/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/150401.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Wednesday, April 1, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 64
Headlines
B U L G A R I A
CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Court Appoints Two Temporary Assignees
G E R M A N Y
CERAMIC FUEL: Administrators Put Business Up for Sale
DUESSELDORFER HYPOTHEKENBANK: Margin Call Triggered Near-Collapse
DUFRY AG: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR Following Acquisition Agreement
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG: Moody's Alters Ba1 CFR Outlook to Positive
TAURUS CMBS 2006-3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A Notes to B1
TAURUS CMBS 2006-3: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC-
G R E E C E
GREECE: PM Tsipras Prepares to Meet Putin as EU Talks Falter
INTRALOT SA: Fitch Says Greece Downgrade No Impact on 'B+' IDR
I R E L A N D
KENMARE RESOURCES: Debt Restructuring Deadline Extended
* IRELAND: Company Failures Down 17% in First Quarter 2015
L U X E M B O U R G
FINDUS PLEDGECO: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Issuer Default Rating
P O R T U G A L
COMBOIOS DE PORTUGAL: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'BB' ICR
SAGRES' DOURO 1: S&P Puts Class D Notes' BB- Rating on Watch Dev.
R U S S I A
SOGAZ: S&P Lowers LT Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+'
URALSIB BANK: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings to 'B'
S P A I N
IM GBP EMPRESAS VI: DBRS Finalizes (P)CCC Rating to Ser. B Notes
T U R K E Y
BURGAN BANK: Moody's Reviews Ba2 LT Deposit Rating for Downgrade
DOGUS HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCR on Sustained Investments
U K R A I N E
CREATIV GROUP: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws 'CCC-' CCR
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
CALECORE: Enters Administration; 50 Jobs Affected
CELESTE MORTGAGE 2015-1: DBRS Finalizes (P)B Rating on F Notes
CITY LINK: John Moulton Balks at MPs' Deception Claims
POPOLO UK: Set to Enter Liquidation
SILVERSTONE HOSPITALITY: Manolete Partners Buys All Claims
TOWERGATE FINANCE: Wins Chapter 15 Protection in U.S.
*********
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B U L G A R I A
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CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Court Appoints Two Temporary Assignees
------------------------------------------------------------
novinite.com reports that the Sofia City Court has approved the
nomination of two temporary assignees who will manage the assets
of collapsed Corporate Commercial Bank, or KTB, and run it on a
daily basis.
Lazar Iliev and Rosen Angelchev will assume their new function
without delay, BNR radio station reported on March 25, the report
relates.
They will replace the two conservators appointed by Bulgaria's
central bank, BNB, in June 2014, novinite.com relates. The BNB
seized control of KTB in June following a run on deposits.
According to the report, Iliev and Angelchev had been nominated
by the Bulgarian Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), which is in charge
of repaying state-guaranteed deposits of up to BGN196,000 in KTB.
Novinite.com, citing the DIF website, says the Fund has repaid a
total of BGN3.544 billion (EUR1.77 billion) to 104,200 depositors
of KTB since the initial day of reimbursement, December 4, 2014,
until the close of day on March 24, 2015. The report notes that
the appointment of Iliev and Angelchev as temporary assignees
became possible after Parliament changed the Bank Insolvency Act
last week.
The report says the changes were proposed by Prime Minister Boyko
Borisov and Finance Minister Vladislav Goranov to prevent what
they called 'looting' of KTB. The change in legislation aims to
protect KTB's creditors and recover the failed bank's assets.
According to the report, the BNB cancelled the banking license of
KTB and opened insolvency proceedings against Bulgaria's fourth
largest lender last year.
novinite.com relates that the insolvency case, however, has been
stalled at Sofia City Court by an appeal against the revoking of
the license filed by the bank's majority owner Bromak EOOD, a
company owned by Bulgarian businessman Tsvetan Vasilev.
novinite.com says the two temporary assignees have the legal
powers to seek suspension or cancellation of deals involving
KTB's assets until the insolvency case resumes. Iliev and
Angelchev can halt such deals or declare them null and void in
case they consider the transactions harm the interests of the
state and the DIF in particular, the report states.
About Corporate Commercial Bank AD
Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.
Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.
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G E R M A N Y
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CERAMIC FUEL: Administrators Put Business Up for Sale
-----------------------------------------------------
The Administrators of Ceramic Fuel Cells Limited and Ceramic Fuel
Cells GmbH are seeking urgent Expressions of Interest for the
sale of the companies' business and assets.
The assets for sale include intellectual property, inventory and
plant for sale. They are located in Melbourne, Australia
(intellectual property) and Heinsberg, Germany (manufacturing).
For further information on the opportunity and the process, one
may contact Chris Church (Australia) at chris.church@au.ey.com or
Niels Zumbaum (Germany) at dueren@zumbaum.de
Ceramic Fuel Cells is into the development of Solid Oxide Fuel
Cell (SOFC) technology to generate highly efficient, low emission
electricity from natural gas and renewable fuels
DUESSELDORFER HYPOTHEKENBANK: Margin Call Triggered Near-Collapse
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Moshinsky, Boris Groendahl and John Detrixhe at Bloomberg
News report that the near-collapse of Duesseldorfer
Hypothekenbank AG, the German lender hit by Heta Asset Resolution
AG's debt moratorium, was prompted in part by a margin call from
Eurex.
According to Bloomberg, people familiar with the matter said
Eurex, Europe's largest derivatives market, asked DuessHyp to
post additional collateral as the German bank faced writing down
its EUR348 million (US$375 million) of bonds issued by Austria's
Heta.
The people said the hit to the bank's capital from the Heta
losses and the extra posting of margin forced the lender, laden
with swaps, to seek a rescue, Bloomberg relates.
The Association of German Banks, or BdB, on March 15 said it
would back DuessHyp, a lender to public entities, and a day later
agreed to buy the company from U.S. private equity firm Lone Star
Funds, Bloomberg notes.
A margin call is a demand on an investor to deposit additional
funds with a broker or clearinghouse after the value of its
trading position falls below a predetermined point.
DuessHyp's trouble began when Austrian regulators ordered a debt
moratorium on Heta March 1, forcing the bank to consider writing
down the bond holding that exceeded the bank's EUR233 million of
core capital as of June 30, Bloomberg recounts. BdB stepped in
to rescue the lender two weeks later, Bloomberg relays.
DuessHyp held swaps with a notional value of EUR13.8 billion as
of June 30, after cutting the holdings from EUR17.6 billion at
the end of 2013, Bloomberg says, citing the company's half-year
report. The lender had interest-rate swaps with a notional value
of EUR13.3 billion, while cross-currency swaps amounted to EUR500
million, both used to hedge risks, it said, without providing
details on its counterparties, Bloomberg relates.
Headquartered in Duesseldorf, Germany, Duesseldorfer
Hypothekenbank AG provides commercial real estate financing in
Germany, the Netherlands, and France. It offers mortgage loans
and mortgage backed securities. The company's capital markets
business consists of the sub-portfolios, such as public sector
lending portfolio; the substitute cover business; and not
eligible as cover business, as well as derivative portfolio.
DUFRY AG: Moody's Affirms Ba3 CFR Following Acquisition Agreement
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Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Ba3 corporate family
rating, and Ba3-PD probability of default rating of Dufry AG as
well as the Ba3 guaranteed senior unsecured notes of Dufry
Finance S.C.A. The outlook on the ratings is stable. The rating
action follows the announcement that the company has signed a
definitive agreement for the acquisition of the Benetton Family's
50.1% stake in World Duty Free S.p.A. ("WDF"). The acquisition of
the Benetton Family shares in WDF will be followed by a mandatory
takeover offer for the remaining 49.9% outstanding shares, which
are listed in the Milan Stock Exchange. Dufry will offer EUR10.25
per WDF share in cash, equivalent to an enterprise value of
approx. EUR3.6 billion (CHF3.8 billion) including net debt
acquired of EUR970 million.
"The deal will consolidate the position of Dufry as the
undisputed world leading operator in the travel retail industry,"
says Ernesto Bisagno, Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst
and lead analyst for Dufry. "The rating affirmation favorably
considers that the company will use equity to fund a meaningful
portion of the acquisition, yet also recognizes that financial
metrics will weaken in the medium term because of the high EBITDA
multiple paid for the acquisition," adds Mr. Bisagno.
The total consideration will be fully payable in cash. Dufry
intends to initially finance the acquisition of WDF and the
refinancing of WDF's debt through a fully committed bridge
financing and term loan of EUR3.6 billion (CHF3.8 billion), which
is expected to be refinanced via a combination of debt
instruments for a total amount of around EUR1.5 billion (CHF1.6
billion) and a rights issue of at least EUR2.1 billion (CHF2.2
billion).
The transaction will enhance Dufry's geographical footprint,
strengthening its position in the Middle East and India and
reinforcing the leadership of Dufry in Latin America. WDF's
operations in the UK, Spain and Italy are highly complementary to
Dufry's existing footprint in EMEA. WDF's US Duty Paid business
and Vancouver Duty Free business will also complement Dufry's
North American business.
The improved business profile is offset with a somewhat higher
leverage. Adding the effect of the transaction, Moody's expect
leverage to increase towards 6.0x assuming 12-months contribution
from the acquired assets, versus our previous expectations of
5.2x by the end of 2015. Moody's expect leverage to return to a
level commensurate with the Ba3 rating by the end of 2016.
With WDF shares currently trading around EUR10.1 down from
EUR10.99, Dufry's ability to complete the deal at EUR10.25 (the
price agreed for the 50.1% interest held by the Benetton family)
will also depend on further share price movements following
announcement of the transaction. Should the company decide to
raise additional debt to fund a higher offer, that could have an
adverse impact on Moody's rating assessment.
The current rating and outlook also assume that (1) Dufry will
successfully integrate the acquired assets leading to a stronger
free cash flow generation; (2) credit metrics will return within
our guidance for a Ba3 rating by the end of 2016; and (3) Dufry
will continue to maintain a conservative policy with regard to
shareholders distributions.
Moody's has also assigned a definitive Ba3 to the EUR500 million
senior unsecured notes due in July 2022.
Upward pressure on the ratings in the medium term is unlikely at
least until the recent acquisitions are fully integrated, but
could result if Dufry manages to achieve and maintain lease-
adjusted debt/EBITDA below 4.0x on a sustainable basis.
Conversely, Dufry's rating could be downgraded if the company
experiences operational weakness or difficulties in integrating
the acquired assets, or if its financial leverage further
increases, such as if the purchase price for WDF is increased.
Quantitatively, downward pressure could be exerted on the ratings
if Dufry's financial leverage does not return below 5.5x;
EBITA/interest expense does not strengthen to 1.75x; and RCF /
net debt does not improve to 14% by the end of 2016.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Retail
Industry published in June 2011. Other methodologies used include
Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies
in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Dufry is the leading global travel retailer operating over 1,650
duty-free and duty-paid shops in airports, cruise lines,
seaports, railway stations and downtown tourist areas. Dufry
employs around 20,000 people. The Company, headquartered in
Basel, Switzerland, operates in 60 countries in all five
continents.
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG: Moody's Alters Ba1 CFR Outlook to Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the provisional (P)Ba1/(P)NP
MTN program ratings, the Ba1/(P)Ba1 ratings on the senior
unsecured notes of HeidelbergCement AG (HC) and its subsidiaries.
Concurrently Moody's has affirmed the Ba1 Corporate Family Rating
(CFR) and the Ba1-PD Probability of default rating (PDR). The
outlook has been changed to positive from stable.
"The change in the outlook of HC's ratings to positive is driven
by our expectation that HC will improve its performance in 2015
on the back of expected positive economic developments in its
major markets US; UK, Germany and Indonesia coupled with a
continued reduction in its overall indebtedness" said Falk Frey,
Moody's Senior Vice President and lead analyst for HC. "These
factors should lead to leverage ratios for the full year 2015 to
be in line with our triggers set for an upgrade to Baa3" Mr. Frey
continued.
In 2014, HC performed solidly overall generating FCF of around
EUR300 million, which were used to reduce net debt. Including the
proceeds from the disposal of its Stardust Holdings, Inc.
(Stardust, B2 stable) division previously part of Hanson Building
Products for USD 1.4 billion, proceeds of which will be applied
to net debt reduction in Q1 2015, this will lead to a proforma
leverage ratio per 2014 of 3.7x and an RCF/net debt of 18% which
positions HC strongly in the Ba1 rating category. Given our
expectation of positive economic growth in HC's major markets
USA, the UK, Germany and Indonesia accounting for around 40-50%
of the company's turnover at the end of December 2014, and
assuming continued disciplined approach towards growth and
shareholder remuneration Moody's expect HC to achieve a leverage
of around 3.4x and an RCF/net debt of 22% in 2015 which would be
in line with the triggers set for an upgrade to Baa3, hence the
positive outlook assigned.
HC's Ba1 rating positively reflects its (i) strong market
position, (ii) good geographic diversification, which should help
offsetting weaknesses in some markets with better performance in
other markets and therefore lead to more stable results in an
otherwise cyclical industry, (iii) management's commitment to
restore its balance sheet, as shown with the application of
proceeds from the disposal of its building products business to
debt reduction and the payout of a relatively small cash dividend
leading to positive free cash flow generation in every single
year since 2009, (iv) Moody's expectation of a strongly improving
capital structure in 2015 and (v) the good short term liquidity
situation with proven ability and willingness to refinance
through bond markets, even during periods of difficult market
conditions. The rating negatively reflects (i) HC's still high,
but continuously improving, leverage stemming from the 2007 debt-
financed acquisition of UK based Hanson Building Products
(Stardust) and the subsequent deterioration of the economic
environment in most of HC's markets, its (ii) lower exposure to
more strongly growing (but also more cyclical) emerging markets
than certain peers, and some dependency on the US, which,
however, is currently supportive of HC's performance as well as
(iii) sizeable minority interests stemming from its highly
profitable 51% owned subsidiary in Indonesia, to some extent
offset by meaningful profit contribution from non-consolidated
Joint-Ventures.
HC has a good liquidity profile. The liquidity position of the
company for the next 12 months starting December 2014 is
supported by the company's unrestricted cash balance of EUR1.35
billion and availability of the EUR3 billion committed revolving
credit facility maturing in 2019. Combined with the operating
cash flows (before working capital) that Moody's would expect HC
to generate, Moody's anticipate that these sources will be
sufficient to cover the company's short-term liquidity needs over
the next 12 months. These needs mainly consist of quite sizeable
short term debt maturities with EUR2.2 billion, out of which
around EUR1.3 billion will be repaid with the proceeds from the
sale of Hanson Building Products (Stardust), of capex payments at
the tune of EUR1.2 billion, dividend payments (including payouts
to minority shareholders) of around EUR 300 million, and seasonal
working capital swings of approximately EUR 300 million. The
company's liquidity facility includes financial covenants with
currently adequate headroom.
Positive rating pressure would build on the current Ba1 rating if
debt / EBITDA would drop sustainably well below 3.5x and RCF /
net debt would increase above 20% on a sustainable basis. A
rating upgrade to Baa3 would also have to reflect the ability and
willingness of HC to maintain credit metrics in line with an
investment grade rating for an extended period of time.
A sharp setback in market conditions in HC's main geographies
leading to a deterioration in operating performance and cash flow
generation with debt/EBITDA remaining sustainably above 4.0x and
RCF/net debt remaining sustainably below the mid teens would
exert negative pressure on the ratings.
The key factors currently influencing the company's rating have
been derived from Moody's rating methodology for companies in the
building materials sector. All ratios are calculated as one year
point in time. Based the results as per FY 2014, HC maps to a
Baa2 rating, which is two notches higher than the currently
assigned Ba1 rating. This difference mainly reflects (i) that
HC's very good business profile, the large size of the group and
low operating margin volatility have been overshadowed by the
weak capital structure, and (ii) that HC's operational
performance historically has been negatively affected by the
economic circumstances with only a very slow recovery. As Moody's
expect a strong improvement in 2015 in HC's major markets, the
outlook on the rating is positive.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Building
Materials Industry published in September 2014. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.
HeidelbergCement AG is the world's third largest cement producer
and the world leader in aggregates with strong market positions
in mature Western European countries, such as Germany,
Scandinavia, Benelux, and the UK, as well as in the emerging
markets of Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and Turkey.
HeidelbergCement generated revenues of EUR12.6 billion for the
fiscal year 2014.
TAURUS CMBS 2006-3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class A Notes to B1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the rating of Class A of
Notes issued by TAURUS CMBS (PAN-EUROPE) 2006-3 P.L.C.
Moody's rating action is as follows:
-- EUR336 million Class A Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf);
previously on Oct 27, 2014 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)
Moody's does not rate the Class B, Class C, Class D, Class X1 and
the Class X2 Notes.
The downgrade action reflects the increased likelihood of a note
event of default on the legal final maturity date of the Notes on
May 4, 2015 stemming from uncertainty around the completion of
the sale of the collateral securing the sole remaining loan, the
Triumph Loan. Following the legal final maturity date, the
ratings will be withdrawn.
The Triumph Loan's performance has remained relatively stable
since Moody's last downgrade action on October 27, 2014 and
Moody's base case recovery assumption that sale proceeds of the
asset will be sufficient to redeem the Class A in full remains
unchanged. In Moody's view there are two likely scenarios: (i)
prior to a note event of default, loan recoveries are allocated
on a modified pro-rata basis (50% sequential and 50% pro-rata),
therefore requiring a full repayment of the loan to ensure full
repayment of the Class A Notes, or (ii) post a note event of
default, the post enforcement waterfall switches to a sequential
allocation of proceeds which is beneficial to senior noteholders.
The issuer waterfall will switch to a fully sequential allocation
only after a Note Enforcement Notice is served. The Note Trustee
at its absolute discretion may, and if so requested in writing by
the Eligible Noteholders or by an Extraordinary Resolution of the
holders of the Most Senior Class of Notes, shall give a Note
Enforcement Notice to the Issuer declaring all the notes to be
due and repayable and the Issuer Security enforceable. Events of
Default include non-payment of interest and principal on the Most
Senior Class of Notes then outstanding.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating EMEA CMBS Transactions published in December
2013.
Main factor or circumstance that could lead to a downgrade of the
Class A rating is a sale of the underlying property at a price
such that a loss on the securitized loan is incurred and the
distribution of the recoveries on a modified pro-rata basis.
An upgrade of the Class A rating is unlikely given the limited
time to the legal final maturity of the notes and the uncertainty
regarding the resolution of a successful sale process during this
limited period and, as such, it is subject to Moody's rating caps
for CMBS transactions in the tail period.
TAURUS CMBS 2006-3: S&P Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC-
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2006-3 PLC's class A and B notes. At
the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class
C and D notes.
The rating actions follow S&P's review of the underlying loan's
credit quality in light of the transaction's May 2015 legal final
maturity date.
Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2006-3 is a 2006-vintage transaction,
currently backed by one loan secured on a German commercial real
estate asset. The underlying pool initially had seven loans,
which were secured on European commercial real estate assets.
THE LOAN
On the February 2015 interest payment date (IPD), the Triumph
loan remained outstanding, with a balance of EUR47.8 million.
The Triumph loan represents the senior portion of a whole loan.
The subordinated portion of the whole loan does not form part of
this transaction.
The loan is secured on a multitenant single asset located in
Markisches Viertel (northern Berlin), which is primarily used for
retail purposes. The occupancy rate has decreased to 65.65% from
91.00% at closing. The top five tenants account for 20.34% of
the property's overall income. The property's weighted-average
lease term is five years.
The loan entered special servicing because the borrower failed to
repay the whole loan balance at maturity on Jan. 30, 2013. The
special servicer has agreed to temporary standstills with the
borrower to organize the sale of the property. The servicer
reported a February 2015 securitized loan-to-value ratio of
68.83% (based on a December 2013 valuation), and a securitized
interest coverage ratio of 3.10x.
S&P understands that the special servicer, after marketing the
property for sale, granted an exclusivity period with a new
preferred bidder. The latter is currently undertaking its due
diligence process. The special servicer is continuing to
negotiate a final solution before the legal final maturity date.
RATING ACTIONS
S&P's ratings in this transaction address the timely payment of
interest, payable quarterly in arrears, and the payment of
principal no later than the May 2015 legal final maturity date.
Although S&P considers the class A and B notes' available credit
enhancement to adequately mitigate the risk of principal losses
from the underlying loan in higher stress scenarios, S&P has
lowered its ratings on these two classes of notes because it
considers them to currently be vulnerable to nonpayment. There
is no virtual certainty that the underlying property will be sold
in time to allow the issuer to repay the notes by their legal
final maturity date in May 2015, in S&P's opinion.
As a result, S&P believes that the class A and B notes face at
least a one-in-two likelihood of default. S&P has therefore
lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' its ratings on the class A and B notes, in
accordance with S&P's criteria.
Under S&P's rating definitions criteria, a payment default on the
legal final maturity date would likely result in its lowering of
its ratings in this transaction to 'D (sf)'.
S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C and D notes
because they continue to experience interest shortfalls.
Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2006-3 is a 2006-vintage commercial
mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) transaction, currently backed
by one loan secured on a German commercial real estate asset.
RATINGS LIST
Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2006-3 PLC
CHF.1 mil, EUR447.75 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate
notes
Rating
Class Identifier To From
A XS0274566420 CCC- (sf) B+ (sf)
B XS0274569523 CCC- (sf) B- (sf)
C XS0274570372 D (sf) D (sf)
D XS0274570703 D (sf) D (sf)
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G R E E C E
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GREECE: PM Tsipras Prepares to Meet Putin as EU Talks Falter
------------------------------------------------------------
Liz Alderman at The New York Times reports that with the prospect
of a default looming in Greece, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is
preparing to meet this week with President Vladimir V. Putin of
Russia as a European deal to give more aid to Athens falters.
The timing has raised questions of whether the visit is an
ordinary component of the new Greek government's multipronged
foreign policy, or a pivot toward Russia for financial aid in the
event that Greece's talks with European officials collapse, The
New York Times notes.
Negotiations between the struggling Greek government and its
creditors stumbled anew on Monday after European leaders said
that a reform plan submitted over the weekend to unlock a fresh
lifeline of EUR7.2 billion, or about US$7.8 billion, fell short,
The New York Times relays. Greece has warned that it may run out
of money soon after Mr. Tsipras meets with Mr. Putin on April 8,
The New York Times discloses.
Mr. Tsipras, who came to power in January, originally planned to
travel to Moscow in May, The New York Times states. But he
accelerated the meeting with Mr. Putin a couple of weeks ago as
Greece came to loggerheads with Germany and other European
countries over the terms for releasing the money, according to
The New York Times. Without it, Greece could go bankrupt or
possibly exit the 19-nation eurozone, an event that, if it
happened, could increase instability in the region, The New York
Times says.
Mr. Tsipras's visit to Moscow is being billed by Athens as a
routine meeting to strengthen the relationship between the
countries, which have longstanding political and religious ties,
The New York Times relates. But some Greek officials have
suggested that Athens might be tempted to assess whether Russia,
which is itself squaring off with Europe over the conflict in
Ukraine, could be willing to ride in as a white knight if Europe
steps back, The New York Times notes.
According to The New York Times, with tax revenues falling
quickly, Greece will be hard pressed to pay EUR450 million owed
to the International Monetary Fund on April 9, the day after Mr.
Tsipras's visit to Moscow.
Most top Greek government officials have rejected suggestions in
recent weeks that they might turn to Russia for aid, The New York
Times discloses. But others have courted the idea publicly,
including Panos Kammenos, Greece's defense minister, according to
The New York Times. Greece could seek financial help from
Russia, China or the United States as a "Plan B" if Germany
"remains rigid and wants to blow Europe apart," he declared in
February, The New York Times recounts.
Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has said that Moscow
would consider a Greek request for aid if one is made -- an offer
that the Russian ambassador to Greece repeated in an interview
with Greek newspaper Kathimerini over the weekend, The New York
Times relays.
On March 30, Greek Energy Minister Panagiotis Lafazanis traveled
to Moscow to meet with his Russian counterpart and the chief
executive of the Russian energy giant Gazprom, The New York Times
relates.
According to The New York Times, even if Greece were eventually
to seek financial assistance from Moscow, Russia's economy is
under pressure amid a collapse in oil prices and the lengthy
conflict in Ukraine.
"Moscow could provide a little bit of funding to tide over the
Greeks," Mr. Tilford said. "But it is not in a position to
provide the kind of money that Greece would need to stay in the
eurozone," The New York Times quotes Simon Tilford, the deputy
director of the Center for European Reform in London, as saying.
INTRALOT SA: Fitch Says Greece Downgrade No Impact on 'B+' IDR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that there is no impact on Intralot S.A.'s
(Intralot B+/Negative) ratings resulting from the recent
downgrade of Greece's Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'CCC' from 'B' and the Country Ceiling
to 'B-' from 'BB'.
Fitch views the downgrade of Greece's sovereign ratings as
neutral for Intralot's ratings given its limited linkage with
Greece, its contractual requirement to maintain a large portion
of cash outside Greek banks and its manageable refinancing risk,
with no debt maturity until 2017.
Under the terms of its bank facilities, Intralot cannot keep more
than 40% of cash on deposit with Greek banks and is further
limited to keeping no more than 20% of cash with any one Greek
bank. Currently, less than 2% of the group's cash is deposited in
Greece.
In addition to revenue diversification, Fitch also looks closely
at the geographical earnings and cash flow profiles of eurozone
corporates in assessing the linkages with their respective
sovereigns. Intralot generates only 5% of its revenue and less
than 10% of its EBITDA in Greece with the rest spread across over
40 countries worldwide. Although its management and a major
proportion of its software developers and machine designers are
based in Greece, these employees account for only 15% of its
total staff. In addition, Fitch notes that the majority of
Intralot's business is transacted outside of Greece.
Intralot has been restructuring its business and operations to
further reduce its reliance on its Greek operational base,
notably by diversifying its recruitment to more non-Greek
nationals, broadening its management and personnel base.
Lastly refinancing risk is manageable, as Intralot does not have
any meaningful debt maturing until 2017 when its EUR200 million
bank facilities mature, whilst its bonds are not due to mature
until August 2018 at the earliest.
=============
I R E L A N D
=============
KENMARE RESOURCES: Debt Restructuring Deadline Extended
-------------------------------------------------------
Charlie Taylor at The Irish Times reports that Kenmare Resources,
which operates the Moma Titanium Minerals Mine in northern
Mozambique, has announced yet another extension of a deadline to
finance a deal with lenders on restructuring its debt.
Kenmare on March 31 said it had agreed with its project lenders
to extend the date for delivery of a budget for 2015 till the end
of April, The Irish Times relates. This is the third time that
the deadline has been pushed back, The Irish Times notes.
According to The Irish Times, the company said it has made
substantial progress in putting together a revised finance
agreement which will extend the maturity of the current
facilities and substantially reduce fixed amortization
requirements in favor of a cash-sweep mechanism.
In conjunction with the financing amendment, project lenders are
considering the provision of a new super-senior debt facility
that would rank ahead of existing debt, and could be drawn to
service working capital and other requirements as necessary, The
Irish Times discloses.
Kenmare Resources is an exploration company based in Dublin.
* IRELAND: Company Failures Down 17% in First Quarter 2015
----------------------------------------------------------
Irish Examiner reports that the first three months of 2015 have
seen a 17% year-on-year decrease in company failures.
However, statistics from Deloitte also show the 250 cases of
corporate insolvency for the first quarter are up 13% on the
final quarter of 2014, Irish Examiner relates. Despite the
introduction of legislation making it more cost-effective for
smaller firms to go down the examinership route if in need of
court protection to safeguard their business, receiverships
accounted for 22% of all insolvencies since the start of January,
unchanged on the same period last year, Irish Examiner discloses.
"An ongoing trend that we are observing in our analysis over the
last number of quarters is that examinerships continue to remain
at disappointingly low levels," Irish Examiner quotes David Van
Dessel of Deloitte's restructuring services division, as saying.
"Take-up is consistent with the comparable periods and shows the
introduction of new legislation, in early 2014, has not had the
anticipated effect of encouraging more struggling SMEs to avail
of this more cost-effective and accessible option.
Currently fewer than one in 50 Irish corporate insolvency cases
concern examinership, which compares to one in seven in Britain
and one in three in the US, Irish Examiner relays.
Mr. Van Dessel, as cited by Irish Examiner, said there is "a
strong need" to change that statistic and "move away from the
high levels of liquidations," which dropped from 24 to 13 year-
on-year in the first quarter.
Company failures in the building sector remain pronounced, with
191 insolvencies noted in the first quarter, Irish Examiner
notes.
===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================
FINDUS PLEDGECO: Fitch Affirms 'B-' Issuer Default Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Findus PledgeCo S.a.r.l's Outlook to
Positive from Stable, while affirming its Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'B-'. The agency has also affirmed
Findus BondCo S.A.'s senior secured notes at 'B+' with a Recovery
Rating of 'RR2'.
Findus PIK S.C.A.'s Issuer Default Rating (IDR) is also affirmed
at 'CCC' and its EUR200 million 8.25%/9% senior PIK notes at
'CC'/'RR6'.
The Outlook revision to Positive reflects Findus's robust
financial performance for the financial year to September 2014,
despite a challenging trading environment and currency headwinds
in the Nordics. Findus has demonstrated it is able to achieve
pricing power and defend its EBITDA margin despite increases in
raw material prices (fish prices), due to cost reduction, product
innovation and efficiency programs. Fitch sees an upgrade to 'B'
as possible in 2016, subject to Findus continuing its EBITDA
improvement, moving to generate neutral to positive cash flows
and achieving further deleveraging with FFO-based net leverage
dropping below 5.5x.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
Strong Pricing Power
Findus demonstrated with its FY14 results that it was able to
maintain its margins in the Nordics and improve its margins in
the UK and southern Europe, by passing on to customers key input
price increases. This is despite a competitive trading
environment, especially in the UK where competition among the big
UK retailers and discounters remains intense and where price
deflation is being experienced in many food categories even by
global packaged food companies such as Nestle (AA+/Stable) and
Unilever (A+/Stable).
Strong Market Positions
Findus remains the leader in its key markets of UK, Norway and
Sweden with high market shares in branded frozen food but with a
concentrated product proposition where 66% of its sales are from
fish and seafood. The UK chilled category enjoyed a 10% increase
in EBITDA in FY14, compensating for the poor performance in the
Nordics. It is now the company's largest segment by EBITDA (29%)
and shows potential for further growth.
Improving Credit Metrics
Findus's funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage at
FY14 improved to 5.9x from 6.4x in FY13. Fitch expects leverage
to improve towards 5.5x with FFO fixed charge cover moving
towards 1.8x by 2016. If maintained, this leverage profile would
be considered fairly strong for the 'B-' rating relative to close
peers. The improvements would be driven by continued investments
in product innovation and successful negotiations of contracts
with food retailers when adjusting prices for raw material costs
changes.
Scope for EBITDA Growth
Fitch expects product innovation and efficiency programs to
continue mitigating both downward pricing pressure from major
retail chains and an ongoing decline of frozen food consumption
in its markets of operation. Cost reduction implemented during
2011-2013 will continue to bear fruit but Fitch does not expect
this to contribute substantially to growth in EBITDA. However,
Fitch projects EBITDA margins to improve, albeit at a slow pace,
on higher spending power by consumers in Findus's key markets,
especially in the UK. Fitch also expects the UK chilled food
division to be the key growth driver.
