TCREUR_Public/150327.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, March 27, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 61

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

* AUSTRIA: Company Insolvencies Down 12% in First Quarter 2015


B U L G A R I A

CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: LIC33 Takes Over Companies From Owner


F R A N C E

FINANCIERE QUICK: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' CCR


G E R M A N Y

UNIFY HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Corp. Credit Rating


H U N G A R Y

ERSTE BANK: Chief Executive Dismisses Bankruptcy Rumors
* HUNGARY: To Impose Tough Rules on Bankrupt Brokerages


I R E L A N D

DECO 2015-HARP: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB+ Rating to Class D Notes
WEATHERFORD INT'L: Moody's Affirms (P)Ba1 Sub. Shelf Rating


I T A L Y

SIENA MORTGAGES 2010-7: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. B Notes to Ba3


L U X E M B O U R G

PENTA CLO 1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR13MM Class E Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

BNPP IP 2015-1: Moody's Rates EUR8-Mil. Class F Notes (P)B2
BNPP IP EURO 2015-1: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
DALRADIAN EUROPEAN II: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. E Notes to B1
HYVA GLOBAL: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to 'B3'
MUNDA CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'


P O R T U G A L

BANCO ESPIRITO: Dubai Unit Secured Creditors to Get 82.7% Payout


R U S S I A

MECHEL OAO: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa3' Corporate Family Rating
MECHEL OAO: Moody's Withdraws Caa2.ru Longterm National Scale CFR
ROST BANK: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'R' Credit Ratings


S P A I N

BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Sr. Sub. Debenture Ratings


U K R A I N E

LEMTRANS LLC: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa2' Corporate Family Rating
UKRAINE: Urges Bondholders to Negotiate Debt Restructuring Deal
UKRAINE: May Face Wave of Corporate Defaults, Economists Say
UKRAINE: Moody's Lowers Government Debt Ratings to 'Ca'
VAB BANK: Moody's Lowers Currency Deposit Ratings to 'C'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASHTEAD GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB' CCR
HIBU GROUP 2013: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'CCC+' CCR
EDEN ACQUISITION: Moody's Assigns 'B2' CFR; Outlook Stable
TULLOW OIL: Moody's Lowers CFR to B1; Outlook Negative


X X X X X X X X

s* BOOK REVIEW: Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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* AUSTRIA: Company Insolvencies Down 12% in First Quarter 2015
--------------------------------------------------------------
Xinhua reports that creditors association KSV1870 revealed in a
press release on March 25, 2015, that company insolvencies in
Austria decreased 12% in the first quarter of 2015 to 747 cases
despite a weakening overall economic situation.

According to Xinhua, the debts of insolvent companies also
decreased 38%, or US$320 million, while the number of employees
affected also fell by 27%.

KSV1870, as cited by Xinhua, said the sharp downturn in
insolvencies is in part due to historically low interest rates,
the latter being "one of the strongest factors for the
development of insolvency."

Construction, hospitality, and business services companies such
as consultancies and brokerages all had an above-average
insolvency rate, KSV1870 putting much of this down to the
existence of a high number of such companies, Xinhua discloses.



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B U L G A R I A
===============


CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: LIC33 Takes Over Companies From Owner
-----------------------------------------------------------
Slav Okov at Bloomberg News reports that LIC33, a group of
European investors, bought a 43% stake in Bulgaria's biggest
telecommunications company Vivacom AD and took over other
companies from Corporate Commercial Bank AD's owner Tsvetan
Vassilev.

According to Bloomberg, Pierre Louvrier, LIC33 chairman, said the
Luxembourg-registered LIC33 also bought 100% of Nurts, Vivacom's
radio and television transmitter unit, 91% in Avionams military
aviation repair plant in Plovdiv, 91% in Dunarit ammunitions
maker in Russe and other assets including TV cable licenses.

Mr. Louvrier, as cited by Bloomberg, said the total purchase, for
a token value of EUR1 (US$1.07), includes a commitment to
refinance debts to banks, estimated at EUR900 million.  The
transaction still requires the relevant regulatory approval,
Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Vassilev, majority owner of Corporate Commercial which failed
in June, has been in Belgrade since last year awaiting a Serbian
court ruling on Bulgaria's extradition request for him, Bloomberg
relays.  Viva Telecom Bulgaria EAD, owned by affiliates of
Russia's VTB Capital Plc and Sofia-based Corporate Commercial
Bank, acquired 94% of Vivacom in 2011, Bloomberg recounts.

Mr. Louvrier said LIC33 plans to raise funds on international
markets to refinance the debts and is "in discussions to
refinance" Vivacom's 150 million-euro equity bridge loan due in
May, Bloomberg relays.  He said the buyer will offer the other
Vivacom shareholders to buy them out, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, the Bulgarian government said in a
statement it "will decide whether to come in contact" with LIC33
after they present information about the source of their funds
and the government assesses their legitimacy.

Prime Minister Boyko Borissov's cabinet took a 1.5 billion-euro
six-month loan and sold BGN1.5 billion (US$828 million) in bonds
on the domestic market in December to repay guaranteed deposits
in Corpbank, Bloomberg discloses.

The lender's insolvency proceedings were suspended by the Sofia
City Court on Nov. 24, which delayed appointment of court
administrators, who can manage the reimbursement of the bank's
creditors, the biggest of which is the Bank Deposit Guarantee
Fund, which borrowed government funds, Bloomberg recounts.

               About Corporate Commercial Bank AD

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.



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F R A N C E
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FINANCIERE QUICK: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B-' CCR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on French Fast Food Chain Financiere Quick S.A.S. (Quick)
to stable from positive.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B-'
long-term corporate credit rating on the company.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue rating on the EUR40
million super senior secured revolving credit facility (RCF).
The recovery rating of '2' on this instrument is unchanged,
indicating S&P's expectation of substantial recovery prospects in
the event of a payment default, in the upper half of the 70%-90%
range.

S&P also affirmed its 'B-' issue rating on Quick's EUR440 million
senior secured notes.  The '3' recovery rating on this debt
remains unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation of modest
recovery in the event of a payment default, in the upper half of
the 50%-70% range.

In addition, S&P affirmed the 'CCC' issue rating on Quick's
EUR155 million junior notes.  The '6' recovery rating on these
notes remains unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation of
negligible recovery in the event of a payment default, in the 0%-
10% range.

The outlook revision hinges on our view that Quick's "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile is unlikely to strengthen to
levels commensurate with higher ratings over the next 12 months.
In 2014, Quick posted a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA
ratio of about 6.6x and adjusted EBITDA-to-interest ratio of
2.3x, which are below S&P's previous expectations of 6.0x and
2.5x.  S&P expects Quick's credit metrics to remain stable over
the next 12 months, on the back of stable EBITDA and modest
generation of free operating cash flow (FOCF), in the context of
challenging trading conditions.

"In addition, the outlook revision incorporates weaker-than-
expected covenant headroom.  We acknowledge that the level of
maintenance leverage covenant under Quick's credit documentation
will decrease to 6.25x as of Dec. 31, 2015, against 7.50x before
that date.  Under our revised base-case scenario, we expect the
headroom under Quick's leverage covenant to tighten to below 10%
in 2015, a level that we regard as "less than adequate" under our
criteria.  However, we think that the tightening will be
temporary, and we expect covenant headroom to rebound to above
15% in 2016.  We also think that the company would have some
flexibility to cut capital spending in order to avert a breach,
if operating performance deteriorated," S&P said.

"Our base-case scenario reflects Quick's weakening operating
performance in 2014, and our view that, while management's
initiatives to increase traffic and to refurbish and expand the
network are sensible, the French fast food market will remain
challenging over the next 12 months.  Quick reported negative
like-for-like sales growth of 5.1% in 2014, against strong
positive like-for-like growth in 2013.  The decrease in like-for-
like sales was mainly due to a negative market trend since April
2014, together with intense competition from McDonald's and KFC,
in particular on the media side.  Tempering the disappointing
top-line performance, however, is Quick's stable profitability in
2014, with a reported EBITDA margin of 16%, slightly above the
level for 2013," S&P added.

Quick's sizable debt constrains S&P's assessment of its financial
risk profile.  S&P's view of the company's financial risk profile
also reflects its weak FOCF generation, which offsets good
interest coverage ratios.  Reported FOCF has often been negative,
and will likely remain limited in 2015-2016, according to S&P's
calculations.  In particular, high capital expenditures constrain
cash flow generation, which S&P thinks reflects the capital
intensity of the business model, as well as the company's
refurbishment and expansion plan.

S&P continues to regard Quick's business risk profile as "weak,"
factoring in S&P's view that the company operates in the highly
competitive restaurant industry, which is exposed to
unpredictable risks.  The industry is, in S&P's opinion,
fragmented, sensitive to commodity prices, and exposed to
economic fluctuations. Although the fast food subsegment is more
resilient, it has recently deteriorated because of the French
recession. Furthermore, fast food chains with only one brand,
such as Quick, are relatively exposed to food safety issues,
although S&P understands that the company has put in place
thorough sanitary control processes.  On the positive side, Quick
holds well-entrenched market positions in France, where it is the
second-largest fast food chain behind McDonald's.  Quick is also
the leading player in Belgium.  S&P believes that these markets
are less competitive than the U.S.  Under S&P's methodology, the
combination of a "weak" business profile and a "highly leveraged"
financial profile yields an initial analytical outcome ("anchor")
of 'b' or 'b-'.  In the case of Quick, S&P assess the anchor at
'b-', reflecting Quick's limited FOCF generation.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Quick's future
revenue growth, fueled by restaurant openings, should enable the
company to maintain a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA
ratio of about 6.5x, and an adjusted EBITDA to interest ratio of
2.3x-2.5x over the next 12 months.  The outlook also incorporates
S&P's expectation of a temporary dip in leverage covenant
headroom to below 10% at year-end 2015, when the covenant
tightens to 6.25x. But S&P expects covenant headroom to rebound
to above 15% in 2016.

An upgrade would rely on Quick's ability to generate meaningfully
positive reported FOCF while bringing its adjusted EBITDA-to-
interest ratio into the high end of the 2.5x-3x range.
Importantly, any positive rating action would hinge on Quick's
ability to maintain "adequate" liquidity, including adequate
headroom under its leverage covenant.

S&P could downgrade Quick if its FOCF was persistently negative,
or if its covenant headroom remained persistently below S&P's
expectations, with no improvement prospects beyond year-end 2015.
This could arise, in particular, if like-for-like growth stayed
negative over a prolonged period.



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G E R M A N Y
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UNIFY HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Corp. Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Unify Holdings B.V., a Germany-
headquartered provider of enterprise communications-related
technology and solutions.  The outlook is stable.

The affirmation primarily reflects S&P's view that the financial
support provided by its 49%-owner Siemens AG helps address
Unify's near-term refinancing needs and equips the company with
sufficient liquidity for operations and its new restructuring and
business-transformation program over the next 12 months.
Nevertheless, thereafter, Unify's liquidity could weaken, in
S&P's opinion, particularly if the company is unable to implement
the proposed issuance of a new EUR100 million senior secured
facility and, at the same time, significantly turn around its
currently weak revenues in fiscal 2015 and achieve organic
revenue growth of at least zero in fiscal 2016.

In January 2015, Siemens, as one of the two principal owners of
Unify, committed to injecting EUR130 million in cash in the form
of new preference shares and to backing a new EUR163 million
facility.  Unify is using the proceeds to redeem all of its
outstanding senior secured notes due November 2015 (about EUR120
million as of Dec. 31, 2014), which it completed on March 9,
2015, and to fund the company's new transformation plan, which
involves substantial headcount reductions and a range of measures
to realign the company's business model.  Unify also successfully
rolled over its fully drawn revolving credit facility of EUR40
million for another year, now due May 2016.

The stable outlook on Unify reflects S&P's expectation that the
company will stabilize its revenue growth to at least zero by
fiscal 2016, implement its latest restructuring program on time
and on budget, improve its operating margins, and significantly
strengthen its FOCF generation before restructuring and business-
transformation costs in the next 12 months.  In particular, S&P
expects cash balances of about EUR100 million at year-end fiscal
2015.

S&P could lower the rating if Unify's revenue decline did not
abate materially in the course of fiscal 2015, with a high
probability of at least stable revenues in fiscal 2016, or if
restructuring and business-transformation costs or operating
underperformance led to a deterioration of Unify's liquidity
position.  Equally, S&P could lower the rating if Unify failed to
successfully conclude the remaining components of its refinancing
package by year-end 2015.

S&P could raise the rating if Unify is able to achieve mid-single
digit revenue growth and EBITDA margins of at least 5% (after
restructuring and business transformation costs) in fiscal
2016 -- supported by the current cost-saving initiatives,
improving industry demand, and its business-model
transformation -- and, at the same time, prospects for break-even
FOCF generation (after restructuring and business-transformation
costs).



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H U N G A R Y
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ERSTE BANK: Chief Executive Dismisses Bankruptcy Rumors
-------------------------------------------------------
According to MTI, Erste Bank Hungary deputy chief executive
Laszlo Harmati said the bank has dismissed as "unfounded rumor"
reports alleging that the bank's financial position had weakened,
and pledged to file a criminal complaint.

Mr. Harmati spoke in response to news that queues have formed in
front of several Erste branches in eastern Hungary's Debrecen
after rumors circulated that the bank may file for bankruptcy
protection imminently, MTI relates.  He told public television M1
that the bank's liquidity and capital strength were stable and
that its financial stability was not compromised, MTI relays.

Mr. Harmati, as cited by MTI, said the source of the rumors had
been identified and Erste would pass this information to the
police.

Mr. Harmati said the bank had closed the fourth quarter already
with a profit last year after paying out compensations to clients
on losses derived from foreign currency loan contracts, MTI
notes.

Erste Bank Hungary ZRT. is a member of the Erste Group.


* HUNGARY: To Impose Tough Rules on Bankrupt Brokerages
-------------------------------------------------------
bne IntelliNews reports that Hungary's ruling Fidesz party has
drafted a bill imposing tough rules on brokerages under
bankruptcy proceedings, the party's parliamentary group leader
Antal Rogan said on March 23.

The bill was drafted in response to a recent scandal in which the
licences of three brokerages were suspended by the central bank
over irregularities, bne IntelliNews relays.  The trio is
suspected of fraud amounting to as much as EUR1 billion, bne
IntelliNews discloses.

The new legislation, which is expected to be discussed by the
parliament's economic committee on March 24, envisages not only
freezing the assets of troubled brokerages but also those of the
entire group to which they belong, bne IntelliNews says, citing
MTI.  Mr. Rogan, as cited by bne IntelliNews, the bill calls for
freezing the assets of company managers and owners who are
suspected of having been involved in fraudulent activities.

Commenting on the bill, Prime Minister Viktor Orban said that the
assets of the troubled brokerages and of their owners and
managers will be placed into an asset fund and used to compensate
the victims, bne IntelliNews relays, citing Portfolio.hu.

Hungary's brokerage woes started in late February, when the MNB
suspended the license of Buda-Cash, saying the brokerage could
not account for about HUF100 billion of client cash, bne
IntelliNews recounts.  Days later, the licenses of four banks
linked to the brokerage were also revoked, bne IntelliNews
discloses.

On March 6, the MNB partly suspended the license of brokerage
Hungaria Ertekpapir because of "irregularities", bne IntelliNews
relates.  The third brokerage to face regulatory action was
Quaestor, bne IntelliNews states.  Its license was revoked on
March 10 on suspicion that the company may have issued bogus
bonds worth hundreds of millions of euros, according to bne
IntelliNews.

In order to prevent future scandals, the economy ministry and the
MNB agreed that more stringent oversight rules should also be
introduced for auditors, bne IntelliNews notes.



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I R E L A N D
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DECO 2015-HARP: S&P Assigns Prelim. BB+ Rating to Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned preliminary credit
ratings to DECO 2015-HARP Ltd.'s class A, B, C, and D commercial
mortgage-backed floating-rate notes (see list below).

DECO 2015-HARP is a commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)
transaction secured by three Irish commercial mortgage loans
originated by Deutsche Bank AG between December 2013 and March
2015.

"In our analysis, we evaluated the underlying real estate
collateral securing each loan in order to generate an "expected
case" value.  Our analysis focused on sustainable property cash
flows and capitalization rates.  We assumed that a real estate
workout would be required throughout the five-year tail period
(the period between the maturity date of the latest maturing loan
and the transaction's final maturity date) needed to repay
noteholders, if the respective borrowers were to default.  We
then determined the recovery proceeds for both loans by applying
a recovery proceeds rate at each rating level.  This analysis
begins with the adoption of base market value declines and
recovery rate assumptions for different rating levels.  At each
rating category, we adjusted the base recovery rates to reflect
specific property, loan, and transaction characteristics," S&P
said

"We aggregated the derived recovery proceeds above for each loan
at each rating level, and compared them with the proposed capital
structure.  We noted that the modified pro rata allocation of
scheduled principal payments and repayments exposes the
transaction to the risk of eroding credit enhancement for the
class A, B, C, and D notes.  We therefore assessed the effect of
the modified pro rata payment profile on each class in turn,
comparing the principal amount of each outstanding tranche at the
time of an assumed loan default with the derived recovery
prospects, and used this as an input to our preliminary ratings,"
S&P added.

THE SHAMROCK LOAN (EUR87.6 MILLION; 50.1% OF THE TRANSACTION)

The loan is secured on mortgages over 14 mixed-use properties
(predominantly residential with additional retail accommodation),
a single hostel property, and a development site.  The initial
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 58.9%.  Material scheduled
amortization over the loan's term will result in an LTV ratio at
maturity of 55.6%.  The loan's initial debt service coverage
ratio (DSCR) is 1.6x.

S&P considers that the assets' potential to produce net cash
flows is EUR8.6 million on a sustainable basis.  This would imply
an initial interest coverage ratio (ICR) of about 1.9x.  S&P's
net recovery value for the portfolio is about EUR137.6 million,
representing a 7.5% haircut (discount) to the open market
valuation.

THE NEW YORK LOAN (EUR47.5 MILLION; 27.1% OF THE TRANSACTION)

The loan is secured by a mortgage over a single multi-family
property, which includes additional retail and office
accommodation.  The loan's initial LTV ratio is 65.0%, and its
LTV ratio at maturity is 62.3%, based on the scheduled
amortization. The initial DSCR is 2.3x.

S&P considers the assets' potential to produce net cash flows to
be EUR3.3 million on a sustainable basis.  This would imply an
initial ICR of 2.2x.  S&P's net recovery value for the portfolio
is EUR55.0 million, representing a 24.7% haircut to the open
market valuation.

THE BOLAND LOAN (EUR39.9 MILLION; 22.8% OF THE TRANSACTION)

The loan is secured by a mortgage over a single office property
on the outskirts of the central business district in Dublin 2.
The loan's initial LTV ratio is 68.8%, and its LTV ratio at
maturity is 64.0%, based on the scheduled amortization.  The
initial DSCR is 2.1x.

S&P considers the assets' potential to produce net cash flows to
be EUR2.9 million on a sustainable basis.  This would imply an
initial ICR of 2.2x.  S&P's net recovery value for the portfolio
is EUR44.2 million, representing a 23.8% haircut to the open
market valuation.

There is a potential capital gains tax (CGT) liability payable by
the borrower in the event that the property is sold in the next
seven years.  Consequently, S&P has accounted for the potential
CGT liability in its analysis in the event the property is sold
for our S&P Value in S&P's default scenario.

COUNTERPARTY RISK

S&P's current counterparty criteria allow it to rate the notes in
structured finance transactions above our ratings on related
counterparties if a replacement framework exists and other
conditions are met.  The maximum ratings uplift depends on the
type of counterparty obligation.  In this transaction, Deutsche
Bank (A/Watch Neg/A-1) is the liquidity facility provider.  In
accordance with S&P's current counterparty criteria, Deutsche
Bank can support a maximum potential rating of 'AA' on the notes
in this transaction.

Deutsche Bank is also the swap provider to the Shamrock loan.  In
accordance with S&P's current counterparty criteria, Deutsche
Bank can support a maximum potential rating of 'AA-' on the notes
in this transaction.  S&P has considered whether, in a rising
interest rate environment, the cash flow would be sufficient to
service the bonds in an unhedged scenario.  Under this scenario,
S&P believes that the class A notes can support a 'AAA' rating,
whilst the class B notes are capped at a 'AA-' rating.

Following S&P's credit analysis and the application of its
current counterparty criteria, S&P considers the available credit
enhancement for each class of notes to be commensurate with the
preliminary ratings that we have assigned.

RATINGS LIST

DECO 2015-HARP Ltd.
EUR175.081 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class      Prelim.           Prelim.
           rating            amount
                            (mil. EUR)

A          AA (sf)               90.0
B          AA- (sf)              55.0
C          A- (sf)               17.5
D          BB+ (sf)              12.5
X          NR                     0.1

NR--Not rated.


WEATHERFORD INT'L: Moody's Affirms (P)Ba1 Sub. Shelf Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Weatherford International
Ltd.'s (Weatherford, incorporated in Bermuda) Baa3 senior
unsecured and Prime-3 commercial paper ratings. The rating
outlook has been changed to negative from stable.

"Weatherford's negative rating outlook reflects the risk that
debt balances could increase during the current cyclical
downturn, weakening the company's financial leverage profile
relative to a number of its Baa3 rated peers," commented Gretchen
French, Moody's Vice President. "While Weatherford was successful
in reducing debt balances through asset sale proceeds in 2014,
its ability to generate positive free cash flow through an
industry cycle has still not been demonstrated, which increases
the risk of negative free cash flow and rising debt levels in
2015."

Ratings affirmed include:

Weatherford International Ltd. (Bermuda)

  -- Senior Unsecured Notes at Baa3

  -- Senior Unsecured Shelf Rating at P(Baa3)

  -- Subordinate Shelf Rating at P(Ba1)

  -- Preferred Shelf Rating at P(Ba2)

  -- Commercial Paper Rating at P-3

  -- Rating outlook change to Negative from Stable

Weatherford International, LLC. (Delaware)

  -- Senior Unsecured Notes at Baa3

  -- Senior Unsecured Shelf Rating at P(Baa3)

  -- Subordinate Shelf Rating at P(Ba1)

  -- Rating outlook change to Negative from Stable

Weatherford's Baa3 senior unsecured rating is supported by: its
scale and leading market positions; its geographic
diversification, with a substantial portion of its revenue coming
from markets outside the historically more volatile North
American market; and its numerous patented products and
technologies, which give the company a competitive edge in
several markets. While Weatherford's asset profile is indicative
of a higher rating, the Baa3 rating is constrained by the
company's high financial leverage and lower returns compared to
its peers. Weatherford has weak coverage and leverage metrics
stemming from a history of debt-financed acquisitions and periods
of sustained negative free cash flow resulting from its
historically aggressive growth profile.

