TCREUR_Public/150402.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Thursday, April 2, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 65



SOUTH CAUCASUS: Faces Bankruptcy Risk Over Losses, Debts


VISION EZOS: Put Into Liquidation; Earnings Not Impacted


MORYGLOBAL: Put Into Bankruptcy by Bobiny Court


ASA NEWCO: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR on Refinancing; Outlook Stable


GREECE: Faces Ugly Scenario if Bailout Talks Fail
GREECE: Presents More Detailed Plan; Bailout Talks Make Progress
GREECE: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'CCC'


NITROGENMUVEK ZRT: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+'; Outlook Stable


SETANTA INSURANCE: Oireachtas to Receive Liquidation Update
TRANSAERO ENGINEERING: Aims to Exit Examinership This Month


F-E GOLD: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB-sf'
MILANO SERRAVALLE: Fitch Keeps 'BB+' Debt Rating on Watch Neg.
VENETO BANCA: S&P Cuts Counterparty Rating to 'B+'; Outlook Neg.


DRYDEN 35 EURO: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F Notes


PORTUGAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR; Outlook Positive


KALUGA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Rating
LIPETSK REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR; Outlook Stable
TULA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR; Outlook Stable
VORONEZH REGION: Fitch Withdraws 'BB+' Issuer Default Rating


IM CAJAMAR 5: Fitch Raises Rating on Class B Notes to 'Bsf'


UKRAINE: Bondholders Form Committee for Restructuring Talks



SOUTH CAUCASUS: Faces Bankruptcy Risk Over Losses, Debts
--------------------------------------------------------, citing Zhamanak, reports that the South Caucasus
Railway may find itself on the brink of bankruptcy in the near
future, just like another Russian company, the Electric Networks
of Armenia.

"For a long time, the company is working with a loss and has huge
debts.  Therefore, it has decided to cut its jobs and reduce
working hours.  In addition, the company management forces
employees to take unpaid leave in order to save some money," quotes the newspaper as saying.

The South Caucasus Railway is a Russian company operating
Armenia's railroads.


VISION EZOS: Put Into Liquidation; Earnings Not Impacted
Andrew Clapham at Bloomberg News reports that Vision IT said its
Vision Ezos unit has been put into liquidation.

According to Bloomberg, Vision IT said the liquidation will have
no impact on earnings.

Staff and activities of Vison Ezos have already been transferred
to other Belgian unit, Vision Consulting Group SA, Bloomberg

Vision Ezos is based in Belgium.


MORYGLOBAL: Put Into Bankruptcy by Bobiny Court
Vidya Root at Bloomberg News, citing Les Echos, reports that the
commercial court in Bobiny, France, put MoryGlobal into
bankruptcy on March 31.

According to Bloomberg, Echos said the court has authorized the
company to continue its activities for one more month.

Echos said the company's 2,150 employees are set to receive pink
slips at the end of the month, Bloomberg relates.

Echos, as cited by Bloomberg, said unions are looking for ways to
save the jobs.

MoryGlobal is a French logistics company.


ASA NEWCO: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR on Refinancing; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Germany-based online classifieds
provider Asa NewCo GmbH (Scout24).  The outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P affirmed its issue rating on the company's
existing senior secured debt at 'B'.  The recovery rating on this
debt is unchanged at '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average
recovery in the event of a payment default, in the higher half of
the 30%-50% range.

S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' issue rating on Scout24's EUR50 million
second-lien loan.  The recovery rating on this debt is unchanged
at '6'.  S&P intends to withdraw these ratings upon this loan's

S&P also assigned its 'B' issue-level rating to the new first-
lien term loan C.  The recovery rating on the loan is '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average recovery in the event of
a payment default, in the higher half of the 30%-50% range.

The affirmation of the long-term rating reflects S&P's view that
Scout24's financial risk profile has not materially weakened,
despite what S&P views as an aggressive refinancing transaction.
It also reflects S&P's view that the group will likely continue
its solid operating performance.

S&P's rating also incorporates its view that Scout24 will
maintain solid operating performance. In 2014, the company
remained a leading classified platform in the real estate
business and posted strong performance in terms of sales revenue
and EBITDA margin. The company's top-line growth totaled more
than 10% and its EBITDA margin approached 43% (both as
preliminarily reported).

S&P further incorporates in its rating Scout24's well-known
brands and its markedly dominant market position in online real
estate classifieds through ImmobilienScout24.  The stable outlook
reflects S&P's view that Scout24 will maintain a FFO cash
interest coverage ratio above 2x and continue to generate
positive free cash flow.  S&P anticipates that debt to EBITDA
(including preference shares) will not materially increase,
despite cumulative preference shares, since S&P factors in some
revenue and EBITDA growth in our base-case scenario.

S&P could downgrade Scout24 if the group's financial policy
became more aggressive, or if S&P saw additional repayment of the
preference shares with cash-paid debt.  S&P could lower the
rating if leverage increased or FFO cash interest coverage
slipped to below 2x for a sustained period of time.  Any
deterioration in the group's performance and liquidity, leading
to negative cash generation or reduced covenant headroom, could
also lead to a downgrade.

S&P views an upgrade as unlikely, given that it projects debt
leverage to remain high, despite factoring some EBITDA growth in
S&P's base-case scenario.  However, S&P could raise the rating on
Scout24 if S&P believes that adjusted debt to EBITDA, including
preference shares, would decline to nearly 5x on a sustained


GREECE: Faces Ugly Scenario if Bailout Talks Fail
Business Insider's Mike Bird reports that Greece's bailout talks
aren't going very well.

Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras addressed Greece's parliament late
on March 30, but he gave little new indication on a deal,
Business Insider says.

So what happens if Greece doesn't get the cash?

Here's what Bank of America Merrill Lynch's researchers call "the
ugly scenario":

According to Business Insider, the researchers said, "In this
scenario, Greece fails to demonstrate a credible commitment to
reforms in the next few weeks.  In this case, the Europeans and
the IMF suspend the current program, the ECB refuses to continue
increasing the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (or just lets the
Greek banks run out of eligible collateral), the loss of bank
deposits accelerates triggering a full bank run, and Greece
defaults to the IMF and the ECB.  Unless any of these shocks
force the Greek government to go back and seek a deal with the
rest of Europe, Grexit within this year becomes inevitable, in
our view.  In this scenario, either Europe would offer it as an
option, allowing Greece to remain in the EU, or it would become
Greece's only option to avoid a complete collapse of the economy
and even a failed state."

A payment to the International Monetary Fund is due April 9, and
that's when some sources suggest the country will run out of
cash, Business Insider notes.  But even if Greece can last a week
or two longer, the payments it has to make in the rest of the
year look insurmountable, Business Insider states.

There is absolutely no chance Greece will make those payments
without help, according to Business Insider.  But even that
bailout funding will last only a few months -- the question of
what Greece does then is completely open, Business Insider says.

So what happens if the government defaults, or lingers right on
the edge of default?

According to Business Insider, "there's a halfway house to a full
exit from the euro -- the government could introduce capital
controls.  As it happens, Greek Orthodox Easter falls a week
later than Easter in the West, meaning there is a four-day bank
holiday weekend immediately after the payment is due (from
April 10 to 13), Business Insider discloses.  That sort of
extended period in which banks are closed anyway would be an
opportune time to impose controls, if necessary, Business Insider

Citi's Willem Buiter says Greece would have to look at an
"alternative monetary arrangement" to the euro if a default
caused the government to bring in capital controls, Business
Insider relates.  Basically, if the government defaults, Greece's
national central bank (NCB), which owns a large proportion of
Greek debt, would be left to fail because of the eurozone's
strict rules about not sharing risks, Business Insider notes.

GREECE: Presents More Detailed Plan; Bailout Talks Make Progress

Nektaria Stamouli and Matthew Dalton at The Wall Street Journal
report that Greece made little headway in negotiations on April 1
toward ending its standoff with its international creditors,
leaving the government facing the prospect of at least another
month without new financing and starved for cash.