Currency Headwinds and Industry Risks
Fitch continues to expect currency headwinds in Findus's Nordics
and southern European business to affect its financial position
in FY15, before subsiding in FY16. The Swedish kroner depreciated
by around 13% in 2014, leading to lower revenues and profits in
GBP. Fitch projects it to further depreciate by another 15% in
2015. However, the EUR has fallen against GBP so far in 2015,
benefiting the company's 60% senior outstanding debt that is
denominated in EUR. In addition, soft demand from the challenging
trading environment will remain a drag on Findus and will slow
revenue growth.
Expected Recovery for Creditors
The senior secured notes' 'B+'/'RR2' rating reflects Fitch's
expectation of superior recoveries in the range of 71%-90% in
case of default. The instrument's rating is reflective of
Findus's high FFO adjusted gross leverage of 5.9x and takes into
account a GBP60 million super senior facility ranking ahead of
the bond. Driving these recovery expectations is an estimated
post restructuring EBITDA of approximately GBP81 million,
reflecting a hypothetical adverse scenario of depressed sales and
compressed margins as a function of increased competition and
elevated commodity prices and a going concern multiple of 5x
enterprise value/EBITDA.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:
-- low single-digit organic sales growth in the UK and the
Nordics from FY15 onward, consistent growth in southern
Europe
-- Depreciation of SEK/GBP by approximately 13-15% and EUR/GBP
by close to 20% in 2015
-- improvement in EBITDA margin driven by efficiency
improvements, cost reductions, product innovations and raw
material prices pass-through offset by higher marketing
spending
-- neutral-to-positive working-capital movements from FY15
onwards as well as capex in line with or slightly higher than
historical levels
-- neutral-to-positive free cash flow generation from FY15
onwards
RATING SENSITIVITIES
Positive: Future developments that could, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating actions include:
-- Maintaining an EBITDA margin of at least 8% and positive
free cash flow generation on a sustained basis
-- Further de-leveraging with FFO adjusted gross leverage to
or below 5.5x on a sustained basis (FYE14: 5.9x).
-- FFO fixed charge cover at 2x or above on a sustained basis
(FYE14: 1.7x).
Negative: Future developments that could, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating actions include:
-- A contraction in organic revenue, for example, resulting
from increased competitive pressures, combined with a
steady reduction in operating profitability leading to an
EBITDA margin below 7%
-- Consecutive periods of negative FCF leading to erosion of
the liquidity cushion
-- A sustained deterioration in FFO adjusted gross leverage to
or above 7x
-- FFO fixed charge cover sustainably at 1.5x or below
LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE
Adequate Liquidity
Fitch expects that Findus's liquidity will remain adequate,
supported by a super senior RCF of GBP60 million and, in the
longer term, by modest positive FCF generation from FY16.
No Maturities Before 2018
Findus's current debt includes approximately GBP400 million of
senior secured notes maturing in July 2018, and a RCF of GBP60
million maturing in December 2017. While there is no debt
amortization pressure in the foreseeable future, we believe that
the deleveraging path will be slow and dependent on growth in
EBITDA. Fitch expects FFO adjusted gross leverage to remain at
around 5.5x in 2016.
===============
P O R T U G A L
===============
COMBOIOS DE PORTUGAL: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'BB' ICR
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on Portuguese rail operator Comboios de Portugal E.P.E
(CP) to positive from stable and affirmed its 'BB' long-term
issuer credit rating on the company.
The rating action follows S&P's outlook revision on the Republic
of Portugal on March 20, 2015.
S&P equalizes its long-term rating on CP with that on Portugal,
based on S&P's view of the almost certain likelihood that CP
would receive timely and sufficient extraordinary support from
the Portuguese government in the event of financial distress.
S&P regards CP as a government-related entity (GRE) under S&P's
criteria. S&P bases its assessment of the likelihood of
government support on its view of CP's critical role for and
integral link with Portugal.
S&P believes CP's role for the Portuguese government is critical
given that CP is virtually the only passenger rail transport
provider in Portugal. In S&P's opinion, the company plays a key
role in implementing the government's policy of fostering urban
mobility in the country. S&P believes that, as such, CP provides
a key public service that a private entity could not readily
undertake and that the government itself would likely conduct if
CP ceased to exist.
S&P views CP's link with the government as integral given the
company's 100% state ownership and its strong legal status as a
public company. Moreover, CP operates under a strategy defined
and monitored by the government. As an EPE, CP enjoys a stronger
legal status than "sociedades anĒnimas" (public limited
companies). Even though EPEs are generally subject to private
law, they are not subject to the bankruptcy laws applicable to
sociedades anonimas. Only the central government can liquidate
an EPE.
S&P assess CP's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'ccc+' based
on S&P's view of the company's capital structure as
unsustainable. S&P considers that its financial commitments and
leverage remain untenable in the short-to-long term on a stand-
alone basis, as the company cannot meet its financial
requirements without government support.
S&P continues to assess CP's business risk profile as "weak" due
to its business model, which includes a large component of public
service that is characterized by ongoing negative operating cash
flow generation. This is due to limited operating efficiency,
with insufficient subsidies from the state to cover below-cost
tariffs. On the other hand, S&P recognizes the company's
strategic position as the national railway operator, with only
marginal competition.
S&P still assess CP's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged," given its very weak credit ratios and cash flow
protection measures. The company has negative net worth due to
the accumulation of persistent losses, and remains highly
leveraged with debt of around EUR3.9 billion as of Sept. 30,
2014.
The positive outlook mirrors that on Portugal and reflects S&P's
view that the government support that CP receives is unlikely to
be challenged or to change in the foreseeable future.
S&P could upgrade CP if it raised its long-term rating on the
Republic of Portugal.
S&P would revise the outlook on CP to stable if it revised the
outlook on Portugal to stable.
In addition, S&P could downgrade CP if it revised downward its
view of the likelihood of extraordinary support from the
Portuguese government. This could be the case if the general
government were to exclude CP from its scope of consolidation or
if the state budget no longer covered its future funding needs,
which S&P currently views as unlikely.
SAGRES' DOURO 1: S&P Puts Class D Notes' BB- Rating on Watch Dev.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch
developing its 'BB- (sf)' credit rating on SAGRES Sociedade de
Titularizacao de Creditos, S.A.'s Douro Mortgages No. 1's class D
notes.
On March 11, 2015, S&P placed on CreditWatch developing its 'BB-'
long-term ICR on Banco BPI S.A., the swap provider for SAGRES'
Douro Mortgages No. 1.
In S&P's Feb. 11, 2015 review, it confirmed that its current
counterparty criteria cap its rating on the class D notes at the
long-term ICR on the swap provider. Consequently, S&P has placed
on CreditWatch developing its 'BB- (sf)' rating on the class D
notes.
S&P will resolve the CreditWatch placement after it has resolved
the counterparty CreditWatch placement.
Douro Mortgages No. 1 is a Portuguese RMBS transaction, which
closed in November 2005 and securitizes first-ranking mortgage
loans. Banco BPI originated the pool, which comprises loans
backed by properties in Portugal.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
SOGAZ: S&P Lowers LT Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has revised its
assessment of Russian property and casualty (P&C) insurance
industry and country risk (IICRA) to high from moderate and
consequently took negative rating actions on four Russia-based
insurance companies.
The rating actions reflect many of the same credit factors that
led S&P to lower the sovereign ratings on the Russian Federation
and to revise S&P's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment
(BICRA) for Russia to Group 8 from Group 7.
The actions reflect S&P's view that economic prospects in Russia
are likely to remain significantly weaker over the next couple of
years than S&P had previously anticipated. S&P now considers
that the impact of the ongoing deterioration of the economic
environment will be more severe than S&P anticipated before.
S&P expects that oil prices, the impact of the sanctions, and
growing business uncertainty will lead to an economic contraction
in 2015 of 2.6%, with average growth in 2015-2018 of about
0.5% -- significantly weaker than the 2.4% average over the
previous four years.
Historically, Russia's insurance market has been volatile and
very dependent on economic factors. Consequently, S&P expects
insurance sector growth to decelerate in 2015 to less than 2% in
nominal terms, as measured by gross premiums written (GPW). S&P
now believes that growth in real terms will likely be negative,
considering projected inflation of 13.5%. S&P sees accelerating
inflation adding to growing losses in the insurance sector. S&P
believes, however, that in 2016 and 2017 growth will pick up and
with the expected deceleration in inflation, it will be positive
in real terms.
S&P expects car sales in Russia to continue to fall, putting
significant pressure on demand for motor insurance, which
represents about 20% of total market GPW.
S&P sees some support of premium levels in obligatory insurance
lines, which have limited demand elasticity and account for about
17% of GPW in Russia. S&P also saw an increase in the obligatory
third-party liability insurance base tariff set by the government
in late 2014, and S&P expects a further increase in 2015.
S&P believes that the recent Russian ruble weakening against the
dollar, the euro, and the yen will be painful for insurers,
especially for companies engaged in motor insurance. S&P
believes the rising cost of imported spare parts will put loss
ratios in motor insurance under significant pressure.
S&P's view on the overall assessment of the industry risks that
Russian insurers face remains unchanged, but S&P notes a clear
negative trend in expected return on equity (ROE) for the sector.
Nevertheless, S&P believes that the sector will, in aggregate, be
profitable. S&P believes that ROE in 2015 will be supported by
investment income, which will be higher than in 2014, reflecting
an interest rate hike on deposits, which are the main investment
asset for insurers. If S&P believes that ROE for the sector is
under 4% for a prolonged period of time S&P could negatively
revise its assessment of the sector's profitability and
consequently revise S&P's assessment of industry risk for the
Russian P/C insurance sector to moderate from intermediate.
However, this wouldn't have an immediate impact on S&P's final
IICRA.
S&P notes that average credit quality of insurers' assets is
deteriorating as most of invested assets are Russian bank
deposits and investments in Russian government and corporate
bonds. S&P believes that the average credit quality of insurers
gravitates toward 'BB', whereas previously it was closer to
'BB+'.
As a result of S&P's IICRA revision, and also taking into account
the latest company-specific developments, S&P is taking rating
actions on several insurers, as detailed.
SOGAZ AND CJSC INSURANCE CO. TRANSNEFT
S&P has lowered its long-term counterparty credit ratings on
Sogaz and Insurance Co. Transneft to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and S&P's
Russia national scale ratings to 'ruAA+' from 'ruAAA'. The
outlook is stable. S&P has removed all ratings from CreditWatch
negative where it placed them on Dec. 29, 2014.