Weatherford is facing what looks to be a sharper and more
protracted oilfield services industry downturn than the last
cyclical downturn of 2009. Moody's expects Weatherford will face
not only reduced activity levels, particularly in North America,
but also reduced pricing across product lines, pressuring
earnings and cash flow generation.

Moody's positively note that Weatherford has quickly responded to
the downturn by reducing its cost structure and capital spending
levels, with the company targeting positive cash flow in 2015,
with any excess cash flow targeted towards debt reduction. In
addition, the company's good geographic diversification outside
of North America and meaningful exposure to the production cycle
through its artificial lift business should help to somewhat
offset severe North American drilling curtailments.

Nevertheless, Weatherford is facing a deep cyclical downtown
while still in the midst of re-vamping its corporate strategy, in
which the company is focusing on its key core businesses, with
the planned divestiture of its remaining rigs business. Moreover,
its track record in generating free cash flow remains challenged.
While the company is focused on continuing to reduce its debt
burden, and its debt levels were reduced materially in 2014
through asset sale proceeds, its ability to protect its balance
sheet during this cyclical downturn remains a risk. Furthermore,
Moody's continue to see a high level of recurring charges in
Weatherford's reported financials and weak free cash flow
generation, which is indicative of its on-going re-vamp strategy,
as well as the cyclical downturn.

Weatherford has an adequate liquidity profile. The company's
Prime-3 rating on its US$2.25 billion commercial paper (CP)
program is supported by its operating cash flow and US$2.25
billion credit facility maturing in July 2016. As of December 31,
2014 Weatherford had US$245 million of commercial paper
outstanding with US$1,800 million of availability under its
revolving credit facility (after accounting for US$30 million in
letters of credit, the commercial paper backstop utilization, and
anticipated drawings of US$175 million to pay off short term debt
due in April 2015). The company is expected to maintain
compliance under its sole financial covenant, which is a maximum
debt-to-capitalization ratio of 60% on an unadjusted basis.

The rating outlook is negative. The outlook could be stabilized
if Weatherford remains disciplined executing its strategy, is
successful in achieving sufficient cost reductions, generating
positive free cash flow, and protecting its balance sheet such
that debt/EBITDA is trending towards 3.5x and retained cash
flow/debt is sustained above 15%.

Weatherford's ratings could be downgraded should debt/EBITDA look
to be sustained above 4.0x and retained cash flow/debt below 15%,
without a clear near-term trajectory to lower leverage levels.

If Weatherford can reduce debt levels sufficiently in order to
support Debt/EBITDA trending towards 3.0x and retained cash
flow/debt above 20%, including through weaker points in the
oilfield services cycle, then the ratings could be upgraded.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Oilfield Services Industry Rating Methodology published in
December 2014.

Weatherford International Ltd., headquartered in Ireland, is a
diversified international energy service and manufacturing
company that provides a variety of services and equipment to the
oil and gas industry.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


SIENA MORTGAGES 2010-7: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. B Notes to Ba3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of twelve notes,
confirmed the rating of one note and affirmed the rating of one
note in five Italian mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions: F-E Mortgages S.r.l., F-E Mortgages S.r.l. 2005,
Siena Mortgages 07-5 S.p.A, SIENA MORTGAGES 2010 -7 and Siena
Mortgages 07-5, Series 2.

The rating actions conclude the placement of the ratings on
review for upgrade of thirteen notes initiated on Jan. 23, 2015,
following the upgrade of the Italian country ceiling to Aa2 from
A2.

The rating upgrades reflect (1) the upgrade of the Italian local
currency country risk ceiling to Aa2; and (2) the updates to
Moody's structured finance rating methodologies to incorporate
the new Counterparty Risk ("CR") Assessment for banks .

The affirmation and confirmation reflect Moody's view that the
available credit enhancement is sufficient to maintain the
current ratings on the affected notes.

The country ceilings reflect a range of risks that issuers in any
jurisdiction are exposed to, including economic, legal and
political risks. On January 20, 2015, Moody's announced a six-
notch uplift between a government bond rating and its country
risk ceiling for Italy. As a result, the maximum achievable
rating for structured finance transactions increased to Aa2 (sf)
from A2 (sf) for Italy.

The rating actions took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as servicers, account banks or swap
providers. Moody's incorporated the updates to its structured
finance methodologies in its analysis of the transactions
affected by the rating actions.

Moody's now matches banks' exposure in structured finance
transactions to the CR Assessment for commingling risk, and to
the bank deposit rating when analyzing set-off risk. Moody's has
introduced a recovery rate assumption of 45% for both exposures.

Moody's considered how the liquidity available in the
transactions and other mitigants support continuity of note
payments, in case of servicer default, using the CR Assessment as
a reference point for servicers or cash mangers.

Moody's also assessed the default probability of each
transaction's account bank providers by referencing the bank's
deposit rating. Moody's analysis considered the risks of
additional losses on the notes if they were to become unhedged
following a swap counterparty default by using the CR Assessment
as reference point for swap counterparties. In addition Moody's
uses internal guidance on the CR Assessments to assess the rating
impact on outstanding structured finance transactions. The
internal guidance is in line with the guidance published in its
updated bank rating methodology and its responses to frequently
asked bank methodology-related questions.

In Siena Mortgages 07-5 S.p.A, the exposure to Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena S.p.A. as swap counterparty constrains the
ratings on the class B and C notes.

The rating review placements of certain banks resulting from
Moody's revised bank methodology, will not affect the ratings in
these five transactions, if the final ratings on the banks are in
line with Moody's preliminary indications.

Moody's has reassessed its lifetime loss expectation, taking into
account the transactions' underlying collateral performance to
date. The portfolios in F-E Mortgages S.r.l. and F-E Mortgages
S.r.l. 2005 show deteriorating growth rate in defaults. As a
result, Moody's increased its Expected Loss (EL) assumption for
F-E Mortgages S.r.l. to 3.48% from 3.21% of the original pool
balance and, in F-E Mortgages S.r.l. 2005, to 3.81% from 3.56%.

Moody's has also increased the MILAN CE in F-E Mortgages S.r.l.to
13.0% from 8.5% and, in F-E Mortgages S.r.l. 2005, to 11.7% from
8.5%. The increased EL assumptions in these two transactions
resulted in a higher Minimum EL Multiple which corresponds to the
MILAN CE floor according to Moody's methodology for rating RMBS
transactions using the MILAN framework.

Moody's key collateral assumptions remain unchanged for Siena
Mortgages 07-5 S.p.A, Siena Mortgages 07-5, Series 2 and SIENA
MORTGAGES 2010 -7, as the pools' performance remains in line with
Moody's assumptions.

Moody's quantitative analysis incorporates the ratings'
sensitivity to increases in key collateral assumptions. The
increases included stresses between 1.25x and 1.50x EL in line
with the current EL assumption, and 1.2x MILAN CE. Moody's
sensitivity analysis would typically expect to see the ratings
fall by no more than one to three notches using these stressed
assumptions. The results of this analysis limited the potential
upgrade of the ratings on the class B Notes in F-E Mortgages
S.r.l., the class C notes in F-E Mortgages S.r.l. 2005 and the
class B notes in Siena Mortgages 07-5, Series 2.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework," published in
January 2015.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) further decrease in sovereign risk; (2)
better-than-expected performance of the underlying collateral;
(3) deleveraging of the capital structure; and (4) improvements
in the credit quality of the transaction counterparties above the
preliminary indication of outcome ratings, after Moody's
concluded its review under the bank rating methodology

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk; (2) worse-
than-expected performance of the underlying collateral; (3)
deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; and (4)
deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: F-E Mortgages S.r.l.

  -- EUR682 million Class A1 Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR48 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously
     on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR11 million Class C Notes, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously
     on Apr 29, 2014 Confirmed at Baa2 (sf)

Issuer: F-E Mortgages S.r.l. 2005

  -- EUR951.6 million Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR41.1 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR36 million Class C Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Siena Mortgages 07-5 S.p.A

  -- EUR4765.9 million Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR157.45 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR239 million Class C Notes, Confirmed at B3 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

Issuer: SIENA MORTGAGES 2010 -7 S.R.L.

  -- EUR400 million Class A2 Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR1666.9 million Class A3 Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR817.6 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

Issuer: Siena Mortgages 07-5, Series 2

  -- EUR3129.4 million Class A Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR108.3 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf);
     previously on Jan 23, 2015 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
     Possible Upgrade



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


PENTA CLO 1: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR13MM Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by PENTA CLO 1 S.A.:

  -- EUR48 million Class B Senior Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
     due 2024, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2014
     Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  -- EUR21 million Class C Senior Subordinated Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf);
     previously on Jun 9, 2014 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR5.5 million (Current rated balance: EUR3.2M) Class Q
     Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
     on Jun 9, 2014 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  -- EUR5 million (Current rated balance: EUR0.5M) Class R
     Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously
     on Jun 9, 2014 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued
by PENTA CLO 1 S.A.:

  -- EUR240 million (Current rated balance: EUR 167.4M) Class A-1
     Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
     previously on Jun 9, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR26 million Class A-2 Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
     Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 9, 2014 Upgraded to
     Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR15 million Class D Senior Subordinated Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously
     on Jun 9, 2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- EUR13 million Class E Senior Subordinated Deferrable
     Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously
     on Jun 9, 2014 Affirmed B1 (sf)

  -- EUR8 million (Current rated balance: EUR4.8M) Class S
     Combination Notes due 2024, Affirmed Baa3 (sf); previously
     on Jun 9, 2014 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

Penta CLO 1 S.A., issued in April 2007, is a single currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. It is predominantly composed of
senior secured loans. The portfolio is managed by Penta
Management Limited, and this transaction has recently ended its
reinvestment period on June 4, 2014.

According to Moody's, the upgrade of the notes is primarily a
result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes and subsequent
increase in the overcollateralization (the "OC ratios"). Moody's
notes that on the December 2014 payment date, the Class A-1 notes
have been paid by EUR65.03 million, or 27% of their original
balance. As a result of this deleveraging, the OC ratios of the
senior notes have significantly increased. As per the latest
trustee report dated February 2015, the Class A, Class B, Class
C, Class D and Class E OC ratios are 163.93%, 131.33%, 120.82%,
114.28% and 109.17, respectively, versus May 2014 levels of
147.68%, 124.54%, 116.55%, 111.45 and 107.37%.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR316.6
million, defaulted par of EUR5.8 million, a weighted average
default probability of 22% (consistent with a WARF of 3,054 with
a weighted average life of 4.51 years), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 44.95% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 23 and a weighted average spread of
4.01%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 85.56% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
15%. In each case, historical and market performance and a
collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the
weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model
generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-case
results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

(2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

(3) Around 23.48% of the collateral pool consists of debt
     obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
     using credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's
     has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing
     a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the
     Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published
     in October 2009.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BNPP IP 2015-1: Moody's Rates EUR8-Mil. Class F Notes (P)B2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following provisional
ratings to notes to be issued by BNPP IP Euro CLO 2015-1 B.V.:

Issuer: BNPP IP EURO CLO 2015-1 B.V.

  -- EUR176,236,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR5,264,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
     2028, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR20,868,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR12,632,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
     2028, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR17,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

  -- EUR15,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

  -- EUR21,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

  -- EUR8,000,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
     Notes due 2028, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

Moody's provisional rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2028. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, BNP Paribas Asset
Management SAS, has sufficient experience and operational
capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

BNPP IP Euro CLO 2015-1 B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least
95% of the portfolio must consist of secured senior loans and up
to 5% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior loans,
second lien loans, mezzanine obligations or DIP loans. The
portfolio is expected to be at least 80% ramped up as of the
closing date and to be comprised of corporate loans to obligors
predominantly domiciled in Western Europe. The remainder of the
portfolio will be acquired during the six month ramp-up period in
compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

BNP Paribas Asset Management SAS will manage the CLO. It will
direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral
on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity,
including discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-
year reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted
using principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit improved and credit impaired
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR32,000,000 of subordinated notes. Moody's
has not assigned rating to this class of notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
February 2014. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

- Par Amount: EUR 300,000,000

- Diversity Score: 35

- Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

- Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

- Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): non applicable

- Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.75%

- Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the provisional rating
assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes
increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is
a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3278 from 2850)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

- Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

- Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3705 from 2850)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

- Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

- Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. BNP Paribas Asset Management
SAS's investment decisions and management of the transaction will
also affect the notes' performance.


BNPP IP EURO 2015-1: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned BNPP IP Euro CLO 2015-1 B.V.'s notes
expected ratings as:

Class A-1: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class A-1: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-1: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B-2: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C: 'A+(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class D: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class E: 'BB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Class F: 'B-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable
Subordinated notes: not rated

The assignment of the final ratings is contingent on the receipt
of final documents conforming to information already reviewed.

BNPP IP Euro CLO 2015-1 B.V. is an arbitrage cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the
'B'/'B-' range.  The agency has public ratings or credit opinions
on all the obligors in the identified portfolio.  The covenanted
maximum Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) for assigning
expected ratings is 34.25.  The WARF of the identified portfolio
is 32.5.

High Recovery Expectations

The portfolio will comprise a minimum of 95% senior secured
obligations.  Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to the entire
identified portfolio.  The covenanted minimum weighted average
recovery rate (WARR) for assigning expected ratings is 68.5%.
The WARR of the identified portfolio is 69.3%.

Payment Frequency Switch

The notes pay quarterly while the portfolio assets can reset to a
semi-annual or annual basis.  The transaction has an interest-
smoothing account, but no liquidity facility.  Liquidity stress
for the non-deferrable class A-1, A-2, B1 and B-2 notes, stemming
from a large proportion of assets resetting to a semi-annual
basis in any one quarterly period, is addressed by switching the
payment frequency on the notes to semi-annual in such a scenario,
subject to certain conditions.

Limited Interest Rate Risk

The transaction is only allowed to invest in floating-rate
assets. This aligns the portfolio yield with the cost of the
floating-rate liabilities as fixed-rate liabilities only
represent approximately 6.0% of the target par amount.  The
presence of fixed rate liabilities partially lowers the impact of
rising interest rates on the cost of liabilities.

Limited FX Risk

Any non-euro-denominated assets have to be hedged with perfect
asset swaps as of the settlement date, limiting foreign exchange
risk.  The transaction is permitted to invest up to 20% of the
portfolio in non-euro-denominated assets.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

Net proceeds from the notes issue will be used to purchase a
EUR300m portfolio of mostly European leveraged loans.  The
portfolio is managed by BNP Paribas Asset Management SAS.  The
reinvestment period is scheduled to end in 2019.

The transaction documents may be amended subject to rating agency
confirmation or noteholder approval.  Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings.  Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that confirmation is considered to be given if
Fitch declines to comment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes.  A 25%
reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
up to two notches for the rated notes.


DALRADIAN EUROPEAN II: Moody's Lifts Rating on Cl. E Notes to B1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following notes issued by Dalradian European CLO II B.V:

  -- EUR31.83 million (Current Outstanding Balance: EUR27.19M)
     Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2014 Upgraded to
     Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR23.81 million Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 26,
     2014 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- EUR25.8 million Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Mar 26,
     2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- EUR15 million (Current Outstanding Balance: EUR12.8M) Class
     E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded
     to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2014 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

  -- EUR7 million Class W Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to
     Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 26, 2014 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Dalradian European CLO II B.V., issued in November 2006, is a
multi-currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European senior secured loans. The
portfolio is managed by Rothschild (NM) & Sons Limited. This
transaction passed its reinvestment period in December 2012.

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
material improvement in over-collateralization ratios following
the June and December 2014 payment dates. Since the last rating
action in March 2014 the Variable Funding Notes and the Class A2
notes have fully paid down and Class C notes have amortized by
approximately EUR 4.6M or 14.4% of their original outstanding
balance. Additionally as reported by the Trustee in January 2015
the balance in the principal account is currently 38.75mil and
this amount should allow the full repayment of Class B and a 48%
partial payment of Class C on the next payment date.

As a result of the deleveraging, over-collateralization has
increased. As of the trustee's January 2015 report, the Class B,
Class C, Class D and Class E had over-collateralization ratios of
368.35%, 196.36%, 130.39% and 111.76% compared with 167.86%,
138.38%, 116.26% and 107.10% respectively, as of the trustee's
January 2014 report.

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class W,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments.

The key model inputs Moody's uses, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score and the weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its published methodology and could differ
from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's
analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of approximately EUR100.15M,
defaulted par of EUR59.8K, a weighted average default probability
of 19.6% (consistent with a WARF of 2,774 over over a weighted
average life of 4.4 years), a weighted average recovery rate upon
default of 47.15% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity
score of 11 and a weighted average spread of 3.84%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 91.85% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the 8.15% remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted a
sensitivity analyses on the estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults. As the portfolio is increasingly becoming less
granular , as evidenced by the low diversity score, the expected
loss of the pool could potentially be more exposed to variation
in future recovery rates on defaulted assets. Moody's ran a model
whereby it decreased the weighted average recovery rate upon
default by 5%; the model generated outputs which are consistent
with the ratings.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy 2) the concentration of lowly- rated debt
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase
     in loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

(2) Around 7.96% of the collateral pool consists of debt
     obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
     using credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's
     has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing
     a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the
     Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published
     in October 2009.

(3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

(4) Foreign currency exposure: The deal is exposed to non-EUR
     denominated assets. Volatility in foreign exchange rates
     will have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds
     available to the transaction, which can affect the expected
     loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


HYVA GLOBAL: Moody's Lowers Corp. Family Rating to 'B3'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded to B3 from B2 the corporate
family rating and probability of default rating to B3-PD from B2-
PD of Hyva Global B.V.  Concurrently, the rating agency has
downgraded to Caa1 from B3 the rating on Hyva's USD375 million of
senior secured notes due 2016. The outlook on the ratings is
stable.

"The downgrade to B3 CFR has been triggered by the weaker outlook
for the construction and mining sector, particularly in China and
Brazil, representing the main end-markets for Hyva's products
which Moody's expect will result in weaker credit metrics in
2015, combined with a weaker liquidity profile, including the
maturity of its senior secured notes in about 12 months' time",
says Pieter Rommens, Moody's lead analyst for Hyva.

On March 20, Hyva announced the replacement of Brice de La
MorandiŠre by a new CEO, Marco Mazzu, who will assume the
position on 10 April, 2015. Although Moody's takes comfort from
the fact that Marco brings more than 20 years of relevant
industry experience, it considers the change of CEO less than a
year before the maturity of Hyva's senior secured notes, maturing
24th of March 2016 as an increased execution risk. To date,
management has not yet publicly addresses the issue of the
nearing maturity.

Fourth quarter results will be announced on April 17, 2015. This
is a month later than previous year, when the last quarter
results were published on March 18, 2014. Based on full year
results from AB Volvo (Baa2 negative) demand for Heavy Duty
Trucks and Construction Equipment has weakened in the second half
of 2014, especially in the Asian and Brazilian mining and
construction end-markets that Hyva supplies. Also, AB Volvo has
revised downwards its 2015 registration forecast for Heavy Duty
Truck and Construction Equipment in China and Europe
respectively.

Based on LTM September 2014 results, Hyva reports a gross
leverage ratio of 4.9x (as adjusted by Moody's) and a negative
FCF/Debt ratio of -1.4%. These ratios position Hyva weakly in the
B2 category. Although Hyva has in the past proven to benefit from
a flexible cost structure that can be quickly adapted to large
swings in demand, the company's performance is likely to be
affected by weak outlook in 2015 GDP growth in EMEA (Hyva's
largest market by sales) and the softening demand for trucks and
construction equipment in Asia and Brazil.

Moody's considers Hyva's liquidity profile to be weak, triggered
by the nearing maturity of its USD375 million notes in March
2016. However, Moody's notes that the company has successfully
extended its USD30 million RCF providing an additional source of
liquidity, albeit only for a 6-month period, from April 2015 to
October 2015. As of December 2014, the company is expected to
have around USD85 million cash on balance sheet (versus USD94
million in December 2013) following a strong working capital
outflow in the first quarter of FY2014 due to increase in
receivables related to higher sales in India and EMEA and lower
sales in China which traditionally displays a negative W/C
position.

The stable outlook assumes that the company will be able to
address the maturity of its senior secured notes in a timely
manner and that the company will be able to partially offset the
negative impact of the weaker demand and sales through its
flexible cost structure and by maintaining its market share.

Moody's could consider upgrading Hyva's rating if the company
were to (1) generate positive free cash flow and reduce
debt/EBITDA below 5.0x and (2) maintain a conservative financial
policy and improve its liquidity profile, including addressing
the maturity of its senior secured notes.

Downward pressure on the rating could arise if there were a
further deterioration in Hyva's operating performance resulting
in material negative free cash flow and worsening liquidity.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Manufacturing Companies published in July 2014. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Hyva is a leading global provider of hydraulic solutions for the
heavy-duty equipment market and an important player in the
manufacturing and supply of truck-mounted cranes, hook and skip
loaders, as well as compactors and waste collecting units for the
environmental services industry. In the fiscal year 2013
(FY2013), the group reported revenues of USD611 million, with its
key end -markets being the infrastructure, construction, mining
and environmental industries. Hyva is majority-owned by private
equity funds managed by Unitas Capital and NWS Holdings, the
infrastructure arm of New World Group.


MUNDA CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'BB+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit rating on
Munda CLO I B.V.'s class D notes.  At the same time, S&P has
affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, B, C, and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance.  S&P performed a credit and cash flow analysis and
assessed the support that each participant provides to the
transaction by applying S&P's current counterparty criteria.  In
S&P's analysis, it used data from the latest available trustee
report dated Feb. 5, 2015.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rates for each rated class of
notes.  In our analysis, we used the reported portfolio balance
that we considered to be performing (EUR511,568,681), the current
weighted-average spread (3.05%), and the weighted-average
recovery rates for the performing portfolio.  We applied various
cash flow stress scenarios, using four different default
patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate stress
scenarios for each liability rating category," S&P said.