According to The Journal, Athens handed over a more detailed plan
for revising its bailout program to the eurozone and the
International Monetary Fund, its latest bid to unlock bailout
lending while rewriting the program as promised by the country's
anti-austerity government.  The 26-page plan proposes a suite of
measures to raise new revenue, such as new value-added taxes and
fighting tax evasion, the Journal discloses.

The plan also proposes new spending on pensions and other
government programs, the Journal notes.

The list is a "very long way from being a basis [for a deal],"
The Journal quotes a eurozone official as saying.  "They should
negotiate in competence and good faith with the institutions
first, and then we will see."

The talks come as Greek officials said the government might repay
the IMF late, rather than deprive the domestic economy of cash,
The Journal relays.  "If there is no disbursement [of bailout
aid], not even a small one, we might delay the IMF repayment," a
senior government official, as cited by The Journal, said.

This week's talks seek to find a common ground on Greece's
economic policies, The Journal relates.  But the list of
proposals defy the creditors' demands for more pension cuts and
fewer labor protections, according to The Journal.  Officials
also said the government's economic-growth projection for this
year of 1.4% is too optimistic, The Journal states.

"There's no meat in it really," The Journal quotes another
eurozone official as saying.  "It still remains nowhere near as
detailed as it needs to be."

The list proposes to raise up to EUR875 million (US$942 million)
this year through fighting tax evasion and EUR300 to EUR400
million by "streamlining" the income tax code, The Journal
discloses.  "Combatting illegal trade on oil, tobacco and
alcohol" yields up to EUR400 million, while auctioning off
television licenses brings in around EUR380 million," The Journal
says, citing the document.


According to The Economist, lavish spending on Greek pensions has
been a source of acrimony with northern creditor nations ever
since Greece was first rescued, almost five years ago.  Greek
spending on them is the highest in Europe as a share of GDP, an
astonishing 17.5% in 2012, The Economist notes.  In fact, a
series of reforms in Greece have restricted pension spending, The
Economist discloses. A big overhaul in 2010 slashed prospective
promises that would have caused pension expenditure to vault to
25% of GDP by 2050, The Economist recounts.  Although the revised
reform list includes a pledge to reduce early retirement,
Greece's creditors will want to see hard evidence that this will
be tough enough, The Economist says.


In a separate report, Bloomberg News' Rebecca Christie, Christos
Ziotis and Corina Ruhe relay that Greece and euro-area
authorities pledged to press ahead with efforts to release aid
payments after progress in recent days.

Two euro-area officials agreed that talks were making progress,
recognizing the advances by Greece while insisting that more work
needs to be done to reach a conclusion of this part of rescue,
Bloomberg relates.

According to Bloomberg, one of the euro-area officials said
finance deputies stand ready to make recommendations to their
ministers as soon as there is a deal between the Greek government
and the institutions.  The deputies used the April 1 conference
call to take stock of the negotiations and they are set to meet
next week, Bloomberg discloses.

GREECE: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'CCC'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Greece's Long-term foreign- and
local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'CCC' from 'B'.
The issue ratings on Greece's senior unsecured foreign and local
currency bonds are also downgraded to 'CCC' from 'B'.  The Short-
term foreign currency IDR has been downgraded to 'C' from 'B.
The Country Ceiling has been revised to 'B-' from 'BB'.

Under EU credit rating agency (CRA) regulation, the publication
of sovereign reviews is subject to restrictions and must take
place according to a published schedule, except where it is
necessary for CRAs to deviate from this in order to comply with
their legal obligations.  Fitch interprets this provision as
allowing Fitch to publish a rating review in situations where
there is a material change in the creditworthiness of the issuer
that we believe makes it inappropriate for us to wait until the
next scheduled review date to update the rating or Outlook/Watch
status.  The next scheduled review date for Fitch's sovereign
rating on Greece is 15 May 2015, but Fitch believes that
developments in Greece warrant such a deviation from the calendar
and our rationale for this is laid out.


The downgrade reflects the following key rating drivers and their
relative weights:


Lack of market access, uncertain prospects of timely disbursement
from official institutions, and tight liquidity conditions in the
domestic banking sector have put extreme pressure on Greek
government funding.  Fitch expects that the government will
survive the current liquidity squeeze without running arrears on
debt obligations, but the heightened risks have led us to
downgrade the ratings.

The damage to investor, consumer, and depositor confidence has
almost certainly derailed Greece's incipient economic recovery.
The damage will take time to repair even if prospects for a
successful program completion improve over the coming days or
weeks.  Fitch has revised down our growth forecast significantly
to 0.5% this year from 1.5% in January 2015 and 2.5% in December
2014, with risks to growth on the downside.  Liquidity conditions
faced by firms will have worsened substantially, in Fitch's view,
due to increased government arrears to suppliers and bank funding

The agreement reached in February to extend the EFSF program to
end-June after several weeks of brinkmanship supports Fitch's
base case scenario that Greece and its creditors will ultimately
reach a compromise deal.  However, progress since then has been
slow.  It is unclear when the earliest disbursement could take
place and what will be required for this to happen.

In the coming days, Greece has been asked to submit a more
detailed list of reforms to the Eurogroup.  If this is accepted,
it would bring the government closer to a partial disbursement
before fully completing the program review.  However, in Fitch's
view, it is likely that the Eurogroup will want the Greek
government to demonstrate they have implemented some part of this
list before funds are disbursed.  This pushes back the probable
disbursement date well into April at the earliest.

Greece faces repayments to the IMF of EUR450 million in April,
EUR750 million in May and EUR1.5 billion in June.  Debt
repayments in July and August rise to EUR4.0 billion and EUR3.2
billion, respectively, primarily due to bonds held by the
Eurosystem falling due.  Fitch expects the government to continue
to run arrears to suppliers to offset weaker-than-budgeted cash
revenues and provide room for debt service.

Large-scale deposit outflows from Greek banks (Fitch estimates a
15% decline in the deposit base since end-November) have added to
pressures on the Greek economy.  Fitch's Banking System Indicator
for Greece is 'b', indicating weak standalone creditworthiness.
The 'b' Viability Ratings of the four main domestic banks are
currently on Rating Watch Negative due to heightened funding and
liquidity risks.  The banks are adequately capitalized but their
asset quality is weak and may deteriorate further this year.

While not our expectation, there is risk of capital controls
being introduced to curb deposit outflows from the domestic
banks.  This risk has led us to revise down our Country Ceiling
to 'B-'.

Greece's 'CCC' IDRs also reflect the following key rating

The state budget delivered a primary surplus (program definition)
of 0.3% of GDP in 2014, the second year of surplus. This is below
the program target of 1.5% due to the non-payment by the
Eurosystem of the rebate on SMP holdings of debt and weaker
revenues.  Even assuming an agreement with the official sector is
forthcoming, it will be challenging to maintain a primary surplus
this year as weaker domestic demand and tighter private sector
liquidity will erode tax revenues.

Greece's external debt burden is heavy but inexpensive to service
due to its largely concessionary nature.  Greece is running a
current account surplus of 1% of GDP, aided by reduced imports,
buoyant tourism receipts in 2014 and a significant step-up in net
EU transfers.  The economy has adjusted substantially over the
past five years through nominal price and wage declines, although
the export base remains narrow.

Although below the eurozone average, income per capita and
governance compares favorably with 'CCC' and 'B' range peers.
However, these structural strengths are not drivers of the
ratings at this point given the prevalence of near-term event


Developments that could, individually or collectively, result in
a further downgrade include:

   -- A break-down in negotiations between Greece and its
      creditors leading to alternative solutions being formally
      considered, for example a debt moratorium or restructuring
      of Greece's debt stock including bonds held by the private

   -- Arrears to the IMF would not in and of themselves
      constitute a rating default.  However, it would nonetheless
      be credit-negative and could lead to a further downgrade.