"We equalize the rating on IC Transneft with that on Sogaz due to
its core status to the company. The downgrade reflects our
revision of the business risk profile to fair from satisfactory,
driven by our change in our assessment of the insurance industry
and country risks. The ratings continue to reflect a less than
adequate financial risk profile supported by moderately strong
capital and earnings, and capped by the weighted average credit
quality of the investment portfolio at 'BB'. After applying our
foreign currency sovereign stress scenario, we consider that
Sogaz would likely retain positive regulatory capital and
maintain a liquidity ratio in excess of 100%. We believe that
Sogaz is unlikely to default on its insurance liabilities under
the scenario. Therefore, the ratings on Sogaz can be higher than
our 'BB+' long-term foreign currency rating on Russia, but are
limited by the 'BBB-' long-term local currency rating on Russia.
We would currently not rate Sogaz more than one notch above the
foreign currency rating on Russia, owing to the company's
substantial exposure to its Russia-based assets," S&P said.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Sogaz will likely
maintain moderately strong capital and earnings, and at least
less-than-adequate investment quality under our methodology. S&P
also thinks the company will continue to benefit from its strong
ties with Russian vertically integrated gas company Gazprom OAO.
A positive rating action on Sogaz is unlikely within the next 12
months.
INGOSSTRAKH INSURANCE CO.
S&P has lowered its long-term counterparty credit ratings on
Ingosstrakh Insurance Co. to 'BB+' from 'BBB-' and its Russia
national scale ratings to 'ruAA+' from 'ruAAA'. At the same
time, S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch negative where it
placed them on Dec. 29, 2014. The outlook is negative.
The downgrade reflects S&P's revision of the business risk
profile to fair from satisfactory, driven by S&P's change in its
assessment of the insurance industry and country risks. It
specifically reflects S&P's concerns of potentially reduced
growth levels and the rising costs of imported spare parts, which
puts loss ratios in motor insurance under significant pressure.
S&P notes, however, that Ingosstrakh's preliminary performance
results for 2014 are above S&P's expectations.
The outlook mirrors that on the sovereign and reflects the risk
that a sovereign foreign currency default could undermine
liquidity at Ingosstrakh.
OSAO RESO GARANTIA
S&P has lowered its long-term counterparty credit rating to 'BB'
from 'BB+' and its Russia national scale rating to 'ruAA' from
'ruAA+'. S&P also removed the ratings from CreditWatch negative
where it placed them on Dec. 29, 2014. The outlook is stable.
The downgrade reflects S&P's revision of the business risk
profile to fair from satisfactory, driven by S&P's changed view
of insurance industry and country risk. S&P kept the financial
risk profile at weak. However, S&P revised its assessment of the
capital and earnings to less than adequate from lower adequate,
which reflects weakening of capital adequacy. Capital adequacy is
pressured following the company's investments in Reso Leasing and
the resulting goodwill which we fully deduct from the company's
capital. S&P also revised the company's financial flexibility
score to adequate from less than adequate, which reflects S&P's
expectations that, in 2014-2017, OSAO Reso Garantia will be able
to maintain its financial leverage below 30% and fixed charge
coverage above 4x. S&P's expectations are supported by the fact
that the company significantly decreased its leverage in 2014, by
reducing debt to about Russian ruble (RUB)11 billion from RUB21
billion in 2013.
The stable outlook on OSAO RESO Garantia reflects S&P's
expectation that the company will be able to maintain its strong
competitive position, in particular on the motor market. S&P
expects that the company will be able to keep leverage at less
than 30% and fixed charge coverage above 4x. However, S&P don't
expect the financial profile to improve from its currently weak
level.
ROSGOSSSTRAKH OAO AND ROSGOSSTRAKH OOO
S&P has affirmed the long-term rating on OAO Rosgosstrakh at 'BB-
' and the Russia national scale rating at 'ruAA-'. The outlook
is negative.
S&P has revised its business risk assessment for OAO Rosgosstrakh
to satisfactory from strong, driven by S&P's revision of the
IICRA. S&P continues to consider the company's competitive
position as strong.
With strong positions in motor risk, the company enjoys strong
brand recognition, and has a superior distribution network to
those of its domestic peers.
The company's financial risk profile is very weak. This
assessment reflects capital and earnings that are less than
adequate and the company's high risk position. The company's
high risk position is due to significant related-party, sector,
and single name concentrations.
The rating on the Rosgosstrakh group's main operating entity,
Rosgosstrakh OOO, is at the same level as the rating on
Rosgosstrakh OAO because Rosgosstrakh OOO is 99.9% owned by
Rosgosstrakh OAO and S&P views it as a core subsidiary.
Rosgosstrakh OOO is the largest operating company within the
Rosgosstrakh group. It constitutes 80% of the consolidated
group's total assets, accounts for close to 90% of its total
capital, and contributes 90% of its gross premium written.
The negative outlook on Rosgosstrakh OAO reflects the possibility
that the company could fail to keep its capital adequacy within
the less-than-adequate category over the next three years. S&P
believes that potential underperformance by the insurance
portfolio, in particular the motor portfolio, could weaken
retained profits. S&P also notes that the company was growing at
higher than market pace in 2014, pressuring capital with growing
premium charges.
SOGLASIE
S&P has affirmed the long-term rating on Soglasie at 'BB-' and
Russia national scale rating at 'ruAA-'. The outlook is stable.
"We revised our business risk assessment to vulnerable from fair,
driven by our revision of the IICRA. We continue to consider the
company's competitive position as adequate. The weak financial
risk profile reflects our view of the company's lower adequate
capital and earnings and high risk position. Our capital
assessment also takes into account that, in line with our
projections in January 2015, the shareholder provided a RUB2
billion capital injection to Soglasie," S&P said.
At the same time, S&P removed one notch of adjustment to the
final rating which incorporated an expected worsening of the
macroeconomic environment and S&P's view of the weakening
insurance environment. S&P has now reflected this risk in its
weaker IICRA assessment.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that Soglasie will
maintain its adequate competitive position, combined with lower
adequate capital and earnings.
S&P could take a negative rating action on Soglasie if S&P sees
no financial support from the main shareholder in 2016, which
could put pressure on capital and earnings; if the company
experiences more losses on its portfolio than S&P currently
projects; or if S&P views the quality of the investment portfolio
as weak.
If S&P considers that liquidity poses severe risks to Soglasie's
operations and its activity as a going concern, S&P is likely to
cap the rating at 'B-' at best. A positive rating action on
Soglasie is unlikely within the next 12 months.
VTB INSURANCE
S&P has affirmed its long-term counterparty credit ratings on VTB
Insurance at 'BB+' and S&P's Russia national scale ratings at
'ruAA+'. S&P has revised downward its assessment of VTB
Insurance's stand-alone credit profile to 'bb' from 'bb+'. The
change reflects S&P's revision of the business risk profile to
vulnerable from fair, driven by S&P's revised view of insurance
industry and country risk. S&P considers VTB Insurance Ltd. as
core to its parent, government-owned VTB Bank JSC. S&P now adds
one notch of support to the rating on VTB Insurance to reflect
this. The outlook on VTB Insurance is negative, mirroring that
on the parent.
RATINGS LIST
CreditWatch Action; Downgraded
To From
OJSC Sogaz
CJSC Insurance Co. TRANSNEFT
Counterparty Credit Rating BB+/Stable BBB-/Watch Neg
Financial Strength Rating BB+/Stable BBB-/Watch Neg
Russia National Scale Rating ruAA+ ruAAA/Watch Neg
Ingosstrakh Insurance Co.
Counterparty Credit Rating BB+/Negative BBB-/Watch Neg
Financial Strength Rating BB+/Negative BBB-/Watch Neg
Russia National Scale Rating ruAA+ ruAAA/Watch Neg
OSAO RESO Garantia
Counterparty Credit Rating BB/Stable BB+/Watch Neg
Financial Strength Rating BB/Stable BB+/Watch Neg
Russia National Scale Rating ruAA ruAA+/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
Rosgosstrakh OAO
Rosgosstrakh OOO
Counterparty Credit Rating BB-/Negative
Financial Strength Rating BB-/Negative
Russia National Scale Rating ruAA-
SOGLASIE Insurance Co. Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating BB-/Stable
Financial Strength Rating BB-/Stable
Russia National Scale Rating ruAA-
VTB Insurance Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating BB+/Negative
Financial Strength Rating BB+/Negative
Russia National Scale Rating ruAA+
N.B. This list does not include all ratings affected.
RATINGS SCORE SNAPSHOTS
OJSC SOGAZ/CJSC INSURANCE CO. TRANSNEFT
To From
Financial Strength Rating BB+/Stable BBB-/Watch Neg
Anchor bb+ bbb-
Business Risk Profile Fair
Satisfactory
IICRA* High Risk Moderate Risk
Competitive Position Strong Strong
Financial Risk Profile Less than Adequate Less than
Adequate
Capital & Earnings Moderately Strong Moderately Strong
Risk Position High Risk High Risk
Financial Flexibility Adequate Adequate
Modifiers 0 0
ERM and Management 0 0
Enterprise Risk Management Adequate Adequate
Management & Governance Fair Fair
Holistic Analysis 0 0
Liquidity Strong Strong
Support 0 0
Group Support 0 0
Government Support 0 0
INGOSSTRAKH GROUP
To From
Financial Strength Rating BB+/Negative BBB-/Watch Neg
Anchor bb+ bbb-
Business Risk Profile Fair Satisfactory
IICRA* High Risk Moderate Risk
Competitive Position Strong Strong
Financial Risk Profile Less than Adequate Less than
Adequate
Capital & Earnings Upper Adequate Upper Adequate
Risk Position High Risk High Risk
Financial Flexibility Adequate Adequate
Modifiers 0 0
ERM and Management 0 0
Enterprise Risk Management Adequate Adequate
Management & Governance Fair Fair
Holistic Analysis 0 0
Liquidity Adequate Adequate
Support 0 0
Group Support 0 0
Government Support 0 0
OSAO RESO Garantia Group
To From
Financial Strength Rating BB/Stable BB+/Watch Neg
Anchor bb bb+
Business Risk Profile Fair Satisfactory
IICRA* High Risk Moderate Risk
Competitive Position Strong Strong
Financial Risk Profile Weak Weak
Capital & Earnings Less than Adequate Lower Adequate
Risk Position Moderate Risk Moderate Risk
Financial Flexibility Adequate Less than
Adequate
Modifiers 0 0
ERM and Management 0 0
Enterprise Risk Management Adequate Adequate
Management & Governance Fair Fair
Holistic Analysis 0 0
Liquidity Adequate Adequate
Support 0 0
Group Support 0 0
Government Support 0 0
ROSGOSSTRAKH OAO/ROSGOSSTRAKH OOO
To From
Financial Strength Rating BB-/Negative BB-/Negative
Anchor bb- bb-
Business Risk Profile Satisfactory Strong
IICRA* High Risk Moderate Risk
Competitive Position Strong Strong
Financial Risk Profile Very Weak Very Weak
Capital & Earnings Less than Adequate Less than
Adequate
Risk Position High Risk High Risk
Financial Flexibility Adequate Adequate
Modifiers 0 0
ERM and Management 0 0
Enterprise Risk Management Adequate Adequate
Management & Governance Fair Fair
Holistic Analysis 0 0
Liquidity Less than Adequate Less than Adequate
Support 0 0
Group Support 0 0
Government Support 0 0
SOGLASIE INSURANCE CO. LTD
To From
Financial Strength Rating BB-/Stable BB-/Stable
SACP bb- bb-
Anchor bb- bb
Business Risk Profile Vulnerable Fair
IICRA* High Risk Moderate Risk
Competitive Position Adequate Adequate
Financial Risk Profile Weak Weak
Capital & Earnings Lower Adequate Lower
Adequate
Risk Position High Risk High Risk
Financial Flexibility Adequate Adequate
Modifiers 0 -1
ERM and Management 0 0
Enterprise Risk Management Adequate
Adequate
Management & Governance Fair Fair
Holistic Analysis 0 -1
Liquidity Less than Adequate Less than Adequate
Support 0 0
Group Support 0 0
Government Support 0 0
VTB INSURANCE LTD
To From
Financial Strength Rating BB+/Negative BB+/Negative
SACP bb bb+
Anchor bb bb+
Business Risk Profile Vulnerable Fair
IICRA* High Risk Moderate Risk
Competitive Position Adequate Adequate
Financial Risk Profile Less than Adequate Less than
Adequate
Capital & Earnings Lower Adequate Lower Adequate
Risk Position Moderate Risk Moderate Risk
Financial Flexibility Adequate Adequate
Modifiers 0 0
ERM and Management 0 0
Enterprise Risk Management Adequate Adequate
Management & Governance Fair Fair
Holistic Analysis 0 0
Liquidity Strong Strong
Support +1 0
Group Support +1 0
Government Support 0 0
*Insurance Industry and Country Risk Assessment.