"From our analysis, we have observed that the available credit
enhancement has increased for all of the rated classes of notes,
driven by deleveraging of the senior notes after the end of the
reinvestment period in January 2014.  The weighted-average spread
earned on Munda CLO I's collateral pool has also decreased to 305
basis points (bps) from 319 bps in our previous review, when the
transaction was formerly Neptuno CLO III B.V.," S&P added.

From S&P's analysis, 2.09% of the portfolio comprises non-euro-
denominated loans, which are hedged under cross-currency swap
agreements with JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (A+/Stable/A-1).  In
S&P's opinion, the downgrade remedies for these cross-currency
swaps do not fully comply with our current counterparty criteria.
Consequently, S&P has assumed for cash flow scenarios above 'AA-'
rating stresses that the currency swap counterparty does not
perform and where, as a result, the transaction is exposed to
changes in currency rates.

In S&P's analysis, it has also applied its non-sovereign ratings
criteria.  S&P has considered the transaction's exposure to
sovereign risk because a sizeable portion of the portfolio's
assets -- equal to 28.72% of the transaction's total collateral
balance -- is based in the Kingdom of Spain (BBB/Stable/A-2) and
the Republic of Italy (Unsolicited, BBB-/Stable/A-3).  As
outlined in S&P's criteria, when applying rating stresses at the
'AAA' and 'AA+' rating levels, S&P has given credit to 10% of the
transaction's collateral balance corresponding to assets based in
these sovereigns in our calculation of the aggregate collateral
balance.

In S&P's credit and cash flow analysis, it has considered the
transaction's exposure to currency exchange and sovereign risk,
which indicates that the available credit enhancement for the
class A-1 and A-2 notes is still commensurate with S&P's
currently assigned ratings.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AA
(sf)' ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes.

At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'A+ (sf)' rating on the
class B notes, S&P's 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class C notes, and
its 'CCC+ (sf)' rating on the class E notes because S&P's credit
and cash flow analysis indicates that the available credit
enhancement for these notes is commensurate with S&P's currently
assigned ratings.

S&P has raised to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on the
class D notes because S&P's analysis shows that the available
credit enhancement for this class of notes is commensurate with a
'BB+ (sf)' rating.

Munda CLO I is a managed cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily European
speculative-grade corporate firms. The transaction closed in
December 2007 and is managed by Cohen & Co. Financial Ltd.

RATINGS LIST

Class    Rating         Rating
         To             From

Munda CLO I B.V.
EUR650 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate And Deferrable Notes

Rating Raised

D        BB+ (sf)        B+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A-1      AA (sf)
A-2      AA (sf)
B        A+ (sf)
C        BBB+ (sf)
E        CCC+ (sf)



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO ESPIRITO: Dubai Unit Secured Creditors to Get 82.7% Payout
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Arnold at Reuters reports that advisory firm Deloitte said on
its Web site liquidators for ES Bankers (Dubai) Ltd. (ESBD) have
estimated they will pay out 82.7% of the US$93.5 million owed to
depositors in the stricken bank.

However, unsecured creditors of the Dubai arm of the Espirito
Santo empire, which stumbled after accounting irregularities were
identified at one of its holding companies earlier last year,
will get none of the US$14 million they are owed, Reuters notes.

In October 2014, a Dubai judge approved an application to
liquidate the local business following an earlier freezing of
deposits to protect customers, Reuters relates.

It was part of global legal action taken after a EUR4.9 billion
(US$5.35 billion) bailout for Banco Espirito Santo, formerly
Portugal's largest listed bank, in the wake of the accounting
issues, Reuters relays.

According to Reuters, a document, an update to depositors, dated
January 25, published on Deloitte's Web site, said a total of
US$77.3 million was available for depositors.

Deloitte's Philip Bowers -- pbowers@deloitte.co.uk -- and
Neville Kahn -- nkahn@deloitte.co.uk -- were appointed as joint
liquidators of ESBD in October, Reuters recounts.

                    About Banco Espirito Santo

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon, Portugal.  It is 20% owned by Espirito Santo Financial
Group.

In August 2014, Banco Espirito Santo was split into "good"
and "bad" banks as part of a EUR4.9 billion rescue of the
distressed Portuguese lender that protects taxpayers and senior
creditors but leaves shareholders and junior bondholders holding
only toxic assets.  A total of EUR4.9 billion in fresh capital
was injected into this "good bank", which will subsequently be
offered for sale.  It has been renamed "Novo Banco", meaning new
bank, and will include all BES's branches, workers, deposits and
healthy credit portfolios.

In August 2014, Espirito Santo Financial Portugal, a unit fully
owned by Espirito Santo Financial Group, filed under Portuguese
corporate insolvency and recovery code.

Also in August 2014, Espirito Santo Financiere SA, another entity
of troubled Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo International
SA, filed for creditor protection in Luxembourg.

In July 2014, Portuguese conglomerate Espirito Santo
International SA filed for creditor protection in a Luxembourg
court, saying it is unable to meet its debt obligations.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


MECHEL OAO: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa3' Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Mechel OAO's corporate
family rating (CFR) of Caa3 and probability of default rating
(PDR) of Ca-PD/LD.  At the time of withdrawal, all the
aforementioned ratings carried a negative outlook.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


MECHEL OAO: Moody's Withdraws Caa2.ru Longterm National Scale CFR
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has withdrawn Mechel OAO's Caa2.ru
long-term national scale corporate family rating (NSR).  Moody's
Interfax is majority-owned by Moody's Investors Service (MIS).

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For
further information on Moody's approach to national scale
ratings, please refer to Moody's Rating Methodology published in
June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale Ratings to
Global Scale Ratings".

Moody's Interfax Credit Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in
credit risk analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between
Moody's Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings,
research and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in
the global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).


ROST BANK: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'R' Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its long- and short-
term counterparty credit and national-scale ratings on OJS
Commercial Bank Rost Bank (Rost Bank) at 'R' (regulatory
supervision).  S&P then withdrew the ratings at the issuer's
request.

The affirmation signified that Rost Bank remains under the
regulatory supervision of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) after
its capitalization and liquidity metrics had weakened severely.
Under Russian law, the regulator has the power to introduce a
moratorium on the bank's credit obligations, if required.

At the end of 2014, the CBR allowed B&N Bank to participate in
the financial rehabilitation of Rost Bank Group.  B&N is
developing a plan for Rost Bank's financial rehabilitation that
it expects the regulator to approve at the end of March 2015.

S&P expects the rehabilitation period to last until Rost Bank
merges into B&N Bank Group.  This could occur at the end of 2016.
Until then, Rost Bank is exempt from complying with the
prudential capital and liquidity norms set by the CBR.  On
Dec. 1, 2014, Rost Bank reported a regulatory capital ratio N1 of
3.8% and a regulatory liquidity ratio N3 of 46.6% -- this
compares with minimum regulatory levels of 10% and 50%,
respectively, for banks that are operating normally.

At the time of the withdrawal, Standard & Poor's did not rate any
of Rost Bank's outstanding debt obligations.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCO SABADELL: Moody's Affirms 'B1' Sr. Sub. Debenture Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Banco Sabadell, S.A.'s
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) at ba3 to reflect the
bank's announcement on March 20, 2015 that it has launched a cash
offer for 100% of the capital of TSB Banking Group plc (TSB,
unrated), which is based in the UK (Aa1 stable) and 50% owned by
Lloyds Bank plc (Lloyds, deposits A1 review for upgrade, BCA
baa1). The affirmation captures Moody's view that the combined
entity's standalone credit profile will remain resilient after
integrating TSB into Banco Sabadell.

At the same time, the rating agency affirmed the Banco Sabadell's
senior subordinated debt ratings at B1 and its preference shares
at Caa1 (hyb).

The following ratings of Banco Sabadell were not affected and
remain on review for upgrade the Ba2/Not Prime deposit ratings,
and the Ba2 long term senior debt ratings. The bank's short-term
senior debt rating remains unchanged at Not Prime. The current
review for upgrade was initiated by Moody's on March 17, 2015

RATIONALE FOR THE AFFIRMATION OF BANCO SABADELL'S STANDALONE BCA:

The affirmation of Banco Sabadell's standalone BCA is based on
Moody's view that the combined entity's credit profile, following
the integration of TSB and the proposed EUR1.6 billion capital
increase, remains commensurate with a BCA of ba3. This is
underpinned by TSB's low asset risk (the bank reported a non-
performing loan ratio of 0.9% at year-end 2014) and sound funding
position (the loan-to-deposit ratio was only 88% at end-2014).
However, Moody's also notes that these strengths are offset by
TSB's high cost to income ratio (75% at year-end 2014) as well as
the challenges for Banco Sabadell to achieve its plans to
generate revenue benefits by developing TSB's franchise within
UK's highly competitive market. At year-end 2014, TSB had GBP27.2
billion of total assets, which represents 21% of Banco
Sabadell's.

In affirming the standalone BCA, Moody's has taken into account
Banco Sabadell's expectation that it will improve TSB's weak
efficiency levels, with the main cost savings deriving from a
full migration of the IT services that Lloyd's currently provides
onto Banco Sabadell's proprietary technology platform. Banco
Sabadell expects to cover the costs of the IT migration through
the GBP450 million that were committed by Lloyds at the time of
the initial public offering of TSB.

DETAILS OF THE OFFER:

Banco Sabadell has also agreed to acquire a 9.99% of TSB's
capital from Lloyds, and Lloyds has entered into an irrevocable
undertaking to accept the offer in respect of its entire
remaining 40.01% shareholding in the capital of TSB. The
transaction is subject to the relevant regulatory approvals.

Under the terms of the offer, TSB shareholders will receive 340
pence per share in cash for each of TSB's shares, which values
TSB's entire share capital at approximately GBP1.7 billion.

Banco Sabadell will use its existing cash resources to finance
the offer, although it has also announced a fully underwritten
rights issue of EUR1.6 billion, which it intends to use to
preserve its solvency ratios after the completion of the offer.
The bank expects to reach a fully loaded Common Equity Tier 1
ratio of 11.6% in the event of acquiring 100% of TSB's capital
and including the planned rights issue, broadly in line with the
11.5% reported at year-end 2014.

Upward pressure on Banco Sabadell's standalone BCA could be
driven by clear evidence that its asset quality is improving,
along with a sustainable recovery in the bank's recurring
earnings and improved capital quality. Any significant
macroeconomic growth in Spain (Baa2 positive) in 2015 -- which
exceeds Moody's central scenario of 2.0% GDP growth -- could
underpin signs of a turnaround that might improve the bank's
metrics.

Banco Sabadell's deposit and long-term senior debt ratings are on
review for upgrade driven by Moody's review of the likely loss-
given-failure that these securities face.

Downward pressure could be exerted on the bank's standalone BCA
if (1) a broad deterioration of its financial fundamentals
hinders the bank's ability to preserve its solvency levels; (2)
operating conditions in Spain worsen beyond Moody's current
expectations; and/or (3) the bank's liquidity profile
deteriorates significantly.