   -- An exit from the eurozone, making the risk of a default
      event on privately held Greek bonds probable

Future developments that could, individually or collectively,
result in an upgrade include:

   -- An agreement between Greece and its official creditors
      unlocking delayed program disbursements and a further
      agreement on the terms of a follow-up arrangement.  This
      would probably take the form, if not the title, of a third
      program of policy-conditional financial support

   -- An acceleration of Greece's economic recovery, further
      primary surpluses, and official sector debt relief (OSI)
      would put upward pressure on the ratings over the medium


The ratings and Outlook are sensitive to a number of key

Greek banks make no further material demands on the sovereign
balance sheet; 20% of GDP has been injected to date.  If Greek
banks incur losses that are not covered by private shareholders,
this would lead to a cash call on the government as guaranteed
tax credits are converted into equity.

General government gross debt/GDP peaked at 178% in 2014 and
remains constant in 2015, before gradually subsiding.  These
assumptions do not factor in any OSI on official loans that may
be agreed over the medium term.  The projections are sensitive to
assumptions about growth, the GDP deflator, Greece's primary
balance and the realisation of privatization revenues.

The EFSF would not exercise its right to declare the EUR29.7
billion PSI sweetener loan to be due and payable in the event
that Greece begins to run arrears on IMF repayments.  Such a
declaration would trigger a cross-default clause in the
privately-held new bonds issued in 2012, which Fitch rates.


NITROGENMUVEK ZRT: S&P Lowers CCR to 'B+'; Outlook Stable
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Hungarian fertilizer producer
Nitrogenmuvek Zrt. to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  The outlook is stable.

"The downgrade reflects our expectation that in 2015-2016,
Nitrogenmuvek will have significant negative free operating cash
flow, increasing leverage, and heightened foreign exchange risk.
The weaker metrics primarily stem from a potential increase in
gross debt to finance an ambitious capex program as well as some
anticipated weakening of EBITDA.  In particular, we forecast that
for 2015, the company's Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) will be about 12%-15% and debt to EBITDA will be
about 4x.  The increased currency risk is linked to the mismatch
between the company's debt (mostly denominated in U.S. dollars)
and its revenues (mostly denominated in euros and Hungarian
forint; HUF)," S&P said.

"It is our understanding that Nitrogenmuvek is aiming to increase
its plant capacity and enhance its efficiency, which will require
significant investment in the next few years.  We anticipate that
total capex could be up to HUF75 billion over 2015-2017 (it was
close to HUF14 billion in 2014), which includes about HUF30
billion in 2015.  We understand that HUF20 billion-HUF25 billion
across 2016 and 2017 are discretionary," S&P added.

The anticipated materially negative free operating cash flow and
potential increase in gross debt are the major negative factors
for the financial risk profile.  S&P's assessment of the
company's financial risk also reflects its forecast of FFO to
debt of 12%-15% in 2015 on the back of EBITDA of about HUF13
billion-HUF17 billion.  S&P also tooks into account the high
volatility of cash flows in the fertilizer sector due to very
significant price swings and potential movements in gas prices.

On the positive side, S&P factors in the company's high cash
balance (HUF64 billion as of Dec. 31, 2014), which exceeded its
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt of HUF61 billion. In calculating
Nitrogenmuvek's adjusted debt, S&P do not adjust for this cash
due to its assessment of its business risk profile as "weak," the
volatility of cash flow, and our expectation that the company
will use its cash partly used to finance capex.  However, S&P do
factor this cash balance into its "strong" liquidity assessment,
which lifts the anchor rating by one notch.

Nitrogenmuvek's performance in 2014 was good for the rating.
Specifically, Nitrogenmuvek achieved a Standard & Poor's-adjusted
EBITDA of close to HUF19 billion and FFO to debt of about 23%.
This was significantly better than HUF6.1 billion and 5.7%,
respectively, in 2013, when the company experienced material,
unforeseen operational shutdowns at its main plant and more
prolonged than expected maintenance works.  S&P assumes that
these operational issues will not recur over the next two to
three years, as the specific issue at the plant has been

S&P's revised base-case scenario anticipates that the company
will continue to operate its plant at near-full capacity for the
next couple of years.  S&P estimates that its EBITDA margin will
decline to about 15% in 2015-2016 (compared with 22% in 2014)
based on significant cost inflation and some fertilizer pricing
pressure.  S&P also assumes that there will be no significant
capacity additions in Nitrogenmuvek's main markets and that most
of its production will be absorbed by increasing demand from

Nitrogenmuvek's business risk profile continues to reflect the
company's relatively small scale, concentrated asset base (it is
reliant on one plant in Hungary), limited product and
geographical diversification, and exposure to the cyclical
fertilizer industry. Partly offsetting these constraints are
Nitrogenmuvek's strong domestic market position and good cost
position as a result of its efficient plant and low
transportation costs.

S&P classifies Nitrogenmuvek's liquidity as "strong" under S&P's
criteria.  S&P forecasts that Nitrogenmuvek's liquidity sources
will exceed its uses by more than 1.5x in the 12 months starting
Jan. 1, 2015.

S&P views favorably that Nitrogenmuvek holds its cash in Hungary
at established international and local banks with which S&P
believes the company has solid relationships.  Nitrogenmuvek has
been prudently managing financial risk, including the high amount
of cash on its balance sheet.  S&P anticipates that the company
will retain sizable cash balances over the next two years.  This
reflects the company's prudent financial policies in the light of
volatile profits in the fertilizer industry.

Principal Liquidity Sources

   -- About HUF64 billion in cash as of Dec. 31, 2014
   -- FFO of HUF8 billion-HUF10 billion
   -- Working capital inflows of less than HUF5 billion in 2015

Principal Liquidity Uses

   -- Debt maturities of about EUR6 million per year
   -- Capex of up to HUF30 billion in 2015
   -- S&P's assumption of minimal (less than HUF5 billion)
      dividends in 2015
   -- Potentially sizeable intra-year seasonal working capital
      outflows of up to HUF5 billion

S&P anticipates that Nitrogenmuvek will maintain ample covenant
headroom under its existing or potential new debt instruments in
2015 because the leverage covenant calculation nets cash from
debt.  The company is subject to a maximum net debt-to-EBITDA
limit of 3x under its credit facilities.  S&P thinks that the
headroom could decrease materially in 2016, but it believes other
qualitative factors -- including strong relationship with banks
and prudent financial management -- support S&P's "strong"
overall assessment.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Nitrogenmuvek will be
able to finance and deliver on its large, multi-year capex
program while continuing to run at near-full capacity production
and maintain a strong liquidity throughout the cycle.  S&P
assumes that Nitrogenmuvek's FFO to debt will be about 12%-15% in
the next couple of years and that DCF will be negative.  In the
event of major shifts in the market or unforeseen operational
issues, S&P believes that the company will limit capex. Our
stable outlook also assumes modest (up to 50% of net income)
shareholder distributions and no acquisitions.

There could be downward rating pressure if Nitrogenmuvek's FFO to
debt falls below 12% on average, which could result from lower-
than-anticipated fertilizer prices, a fall in production, or a
material depreciation of the forint against the euro, the dollar,
or both.  S&P could also consider lowering the rating again if
Nitrogenmuvek were to adopt financial policies that S&P considers
less prudent or if we no longer consider its liquidity "strong,"
which S&P don't anticipate.

An upgrade is unlikely in the next 12 months in view of S&P's
forecasts of Nitrogenmuvek's weak metrics and high capex outlays.


SETANTA INSURANCE: Oireachtas to Receive Liquidation Update
Irish Examiner reports that the Oireachtas Finance Committee was
set to receive an update on April 1 on the progress being made on
the liquidation of Setanta Insurance.

Around 75,000 Irish consumers were left uninsured when Setanta's
Maltese parent company went into liquidation around a year ago,
Irish Examiner discloses.

According to Irish Examiner, the Maltese liquidator, officials
from the Department of Finance and the accountant to the High
Court will appear before the committee.

Setanta Insurance was a Maltese-registered insurer.  It provided
private and commercial motor insurance policies to Irish
consumers and sold exclusively through 230 brokers.

TRANSAERO ENGINEERING: Aims to Exit Examinership This Month
Pat Flynn at The Clare Herald reports that Transaero Engineering
Ireland say they are looking forward to exiting examinership
later this month.

An interim examiner was appointed to TEI in January following a
request from the company in High Court, The Clare Herald relates.

TEI requested Court Protection and the High Court appointed
Michael McAteer of Grant Thornton as interim examiner to the
company with a view to presenting a restructure plan to ensure
the company's future, The Clare Herald discloses.

According to The Clare Herald, the company's legal team had told
the court that the global geo-political and economic climate had
been having increasingly negative effects on TEI's parent
company, the Russian carrier Transaero Airlines.

A notice on the company's Web site outlines how the combined
impact of the EU/US trade sanctions, geo-political tensions, the
fall in the price of oil and the Rouble currency crisis continue
to impact on economic activity within Russia and between many of
its main trading partners, The Clare Herald discloses.

The High Court also heard how Transaero Airlines was not in a
position to pay TEI moneys due for services rendered and has
indicated that it is not in a position to support TEI on an
ongoing basis, The Clare Herald notes.

TEI said it intended to use the court protection period to
restructure its business and to work with its existing core base
of quality customers, The Clare Herald relays.

The company also confirmed in January having "initial contacts
with a potential investor with a view to securing an investment
that will put the company on to a solid footing", The Clare
Herald relates.

"It is anticipated that an arrangement could be reached within
the timeframe of the examinership period," The Clare Herald
quotes the company as saying.

Following meetings held on March 27, a company spokesman, as
cited by The Clare Herald, said: "We look forward to the final
Court hearing on the 14th of April, and the exiting of the
Company from Examinership."

Transaero Engineering Ireland is an aircraft maintenance facility
that employs 230 people at Shannon Airport.


F-E GOLD: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'BB-sf'
Fitch Ratings has downgraded F-E Gold S.r.l.'s (F-E Gold) notes,

  EUR95.1 million class A2 notes downgraded to 'Asf' from 'A+sf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR21.5 million class B notes downgraded to 'BB+sf' from
  'BBBsf'; Outlook Negative

  EUR3.9 million class C notes downgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'BBsf';
  Outlook Negative

F-E Gold is a securitization of performing leases on real estate,
auto and equipment assets originated in 2006.  To date, the real-
estate pool accounts for 99.8% of the collateral.  The leases pay
mainly floating rate with monthly installments.  The notes pay
quarterly at a floating rate based on Euribor.



Since Fitch's last review in April 2014, the transaction's
performance has deteriorated, especially as far as delinquencies
in 2H14 are concerned: the delinquency ratio peaked at 10.3% at
end-2014, albeit to some extent due to information systems
integration hiccups following the merger between Fineco Leasing
SpA (the original seller and servicer) and UniCredit Leasing SpA
in 3Q14.  The cumulative default and loss ratios were at 8.8% and
5.2%, respectively at end-2014; this compounds Fitch's declining
performance outlook on the Italian mixed-leases sector.  For F-E
Gold, the lifetime default expectation was maintained at 10%.


The credit enhancement (CE) for the class A notes is currently
34.1%; it has increased at a relatively slow pace since the end
of the revolving period because of the pro-rata amortization of
the notes (in all but two quarters).  The portfolio migration to
almost exclusively real-estate leases has further slowed down the
amortization, due to their longer average tenor.  Conversely, the
CE for the class B and C notes has increased to 16.4% and 13.1%
respectively, due to both the pro-rata amortization and the
static EUR15.3 million reserve fund.


The transaction cleared the principal deficiency ledger (PDL)
outstanding during 4Q14 and therefore will revert to pro-rata
amortization in the next quarter.  The documentation does not
include any trigger to switch the amortization to sequential in
the transaction's tail, as it is common in recent pro rata-
amortizing deals.  However, a further breach of a performance
trigger (based on either cumulative defaults or PDL) would
irreversibly switch the amortization back to sequential.  The
recent performance suggests such a breach is likely (and within
Fitch's remaining default expectations), although the
originator's support might delay or even avoid it through
delinquency buy-backs.  For example, the transaction would revert
to sequential amortization if more than EUR12.8m of defaults
occurred, but the originator is still permitted to repurchase
EUR14.4m of assets.


Fitch analyzed the loan-by-loan portfolio as of end-2014 through
its proprietary Portfolio Credit Model (PCM) to assess the impact
of increasing obligor and sector concentration.  The top 10
lessees represent 7.2% of the non-defaulted portfolio, while 24
lessees (out of 1,057) weigh more than 50bp and therefore are
considered large in the SME CLO criteria framework.  Increasing
concentration underpins the Negative Outlook on the class B and C


In Fitch's rating sensitivity analysis, the expected remaining
default rate was assumed at 19% on the EUR121.1m remaining non-
defaulted collateral.

Expected impact upon the note ratings of increased default rate
(class A2/B/C):

Current rating: 'Asf'/'BB+sf'/'BB-sf'
Increase base case default rate by 10%: 'A-sf'/'BBsf'/'B+-sf'
Increase base case default rate by 25%: 'BBB+sf'/'B+sf'/'CCCsf'
Expected impact upon the note ratings of reduced recovery rate
(class A/B/C):

Current rating: 'Asf'/'BB+sf'/'BB-sf'
Reduce base case recovery rate by 10%: 'A-sf'/'BB+sf'/'BB-sf'
Reduce base case recovery rate by 25%: 'A-sf'/'BBsf'/'B+sf'
Expected impact upon the note ratings of increased defaults and
reduced recoveries (class A/ B/C):

Current rating: 'Asf'/'BB+sf'/'BB-sf'
Increase base case default rate by 10%; reduce base case recovery
rate by 10%: 'A-sf'/'BBsf'/'CCCsf'
Increase base case default rate by 25%; reduce base case recovery
rate by 25%:

Finally, if the transaction continues to amortise on a pro-rata
basis until the collateral amortises in full, the rating on the
class A and, to a lesser extent, the class B notes may be

MILANO SERRAVALLE: Fitch Keeps 'BB+' Debt Rating on Watch Neg.
Fitch Ratings is maintaining Italian toll roads operator Milano
Serravalle-Milano Tangenziali's (MSMT) 'BB+' senior unsecured
debt rating on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The RWN reflect uncertainty around the company's ability to roll
over its EUR72 million bridge loan maturing at end-March 2015.
Lenders are, however, in the process of approving the extension
of the loan's maturity to September 2015.


MSMT has recently proposed to the grantor to downsize its direct
investment plan (to EUR380 million from EUR700 million) in
exchange for lower tariff hikes.  The downsizing of its business
plan, if approved, would materially improve MSMT's capital
structure.  Under Fitch revised rating case -- which incorporates
the proposed lower capex and tariff -- MSMT's leverage will
remain safely below the 6x mark over the next five years.
Concession debt will be fully repaid three years before
concession maturity (2028).

The recent change in ownership -- with the financially- and
politically-strong Region of Lombardy becoming the indirect
controlling shareholder -- is also a positive credit development
for MSMT and its 79%-owned subsidiary Autostrada Pedemontana
Lombarda (APL) which is running a large (EUR5bn), financially
strained greenfield project in the region.

The APL project is under severe financial stress.  Traffic
forecast has been materially revised lower and banks involved in
the project (as shareholders and lenders) have neither provided
additional equity nor new financing.  The EUR200 million bridge
loans continue to be regularly overdue, with lenders granting
only short-term maturity extensions.  To cover this financial
shortfall and to keep the project running, MSMT has materially
increased its exposure to APL since 2012.  Despite MSMT not being
willing to provide additional material funds to APL, further
financial support cannot be ruled out if APL continues to be
managed with a short-term financial view.

APL has still significant financial needs.  The first phase of
the project (35%) is to be delivered by mid-2015 but additional
funding requirement of around EUR3bn is needed to complete the
remaining 65% of the project.  In this respect, Fitch expects
that the recent involvement of the Region of Lombardy in the
discussion on APL funding should contribute to a clearer, long-
term view on APL's future capital structure.

