. Restructured and/or rolled-over
loans classified in the Watch category comprised a further 8% of
loans at end-2013 (the last date on which this was disclosed).

At end-1H'14, the FCC ratio was 13.3%, which Fitch views as
moderate given the weak provisioning of NPLs, significant
restructured exposures and new potential problems.  The bank's
RUB25bn preferred shares, into which Vnesheconombank converted
its subordinated debt in 4Q'14, were equal to 147 bps of end-9M14
RWAs, and RusAg may also access RUB68.5 billion of additional
capital under the DIA-administered recapitalization program.
However, internal capital generation is weak, with pre-impairment
profit (net of accrued but not received interest income)
amounting to only RUB3.6 billion (equal to 0.4% of average risk-
weighted assets) in 1H'14.

RusAg's high loans/deposits ratio (174% at end-1H'14) and the
fairly long-term nature of its loan book make the bank's
liquidity position vulnerable to a sustained reduction in access
to wholesale funding (37% of liabilities at end-1H'14).  However,
near-term maturities are moderate and liquidity is comfortable at
present, so recently introduced sanctions are unlikely to result
in a sharp increase in refinancing risks.  At end-2014, RusAg had
USD8 billion of foreign liabilities (nearly 20% of total non-
equity funding), with USD0.8 billion due for repayment in 2015,
while the bank held RUB276 billion (USD5 billion) of liquid
assets (cash, short-term bank placements, unencumbered repoable
securities and loans eligible for refinancing in CBR).

A further marked deterioration in asset quality could result in a
downgrade of the VR.  A strengthening of capitalization, if this
is sufficient to significantly alleviate asset quality risks,
could lead to an upgrade.

Fitch has taken these rating actions:

Alfa-Bank

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BB+' from
  'BBB-'; Outlook Negative

  Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-';
  Outlook Negative

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'B' from 'F3'

  National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AA+(rus)'; Outlook
  Stable

  Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bb+' from 'bbb-'

  Support Rating: affirmed at '4'

  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B

  Senior unsecured debt: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'/affirmed
  at 'AA+(rus)'

  Subordinated debt: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'

  Senior unsecured debt of Alfa Bond Issuance Public Limited
  Company: downgraded to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'

  Senior unsecured debt of ALFA MTN ISSUANCE LTD: downgraded to
  'BB+' from 'BBB-'

  Subordinated debt of Alfa Bond Issuance Public Limited Company:
  downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'

ABH Financial Limited

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+';
  Outlook Negative

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  Senior unsecured debt of Alfa Holding Issuance plc: downgraded
  to 'BB' from 'BB+'

Sberbank of Russia

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BBB-'; Outlook Negative;
  unaffected

  Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB';
  Outlook Negative;

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'F3'; unaffected

  Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

  National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
  Stable

  Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bbb-' from 'bbb'

  Support Rating: '2'; unaffected

  Support Rating Floor: 'BBB-'; unaffected

  Senior unsecured debt Long-term Rating: downgraded to 'BBB-
  (EXP)' from 'BBB(EXP)' and withdrawn

  Senior unsecured debt National Long-term Rating: affirmed at
  'AAA(EXP)(rus)' and withdrawn

  Commercial paper of SB Securities S.A. Short-term Rating:
  affirmed at 'F3' and withdrawn

  Senior unsecured debt of SB Capital S.A. Long-term Rating (RUB
  bond ISIN XS0882561821): downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'

  Senior unsecured debt of SB Capital S.A. Long-term Rating
  (except RUB bond ISIN XS0882561821): 'BBB-'; unaffected

  Senior unsecured debt of SB Capital S.A. loan participation
  note programme Long-term and Short-term Ratings: affirmed at
  'BBB-'/'F3' and withdrawn

  'Old-style' and 'New-style' subordinated debt of SB Capital
  S.A.: 'BB+'; unaffected

Sberbank Leasing

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BBB'; Outlook Negative;
  unaffected

  Long-term local currency IDR: downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB';
  Outlook Negative

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'F3'; unaffected

  National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Outlook
  Stable

  Support Rating: '2'; unaffected

Gazprombank:

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook
  Negative; unaffected

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'B'; Unaffected

  National Long-term rating: 'AA+(rus)'; Outlook Stable;
  Unaffected

  Viability Rating: downgraded to 'bb-' from 'bb'

  Support Rating'3'; unaffected

  Support Rating Floor: 'BB+'; unaffected

  Senior unsecured debt: 'BB+'/ 'AA+(rus)'; unaffected

  Senior unsecured debt of GPB Eurobond Finance PLC: 'BB+';
  Unaffected

  'Old-style' subordinated debt of GPB Eurobond Finance PLC:
  'BB'; Unaffected

  'New-style' subordinated debt of GPB Eurobond Finance PLC:
  downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-'

Russian Agricultural Bank

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook Negative,
  Unaffected

  Long-term local currency IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook Negative,
  Unaffected

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'B', unaffected

  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

  National Long-term rating: 'AA+(rus)'; Outlook Stable,
  Unaffected

  Support Rating: '3', unaffected

  Support Rating Floor: 'BB+', unaffected

  Senior unsecured debt: 'BB+'/ 'AA+(rus)', unaffected

  Senior unsecured debt of RSHB Capital S.A.: 'BB+'/ 'AA+(rus)',
  unaffected

  'Old-style' subordinated debt of RSHB Capital S.A.: 'BB',
  unaffected


GAZ CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on EUR500MM Notes to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had corrected its
issue credit rating on Gaz Capital S.A.'s EUR500 million 5.136%
medium-term loan participation notes series 6, due March 2017
(Borrower: OAO Gazprom).