A downgrade of Banco Sabadell's deposits and long-term senior
debt rating is very unlikely given the current review for
upgrade. As the bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the
standalone BCA, any change to the BCA would likely also affect
these ratings.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Affirmations:

Issuer: Banco Sabadell, S.A.

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Maintained ba3

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Maintained ba3

  -- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, Affirmed (P)B1

  -- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, Affirmed Caa1
     (hyb) NEG

  -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1 NEG

  -- Senior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1 NEG

Issuer: CAM International Issues, SA Sociedad Unipers

  -- Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B1 NEG

The principal methodology used in these rating was Banks
published in March 2015.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


LEMTRANS LLC: Moody's Withdraws 'Caa2' Corporate Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Lemtrans LLC's corporate
family rating of Caa2, probability of default rating of Caa2-PD
and long-term national scale corporate family rating of B3.ua.
At the time of withdrawal, all the aforementioned ratings carried
a negative outlook.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.
For further information on Moody's approach to national scale
credit ratings, please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology
published in June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale
Ratings to Global Scale Ratings".


UKRAINE: Urges Bondholders to Negotiate Debt Restructuring Deal
---------------------------------------------------------------
Natasha Doff and Daryna Krasnolutska at Bloomberg News report
that Ukraine's Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko urged the
nation's bondholders, including Russia, to negotiate a
debt-restructuring agreement now or risk facing bigger losses.

Speaking after her ministry held talks with Franklin Templeton
and the 14 other largest U.K. and U.S. bondholders, Ms. Jaresko
reiterated that Russia will not receive special treatment,
Bloomberg relates.  She said the former Soviet republic needs to
reach new terms on 29 bonds and enterprise loans before the next
review of a US$17.5 billion International Monetary Fund aid
agreement at the end of the May, Bloomberg notes.

Verbal sparring between Ukraine and its bondholders is in full
swing as talks begin against the backdrop of renewed fighting in
eastern Ukraine that threatens to undermine a five-week cease-
fire, Bloomberg relays.

Mr. Jaresko's comments signal that Ukraine has limited scope for
flexibility in its talks with Franklin Templeton and Russia, the
biggest holders of its bonds, Bloomberg states.  Both have
indicated in recent days that they won't accept any cuts to the
principal value of the US$10 billion of bonds they hold,
Bloomberg notes.

"If I were on the other side of the table, I would want to do
this now because the risks that are out there are extraordinarily
unpredictable," Bloomberg quotes Ms. Jaresko as saying.  Ukraine
needs a deal to "lift the burden of this debt off the shoulders
of the Ukrainian people and off the shoulders of our budget."

According to Bloomberg, investors are skeptical that creditors
will get anything less than a steep writedown after 12 months of
fighting between government troops and pro-Russian rebels drained
hard-currency reserves.

Ms. Jaresko made clear that Ukraine plans to treat all creditors
equally in the face of comments from Russian politicians that the
country expects full repayment of its US$3 billion Eurobond by
December, Bloomberg relays.

Ms. Jaresko said in an interview with Bloomberg Television a
moratorium on Ukraine's debt, which would delay the country's
return to international bond markets, remains an option if the
country doesn't reach a deal,

"It's not something I would like to consider," Bloomberg quotes
Ms. Jaresko as saying.  "I'd like to reach an agreement with the
creditors so we can have renewed access to the markets over
reasonable period of time."


UKRAINE: May Face Wave of Corporate Defaults, Economists Say
------------------------------------------------------------
Josie Cox at The Wall Street Journal reports that Ukrainian
Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko's tour of Europe this week has
done little to placate fears that the country is hurtling toward
a costly default on its government bonds.

But now concerns are mounting that Ukraine's companies may face
the same fate, the Journal says.  Economists are warning that a
wave of corporate defaults is all but inevitable, the Journal
relates.

According to the Journal, the prolonged recession and conflict
with Russia have for months hit sales, and the foreign investors
that companies need for financing have stayed away from Ukraine
even as they have taken on more risk elsewhere.

Ukraine's currency, the hryvnia, has plummeted more than 50%
against the dollar in the past year, the Journal relays.  That
has made it cripplingly expensive for companies that issued bonds
in dollars but have revenue in hryvnia to service that debt, the
Journal notes.  Companies dependent on imports from abroad,
meanwhile, have to stump up much more cash to buy their goods
too, also hurting earnings, the Journal states.

Several Ukrainian companies, including VAB Bank PJSC and
agriculture firm Mriya Agro Holding, defaulted last year, and
this year, J.P. Morgan expects "most [Ukrainian] issuers to
attempt to restructure or extend upcoming bond maturities",
according to the Journal.

The U.S. bank expects the rate of default among companies in
emerging Europe to rocket to 8.6% this year, almost entirely
driven by Ukraine, the Journal discloses.

BNP Paribas data show Ukrainian companies have just over US$10
billion of external debt outstanding, the bulk of which is junk
bonds, but according to the International Monetary Fund,
Ukrainian companies have external financing needs of more than
US$15 billion this year including repayments of debt and coupon
payments, the Journal notes.

"Any Ukrainian company whose performance is strongly correlated
to the performance of the economy is potentially at risk of
default," the Journal quotes Zeke Diwan, senior portfolio manager
in the emerging market fixed income team at Allianz Global
Investors, which has around EUR1.8 trillion (US$2 trillion) of
assets under management, as saying.

Ukrainian companies that generate the majority of their revenues
in local currencies, but have debt piles in dollars are likely to
be the first to miss repayment deadlines and default, the Journal
says.


UKRAINE: Moody's Lowers Government Debt Ratings to 'Ca'
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Ukraine's long-term issuer
and government debt ratings to Ca from Caa3. The outlook remains
negative.

The key driver of the downgrade is the likelihood of external
private creditors incurring substantial losses as a result of the
government's plan to restructure the majority of its outstanding
Eurobonds. Also included in the restructuring is the external
debt of state-guaranteed entities and selected other state-owned
enterprises, and the Eurobonds issued by the capital city of
Kiev.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Ukraine's
government and external debt levels will remain very high, in
spite of the debt restructuring and plans to introduce reforms.

In a related rating action, Moody's also downgraded the issuer
and debt ratings of the "Financing of Infrastructural Projects"
(Fininpro) to Ca/(P)Ca from Caa3/(P)Caa3 and maintained the
negative outlook. Fininpro's debt is fully and unconditionally
guaranteed by the government of Ukraine.

Moody's also lowered Ukraine's country ceiling for long-term
foreign currency debt to Caa3 from Caa2, and its country ceiling
for long-term domestic currency debt and deposits to Caa2 from
Caa1. Ukraine's country ceiling for foreign-currency bank
deposits remains unchanged at Ca. All short-term country ceilings
also remain unchanged at Not Prime (NP).

The key driver of Moody's decision to downgrade Ukraine's long-
term government debt and issuer ratings to Ca is the government's
plan to restructure the majority of its outstanding Eurobonds as
well as other public sector external debt and the rating agency's
expectation that private creditors will incur substantial
economic losses as a result of the restructuring. The debt
operation is intended to provide US$15.3 billion of the four-
year, US$40 billion external financing package agreed with the
IMF and other multilateral and bilateral creditors. The package
was approved by the IMF Executive Board on March 11.

Although negotiations over the specific details of the
restructuring are only now getting underway, Moody's believes
that the likelihood of a distressed exchange, and hence a default
on government debt taking place, is virtually 100%. The bonds'
recovery value will be determined by the terms of the debt
exchange and is currently being discussed with creditors. The
terms could include a grace period on principal repayments during
the term of the IMF program, a reduction in the existing bonds'
current coupons, which now average 7.1%, and a haircut on the
outstanding principal.

The principal objective of the proposed debt exchange is to
reduce the government's external debt and debt service to more
manageable levels. This effort will be supported by the economic,
budget/debt and monetary reforms being pursued by the new
government in connection with the IMF program. These
comprehensive sectoral, judicial and social reforms aim to
stabilize the economy and return it to a positive growth path.

However, Ukraine's government and external debt will remain at
very high levels even if these reforms are successful, and
despite the lower debt levels achieved by the external debt
restructuring. These solvency challenges are the key reason for
maintaining a negative outlook on the government's downgraded
ratings.

Moody's would consider moving the rating outlook to stable after
the debt restructuring if it were to see a sustained
normalization of the geopolitical situation in Eastern Ukraine,
along with improvements in the country's external liquidity
position. An upgrade would likely require several additional
factors to be in place, including a positive policy track record
of structural reforms, improved growth prospects and positive
debt dynamics.

Moody's would downgrade Ukraine's rating if bond holders were to
incur higher losses than what is captured by the Ca rating
following the planned debt restructuring, or any other default by
the government.

  -- GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 8,651 (2013 Actual) (also
     known as Per Capita Income)

  -- Real GDP growth (% change): -6.9% (2014 Actual) (also known
     as GDP Growth)

  -- Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 24.5% (2014 Actual)

  -- Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -4.6% (2014 Actual) (also
     known as Fiscal Balance)

  -- Current Account Balance/GDP: -9% (2013 Actual) (also known
     as External Balance)

  -- External debt/GDP: 77.5% (2013 actual)

  -- Level of economic development: Very Low level of economic
     resilience

  -- Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
     loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On March 20, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Ukraine, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer has become increasingly
susceptible to event risks. The outlook for post-restructuring
recovery has worsened.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in September 2013.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.


VAB BANK: Moody's Lowers Currency Deposit Ratings to 'C'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded VAB Bank's long-term local-
and foreign-currency deposit ratings to C from Ca, and its
National Scale Rating to C.ua from Ca.ua. Moody's will withdraw
all the bank's ratings following the withdrawal of its banking
license by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU).

This rating action concludes the review with direction uncertain
placed on VAB Bank's ratings in November 2014 and follows an
announcement by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) -- on
March 20, 2015 -- that it had revoked VAB Bank's banking license.

The rating action and subsequent rating withdrawals follow the
NBU's announcement on March 20, 2015 that it had revoked VAB
Bank's banking license in connection with the entity's violation
of the banking license requirements and its inability to meet
creditors' claims.

The downgrade of VAB Bank's deposit ratings to C reflects Moody's
expectation that as a result of liquidation, uninsured depositors
are likely to suffer losses larger than would be commensurate
with the Ca rating range.

According to Moody's, VAB Bank had no rated debt outstanding at
the time of the rating withdrawal, and customer deposits
represented the main source of the bank's non-equity funding.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.

Moody's National Scale Credit Ratings (NSRs) are intended as
relative measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and
issuers within a country, enabling market participants to better
differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global
scale credit ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".za" for South Africa.
For further information on Moody's approach to national scale
credit ratings, please refer to Moody's Credit rating Methodology
published in June 2014 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale
Ratings to Global Scale Ratings".

Domiciled in Ukraine, VAB Bank reported total assets of UAH11.4
billion (US$723 million) as of January 1, 2015 (in accordance
with unaudited local GAAP financials).