Volume Risk- Midrange

From an operational standpoint, MSMT has performed substantially
in line with Fitch's expectations.  After a sharp fall in 2012 (-
6.3%), traffic moderately contracted in 2013 (2.1%).  This
largely reflected the effect of Italy's austerity measures
feeding into the real economy and consumer activity.  However,
MSMT's FY14 traffic figures show signs of stabilization (+0.7%
yoy).  Under Fitch's updated rating case, traffic moderately will
grow in 2015 (+1.5%), sustained by Milan EXPO and remain subdued
thereafter. The downside risk to this scenario mainly relates to
the still evolving Italian economy and its impact on traffic

Price Risk- Midrange

Tariff increase for 2015 (+1.5%) was lower than expected but the
concessionaire should be compensated with the approval of the
updated business plan.  Under MSMT's proposed business plan,
tariff hikes will be capped at 1.5% until 2017 but lower
concession flows will be offset by capex reduction.  Lower tariff
increases would limit the risk of price elasticity on MSMT's
network.  The Price Risk attribute is assessed as midrange.

Infrastructure Renewal - Midrange

MSMT's current ambitious capex program (of around EUR700 million)
would be substantially halved if the grantor approves the
downsized business plan with a view to reducing tariff hikes.
MSMT has a long-standing experience in delivering investment on
its network but its growing involvement in APL and uncertainty on
the size of its direct investment program constrain the
Infrastructure Renewal attribute to Midrange

Debt Structure - Weaker

Despite the possible capex downsizing, MSMT will remain dependant
on external funding to cover its direct and indirect investment
needs and repay its maturing debt.  The existing bank debt is
unsecured, carries mostly floating rates (78%) but benefit from a
financial covenant package comprising leverage and capital
structure ratios.

MSMT's plan to use a single large bullet debt would weaken its
current debt structure (predominantly amortizing) and expose the
issuer to refinancing risk, given that the company has never
tapped capital markets.  MSMT's liquidity is stretched (EUR34m at
FYE14).  Under Fitch rating case, such liquidity would only be
sufficient to cover June 2015 maturities provided that, the
EUR72m bridge loan due at end March is rolled over.  Debt
Structure is assessed as Weaker.

Although significantly smaller in size, the main peers for MSMT
are Atlantia (A-/Stable), Sias (BBB+/Stable) Abertis
(BBB+/Stable) and Brisa (BBB/Stable).  Although MSMT's traffic
has performed in line with Italian peers and better than its
international peers (Abertis and Brisa), its credit profile is
largely weighed down by contingent risk stemming from APL and a
weaker debt structure.


Despite positive developments at MSMT over the past few months, a
number of key uncertainties remain outstanding.  The resolution
of the RWN will focus on MSMT's liquidity position, including the
expected rollover of the EUR72 million bridge loan, progress in
the grantor's approval of the downsized business plan and
additional financial support MSMT could provide to APL.

VENETO BANCA: S&P Cuts Counterparty Rating to 'B+'; Outlook Neg.
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Veneto Banca SCPA to
'B+' from 'BB-'.  At the same time, S&P removed the long-term
rating from CreditWatch, where it placed it with negative
implications on Feb. 26, 2015.  In addition, S&P affirmed its 'B'
short-term rating on the bank.  The outlook is negative.

S&P also lowered its long-term issue rating on Veneto Banca's
nondeferrable subordinated debt to 'CCC' from 'CCC+' and its
long-term issue rating on its preferred securities to 'CCC-' from

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that the ongoing investigation
of Veneto Banca's former chairman and former CEO has increased
the bank's reputational risk.  As a result, S&P believes the bank
will likely face heightened challenges to successfully implement
actions aimed at strengthening its weak financial profile amid a
still-fragile economic environment.

On Feb. 17, 2015, Italian tax authorities launched an
investigation of Veneto Banca's former Chairman and its current
general manager, who was CEO at the time of Bank of Italy's
inspection.  It's S&P's understanding that the investigation will
not likely result in any allegations against the bank itself.
Nonetheless, S&P also understands that the investigation is
focused on the bank's former management practices over the past
few years, particularly regarding certain loan-granting practices
and the pricing of the shares the bank issued last year.

This investigation follows last year's reported disagreements
between the bank and regulatory authorities, which concluded with
the Bank of Italy formally requesting the bank to appoint a new
board of directors.  In S&P's view, the combined impact of the
ongoing investigation, the reported disagreements with
regulators, and the media's focus on these topics have heightened
Veneto Banca's reputational risk.

S&P also believes the increased reputational risk makes it more
difficult for the bank to successfully execute its strategic
plan, especially in a still-fragile economic environment.  The
recently approved reform of popolari banks in Italy will require
Veneto Banca to change its corporate form and governance
structure over the next 18 months.  To comply with the Bank of
Italy's requests after its 2013 inspection, Veneto Banca has
already implemented several remedial actions to enhance its
organizational and corporate governance structures.  However,
part of these changes requires a turnaround of the bank's
culture, and S&P believes achieving the expected results will
take time.  For these reasons, S&P considers Veneto Banca's
corporate governance to no longer be supportive of an "adequate"
business position assessment when compared with that of Italian

S&P also anticipates that it will be more difficult for the bank
to mitigate pressures on its depressed operating performance and
efficiency, particularly in areas like revenue generation and
retail funding cost management.  Overall, S&P expects Veneto
Banca's operating performance to remain weak in the next couple
of years, burdened by still-high credit losses after a continued
deterioration over the past few years that resulted in weaker-
than-peers' revenue stability and operating efficiency.  On
March 24, 2015, the bank announced a net loss for 2014 of about
EUR300 million (excluding a goodwill impairment of about EUR670
million).  In addition, Veneto Banca's cost-to-income ratio was
higher than peers' at 73.5% at year-end 2014.

As a result of these factors, S&P has revised its assessment of
Veneto Banca's business position to "moderate" from "adequate".
Consequently, S&P revised downward its assessment of Veneto
Banca's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'b' from 'b+', which
led S&P to lower the long-term counterparty credit rating to 'B+'
from 'BB-'.

S&P continues to incorporate a one-notch uplift into the long-
term rating to reflect the potential that Veneto Banca would
receive extraordinary support from the Italian government if
needed.  S&P bases this view on its assessment of Veneto Banca's
"moderate" systemic importance and Italy's "supportive" stance
toward its banking system.

The one-notch downgrades of Veneto Banca's non-deferrable
subordinated debt and preferred securities reflect S&P's revision
of the bank's SACP and our belief that the probability of default
of these instruments is consistent with the rating definition in
the 'CCC' category, according to S&P's criteria.

The negative outlook reflects the possibility that S&P could
lower the long-term rating on Veneto Banca by another notch by
year-end 2015 if it determines that extraordinary government
support is less predictable under the new EU legislative
framework.  S&P could remove the one notch of uplift for
potential extraordinary support shortly before the January 2016
introduction of bail-in powers under the European Union's Bank
Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) for senior unsecured

S&P could also lower the long-term rating if it was to see any
evidence of unexpected additional pressures on Veneto's Banca
business and financial profiles.  This could happen, for example,
if the outcome of the current investigation were to result in any
unexpected legal, regulatory, or financial sanction on the bank
or heighten the bank's reputational risk beyond what S&P
currently anticipates.

In addition to potential changes in the SACP and government
support, S& will review other relevant rating factors when
considering any further rating actions.  These might include any
measures Veneto Banca might take that provide substantial
additional flexibility to absorb losses while a going concern and
mitigate bail-in risks to senior unsecured creditors.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it considers,
everything else being equal, that potential extraordinary
government support for Veneto Banca's senior unsecured creditors
is unchanged in practice, despite the introduction of bail-in
powers and international efforts to increase banks'
resolvability.  S&P could also revise the outlook to stable if we
believe that other rating factors -- such as a stronger SACP or a
large buffer of subordinated instruments -- fully offset
increased bail-in risks.