URALSIB BANK: Fitch Cuts Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Russia-based Uralsib Bank (UB) and its subsidiary,
Uralsib Leasing Group (ULG), to 'B' from 'B+'.
The Outlook on UB is Stable and Negative on ULG.
KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - UB's RATINGS
The downgrade of UB's Viability Rating (VR), and consequently its
IDRs, reflects continued pressure on the bank's capitalization,
and weaker prospects for an improvement in solvency given the
more difficult operating environment. In Fitch's view, increased
funding costs and impairment charges, in line with market trends,
are likely to further undermine UB's already weak profitability
and internal capital generation. At the same time, the VR
considers UB's limited near-term wholesale funding repayments and
stable deposit franchise.
UB's regulatory core Tier 1 ratio was a moderate 6.9% at end-
February 2015, down from 7.7% at end-3Q14, while the Fitch Core
Capital (FCC)/risk-weighted assets ratio stood at 9.5% at end-
1H14, based on the bank's latest IFRS accounts. Fitch views
capitalization as weak because of the bank's large holdings of
non-core assets and related party exposures, in total equal to
1.4x FCC at end-1H14. These include investments in insurance
company SG Uralsib (SGU, equal to 0.6x FCC) and real estate (0.6x
FCC), and related party exposures (0.2x FCC). In Fitch's view,
the investment in SGU and some of the real estate holdings are
aggressively valued, and prospects for sales/work-outs have
further weakened in the current operating environment, meaning
additional provisioning may be required.
UB makes annual deductions from its regulatory core Tier I
capital equal to 20% of the bank's investment in SGU, with the
last such deduction made in January 2015. Offsetting this and
supporting regulatory capitalization was a RUB4 billion
subordinated debt issue in December 2014 (converted into a
perpetual in February 2015), a RUB5 billion exchange of 'old
style' subordinated debt into 'new style' debt in January 2015,
some deleveraging, and regulatory forbearance with respect to
using end-3Q14 exchange rates for the calculation of foreign
currency risk-weighted assets (about 25% of the total). As a
result, the total regulatory ratio slightly improved to 11.7% at
end-February 2015 from 10.8 at end-3Q14, notwithstanding the
weakening in the core Tier I ratio.
The announced likely withdrawal of regulatory forbearance in July
2015 and UB's weak performance mean that pressure on
capitalization is likely to remain significant. UB's statutory
pre-impairment profitability deteriorated to around break-even
level in 4Q14 and became moderately negative in 2M15, and bottom
line performance has been negative in recent years. UB's possible
participation in the state recapitalization program could result
in moderate support for capital ratios.
Impairment charges of RUB3.5 billion (equal to 2% of gross loans)
in regulatory accounts for 2H14-2M15 suggest that there has been
some deterioration of asset quality since end-1H14, when NPLs
(loans overdue by more than 90 days) and non-overdue impaired
loans were 11.5% and 3.5% of the portfolio, respectively, 90%
covered by total IFRS reserves.
UB's liquidity position remains stable, with highly liquid assets
(cash and unencumbered government bonds), net of short-term
interbank borrowings, covering customer deposits by 10% at end-
February 2015. Bank placements and non-government bonds represent
additional potential sources of liquidity. The liquidity position
also benefits from limited near-term debt maturities, highly
granular deposits, a large quickly amortizing retail loan book
and a relatively broad retail franchise.
UB's IDRs have been downgraded to the level of the bank's Support
Rating Floor (SRF). The SRF and Stable Outlook on the Long-term
IDRs reflect Fitch's view that in case of the bank's failure,
state support would likely be sufficient to avert losses for
senior creditors. This view takes into account UB's broad deposit
franchise and network, its limited foreign liabilities and the
recent track record of state-supervised rescues of Russian banks
smaller than UB. At the same time, significant uncertainty
regarding state support for a relatively small (accounting for
0.5% of sector assets at end-2014) privately-owned bank means
that Fitch maintains a multi-notch differential between the
sovereign's 'BBB-' Long-term IDR and UB's SRF.
UB's IDRs and Support Rating (SR) of '4' could be downgraded and
the SRF lowered should state support not be forthcoming in case
of further deterioration in the bank's credit profile. The bank's
Long-term IDR and SR could be upgraded should UB be acquired by a
financially stronger institution.
UB's VR could be further downgraded if reported capital ratios
and/or the quality of capital erode further due to either
deterioration of performance, downward adjustments to asset
valuations, increased reserve requirements for some of the bank's
risky/related party exposures, a change of treatment by the CBR
of the bank's non-core exposures resulting in increased
deductions from regulatory capital, or any new material capital
withdrawals by the shareholder. A major liquidity squeeze could
also lead to a downgrade. The VR could stabilize at its current
level if the bank strengthens capitalization and core
profitability, thereby reducing vulnerability to future capital
deductions or losses on non-core assets.
KEY RATING DRIVERS AND RATING SENSITIVITIES - ULG's RATINGS
The downgrade of ULG's Long-term IDRs reflects UB's reduced
ability to support its subsidiary, as reflected by the downgrade
of the bank's VR. The Negative Outlook on ULG's Long-term IDRs
reflects Fitch's view that UB's VR remains under downward
pressure, and ULG could be downgraded further in case of a
lowering of UB's VR. In Fitch's view, any potential state support
to UB would not necessarily flow through to support creditors of
the leasing subsidiary, and hence ULG's ratings do not benefit
from UB's SRF.
The alignment of ULG's ratings with UB's VR reflects Fitch's view
of the parent's still high propensity to support its subsidiary,
given the track record of support to date, high managerial
integration and tight parent supervision, and significant
reputational risks for UB in case of a default by ULG.
The rating actions are as follows:
UB
Long-Term IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'B+'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating downgraded to 'b' from 'b+'
Support Rating affirmed at '4'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B'
ULG
Long-Term foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'B+';
Outlook Negative
Long-Term local currency IDR downgraded to 'B' from 'B+';
Outlook Negative
Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating affirmed at '4'
=========
S P A I N
=========
IM GBP EMPRESAS VI: DBRS Finalizes (P)CCC Rating to Ser. B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has finalized its provisional ratings to the
following notes issued by IM GBP Empresas VI, FTA (the Issuer):
-- EUR2,340 million Series A Notes at A (sf) (the Series A
Notes)
-- EUR660 million Series B Notes at CCC (low) (sf) (the Series B
Notes; together, the Notes)
The transaction is a cash flow securitization collateralized by a
portfolio of bank term loans originated by Banco Popular Espanol,
S.A. (Banco Popular) and Banco Pastor, S.A.U. (Banco Pastor;
together, the Originators) to small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) and self-employed individuals based in Spain. As of 25
March 2015, the transaction's securitized portfolio included
43,638 loans to 34,104 obligors groups, totaling EUR3,000
million.
The rating on the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal payable on or
before the Legal Maturity Date in January 2046. The rating on
the Series B Notes addresses the ultimate payment of interest and
principal payable on or before the Legal Maturity Date in 2046.
The securitized pool exhibits low industry and obligor
concentration. The top three industries based on the DBRS
industry classification are Building & Development (15.1% of the
portfolio balance), Business Equipment & Services (10.4%) and
Surface Transport (6.8%). The top obligor and the largest ten
obligor groups represent 0.4% and 2.6% of the outstanding
balance, respectively. The portfolio also exhibits low regional
concentration; the top three regions for borrower concentrations
are Catalonia, Madrid and Andalusia, representing approximately
18.9%, 16.6% and 14.8% of the portfolio balance, respectively.
These ratings are based on DBRS's review of the following items:
-- The portfolio characteristics, the transaction structure as
well as the form and sufficiency of available credit
enhancement.
-- At closing, the Series A Notes benefit from a total credit
enhancement of 25.0%, which DBRS considers to be sufficient
to support the A (sf) rating. The Series B Notes benefit
from a credit enhancement of 3.0%, which DBRS considers to be
sufficient to support the CCC (low) (sf) rating. Credit
enhancement is provided by subordination and the Reserve Fund
(RF). In addition, the Notes also benefit from available
excess spread.
-- The RF is non-amortizing along the life of the transaction.
The RF has a balance of EUR90 million, 3% of the aggregate
balance of the Notes and is available to cover shortfalls in
the senior expenses and interest on the Series A Notes and
once the Series A Notes are fully paid, interest on the
Series B Notes throughout the life of the Notes. The RF will
only be available as credit support for the Notes at the
Legal Final Maturity.
-- DBRS considers that there are inadequate mitigants to the
commingling risk. To address this risk, DBRS's analysis
includes a stress equivalent to the interruption of interest
and principal proceeds for a period of six months by assuming
senior expenses and interest on the Series A Notes would be
paid from the Cash Reserve for this period.
-- The transaction parties' financial strength and capabilities
to perform their respective duties and the quality of
origination, underwriting and servicing practices.