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ASHTEAD GROUP: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB' CCR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on U.K.-based industrial equipment hire group Ashtead
Group PLC (Ashtead) to stable from positive.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' long-term corporate
credit rating.  Furthermore, S&P raised to 'BB' from 'BB-' the
senior secured debt ratings on the company's US$900 million and
US$500 million second-lien notes.  This reflects a higher
recovery rating of '3' from '5', which indicates S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery of principal in the
event of default.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's expectations that Ashtead
will maintain higher adjusted debt than S&P had expected, due to
negative free operating cash flow (FOCF) caused by sizeable
capital expenditure (capex) investments on maintaining and
growing its rental fleet.  In addition, the company is spending
more on bolt-on acquisitions.

S&P recognizes that this is partly mitigated by higher operating
cash flow generation due to favorable conditions in rental
equipment markets -- notably in the U.S. Leverage metrics have
nevertheless weakened during the current financial year, such
that S&P expects the ratio of funds from operations (FFO) to
adjusted debt to be 40%-45% for the year to April 30, 2015,
compared to 51% as at April 30, 2014.  Whilst this level remains
stronger than the 35% ratio which S&P had indicated could support
a higher rating, S&P sees the risk that the negative trend seen
during fiscal 2015 could continue in fiscal 2016 as the company
continues to increase its spending, or if there was a reduction
in operating cash flow generation.  For the current rating, S&P
factors in a ratio of FFO to adjusted debt of above 30%, which
provides some headroom compared to S&P's base-case scenario.

S&P continues to assess Ashtead's financial risk profile as
"significant."  S&P's view is supported by relatively strong
credit metrics for the rating, and a flexible business model
which allows capex spending to be lowered during industry
downturns.  S&P also notes the company's stated financial policy
guideline of reported net debt-to-EBITDA of up to 2x. However,
cyclical cash flow generation, including negative FOCF and rising
adjusted debt levels during market upturns, and spending on
acquisitions are offsetting factors.

S&P's base case for fiscal 2015 and 2016 (year-end April 30)
assumes:

   -- Real U.S. GDP growth of 3.3% in 2015 and 2.9% in 2016.
   -- Low-double-digit revenue growth, supported by U.S. non-
      residential construction growth of 7.1% in 2015 and 5.8% in
      2016.
   -- Reported EBITDA margins of above 40%.
   -- Capital expenditures of about GBP1.0 billion in fiscal
      2015, potentially rising to GBP1.1 billion in fiscal
      2016 -- as guided by the company -- and depending on market
      conditions.
   -- Negative free operating cash flow in each year.
   -- Acquisition spending in fiscal 2015 of around GBP200
      million, as already spent, with further spending likely in
      fiscal 2016.

Based on these assumptions, and depending on the level of capex
and acquisition spending, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- FFO to debt of 40%-45% for fiscal 2015 and 30%-40% for
      fiscal 2016.
   -- Debt to EBITDA of 2.1x for fiscal 2015 and 2.2x-2.4x in
      fiscal 2016.

At Jan. 31, 2015, S&P's figure for adjusted debt was EUR1.9
billion compared to EUR1.3 billion at year-end April 30, 2014.
On this basis, the ratios of adjusted funds from operations (FFO)
to adjusted debt and debt to EBITDA for the 12 months ended
Jan. 31, 2015, were about 41% and 2.2x, respectively, compared to
51% and 1.8x for the year to April 30, 2014.

S&P continues to assess Ashtead's business risk profile as
"fair." S&P's view is supported by the group's strong market
position in the fragmented U.S. market, and S&P's view that the
scale of its operations enhances its purchasing power.  S&P also
believes that Ashtead has healthy profitability supported by a
competitive average physical utilization rate -- 72% for the nine
months to Jan. 31, 2015 -- and a fairly low average fleet age of
26 months. However, the high capital intensity of the equipment
rental sector, cyclicality of its end-markets -- mainly
non-residential construction --, as well as limited geographic
diversity, are factors which constrain S&P's business risk
assessment.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Ashtead will continue
to focus on growing its business mainly organically, supported by
favorable market conditions in the U.S., and further sizeable
capex spending.  Whilst S&P factors in ongoing negative FOCF, it
expects the company to maintain adjusted FFO to debt of above 30%
on a sustained basis, which S&P considers to be in line with the
current rating.

S&P could raise the rating if it anticipates FFO to debt would be
above 35% on a sustainable basis.  This could occur if the
company performed ahead of S&P's expectations, and moderated
spending on capex and acquisitions, whilst maintaining a
supportive financial policy.  Positive FOCF would also be a
supportive factor.

S&P could lower the rating if it anticipates FFO to debt would be
below 30% on a sustainable basis.  This could occur due to weaker
operating performance, or higher spending on capex leading to
sustained negative FOCF.  Debt-financed acquisitions could also
be a negative factor.

Analytical modifiers do not affect the rating, resulting in a
'BB' corporate credit rating on Ashtead.


HIBU GROUP 2013: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'CCC+' CCR
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has revised its
outlook to stable from negative on international publisher of
classified directories Hibu Group 2013 Ltd. (hibu).  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term corporate credit rating
on hibu.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's opinion that hibu's moderate
recovery in profitability and credit metrics will likely continue
over the next 12 to 18 months, due to significant ongoing cost
savings and the gradual transition from print to online and
digital.

However, while 2014's debt restructuring lightened hibu's debt
load and significantly improved its liquidity profile, the
company's debt leverage remains high and S&P continues to assess
the group's capital structure as unsustainable in the medium
term.

S&P believes that hibu's profitability will continue to improve
in 2015 and 2016, supported by significant reductions in direct,
indirect, and semi-variable costs.  On an adjusted basis, S&P
believes that hibu's adjusted EBITDA margins could recover from
about 14.5% in 2014 to above 20% in 2016.  However, S&P expects
hibu's operating performance will continue to suffer in 2015 and
2016 from the ongoing industry-wide decline of print classified
directories, which still represented 61% of the group's full year
revenues in 2014.  That said, S&P believes that hibu's move from
print to online and digital will lead to a more moderate revenue
decline in the foreseeable future.

As hibu moves further into the highly fragmented and rapidly
evolving online market, S&P believes that it will suffer from
intense competition due to online advertising expanding across a
greater number of internet marketing channels.  Hibu will also
have significantly less pricing power with its online business
than its former leading position in the traditional classified
directories business.  All these factors support S&P's assessment
of hibu's business risk profile as "vulnerable."

The company completed its capital restructuring on March 3, 2014,
reducing its borrowings to œ1.5 billion from about GBP2.3
billion. It also made further repayments of GBP170 million in
2014 using internally generated cash flow.  Therefore, hibu's
total outstanding debt now stands at approximately GBP1.35
billion, which includes GBP410 million of senior secured notes
(SSN), and about GBP939 million of outstanding payment-in-kind
(PIK) notes. The debt-to-EBITDA ratio was 9.7x as of March 31,
2014, and S&P projects it will remain high but decline to about
8.2x by March 31, 2015, on improving EBITDA.

"Despite our view that hibu's highly leveraged capital structure
is unsustainable given the business model, we believe that the
risk of default over the next 12 months is mitigated by the
group's positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) generation,
absence of short-term debt maturities, and adequate covenant
headroom.  We estimate positive FOCF of over GBP100 million in
the financial year ending March 31, 2015 (fiscal 2015).  This
reflects hibu's low cash interest payment obligations (1.5% on
the outstanding GBP40 million facilities and Libor + 5% on the
outstanding SSN of about GBP400 million).  It also takes into
account the company's cost savings resulting in our forecast of
mid-single-digit EBITDA growth in fiscal 2015.  Furthermore, we
project that hibu will not breach its minimum EBITDA covenant,
will have more than 35% headroom under its interest coverage
covenant, and more than 40% headroom under its leverage covenant
over the coming 12 months," S&P said.

Hibu's financial statements for financial year 2013 have not been
audited because the group was in default.  Therefore, S&P has
essentially relied on historical, unaudited management accounts
for S&P's credit analysis.  As a result, any material divergence
between the management accounts and audited financial statements
for financial years 2013 and 2014 could lead S&P to reassess its
ratings.

The outlook is stable because S&P don't expect any liquidity
issues over the next 12 months thanks to positive FOCF, an
absence of short-term debt maturities, and adequate covenant
headroom. This is despite the company's unsustainable capital
structure.  S&P could lower the rating if hibu is unable to
stabilize its capital structure.  Debt restructuring or weakening
liquidity could also lead to a downgrade.  Given the highly
leveraged capital structure, S&P believes any upgrade will hinge
on earnings and credit metrics improving sustainably.


EDEN ACQUISITION: Moody's Assigns 'B2' CFR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B2 Corporate Family Rating
and B2-PD probability of default rating to Eden Acquisition 5
Limited a company which is the 100% ultimate owner of Top Right
Group Limited, a UK based business-to-business media company with
international operations focusing on Events, Information Services
and Subscription Contents. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a
provisional rating of (P)B2 to the GBP435 million equivalent
senior secured Term Loan B due 2022 to be issued by Eden Bidco
Limited with TRG Financing LLC as a co-borrower and a provisional
rating of (P)B2 to the GBP75 million equivalent senior secured
revolving credit facility due 2021 to be issued by Eden Bidco
Limited. The outlook on the ratings is stable.

Proceeds from the senior secured Term Loan B will be used to
repay GBP308 million of outstanding senior term loans and GBP118
million of mezzanine debt (including interest and termination
costs).

The (P)B2 ratings assigned to the senior secured term loan and
RCF are provisional pending a conclusive review of final
documentation. The rating has been assigned on the basis of
Moody's expectations that the transaction will close as described
above and that the final documentation for the facilities will
not be materially different to the draft reviewed by Moody's.
Following closing of the transaction, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the senior secured facilities.
Moody's notes that a definitive rating may differ from a
provisional rating. In this press release "TRG" or "the company"
refer to the group headed by Eden Acquisition 5 Limited.

TRG is jointly owned by funds managed by Apax Partners Europe
Managers Limited (55.25% holding) and Guardian Media Group plc
(33.15% holding) with the residual stake owned by the company's
management (11.6% holding).

The B2 CFR reflects (i) the relatively high Moody's-adjusted
leverage of the company (5.4x Debt/EBITDA at year end 2014); (ii)
the inherent cyclicality of the end markets serviced by some of
TRG's products which target the retail, fashion and construction
sectors; (iii) concentration of revenues and EBITDA around
certain events (such as the Cannes' Lions and the Spring Fair);
(iv) Moody's expectations that TRG will continue to seek
acquisitions to reinforce its offering, and the potential for
further performance-based earn-outs to be paid as part of
previous as well as future acquisitions.

The B2 CFR also reflects (i) the company's strong brand names in
the i2i and Lions businesses which host and manage long standing
successful events; (ii) the company's prudent financial policy
with deleveraging expectations in the coming 12-18 months and no
dividend payment expected; (iii) the healthy proportion of
recurring revenues generated by the subscription businesses; (iv)
the decrease in reliance on traditional advertising revenues for
the contents and subscription businesses; and (v) the company's
good liquidity profile following closing of the new GBP75 million
RCF.

TRG is a business-to-business media company focusing on Events,
Information Services and Subscription Contents with international
operations. The company was formed in 1947 under the name East
Midlands Allied Press, eventually becoming EMAP plc in 1985 when
it was listed on the London Stock Exchange.