DRYDEN 35 EURO: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F Notes
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned credit ratings to
Dryden 35 Euro CLO 2014 B.V.'s class A-1A, A-1B, B-1A, B-1B, C,
D, E, and F notes.  At closing, Dryden 35 Euro CLO 2014 also
issued an unrated subordinated class of notes.

S&P has assigned its ratings following its assessment of the
transaction's capital structure and the collateral portfolio's
credit quality, a cash flow analysis, and a review of the
transaction documents.  The portfolio is diversified, primarily
comprising broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured
term loans and senior secured bonds.

S&P's ratings are commensurate with the available credit
enhancement for the rated notes.  S&P subjected the capital
structure to a cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate for each rated class of notes at each rating level.

In S&P's analysis, it used the target par amount of EUR425
million, the covenanted weighted-average spread of 4.30%, the
covenanted weighted-average coupon of 6.20%, and the covenanted
weighted-average recovery rates.  S&P applied various cash flow
stresses, using four different default patterns, in conjunction
with different interest rate stresses for each liability rating

The transaction documents allow between 10% and 20% of assets
paying a fixed interest rate where no additional hedging is
required.  S&P tested the mix of fixed- and floating-rate assets
at the maximum and minimum levels under the transaction
documents. S&P also biased defaults toward fixed-rate assets
during low interest-rate environments and toward floating-rate
assets during high interest-rate environments.

S&P's analysis also shows that the credit enhancement available
for each rated class of notes is sufficient to withstand the
defaults applicable under the supplemental tests (not counting
excess spread) outlined in S&P's corporate collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) criteria.

S&P considers that the transaction's documented replacement and
remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its exposure to
counterparty risk under S&P's current counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's criteria for nonsovereign
ratings that exceed eurozone (European Economic and Monetary
Union) sovereign ratings, S&P considers the transaction's
exposure to country risk to be limited at the assigned rating
levels, as the concentration of the pool comprising assets in
countries rated lower than 'A-' does not exceed 10% of the
aggregate collateral balance.

S&P considers that the transaction's legal structure is
bankruptcy-remote, in line with S&P's European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

Dryden 35 Euro CLO 2014 is a European cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction, comprising euro-denominated
senior secured loans and bonds issued by European borrowers.
Pramerica Investment Management Ltd. is the collateral manager.


Ratings Assigned

Dryden 35 Euro CLO 2014 B.V.
EUR442.6 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes (Including
EUR47.3 Million Subordinated Notes)

Class                 Rating          Amount
                                    (mil. EUR)

A-1A                  AAA (sf)        232.10
A-1B                  AAA (sf)         15.80
B-1A                  AA (sf)          19.00
B-1B                  AA (sf)          33.70
C                     A (sf)           31.90
D                     BBB (sf)         21.20
E                     BB (sf)          27.10
F                     B- (sf)          14.50
Subordinated          NR               47.30

NR--Not rated.


PORTUGAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' IDR; Outlook Positive
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Portugal's Long-term foreign and local
currency Issuer Default Rating (IDRs) at 'BB+'.  The Outlook is
Positive.  The agency has also affirmed Portugal's Short-term
foreign-currency IDR at 'B' and the Country Ceiling at 'A+'.

The issue ratings on Portugal's senior unsecured foreign and
local currency bonds have also been affirmed 'BB+'.


The affirmation and the Positive Outlook reflect these key rating

The economy has returned to growth.  Real GDP grew by 0.5% in
4Q14, taking 2014 total to 0.9%, in line with the eurozone
average. Fitch expects growth to increase to 1.5% in 2015, driven
by rising employment, higher gross disposable income, low
interest rates and strengthening confidence indicators, while
recovery in the eurozone and euro depreciation should support
export performance.

The current account registered a surplus of 0.9% of GDP in 2013
and an estimated 0.5% in 2014, the first surpluses in at least
two decades and a material improvement from an over 12% deficit
in 2008.

Excluding one-off factors the general government deficit at 3.4%
of GDP fell below the target of 4% in 2014.  This follows a
deficit of 5.2% in 2013 (4.9% with one-offs), below the official
target of 5.5%.  The primary surplus increased last year after
moving into positive territory for the first time in 16 years in

Portugal enjoys broad market access at favorable yields in
several currencies and at different maturities allowing the early
repayment of the IMF loan.  The government has prefunded a
significant portion of its financing needs for 2015 and built a
sizeable deposit buffer (10% of GDP).

The two main political parties (the Social Democratic Party, the
leading member of the current coalition, and the main opposition
the Socialist Party) are pro-European.  Fitch expects no major
deviation of policy after this year's elections.  Currently, no
anti-euro or populist party has attracted significant support in
opinion polls in Portugal.

Although the resolution of Banco Espirito Santo (BES) was handled
in a smooth manner with the creation of the bridge bank Novo
Banco in August 2014, the episode raised some doubts about the
underlying strength of the banking sector and the effectiveness
of monitoring by national authorities.  Fitch's view is that this
was a one-off event and spillover from BES to the real economy
and the rest of the banking sector will remain limited.

The three largest Portuguese banks passed the ECB comprehensive
assessment conducted in October 2014 and no additional capital or
asset sale was required.  The authorities plan to sell Novo Banco
before the elections.  However, Fitch expects that the high level
of corporate sector debt, weakening asset quality and the modest
pace of write-downs will continue to act as a constraint on
growth-supportive new lending.

Portugal's long-term fiscal cost of an ageing population is one
of the most stable in the EU, according to estimates by the
European Commission, due to past pension reforms.

Balancing these positive developments are the following fiscal
and economic risks:

Government targets for fiscal deficit reduction are at risk.  In
Fitch's view Portugal is unlikely to correct its excessive
deficit in line with EU commitments to bring it below 3% of GDP
in 2015 from 4.5% in 2014.  Fitch forecasts a headline deficit of
3.1% this year.  The official target of 2.7% is based on more
optimistic assumptions of revenue growth and the positive impact
of macroeconomic developments on the budget.  Past constitutional
Court rulings on fiscal measures have also constrained fiscal
consolidation options.

The official target also reflects a pause in the consolidation of
the structural deficit (after excluding one-offs and cyclical
impact from the headline budget deficit) ahead of parliamentary
elections in 2H15.  There are similar risks to government fiscal
targets into the medium term and Fitch expects the overall pace
of consolidation to slow.

Progress towards rebalancing the economy has been slower than
Fitch expected when the Outlook was revised to Positive in April
2014, notwithstanding structural reforms in areas such as the
labor and product markets, which have been central to the
government's adjustment program.  Private investment and GDP
growth will likely be constrained by still-high corporate
indebtedness and low competitiveness.  Fitch has therefore
revised down its potential growth estimate to around 1.25% from
1.5% in the April and October 2014 reviews.  Investment has
started to grow but it remains too low to maintain the capital
stock. Investment share of GDP dropped to 15% in 2014, from 22%
in 2007.

Underlying public debt dynamics have weakened into the medium
term with the forecast pace of debt reduction slowing.  Wider
deficits and weaker growth prospects mean Fitch now expects debt
to have peaked at 128.7% in 2014, before sliding to 117.5% in
2020.  It would peak in 2015 if cash balances were not reduced.
This compares with previous projections of a peak in 2013 and a
gradual reduction to 115.8% by 2020.  Such an elevated debt level
(BB and BBB medians were close to 40% of GDP in 2014) leaves
public finances with limited flexibility if faced with future
shocks and exposed to the risk of deflation.  From 2017 to 2020
we expect debt to fall by an average 1.7% of GDP per year
compared with 2.5% in April 2014.

Portugal's net foreign liabilities remain among the highest of
Fitch-rated countries and are unlikely to fall to more
comfortable levels in the medium term notwithstanding the
improvement in the current account and recent FDI flows.


Future developments that could individually or collectively
result in an upgrade to investment grade include:

   -- An underlying improvement in the debt dynamics and a clear
      downward trend in the gross government debt (GGGD/GDP)

   -- An improvement in medium term economic prospects, leading
      to lower unemployment and progress in private sector

   -- Further sustained progress in the unwinding of external

These risk factors may, individually or collectively, result in
the stabilization of the Outlook:

   -- A weakening in the pace of fiscal consolidation, resulting
      in a less favorable trajectory in debt to GDP;

   -- Continued weak economic growth or deflation that could
      forestall corporate sector deleveraging or have a negative
      impact on the banking sector or public finances;

   -- Failure to make further progress in unwinding external


In its debt sensitivity analysis, Fitch assumes a primary surplus
averaging 2.1% of GDP, trend real GDP growth averaging 1.3%, an
average effective interest rate of 3.3% and deflator inflation of
1.3%.  On the basis of these assumptions, the debt-to-GDP ratio
would have peaked at 128.7% in 2014, and edge down slowly to
111.9% by 2024.  The national statistics office published new
nominal GDP numbers on March 26, which would push the debt ratio
up to 130.2% in 2014.  Fitch will incorporate the revised numbers
once they are published by Eurostat.

The European Central Bank's asset purchase program should help
underpin inflation expectations, and supports our base case that,
in the context of a modest economic recovery, the eurozone will
avoid prolonged deflation.  Fitch also assumes gradual progress
in deepening financial integration at the eurozone level and that
eurozone governments will tighten fiscal policy over the medium

Fitch's base case is that Greece will remain a member of the
eurozone, though it recognizes that 'Grexit' is a material risk.
Although a Greek exit would represent a significant shock to the
eurozone that could spark a bout of financial market volatility
and dent confidence, Fitch does not believe it would precipitate
a systemic crisis like that seen in 2012, or another country's
rapid exit (see 'Grexit Still Possible; Systemic Crisis

In accordance with Fitch's policies the issuer appealed and
provided additional information to Fitch that resulted in a
rating action which is different than the original rating
committee outcome.


KALUGA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Kaluga Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'
with Stable Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency IDR at

The agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)' with Stable Outlook.  Kaluga's outstanding
senior unsecured domestic bonds (ISIN RU000A0JRHN7) have also
been affirmed at 'BB' and 'AA-(rus)'.


The ratings reflect the administration's efficient and proactive
management, the region's rapid economic development and sound
budgetary performance.  The ratings also factor in increasing
pressure on operating expenditure and a growing debt burden,
including contingent risk stemming from the liabilities of public
sector entities (PSEs), although the maturity profile of these
liabilities is long-term.

Fitch expects Kaluga to continue to demonstrate solid operating
performance, supported by further expansion of its tax base.  The
agency expects operating balance to be at 12% of operating
revenue in 2015-2017, in line with the 12.9% reported in 2014.
This was down slightly from an average of 15.4% during 2010-2012,
due to increasing operating expenditure pressure and sluggish
revenue from corporate income tax in 2013 and 2014.  Operating
spending will remain under pressure as a result of the national
government's decision to increase public sector salaries and
reduce transfers from the federal budget.  However, the
administration expects tax revenue growth to accelerate in 2015
on growing industrial output and increased tax rates.

In line with Fitch's expectations Kaluga's direct risk, including
the liabilities of the Development Corporation of Kaluga Region
(DCKR), increased 20% to RUB27.5 billion in 2014, fuelled by a
RUB4.5 billion deficit before debt variation.  Over the medium
term the region intends to narrow the budget deficit and limit
debt growth.  Fitch therefore forecasts direct risk growth to
decelerate in absolute terms during 2015-2017, while operating
revenue growth should allow the overall debt burden to gradually
decline below 70% by end-2017, from 73.6% in 2014.

Fitch projects the region's debt coverage (direct debt to current
balance) to be close to four years in 2015-2017.  This would be a
modest improvement from the 5-6 years reported in 2013 and 2014
but still above the region's average direct debt maturity profile
of 2.5 years.  As with most Russian regions Kaluga is exposed to
refinancing pressure in the medium term as it faces repayment of
about 80% of its outstanding direct liabilities (RUB16.4bn) in
2016-2017, mostly bank loans and loans from the federal budget.

Fitch expects the region will roll over maturing budget loans and
substitute part of maturing bank loans with new loans from the
federal budget.  The remaining maturing bank loans will be rolled
over with the same banks.  However, the cost of borrowing is
likely to increase due to the depressed national debt capital
market.  Interest rates in 2015 could double their 2014 levels,
making new debt more expensive.

The regional government is focused on local economic development
and on expanding the tax base.  Kaluga has been successful in
attracting foreign investments, and promoting industrial
production and innovation.  These policies have allowed the local
economy to grow at a cumulative 23.4% in 2011-2014, well above
the 10.5% average for the Russian Federation.  The government
forecasts economic growth of 2% p.a. in 2015-2016.

Kaluga actively uses PSEs to finance local investment projects.
It established DCKR, which at end-2013 borrowed RUB6.8 billion to
finance the development of regional industrial zones.  Two other
regional public companies incurred a combined RUB1 billion debt
at end-2013 to finance various investment projects.  The region
provides subsidies to cover the principal and interest on the
debt of these PSEs.  Consequently, Fitch considers the
liabilities of those PSEs as the region's direct risk.
Positively, PSEs' liabilities have a long-term maturity profile
till 2022.


Maintaining sound operating performance with an operating margin
of 12%-14% and restoring direct debt coverage to be in line with
the region's average debt maturity could lead to an upgrade.

Continued deficit before debt variation leading to direct risk
increasing above 75% of current revenue and deterioration in
direct debt coverage beyond 10 years would lead to a downgrade.

LIPETSK REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR; Outlook Stable
Ratings has affirmed Russian Lipetsk Region's Long-term foreign
and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB', with
Stable Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency IDR at 'B'.
The agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)' with a Stable Outlook.

The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds' ratings
have been affirmed at 'BB' and 'AA-(rus)'.


The ratings reflect the region's moderate direct risk, sound
operating performance in 2014 and strong regional economy.  They
also take into account the high concentration of the regional
economy in ferrous metallurgy, which makes Lipetsk dependent on
the fluctuations in the steel market, leading to volatile tax

Fitch expects the region will maintain satisfactory budgetary
performance over the medium-term.  The operating balance will be
around 10% of operating revenue in 2015-2017, supported by
control over operating expenditure and moderate growth of
operating revenue.  In 2014 the region demonstrated outstanding
performance with an operating balance at 14.4% of operating
revenue (2013: 5.9%) and budget deficit before debt at 0.2% of
total revenue (2013: 13.5%), driven by an impressive 21% growth
of operating revenue.  Fitch believes that the exceptional
results were driven by external factors, which are unlikely to be
repeated over the medium-term.

Lipetsk's corporate income tax (CIT) increased 43% in 2014 as
profits of the region's largest taxpayer OJSC Novolipetsk Steel
(NLMK, BBB-/Negative) grew substantially, contributing 35% to the
region's taxes.  NLMK, which is one of the largest Russian steel
producers, benefitted from the sharp rouble depreciation last
year as around 80% of its revenue is denominated in foreign
currency (mostly dollars and euros).  Fitch expects CIT to
decline by 10% or more in 2015 after the high proceeds last year,
although this will be tempered by moderate growth of other taxes
and current transfers.

Fitch assumes the budget deficit before debt will widen in 2015
from its exceptionally low level in 2014, but will remain
moderate at 5%-6% of total revenue over the medium term.  The
administration will continue to control growth of operating and
capital expenditure, as part of prudent financial management.
Fitch expects capex as a share of total spending will decline on
average to 15% per year in 2015-2017 versus 21% in 2012-2014.

In Fitch's view the region's direct risk will remain moderate
over the medium term, not exceeding 50% of current revenue.  In
2014 direct risk accounted for 45.9% of current revenue, up from
41.4% in 2013.  The region's maturity profile is stronger than
for most of its national peers.  Direct risk is dominated by
medium-term bank loans and issued debt with amortizing
repayments, providing a smooth maturity profile until 2020, with
a small amount of budget loans to be repaid in 2023-2032.

Fitch estimates the region's refinancing risk as moderate.  In
2015 the region has to repay RUB4.3bn, which corresponds to 24%
of total direct risk.  Part of the debt will be refinanced by
RUB2bn federal budget loans, which the region will receive during
2015. The budget loans have three-year maturity and bear 0.1%
annual interest rates, thus allowing the region to support a
medium term debt profile and to save on interest costs.  The
remaining debt obligations due in 2015 will be covered by
committed credit lines and accumulated liquidity.

The region's economy is developed but concentrated in ferrous
metallurgy, which contributed 58% of the region's industrial
output in 2014, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in the
domestic and international steel markets and contributing to the
volatility of the region's taxes.  In 2014 the regional economy
grew 1% yoy according to preliminary data, which is only
marginally better the national weak growth of 0.6%.


Widening deficit before debt variation leading to an increase in
direct risk to above 60% of current revenue could lead to a
negative rating action.

Maintenance of strong operating performance above Fitch
expectations on a sustained basis accompanied by debt coverage
(direct risk to current balance) below four years (2014: 4.3
years) would lead to positive rating action.

TULA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IDR; Outlook Stable
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Tula Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB',
with Stable Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency IDR at
'B'. The agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)' with Stable Outlook.

The region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds' ratings
have also been affirmed at 'BB' and 'AA-(rus)'.


The ratings reflect Tula's moderate direct risk, sound operating
performance in 2014 and a well-diversified tax base.  They also
reflect deterioration of the national economic environment, which
could put pressure on Tula's budgetary performance over the
medium term.

Fitch expects the region will continue to maintain stable
budgetary performance over the medium term, with an operating
balance at 6%-8% of operating revenue, close to the 2011-2013's
average.  In 2014 the operating margin peaked at 13.4%, as tax
proceeds grew more than 30% yoy.  Each of the region's most
important taxes, namely corporate income (CIT), excise and
personal income (PIT), rose 30% or more in 2014.

A sharp hike in the region's tax proceeds in 2014 was driven by
both technical and economic factors.  PIT growth was a result of
the reallocation of additional tax share to the regional level in
compensation for new expenditure responsibilities while excise
duty growth was driven by higher excise rates, with major
contribution from the subsidiary of one of the country's largest
breweries sited in Tula.  CIT growth was supported by the
expansion of the tax base due to a growing regional economy.
Fitch believes this was a one-off development and expects
significant deceleration in tax proceeds in 2015 due to a weaker
national economy.

Fitch assumes the region will control the budget deficit before
debt at around 4% of total revenue per year in 2015-2017 by means
of capex limitation.  Tula has no plans for new capex beyond
complete on-going projects.  As a result, Fitch projects capex as
a share of total spending to decline to 10%-12% in 2015-2017 from
16%-18% in 2012-2014.  Its budget deficit narrowed to 3.3% of
total revenue in 2014, supported by a strengthened operating
balance, after peaking at 10.8% in 2013.

Tula's direct risk will remain moderate over the medium-term at
below 35% of current revenue.  The agency expects the debt
payback ratio (direct risk to current balance) will return to
eight years in 2015-2017 after having improved to 2.4 years in
2014.  Direct risk increased in nominal terms to RUB15.9 billion
in 2014 (2013: RUB13.9 billion), but declined in relative terms
to 27.3% of current revenue (2013: 30.1%).

The region's short debt maturity profile of under three years
creates ongoing refinancing pressure.  In 2015 the region has to
repay RUB3.25 billion of maturing bonds, which corresponds to 20%
of total direct risk.  The administration plans to refinance the
total amount of debt due in 2015 by subsidized federal loans.
Federal loans have three-year maturity and bear an annual
interest rate of just 0.1%.  The region is likely to receive
RUB3.3 billion of budget loans during the year, which will help
to save on interest payments and extend the debt maturity

The regional economy has a well-diversified processing industry.
Nevertheless, the region's economic profile is still modest, with
GRP per capita below the national median.  At the same time,
Tula's economic growth has outpaced the national average for
three years in a row.  In 2014 the regional economy grew 4.5%,
significantly outperforming national growth of 0.6%.  The
administration expects regional economic growth in 2015 to be
close to that in 2014.  Fitch is less optimistic and expects that
Russia's economic contraction - Fitch projects 4.5% - in 2015
could lead to a slowdown of the region's economy.


Maintaining a sustained sound operating balance above 10% of
operating revenue, accompanied by debt payback being in line with
debt maturity would lead to positive rating action.

Conversely, inability to maintain stable operating performance
with an operating margin above 5% resulting in weak debt payback
exceeding 10 years could lead to a downgrade.

VORONEZH REGION: Fitch Withdraws 'BB+' Issuer Default Rating
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Russian Voronezh Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) of 'BB+'
and National Long-term rating of 'AA(rus)', both with Stable
Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency IDR of 'B'.

Voronezh Region's outstanding senior unsecured domestic bonds'
ratings of 'BB+' and 'AA(rus)' were also withdrawn.

The ratings were withdrawn as the issuer has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process.

Therefore, Fitch will no longer have sufficient information to
maintain the ratings.  Accordingly, Fitch will no longer provide
ratings or analytical coverage for the Voronezh Region.


IM CAJAMAR 5: Fitch Raises Rating on Class B Notes to 'Bsf'
Fitch Ratings has upgraded IM Cajamar Empresas 5, FTA's class B
notes and affirmed the class A notes, as:

  EUR46.1 million Class A1 (ISIN ES0347431001) affirmed at
  'A+sf', Outlook Stable

  EUR244.9 million Class A2 (ISIN ES0347431019) affirmed at
  'A+sf', Outlook Stable

  EUR135 million Class B (ISIN ES0347431027) upgraded to 'Bsf'
  from 'CCCsf', Outlook Positive

IM Cajamar Empresas 5 is a static cash flow SME CLO originated by
Cajamar Caja Rural and Caja Rural del Mediteraneo.  Cajamar and
Ruralcaja merged in October 2012 to form Cajas Rurales Unidas
(BB/Stable/B).  The transaction is a granular securitization of a
EUR675 million portfolio of secured and unsecured loans granted
to Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises and self-employed


The upgrade reflects the increase in credit enhancement (CE) over
the past year due to the amortization of the class A notes and
the improved performance of the portfolio.  CE for the class A1
and A2 notes, which rank pari passu, has risen to 58.6% from 44%
at the last review.  CE for the class B notes has increased to
27% from 20.2% at the last review and 17% at closing.

The transaction has a 12 months default definition and the
defaulted assets increased to 4.63% from 0.64% at the last
review, the delinquency over 90 days decreased to 0.86% from
3.36% and the delinquency over 180 days decreased to 0.36% from
2.52%.  The largest industry is Agricultural Services which
contributes 39.3% of the performing portfolio and the largest
obligor accounts for 0.9%.

The class A notes' rating is capped at 'A+sf' due to the treasury
account bank rating triggers embedded in the transaction
documentation as the EUR114.75 million reserve fund is held at
the account bank to provide the liquidity support.  These
triggers are set at a minimum rating requirement of BBB+/F2 for
the account bank Banco Santander (A-/Stable/F2).

The Positive Outlook on the class B notes reflects the
significant drop in delinquencies combined with the rapid
deleveraging, which if continued may lead to the rating being


Fitch modelled two stress scenarios.  The first increased the
assets' probability of default by 25% and the second decreased
the recovery rate on the assets by 25%.  Neither of the scenarios
had an impact on the current ratings of the notes.


UKRAINE: Bondholders Form Committee for Restructuring Talks
Natasha Doff and Lyubov Pronina at Bloomberg News report that
Franklin Templeton and four other leading Ukraine bondholders
have formed a committee for restructuring negotiations.

According to Bloomberg, a person close to the negotiations, who
asked not to be named because the details are private, said
Blackstone and Weil, Gotshal & Manges have been appointed to
advise the committee.

A representative of Lazard, which is advising Ukraine's
government in the restructuring talks, declined to comment,
Bloomberg notes.


Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through  Go to order any title today.


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at

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