S&P reclassified the rating as a foreign currency rating and
lowered it to 'BB+' from 'BBB-', in line with other foreign
currency issues by Gazprom.

Because of an administrative error, S&P did not lower the rating
on this issue on Feb. 4, 2015, when S&P lowered its long-term
foreign currency rating on Gaz Capital S.A.'s parent, Gazprom
OAO, to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.

RATINGS LIST
                                    To           From
Gaz Capital S.A.
EUR500 mil 5.136% loan participation
med-term nts ser 6 due 03/22/2017*
                                    BB+          BBB-

*Borrower: OAO Gazprom.


SUDOSTROITELNY BANK: Central Bank Revokes License
-------------------------------------------------
The Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia) on
Feb. 16 disclosed that due to the non-compliance by the
Moscow-based credit institution Commercial Bank Sudostroitelny
Bank, limited liability company, or SB Bank LLC with federal
banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations, revealed facts of
significant unreliability of reporting data, all capital adequacy
ratios below 2%, decrease in equity (capital) below the minimal
amount of the authorized capital established as of the date of
the state registration of the credit institution, inability to
meet the creditors' claims on monetary obligations, taking into
account the repeated application over the past year of
supervisory measures envisaged by the Federal Law 'On the Central
Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)', and guided by
Article 19, of Part 2 of Article 20 of the Federal Law 'On Banks
and Banking Activities', and Part 11 of Article 74 of the Federal
Law 'On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
Russia)', the Bank of Russia took a decision (Order No. OD-366,
dated February 16, 2015) to revoke the banking license from the
credit institution Commercial Bank Sudostroitelny Bank, limited
liability company, (Bank of Russia Registration No. 2999, date of
registration July 27, 1994) from February 16, 2015.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


* SWITZERLAND: Moody's Says Insurers Face Credit-Negative Effects
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Switzerland's domestic insurers face credit-negative effects --
particularly in regard to lower retained earnings -- following
the Swiss National Bank's (SNB) surprise decision last month to
abandon the exchange rate peg between the Swiss franc and the
euro, says Moody's Investors Service in a new report.  In
addition, the SNB's concurrent base rate reduction to -0.75% from
-0.25% is credit negative for all insurers operating in
Switzerland, because it will further reduce investment returns
insurers earn on Swiss-denominated fixed-income securities.

Moody's Sector In-Depth Report -- "Swiss National Bank's Policy
Changes are Credit Negative for Domestic Insurers" -- presents
Moody's response to the most frequently asked questions, focusing
on the implications of the SNB's decision in relation to dividend
policies, earnings, capital ratios and financial flexibility.

"The most significant impact is the material increase in reported
dividends of Swiss domiciled groups, such as Zurich and Swiss Re,
which pay dividends in Swiss francs but earn the majority of
their income in other currencies," says Helena Pavicic, a Moody's
Analyst and author the report.

Moody's observes that from a balance sheet perspective, the
impact of the SNB monetary policy change will be limited, but the
decision is credit negative for earnings of Swiss domiciled
insurers. "Following the appreciation of the Swiss franc,
insurers with large international operations, which are
headquartered in Switzerland but do not file financial statements
in Swiss francs, such as Zurich and Swiss Re, will report higher
total expenses because of the increase in their reported head
office costs. In contrast, non-Swiss groups with sizeable Swiss
operations -- such as AXA, and to a lesser extent Allianz and
Generali -- will likely report accounting currency translation
benefits in their consolidated group accounts," adds Ms. Pavicic.

While higher reported dividend amounts and head office costs
could reduce retained earnings, Moody's expects the largest and
well diversified international insurers (Zurich and Swiss Re) to
remain strongly capitalized, and the rating agency predicts that
the SNB's policy change will have a minimal impact on their
economic capital ratios.

Moody's also believes that the impact of the SNB's policy change
on Zurich and Swiss Re's financial flexibility will be modest,
explaining that a 20% appreciation of the Swiss franc against the
US dollar would increase total leverage of both groups by less
than 1 percentage point.  In addition, the rating agency observes
that any adverse currency translation effect on the earnings
coverage of Zurich and Swiss Re may be partially offset by lower
interest payments on Swiss-franc-denominated debt instruments
with Libor linked coupons since the exchange rate peg policy
change coincided with a shift in the three-month Swiss franc-
LIBOR to a range of -0.25% to -1.25% from +0.25% to -0.75%.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


BANK NADRA: Placed in Temporary Administration
----------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee
Fund has introduced temporary administration at Bank Nadra
(Kyiv), sources on the financial market said.

The decision to declare the bank as insolvent is stipulated in
NBU resolution No. 83 of February 3: the main reason is the not
enough capitalization of the bank under the requirements of
stress tests and the bank's operation not being in line with
Ukrainian law, according to Interfax-Ukraine.

Citing a post on the Deposit Guarantee Fund website, Interfax-
Ukraine says temporary administration was introduced for three
months -- until May 5, 2015. Iryna Striukova has been appointed
as temporary administrator, the report discloses.

According to a post on the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU)
website, 99% of depositors at the bank have deposits within the
guaranteed sum (UAH200,000), Interfax-Ukraine reports.

"They will receive their deposits in full," NBU, as cited by
Interfax-Ukraine, said.

According to the report, total payments to Bank Nadra's
depositors will be over UAH3.6 billion.

Interfax-Ukraine relates that the NBU said that the central bank
had no grounds to consider the bank as solvent, as expert
analysis of its plans confirmed continued losses in the future.

The possibility of realizing capitalization plans was dependent
on the restructuring of beneficial credits issued by the NBU for
ten years.

"Shareholders in Bank Nadra did not confirm their readiness to
quickly support the financial institution, including to pay debts
from the previous shareholder, which resulted in the further
worsening of financial indicators in the bank's operation and the
impossibility of fulfilling liabilities to depositors and other
creditors on time," NBU said in the report cited by Interfax-
Ukraine.

"We confirm our plans to leave only reliable and transparent
banks, which function efficiently and stably fulfill liabilities,
on the market. This is the obligatory condition for restoring the
country's economy, restoring its growth," reads the report,
citing First Deputy NBU Governor Oleksandr Pysaruk, Interfax-
Ukraine relays.

Bank Nadra, founded in 1993, and is part of Group DF owned by
Dmytro Firtash.  Bank Nadra ranked 11th among 166 operating banks
as of October 1, 2014, in terms of total assets it is worth
UAH35.87 billion, Interfax-Ukraine discloses citing the National
Bank of Ukraine.


UKRAINE: Fitch Lowers Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'CC'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Ukraine's Long-term foreign currency
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'CC' from 'CCC' and affirmed its
local currency IDR at 'CCC'.  The issue ratings on Ukraine's
senior unsecured foreign currency bonds have been downgraded to
'CC' from 'CCC', while the senior unsecured local currency bonds
have been affirmed at 'CCC'.  The Country Ceiling has been
affirmed at 'CCC' and the Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'C'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade of Ukraine's Long-term foreign currency IDR to
'CC', which indicates that a default of some kind appears
probable, reflects the following factors and their relative
weights:

HIGH

The new IMF program announced on February 12, 2015 will help to
close Ukraine's financing gap, but an associated restructuring of
privately-held external debt appears increasingly probable.
Sovereign creditworthiness has deteriorated.  The consolidated
fiscal deficit, including losses of state energy company
Naftogaz, reached 13% of GDP in 2014.  Fitch estimates that
direct and guaranteed debt rose to 72% of GDP in 2014.  Conflict
and economic weakness have led to large additional financing
needs beyond those envisaged in Ukraine's IMF program agreed in
April 2014.

The escalation of the conflict with rebels in the eastern regions
of Donetsk and Lugansk has severely affected the economy.  Fitch
estimates that real GDP fell 7.5% in 20152014, and forecast a
further contraction of 5% in 2015, considerably worse than
expected at the time of Fitch's last review in August 2014.

The reserves position is precarious, with foreign exchange
reserves declining to just 1.3 months of imports in January 2015.
The hryvnia fell almost 50% against the dollar in 2014, and a
further substantial depreciation has occurred in February 2015.
This is leading to a sharp external adjustment, mostly driven by
a steep contraction of imports.  The current account deficit
narrowed from 9.1% of GDP in 2013 to an estimated 4.1% of GDP in
2014, and will fall further in 2015.

MEDIUM

Banks have been heavily affected by economic turmoil and currency
depreciation, and also continue to suffer from the overhang of
the 2008-09 crisis.  The government has budgeted around 2% of GDP
for bank recapitalization in 2015, but in Fitch's view, the costs
will be materially higher, putting further upward pressure on
public debt.

Political transition continues following the ousting of former
president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014.  The new government
formed in December, following parliamentary elections in October,
has expressed a strong commitment to undertake structural
reforms. However, political risks to the implementation of
reforms are high.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, collectively or individually, result
in a downgrade are:

   -- Announcement of a restructuring operation with private
      external creditors.
   -- Failure to make progress on structural reforms leading to a
      suspension of the IMF program.
   -- Further escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and
      intensification of economic stress, such that financing
      needs increase beyond what external partners are willing to
      provide and default becomes inevitable.

Fitch currently does not envisage a situation in the short term
in which the rating would be upgraded.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The ratings and Outlooks are sensitive to a number of
assumptions:

Ukraine receives timely disbursements from the IMF and retains
support from other multilateral organizations and western
partners including the EU and the US.

Talks with private creditors on restructuring public external
foreign currency debt begin.

Ukraine does not succumb to a material escalation of incursions
into its sovereign territory.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ACCUNOSTICS: To Go Into Administration, Cuts 30 Jobs
----------------------------------------------------
The Northern Scot reports that AccuNostics, one of Moray's and
Scotland's most feted companies, looks set to go into
administration with the loss of 30 jobs.

Staff at AccuNostics were reportedly left dumbstruck when bosses
called a meeting and told them they should go home, according to
The Northern Scot.

The report notes that the firm, based on the Forres Enterprise
Park, was seen as being at the cutting edge of diagnostic
research to enhance the lives of diabetics.  Its main focus was
on using wireless technology to measure people's blood glucose
levels.

Among its backers was Highlands and Islands Enterprise which gave
the company a GBP1.5 million grant package, the report relates.

News of the AccuNostics's demise was said to have completely out
of blue to many of its employees, with some now questioning when
they will be paid, the report adds.


BIRMINGHAM INT'L: In Receivership; Club Not In Liquidation
----------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Birmingham International Holdings Limited,
the parent company of Birmingham City Football Club, has gone
into receivership.

BIHL blamed "fractious and inharmonious relations within the
management" for the decision, BBC relates.

According to BBC, BIHL said it had appointed three receivers from
Ernst and Young.

The club, as cited by BBC, said it was not in liquidation and
could continue to fulfill its fixtures in the league.

"The receivers are keen to stress their appointment does not
extend to Birmingham City which continues to trade as normal and
outside of any insolvency process," BBC quotes Ernst and Young as
saying in a statement.  "The appointment allows the receivers to
be able to manage the day-to-day activities of BIHL, take control
of its finances, carry on the business of the company and take
such steps as may be necessary for the purpose of preserving the
future of . . . Birmingham City."

Birmingham City Football Club is a professional association
football club based in the city of Birmingham, England.


IPR CAPITAL: Placed Into Provisional Liquidation
------------------------------------------------
IPR Capital Ltd, a company who sold partnerships in a gold mining
company in Ecuador as investments, has been placed into
provisional liquidation following an investigation by Company
Investigations of the Insolvency Service.

IPR Capital Ltd sold partnerships in a limited partnership that
it wholly controlled, IPR Capital Mining 06 LP, to members of the
public via a network of sales agents. The role of the provisional
liquidator is to protect assets in the possession or under the
control of the company pending the determination of the petition.
The provisional liquidator also has the power to investigate the
affairs of the company insofar as it is necessary to protect
assets including any third party or trust monies or assets in the
possession of or under the control of the company.

The case is now subject to High Court action and no further
information will be made available until a petition to wind up
the company is heard in the High Court on April 1, 2015.

IPR Capital Ltd was incorporated on February 8, 2013,
registration number 08394553. The registered office of the
company is at 68 Lombard Street, London, EC3V 9LJ. IPR Capital
Mining 06 LP was registered on May 8, 2013. The recorded
directors of the company are Stephen John Mayne, Robert Alexander
Hall and Ronald Skelton.

The petition was presented under s124A of the Insolvency Act
1986. The Official Receiver was appointed as provisional
liquidator of the company on Feb. 2, 2015 by Mr. Justice Nugee.


MANOR MOTORSPORT: Eyes Return to F1 Grid Using Modified Car
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ian Parkes at Mail Online reports that Claire Williams has
revealed her team is doing all it can to help Manor Motorsport,
formerly Marussia F1, claim a place on this year's Formula One
grid.

According to Mail Online, Manor is aiming for a return to F1
after falling into administration in October last year.

Now based back at their old headquarters in Dinnington,
Yorkshire, Manor is scheduled to emerge from administration on
Feb. 19 by entering into a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA),
Mail Online relates.

It appeared as if a major step towards salvation was blocked
during a meeting of the Strategy Group in Paris, Mail Online
relays.

The Strategy Group comprises the FIA, F1 supremo Bernie
Ecclestone and the leading six teams -- Ferrari, Mercedes, Red
Bull, McLaren, Williams and Force India, Mail Online discloses.

According to Mail Online, Force India voted against a motion for
Manor to use a modified version of their 2014 car for this
season, scuttling hopes as unanimity is required from all the
teams for such a regulation to be passed.

Manor, however, expressed surprise as they were unaware such a
vote was being taken, and despite that fact that they are
ploughing on with their plans to present their case, Mail Online
notes.

Motorsport is a British motor racing team that was formed in 1990
by former single-seater champion John Booth.

Motorsport, formerly Marussia, plunged into administration in
October 2014 and missed the final three races of the 2014 season.


MATRIX COMPANY: Ordered Into Liquidation
----------------------------------------
Matrix Company 1 Limited, a company that operated an estate
agency business trading as Crown Property Professionals, has been
ordered into liquidation on grounds of public interest following
an investigation by the Insolvency Service.

The company advertised properties on third party property search
websites and on two websites operated by or connected with the
compan - www.crownpc.co.uk and www.propertypropertyproperty.uk.

The Court heard that the investigation was met with deliberate
confusion and obstruction to prevent its business and affairs
being fully investigated and that despite the obstruction,
accounts were identified which had received over half a million
pounds all of which remains unaccounted for.

According to the sole registered director of the company at the
time of the investigation, a Ms Kimberley Grice (who the
investigators were not able to meet and who an employee of the
company stated she had never heard of) had decided to sell the
company's business to one of its employees, a Mr Shakiru Knight
(a former employee of Credence) who was going to trade as a sole
trader.

The investigation found that the company was a continuation of
the business previously carried on from the same address in
Catford by Piper London Limited (trading as 'Credence'), one of
14 connected companies which were all wound up in the public
interest on June 4, 2014. The companies were linked in that they
were found to be vehicles for the business interests of Mr.
Charles Gordon, an undischarged bankrupt.

Welcoming the Court's winding up decision Chris Mayhew, Company
Investigations Supervisor, said:

"This formally brings to an end a disreputable estate agency
business carried on by this company which failed to co-operate
with the investigation and deliberately sought to mislead the
investigation as to who managed and controlled its affairs.

"The Insolvency Service works closely with other regulators to
protect the interests of the public against unscrupulous
companies and I would like to thank Lewisham Trading Standards
for their assistance in bringing this company's affairs to an
end.

"The company engaged in unfair trading practices and complaints
made to Lewisham Trading Standards included allegations of taking
deposits and attempting to retain administration fees in
circumstances where the property had been let to someone else or
the transaction did not proceed; giving false information as to
why properties were available as to price, availability and/or
condition of properties; taking an unreasonable length of time to
refund deposits; advertising properties for sale when not a
member of an estate agent redress scheme as required by law and
making false claims of membership in this regard.

"The Insolvency Service will not allow companies to operate in
this way and will investigate abuses and close down companies if
they are found to be operating, as here, against the public
interest."

Matrix Company 1 Limited was incorporated on Oct. 26, 2012. The
registered office throughout has been Flat C, 64 Broadfield Road,
London, SE6 1NG. The recorded directors have been Miss Kimberley
Grice, from incorporation to present date and Mr. Sean Knight
from May 26, 2014 to present date. No secretary is shown to have
been appointed. The company's share capital is shown to be GBP100
divided into 100 ordinary shares held throughout by Miss Grice.
No accounts have been filed.

The petition to wind up the company was presented in the High
Court on Nov. 26, 2014, under the provisions of section 124A of
the Insolvency Act 1986 following confidential enquiries carried
out by Company Investigations under section 447 of the Companies
Act 1985, as amended.

Charles Gordon was adjudged bankrupt on July 22, 2003. Mr Gordon
failed to co-operate with the Official Receiver and Trustee in
Bankruptcy as a result of which his automatic discharge from
bankruptcy was suspended indefinitely and remains suspended.

Mr. Gordon is known to have used various aliases, including
Charles Roberts and has been associated with the Catford address
for over ten years.

The grounds to wind up the company were its lack of transparency;
failure to co-operate with the investigation; lack of commercial
probity; failure to maintain, preserve and/or make available to
the investigation accounting records; and failure to file
accounts.

In ordering the company into liquidation on January 21, 2015, Mr
Registrar Jones gave a detailed and damning judgement in which he
said:

"The concerns of the Secretary of State are wholly justified. It
seems to me that the conclusion to be drawn is that the company
is indeed a company controlled by Mr. Charles Gordon. On the
basis of there being no objection to the petition there can be no
other conclusion other than that the company should be wound up
on the grounds alleged and I do so order."


MIKHAIL SHLOSBERG: February 26 Claims Filing Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------
In accordance with Rule 6.124 of the Insolvency Rules 1986,
Jeremy Willmont -- jeremy.willmont@moorestephens.com -- and Emma
Sayers -- emma.sayers@moorestephens.com -- of Moore Stephens LLP,
of 150 Aldersgate Street, London, EC1A 4AB, were appointed joint
trustees of Mikhail Shlosberg, in bankruptcy, by Secretary of
State on January 20, 2015.

Creditors are required by February 26, 2015, to send in writing
their full names, addresses and descriptions, and full
particulars of their debts or claims, and the names and addresses
of their solicitors (if any) to Mr. Willmont, the joint trustee
in bankruptcy, and, if so required by notice in writing from the
said joint trustee in bankruptcy, or by their solicitors, or
personally, to come in and prove their said claims at such time
and place as may be specified in such notice, or in default
thereof they will be excluded from the benefit of any
distribution made before such debts are proved.  All debts and
claims should be sent to Mr. Willmont at the provided address.
All creditors who have not already done so are invited to prove
their debts, writing to me for a claim form.  No further public
advertisement of invitation to prove debts will be given.

For further details contact:
Hari Patel
Tel: 020 7334 9191
Email: Hari.Patel@moorestephens.com


ON LINE PLATFORM: Provisional Liquidator Appointed
--------------------------------------------------
A Manchester-based company which offered to manage the 'Google My
Business' (formerly 'Google Places') listings of its customers,
was placed into provisional liquidation on Feb. 10, 2015,
following an investigation by Company Investigations, part of the
Insolvency Service.

On Line Platform Management Consultants Limited (OPMC) had been
the subject of a significant volume of complaints during its two-
and-a-half year trading history, including from Google itself,
which included allegations that it was misrepresenting itself as
Google or an affiliate of Google and that it subjected its
customers to threats and intimidation in order to collect funds
it claimed were owed to it. The company operated out of trading
premises at 23 New Mount Street, Manchester, from where it cold
called prospective customers.

The role of the provisional liquidator is to protect assets in
the possession or under the control of the company pending the
determination of the petition. The provisional liquidator also
has the power to investigate the affairs of the company insofar
as it is necessary to protect assets including any third party or
trust money or assets in the possession of or under the control
of the company.

The case is now subject to High Court action and no further
information will be made available until the petition to wind up
the company is heard in the High Court in Manchester on April 13,
2015.

The registered office of On Line Platform Management Consultants
Limited (CRO No. 07923997) is at Suite 125, 23 New Mount Street,
Manchester, M4 4DE. The petition to wind up the company was
presented under s124A of the Insolvency Act 1986 on Feb. 3, 2015.
The Official Receiver was appointed as Provisional Liquidator of
the company on Feb. 10, 2015. Company Investigations, part of the
Insolvency Service, uses powers under the Companies Act 1985 to
conduct confidential fact-finding investigations into the
activities of live limited companies in the UK on behalf of the
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS).


THOMAS COOK: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to EUR400MM Sr. Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Thomas Cook Finance plc's issue of
EUR400 million fixed-rate senior notes due 2021 a senior
unsecured rating of 'B+'/'RR3'.

The fixed-rate notes are guaranteed by Thomas Cook Group plc
(TCG; B/Stable).  The rating is one notch higher than the IDR due
to expected good recovery prospects under a going concern
scenario. The notes rank pari passu with TCG's existing bank debt
and senior unsecured notes.  The proceeds will be used to pre-
fund the company's EUR400 million 6.75% notes due in 2015.
Concurrent with the bond issue will be the cancellation of the
additional bank facility that was arranged in May 2013 to support
the repayment of the EUR400 million 2015 bond.

Fitch affirmed TCG and the senior unsecured notes (B+/RR3) issued
by Thomas Cook Finance plc on Jan. 7, 2015.  The affirmation
reflected improved results in FY14 and the significant further
cost-cutting achieved, which has led to improved profitability.

For TCG's Key Rating Drivers, see the previous rating action
commentary dated Jan. 15, 2015.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- An enhanced EBIT margin of close to 4%
   -- Positive free cash flow generation
   -- Improved interest cover and lease-adjusted FFO gross
      leverage (including GBP700m for working changes) below 5.0x

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Deterioration in EBIT margin below 2.5%, reflecting
      increased competition
   -- Liquidity headroom below GBP200m
   -- Increase in FFO gross leverage (as adjusted by Fitch) above
      7.0x


VIRIDIAN GROUP: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Rating to EUR600MM Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive B2 rating to
EUR600 million (c. GBP468 million) of Senior Secured Notes due
2020 issued by Viridian Group FundCo II Limited, with a loss
given default assessment of LGD4, and a definitive Ba1 rating to
a new GBP225 million super senior revolving credit facility with
an LGD assessment of LGD1 borrowed by Viridian Group Limited.
The outlook on all ratings is stable.

The proceeds of the Notes were used to redeem the c. GBP320
million of outstanding Senior Secured Notes, which fell due in
April 2017, and to pay costs associated with the redemption.  The
excess proceeds were used to repay a portion of the subordinated
shareholder loan provided by the parent of VGIL, Viridian Group
Holdings Limited, which is not part of the Restricted Group. In
turn, the proceeds from the part-repayment of the shareholder
loan were used to extinguish a part of the junior debt
obligations of VGHL, which Moody's does not rate.

The ratings on the existing Notes and RCF have or will be
withdrawn following their repayment.

The rating of the Notes, in line with the B2 rating of the former
senior secured notes, and the recently-affirmed B1 CFR take into
account that the reduction in cash interest from the lower coupon
of the Notes will result in an improvement in interest coverage
ratio but also that the transaction resulted in an increase in
financial leverage (measured by Net Debt to EBITDA) of the
Restricted Group to circa 5.0x from the previous position of
closer to 4.0x.

Viridian's B1 CFR positively reflects the group's earnings
diversity across its businesses, including capacity payments for
power generation assets, price-regulated electricity supply in
Northern Ireland, unregulated energy supply and a portfolio of
contracted wind farm output.

However, the company's credit profile is constrained by (1) its
high financial leverage, which increased following completion of
the refinancing, (2) the expected significant short-term increase
in (mainly debt-funded) capital expenditure to grow the portfolio
of owned operational onshore wind assets; (3) the uncertainty
about the future profitability of its core businesses resulting
from a potential re-design of the Irish Single Electricity Market
(SEM), which is required to enable market coupling with the UK
and is due to be implemented by the end of 2017; (4) the limited
owned assets supporting its market activities and concentration
risk at the Huntstown site; and (5) the expected gradual decrease
in the contribution to earnings from price-regulated businesses
in Northern Ireland.

The new financing structure allows for an increase in investments
in the renewable energy business to the greater of GBP70 million
or 6% of total assets, almost double the GBP40 million permitted
under the terms of the previous notes.  The rating agency
considers that the resultant increase in the scale of owned
assets is likely in time to result in an improvement in
Viridian's business risk profile.  However, Moody's considers
that the significant scale of the proposed investment program is
likely to result in incremental risk for Viridian in the short
term.

Viridian's intention is to use project finance debt facilities to
finance the majority of the growth in this business.  While
project finance lenders will have limited recourse to the
Restricted Group, the investments would result in an increase in
the level of debt which the consolidated group is required to
service.

The Group's adequate liquidity post-refinancing is provided by
the cash flow generation of its core businesses, supported by a
new GBP225 million RCF which allows up to GBP100 million of cash
to be drawn but also provides letters of credit necessary for the
Group to support its operations in the SEM.  Moody's also expects
the Group to retain a comfortable cash position post refinancing
the business.

The terms of the new Notes provide creditor protection including
restrictions on additional indebtedness, subject to a number of
debt incurrence tests and a limitation on the payment of
dividends and other restricted payments.  Carve-outs allow a
limited amount of additional indebtedness and dividends, should
certain leverage tests be met.

The B2 rating of the Notes reflects the fact that they will
effectively be subordinated to (1) the new GBP225 million RCF,
(2) a maximum GBP70 million of commodity hedging liabilities and
an uncapped amount of interest rate and foreign exchange hedging,
which have priority of claim over the shared collateral.

The Ba1 rating of the new RCF reflects its super senior priority
of claim upon enforcement of the shared collateral.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the issuer
will maintain financial metrics in line with the guidance for its
B1 CFR: FFO interest coverage ratio comfortably above 2.0x, FFO/
net debt above 10%, and net debt/EBITDA trending below 4.5x by
2017.

Given the high level of leverage and the material investment
program, Moody's considers that upward pressure on the ratings is
unlikely to arise in the short term.

Conversely, downward pressure could arise in the event of (1) an
adverse outcome from the ongoing I-SEM review or serious
technical problems, which impacted on Huntstown's ability to
receive capacity payments; (2) unexpected difficulties in
relation to the onshore wind build-out including cost overruns;
(3) significant loss of market share as the supply business in
Northern Ireland continues to be deregulated; (4) weaker than
expected retail margins in the growing domestic retail business
in the Republic of Ireland; and (5) a shift in financial
strategy, such that it became materially more equity-friendly
(through enhanced dividends or investments) than the current
management plan.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Unregulated
Utilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in October
2014, and Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.


VIRIDIAN GROUP: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+' on Post Refinancing
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded UK-based Viridian Group Investments
Limited's (VGIL) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'B+'
from 'BB-' and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN)
following the completion of its refinancing exercise.  Fitch has
also assigned Viridian Group Fundco II Limited's (VGFII) EUR600
million senior secured notes a final rating of 'B+' and Viridian
Group Limited's (VGL) and Viridian Power and Energy Holdings
Limited's (VPEHL) GBP225 million super senior revolving credit
facility (RCF) a final senior secured rating of 'BB+'.  The 'BB'
rating on the EUR313 million and USD250 million senior secured
notes due 2017 and the 'BB+' rating on the EUR225 million super
senior RCF due 2016 have been withdrawn as these notes have been
repaid in full.  The Outlook on the IDR is Stable.

The EUR600 million senior secured notes issue proceeds were used
to redeem the EUR313 million and USD250 million senior secured
notes due 2017 (GBP357 million equivalent) and drawings under the
super senior RCF due 2016 (GBP23 million).  Proceeds were also
used to pay down GBP64 million of the subordinated shareholder
loan, which is currently classified as an equity-like PIK
instrument by Fitch, and is thus not included in debt-based
metrics for the restricted group.  In turn the proceeds from the
repayment of the shareholder loan were used to partly repay
junior debt obligations outside the restricted group.

The downgrade of VGIL's IDR is driven by the completed
refinancing, which has resulted in an increase of VGIL's forecast
funds from operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage to 4.7x in FY15
and around 4.3x on average for FY15-FY17 (financial year end
March).  The interest coverage is forecast to improve to 2.3x in
FY15 and around 2.5x on average for FY15-FY17.  Fitch expects
leverage to eventually improve to somewhat below 4x by FY17 due
to positive free cash flow (FCF) generation.  However, this is
subject to investments in renewable assets, uncertainty of growth
in customer energy supply and the trading environment for its
power generation segment.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Medium-Term Deleveraging Expected

Fitch expects VGIL's FFO-adjusted net leverage to peak at 4.7x in
FY15, compared with 3.6x in FY14, before declining to around 3.6x
in FY17.  The immediate increase in leverage is due to the issue
of senior secured notes to redeem the existing senior secured
notes (due 2017), to part repay the non-restricted group's PIK
and to fund refinancing costs.  The deleveraging that we expect
to follow will be supported by projected positive FCF after FY15.
Fitch has assumed no dividends will be paid until the restricted
payment clause of consolidated net debt/EBITDA of 3.5x is
achieved.

Interest cover is forecast to improve to around 2.3x in FY15 from
1.8x in FY14.  This is due to a lower forecast cost of debt
compared with previous debt instruments.  This improvement means
that the interest cover ratio has ceased to be a major
constraining factor for the ratings.

Weak Business Risk Profile

While VGIL's ratings are supported by predictable earnings from
its regulated and quasi-regulated activities, its business risk
profile is offset by a light and concentrated asset base,
potential regulatory risk and increasing competition in retail
operations.  VGIL's regulated retail supply and power procurement
businesses generated about 30% of EBITDA in FY14, although
regulation of this sector is not comparable with that of
transmission or distribution networks.  VGIL's quasi-regulated
earnings, which represented another 23% of EBITDA for FY14, are
supported by capacity payments for its combined cycle gas turbine
(CCGT) plants.

At the same time, the business risk profile is restricted by its
two closed-cycle gas turbines of limited generation size, which
are currently operating at low or close to 0% constrained
utilization as a result of low spark spreads and their mid-to-low
merit order.  Fitch notes low downside risk in the generation
segment given low utilization levels and the support from the
capacity payments.  Regulatory risk stems from the changes that
are being considered to the wholesale electricity trading market
and capacity payment calculation.  The retail operations are
under pressure from increased market competition.

Varying Recovery Expectations

The issued EUR600 million senior secured notes are subordinated
to the GBP225 million super senior RCF, which constitutes a cash
facility of up to GBP100 million and a letter of credit facility.
The notes are also subordinated to a maximum GBP70 million of
hedging liabilities, which have first priority ranking over the
security.  The rating of the RCF is notched up three levels from
the 'B+' IDR due to its high recovery prospects (RR1), while the
senior secured bond is rated at the same level as the IDR, given
average recovery prospects (RR4).  VGIL's asset profile is light
and unique relative to other utilities, with mostly contractual
revenue streams in place.

Weaker Covenant Package

VGIL's bondholders benefit from share pledges and guarantees from
restricted group companies, and from fixed and floating charges
over certain assets.  Bondholders also benefit from a limitation
of indebtedness test with a fixed charge coverage of 2x and a
senior secured leverage test of 4x, up from 3x in the previous
notes, with a higher carve out totaling GBP50 million.  Viridian
is also allowed by the bond documentation to make GBP70 million
of investments in renewable assets, which may be debt-funded.
The company can exceed 4x debt incurrence by drawing on the RCF
or issuing senior unsecured notes.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Near-zero utilization assumed for Huntstown for FY15-FY18.
   -- System marginal price growth of approximately 3% per annum
      on average for FY15-FY18.
   -- Margins in the competitive Energia supply business are
      forecast to be under pressure over the rating horizon due
      to increased competition.
   -- Margins in the currently regulated Power NI business are
      expected to improve over the rating horizon due to
      prospective de-regulation.
   -- EBITDA growth of the renewable PPA segment is assumed at
      around 11%-12 % per annum, driven mainly by new capacities
      coming on stream.
   -- Capex reflects predominantly investments in renewable
      assets and is funded from the internally generated cash
      flow.

Average capex spending assumed at around GBP37 million per annum
for FY15-FY18.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Fitch could consider a positive rating action should
FFO adjusted net leverage decrease below 4x on a sustained basis
and FFO interest cover trend towards 3x.

Negative: Further repayments on the obligations outside the
restricted group or significant investments in the assets outside
the restricted group, not supported by the appropriate dividend
stream would be negative for the rating.  Fitch could consider a
negative rating action if FFO adjusted net leverage weakens
further to above 5x and FFO interest cover falls below 2x on a
sustained basis.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Liquidity is adequate as debt maturities were extended to 2020 as
part of the refinancing.  Liquidity is further supported by
positive projected free cash flow after FY15 and a fully undrawn
RCF of GBP100m.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Viridian Group Investments Limited
   -- Long-Term IDR: downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-'; off RWN;
      Outlook Stable

Viridian Group Fundco II Limited
   -- Senior secured rating: assigned at 'B+', 'RR4'

Viridian Group Limited
   -- Senior secured rating: assigned at 'BB+', 'RR1'

Viridian Power and Energy Holdings Limited
   -- Senior secured rating: assigned at 'BB+', 'RR1'



===================
U Z B E K I S T A N
===================


IPAK YULI: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ipak Yuli Bank (IY) and PJSEB
Trustbank's (TB) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) at 'B-' with a Stable Outlook and Universalbank's
(UB) Long-term local currency IDR at 'CCC'.

Key Rating Drivers

These banks' Long-term IDRs are driven by their standalone
strength, as reflected in their Viability Ratings (VR) of 'b-'
for IY and TB and 'ccc' for UB. The affirmation of these banks'
ratings reflects limited changes in the banks' standalone credit
profiles since their previous review in February 2014.

The VRs consider their challenging operating environment,
including the difficult business climate, structural weaknesses
in the economy, high concentration risk and external pressures
due to the significant weakening of commodity markets and
deterioration in key trading partners (in particular, Russia).

The ratings are also constrained by the high transfer and
convertibility risks present in the economy due to the country's
tightly regulated FX market, and the banks' generally limited
franchises. The latter is more acute for UB, which is
consequently rated one notch lower than its peers, given
geographical concentration and relatively short track record of
operations as well as past regulatory problems (UB's license on
foreign currency operations was revoked in July 2012).

The Stable Outlooks on IY and TB's ratings reflect Fitch's
expectations for continued economic growth, backed by government
spending on industrial development, and solid domestic
consumption to support bank lending and profitability in 2015.

Reported asset quality metrics remain reasonable across the
board, with impaired loans at below 3.6% at all banks at end-
3Q14. At the same time, loan books are yet to season after rapid
growth in 2014 (up by 63%, 50% and 23% for IY, TB and UB,
respectively, albeit from a relatively low base). Top 25
exposures/gross loans ratios are high at 57%-61% at TB and UB and
a more moderate 28% at IY. Fitch's review of the largest
exposures did not reveal major asset quality issues at IY and TB,
while, in Fitch's view, nearly a third of the largest exposures
at UB were of high-risk and weakly provisioned, also reflecting
the bank's limited presence in the mid-sized corporate segment.

The banks currently available capital buffers would enable them
to absorb some extra losses: at end-3Q14, Fitch estimated that
the banks could increase loan impairment reserves up to 12% at
IY, 18% at TB and 33% at UB without breaching minimum regulatory
capital limits. In addition, solid pre-impairment profitability,
underpinned by a high non-interest income, mostly fees (in the
range of 52%-61% of gross revenues in 2014) provides additional
loss absorption capacity. UB's weaker-than-peers' operating
efficiency (cost/income ratio of 72% in 2014) reflects its
limited scale.

The banks' liquidity positions vary significantly. IY and TB's
highly liquid assets net of potential debt repayments comfortably
covered around 32% and 47%, respectively, of customer accounts at
end-3Q14. TB's more ample liquidity should be viewed in light of
the high concentration of deposit funding, mostly due to related
parties, the Uzbek Commodities Exchange and its affiliates, which
accounted for about half of the bank's total liabilities at end-
3Q14. UB's liquidity cushion was small covering just 9% of its
customer accounts.

These banks' Support Rating Floors (SRFs) of 'No Floor' and their
'5' Support Ratings reflect their limited systemic importance and
rendering of extraordinary support from Uzbek authorities is
unlikely. The ability of the banks' private shareholders to
provide support cannot be reliably assessed and, therefore this
support is not factored into the ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An upgrade of IY and TB's IDRs and VRs would require a general
improvement in the operating environment. An upgrade of UB would
require notable growth and diversification of its franchise as
well as significant strengthening of its liquidity position.
Profitability improvement, while maintaining adequate asset
quality and capitalization, would also be rating positive.

A downgrade could occur in the case of a deterioration of the
operating environment, significantly increased pressure on
capital as a result of any marked deterioration of the credit
quality and/or major liquidity shortfalls (e.g. in case of
withdrawals by key customers).

Fitch does not anticipate changes to the Support Ratings and SRFs
of these banks given their limited systemic importance.

The rating actions are as follows:

IY


Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B-',
Outlooks Stable

Short-term foreign and local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'NF'

TB

Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B-',
Outlooks Stable

Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'NF'

UB

Long-Term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'CCC'

Short-Term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'C'

Viability Rating: affirmed at 'ccc'

Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'NF'


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
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is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
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Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
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                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
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Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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