-- An assessment of the operational capabilities of key
transaction participants.
-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the
approved terms. Interest and principal payments on the
Series A Notes will be made quarterly on the 22nd day of
January, April, July and October, with the first payment date
on July 22, 2015.
-- The soundness of the legal structure and the presence of
legal opinions that address the true sale of the assets to
the trust and the non-consolidation of the special-purpose
vehicle as well as consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria
for European Structured Finance Transactions."
DBRS determined these ratings as follows, as per the principal
methodology specified below:
-- The annualized probability of default (PD) for the
Originators was determined using the historical performance
information supplied. DBRS assumed an annualized PD of 2.56%
for this transaction.
-- The assumed weighted-average life (WAL) of the portfolio was
2.65 years.
-- The PD and WAL were used in the DBRS Diversity Model to
generate the hurdle rate for the target ratings.
-- DBRS applied the following recovery rates: 16.3% for the
Series A Notes and 20.8% for Series B Notes as the portfolio
is composed exclusively of senior unsecured loans.
-- The break-even rates for the interest rate stresses and
default timings were determined using the DBRS cash flow
model.
DBRS published a Request for Comments for the Rating CLOs and
CDOs of Large Corporate Credit methodology on February 4th. The
proposed methodology includes revised recovery rates at BB and
below stress levels. More specifically, the senior unsecured
recovery rates for the Series B notes is expected to increase
from 20.8% to 21.5%. If the methodology is published in its
current proposed form, DBRS does not expect there to be any
impact on its ratings for the Series A and Series B Notes.
===========
T U R K E Y
===========
BURGAN BANK: Moody's Reviews Ba2 LT Deposit Rating for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed the Ba2 long-term deposit rating
and ba2 adjusted baseline credit assessment (BCA) of Burgan Bank
AS on review for downgrade.
Burgan Bank AS's Not-Prime short-term deposit ratings are not
affected by this action.
The review for downgrade results from the review for downgrade on
the ba1 BCA of Burgan's Kuwait based parent, Burgan Bank SAK
(deposits A3 RuRD /P-2; /BCA ba1 RuRD).
Burgan AS's Ba2 long-term deposit rating incorporates three
notches of uplift from the standalone BCA of b2 due to Moody's
assumption of a very high probability of support from its parent
and majority shareholder (99%) Burgan SAK.
Therefore, the review on the parent's ratings drives the review
on the supported ratings of its Turkish subsidiary. The review
will focus on the degree and likelihood of parental support
assumptions and notching uplift incorporated in the deposit
ratings of Burgan Bank AS. The review will conclude after the
conclusion of the review on parental ratings.
As noted by the review for downgrade, upside potential for Burgan
Bank AS's deposit ratings is currently limited.
A downgrade of Burgan bank AS's supported ratings could be
triggered by a downwards rating action in the baseline standalone
credit assessment (BCA) of Burgan SAK.
The standalone BCA of Burgan Bank AS has not been affected and
any upward future pressure will be driven by material evidence of
sustainable improvement in the bank's overall franchise, core
profitability and self-sufficiency in funding and capital
generation.
Conversely, a negative pressure could develop on the BCA in case
of further deterioration in profitability or asset quality,
leading to further losses and diminished capitalization of the
bank.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.
DOGUS HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCR on Sustained Investments
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB/B' long- and
short-term corporate credit ratings and its 'trAA-/trA-1' long-
and short-term Turkey national scale ratings on Turkey-based
diversified holding company Dogus Holding A.S. The outlook on
the long-term credit rating remains negative. At the same time,
S&P withdrew the national scale ratings at the group's request.
The affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that Dogus Holding's
upcoming sale of its 14.89% stake in Turkish bank Turkiye Garanti
Bankasi A.S. (Garanti; BB+/Negative/--) will temporarily enhance
materially the holding company's financial position, despite the
its pursuit of debt-funded investments.
Over the past few quarters, Dogus Holding has continued pursuing
debt-funded investments in its portfolio of assets, including new
activities. Dogus Holding net financial debt increased to $1.2
billion in 2014 from $0.6 billion at year-end 2013. This is
primarily due to the group's equity injections in new tourism
ventures and in the ongoing construction of the company's
hydroelectrical power plant, which the group expects to complete
in 2016.
In addition, over the next few months, Dogus Holding expects to
complete the sale of its 14.89% stake in Garanti. The group
expects proceeds to near US$2.1 billion, which would
significantly enhance its financial position in 2015. This
offers the group an opportunity to deleverage at parent level and
at some operating subsidiaries, thus improving the average
quality of its portfolio assets, which will have weakened as
result of the sale of its Garanti stake. The consolidated
group's total debt swelled to US$4.6 billion at year-end 2014
from $3 billion at year-end 2013 and US$2.1 billion at year-end
2012.
Given the still unattractive economic prospects for Turkey, to
which Dogus Holding's portfolio companies are largely exposed,
the group's asset valuations could remain volatile and the
turnaround of those more fragile businesses would be subdued.
The continued modest performance or cash burn of a number of
segments would strain Dogus Holding's financial metrics if loans
or equity infusions became necessary.
Moreover, S&P's ratings on Dogus reflect S&P's view of its "weak"
business risk and "intermediate" financial risk profiles.
Dogus Holding's business risk profile reflects the group's high
exposure to Turkey, modest profitability, and moderate dividend
stream of industrial operations, execution risks related to large
infrastructure projects in the energy and construction
businesses, low percentage of liquid assets (about 42% at year-
end 2014 pro-forma the sale of Garanti stake), and weakened
average credit quality of assets following the sale of 14% stake
on Garanti. However, S&P expects ongoing investment activity,
particularly in tourism, to progressively increase the
diversification of income away from the financial services and
automotive sector, on which Dogus Holding has historically
focused. In addition, Dogus Holding influences its subsidiaries'
strategic decisions due to its controlling stakes.
S&P's "intermediate" assessment of Dogus Holding's financial risk
profile reflects rising consolidated debt and the group's
exposure to foreign exchange swings. This is because a large
portion of its financing is denominated in U.S. dollars.
However, this is mitigated by the fact that cash is also
denominated in hard currency and that part of the group's
operating activities offers a natural hedge, particularly the
automotive business. S&P's loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on Dogus
Holding stood at 28% at year-end 2014, and S&P estimates that pro
forma the disposal of the Garanti stake, the ratio will
temporarily lower to about 6%.
S&P assess Dogus Holding's management and governance as "fair"
under S&P's criteria.
The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that Dogus Holding may
continue pursuing additional investments, instead of reducing the
group financial debt. As such, S&P will monitor how the group
will use the proceeds from the sale of the Garanti stake.
Conversely, S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Dogus
Holding uses the cash proceeds from the sale of Garanti stake to
reduce the group financial debt, while committing to preserve the
LTV ratio below 30%. An outlook revision to stable would also
hinge on stronger-than-expected improvements of the Turkish
economy's performance in 2015, leading to a positive impact on
the operating performance of Dogus Holding's main subsidiaries.
=============
U K R A I N E
=============
CREATIV GROUP: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws 'CCC-' CCR
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'CCC-' long-term corporate credit rating on Ukraine-based
agribusiness Creativ Group OJSC (Creativ). S&P subsequently
withdrew the rating at the request of the company. The outlook
was negative at the time of withdrawal.
At the time of the withdrawal, the rating on Creativ reflected
S&P's long-term 'CCC-' foreign currency sovereign rating on
Ukraine.
At the time of withdrawal, the negative outlook mirrored that on
the sovereign and reflected the severe constraints currently
faced by Ukrainian companies in accessing external liquidity
sources.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
CALECORE: Enters Administration; 50 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------
Richard Crump at Accountancy Age reports that administrators from
Price Bailey have been called in to Calecore after the specialist
in offshore site investigations entered administration to protect
its assets.
Matt Howard -- matt.howard@pricebailey.co.uk -- and Paul Pitman
-- paul.pittman@pricebailey.co.uk -- were appointed joint
administrators on March 23 after the offshore firm, which has
operations in Russia, Norway and Singapore encountered
difficulties as a result of US and EU sanctions against Russia,
Accountancy Age relates.
According to Accountancy Age, Price Bailey said that 50 staff
employed by the company will be made redundant but that 17 core
admin staff, together with a number employees with experience in
relation to the operational side of the business will be
retained.
The administrators have begun to contact Calecore's creditors
regarding any claims and hope to sell at least part of the
business on an ongoing concern basis, Accountancy Age discloses.
Calecore is a firm specializing in offshore site investigations.
CELESTE MORTGAGE 2015-1: DBRS Finalizes (P)B Rating on F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has finalized its provisional ratings of the
following notes issued by Celeste Mortgage Funding 2015-1 PLC
(the Issuer):
-- Class A to GBP 161,905,000 at AAA (sf)
-- Class B to GBP 29,275,000 at AA (sf)
-- Class C to GBP 23,929,000 at A (sf)
-- Class D to GBP 10,692,000 at BBB (sf)
-- Class E to GBP 9,164,000 at BB (sf)
-- Class F to GBP 3,819,000 at B (sf)
The Issuer is a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle
incorporated in the U.K. The mortgage portfolio consists of U.K.
Buy-to-Let (BTL) and a small proportion of non-conforming
residential mortgage loans originated by Basinghall Finance
Limited (BFL; 96.80%) and GMAC-RFC Limited (3.20%). The legal
title holder of the mortgage portfolio is BFL. Using the
proceeds of the Class A to Class H notes, the Issuer will
purchase the beneficial title to the mortgage loans from
Basinghall Mortgage Finance No.1 Limited (the Seller), a wholly
owned subsidiary of BFL.
BFL is responsible for servicing the mortgage portfolio; however,
day-to-day servicing responsibilities have been delegated to
Homeloan Management Limited (HML) in accordance with the
transaction documents. Special servicing responsibilities will
remain with BFL. HML will also undertake the role of back-up
servicer. DBRS conducted a review of servicing operations of BFL
and HML.
BFL was established by WestLB AG in 2005 with the aim of
acquiring and originating mortgage loans in England and Wales.
In 2008, WestLB AG applied for German state aid, at which point
BFL was instructed to cease all new originations. In late 2010,
Erste Abwicklungsanstalt, a winding up agency under German law,
took full ownership of BFL from WestLB. BFL was acquired by the
Bluestone Group on 12 December 2014, following the U.K.'s
Financial Conduct Authority approval of the change in control.
As of December 31, 2014, 98.95% of the mortgage portfolio has an
interest only repayment profile. This is largely a consequence
of the BTL loans in the portfolio (94.7%). The weighted-average
seasoning of the portfolio is 86.5 months, with 98.7% of the
mortgage loans originated in 2006, 2007 and 2008, the peak of the
U.K. mortgage and housing market. The weighted-average current
loan-to-value of the portfolio is 83.1%. Based on Nationwide
House Price Index (Q4 2014), DBRS calculates 0.07% of the
portfolio is in negative equity. Self-employed borrowers
comprise 59.14% of the portfolio with a small proportion of the
mortgage balance (2.75%) origintaed on a self-certified basis.
Loans that have been restructured in the past comprise 3.86% of
the portfolio. All such loans in the portfolio are classified as
performing indicating one-time adverse events took place that
affected borrowers' ability to maintain regular mortgage
payments. The 90-plus days arrears level is 0.38%, with 1.17% of
the portfolio granted to borrowers with adverse credit history at
the time of originations.
The weighted-average coupon generated by the mortgage loans is
2.67%. All the loans have come off their teaser periods and the
majority of the loans (67.05%) pay an interest rate linked to the
Bank of England Base Rate (BBR), 28.56% pay interest linked to
three-month GBP LIBOR and 4.38% pay interest linked to the
lender's Standard Variable Rate (SVR). The weighted-average
margin, over three-month GBP LIBOR, is equal to 2.15%. The
interest payable on the notes is linked to three-month GBP LIBOR.
For the purposes of its cash flow analysis, DBRS stressed the BBR
and SVR rates generated by the assets.
Credit enhancement is provided in the form of subordination of
the junior notes and the Credit Reserve equal to 0.8% of the
rated note balance. The subordinated notes will be used to
establish the reserve fund at closing, which equates to 1.5% of
the rated note balance. Excess spread, where available, can be
utilised to increase the reserve fund to 2.25% of the initial
balance of the rated notes. The Reserve Fund is split into two
components; the Credit Reserve and the Liquidity Reserve. The
Liquidity Reserve portion will be formed by 0.7% of the current
outstanding rated note balance and is available to cover
shortfalls in payment of senior fees and interest on the rated
notes, subject to Principal Deficiency Ledger and Defaulting Loan
triggers.
The DBRS rating of the notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and full payment of principal by the legal final
maturity date in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
notes. DBRS based the ratings primarily on:
-- The transaction's capital structure and the form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement. Relevant credit
enhancement for each rated class of notes is provided in the form
of subordination of the respective junior notes and the Credit
Reserve (0.8% of the rated note balance). The Class A Notes are
supported by 37.15% of credit enhancement (as a percentage of
collateral balance), the Class B Notes are supported by 25.65% of
credit enhancement, the Class C Notes are supported by 16.25% of
credit enhancement, the Class D Notes are supported by 12.05% of
credit enhancement, the Class E Notes are supported by 8.45% of
credit enhancement and the Class F notes are supported by 6.95%
of credit enhancement.
-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms of
the transaction documents. All classes of rated notes pass DBRS
stresses for timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of
principal.
-- BFL's capabilities with respect to originations,
underwriting, servicing and financial strength.
-- The credit quality of the collateral and ability of the BFL
and HML to perform collection activities on the collateral.
-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
the assignment of the assets to the issuer and the consistency
with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.
CITY LINK: John Moulton Balks at MPs' Deception Claims
------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Trotman at The Telegraph reports that Jon Moulton has hit
back at MPs who accused his company of "deliberate deception"
over the collapse of City Link.
The chairman of Better Capital, which bought City Link for GBP1
in 2013, claimed that the Business Innovation and Skills and
Scottish Affairs committees failed to let him respond to "hurtful
and unjust labeling" in its report into City Link's failure on
Christmas Eve, The Telegraph relates.
MPs last week said that putting City Link into administration on
December 24 rather than December 22, when the company's financial
troubles became clear, was done for the "financial benefit" of
the group and Better Capital, The Telegraph relays. MPs said
about 1,700 staff and 1,000 subcontracted drivers who lost their
jobs had been kept in the dark "as to the true intentions of the
company", The Telegraph notes.
However, Mr. Moulton slammed the report on March 30, saying that
the committees had acted "outside the normal rules of natural
justice" by not informing him of the accusations that they would
make and giving him an opportunity to respond, The Telegraph
relates.
"The right to a fair hearing generally requires that persons
should not be penalized by decisions affecting their rights,
reputation or legitimate expectations unless they have been given
prior notice of the case, a fair opportunity to answer it, and
the opportunity to present their own case," The Telegraph quotes
Mr. Moulton as saying in a letter to the committees.
"You did not do this. You have published verdicts on matters we
did not know you were accusing Better Capital of."
Mr. Moulton questioned the MPs' assertion that delaying the
announcement of putting City Link in administration benefitted
the delivery firm, saying that the move actually could have
harmed Better Capital, The Telegraph discloses.
Mr. Moulton states that far from being guilty of "deliberate
deceit by omission" by failing to tell staff of the collapse
earlier, it was not Better Capital's job to do so. As a
"shareholder and secured creditor of City Link . . . there is no
legal requirement for such to make announcements", and such a
burden would fall on the directors of City Link, The Telegraph
relates.
Mr. Moulton also lists the pros and cons of ceasing trading on
Dec. 22 versus Dec. 24, The Telegraph relays. According to The
Telegraph, he claimed that by closing the business two days
earlier, most employees would not get paid after that date and
hundreds of thousands of parcels waiting for delivery in time for
Christmas "do not get delivered, many stolen". This would mean
people whose Christmas presents are not delivered would suddenly
become creditors to City Link to the tune of at least GBP10
million, The Telegraph notes.
Mr. Moulton, as cited by The Telegraph, said in the letter
waiting until Dec. 24 gave Better Capital the "opportunity" to
try to rescue City Link, employees would get paid to Dec. 31, and
creditor claims were "much reduced" as the "vast majority" of
parcels were delivered.
City Link was a Coventry-based parcels delivery company.
POPOLO UK: Set to Enter Liquidation
-----------------------------------
Tom Keighley at The Journal reports that Popolo UK Limited, which
operates the newly opened Popolo City Bar on Newcastle Quayside,
is expected to enter liquidation on April 2. It has only been
less than a year after it reopened.
Following the demise of Popolo Leisure in 2014, and the
subsequent closure of its renowned Popolo cocktail bar on
Newcastle city centre's Pilgrim Street, certain assets were sold
to Popolo UK Limited, according to The Journal.
The company shared the same directors: Wayne Delaney and Paul
Richardson, who retired from the firm in July 2014, the report
notes.
Manchester-based insolvency firm Harrisons expects to place the
company into liquidation on April 2, as the future of the newly
opened Popolo City Bar on Newcastle Quayside remains unclear, the
report relates.
A spokesperson from Harrisons confirmed a meeting of creditors
had occurred in relation to Popolo UK Limited, which operates
Popolo City Bar on Sandhill Quayside and another venue in
Sheffield, the report adds.
SILVERSTONE HOSPITALITY: Manolete Partners Buys All Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Manolete Partners Plc, the UK's leading insolvency litigation
investment company, said March 24 that it had purchased all
claims from Silverstone Hospitality Limited against Silverstone
Circuits Limited and its related companies.
Silverstone Hospitality Limited was forced into Administration on
December 23, 2014, following the sudden termination of its six-
year contract by Silverstone Circuits Limited. Manolete has now
purchased all claims against Silverstone Circuits following the
breakdown of settlement discussions instigated by the
Administrator of Silverstone Hospitality Limited. Manolete now
intends to launch formal legal proceedings through the High Court
within the next three weeks. The large majority of the proceeds
from the claims will be returned to the creditors and
shareholders of Silverstone Hospitality.
Manolete Partners is the largest specialist insolvency litigation
firm in the UK, led by former HSBC Investment Banker, Steven
Cooklin. It currently has over 100 insolvency litigation claims
ongoing in the UK. In the recent past, Manolete has pursued
successful claims against Network Rail, Hastings Borough Council,
large insurance companies and global hotel groups. Manolete has
never lost a single case in its five-year history.
Manolete is financed by the prominent private investor Jon
Moulton and New York based Burford Capital Plc (the largest
litigation funding company in the world with litigation
investment funds of over $500m) is also a shareholder in
Manolete.
Steven Cooklin, CEO of Manolete, commented: "There is a very
strong claim for repudiatory breach of contract against
Silverstone Circuits. The Administrators have given Silverstone
Circuits an opportunity to settle the matter but those efforts
have come to nothing. Silverstone Hospitality has been forced
into an unwarranted insolvency and the company now simply does
not have any funds available to pursue its wholly meritorious
claim. Manolete Partners exists to give such companies access to
the British justice system. We are left with no choice but to
issue the claim through the Courts."
Steven Saunders, former CEO and Proprietor of Silverstone
Hospitality, said: "I am delighted and relieved to be supported
by Manolete Partners. We had successfully looked after
Silverstone and Formula 1 clients for over eight years."
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 16,
2015, Insider Media Limited said a business which provided
hospitality for major events at Silverstone, including the
British Grand Prix, has gone into administration.
Jo Milner and Stephen Cork partners at insolvency firm Cork
Gully, were appointed to Silverstone Hospitality Ltd, formerly
known as Aspire Hospitality Ltd, by its directors on December 23,
2014, according to Insider.
TOWERGATE FINANCE: Wins Chapter 15 Protection in U.S.
-----------------------------------------------------
Sherri Toub at Bloomberg News reports that Towergate Finance Plc
won Chapter 15 protection in the U.S.
According to Bloomberg, a Manhattan bankruptcy judge on March 27
concluded that England is home to the "foreign main proceeding."
Schemes of arrangement under the U.K. Companies Act of 2006 were
"overwhelmingly" approved by requisite senior secured and senior
unsecured noteholders, Bloomberg says, citing court papers filed
March 25 in Manhattan.
The U.S. court's recognition order gives full effect to the
schemes, in the form approved by the Chancery Division of the
High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Bloomberg states. It
prevents noteholders from taking action against Towergate in the
U.S. to collect debt affected by the U.K. proceedings, Bloomberg
notes.
The company missed an interest payment on secured notes in
February, prompting a debt restructuring in the U.K., Bloomberg
recounts.
Headquartered in Kent and operating with more than 90 offices in
the U.K., Towergate said total debt was GBP1.05 billion (US$1.55
billion) as of Jan. 30, Bloomberg relays.
Liabilities include GBP630 million on two issues of senior
secured notes and GBP304.6 million in senior unsecured notes,
Bloomberg discloses. The indentures are governed by New York
law, Bloomberg states.
The case is In re Towergate Finance Plc, 15-bk-10509, U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).
Towergate Finance plc is an independently owned insurance
intermediary in the U.K. It distributes insurance policies in
the U.K. through brokers and has no operations in the U.S.
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.
Copyright 2015. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.
* * * End of Transmission * * *