In 2012, the company reorganized its various businesses into
three main segments: (i) Events: i2i Events Group and Lions
Festivals; (ii) Information Services: WGSN Group and 4C
Information Group; and Subscription Contents: EMAP. All five of
the core sub-operating companies operate independently from one
another and have their own senior management teams.

In 2014, pro-forma for the sale of the content provider MBI
(which closed in January 2015), 53% of the company's revenues
were generated from events which typically take bookings 12-18
months in advance of the events taking place. In addition, the
company generated around 32% of its revenues through its
subscription based activities, which have historically enjoyed
high renewal rates (around 86% for WGSN and 70% to 80% for 4C).
These levels of upfront payments and the proportion of recurring
subscribers provide the company with some visibility over future
earnings, although on a short-term (12-18 months) basis only.

TRG's revenues and EBITDA bear concentration risk on the
company's top 5 events, exhibitions and congresses (including the
material Cannes Lions event) which, in 2014, generated 30% of
revenue. This key-event risk is mitigated by the very strong
brand names and long standing reputation of these events.

Going forward, TRG expects to drive growth from expanding its
portfolio of existing events, exhibitions and congresses
internationally by "geo-cloning" these in local markets where it
believes demand for similar events exists. Those events
capitalize on the success of the original but remain only
marginally profitable in their first two years. In addition, the
company is also focusing on enhancing cross-selling opportunities
among existing customers in different platforms as well as
consolidating its position as the leading international trend
forecasting service, which was the rationale for the acquisition
of Stylesight in 2014.

To grow its Events business, the company is likely to continue to
seek bolt-on target acquisitions of smaller event businesses. One
example of which was the acquisition at the end of 2014 of Money
20/20 by TRG's i2i business. Money 20/20 is a US based company
specialized in running congresses in the payment technology
sector. While the initial consideration price for the acquisition
remains modest relative to TRG's size, the potential for future
earnout payments is more material -- the current rating assumes
that the company will prudently manage its earnout liabilities
when considering future acquisitions.

TRG has a good liquidity profile, supported by a new GBP75
million revolving credit facility (RCF) -- as part of the current
refinancing -- which is expected to remain undrawn in the coming
18 months as the company generates positive free cash flow.
Moody's notes that access to the RCF is effectively unrestricted
as the facility only contains one springing covenant (leverage
based) to be tested only when drawings under the RCF increase
above 40% of total commitment.

TRG's capital expenditure requirements are expected to be in line
with historical investment and will focus around product
development, information technology and business applications.

The new facilities will benefit from a security package to
include material subsidiaries' assets, they will also benefit
from guarantees from a number of guarantors which together are
expected to represent no less than 80% of TRG's consolidated
assets and EBITDA. The (P)B2 ratings on the Term Loan B and the
RCF reflect the ranking of these instruments in the waterfall
ahead of unsecured lease rejection claims.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects the company's high proportion of
recurring revenues as well as Moody's expectations that TRG will
continue to maintain a prudent financial policy with regards to
shareholder remuneration and maintain a strong liquidity profile.

What Could Change the Rating Up

Positive pressure on the ratings could develop should TRG's
adjusted leverage sustainably decrease to below 4.75x. An upgrade
would also require the company to successfully achieve organic
mid-single digit revenue growth in line with the company's
expectations.

What Could Change the Rating Down

Negative ratings pressure could develop should TRG's leverage
increase towards 6.0x as a result of softening in demand for the
company's products. Downward pressure would also ensue should the
company's liquidity profile deteriorate as a result of aggressive
M&A or larger than expected earn-out payments.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Publishing Industry published in December 2011. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.


TULLOW OIL: Moody's Lowers CFR to B1; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded corporate family rating and
probability of default rating of Tullow Oil plc to B1/B1-PD from
Ba3/Ba3-PD.  The ratings on its USD650 million 2020 and USD650
million 2022 senior notes were downgraded to B3/LGD 6 from B2/LGD
5 following the downgrade of Ghana's sovereign rating by Moody's
by one notch to B3/negative on March 19, 2015.  The outlook on
all Tullow's ratings remains negative.

Tullow retains considerable concentration in Ghana, where its
core Jubilee production field is located. As a result, Tullow's
CFR remains constrained by the ratings of its largest country of
operations. However, we continue to position Tullow's ratings two
notches above the sovereign rating of Ghana to reflect a number
of risk mitigating considerations, including the off-shore
production and direct international sales of crude, its US
dollar-based pricing and its established and diversified
financing framework, which does not depend on the domestic
banking system in Ghana. Finally, Tullow also enjoys a limited
degree of cash flow diversification with approximately half of
production in other West African countries.

Tullow's fundamental business position remains solid, supported
by its sizeable oil and gas resource base, which has been
enhanced in recent years through successful exploration and
appraisal program leading to the opening of new hydrocarbon
basins and significant oil discoveries, including in Ghana,
Uganda and Kenya, that underpin the company's long-term
production growth trajectory.

In the near term, the rating reflects Tullow's focus on the
execution of the TEN project, off shore Ghana, that is set to add
materially to the company's high margin oil production in
2016/2017. Strong and timely execution of TEN is the key priority
for the company in the next 12 months, and the project remains on
target for completion in mid-2016.

Until TEN comes on stream, Tullow's leverage will remain high. We
expect it will generate negative free cash flow (FCF) in 2015 and
2016 and will borrow under its recently extended bank facilities
to fund the remaining project investment. Taking into account our
revised oil price assumptions (US$55/boe Brent in 2015 and
US$65/boe in 2016), we expect that Tullow's leverage will exceed
USD60,000/boe average daily production in 2015/2016, and project
that it will decline steadily from 2016/2017 as the company adds
production and returns to FCF generation.

Finally, Tullow is inherently exposed to the oil price
fluctuations. In 2015, the company has materially reduced its
exploration budget, suspended the dividends and is implementing a
number of measures to reduce fixed and operating costs to adjust
the operations to the lower oil price environment. It is managing
oil price risks proactively and its cash flows will be materially
supported by the existing hedging arrangements in 2015/2016.
Tullow's conservative financial policies and strong project
execution continue to support the ratings.

Tullow maintains good liquidity position. In March 2015, the
company negotiated US$450 million extension of commitments under
its bank facilities, increasing its 2019 RBL facility to US$3.7
billion (from US$3.5 billion) and its 2017 corporate credit
facility to $1 billion (from US$0.75 billion). Tullow has also
agreed with the lenders the amendment of the financial covenants
under the committed facilities to address the risk of potential
non-compliance with covenants during the investment period in the
TEN project in 2015/2016. Tullow has no maturities before TEN
comes on stream. At the end of 2014, the company reported US$118
million in unrestricted cash (in addition to US$201 million in
cash balances at the accounts of its JVs).

The negative outlook mirrors the negative outlook on Ghana, even
though the fundamentals of the business remain strong.

"We are looking in particular towards the timely development of
the TEN project to help Tullow to recover its credit metrics and
gain financial flexibility to manage any fiscal pressures in
Ghana. In this context, we are following the ongoing arbitration
procedure between Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire over the maritime
border, that relates to the area where the TEN project is
located. In particular, the Government of C“te d'Ivoire has
recently applied for provisional measures to be ordered in
Ghana's maritime boundary dispute to require Ghana to suspend
ongoing exploration and exploitation operations in the disputed
area until the resolution of the dispute, which may affect the
timely execution of the TEN project. The negative outlook also
captures the increased uncertainty generated by the maritime
border dispute with C“te d'Ivoire," Moody's said.

The B1 ratings could come under pressure should (i) Tullow suffer
significant delays and/or cost overruns in progressing its major
TEN project and/or (ii) experience a significant and sustained
deterioration in production levels or further decline in oil
price realizations, which would put pressure on its internal cash
flow generation and result in more pronounced and sustained
balance sheet leveraging than currently expected. Weak liquidity
position may also drive the downgrade of the ratings. The rating
may also be downgraded in an event of a downgrade of the ratings
of Ghana.

In spite of the profitable organic growth, the B1 rating remains
constrained by the sizable country exposure to Ghana. The upgrade
of the rating would require an improved geographical
diversification of the company's reserve base and production
profile towards lower risk jurisdictions, and a recovery in the
financial profile, with debt/average daily production falling to
below USD 40,000/boe and RCF/Debt improving towards 50% level.

Tullow Oil is a leading independent oil and gas exploration and
production company with a large and diversified portfolio of
interests focused on Africa and the Atlantic margins. In 2014,
the company reported an average production (on a working interest
basis) of 75,200 barrels of oil equivalent per day and sales
revenue of USD2.2 billion.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Independent Exploration and Production Industry published in
December 2011. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions
-----------------------------------------------------
Author: Sarkis J. Khoury
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 292 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/hl7cni

Transnational Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States will
appeal to a wide range of readers. Dr. Khoury's analysis is
valuable for managers involved in transnational acquisitions,
whether they are acquiring companies or being acquired
themselves.

At the same time, he provides a comprehensive and large-scale
look at the industrial sector of the U.S. economy that proves
very useful for policy makers even today. With its nearly 100
tables of data and numerous examples, Khoury provides a wealth of
information for business historians and researchers as well.

Until the late 1960s, we Americans were confident (some might say
smug) in our belief that U.S. direct investment abroad would
continue to grow as it had in the 1950s and 1960s, and that we
would dominate the other large world economies in foreign
investment for some time to come. And then came the 1970s, U.S.
investment abroad stood at $78 billion, in contrast to only $13
billion in foreign investment in the U.S. In 1978, however, only
eight years later, foreign investment in the U.S. had skyrocketed
to nearly #41 billion, about half of it in acquisition of U.S.
firms. Foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies grew from 20 in
1970 to 188 in 1978. The tables had turned an Americans were
worried. Acquisitions in the banking and insurance sectors were
increasing sharply, which in particular alarmed many analysts.

Thus, when it was first published in 1980, this book met a
growing need for analytical and empirical data on this rapidly
increasing flow of foreign investment money into the U.S., much
of it in acquisitions. Khoury answers many of the questions
arising from the situation as it stood in 1980, many of which are
applicable today: What are the motives for transnational
acquisitions? How do foreign firms plans, evaluate, and negotiate
mergers in the U.S.? What are the effects of these acquisitions
on competition, money and capital markets; relative technological
position; balance of payments and economic policy in the U.S.?

To begin to answer these questions, Khoury researched foreign
investment in the U.S. from 1790 to 1979. His historical review
includes foreign firms' industry preferences, choice of location
in the U.S., and methods for penetrating the U.S. market. He
notes the importance of foreign investment to growth in the U.S.,
particularly until the early 20th century, and that prior to the
1970s, foreign investment had grown steadily throughout U.S.
history, with lapses during and after the world wars.

Khoury found that rates of return to foreign companies were not
excessive. He determined that the effect on the U.S. economy was
generally positive and concluded that restricting the inflow of
direct and indirect foreign investment would hinder U.S. economic
growth both in the short term and long term. Further, he found no
compelling reason to restrict the activities of multinational
corporations in the U.S. from a policy perspective. Khoury's
research broke new ground and provided input for economic policy
at just the right time.

Sarkis J. Khoury holds a Ph.D. in International Finance from
Wharton. He teaches finance and international finance at the
University of California, Riverside, and serves as the Executive
Director of International Programs at the Anderson Graduate
School of Business.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
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                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *