TCREUR_Public/150313.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, March 13, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 51

                            Headlines

F I N L A N D

TALVIVAARA MINING: Audley to Acquire Bankrupt Operational Unit


F R A N C E

BANQUE PSA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCRs Over Santander Partnership
CREDIPAR: S&P Raises LT CCR to 'BB+' Over Santander Partnership


G E R M A N Y

TELE COLUMBUS: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating


I R E L A N D

AQUILAE CLO II: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes


I T A L Y

WIND ACQUISITION: Fitch Rates Proposed Sr. Sec. Bonds 'BB-(EXP)'


L U X E M B O U R G

ELEX ALPHA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'


M A L T A

CITIES ENTERTAINMENT: Took Almost EUR300,000 Worth of Furniture


N E T H E R L A N D S

GATEWAY II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B-1 Notes to 'CCC+'


P O R T U G A L

BANCO BPI: S&P Revises CreditWatch on 'BB-' Rating to Developing


R U S S I A

MECHEL OAO: Debt Settlement Plan May Help Avert Bankruptcy


S P A I N

TDA IBERCAJA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ANYSTAFF RECRUITMENT: In Administration After No Buyer Found
ATMOSPHERE BARS: Broadway Boulevard Could Sell for GBP1
CELESTE MORTGAGE 2015-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating to F Notes
KEY HOMES: Berkeley Homes Takes Over Abandoned Woolwich Hotel
MASTERTON LTD: Unprofitable Contracts Prompt Administration

MUIRFIELD CONTRACTS: In Administration, Staff Put on Leave
PT MCWILLIAMS: Creditors May Lose GBP25MM After Administration


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History


                            *********


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F I N L A N D
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TALVIVAARA MINING: Audley to Acquire Bankrupt Operational Unit
--------------------------------------------------------------
Kati Pohjanpalo and Kasper Viita at Bloomberg News report that a
group of investors led by Audley Capital Advisors will acquire
Talvivaara Mining Co.'s bankrupt operational unit.

Finland's Economy Ministry said in an e-mailed statement Audley
signed a conditional agreement to acquire Talvivaara Sotkamo's
operations from its bankruptcy estate, Bloomberg relates.  It
also signed an investment deal with the Finnish state's Terrafame
Oy, Bloomberg notes.

According to the investment agreement, Audley will hold an 85%
stake in a new mining company that will operate the nickel mine
in northern Finland, with Terrafame owning the remaining 15%,
Bloomberg relates.

The companies are planning to invest more than EUR200 million
(US$212 million) to restart operations at the mine and agreed to
share environmental risks, Bloomberg discloses.

Economy Minister Jan Vapaavuori, as cited by Bloomberg, said the
value of the deal is less than the EUR40 million the Finnish
government has spent after the operational unit's bankruptcy in
November.

The company suffered from falling nickel prices, a slow ramp-up
at its mine as well as environmental issues and pollution caused
by excess water, Bloomberg relays.

Mr. Vapaavuori said the state will continue to spend about
EUR10 million per month until the new owner takes over, Bloomberg
notes.

The ministry, as cited by Bloomberg, said funding for the deal,
as well as approval by authorities, are still pending and the
target date for the arrangement was set at "summer" 2015.

                     About Talvivaara Mining

Talvivaara Mining Co. Ltd. is a Finnish nickel producer.  It
filed for a corporate reorganization on Nov. 15, 2013, to raise
funds and avoid bankruptcy.  The company suffered from falling
nickel prices and a slow ramp-up at its mine in northern Finland,
forcing it to seek fundraising help from investors and creditors.



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F R A N C E
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BANQUE PSA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCRs Over Santander Partnership
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed the
long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on European auto
manufacturer Peugeot S.A.'s captive finance company, France-based
Banque PSA Finance (BPF) at 'BB/B'.  S&P's outlook on BPF's long-
term counterparty credit rating is positive.

On July 10, 2014, BPF and Santander Consumer Finance (SCF), the
consumer finance subsidiary of Spanish bank Banco Santander
(Santander), signed a framework agreement to establish joint-
partnerships between the two groups in 11 European countries.  On
Feb. 2, 2015, BPF announced that its 50/50 partnership with SCF
had obtained regulatory approvals to start operating in France
and in the U.K.  S&P expects the remaining transactions to close
during 2015 and early 2016.

S&P does not view the BPF-SCF partnership as having consequences
for BPF's degree of insulation from its 100%-owner Peugeot.  S&P
continues to consider BPF as a "core" and "insulated" subsidiary
of Peugeot and S&P caps its long-term rating at two notches above
its parent under S&P's group rating methodology.  Previously, the
two-notch differential also reflected S&P's view of BPF's
systemic importance to the French government, which S&P has now
revised to "low" from "moderate."  In S&P's view, BPF's reduced
balance sheet size going forward means that a default is not
likely to weaken the French financial system.  In the meantime,
although BPF will continue to oversee the financial services
operations of Peugeot, the ability of the group to provide
financing solutions to its customers (and potentially preserving
employment in France) is in itself enhanced through the joint-
ventures.  BPF will directly supervise its existing financing
activities in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE),
and Russia, while providing commercial, information technology
(IT), and operational services for the 11 joint-ventures for a
fee.

S&P now analyzes BPF as a member of a wider group, the BPF group,
that provides car financing for Peugeot and that includes 50% of
the joint-ventures.  This is to better reflect the credit
strength of the combined operations by allowing S&P to capture
the benefits brought by the joint-ventures to BPF's overall
credit profile.  S&P assess the group credit profile of the BPF
group before extraordinary support (unsupported GCP).  S&P then
assess the potential extraordinary support BPF might receive,
together with its degree of insulation from Peugeot, to derive
its issuer credit rating (ICR).  S&P assess the unsupported GCP
at 'bb+'.  Based on this, S&P rates BPF at 'BB'.

The starting point for S&P's unsupported GCP assessment is the
anchor for the BPF group, which S&P assess as 'bbb+'.  The anchor
factors in the full lending activities of BPF in Latin America,
CEE, and Russia, and 50% of the loan book exposure of the joint-
ventures.

S&P does not expect the group to restore its business model
resilience until 2016, given Peugeot's weak sales growth
momentum. However, S&P expects the group's loan book to stabilize
and operating revenues to rise in 2015.  In 2014, the group's
operating performance remained satisfactory and broadly in line
with S&P's expectations, despite weak business volumes and high
cost of funding, in S&P's view.

S&P expects BPF group to remain adequately capitalized.  S&P
forecasts its RAC ratio (calculated at the level of BPF's
regulatory perimeter) will progressively decrease, but stabilize
at slightly above 7% by year-end 2016.  S&P anticipates a sharp
decrease as it expects significant dividends and equity to be
upstreamed to Peugeot and S&P's model includes a 1,250% risk-
weight for BPF's minority equity holding in the joint ventures.

S&P considers that BPF group's credit exposure is low risk,
despite its high concentration in the auto dealership sector.
The group's credit risk performance in 2014 was comparable with
that of captive peers and the banking industry in general.

In S&P's view, the ongoing funding and liquidity support the
joint-ventures receive from SCF balances the less-secured funding
structure for BPF subsidiaries in Latin America, CEE, and Russia.
Under the partnership with SCF, although each joint-venture will
need to find and diversify its own sources of funding, SCF will
provide additional financing to close any funding gaps.

The positive outlook mirrors that on Peugeot.  S&P would likely
raise the long-term rating on BPF if we upgraded Peugeot, all
else remaining equal.

S&P would consider revising the outlook to stable if it revised
the outlook on Peugeot to stable.


CREDIPAR: S&P Raises LT CCR to 'BB+' Over Santander Partnership
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has raised its
long-term counterparty credit rating on the French captive
finance company of European auto manufacturer Peugeot S.A.,
Credipar to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  S&P's outlook on Credipar's long-
term counterparty credit rating is positive.  S&P also affirmed
its short-term counterparty credit ratings on Credipar and its
sister company Sofira at 'B'.

On July 10, 2014, BPF and Santander Consumer Finance (SCF), the
consumer finance subsidiary of Spanish bank Banco Santander
(Santander), signed a framework agreement to establish joint-
partnerships between the two groups in 11 European countries.  On
Feb. 2, 2015, BPF announced that its 50/50 partnership with SCF
had obtained regulatory approvals to start operating in France
and in the U.K.  S&P expects the remaining transactions to close
during 2015 and early 2016.

"In our view, the French joint-venture would likely receive
extraordinary support from Santander in case of need, but if
Peugeot experienced financial stress, it would likely affect the
joint-venture's creditworthiness.  As a result, we could factor
up to one notch of group support from Santander into our long-
term rating on the French joint-venture, but we would cap it at
three notches above the long-term rating on Peugeot.  Under our
group rating methodology, we define the French joint-venture as a
"moderately strategic" subsidiary of Santander and an "insulated"
subsidiary of Peugeot.  Among other things, this reflects SCF's
50% ownership, its full consolidation for accounting and
regulatory purpose, the long-term nature of the partnership, and
the contractual agreement from SCF to provide liquidity support
if needed," S&P said.

The French joint-venture consists of Credipar, its sister company
Sofira, and their unrated direct parent SOFIB, all of which
operated before the BPF-SCF partnership and were owned by BPF.
Now, BPF and SCF each own 50% of SOFIB, which directly owns
Credipar and Sofira.  All three companies operate exclusively in
France: Credipar handles the financing of Peugeot's end-
customers, Sofira handles the financing of the dealers' network,
and SOFIB will book the deposit business.

The long-term rating on Credipar and the short-term ratings on
Credipar and Sofira reflect S&P's assessment of the
creditworthiness of the French joint-venture.

S&P analyzes Credipar as a member of a wider group, the BPF
group, that provides car financing for Peugeot and that includes
50% of the joint-ventures.  This is to better capture the close
links, in S&P's view, between the joint-ventures and their 50%
owner BPF.  S&P assess the group credit profile of the BPF group
before extraordinary support (unsupported GCP).  S&P then assess
the potential extraordinary support Credipar might receive,
together with its degree of insulation from Peugeot, to derive
its issuer credit rating (ICR).  S&P assess the unsupported GCP
at 'bb+'. Based on this, S&P has assessed the ICR of Credipar at
'BB+'.

The French joint-venture is exclusively focused on car finance
and auto leasing for Peugeot in France, which S&P views as a
rating weakness.  In the meantime, S&P anticipates that its
capitalization will remain at an adequate level, and consider
that its credit exposure is low risk, although highly
concentrated on the auto dealership sector.  S&P understands
that, under the partnership, SCF will close any funding gaps,
although the joint-venture will need to maintain its own
diversified sources of funding.

The positive outlook mirrors that on Peugeot.  S&P would likely
raise the long-term rating on Credipar if S&P upgraded Peugeot,
all else remaining equal.

S&P would consider revising the outlook to stable if it revised
the outlook on Peugeot to stable.



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G E R M A N Y
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TELE COLUMBUS: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'B+' long-term corporate credit rating to German cable operator
Tele Columbus AG.  The outlook is stable.

S&P also assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the company's EUR500
million senior facilities, consisting of a EUR375 million term
loan, a EUR75 million capital expenditure facility, and a EUR50
million revolving credit facility (RCF).  The recovery rating on
these facilities is '4', indicating S&P's expectation of 30%-50%
recovery in the event of a payment default.  S&P's recovery
expectations are in the upper half of the 30%-50% range.

These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings that S&P
assigned on Oct. 6, 2014.

The corporate credit rating is constrained by Tele Columbus'
still-significant reliance on third-party cable-TV networks and
the need to successfully execute its ambitious network
modernization program, which is necessary to upgrade its
technology to the highest industry standards.  The company's
limited scale and diversity also constrain the rating, as do huge
investment outlays and significant execution risks as it seeks to
accelerate its transition away from basic cable-TV offerings
toward the model of its successful European and German peers.  If
it manages to do so, the transition should support customer
retention, increase bundle penetration, and lift its average
revenues per user (ARPU) through upselling activity.  The sheer
level of investments involved in the various projects related to
this transformation, spanning technical upgrades, own network
extension, and commercial initiatives, generates a risk,
including timing uncertainty, which could materially affect
overall performance in a very competitive environment.  In S&P's
view, there is a risk that, on renewal dates, housing-association
direct customers would move to larger and generally more-advanced
cable providers Kabel Deutschland or Unitymedia, or to competing
products from Deutsche Telekom, if Tele Columbus cannot offer
upgraded and converged services.

However, the long-term nature of the housing-association
contracts provides the company with some visibility and leeway to
deploy its investment plan.  S&P also acknowledges that the
company has been able to significantly increase its broadband
market share against incumbent Deutsche Telekom in the recent
past and that it boasts leading local cable market shares in
Eastern Germany, testifying to the company's successful
commercial achievements within its own upgraded footprint, and
also reflecting the technical edge of an upgraded cable offer
over inferior ADSL technology.

S&P thinks the company has had a good operational track record in
the recent past, benefiting from a well-seasoned new management
team, and that it will continue to shift an increasing portion of
its ultimate customers to its own broadband-enabled network.
This should allow customers to increasingly benefit from its
high-speed broadband offers based on data over cable service
interface specification (DOCSIS) 3.0 technology, reduce the risk
of losing customers to the competition, and increase the
prospects for higher ARPU as subscribers take up triple-play
bundles.  Good operating efficiency and an increasing proportion
of customers served over the company's own network should provide
some margin upside, in S&P's view.

S&P's financial risk and management and governance assessments
reflect its assumption that historical shareholders no longer
control the company after the IPO, as a result of the injection
of EUR367 million of fresh capital and the planned post-IPO
liquidation of Tele Columbus Management and Tele Columbus
Holdings S.A., two entities through which former shareholders
used to fully control the company.  S&P takes into account
management's intention to maintain unadjusted net debt to EBITDA
of about 3x-4x in the future and to not pay dividends for
financial years 2014 and 2015.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's assumption that the company
will maintain its high operating efficiency in the next two
years, successfully renegotiate maturing housing-association
contracts, and continue to deliver its operational targets, which
should be illustrated by revenue growth of more than 4% in 2015
and 2016 and improving EBITDA margins.  In addition, S&P
anticipates FOCF will improve from negative EUR30 million before
IPO-related one-time items in 2015 to positive in 2017, adjusted
debt to EBITDA will remain below 4x, and liquidity will remain
adequate.

Rating downside would stem from evidence of rising churn levels
and loss of customers, which could come from delays or setbacks
in the company's network investment program, various execution
issues, or customer losses to Deutsche Telekom or other cable
providers on contract renewal dates.  In addition, heavy capital
outlays not properly matched by revenues could adversely affect
liquidity.  Therefore, while S&P sees Tele Columbus as adequately
funded to match its network upgrade program over the next two to
three years, S&P would likely see rating pressure build if Tele
Columbus depleted its cash balances and started to draw on its
RCFs because revenues or EBITDA failed to increase.  Given the
company's cash-generation profile, adjusted leverage staying at
about 4x could also put downward pressure on the rating.

Rating upside appears limited for the next two to three years,
but could occur if the company successfully executes its
investment plan and manages to migrate an increasing portion of
its customers to its own network and bundled offers, while
maintaining leverage below 4x and strengthening free cash flow
generation to about 10% of adjusted debt.



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AQUILAE CLO II: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Aquilae CLO II PLC's class A, B, and C notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class D and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 7,
2015 and the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes.  The BDR
represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults,
based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand
and still fully repay the noteholders.  S&P used the portfolio
balance that it considers to be performing, the reported
weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates
that S&P considered to be appropriate.  S&P incorporated various
cash flow stress scenarios using S&P's standard default patterns,
levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each
class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios
as outlined in S&P's criteria.

S&P's review of the transaction highlights that the class A notes
have amortized by more than 75% since S&P's Oct. 26, 2012 review.
Overall, the deleveraging of the class A notes has resulted in
increased available credit enhancement for all classes of rated
notes.  S&P's cash flow results show that the available credit
enhancement for the class A and B notes is now commensurate with
'AAA (sf)' ratings.  S&P has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from
'AA+ (sf)' its rating on the class A notes, and to 'AAA (sf)'
from 'A+ (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

In addition, the transaction's exposure to 'CCC' rated assets is
now lower than in S&P's previous review.  These assets now
account for EUR0.943 million (equivalent to 0.74% of the
performing portfolio).  In S&P's previous review, EUR13.65
million assets had 'CCC+', 'CCC' or 'CCC-' ratings, representing
5.19% of the performing balance at the time.

Predominantly driven by the class A notes' amortization, S&P
considers the available credit enhancement for the class C notes
to be commensurate with a higher rating than that currently
assigned.  While S&P's credit and cash flow results indicate a
rating that is at least equal to 'AA' for the class C notes, S&P
has raised its rating on this class of notes to 'A+ (sf)' from
'BBB+ (sf)' as the application of S&P's largest obligor
supplemental test constrains its rating at this level.

Similarly, S&P's credit and cash flow results indicate higher
rating levels for the class D and E notes than those currently
assigned.  However, the application of S&P's largest obligor
supplemental test constrains its ratings at their currently
assigned levels.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BB+ (sf)' and
'CCC+ (sf)' ratings on the class D and E notes, respectively.

Aquilae CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that closed in November 2006 and securitizes
loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms.

RATINGS LIST

Aquilae CLO II PLC
EUR316.5 mil floating-rate and deferrable floating-rate notes
                                 Rating
Class        Identifier          To               From
A            03842EAA3           AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)
B            03842EAB1           AAA (sf)         A+ (sf)
C            XS0272303776        A+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
D            XS0272304154        BB+ (sf)         BB+ (sf)
E            XS0272304238        CCC+ (sf)        CCC+ (sf)



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WIND ACQUISITION: Fitch Rates Proposed Sr. Sec. Bonds 'BB-(EXP)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned proposed new euro-denominated floating
rate notes due 2020 issued by Wind Acquisition Finance S.A. (WAF)
and guaranteed by Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA (B+/Stable) (Wind)
an expected 'BB-(EXP)'/RR2(EXP)' rating.

The proposed bond will effectively be a senior secured obligation
of Wind ranking pari passu with other senior secured debt.  The
'BB-(EXP)'/RR2(EXP)' expected rating reflects Fitch's expectation
of high recoveries for secured creditors.

The new bond is a part of EUR600 million offering, in a
combination with a tap issue of WAF's currently outstanding euro-
denominated 4% senior secured notes due 2020 ('BB-'/RR2) also
guaranteed by Wind. The new issue proceeds, along with the tower
sale proceeds and the recently announced new term loans, will be
used for repayment of the existing EUR1.7bn term loans.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.

On a standalone basis, Wind's rating corresponds to 'B'/Stable.
Wind's Issuer Default Rating is lifted by one notch to 'B+' for
potential parental support.  Wind is the number-three mobile
operator in Italy with a subscriber market share of approximately
25% and the second-largest alternative fixed-line/broadband
provider with a subscriber market share of approximately 16% at
end-2014.  Its leverage is high, reported at 5.9x net debt/EBITDA
at end-2014.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Challenging Operating Environment

The Italian mobile market continues to contract in revenue terms.
However, there are signs that the pricing war may be over.  Key
operators expect less direct tariff competition, with network
quality issues coming to the fore.  Wind demonstrates strong
relative outperformance slowly increasing its subscriber market
share, but this is not sufficient to protect it from absolute
revenue and EBITDA declines.  The weak economic environment in
Italy continues to weigh on customer sentiment.

Stable Fixed-Line

Wind has significantly improved profitability in its fixed-line
segment which Fitch believes should be sustainable with
continuing focus on more profitable direct customers.  Fibre
roll-out in Italy is likely to be slow, protecting Wind's
position as the largest alternative fixed-line operator in Italy.

High Leverage

Wind's leverage is high, reported at 5.9x net debt/EBITDA at end-
2014.  Fitch estimates that the impact of the tower sale on
leverage will be marginally positive as the reduction in net debt
on the back of cash proceeds will be muted by increased rent
expense, which Fitch capitalizes at a multiple of eight and adds
to the total debt for funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net
leverage calculation.  The refinancing would improve the
company's maturity profile and lead to interest savings.

Deleveraging is likely to be slow.  At above 5.5x net
debt/EBITDA, Wind's leverage is sensitive to even minor EBITDA
pressures.  Fitch expects the company's free cash flow (FCF) to
remain positive in the medium term but modest in absolute terms
on average with less than EUR250m per year available for debt
reduction in 2015-2017.

Shareholder Support Positive but Limited

Wind's ratings benefit from potential support from its sole
ultimate shareholder, Vimpelcom Ltd., whose credit profile
remains significantly stronger than Wind's.  However, Fitch
believes that a further rise in Wind's leverage may diminish
Vimpelcom's propensity to provide support.  An increase in
leverage to above 6x net debt/EBITDA will no longer likely be
consistent with expectations of any parental support.

Vimpelcom's support has been modest so far.  A EUR500m cash
contribution in conjunction with PIK-notes refinancing in 1H14
was insufficient to materially reduce Wind's leverage, given its
limited size relative to Wind's total debt of approximately
EUR10bn.  Vimpelcom has not committed itself to any additional
support.

No Short-Term Refinancing Risks

Wind does not face any material refinancing risks before 2019
when the bulk of its debt comes due.  Post-refinancing, the
maturity profile is expected to improve.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Continuing modest revenue declines tempering from mid-
      single digit territory in 2015 to low-single digits
      afterwards.
   -- EBITDA margin stabilising at above 37%.
   -- Interest rate savings on the back of refinancing in 2014.
   -- Substantial on-going network investments with capex to
      revenue ratio of above 15% in the medium-term.
   -- No common dividends.
   -- No equity injection from the parent.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that may individually or
collectively lead to negative rating action include:

   -- A deterioration in leverage beyond 6x net debt /EBITDA
      and/or FFO adjusted net leverage sustainably above 6.5x.

   -- Continuing operating and financial pressures leading to
      negative FCF generation.

Positive: Future developments that may individually or
collectively lead to positive rating action include:

   -- Tangible parental support such as equity contribution or
      debt refinancing via intercompany loans leading to a
      material reduction in Wind's leverage.

   -- Net debt/EBITDA sustainably below 5.5x and FFO adjusted net
      leverage sustainably below 6x.

   -- Stabilization of operating and financial performance
      resulting in stronger and less volatile FCF generation.



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L U X E M B O U R G
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ELEX ALPHA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
eleX Alpha S.A.'s class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes.  At the same
time, S&P has lowered its rating on the class E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 26,
2015 and the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes.  The BDR
represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults,
based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand
and still fully repay the noteholders.  S&P used the portfolio
balance that it considers to be performing, the reported
weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates
that S&P considered to be appropriate.  S&P incorporated various
cash flow stress scenarios using its standard default patterns,
levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each
class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios
as outlined in S&P's criteria.

S&P's review of the transaction highlights that the class A-1 and
A-2 notes have amortized by nearly 80% of the initial balance
since closing.  S&P's cash flow results show that the available
credit enhancement for these classes of notes is commensurate
with a 'AAA (sf)' rating.  S&P has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)'
from 'AA+ (sf)' its ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes.

As of the January 2015 trustee report, the portfolio's weighted-
average life has increased to 3.98% from 3.92% since S&P's
previous review.  All else being equal, an increase in the
weighted-average life would result in an increase in scenario
default rates (SDRs) at each rating level.  The SDR is the
minimum level of portfolio defaults that S&P expects each CDO
tranche to be able to support the specific rating level using CDO
Evaluator. S&P then determine whether the BDRs pass their SDRs at
the assigned rating levels.

Assets rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', and
'CC') have decreased to EUR9.8 million from EUR15.05 million
since S&P's previous review.  Defaults have also decreased to
EUR6.4 million from EUR13.1 million over the same period.  The
concentration risk has peaked, compared with S&P's previous
reviews, but will continue to increase as the transaction
amortizes.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class B,
C, and D notes to be commensurate with higher ratings than those
previously assigned.  S&P has therefore raised its ratings on the
class B, C, and D notes.

S&P's cash flow results indicate that the available credit
enhancement for the class E notes is commensurate with a lower
rating than that currently assigned.  Additionally, the weighted-
average recovery rate at the 'B' and 'CCC' rating levels has
decreased to 67.8% from 70.5% since S&P's previous review, which
has caused the class E notes' BDR to pass its SDR at lower rating
than that currently assigned.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'CCC+
(sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

eleX Alpha is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms.  The transaction closed in December 2006.  Since
the reinvestment period ended in March 2013, the issuer has used
all scheduled principal proceeds to redeem the notes in the
transaction's documented priority of payments.

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating            Rating
             To                From

eleX Alpha S.A.
EUR300 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1          AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)
A-2          AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)
B            AA+ (sf)          AA- (sf)
C            AA (sf)           A (sf)
D            BBB- (sf)         BB+ (sf)

Rating Lowered

E            CCC+ (sf)         B+ (sf)



=========
M A L T A
=========


CITIES ENTERTAINMENT: Took Almost EUR300,000 Worth of Furniture
---------------------------------------------------------------
Maltatoday reports that Former Cafe Premier owners Cities
Entertainment were allowed to take almost EUR300,000 worth of
office furniture and equipment after the company was liquidated.

Addressing parliament, Nationalist MP Jason Azzopardi said it was
"scandalous" that a company facing liquidation was also allowed
to take the assets with it, according to Maltatoday.

MP Azzopardi explained that through liquidation, owners would use
all their assets to pay some of their debts, the report notes.

The report relates that Mr. Azzopardi said a copy of the most
recent audited accounts of Cities Entertainment were dated
December 31, 2012, with a disclaimer that the audit evidence was
not sufficient.

The report by the National Audit Office, requested by the
Opposition, was spurred on by MaltaToday's first report back in
February 2014 when it broke the story that the Government
Property Department (GPD) had withdrawn legal action for the
rescission of CE's lease, despite having fallen back on some
EUR250,000 in ground rent.

Instead, on the advice of former GPD director and advisor to the
Prime Minister, John Sciberras, the Cabinet approved a EUR4.2
million bailout to buy back the 65-year lease on the cafe in Old
Theatre Street, Valletta; which money was used to pay the State
back on outstanding rents, energy bills, VAT and tax, as well as
Banif Bank loans of EUR2 million and a EUR210,000 fee to CE's
shareholder Mario Camilleri for brokering the deal with John
Sciberras, the report says.

The NAO found a "lack of rigorous and documented consideration of
other options" such as the legally justified rescission of the
lease; "poor governance" with the Prime Minister's negotiating
team failing to involve the GPD from the initial stages of
negotiations; an absence of documentation to sustain government
claims that there was a danger to the overlying National Library
by gas cylinders in the cafe; and that a 5% commission for CE's
shareholder was "unsubstantiated and . . .  inappropriately
included in the agreement," the report adds.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GATEWAY II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B-1 Notes to 'CCC+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Gateway II Euro CLO B.V.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its ratings on the class A1-E, A-1R, A-2, and A-3
      notes; and

   -- Lowered its ratings on the class B-1 and B-2 notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 9,
2015 and the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes.  The BDR
represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults,
based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand
and still fully repay the noteholders.  S&P used the portfolio
balance that S&P considers to be performing, the reported
weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates
that S&P considered to be appropriate.  S&P incorporated various
cash flow stress scenarios using S&P's standard default patterns,
levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each
class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios
as outlined in S&P's criteria.

S&P then compare the BDRs with the scenario default rates (SDRs).
S&P generates the SDRs by using its CDO Evaluator and taking into
account the obligors in the portfolio, S&P's ratings, industries,
maturities, and countries in which the obligors operate.

Obligor concentration has increased since our Feb. 24, 2012
review, mainly due to asset amortization.

Assets rated in the 'CCC' category have decreased to 3.28% from
about 8.00% over the same period.  Defaults have also decreased
to 0.80% from 1.84%.  S&P also notes that British pound sterling
assets are now greater than liabilities.  The transaction's
weighted-average life has decreased as it is nearing its
maturity.

The class A1-E and A1-R notes (together class A1 notes) have
amortized by nearly 79% of their outstanding balance since the
end of the reinvestment period that ended in July 2013.  With
higher available credit enhancement and lower SDRs, S&P's cash
flow analysis shows that credit enhancement is commensurate with
'AAA' ratings.  S&P has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+
(sf)' its ratings on the class A1-E andA1-R notes.

Due to the class A1 notes' amortization, lower SDRs, and a higher
recovery rate, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for
the class A-2 and A-3 notes to be commensurate with higher
ratings than previously assigned.  S&P has therefore raised to
'AA+ (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' and to 'A (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its
ratings on the class A-2 and A-3 notes, respectively.

While the available credit enhancement for the B-1 and B-2 notes
has also increased since S&P's previous review, the results of
S&P's cash flow analysis indicate that the notes are able to
sustain defaults at rating levels which are lower than those
currently assigned.  S&P has therefore lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from
'BB+ (sf)' and to 'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its ratings on the
class B-1 and B-2 notes, respectively.

Gateway II Euro CLO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
April 2007 and is currently amortizing.  Since the end of the
reinvestment period, the issuer has used all scheduled principal
proceeds to redeem the notes in the transaction's documented
priority of payments.

RATINGS LIST

Class                Rating
             To                From

Gateway II Euro CLO B.V.
EUR413 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1E         AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)
A-1R         AAA (sf)          AA+ (sf)
A-2          AA+ (sf)          A+ (sf)
A-3          A (sf)            BBB+ (sf)

Ratings Lowered

B-1          B+ (sf)           BB+ (sf)
B-2          CCC+ (sf)         B (sf)



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO BPI: S&P Revises CreditWatch on 'BB-' Rating to Developing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised the
CreditWatch status to developing from positive on its 'BB-' long-
term rating on Portugal-based Banco BPI S.A. (BPI) and its core
subsidiary Banco Portugues de Investimento S.A.  S&P affirmed its
'B' short-term rating on both BPI and Banco Portugues de
Investimento.

The CreditWatch developing placement follows the recommendation
of BPI's board of directors that the shareholders decline the
recent tender offer from Caixabank S.A.  S&P believes that the
possible failure of Caixabank's tender offer could lead to
material changes to BPI's current ownership structure and
strategic direction, and could put pressure on the ratings on
BPI.  When Caixabank launched the offer in February, S&P only
contemplated the possibility of a positive impact on the
long-term ratings on BPI if the tender offer were successful, or
a neutral impact if it were to fail.

BPI's board of directors' recommendation primarily reflects their
view that the tender offer price does not reflect the bank's fair
value.  Caixabank responded that it considered the price offered
to be appropriate and its plans beneficial for BPI and its
shareholders.

Santoro Finance-Prestacao de Serviā€”os S.A., BPI's second-largest
shareholder with a stake of about 19%, has suggested that BPI
explore strategic alternatives, in particular the possibility of
a merger with Banco Comercial Portugues S.A. (Millenium bcp).

These developments make the deal with Caixabank more uncertain
and indicate the divergence of views among shareholders on BPI's
strategy.  S&P considers it feasible that if Caixabank's offer is
not accepted, this could lead to material changes in BPI's
ownership structure (with Caixabank potentially reducing its
interest in the bank) and, as a result, in the bank's strategic
direction.

S&P understands that the next step will be the decision of BPI's
shareholders at their general meeting regarding the removal of
existing limitations on voting rights.  The outcome of this
decision is, in S&P's view, a key determinant of whether the
tender offer will proceed as Caixabank's offer is conditional on
these limitations being removed.  S&P understands that the
general shareholders' meeting could take place in April.  At that
point, S&P expects to be able to have greater visibility on the
likelihood of the tender offer progressing and the implications
of the likely subsequent scenarios for BPI.

The revision of the CreditWatch placement on Banco Portugues de
Investimento S.A., a core subsidiary of BPI, mirrors that on its
parent.

The affirmation of the short-term rating reflects that, at
present, S&P considers the upside or downside potential for the
long-term counterparty credit ratings to be likely limited to one
notch.

The CreditWatch developing placement reflects the possibility of
the long-term ratings on BPI being raised, affirmed, or lowered
depending on the outcome of Caixabank's tender offer and
subsequent developments, and S&P's assessment of their likely
impact on the bank's business and financial profiles.

S&P could raise the long-term rating by one notch if Caixabank
acquires BPI and S&P considers BPI to be at least moderately
strategic to its parent (which S&P believes is likely if the
acquisition goes ahead).  In that case, the ratings on BPI could
benefit from one notch of uplift, capped at the level of the
sovereign credit rating on Portugal, reflecting S&P's view of the
likelihood of BPI receiving financial support from its parent if
needed.  (Under S&P's criteria, any uplift it applies for
potential group support cannot lift the issuer credit rating on a
subsidiary that is not "core" higher than the sovereign rating on
the host country.)

S&P could lower the long-term rating on BPI if the failure of
Caixabank's tender offer were to lead to meaningful changes in
the bank's shareholder structure--which has been stable and
supportive in the past--as well to its strategic direction,
resulting in higher risks for the bank.

Finally, S&P could affirm the ratings if Caixabank's tender offer
is declined, but BPI maintains a cohesive, supportive
shareholding structure, and a strategy that S&P believes will
entail contained business and financial risks.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


MECHEL OAO: Debt Settlement Plan May Help Avert Bankruptcy
----------------------------------------------------------
PRIME reports that Andrei Kostin, CEO of the country's second
largest bank VTB Bank, said in an interview with Bloomberg
released on March 11 Mechel OAO may still avoid bankruptcy if the
company offers a real debt settlement plan to its creditors.

According to PRIME, Mr. Kostin said VTB needs a real program
aimed at gradually redeeming the debt and not just a five- to 10-
year delay with no obvious sources of financing or any progress
in the situation.

Mr. Kostin, as cited by PRIME, said that there is still a
possibility to settle the situation with Mechel's debt and he
plans to meet with the company's main owner Igor Zyuzin in the
week starting from March 16 to discuss the issue.

The Russian government is monitoring the dialogue between Mechel
and VTB, Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov told
reporters, adding that he hopes that the sides will come to an
agreement, PRIME relays.

Mechel, PRIME says, has been in debt restructuring talks with its
core creditors -- Sberbank, Gazprombank and VTB, for several
months.

On Feb. 24, Mechel said it plans to ask the government for help
under an anti-crisis plan, while on March 7, VTB notified other
creditors that it is going to file a bankruptcy suit against the
company, PRIME recounts.

Mechel OAO is a Russian metals and mining group.



=========
S P A I N
=========


TDA IBERCAJA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'A+ (sf)' from 'AA
(sf)' its credit rating on TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO, Fondo de
Titulizacion Hipotecaria's class A(G) notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class B notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria) and its updated
criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received
dated October 2014.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of
its RMBS criteria and its RAS criteria.  Under S&P's RAS
criteria, S&P applied a hypothetical sovereign default stress
test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient credit and
structural support to withstand a sovereign default and so repay
timely interest and principal by legal final maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as "moderate".  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.

The transaction has an amortizing reserve fund, which is set at
the minimum of 9.2% of the initial balance of the class A(G)
notes and 18.4% of the outstanding principal balance of the class
A(G) notes.  The reserve fund is at its required level and
represents 14.8% of the class A(G) notes' outstanding balance.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days are at 0.21%.  They
are, on average, lower than S&P's Spanish RMBS index.  Defaulted
loans are defined as loans in arrears for a period equal to or
higher than 18 months, or those considered so by the
administrator. Cumulative defaults are 0.21% of the initial pool
balance, lower than in other Spanish RMBS transactions that S&P
rates.  Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction is
unlikely to pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P's
opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) at all rating levels, since S&P's
previous review.  The weighted-average loss severity (WALS) has
increased at each rating level in this transaction.

Rating            WAFF (%)   WALS (%)
  AAA               25.76       16.22
  AA                19.10       10.91
  A                 15.53        3.98
  BBB               11.27        2.00
  BB                 7.06        2.00
  B                  5.86        2.00

The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to adjustment factors that
S&P has applied to the original loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, the
different adjustments that S&P applies to seasoned loans, and the
geographical province concentration adjustments under S&P's RMBS
criteria.  The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the
application of S&P's revised market value decline assumptions
under S&P's RMBS criteria.  The overall effect is an increase in
the required credit coverage for each rating level since S&P's
previous review.

Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria and its RMBS
criteria, S&P has determined that its assigned rating on each
class of notes in this transaction should be the lower of (i) the
rating as capped by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that
the class of notes can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.

The notes redeem sequentially and there are no pro rata
conditions or interest deferral triggers.  The transaction has an
interest rate swap to mitigate the mismatch between the reference
index on the asset pool and that on the notes.

S&P's rating on the class A(G) notes is constrained by S&P's RAS
stresses and this class of notes can be rated up to four notches
above S&P's rating on the sovereign to reach 'A+ (sf)' (Kingdom
of Spain [BBB/Stable/A-2]).  S&P has therefore lowered to 'A+
(sf)' from 'AA (sf)' its rating on the class A(G) notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class B notes because
this class of notes first missed an interest payment in 2012,
which was used at closing to fund the reserve fund.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 4% and 8% for one-year and three-
year horizons, respectively.  This did not result in S&P's rating
deteriorating below the maximum projected deterioration that S&P
would associate with each relevant rating level, as outlined in
S&P's credit stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and that the falls in house prices which we
observed in 2014, will level off in 2015.

On the back of improving but still depressed macroeconomic
conditions, S&P doesn't expect the performance of the
transactions in its Spanish RMBS index to improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth, high unemployment, and fiscal
tightening.  On the positive side, S&P expects interest rates to
remain low for the foreseeable future.

TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which
securitizes a portfolio of first-ranking mortgage loans granted
to Spanish residents.  The transaction closed in July 2013.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating            Rating
                  To                From

TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR447.2 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Lowered

A(G)             A+ (sf)            AA (sf)

Rating Affirmed

B                D (sf)



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ANYSTAFF RECRUITMENT: In Administration After No Buyer Found
------------------------------------------------------------
Recruiter reports that Anystaff Recruitment has called in the
administrators after amassing a "significant" number of debts.

In a statement released March 11, insolvency practitioners SFP
announced they had been appointed administrators to Anystaff,
which has subsequently ceased trading, despite an "intensive"
search for a possible buyer, Recruiter relates.

According to Recruiter, the statement adds the loss of one of the
firm's clients "severely" affected turnover leading to mounting
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) arrears.

A Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) was agreed but breached,
while a payment plan with HMRC was rejected, Recruiter recounts.
The CVA supervisor petitioned for the winding up of the company,
and subsequently SFP's Simon Plant and Daniel Plant were
appointed as joint administrators on February 20 2015, Recruiter
relays.

SFP adds that it along with valuation agents actively marketed
the business for sale and spoke to three interested parties,
Recruiter discloses.  Having contacted the Gangmasters Licensing
Authority (GLA), the administrators continued to run the business
to maximize returns for creditors, Recruiter notes.

However, Anystaff ceased trading on Feb. 27 after confirmation
from its largest customer, which represented 80% of the firm's
turnover, that it had taken its business elsewhere, Recruiter
recounts.

Anystaff is a food industry recruiter.


ATMOSPHERE BARS: Broadway Boulevard Could Sell for GBP1
-------------------------------------------------------
Owen Hughes at The Daily Post reports that a nightclub in the
seaside resort is set to go to auction in London with no reserve
price attached to the listing as owners look to finally dispose
of the former theatre.

Llandudno nightclub Broadway Boulevard is set to go to auction --
and could sell for GBP1, according to The Daily Post.

The report notes that the nightspot closed in June 2013 after
parent company Atmosphere Bars and Clubs went into
administration.

It was initially put on the market for GBP750,000 but this was
reduced GBP500,000 last year, the report relates.

The former Grand Theatre then went up at auction in December but
failed to meet the reserve price, the report says.

Last month, the Daily Post revealed an offer had been accepted
for the club but the deal was not completed.

Now, the site is to go to auction with Allsops in London on March
25, the report relays.

There is no reserve price so even if the highest bid is GBP1, it
will sell on the day -- although the buyer will then take on any
liabilities on the Grade II listed site, the report discloses.

Solicitors from Edwards Duthie Solicitors, acting for the client,
confirmed if GBP1 was the highest bid it would sell for that
price, the report relates.

Llandudno Seaside Buildings Preservation Trust are campaigning to
save and reopen the site as part of a community interest company,
the report notes.

But Chairman of the Trust, John Lawson-Reay said the group will
not be bidding at the auction due to potential liabilities, the
report adds.


CELESTE MORTGAGE 2015-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating to F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary
credit ratings to Celeste Mortgage Funding 2015-1 PLC's class A,
B, C, D, E, and F notes.  At closing, Celeste Mortgage Funding
2015-1 will also issue unrated notes.

At closing, the issuer will purchase the beneficial interest in a
portfolio of U.K. residential mortgages from the beneficial title
seller (Basinghall Mortgage Finance No.1 Ltd.), using the
proceeds from the issuance of the rated and unrated notes.  The
proceeds will also be used to fund a credit reserve fund.

The GBP254.67 million preliminary pool (as of Dec. 31, 2014)
comprises first-lien U.K. buy-to-let residential mortgages owned
by Basinghall Mortgage Finance No.1.  The originators are
Basinghall Finance Ltd. (96.3%) and GMAC RFC Ltd. (3.7%).

The collateral pool comprises first-lien U.K. buy-to-let
residential mortgage loans, 1.86% of which have previous county
court judgments (CCJ).  The portfolio's weighted-average current
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 77.68% (according to S&P's
methodology, which includes haircuts to valuations when the
valuation method was not a full surveyor valuation).

The class A to F notes' interest rate is equal to three-month
British pound sterling LIBOR plus a class-specific margin.  As
the notes' interest will be based on an index of three-month
sterling LIBOR, there is a basis risk mismatch.  This is because
the underlying collateral contains loans that are linked to the
seller's standard variable rate, the Bank of England Base Rate
(BBR), or three-month sterling LIBOR (that resets at a different
reset date to the notes).  As a result, S&P stress the historical
difference between the index paid on the assets and the
liabilities.  S&P's analysis then uses the percentiles of the
resulting distribution according to table 20 of S&P's U.K.
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria.  This
transaction will not benefit from a swap to hedge interest rate
or basis risk.

The issuer will pay interest according to the interest payment
priority.  Under the transaction documentation, interest payments
on all classes of notes (excluding the senior class of notes),
can be deferred if the issuer has insufficient funds.
Consequently, any interest deferral would not constitute an event
of default. However, S&P's preliminary ratings address the timely
interest and ultimate principal payments on the notes.  While all
classes of notes were able to pass our cash flow stresses under
these assumptions, if a class of notes were to defer interest,
S&P would lower its rating on that class of notes to 'D (sf)'.

S&P's preliminary ratings reflect its assessment of the
transaction's payment structure, cash flow mechanics, and the
results of S&P's cash flow analysis to assess whether the notes
would be repaid under stress test scenarios.  Subordination and
the credit reserve fund available amount provide credit
enhancement to the notes.  Taking these factors into account, S&P
considers the available credit enhancement for the notes to be
commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings.

RATINGS LIST

Celeste Mortgage Funding 2015-1 PLC
British Pound Sterling-Denominated Residential
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Class                   Prelim.     Prelim.
                          rating      amount
                                      (mil. GBP)

  A                       AAA (sf)      TBD
  B                       AA (sf)       TBD
  C                       A (sf)        TBD
  D                       BBB (sf)      TBD
  E                       BB (sf)       TBD
  F                       B (sf)        TBD
  G                       NR            TBD
  H                       NR            TBD
  Subordinated notes      NR            TBD

TBD--To be determined.
NR--Not rated.


KEY HOMES: Berkeley Homes Takes Over Abandoned Woolwich Hotel
-------------------------------------------------------------
newsshopper.co.uk reports that a Woolwich hotel site which was
left abandoned midway through construction has been bought by
Berkeley Homes.

The shell of the six-storey Beresford Street building was built
several years ago before owners Key Homes Group went into
administration, according to newsshopper.co.uk.

The report relates that now Berkeley Homes, which is developing
the Royal Arsenal, has purchased the site and is looking for a
hotel operator to complete it.

Once finished, the hotel will provide 130 bedrooms with the
promise of up to 35 new jobs, the report discloses.

"Local residents have had to put up with years of uncertainty
over this building so we are delighted to have completed the
purchase and be able to offer it a positive future," the report
quoted Divisional managing director of Berkeley Homes Karl
Whiteman as saying.

"We will be working hard over the coming months to identify the
right operator to ensure that it complements the new development
at Royal Arsenal Riverside.  We will keep the community updated
on progress through the course of this year," Mr. Whiteman added.


MASTERTON LTD: Unprofitable Contracts Prompt Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------
Scott McCulloch at Daily Record reports that Masterton Ltd. has
gone into administration.

The company, a division of Blackwell Group, had employed 140
people at its peak, though it had been forced to scale back its
operations due unprofitable contracts, Daily Record relates.

In recent years, the company had been predominantly focused on
industrial dismantling and decommissioning work in the
petrochemical and industrial sectors, Daily Record notes.

PwC, as cited by Daily Record, said 28 staff had been laid off
prior to administrators being appointed, with a "small number"
retained to service remaining contracts.

The directors of Masterton were reported to have sought a Company
Voluntary Agreement (CVA) with creditors in August of last year
in a bid to continue trading, Daily Record relays.

However, the CVA attempt failed and joint administrators from PwC
have now been appointed, Daily Record discloses.

Masterton Ltd. is a Grangemouth-based demolition contractor.


MUIRFIELD CONTRACTS: In Administration, Staff Put on Leave
----------------------------------------------------------
thecourier.co.uk reports Dundee building firm Muirfield Contracts
has called in administrators and placed its staff on indefinite
gardening leave.

Contractors complained of being locked out of the company's
headquarters as management spent hours in crisis talks hoping to
stave off the threat of administration, according to
thecourier.co.uk.

However, workers were given letters confirming the firm is to
call in administrators, the report relates.  Staff were also told
they are being placed on gardening leave, the report notes.

Only office workers and management were allowed to attend the
meeting at Muirfield's headquarters on George Buckman Drive, the
report discloses.

Office workers were later seen leaving Muirfield's offices with
what appeared to be the contents of their desks, the report
notes.

However, they declined to speak to the press, the report adds.


PT MCWILLIAMS: Creditors May Lose GBP25MM After Administration
--------------------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that creditors look set to lose out on more
than GBP25 million as a result of the administration of PT
McWilliams.

According to Insider Media, a report to creditors has also
revealed a dispute with two main contractors over payments
totaling GBP2.7 million contributed to the collapse.

Michael Jennings -- michael.jennings@bdo.co.uk -- and
Brian Murphy -- brian.murphy@bdo.co.uk -- of BDO Northern Ireland
were appointed joint administrators on Feb. 13 after the company
experienced cash flow difficulties, Insider Media relates.

At the date of the administration, trade ceased from all sites
with the exception of a single contract, Insider Media recounts.
A total of 60 employees were made redundant prior to the
administration, Insider Media discloses.

Jennings and Murphy believe about GBP27 million is owed to
unsecured creditors, including trade creditors which were
involved with PT's company voluntary arrangement (CVA) in 2011,
Insider Media says.  However, it is unlikely there will be any
cash available to repay them, Insider Media states.

According to Insider Media, CVA trade creditors are owed GBP20.9
million in total.  It comes after PT McWilliams agreed to a CVA
in 2011 after entering administration as it was deemed the
"optimum route" to enable it to continue with a number of
profitable contracts, Insider Media notes.

HSBC also looks set to lose out on about GBP670,000 of its
GBP2.63 million investment in the company, Insider Media says.

The CVA was approved in October 2011 by a majority of the
company's unsecured creditors and the administration concluded on
March 7, 2012, Insider Media recounts.

PT McWilliams is a Omagh-based civil engineering firm.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History
----------------------------------------------------
Author: Alfred L. Malabre, Jr.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 256 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/KNTLyr

Alfred Malabre's personal perspective on the U.S. economy over
the past four decades is firmly grounded in his experience and
knowledge. Economics Editor of The Wall Street Journal from 1969
to 1993 and author of its weekly "Outlook" column, Malabre was
in a singular position to follow the U.S. economy in recent
decades, have access to the major academic and political figures
responsible for economic affairs, and get behind the crucial
economic stories of the day. He brings to this critical overview
of the economy both a lively, often provocative, commentary on
the picture of the turns of the economy. To this he adds sharp
analysis and cogent explanation.

In general, Malabre does not put much stock in economists. "In
sum, the profession's record in the half century since Keynes
and White sat down at Bretton Woods [after World War II] provokes
dismay." Following this sour note, he refers to the belief of a
noted fellow economist that the Nobel Prize in this field should
be discontinued. In doing so, he also points out that the Nobel
for economics was not one originally endowed by Alfred Nobel, but
was one added at a later date funded by the central bank of
Sweden apparently in an effort to give the profession of
economists the prestige and notice of medicine, science,
literature and other Nobel categories.

Malabre's view of economists is widespread, although rarely
expressed in economic circles. It derives from the plain fact
that modern economists, even hugely influential ones such as
John Meynard Keynes, are wrong as many times as they are right.
Their economic theories have proved incomplete or shortsighted,
if not basically wrong-headed. For example, Malabre thinks of the
leading economist Milton Friedman and his "monetarist colleagues"
as "super salespeople, successfully merchandising.an economic
medicine that promised far more than it could deliver" from about
the 1960s through the Reagan years of the 1980s. But the author
not only cites how the economy has again and again disproved the
theories and exposed the irrelevance of wrong-headedness of the
policy recommendations of the most influential economists of the
day. Malabre also lays out abundant economic data and describes
contemporary marketplace and social activities to show how the
economy performs almost independently of the best analyses and
ideas of economists.

Malabre does not engage in his critiques of noted economists and
prevailing economic ideas of recent decades as an end in itself.
What emerges in all of his consistent, clear-eyed, unideological
analysis and commentary is his own broad, seasoned view of
economics-namely, the predominance of the business cycle.  He
compares this with human nature, which is after all the substance
of economics often overlooked by professional and academic
economists with their focus on monetary policy, exchange rates,
inflation, and such. "The business cycle, like human nature, is
here to stay" is the lesson Malabre aims to impart to readers
interested in understanding the fundamental, abiding nature of
economics. In Lost Prophets, in language that is accessible and
jargon-free, this author, who has observed, written about, and
explained economics from all angles for several decades,
persuasively makes this point.

In addition to holding a top position at The Wall Street Journal,
Malabre is also the author of the books, Understanding the
New Economy and Beyond Our Means, which received the George S.
Eccles Prize from the Columbia Business School as the best
economics book of 1987.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *