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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, April 24, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 80

                            Headlines

B E L A R U S

BELAGROPROMBANK: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Deposit Rating to Caa1


B E L G I U M

INEOS GROUP: Moody's Rates New EUR770MM Sr. Secured Notes Ba3


B U L G A R I A

CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Declared Insolvent by Sofia Court


F R A N C E

PEUGEOT: S&P Raises LT Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB-'
RENAULT SA: S&P Raises CCRs From 'BB+/B', Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

GREECE: No Creditor Discussions on "Plan B", Official Says
GREECE: Construction Sector Hit the Hardest
PUBLIC POWER: S&P Cuts CCR to 'CCC+' on Increased Liquidity Risk


I R E L A N D

BUSINESS MORTGAGE 5: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC
LION I RE: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating to EUR190MM Notes


I T A L Y

AGRI SECURITIES 2008: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating on B Notes
MONTE DEI PASCHI: Moody's Cuts Deposit & Sr. Debt Ratings to B3


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZMUNAYGAS NC: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Negative


L U X E M B O U R G

BRAAS MONIER: Fitch Affirms 'B' IDR, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

ING GROUP: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Additional Tier 1 Notes
VAN GANSEWINKEL: Creditors Seek to Take Over Business


P O R T U G A L

ESPIRITO SANTO: Sells Art Work, 36-Story Building in Miami


R U S S I A

AUTOBANN: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Corp. Family Rating
FAR-EASTERN SHIPPING: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
O'KEY LLC: Fitch Assigns 'B+(EXP)' Rating to New RUB5-Bil. Bond


S P A I N

ABANCA CORPORACION: S&P Raises LT Credit Rating to 'B+'
INSTITUTO VALENCIANO: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable


U K R A I N E

PROFIN BANK: Deposit Guarantee Commences Liquidation Procedure
ROSHEN: Opts to Liquidate Mariupol Confectionery Factory


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALPARI UK: KPMG Charges US$6 Million in Administrator Fees
EXETER BLUE: Fitch Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Bsf'
MONEY PARTNERS 3: Moody's Lifts on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
MYTRAH ENERGY: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws 'B' CCR
PHONES 4U: HMRC, Unsecured Creditors to Get 0.4% Payout


X X X X X X X X

* 40% of the Value of B2B Invoices in Western Europe in Default
* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit


                            *********


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B E L A R U S
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BELAGROPROMBANK: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Deposit Rating to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on five
Belarus banks -- namely Belarusbank, Belagroprombank JSC, BPS-
Sberbank, Belinvestbank and Minsk Transit Bank.

Specifically, Moody's downgraded to Caa1 from B3 the local-
currency deposit ratings of Belarusbank, Belagroprombank,
Belinvestbank and Minsk Transit Bank, while BPS-Sberbank's local-
currency deposit rating was downgraded to B3 from B1. Moody's
also downgraded to caa1 from b3 the baseline credit assessments
(BCAs) of Belarusbank, BPS-Sberbank and Minsk Transit Bank. The
caa1 BCAs of Belagroprombank JSC and Belinvestbank were not
affected by the rating action. In addition, the foreign-currency
deposit ratings of all five banks were downgraded to Caa2 from
Caa1 following the change in Belarus's foreign-currency deposit
ceilings. All five banks' local- and foreign-currency deposit
ratings now carry negative outlooks.

These actions follow the weakening of Belarus's credit profile,
as reflected by Moody's decision to downgrade Belarus's sovereign
bond rating to Caa1 (negative outlook) from B3 on April 17, 2015.

The rating actions on these five Belarusian banks were prompted
by their exposure to adverse changes in the country's already
very challenging operating environment as reflected in the
country's persistently high inflation, the national currency
devaluation during December 2014 and January 2015, a wide current
account deficit, and substantial vulnerability to external
shocks, particularly as a result of deterioration in Russia's
economy.

Substantial improvements in Belarus's operating environment,
reflected in positive changes in the sovereign credit profile --
if supported by improvements in the standalone creditworthiness
of the five Belarus banks -- could lead to the rating outlook
being changed to stable, or could exert upward pressure on the
banks' ratings in the longer term.

In turn, downward rating pressure on the five Belarus banks could
stem from any further negative adjustments in the Belarus
sovereign rating. Downward rating adjustments could also be
triggered by an erosion of the banks' standalone credit profiles.

List of Affected Ratings

Belagroprombank

  -- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating downgraded to
     Caa1 from B3, with negative outlook

  -- Long-term global foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded
     to Caa2 from Caa1, with negative outlook

Belarusbank

  -- BCA downgraded to caa1 from b3

  -- Adjusted BCA downgraded to caa1 from b3

  -- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating downgraded to
     Caa1 from B3, with negative outlook

  -- Long-term global foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded
     to Caa2 from Caa1, with negative outlook

Belinvestbank

  -- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating downgraded to
     Caa1 from B3, with negative outlook

  -- Long-term global foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded
     to Caa2 from Caa1, with negative outlook

BPS-Sberbank

  -- BCA downgraded to caa1 from b3

  -- Adjusted BCA downgraded to b3 from b1

  -- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating downgraded to
     B3 from B1, with negative outlook

  -- Long-term global foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded
     to Caa2 from Caa1, with negative outlook

Minsk Transit Bank

  -- BCA downgraded to caa1 from b3

  -- Adjusted BCA downgraded to caa1 from b3

  -- Long-term global local-currency deposit rating downgraded to
     Caa1 from B3, with negative outlook

  -- Long-term global foreign-currency deposit rating downgraded
     to Caa2 from Caa1, with negative outlook

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.



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B E L G I U M
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INEOS GROUP: Moody's Rates New EUR770MM Sr. Secured Notes Ba3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a Ba3 rating to the proposed
EUR770 million senior secured guaranteed notes to be issued by
Ineos Finance Plc, a subsidiary of Ineos Group Holdings S.A.
(Ineos), to refinance its existing 7.5% USD775 million senior
secured notes due 2020 (rated Ba3). The transaction is contingent
on the repayment of the senior secured notes maturing in 2020.
Concurrently, the rating agency affirmed Ineos' B1 Corporate
Family Rating (CFR), B1-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR),
the Ba3 ratings on its senior secured term loans, as well as the
B3 ratings on its senior unsecured bonds. The outlook on all
ratings remains stable. Upon completion of refinancing, Moody's
will withdraw the Ba3 rating on existing senior secured notes due
2020.

Ineos' B1 CFR primarily reflects the group's (1) highly leveraged
capital structure, which limits its financial flexibility and
ability to incur additional indebtedness if needed; (2) inherent
cyclicality and exposure to volatile raw material prices, which
have historically led to volatile earnings over the cycle; (3)
exposure to weakening US margins through 2015; and (4)
shareholder friendly policy and the group's complex structure.
However, the company's rating benefits from the group's (1)
strong liquidity and reinforced capital structure; (2) position
as one of the world's largest chemical groups, enjoying leading
market positions across a number of key commodity chemicals; (3)
vertically integrated business model, which ensures Ineos can
capture margins across the value chain, whilst benefitting from
certainty of supply and economies of scale; (4) modest
improvements in European olefin margins; (5) well-invested
production facilities, with the majority ranking in the first or
second quartiles on the regional industry cost curve; and (6)
track record of generating positive, albeit modest, cash flows in
the five years preceding FYE 2013 and approximately EUR500
million of free cash flow in FYE 2014.

Ineos performance in 2014 was above Moody's expectations, with
Moody's adjusted EBITDA of EUR1.8 billion, gross adjusted
leverage of 4.9x and retained cash flow / debt of approximately
13%. Results benefitted from continued strong margins in O&P
North America, competitor outages in both the US and Europe and a
weaker euro.

Whilst Moody's expects Ineos to benefit from continued advantaged
feedstocks in the US margins will decline from 2014. Margins in
the US remain elevated due to a number of unplanned outages and
planned turnarounds which should end in the second quarter
putting greater pressure on prices. The rating agency also
expects European O&P margins will improve modestly in 2015 year-
on-year, with lower oil prices and the benefit of competitor
outages in the first half of the year. The rating agency also
expects Chemical Intermediates to show slight volume increases,
driven by Oxide and Oligomers.

Moody's views Ineos' liquidity over the next 12-18 months as
good. As of 31 March, it had approximately EUR1.7 billion in
unrestricted cash and EUR160 million available under its EUR1
billion securitization facility that matures in December 2016.
The rating agency expects continued positive free cash flow over
the next 12 months, benefitting from reduced interest expense
following the refinancing of approximately EUR1.4 billion of
notes due 2019, as well as potentially lower interest rates from
the proposed EUR770 million note refinancing. Apart from the
securitization facility and the repayment of a USD244 loan in
2016, there are no major debt maturities until 2018, where
approximately EUR4 billion of term loans and senior notes are
due.

The stable outlook incorporates Moody's expectations that the
company will maintain its credit metrics including leverage and
retained cash flow and that its underlying chemical markets do
not deteriorate. It also assumes that Ineos will maintain good
liquidity.

Moody's does not expect any positive rating pressure in the near
term. However, positive pressure could come from Ineos generating
retained cash flow / debt consistently around 15%, with gross
leverage sustained below 4.5x through the cycle and gross debt
materially reduced. Any upgrade would also require Ineos to
display sustained materially positive free cash flow.

Conversely, the rating could be downgraded if gross leverage
rises over 5.5x and liquidity deteriorates.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Chemical Industry Rating Methodology published in December 2013.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Assignments:

Issuer: Ineos Finance plc

  -- Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Ba3

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Ineos Finance plc

  -- Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: Ineos Group Holdings S.A.

  -- Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: Ineos US Finance LLC

  -- Outlook, Remains Stable

Affirmations:

Issuer: Ineos Finance plc

  -- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed Ba3

  -- Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Ba3

Issuer: Ineos Group Holdings S.A.

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B1-PD

  -- Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B1

  -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B3

Issuer: Ineos US Finance LLC

  -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed Ba3

  -- Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed Ba3

Ineos Group Holdings S.A. was established in 1998 via a
management buy-out of the former BP petrochemicals asset in
Antwerp, which was led by Mr. Ratcliffe, chairman of Ineos Group
Holdings S.A. The group has subsequently grown through a series
of acquisitions and at the end of 2005 acquired Innovene Inc., a
100% subsidiary of BP p.l.c. (A2 negative), in a $9 billion buy-
out, transforming Ineos into one of the world's largest chemical
companies (measured by turnover). In FYE 2014, Ineos reported a
turnover of EUR17.2 billion and Moody's-adjusted EBITDA of EUR1.8
billion.



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B U L G A R I A
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CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Declared Insolvent by Sofia Court
-------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that the Sofia City Court said on April 22 it
decided to declare Corporate Commercial Bank insolvent.

According to SeeNews, the court set November 6, 2014 as the
starting date of the insolvency and halted the operations of
Corpbank.

The Sofia City Court ordered a general injunction on the disposal
of the lender's assets and the realization of assets which are
part of the bankruptcy estate, SeeNews relates.  The decision is
appealable within seven days, SeeNews notes.

In June 2014, the Bulgarian National Bank placed Corpbank under
special supervision over risk of insolvency and appointed two
conservators after it notified the central bank it had run out of
liquidity, SeeNews recounts.  Payments and all types of banking
operations were suspended, SeeNews discloses.

In November, the central bank delicensed Corpbank and said it
would seek the bank's insolvency after it was found to have a
negative own capital, SeeNews relays.

               About Corporate Commercial Bank AD

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.



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F R A N C E
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PEUGEOT: S&P Raises LT Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB-'
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit ratings on French automotive manufacturer Peugeot S.A. and
related entity GIE PSA Tresorerie to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  The
outlook is positive.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term corporate
credit ratings on Peugeot and GIE PSA Tresorerie.

S&P also raised its issue rating on the senior unsecured notes
issued by Peugeot and GIE PSA Tresorerie to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  The
recovery rating on these notes is '4', indicating S&P's
expectation of average recovery in the lower half of our 30%-50%
range in the event of a payment default.

The upgrade reflects S&P's view that Peugeot's decreased debt and
successful restructuring of the automotive division should enable
it to achieve higher credit ratios, despite eroding market share.

S&P said, "In our view, the company will likely post a Standard &
Poor's-adjusted funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio of more
than 20% in 2015, up from 16% at year-end 2014.  We think that
earnings generation will benefit from the numerous cost-cutting
initiatives the company has implemented in the automotive
division, as well as the euro's recent depreciation.  In
addition, the automotive division could receive a payment of
EUR1.5 billion spread over the 2015-2018 period, thanks to the
partnership of Peugeot's captive finance subsidiary, Banque PSA
Finance, with Spanish bank Santander.  Beyond 2015, Peugeot could
also exercise warrants that its shareholders received during the
2014 capital increase, which could lead to an additional cash
inflow of about EUR800 million, although the timing of such an
exercise is uncertain," S&P said.

"Future cash flow generation may constrain the ratings on
Peugeot, in our opinion.  A decrease in working capital partly
explains Peugeot's sizable free operating cash flow (FOCF)
generation in 2014, and we think that achieving a further
reduction this year will be challenging.  In this regard, we note
Peugeot's tendency to sell receivables to improve its working
capital position, and we adjust debt and cash flows for such
transactions.  Discounted receivables alone accounted for EUR1.6
billion of Peugeot's EUR5.9 billion of adjusted debt in 2014.  We
calculate an adjusted FOCF-to-debt ratio of less than 5% on
average over the next three years, which is low for the current
rating level," S&P added.

"Although we still view Peugeot's business risk profile as
"weak," the company is starting to reap the benefits of
restructuring measures.  The ratings are constrained by the
company's low profitability, its reliance on European markets,
and its highly volatile earnings.  Still, Peugeot is reducing its
cost base and increasing the utilization rate of its European
facilities, which climbed to 79% in 2014 from 72% in 2013.  The
company is also performing well in China.  Pockets of losses
remain in Russia and Latin America, but Peugeot is reducing its
fixed-cost base in these regions.  On the downside, the company's
market shares have fallen in Europe since 2010 and may decline
further because its pipeline of new vehicles seems relatively
weak.  Additionally, capital expenditures and research and
development costs appear low relative to peers' and may constrain
future growth, despite Peugeot's cooperation agreements with
several automakers," S&P noted.

Under S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Growth in worldwide real GDP of 3.6% in 2015 and 3.8% in
      2016, with a mild recovery in Western Europe to 1.4% in
      2015 and 1.7% in 2016.

   -- Growth in global car sales of 3.2% in 2015 and 4.9% in
      2016, with increases in Western Europe of 3.1% and 3.9% in
      2015 and 2016, respectively.

   -- A gradual increase in adjusted EBITDA margin to about 5% in
      2015.

   -- A gradual increase in the capital expenditures-to-revenue
      ratio.

   -- No dividend payment in the next 12 months.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these adjusted credit
measures for Peugeot:

   -- An FFO-to-debt ratio of about 25% in 2015, with an
      improvement in 2016.

   -- A debt-to-EBITDA ratio of about 2x.

   -- An FOCF-to-debt ratio of less than 5%.

The positive outlook on Peugeot reflects S&P's view that the
profitability of the automotive division will continue to
improve, enabling the company to maintain adjusted FFO to debt of
more than 20% in the next 12 months.  Under our base-case
scenario, S&P assumes over the next 12 months revenues edging up,
pro forma changes in the consolidation scope, and gradually
widening in the adjusted EBITDA margin to about 5%.  S&P also
forecasts that Peugeot will preserve the marked reduction in
working capital it achieved at year-end 2014.

S&P could raise its ratings on Peugeot if S&P revised up its
assessment of its business risk profile to "fair" from "weak."
This could happen if it delivers on its turnaround plan, namely
by sustaining improved profitability and further reducing its
production break-even point.  S&P might also consider a positive
rating action if Peugeot achieves an adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio
of more than 30% and generates recurring positive FOCF.  If so,
S&P would reassess its view of the financial risk profile to
"intermediate" from "significant."

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Peugeot was unable to
substantially increase earnings at its automotive division.  Such
a scenario could unfold if, for instance, a sustained decline in
market shares offset the positive effects of cost cutting.  S&P
also foresees pressure on the ratings if Peugeot doesn't achieve
adjusted FFO to debt of more than 20% by year-end 2015.


RENAULT SA: S&P Raises CCRs From 'BB+/B', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long- and short-
term corporate credit ratings on French automotive manufacturer
Renault S.A. to 'BBB-/A-3' from 'BB+/B'.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P has withdrawn its 'B' short-term corporate
credit rating on Cofiren Renault et Cie, since this entity no
longer exists.

The upgrade reflects S&P's view that Renault will maintain strong
credit ratios in the next two years and gradually improve the
profitability of its core automotive division, which now
contributes about half of the group's reported EBIT.

Renault has markedly improved its financial profile in recent
years.  S&P believes that it will sustain an adjusted FFO-to-debt
ratio of more than 45% over the next two years.  Between 2010 --
when S&P raised the company's long-term rating to 'BB+' -- and
2014, FFO to debt climbed to 55% from 38%, thanks to asset
disposals and earnings growth.  Additionally, the automotive
division had a EUR1.3 billion net cash position on a reported
basis at year-end 2014.  S&P expects Renault will continue to
generate positive FOCF in 2015 and 2016, owing to sustained
recovery of the Western European car market, capital expenditures
in line with historical trends, and stable working capital cash
outflows.  S&P also assumes that the company will maintain a
disciplined approach toward shareholder remuneration and
acquisitions.

S&P believes that Renault's profitability will continue to
improve, despite the weakness of the Russian and Latin American
economies.  In S&P's base-case scenario, it forecasts that the
reported margin of the automotive division will continue to rise,
on track with management's target of achieving at least 5% by
2017.  S&P sees risk arising from emerging markets, but it
believes that Renault enjoys several cushions, notably the
weakness of the euro and the future benefits of ongoing cost-
cutting measures.  Regarding Russia, S&P expects the high share
of Russian production and possible market share gains to partly
offset the negative impact on earnings of falling car sales.

Under S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Real GDP growth of 3.6% in 2015 and 3.8% in 2016 globally.
      In the EU S&P expects 1.5% in 2015 and 1.8% in 2016; in
      Latin America 3.5% and 4%; and in Russia -2.3% and 1.9%.

   -- An increase in light vehicle sales of 3.1% in 2015 and 0.8%
      in 2016 globally, of which 4.6% and 3.7% in Western Europe;
      -7.7% and 4.9% in Latin America; and -35.3% and -0.1% in
      Russia.

   -- Stable revenues in 2015, followed by a 3% increase in 2016.

   -- A gradual increase in the profitability of the automotive
      division, thanks to additional productivity gains.

   -- A prudent financial policy over the next two years, with
      stable investment trends, a gradual increase in dividends,
      and no large debt-financed acquisitions.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Renault's adjusted EBITDA margin will rise to about 8%-10%
      in 2016, from 7.6% in 2014.

   -- The reported operating margin of Renault's automotive
      division will structurally improve and the consolidated
      operating margin will continue to rise toward 5%, from 3.9%
      in 2014.

   -- Adjusted FFO to debt will remain comfortably above 45% over
      the next two years.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Renault's automotive
division will continue to improve its profitability, despite an
uncertain outlook in emerging markets, and that Renault will
maintain positive FOCF over the coming two years.  S&P also
expects that financial policy will remain prudent.  S&P believes
that revenues will grow moderately in the next 24 months and that
the adjusted EBITDA margin will rise to about 8%-10% by 2017.

S&P could lower the ratings if Renault was unable to maintain an
adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio above 45%.  This could happen if
earnings declined sharply, possibly because of an unexpected
downturn of the European market or large losses in Latin America
or Russia.  Debt-financed acquisitions or an increase in
shareholder remuneration could also lead to a negative rating
action.

S&P could raise its ratings on Renault if its management was
committed to sustaining an adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio of more
than 60% and if FOCF generation improved substantially.  In that
case, S&P would revise its financial risk profile assessment to
"minimal" from "modest."  Such a scenario could unfold if, for
instance, the profitability of the automotive division rose above
our expectations, thanks to productivity gains and a sharper
recovery of the European car market.



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G R E E C E
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GREECE: No Creditor Discussions on "Plan B", Official Says
----------------------------------------------------------
Eleni Chrepa at Bloomberg News reports that Greece and its
creditors haven't discussed having the country miss a payment to
the International Monetary Fund or default as agreement over
bailout disbursements remains beyond reach.

According to Bloomberg, a senior Greek government official said
failure to find a consensus would be viewed in Greece as a
political event and would have to be dealt with in a political
manner, the person said, when asked about the prospect of snap
elections or a referendum.  The person, as cited by Bloomberg,
said such scenarios are viewed as being hypothetical and not part
of the government agenda.

Talks today, Friday, April 24, will shift to Riga, Latvia, where
euro-area finance ministers will attempt to persuade Greece to
commit to economic reforms so that aid payments can be released
before the country runs out of money, Bloomberg relays.

In an effort to avert a breakdown in communication, Mr. Tsipras's
office and leaders of creditor institutions have established a
hotline for direct contact, Bloomberg says, citing two people
familiar with the matter.

The hotline group is comprised of Greek Minister of State Nikos
Pappas, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's economic
adviser, Luc Tholoniat, European Central Bank Executive Board
Member Benoit Coeure, and the IMF's Europe Director Poul Thomsen,
Bloomberg discloses.

According to Bloomberg, one of the officials said the group is in
regular contact and acts to avert crises and resolve disputes.

Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis said on April 21 that,
while there was a clear convergence of views between the sides,
the Latvian meeting is too soon to seal an agreement, Bloomberg
notes.  Mr. Varoufakis said the best chance for success is an
accord that leaves all parties somewhat unsatisfied, as a failure
would be "catastrophic", Bloomberg notes.


GREECE: Construction Sector Hit the Hardest
-------------------------------------------
Balkans.com reports that Greece's construction industry has been
hit harder than all other economic sectors during the Greek
crisis years, with its added value dropping 78 percent within
five years, while one of the biggest local firms, Michaniki, has
just been forced into administration.

A recent study by the Foundation for Economic and Industrial
Research (IOBE) showed that construction saw its added value lose
78 percent from 2008 to end-2013, compared to the commerce
sector's 38 percent loss in the same period, according to
Balkans.com.

The report notes that the biggest blow has been felt by companies
such as Michaniki, which specialized in public projects, as the
Public Investments Program has undergone repeated cuts in the
recession years, dropping to just EUR5 billion this year against
more than EUR11 billion in 2011, in the midst of the six-year
recession.

Worse still, state entities have delayed payments to construction
companies even after the completion of the projects conceded
reports Kathimerini, the report adds.


PUBLIC POWER: S&P Cuts CCR to 'CCC+' on Increased Liquidity Risk
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Greek utility Public Power Corp. S.A.
(PPC) to 'CCC+' from 'B-'.  The rating remains on CreditWatch
with negative implications, where S&P placed it on Feb. 10, 2015.

The downgrade reflects the heightened liquidity risks stemming
from the continuously deteriorating macroeconomic conditions in
Greece and the shrinking funding sources available to PPC.  In
light of the group's increasing working capital needs, heavy
investment commitments, and heavier reliance on the depressed
Greek banking system, S&P believes its liquidity could continue
to weaken materially in the coming months.

It's S&P's understanding that PPC's cash collection remains
challenging, as customers have been more reluctant to pay their
electricity bills.  Meanwhile, PPC must cover its operating
expenses, most notably fuel costs, and pay its taxes, which are
based on invoiced revenues, not collected revenues.  This
continuously strains working capital needs and, ultimately,
lowers PPC's capacity to generate and retain cash.

The negative CreditWatch status reflects that of the Greek banks
and the group's fragile liquidity position in this stressed
environment.

S&P could lower the rating again if PPC's liquidity position
deteriorates further.  This could happen if:

   -- PPC's credit lines are canceled.
   -- The Greek banking system has a liquidity crisis that
      restricts PPC's access to its cash or to short-term
      funding.
   -- The group fails to secure additional credit facilities to
      finance its future investments and debt maturities.
   -- PPC's cash flow generation narrows further.

And ultimately, S&P believes Greece's exclusion from the Economic
and Monetary Union would likely lead PPC to default.

A stabilization of the rating would depend on the group's ability
to restore a good level of cash collection and a more solid
liquidity position, including demonstrated access to new,
sustainable financing sources.  An improvement of macroeconomic
conditions and abating pressure on the sovereign ratings would
also support an improvement in creditworthiness.



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BUSINESS MORTGAGE 5: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded eight tranches of the Business
Mortgage Finance PLC (BMF) series and affirmed 24 tranches,
following a review of the transactions' performance.

The BMF transactions are securitizations of mortgages to small
and medium-sized enterprises and the owner-managed business
community, originated by Commercial First Mortgages Limited
(CFML).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Weaker Performance of Later Vintages

Over the past year, arrears across the entire series have
continued to trend downwards.  As of Feb. 2015, the volume of
loans in arrears by three months or more as a percentage of the
current portfolio balance, ranged between 12.6% (BMF 7) and 26.8%
(BMF3) compared with 19.2% (BMF7) and 30% (BMF3) a year ago.  The
reduction in arrears is mainly attributable to the sale of
properties taken into possession as the servicer, CFML, continues
to clear its legacy portfolio.  These sales have in turn led to
the high levels of losses incurred across the series, especially
for the later transactions, BMF5, BM6 and BMF7.

In particular, cumulative possessions have exceeded 23% of the
respective original balance in BMF5, BM6 and BMF7 compared with
14% and 19% in the slightly more seasoned BMF3 and BMF4
transactions.  Consequently, the later transactions have recorded
higher losses to date, with figures reaching 14.1% of the
original balance in BMF5 compared to the lower 5.5% in BMF3.

Reserve funds in each of BMF5, BMF6 and BMF7 have been fully
depleted and amounts recorded on the principal deficiency ledgers
continue to build up.  With principal deficiencies exceeding the
balances of the most junior class C tranches, they now represent
16.8%, 51.6% and 53.1% of the respective class B balances.
Conversely, the reserve fund in BMF3 has fluctuated just below
its target level and is now at 97.5% of its required amount.
While the reserve fund in BMF4 remains limited, it has marginally
increased to 11.6% of its target, given the lower amount of
losses incurred over the last two periods.

Nonetheless, outstanding properties in possession remain high
across the series, ranging between 1.9% (BMF4) and 8.9% (BMF5) of
outstanding portfolio balances.  Fitch expects a further
deterioration in principal deficiencies across the later
transactions as sales and subsequent losses continue to erode the
available excess spread.

In Fitch's view, the weaker performance of the BMF5, BMF6 and
BMF7 has not been offset by a sufficient build-up in credit
support. For this reason, the agency has downgraded tranches
across BMF5 as well as the senior notes in BMF6 and BMF7.  The
affirmation of BMF3 and BMF4 reflect the adequate levels of
credit enhancement, supported by slightly more robust
performance.

Increased Quick Sale Adjustment (QSA) Assumption

Taking into account the absence of up-to-date information
regarding the buy-to-let portions remaining in the portfolios and
considering the types of property backing the loans, a criteria-
driven QSA of up to 29% could have been applied.  However, the
analysis of loan level possession data suggests that the average
implied QSA incurred upon the sale of properties is actually
higher at 40%.  Consequently, in its analysis, Fitch has
increased its QSA assumption with the effect of reducing recovery
rates.

Additionally, the possession data provided evidence of higher
actual observed recovery rates in BMF3 and BMF4 at about 57% and
77%, respectively, compared with the 30% range for the later
three transactions.  The agency believes that the high loss
severities in BMF5, BMF6 and BMF7 are exacerbated by the higher
portions of peak-of-the market originations in these transactions
compared with the earlier vintages.

Furthermore, Fitch has factored into its analysis high
foreclosures costs such as those incurred when bringing the
properties to a more viable state for sale, coupled with
relatively large amounts of accrued interest that tend to be due
at time of foreclosure.  The agency estimates that these costs
result in a reduction in recovery rates of between 20% and 25%.

Timely Interest on Class A Detachable Coupon (DAC)

The payments due on each of the class A DAC in BMF4, BMF5, BM6
and BMF7 rank pro rata and pari passu with the standard class A
interest payments (excluding step-up amounts).  In Fitch's view,
the fully-funded and amortizing liquidity facility in each
transaction is adequate to cover for potential shortfalls in the
class A DAC.  For this reason, the DACs in the series have been
affirmed at 'AAAsf'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Lending standards for new SMEs loans have tightened since 2009,
reducing the possibility for financially distressed borrowers to
refinance at better terms.  Easing of these rather conservative
lending policies could have a favorable impact on the performance
of the collateral.  The evolution of the commercial property
market and its impact on losses incurred on sold properties is
another sensitive aspect that Fitch monitors when reviewing the
BMF transactions' ratings.

The rating actions are:

BMF3:
Class M notes (XS0223481838): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
Class B1 notes (XS0223482307): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative
Class B2 notes (XS0223482729): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
revised to Stable from Negative
Class C notes (XS0223483024): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook revised
to Stable from Negative

BMF4:
Class A (XS0249507947): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
Detachable A coupon (XS0250410114): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M (XS0249508242): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook revised to
Stable from Negative
Class B (XS0249508754): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate
(RE) revised to 95% from 20%
Class C (XS0249509133): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE 0%

BMF5:
Class A1 notes (XS0271320060): downgraded to 'A+sf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Stable
Detachable A1 coupon (XS0271321035): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class A2 notes (XS0271323163): downgraded to 'A+sf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Stable
Detachable A2 coupon (XS0271323676): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M1 notes (XS0271324724): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
RE 85%
Class M2 notes (XS0271324997): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from 'Bsf';
RE 85%
Class B1 notes (XS0271325291): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE revised to
0% from 10%
Class B2 notes (XS0271325614): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE 0%
Class C notes (XS0271326000): downgraded to 'Csf' from 'CCsf'; RE
0%

BMF6:
Class A1 notes (XS0299445808): downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Stable
Detachable A1 coupon (XS0299535384): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class A2 notes (XS0299446103): downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Stable
Detachable A2 coupon (XS0299536515): affirmed at 'AAAsf': Outlook
Stable
Class M1 notes (XS0299446442): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE revised to
75% from 90%
Class M2 notes (XS0299446798): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE revised
to75% from 90%
Class B2 notes (XS0299447507): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE 0%
Class C notes (XS0299447846): affirmed at 'Csf'; RE 0%

BMF7:
Class A1 notes (XS0330211359): downgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'Asf';
Outlook Stable
Detachable A1 coupon (XS0330212597): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
Stable
Class M1 notes (XS0330220855): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE revised to
65% from 70%
Class M2 notes (XS0330222638): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; RE revised to
65% from 70%
Class B1 notes (XS0330228320): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE 0%
Class C notes (XS0330229138): affirmed at 'Csf'; RE 0%


LION I RE: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating to EUR190MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings affirms the principal at-risk variable rate notes
issued by Lion I Re Limited, a special purpose reinsurance
vehicle in Ireland, as:

  -- EUR190,000,000 principal at-risk variable rate notes
     (scheduled maturity April 28, 2017) at 'B+sf'.

The Rating Outlook is Stable.

This affirmation is based on Fitch's annual surveillance review
of the notes and an updated evaluation of their natural
catastrophe risk, counterparty exposure, collateral assets and
structural performance.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes are exposed to European windstorm losses as reported by
the ceding insurer, Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. (Generali).
There were no reported Covered Events that exceeded the Trigger
Amount of 400 million (euro) in the Initial Risk Period from
April 24, 2014 through Dec. 31, 2014.

On Dec. 15, 2014, Risk Management Solutions, Inc. (RMS), acting
as the Reset Agent, determined the attachment probability as
2.32% for the risk period Jan. 1, 2015 through Dec. 31, 2015.
This corresponds to an implied rating of 'B+' per the calibration
table listed in Fitch's 'Insurance-Linked Securities Methodology.
The updated probability reflects updated property exposures
within the Subject Business in the Covered Area that have been
run through the escrowed RMS model and is an increase from the
initial attachment probability of 2.10%.

The Trigger Amount and Exhaustion Amount remain unchanged at 400
million (euro) and 800 million (euro), respectively.  The Risk
Interest Spread increased slightly to 2.36% reflecting the
increase in the expected loss to 1.09% (from 1.00%).

Generali currently has a Fitch Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of
'BBB+' with a Stable Outlook.  The collateral assets, EBRD notes,
currently have a Fitch IDR of 'AAA' with a Stable Outlook.  These
ratings are unchanged since the closing date of the notes.

Fitch believes the notes and indirect counterparties are
performing as required.  There have been no reported early
redemption notices or events of default and all agents remain in
place.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

This rating is sensitive to the occurrence of a covered event,
Generali's election to reset the notes' attachment levels,
changes in the data quality, the counterparty rating of Generali
and the rating on the assets held in the collateral account.

If qualifying covered event occurs that causes a per occurrence
loss to exceed the attachment level, Fitch will downgrade the
notes reflecting an effective loss of principal and issue a
Recovery Rating.

To a lesser extent, the notes may be downgraded if the EBRD notes
or Generali are sufficiently downgraded to a level commensurate
to the implied rating of the natural catastrophe risk.

The rating is highly model-driven and actual losses may differ
from the results of the simulation analysis.  The escrow models
may not reflect future methodology enhancements by RMS which may
have an adverse or beneficial effect on the implied rating of the
notes were such future methodology considered.



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I T A L Y
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AGRI SECURITIES 2008: Fitch Affirms 'B+sf' Rating on B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three Italian mixed-leases
transactions originated by Iccrea BancaImpresa SpA (Iccrea,
BBB/Negative/F3), and revised the Outlook for two tranches to
Stable from Negative as:

Agri Securities S.r.l. Series 2008 (Agri Securities 2008)

  EUR42.7 million class A notes affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
   revised to Stable from Negative

  EUR136.4 million class B notes affirmed at 'B+sf'; Outlook
   revised to Stable from Negative

  EUR40.6 million class C notes: not rated

Agricart 4 Finance S.r.l. Series 2007 (Agricart 2007)

  EUR248.4 million class A1 notes affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
   Stable

  EUR58.5 million class A2 notes affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Stable

  EUR65 million class B notes: not rated

  EUR26.5 million class C notes: not rated

Agricart 4 Finance S.r.l. Series 2009 (Agricart 2009)

  EUR65 million class A notes affirmed at 'AA+'; Outlook Stable

  EUR173 million class B notes: not rated

These transactions (together, the Agri transactions) are
securitizations of leasing receivables with the following asset
types as of end-February 2015: real estate (93.1% for Agri
Securities 2008, 74.9% for Agricart 2007, 74.1% for Agricart
2009), equipment (6.1%, 18.1%, 22.3%), industrial vehicles (0.6%,
4.1%, 2.1%) and autos (0.2%, 3%, 1.6%).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch has affirmed the ratings despite continued poor performance
of the assets, as it is offset by increased credit enhancement
(CE) from the notes' amortization.  Fitch believes that the
recent performance is broadly in line with its revised
expectations determined last year.

Agri Securities 2008

The transaction's performance has largely been below Fitch's
original expectations and has been underperforming the other Agri
transactions.  However, the large CE for the class A notes, which
has built up to above 83.3%, from 17.5% at closing in July 2008,
due to the sequential amortization of the notes, is considered
adequate for the current ratings, in spite of the increasing
volatility of quarterly defaults.

CE available to the class B notes is 29.8% of the outstanding
non-defaulted assets and is only provided by lease receivables as
the transaction's EUR5 million debt service reserve (DSR) is only
available for liquidity support.  Interest on the class B notes
has been deferred since March 2013 due to the breach of a trigger
based on cumulative losses.  The deferred interest does not
accrue and will be paid once the class A notes are paid in full
(or once recoveries from the assets are sufficient to drive
cumulative losses down, which appears less likely), provided
there are sufficient funds.  Excess spread has also been trapped
in the structure since September 2010.

The advanced amortization of the class A notes (which are now at
5.1% of their original balance) underpins the revision of the
Outlook to Stable from Negative for both class A and class B
notes.

Based on recent performance and its outlook on mixed-lease
receivables, Fitch expects that more than one third of the
current EUR255 million collateral would default, which is
consistent with the transaction's lifetime default expectation to
25%; as of end-February 2015 a default rate of 17.1% or EUR228.6
million had already been realized.  Fitch does not have detailed
information (eg vintage or asset type break-down) on the
recoveries generated by these defaulted assets so it is unable to
forecast the future proceeds from current defaults; however, the
agency took this into account in its assumption of future excess
spread.

Since late 2013, gross excess spread has been insufficient to
cover the principal losses and during 2014 the transaction had an
outstanding principal deficiency ledger (PDL) of about EUR14m.
The PDL was almost cleared (to EUR0.5m) in the latest period,
mainly due to repurchase of defaulted assets, which boosted
recoveries.

Finally, the transaction documents require the issuer to appoint
a back-up servicer upon the servicer's rating falling below
'BBB+'. Although Fitch downgraded Iccrea BancaImpresa's rating to
'BBB' from 'BBB+' on Feb. 3, 2014, the issuer did not appoint a
back-up servicer.  However, this did not have a material effect
on the ratings, as payment interruption risk is not a major risk
driver, especially in the current interest rate environment.

Agricart 2007

The transaction began amortizing the class A notes in June 2014,
before the scheduled end of the revolving period in September
2016, following an amendment of the documentation.

During the amortization period, the originator has continued to
support the transaction by repurchasing assets.  Repurchased
assets so far have amounted to about 7% of the total assets
purchased by the issuer, of which more than half were defaulted.

Fitch believes that CE for the class A1 and A2 notes (40.6% and
26.7% respectively, based on a non-defaulted collateral of
EUR418.4 million) is sufficient to sustain the current ratings.
Based on recent performance and its outlook on mixed-lease
receivables, Fitch expects that almost 22% of the current
collateral would default, and decided to maintain the lifetime
default expectation at 17%.  As of end-February 2015 EUR92.3
million or 7.7% of the assets had defaulted.  Of these, EUR43
million have been repurchased thus achieving full recovery.

Agricart 2009

The transaction -- whose revolving period ended in December
2012 -- is performing better than the other Agri transactions.
Unlike Agricart 2007 it did not historically benefit from any
repurchases of non-performing leases by the originator, although
some repurchases began in 2H14.  In one occasion (May 2014),
excess spread could not entirely cover principal losses, which
resulted in a PDL of almost EUR1 million.  The transaction's
performance has improved since, with delinquencies on a downward
trend to 2.4% in February 2015.  Based on recent performance and
its outlook on mixed-lease receivables, Fitch expects that about
18.4% of the current EUR240.8 million collateral would default,
which is consistent with the transaction's lifetime default
expectation of 11%.  As of end-February 2015 EUR49.6 million or
5.7% of assets had defaulted.

The CE on the class A notes reached 73% in February 2015, which
is the main driver for the affirmation at 'AA+sf', the highest
rating achievable by an Italian transaction.

RATING SENSITIVIES

Fitch incorporated the above-mentioned assumptions in its rating
considerations, as a result of the recent performance.
Sensitivities of the ratings to changes in defaults and
recoveries are shown:

Agri Securities 2008

  Rating sensitivity to increased default rates (class A/B)
  Current ratings: 'AAsf' / 'B+sf'
  Increase base case by 10%: 'AA-sf' / 'Bsf'
  Increase base case by 25%: 'A+sf' / 'CCsf'
  Rating sensitivity to reduced recovery rates (class A/B)
  Current ratings: 'AAsf' / 'B+sf'
  Reduce base case by 25%: 'AAsf'/ 'B+sf'
  Rating sensitivity to increased default rate and reduced
   recovery rate (class A/B)
  Current ratings: 'AAsf' / 'B+sf'
  Increase default base case by 10%; reduce recovery base case by
    10%: 'AA-sf' / 'CCCsf'
  Increase default base case by 25%; reduce recovery base case by
    25%: 'A+sf' / 'CCsf'

Agricart 2007

  Rating sensitivity to increased default rates (class A1/A2)
  Current ratings: 'Asf' / 'BBBsf'
  Increase base case by 10%: 'A-sf' / 'BBB-sf'
  Increase base case by 25%: 'A-sf' / 'BB+sf'
  Rating sensitivity to reduced recovery rates (class A1/A2)
  Current ratings: 'Asf' / 'BBBsf'
  Reduce base case by 10%: 'Asf' / 'BBB-sf'
  Reduce base case by 25%: 'Asf'/ 'BBB-sf'
  Rating sensitivity to increased default rate and reduced
   recovery rate (class A1/A2)
  Current ratings: 'Asf' / 'BBBsf'
  Increase default base case by 10%; reduce recovery base case by
   10%: 'A-sf' / 'BBB-+sf'
  Increase default base case by 25%; reduce recovery base case by
   25%: 'BBB+sf' / 'BB+sf'

If the originator's support ceases following the end of the
revolving period, the reported performance can be significantly
affected.  Fitch took this into account in its analysis, although
significant deviations from the tested scenarios may impact the
ratings.

Agricart 2009

  Rating sensitivity to increased default rates (class A)
  Current rating: 'AA+sf'
  Increase base case by 25%: 'AA+sf'
  Rating sensitivity to reduced recovery rates (class A)
  Current rating: 'AA+sf'
  Reduce base case by 25%: 'AA+sf'
  Rating sensitivity to increased default rate and reduced
   recovery rate (class A)
  Current rating: 'AA+sf'
  Increase default base case by 25%; reduce recovery base case by
   25%: 'AA+sf'

As the transaction is now in the amortisation period and the CE
for class A notes is building up rapidly, it is resilient to
highly stressful assumptions on the future default rates of the
collateral portfolio.

The rating is currently capped at 'AA+sf', due to Italy's rating.
Any change to the cap would lead to a change of the rating of the
notes.

The review of these transactions was carried out applying the
Consumer ABS rating criteria in lieu of the SME CLO rating
criteria due to the limited amount of available information (e.g.
loan-by-loan internal ratings of the originator).  Fitch has
observed multiple deals with similar assets and believes that the
former methodology is adequate.


MONTE DEI PASCHI: Moody's Cuts Deposit & Sr. Debt Ratings to B3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's downgraded Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.'s (MPS)
deposit and senior debt ratings to B3 from B1. At the same time,
the rating agency confirmed the bank's caa2 standalone baseline
credit assessment (BCA), while the senior subordinated rating and
junior subordinated rating were upgraded to Caa3 from Ca.
Additionally, Moody's downgraded the deposit rating of MPS's
fully-owned corporate and investment banking subsidiary MPS
Capital Services (MPSCS) to B3 from B1, and it confirmed the
bank's caa2 BCA.

Moody's said that today's rating action follows the approval of a
EUR3 billion capital increase by MPS's shareholders, the
implementation of Moody's new bank rating methodology and
specifically the advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis, and
the rating agency's lowered government support assumptions for
MPS.

This rating action concludes the review on the deposit, senior
debt and junior debt ratings initiated on Oct. 30, 2014 and
extended on Feb. 12, 2015, and it concludes the review on the BCA
and adjusted BCA initiated on March 17, 2015.

Moody's said that the confirmation of MPS's standalone BCA was
triggered by the approval of a EUR3 billion capital increase by
the bank's shareholders. This capital increase, which is fully
underwritten by a pool of investment banks, will lead to a pro-
forma Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) of 11.4%, which will cover the
capital shortfall of EUR2.1 billion that resulted from the ECB's
comprehensive assessment, and be sufficient to reach the 10.2%
prudential CET1 requirement imposed by the ECB (see note 1 at the
end of this press release).

At the same time, the rating agency noted that MPS's credit
profile remains weak. As at December 2014 problem loans
represented almost a quarter of the bank's loan book, a level
amongst the highest in Italy (see note 2 at the end of this press
release). As a partially mitigating factor, Moody's noted that
the coverage of problem loans increased significantly in 2014, to
69% from an average of 55% between 2009 and 2013.

In the coming months MPS plans to repay the EUR1.1 billion still
outstanding from the hybrid that it issued in 2013 and that was
subscribed by the Italian government; including the capital
increase and the repayment of the government hybrid, MPS will
report a pro-forma phased-in CET1 of 11.4% as at December 2014.
Moody's said that this level remains weak in the context of MPS's
very weak asset quality. In particular, the level of problem
loans is still higher than the bank's equity and reserves, also
including the upcoming capital increase (105%). Additionally, the
pro-forma CET1 ratio is only 120bp higher than the 10.2%
prudential and specific minimum capital required by the ECB under
Pillar 2, amongst the highest levels in Europe.

MPS's profitability remains weak. In 2014, the bank reported a
pre-provision profit of EUR724 million, or 0.4% of the bank's
assets. Pre-provision profitability is negatively impacted by a
series of factors; in particular, significant deleverage, with
net loans reducing by 8% in 2014, and increasing proportion of
non-interest generating assets, with problem loans increasing
from 20% in 2013 to almost a quarter of gross loans in 2014.
Moody's said it does not expect significant improvements in the
bank's pre-provision profitability for 2015. Net profitability
was also negatively influenced by very high cost of credit; in
particular, in 2014 the bank reported EUR7.8 billion loan loss
charges, more than ten times the bank's pre-provision profit, and
more than 6% of loans. The bank reported that the very high level
of loan loss charges was significantly influenced by the ECB's
Asset Quality Review, which required a thorough revision of the
bank's collateral evaluation. The combination of weak pre-
provision profitability and very high loan loss charges led to a
significant EUR5.3 billion net loss in 2014. Moody's said it
expects a lower level of loan loss charges in 2015; however,
considering the rating agency's expectations of a still
stagnating economic environment in Italy, Moody's said that MPS's
cost of risk will remain high, and that it will be challenging
for MPS to reach an adequate level of net profitability this
year.

Moody's said that the downgrade of MPS's deposit and senior
unsecured debt ratings derives from the confirmation of the BCA,
the introduction of the rating agency's Loss Given Failure (LGF)
analysis, and revised government support assumptions.

MPS is subject to the EU Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive
(BRRD), which Moody's considers to be an Operational Resolution
Regime. The rating agency's standard assumptions, which are
applied to MPS, assume residual tangible common equity of 3% and
losses post-failure of 8% of tangible banking assets, a 25% run-
off in junior wholesale deposits, a 5% run-off in preferred
deposits, and a 25% probability of deposits being preferred to
senior unsecured debt. Under these assumptions, MPS's deposits
and senior unsecured debt are likely to face very low loss-given-
failure, due to the loss absorption provided by subordinated debt
and, potentially, by senior unsecured debt should deposits be
treated preferentially in a resolution, as well as the
substantial volume of deposits themselves. This results in a
Preliminary Rating Assessment for MPS's deposit and senior debt
of b3, two notches above the caa2 BCA.

At the same time, Moody's said that the introduction of the BRRD
has demonstrated a reduction in the willingness of EU governments
to bail-out banks, and this led to lower expectation of
government support. MPS is the third largest bank in Italy, but
significantly smaller than the largest two banks; as such,
Moody's said it does not consider MPS to be a systemically
important bank. The rating agency reduced its assumption of
government support for MPS to low from very high; the new
assumption lead to zero notches of uplift, from four notches
previously.

Taking into account the approved capital increase, Moody's said
that the incremental risk of requiring public support has
reduced, and it upgraded MPS's senior and junior subordinate
ratings to Caa3 from Ca; this level is one notch below the bank's
BCA, and it reflects the instruments' high loss-given-failure
level.

Moody's has withdrawn the outlooks on all subordinated debt
ratings for MPS. It has withdrawn these outlooks for its own
business reasons. Outlooks are now only assigned to long-term
senior debt and deposit ratings, indicating the direction of any
rating pressures.

The outlook on the deposit and senior unsecured rating is
negative, reflecting the challenges that MPS will face in 2015
and 2016. In particular, Moody's said that MPS's profitability
and asset quality will remain under pressure in the coming twelve
months.

Moody's also downgraded the deposit ratings of MPS's fully-owned
corporate and investment banking subsidiary MPSCS, and it
confirmed its BCA.

Moody's said that the drivers of the downgrade of MPSCS's deposit
ratings were the confirmation of the BCA, the introduction of
LGF, and reduced assumptions of government support.

Taking into account the very high interconnections between MPS
and MPSCS, the BCA of MPSCS is positioned at the same level as
its parent.

Moody's said it believes that a resolution of the MPS group would
be done at consolidated level; the rating agency's central
scenario is that domestic ring-fencing between MPS and MPSCS
would not be applied by the resolution authorities. For this
reason, Moody's said it applied MPS's LGF assumptions to MPSCS,
which resulted in a Preliminary Rating Assessment for MPSCS's
deposit of b3, two notches above the caa2 BCA.

The reduction of government support assumptions on MPS to low
from very high also impacted MPSCS, that had previously
benefitted from four notches of government support indirectly
through MPS. Moody's said that it also reduced its government
support assumptions for MPSCS to low.

MPSCS's negative outlook reflects the negative outlook on MPS.

Moody's said that the deposit and senior unsecured ratings for
MPS and MPSCS could be upgraded following a raise of MPS's BCA.
MPS's BCA could be raised following a reduction in the stock of
problem loans, return to sustainable profitability, and improved
capital buffers.

The ratings for MPS and MPSCS could be downgraded following a
further material deterioration in asset quality, or losses that
would reduce the current capital buffers.

Note 1: Unless noted otherwise, data in this report is sourced
from company reports and Moody's Banking Financial Metrics.

Note 2: Problem loans include non-performing loans (sofferenze),
watchlist (incagli), restructured (ristrutturati), and past-due
(scaduti); we adjust these numbers and only incorporate 30% of
the watchlist category as an estimate of those over 90 days
overdue.

List of Affected Ratings

Downgrades:

Issuer: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Downgraded to
     (P)B3 from (P)B1 Rating under review

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to B3
     Negative from B1 Rating under review

  -- Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Downgraded to B3 Negative
     from B1 Rating under review

Issuer: MPS Capital Services

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to caa2 from
     b1 Rating under review

  -- Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, Downgraded to B3 Negative
     from B1 Rating under review

Upgrades:

Issuer: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.

  -- Junior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Caa3
     (hyb) from Ca (hyb) Rating under review

  -- Multiple Seniority Medium-Term Note Program, Upgraded to
     (P)Caa3 from (P)Ca Rating under review

  -- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to Caa3 from Ca
     Rating under review

Confirmations:

Issuer: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.

  -- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Confirmed at caa2

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Confirmed at caa2

Issuer: MPS Capital Services

  -- Baseline Credit Assessment, Confirmed at caa2

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Changed To Negative From Rating Under Review

Issuer: MPS Capital Services

Issuer: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in March 2015.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZMUNAYGAS NC: S&P Affirms 'BB+' CCR, Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
'BB+' long-term corporate credit ratings on Kazakhstan-
government-controlled vertically integrated oil company
KazMunayGas NC JSC (KMG) and its core subsidiary KazMunaiGas
Exploration Production JSC (KMG EP).  The outlook is negative.

At the same time, S&P also affirmed its 'kzAA-' Kazakhstan
national scale rating on KMG.

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that despite weakening credit
metrics, KMG's liquidity will not deteriorate due to its
manageable debt maturity profile and dividend income from its
largest holdings.  However, S&P now thinks the likelihood of
extraordinary government support is very high, rather than
extremely high.  This reflects the absence of government support
amid the fall in oil prices and substantial capital expenditure
(capex), which the company has to finance with debt.  It also
reflects the lack of progress with regard intragroup
mergers/transactions, as KMG still has no access to the almost
US$4 billion of cash held at its majority-owned subsidiary KMG
EP. That said, according to S&P's criteria for government-related
entities (GREs) the revision of the likelihood of support does
not impact S&P's rating on KMG, which still receives four notches
of uplift from its stand-alone credit profile of 'b'.

KMG is a 100% government-owned national oil company with stakes
in essentially all of Kazakhstan's oil-related assets and
priority access to new assets, which also benefits from vertical
integration into pipelines.  KMG holds stakes in all significant
oil operations in Kazakhstan.  It is one of the country's largest
exporters and taxpayers and has some social mandates, such as
supplying the local market with fuel at fairly low prices and
investing in socially important projects.  Still, KMG is
responsible for only about 28% of the country's oil production
(12% if only majority-owned operations are included).

Most of KMG's peers have substantially reduced capex amidst the
collapse in oil prices, but KMG is not doing so as many of its
assets require investments.  Most of KMG's majority-owned oil
production assets are mature and lack growth prospects, its
refineries are relatively old, and the company only has minority
stakes in the country's most profitable and young oil projects
(such as 20% in the Tengizchevroil joint venture and 10% in the
Karachaganak field).  Contrary to S&P's expectations, KMG has not
received any meaningful financial support from the government and
continues to finance capex with company-level debt.  This will
significantly weaken its credit metrics, as we forecast a ratio
of funds from operations (FFO) to debt of below 12% in 2015-2016.

"We assess KMG's liquidity as "less than adequate," based on a
ratio of liquidity sources to liquidity needs of less than 1.2x.
This is because we do not include cash held at KMG EP because it
might not be fully available for repayment of debt at the parent
company, in our view.  We believe the company's debt maturing in
2015 is covered by available liquidity.  At the same time, we
think that available liquidity sources might not fully cover the
full amount of capex that the company might undertake in 2015.
That said, we think the ongoing support from the government and
the company's adequate standing in credit markets and with banks,
partly offset the risk, as does the availability of financing
from the Kazakhstan National Fund," S&P said.

As of Dec. 31, 2014, liquidity sources at the parent company for
the next 12 months included:

   -- About US$3.1 billion of cash;

   -- About US$1.2 billion of dividend income from subsidiaries
      and point ventures, minus about US$0.7 billion in interest
      and about US$160 million of administrative costs; and

   -- The backup line from the Kazakhstan National Fund of about
      US$2.7 billion and availability of financing under
      uncommitted lines from the government.

Key liquidity uses over the next 12 months as of the same date
included:

   -- About US$2.4 billion in short-term debt maturities,
      including a US$1.5 billion Eurobond repaid in January 2015.

   -- Capex for Kashagan, which S&P understands the parent
      company will have to finance; and

   -- Dividends to Samruk-Kazyna in line with the 15% payout
      ratio.

S&P's assessment of liquidity as less than adequate also factors
in the possible breach of covenants in 2015.  However, S&P
expects KMG to receive support from the government in various
forms to prevent early redemption claims.

The negative outlook on KMG mirrors the outlook on Kazakhstan.

If S&P was to lower its rating on Kazakhstan, it would likely
lower the rating on KMG.  This is because the uplift S&P includes
in the long-term rating on KMG reflects S&P's expectation of a
"very high" likelihood of government support for the company.

S&P could also lower the ratings if KMG's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) weakens to 'b-', however, this would likely be due
to deteriorating liquidity, which S&P do not expect in its base-
case scenario.

S&P would likely revise its outlook on KMG to stable if S&P made
a similar revision to its rating on the sovereign.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


BRAAS MONIER: Fitch Affirms 'B' IDR, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Braas Monier Building Group S.A.'s
(Braas Monier) Long-term Issuer Default Rating at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook.

The affirmation reflects our expectation that Braas Monier's
financial profile will remain in line with the ratings.  Funds
from operations (FFO)-adjusted net leverage improved to 4.0x at
end-2014 from 4.8x a year earlier, as the group outperformed
Fitch's previous earnings expectations and reduced debt following
its IPO and the pre-payment of debt.  However, Fitch expects the
free cash flow (FCF) margin to remain low and the pace of
deleveraging to slow over the next 12 to 18 months.  This assumes
a slow recovery in end-markets and a modest ramp up in capex and
acquisitions in anticipation of Europe's return to growth.  Fitch
views positively management's focus on bolt-on acquisitions and
its commitment to maintain net debt to EBITDA below 2x.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leading Market Positions

Braas Monier is a leading pan-European roofing tiles and
components manufacturer.  The group has a leading market share in
concrete roofing tiles in most markets in which it operates,
(over 50% share in some markets), and a secondary or tertiary
market share in clay roofing tiles.  The group also has leading
positions in components and chimney and energy systems.

Slow Profitability Growth

Fitch calculated that the EBITDA margin improved to 16.1% in 2014
from 13.0% a year earlier, driven by management's successful
cost-cutting measures.  The group achieved this despite a
prolonged downturn leading to weak volumes from slow construction
activity in Braas Monier's core European markets and FX
headwinds.  Fitch expects future EBITDA margin improvement to be
slow, with some margin-dilutive acquisitions and increases in
operating costs mitigating productivity gains.

No Pressure from Acquisitions

Braas Monier's growth initiatives, including bolt-on acquisitions
and capacity expansions in emerging markets, can be accommodated
within its financial headroom, including its acquisition of
Golden Glay Industries for around EUR23 million.  The
acquisitions of Tejas Cobert and CT Cobert Telhas in Spain and
Portugal will complement Braas Monier's footprint, with leading
roof tile market shares on the Iberian Peninsula.  Management
also intends to use the two companies' existing distribution
networks to cross-sell its components products, and further
develop their export businesses.

Reduced Debt Burden

FFO adjusted net leverage reduced to 4.0x at end-2014 from 4.8x a
year earlier, following the group's IPO, prepayment of debt and
higher fundamental earnings.  Refinancing at better terms
simplified the group structure and reduced the debt service
burden.  Fitch expects a slow-down in deleveraging over the
coming years, assuming a slow recovery in end-markets and modest
bolt-on acquisitions.

Positive FCF Generation

Fitch expects FCF in 2015 to be positive, aided by minimal
restructuring costs.  However, an FCF margin in the low single
digits remains a credit weakness, as slightly increased capex and
dividends consume internally generated cash flow.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- FFO adjusted net leverage below 4.0x (FYE14: 4.0x).
   -- Maintaining the ability to pass on price increases and
      EBITDA margin in mid- to high teens (16.1% in 2014).
   -- FCF above 2% through the cycle (0.9% FCF margin in 2014).

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- FFO adjusted net leverage above 5.0x.
   -- Negative free cash flow for 18-24 months.
   -- FFO fixed charge cover below 2.0x (1.7x in 2014).

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity

Liquidity amounts to EUR160 million and comprises a EUR100
million undrawn revolver and around EUR60 million in cash
(adjusted for EUR120 million required to cover working capital
swings and restricted cash).  This compares with EUR12.4 million
in short-term debt maturities at end-2014. Refinancing risk will
only become material in 2019, ahead of its debt maturity in 2020.

Full List of Rating Actions

Braas Monier Building Group S.A.

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable

BMBG Bond Finance S.C.A.

Senior secured rating: affirmed at 'B+'/'RR3'

Monier Finance S.a r.l.

Senior secured rating: affirmed at 'B+'/'RR3'



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ING GROUP: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Rating to Additional Tier 1 Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned ING Group's (A/Negative) issue of
additional Tier 1 convertible notes a final rating of 'BB'.

The final rating is in line with the expected rating Fitch
assigned to the notes on April 7, 2015.

The notes are CRD IV-compliant perpetual additional Tier 1
contingent convertible capital securities.  The notes are subject
to automatic conversion if ING Group's consolidated common equity
Tier 1 (CET1) ratio falls below 7%, and any coupon payments may
be cancelled at the discretion of the group.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating is five notches below ING Group's implicit intrinsic
creditworthiness.  The latter reflects somewhat higher risk in
ING Group as a holding company compared with its main operating
company ING Bank (A+/Negative/a).  The notching reflects the
notes' higher expected loss severity when compared with average
recoveries (two notches) as well as high risk of non-performance
(an additional three notches).

The notching for loss severity reflects the instruments' deep
subordination, full contractual automatic conversion language,
and that the instruments can be converted before the point of
non-viability.

The three notches for non-performance risk reflect the
instruments' fully discretionary coupon payment, which Fitch
considers as the most easily activated form of loss absorption.
The consolidated phased-in CET1 ratio of ING Group (where the 7%
trigger applies) was 13.5% (fully-loaded CET1 ratio of 10.5%) at
end-December 2014.

Fitch expects the Dutch regulator to impose restrictions on
interest payments on the notes should ING Group's capital
approach the estimated Pillar 1 limit of 10% CET1 phased in by
2019 (4.5% minimum CET1 plus 2.5% capital conservation buffer
plus 3% systemic risk buffer).  Given ING Group's robust capital
position, the current level of distributable items and Fitch's
expectations for their evolution, the agency has limited the
notching for non-performance to three notches.

Given the securities are perpetual, their deep subordination,
coupon flexibility and going concern mandatory conversion of the
instruments, Fitch has assigned 100% equity credit.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As the notes are notched down from ING Group's implicit intrinsic
creditworthiness, their rating is broadly sensitive to the same
factors as those that would affect ING Bank's Viability Rating.
Their rating is also sensitive to the implied notching of ING
Group from ING Bank, which factors in the risk in the remaining
insurance operations.

The notes' rating is also sensitive to changes in Fitch's
assessment of their non-performance risk relative to that
captured in ING Bank's VR.


VAN GANSEWINKEL: Creditors Seek to Take Over Business
-----------------------------------------------------
Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News reports that Van Gansewinkel
Group BV's creditors are seeking to take control of the company
from CVC Capital Partners and KKR & Co. as they restructure its
debt.

According to Bloomberg, three people familiar with the matter
said Alcentra Capital Corp., Beach Point Capital Management,
Capula Investment Management and ING Groep NV proposed that
creditors take full control from the private equity owners in
exchange for postponing about EUR800 million (US$860 million) of
loans due 2017 and 2018.  The people, as cited by Bloomberg, said
remaining lenders have until today, April 24, to vote on the
plan.

Restructuring negotiations started last year after KKR and CVC,
which acquired Van Gansewinkel in 2007, failed to find a buyer
for the business that's been hurt by greater competition,
Bloomberg relays.

The people said under the plan, proposed on April 20, the company
will have five years from completion of the restructuring to pay
back EUR320 million of senior loans and six years to repay about
EUR500 million of new payment-in-kind loans while the owners will
get warrants in the reorganized company, Bloomberg relates.

The people said without unanimous support for the restructuring
proposal, creditors may seek backing from a London court,
Bloomberg notes.  The U.K. legal process, known as a scheme of
arrangement, requires consent from 75% of lenders, Bloomberg
says.

Van Gansewinkel Group BV is a Dutch waste management firm.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


ESPIRITO SANTO: Sells Art Work, 36-Story Building in Miami
----------------------------------------------------------
Margot Patrick at The Wall Street Journal reports that art work
and office buildings are being sold by bankruptcy receivers for
the Espirito Santo group of companies that collapsed last year
amid fraud allegations.

According to the report, the 36-story Espirito Santo Plaza in
Miami went on the block in April after Luxembourg officials
managing the bankrupt companies hired Florida's EXAN Capital to
manage the sale. The office and condominium tower, located in
Miami's Brickell Avenue financial district, is expected to fetch
at least $120 million based on market prices, the report relates.

The Journal notes that the proceeds of the sale will go to
creditors of Espirito Santo International SA, the top holding
company of the former Espirito Santo empire that spanned banking,
real estate, health care and energy, and its subsidiaries.

Espirito Santo Plaza had been owned by Florida-registered Estoril
Inc., part of Espirito Santo International subsidiary Rio Forte
Investments SA, the Journal discloses.

The Journal adds that Espirito Santo International also put up
for sale a set of paintings at Christie's in Paris last month.
According to Christie's website, paintings offered by multiple
sellers including the Espirito Santo International estate raised
EUR2.98 million ($3.18 million) on March 30. A spokeswoman for
Christie's said she couldn't provide a breakdown by seller, the
Journal notes.

According to the Journal, Portugal's Espirito Santo family spent
decades building a global network of financial and industrial
companies under patriarch Ricardo Salgado. The Journal relates
that the group started to collapse last spring when the Bank of
Portugal appointed auditors to review Esp¡rito Santo
International's accounts and they found irregularities. A tangle
of cross-funding across the group unraveled, leading to the
August failure of the group's prize asset, Banco Espirito Santo
SA.

The Journal says Banco Espirito Santo's failure is under
investigation by the Bank of Portugal, the country's markets
regulator and the prosecutor's office, which has opened probes
for suspected money laundering and fraudulent practices.

Other assets up for sale across the insolvent group include
several real-estate projects in Brazil and a 66% stake in real-
estate developer Property Brasil SA, the Journal discloses citing
documents on the receiver's website.

The Journal says the Luxembourg court-appointed receivers haven't
publicly said how much the group companies held in assets and
liabilities at the time of their collapses. They also haven't
indicated what the ultimate outcome for creditors might be. Alain
Rukavina, receiver for Espirito Santo International and Rio
Forte, didn't immediately respond to requests for comment.

The Journal notes that the sales come as some Espirito Santo
creditors have taken legal action in the U.K. and Portugal over
repayment.

In mid-April, New Zealand's Superannuation Fund and several other
funds filed a claim in Portugal against Novo Banco SA, the "good
bank" carved out of Banco Espirito Santo, over a loan made by a
Luxembourg investment vehicle to the Portuguese bank, the Journal
reports.  According to the report, the New Zealand retirement
fund, holding notes backed by the loan, is questioning the
legality of a decision by the Bank of Portugal to keep the loan
in the rump "bad bank" of Banco Espirito Santo where it is
unlikely to be repaid.

Junior bondholders in Banco Espirito Santo have also filed
lawsuits in Portugal and in the European Union's general court
over actions by Portuguese and European Union authorities in the
bank's August breakup, the Journal adds.

                       About Espirito Santo

Espirito Santo International S.A., through its subsidiaries,
provides services which include corporate and retail banking,
insurance, investment banking, brokerage, asset management, and
also operates in the agriculture, hotel, and real estate
industry.  The company was formerly known as Espirito Santo
International Holding S.A. and changed its name to Espirito Santo
International S.A. in August 2003.  The company was incorporated
in 1975 and is based in Luxembourg.

In July 2014, Espirito Santo International SA filed for creditor
protection in a Luxembourg court, saying it is unable to meet its
debt obligations.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


AUTOBANN: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Corp. Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B1 corporate family rating
and a B1-PD probability of default rating to Russian road
construction company Autobann (LLC SOYUZDORSTROY) with a stable
outlook. This is the first time that Moody's has rated the
company.

Autobann's B1 CFR primarily reflects its (1) sectoral, geographic
and customer concentration relative to global peers, with
reliance upon a single industry segment -- road construction --
and the majority of contracts being with the Russian government;
(2) competitive market environment; (3) exposure to cost
inflation, which may be more material in 2015 than in previous
years; (4) in-year liquidity volatility, with costs incurred
throughout the year but contract receipts clustered towards the
end of each fiscal year; and (5) single shareholder corporate
structure, which potentially presents corporate governance risks.

However, the rating also takes into account (1) the low risk
business model of the company whereby most projects are performed
against contracts with the state bodies; (2) exposure mainly to
low-risk simple road construction, with only modest exposure to
more complex multi-year works such as junctions and bridges; (3)
strong net liquidity profile and minimal long-term debt; (4)
relatively robust historical profitability for the segment; (5)
track record of successful project completion; and (6)
conservative financial policies.

The size of the order book has increased in recent years and
Autobann already has substantial contracted volumes through 2017.
However, Moody's expects that there will be a slowdown in light
of the government's budget constraints. The strong order book and
low level of debt provide a degree of resilience to a slowdown in
new contracts.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Autobann
will maintain construction volumes at 2014 levels, and that its
business model will prove resilient to cost inflation risks. The
outlook assumes that the company's leverage measured by
debt/EBITDA will sustainably remain below 2.0x, and coverage
measured by EBITA/interest above 3.0x.

Given the company's current scale of operations and limited
diversification, an upgrade in the medium term is unlikely. A
continuing track record of strong financial performance and
conservative financial policies, and maintenance of good
visibility over future cash flows alongside conservative
liquidity management would have a positive effect on the ratings.

Autobann's rating could come under downward pressure if the
company faced material deterioration in its business and
financial profile, with leverage measured by reported debt/EBITDA
increasing above 2.0x, and EBITA/interest falling below 3.0x.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
Industry published in November 2014.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Autobann (LLC SOYUZDORSTROY) is
the third-largest Russian infrastructure construction company in
terms of contracts portfolio, specialising in road construction.
The company operates 14 branches in the Russian regions and
participates in the large-scale federal road construction
projects such as the M-4 "Don", M-3 "Ukraine", M-7 "Volga" in
Central Russia, and regional projects primarily in West Siberia.
In 2013, Autobann reported RUB22.3 billion (approximately US$700
million) in revenue and RUB2.6 billion in EBITDA (US$81 million).


FAR-EASTERN SHIPPING: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Far-Eastern Shipping Company Plc's
(FESCO) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating to 'B-'
from 'B', and removed it from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).  The
Outlook is Negative.

The downgrade reflects our expectation that the company is
unlikely to reduce its funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net
leverage to below 5x by the end of 2015 as a result of weaker
rouble and continued underperformance of its rail division, even
if the ongoing Eurobond buyback tender is successfully realised
in full, in accordance with the company's plans.

The Negative Outlook incorporates the uncertainty around the
operating environment and the company's exposure to the shrinking
Russian economy and high volatility of the rouble to US dollar
exchange rate.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Bond Buybacks Not a Distressed Debt Exchange

Fitch does not consider the Eurobond and rouble bond buybacks
that FESCO announced on 31 March 2015 as a Distressed Debt
Exchange (DDE) under the agency's DDE criteria, as the tender
acceptance is not conditional on a minimum aggregate amount being
tendered and is not combined with the amendment of restrictive
covenants.  Fitch also believes that the offer was not made in
order to avoid bankruptcy, similar insolvency or intervention
proceedings or a traditional payment default as the bonds mature
in 2018 and 2020 and do not cause an imminent liquidity squeeze.
The bondholders are not obliged to participate in the offer as it
is voluntary.

FESCO initially announced it would spend USD85 million on a
Eurobond buyback for both issues with the possibility of
modifying the maximum payment amount.  On April 20, 2014, the
company announced an increase in the amount it would spend on the
Eurobonds buyback to USD130 million.  FESCO proposed to
bondholders a discount of 49%-65% on the bonds' nominal value
depending on the application submission date and the particular
Eurobond.

FESCO expects to fund the Eurobonds buyback with external funds
which are mostly local currency denominated.  If fully realized,
the tender could improve FESCO's net debt-based credit metrics
and its FX risk exposure, although interest coverage ratios may
weaken as the cost of new debt is likely to be higher than the
coupons on Eurobonds.

FESCO has also offered to buyback rouble bonds as well for the
nominal value of RUB4bn (80% of outstanding rouble bonds) with a
20% discount.  The application period for local bonds has closed
and FESCO received applications for RUB2.992 billion bonds with a
nominal value of RUB1,000 each at a fixed price of 80% of the
nominal value.  FESCO spent RUB2.5 billion on buying back rouble
bonds covering the discounted bonds value (RUB2.4 billion) and
accrued interest expense.  The rouble bonds buyback was funded
with own funds.

FX Risks Are Still High

FESCO remains exposed to foreign currency fluctuations as about
86% of its total debt at end-2014 was denominated in US dollars.
In contrast, only around 47% of revenues are dollar-linked or
dollar-denominated.  The company is improving the natural hedge
of its earnings through renegotiation of contracts in the port
division, converting certain port tariffs to US dollars from
roubles.  In addition, FESCO has made an offer to buy back a
portion of its US dollar-denominated Eurobonds due in 2018 and
2020.  The company expects the buyback to be funded mostly by
rouble-denominated external funds.  If successful, this should
result in narrowing the currency mismatch between FESCO's debt
and revenue.

Low Capex, Positive FCF Expected

We expect FESCO to revise its investment plans down to a
maintenance level of around USD22 million annually on average
over 2015-2018.  Together with its policy of zero dividend
payments as long as the fixed charge coverage ratio is below 2.0x
and consolidated total leverage ratio is above 3.25x, this may
allow management to keep FCF positive over 2015-2018.

Continued Rail Division Underperformance

In 2014, FESCO's rail division reported revenue of USD165 million
and EBITDA of USD45 million, a 34% and 50% year-over-year (yoy)
decline respectively, driven by the decline of gondola rates,
single-digit decline in rail cargo load as well as rouble
devaluation.  Freight rail volumes and prices continued to
decline in 2014 driven by the slowdown of the Russian economy.
In the medium term, we expect freight volumes to decline
following a GDP contraction, which we currently forecast at 4.5%
in 2015 and at 1% in 2016.  Fitch do not expect gondola rates to
increase as falling demand for the transportation of commodities
intensifies the competition between freight rail operators.

Port Division Is Key

FESCO's port business continues to remain the key contributor to
the company's earnings responsible for about 46% of group's 2014
EBITDA given its higher margins.  Intensified international trade
between Russia and Asian countries benefit FESCO's volumes in the
port segment.  Total container and non-container volumes
demonstrated strong growth of around 7.7% and 16.7%,
respectively, while the revenue and EBITDA of this division
declined by 7.4% and 1.3% yoy in 2014.  This was mostly due to
rouble depreciation as in rouble terms revenue and EBITDA
increased by 11.1% and 26.8%, respectively.  Fitch expects the
port division to continue to outperform the company's rail
division due to the high margin container business,
implementation of a cost-optimization program and tariff
dollarization, which the company implemented at end October 2014.

Buyback Driven Deleveraging Expected

From 2014, Fitch has incorporated a repo loan in its leverage and
coverage metrics calculations as margin calls payment last year
were partially funded by cash from within the restricted group,
although the loan of EUR73m at end-2014 with a pledge over
FESCO's 24.1% stake in TransContainer (BB+/Stable) is outside the
restricted group and ring-fenced.  Fitch expects FESCO's
outstanding loans and borrowings to decrease by up to 24% yoy at
end-2015 (assuming current exchange rates are unchanged by end-
2015) mainly as a result of the expected buyback process, if
fully realised.  This would improve the company's FFO adjusted
leverage metrics.  However, Fitch does not anticipate FESCO to
reduce its FFO net adjusted leverage to below 5.0x by end-2015,
primarily as a result of weak performance of the rail division
and rouble depreciation.

Manageable Liquidity

Fitch assesses FESCO's liquidity position as manageable.  At end-
2014, FESCO had cash and cash equivalents of USD66 million
compared to short-term debt of USD48 million including a repo
loan.  Also the company had unused local currency credit
facilities.

FESCO's debt repayment profile is spread with the remaining
RUB2bn local bonds to be repaid over 2016-2017 in four half-year
instalments and Eurobonds of USD550 million and USD325 million
due in 2018 and 2020, respectively.  Financial covenants (i.e.
fixed charge coverage ratio at 2.0x or higher and consolidated
total leverage ratio of less than 3.25x) in the Eurobonds
documentation limit the ability to incur additional debt over
certain limits but their breach does not constitute an event of
default as they are not maintenance covenants.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to a revision of
the Outlook to Stable include:

   -- A sustained decrease in FFO lease-adjusted net leverage
      below 5.5x and FFO fixed charge coverage above 1.5x on a
      sustained basis.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to a downgrade
include:

   -- Sustained slowdown of the Russian economy, rouble
      depreciation or weaker than expected operational
      performance, leading to projected FFO lease-adjusted net
      leverage above 5.5x and FFO fixed charge cover below 1.5x
      on a sustained basis.

   -- Weaker liquidity position.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Russian GDP of -4.5%-0% over 2015-2017; Chinese GDP of
      6.5%-6.8% over 2015-2017
   -- Russian CPI 7.3-15% over 2015-2017
   -- No dividends payments
   -- Capex of around USD20-23m over 2015-2017
   -- USD/RUB exchange rate of 50-60 over 2015-2017

FULL LIST OF RATINGS

Far-Eastern Shipping Company Plc

   -- Long-term foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
      removed from RWN, Outlook Negative

   -- Long-term local currency IDR downgraded to 'B-' from 'B';
      removed from RWN, Outlook Negative

   -- National Long-term rating downgraded to 'BB-(rus)' from
      'BBB+(rus)'; removed from RWN, Outlook Negative

   -- Local currency senior unsecured rating downgraded to 'B-'
      from 'B'; removed from RWN, Recovery Rating 'RR4'

Far East Capital Limited S.A. (Luxembourg)

   -- Foreign currency senior unsecured rating downgraded to 'B-'
      from 'B'; removed from RWN, Recovery Rating 'RR4'.


O'KEY LLC: Fitch Assigns 'B+(EXP)' Rating to New RUB5-Bil. Bond
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned O'KEY LLC's upcoming RUB5 billion bond
under its RUB25 billion program an 'B+(EXP)' expected rating,
with a Recovery Rating of 'RR4' and an expected National Long-
term rating of 'A(rus)(EXP)'.

The assignment of the final rating is subject to the receipt of
final documentation conforming to information already received.

The notes are rated at the same level as O'KEY's Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) of 'B+', reflecting the absence of subordination to
other unsecured debt issued by the group.

The planned five-year RUB5 billion senior unsecured bond is
expected to be issued by O'KEY LLC, with a guarantee by the
holding company O'key Group SA (O'KEY) and a suretyship of JSC
Dorinda, the group entity that owns real estate and long-term
lease rights.  These notes rank junior to O'KEY's RUB5 billion
secured debt instruments.  The bond will also benefit from a put
option in one year.

The proceeds will be used to refinance part of O'KEY's short-term
debt (RUB12.4 billion at 2014-end) and capex.  Consequently,
there will not be a material increase in gross or net debt as a
result of the bond issue.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Recovery Assumptions

Fitch assumes that given the group's large scale of operations
and strong market position in the Russian food retail market, the
prospect of recoveries for noteholders, given default, would
likely be based on a "going concern" basis.  In Fitch's bespoke
recovery analysis for the company, a distressed multiple of 5.0x
and an embedded value (EV) of RUB39 billion are assumed.  Fitch's
distressed EV analysis implies a post-restructuring EBITDA of
RUB7.8 billion.

Recoveries Capped

Based on Fitch's estimated enterprise valuation in a distressed
sale scenario the resulting recoveries on the proposed notes
would equate to a Recovery Rating of 'RR1' (91% - 100% recovery
given default) although the assigned recovery is capped at 'RR4'
(31%-50% recovery prospects given default) given the Russian
jurisdiction based on the agency's country-specific treatment of
Recovery Ratings.  Therefore, there is no notching of the notes
from O'KEY's IDR.

Bond Issuance Program

O'KEY has a registered bond program with a total value of RUB20
billion (post placement of the RUB5 billion issue), including
five tranches (RUB3 billion-RUB5 billion) of five-year maturity
each.  Should the company consider a placement of additional bond
issues from the program these bonds are likely to be rated at the
same level as the group's IDR.

Weaker Credit Metrics

Gross funds from operations (FFO) adjusted leverage weakened to
4.2x in 2014 from 3.1x in 2013 following a large increase in debt
raised for expansionary capex.  Given the planned launch of the
new convenience store format, together with the accelerated store
openings in 2015-16, Fitch expects gross FFO adjusted leverage to
remain between 4.0x and 4.4x for FY15 to FY18, albeit still
commensurate with the ratings.  Similarly, Fitch projects FFO
fixed charge cover will deteriorate to around 2.0x (FY14: 2.3x),
given increased cost of debt.

Change in Management Team

In 2014, the company underwent a few major changes in its
management team.  Tony Maher was appointed the company's Chief
Executive Officer in February 2014, succeeding Patrick Longuet
who had been with O'KEY for the past seven years.  Also, a new
Commercial Director, Angelo Turati, was appointed in October
2014. Although these individuals come with vast industry
experience and have in-depth knowledge of the Russian market, we
believe there are execution risks in managing step changes to the
company's strategy, which include modifying the logistics
operations amid a challenging trading environment.

Tougher Retail Competition in Russia

O'KEY will face more intense competition from major market
players, who have also aggressive expansion plans and have
identified hypermarkets as one of their target areas of growth.
Fitch believes that this further expansion from competitors will
translate into pressure on operating margins for all retailers,
particularly as they use pricing as a factor to attract consumers
whose spending power should remain subdued in 2015.
Expansion into New Regions

Although O'KEY has been successful in one of the most competitive
regions in Russia (St. Petersburg - 42% of group sales in 2014),
there are execution risks embedded in its expansion plans into
other regions in Russia where consumer purchasing power and
infrastructure are less developed.  In addition, O'KEY will be
launching its new convenience store format, which we expect will
negatively impact group profit margin in 2015 before improving in
2016.

Negative Free Cash Flow

Fitch projects that O'KEY will be able to finance more than 50%
of its capex with internally generated cash flows.  However,
Fitch expects O'KEY to show negative free cash flow (FCF) over
the next four years, averaging 4% of net sales per annum, due to
its large expansion program and a dividend pay-out of up to 25%
of group net profit.  This is mitigated by O'KEY's proven access
to both bank and capital markets and its ability to obtain trade
creditors' financing for its working capital as sales continue to
grow.

Key Russian Hypermarket Operator

The group's positioning in the fast-growing hypermarket format
enables O'KEY to capture the structural shift towards modern food
retail chains in Russia.  The group has shown reasonable
resilience during the 2008/9 economic downturn.  In addition,
operating performance in terms of sales per sq m compares
positively against other food retailers: RUB272,000 for O'KEY vs.
RUB246,000 for X5 Retail Group and RUB277,000 for Lenta for 2014.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to a negative
rating action including, including the Outlook being revised to
Negative, are:

   -- A sharp contraction in like-for-like sales growth relative
      to peers

   -- Material failure in executing its expansion plan

   -- EBITDAR margin erosion to below 9% (FY14: 9.9%)

   -- FFO-adjusted gross leverage remaining above 4.5x on a
      sustained basis

   -- Deterioration of liquidity position as a result of high
      capex and weakened capital market in the country

Positive: Future developments that could lead to a positive
rating action are:

   -- Solid execution of its expansion plan and positive like-
      for-like sales growth relative to peers

   -- Maintaining current market position in Russia's retail
      sector

   -- Ability to maintain the group's EBITDAR margin of at least
      9.5%-10%

   -- FFO-adjusted gross leverage below 3.5x on a sustained basis

   -- FFO fixed charge coverage around 2.0x on as sustained basis

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

At end-2014 about 60% of O'KEY's debt was long-term (RUB19bn)
while most of the remainder was short-term under one-year
revolving credit facilities for which the company has a
consistent track record of annual renewal.  Combined with strong
operating cash flow expected in FY15 Fitch believes that
liquidity sources are sufficient both for debt servicing and for
financing O'KEY's expansion plans.

The latest bonds issue will improve headroom under the company's
undrawn credit facilities.  Available unrestricted cash totalled
RUB5.4 billion as of end-2014 and undrawn committed credit
facilities amounted to RUB5.6 billion as of end-2014.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABANCA CORPORACION: S&P Raises LT Credit Rating to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took these rating actions:

   -- It raised the long-term credit ratings on Abanca
      Corporacion Bancaria S.A. (Abanca) to 'B+' from 'B' and
      affirmed the short-term ratings at 'B'.  The outlook is
      stable.

   -- It revised to stable from negative the outlooks on Bankia
      S.A. (Bankia) and its holding company BFA-Sociedad Tenedora
      de Acciones S.A.U. (BFA).  S&P affirmed the long- and
      short-term 'BB/B' ratings on Bankia and the 'B+/B' long-
      and short-term ratings on BFA.

   -- S&P revised to stable from negative the outlook on Banco
      Popular Espanol S.A. (Popular) and affirmed the long- and
      short-term counterparty credit ratings at 'B+/B'.

   -- At the same time, it affirmed the ratings on another eight
      Spanish banks.  The outlooks on these banks remain
      unchanged.  S&P also maintained on CreditWatch negative the
      ratings on the remaining two Spanish institutions S&P
      rates.

RATIONALE

The rating actions above follow S&P's review of all the Spanish
banks it rates.  The changes that resulted from the review were
an upgrade and two outlook revisions, all driven by bank-specific
developments and concentrated in lower-rated institutions.  S&P
also made some changes to the outlook drivers of three other
banks, which it has detailed in the outlook section.

Prospects for a more favorable economic environment in Spain --
as it enters a cyclical recovery and as dynamics in the property
market show signs of improvement -- will help support the
improving trends S&P has already anticipated for banks'
profitability, capital strengthening, and reduced problematic
assets.  These trends are unlikely, however, to lead by
themselves to widespread positive rating actions.

S&P's ratings on Spanish banks continue to reflect the banks'
wide range of creditworthiness; long-term ratings range from
'BBB+' to 'B+'.  S&P rates 10 of the 14 rated entities higher
than it did one year ago, and eight of the 14 are rated
investment grade.  All banks have a stable outlook, with the
exception of two that are on CreditWatch negative, one that still
has a negative outlook, and one that has a positive outlook.

The upgrade of Abanca is supported by its strengthened capital
position following its EUR1.1 billion net profit in 2014.  This
pushed up S&P's estimated risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio for
the bank to 7.9% at end-2014, which S&P expects the bank will
maintain or slightly increase over the next 12-18 months.  S&P
revised its capital and earnings assessment on the bank to
adequate from moderate and the bank's SACP to 'b' from 'b-'.  All
other factors supporting the ratings remain unchanged, including
S&P's "weak" risk position assessment.  S&P acknowledges that the
bank significantly reduced its stock of problematic assets in
2014.  S&P also notes that, under its new management team, the
bank is taking initiatives to tighten its underwriting standards
and improve its risk processes.  However, S&P believes that
implementing a new risk framework and changing the risk culture
of an institution takes time.  Furthermore, S&P's weak risk
position assessment factors in the bank's large stock of deferred
tax assets (some of which were added to the balance sheet in
2014, partly explaining the large profits reported in that year),
as well as the high leverage of its Spanish holding company,
Abanca Holding Financiero S.A. Both factors are not appropriately
captured in S&P's RAC measures and, in our view, lower the
quality of the bank's capital.

S&P's outlook revision to stable from negative on Bankia reflects
the progress S&P has seen the bank make in cleaning up
problematic exposures, and the likely benefits that revamping the
risk management unit would have on future credit performance.
Thus, unlike previously, S&P considers it feasible that its
future credit performance will not diverge from the system
average.  These positive developments could lead S&P to revise
its assessment of the bank's risk position to adequate from
moderate, and, therefore, its SACP to 'bb' from 'bb-'.  A higher
SACP, in turn, would help offset the negative impact of the
potential removal of government support (as resolution regimes
are implemented) on S&P's ratings on Bankia.  This is why S&P's
outlook on the ratings is currently stable.

The outlook revision to stable from negative on BFA follows the
outlook revision on Bankia S.A., its core operating entity, as,
all other things being equal, S&P expects the ratings on parent
and subsidiary to move in tandem.

The outlook revision on Popular to stable from negative reflects
S&P's view that management is conscious of the strategic
challenges it faces (to strengthen its balance sheet, workout its
large stock of nonperforming assets, turnaround its weak
profitability, and redefine its risk appetite and culture) and is
taking initiatives to address them at a time when the economic
environment is improving.  If the bank continues to make progress
in its turnaround, while at the same time preserving the strength
of its franchise, S&P would revise its assessment of its business
position to adequate from moderate, and its SACP to 'b+' from
'b'. A higher SACP, in turn, would help offset the negative
impact of the potential removal of government support (as
resolution regimes are implemented) on S&P's ratings on Popular.
This is why S&P's outlook on the bank is currently stable.

OUTLOOKS

Abanca

The stable outlook on Abanca balances:

   -- S&P's possible removal, by year-end 2015, of the one notch
      of extraordinary government support that S&P currently
      incorporates into its ratings, should S&P considers that
      extraordinary government support has become less
      predictable under the new EU legislative framework, and, in
      turn, S&P sees a greater likelihood that senior unsecured
      liabilities could incur losses if the bank were to fail;
      with

   -- The bank's ongoing improvement in its liquidity position,
      notably by reducing its short-term and ECB borrowings,
      which S&P expects to continue and which could lead S&P to
      revise its liquidity assessment to adequate from moderate,
      and therefore lead S&P to revise the bank's SACP upward.

The stable outlook reflects that S&P currently considers an
upgrade or downgrade unlikely.  For S&P to consider an upgrade it
would need to conclude that, following the implementation of the
EU bank resolution framework, the likelihood of Abanca receiving
potential extraordinary government support was effectively
unchanged, or that the bank has a large enough buffer of
subordinated instruments that offset increased bail-in risk.  S&P
could also consider an upgrade once the bank completes its
turnaround and proves it can achieve sustainable profitability.

Alternatively, S&P could lower its ratings on Abanca if the
bank's liquidity position does not continue improving or if it
adopts aggressive financial policies.  Such policies could
include substantially upstreaming its regulatory capital surplus
to shareholders, or providing liquidity to shareholders or
affiliated parties.

Bankia S.A.

The stable outlook on Bankia balances:

   -- The possibility that we could remove by year-end 2015 the
      one notch of extraordinary government support that S&P
      currently incorporates into the ratings if it was to
      consider that extraordinary government support is less
      predictable under the new EU legislative framework, and
      therefore that there is a greater likelihood that senior
      unsecured liabilities could incur losses if the bank were
      to fail; with

   -- S&P's expectation that, following its risk-management
      revamp, the bank would not likely resume the aggressive
      lending practices of its past and, therefore, that the
      future quality of its credit exposures could be in line
      with peers'.

S&P's stable outlook reflects its view that it is currently
unlikely to raise or lower the ratings.  For S&P to consider an
upgrade it would have to conclude that, following the
implementation of the EU bank resolution framework, the
likelihood of Bankia receiving potential extraordinary government
support was effectively unchanged, or that the bank has a large
enough buffer of subordinated instruments that offset increased
bail-in risk. Another factor that could lead to an upgrade could
be a substantial improvement in the liquidity position, which
currently remains constrained by what S&P sees as a structurally
heavy reliance on short-term funding and funding support from the
ECB.

Alternatively, S&P could consider lowering the ratings if it
concludes that the bank's approach to risk has not dramatically
changed, or if the group starts returning capital to the state
such that it undermines S&P's assessment of its capital position
(both at the BFA consolidated level and at the level of Bankia
itself).

The stable outlook on BFA mirrors that on its operating entity,
Bankia S.A. as, all else being equal, S&P expects the ratings to
move in tandem.

Popular

The stable outlook on Popular balances:

   -- The possibility that S&P could remove by year-end 2015 the
      extraordinary government support that S&P currently
      incorporates into the ratings if it was to consider that
      extraordinary government support is less predictable under
      the new EU legislative framework, and therefore that there
      is a greater likelihood that senior unsecured liabilities
      could incur losses if the bank were to fail; with

   -- S&P's expectation that Popular will progress in tackling
      its challenges, particularly strengthening its balance
      sheet and working out its high stock of problematic assets;
      improving recurrent profitability and strengthening its
      risk framework; and concurrently in preserving the key
      strengths of its franchise.

S&P's stable outlook reflects its view that it is currently
unlikely to raise or lower the ratings.  For S&P to consider
raising the ratings it would need to conclude that, following the
implementation of the EU bank resolution framework, the
likelihood of Popular receiving potential extraordinary
government support remains effectively unchanged, or that the
bank has a large enough buffer of subordinated instruments that
offset increased bail-in risk.  S&P could also consider an
upgrade if its concerns about the bank's dependency on short-term
and ECB funding, and refinancing risk eases during S&P's rating
horizon.

S&P could lower the ratings if it do not see much progress in the
bank's turnaround or if the bank shifts toward a more aggressive
strategy -- for example engaging in a material acquisition in
geographies or businesses where its management know-how is
limited.

Bankinter

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the bank will
be able to support a RAC ratio of 7.25%-7.75% over the next 18-24
months on improving profits and despite higher business volumes.
S&P also expects Bankinter to maintain a focused business
strategy of growing selectively, particularly in corporate and
private banking, and preserving an asset quality track record
superior to that of the industry in Spain.  S&P believes,
however, that the bank's wholesale funding profile will remain
highly reliant on short-term resources.

Although S&P considers it unlikely at this stage, an upgrade
could possibly stem from a sustainable improvement in the
liquidity position if the bank were to reduce its reliance on
short-term funding.  Conversely, S&P could lower the ratings if
it anticipates that its capital position could weaken below a
level that S&P currently considers adequate, either because of
limited organic capital generation or higher and riskier loan
growth leading to much higher risk-weighted assets than S&P'
incorporates in its forecasts.

Sabadell

The negative outlook reflects that S&P might lower the ratings on
Sabadell by one notch by year-end 2015 if S&P considers that
extraordinary government support is less predictable under the
new EU legislative framework, and, as a result, S&P believes
there is a greater likelihood that senior unsecured liabilities
could incur losses if the bank were to fail.

Conversely, S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it
considers that potential extraordinary government support for
Sabadell's senior unsecured creditors is unchanged in practice,
despite the introduction of bail-in powers and international
efforts to increase banks' resolvability.

S&P could also revise the outlook to stable if it believes that
other rating factors, such as a stronger SACP or a large buffer
of subordinated instruments, fully offset increased bail-in
risks. Specifically, this could happen if the bank's capital
position improves beyond the levels that S&P currently
incorporates into the ratings and its RAC ratio for the bank
stands sustainably above 7%, or if the bank accelerates the
reduction of its large stock of problematic exposures and closes
the gap with domestic peers.  This assumes, though, that Sabadell
will successfully deal with the challenges resulting from the
planned acquisition of U.K.-based TSB Banking Group PLC.

Ibercaja

The positive outlook of Ibercaja reflects the possibility of an
upgrade if the bank's capital position continues improving and
S&P sees potential for its RAC to remain sustainably and
comfortably above 4.0% over the next 12-18 months.

Unlike in the recent past, though, S&P currently believes it is
more likely that capital strengthening results from organic
earnings generation -- on the back of a more supportive economic
environment -- than from specific capital initiatives.  Following
recent management changes, S&P now believes that previous plans
to undertake capital enhancing measures (potentially including a
capital increase) in the context of the bank's parent company
becoming a banking foundation are less likely to materialize.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the bank proves unable
to strengthen its solvency, which S&P sees as weak and
structurally constrained by its unlisted status and the limited
financial flexibility of its shareholders.  This would occur if
higher-than-anticipated credit losses or loan growth limit
Ibercaja's organic capital generation in 2015 and 2016.  A
revision of the outlook to stable could also occur if the bank
were to make additional acquisitions of weaker players that could
put pressure on its stronger asset quality than peers.

RATINGS LIST

Upgraded
                                 To               From
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      B+/Stable/B      B/Stable/B

Affirmed; Outlook Revised

Bankia S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BB/Stable/B      BB/Negative/B
Banco Financiero y de Ahorros S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      B+/Stable/B      B+/Negative/B
Banco Popular Espanol S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating       B+/Stable/B      B+/Negative/B

Affirmed

Banco Santander S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BBB+/Stable/A-2
Santander Consumer Finance S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BBB/Stable/A-2
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BBB/Stable/A-2
Cecabank S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BBB/Stable/A-2
Kutxabank S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BBB-/Stable/A-3
Bankinter S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BBB-/Stable/A-3
Banco de Sabadell S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BB+/Negative/B
Ibercaja Banco S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BB/Positive/B

Ratings Remain On CreditWatch

CaixaBank S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BBB/Watch Neg/A-2
Barclays Bank S.A.U.
Counterparty Credit Rating      BBB/Watch Neg/A-2


INSTITUTO VALENCIANO: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long-term issuer credit rating on Spanish financial agency
Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas (IVF) to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, the 'B' short-term issuer credit rating was
affirmed.

The upgrade of IVF follows a similar rating action on Valencia
(BB/Stable/B) on April 17, 2015.

The ratings on IVF reflect S&P's view of the strength of
Valencia's explicit statutory guarantee, under which it considers
IVF's liabilities as its own debt.  IVF is included in Valencia's
public-sector consolidation scope under the European System of
Accounting Standards.  Consequently, IVF's debt is covered by the
liquidity support that Spain's central government provides to
Valencia through the regional liquidity facility, Fondo de
Liquidez Autonomico(FLA).

In addition, S&P considers IVF to be a government-related entity
(GRE) and that there is an "almost certain" likelihood that
Valencia would provide timely and sufficient support to IVF if
needed.  S&P bases its view on our assessment of IVF's:

   -- "Critical" role for Valencia.  IVF carries out key
      functions that a private entity could not undertake, such
      as managing regional debt and public-sector credit policy.
      Consequently, S&P thinks that the markets would perceive a
      default by IVF as tantamount to a default by the region,
      especially considering Valencia's financial guarantee of
      IVF's debt.  In S&P's view, IVF's importance to Valencia is
      also reflected in the regional government's strong
      involvement in IVF's management and stable financial
      support; and

   -- "Integral" link with Valencia, considering that Valencia
      exerts total control over IVF's strategy and day-to-day
      operations and carries out extremely tight financial
      oversight.

Based on IVF's "critical" role for and "integral" link with
Valencia, as defined in S&P's GRE criteria, S&P equalizes the
ratings on IVF with those on Valencia.

S&P do not assess a stand-alone credit profile for IVF because
S&P do not consider it meaningful.  In S&P's view, IVF's
financial metrics are a reflection of its public-policy role and
total integration within Valencia's budget.  In addition, S&P
thinks IVF would not exist as an independent financial
institution if separated from Valencia's budget.

The stable outlook on IVF mirrors that on Valencia.  If S&P
downgraded Valencia, it would downgrade IVF, all other factors
remaining unchanged.

S&P could raise the ratings on IVF if S&P upgraded Valencia and
S&P continued to expect an "almost certain" likelihood of support
for IVF, based on S&P's view of IVF's "integral" link with, and
"critical" role, for Valencia.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


PROFIN BANK: Deposit Guarantee Commences Liquidation Procedure
--------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee
Fund on April 21 decided to begin the liquidation of Profin Bank

The fund appointed Viktor Shkurko as the liquidating agent,
Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, while effecting supervision over
that bank's activity, the NBU identified risky activity by the
bank, which let to multiple measures being taken by the regulator
against the bank, including fines for violations of financial
monitoring legislation.  In connection with this, on January 19,
2015, the bank was designated as insolvent, and interim
administration was introduced from January 20 to April 19, 2015,
Interfax-Ukraine relates.

Profin Bank is based in Kyiv.  The bank ranked 120th among 158
operating banks as of January 1, 2015, in terms of total assets,
which are worth UAH527.718 million, according to the National
Bank of Ukraine.


ROSHEN: Opts to Liquidate Mariupol Confectionery Factory
--------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that Mariupol-based PJSC Roshen
confectionery factory will face closure.

"At their meeting on April 20, 2015, shareholders unanimously
took a voluntary decision to liquidate PJSC Mariupol-based Roshen
confectionery factory.  The shareholders appointed an ad hoc
commission in charge of the liquidation of the entity.  The
liquidation of PJSC Mariupol Roshen confectionery factory will
proceed according to the model foreseen by Ukrainian laws,"
Interfax-Ukraine quotes Roshen as saying on its Web site.

The Mariupol factory ceased operating in February 2014,
Interfax-Ukraine relays.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, Roshen said the closure was due to
pressure from tax authorities and a ban on its supplies to
Russia.

Roshen owns factories in Ukraine, one in Lithuania, one in
Hungary and one in Russia based in Lipetsk.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALPARI UK: KPMG Charges US$6 Million in Administrator Fees
----------------------------------------------------------
LeapRate reports that the Alpari UK's administrator KPMG has
reported that it has already rung up fees of more than
GBP4 million (US$6 million) to come out of client funds.

LeapRate says KPMG expects to charge somewhere between
$7 and $8 million in fees. In addition to KPMG's special
administrator fees, KPMG has approved between $1.3 and
$1.6 million in lawyers' fees on the insolvency.

Adding in wages paid to retained Alpari UK clients and other
infrastructure costs, fees charged to Alpari UK will total
$12 and $14 million -- representing more than 10% of the value of
client funds of just under $100 million at Alpari UK as at
January 15, the report relays.

Any money haircut from these fees can be recouped in full from
the FSCS, although only up to a maximum of GBP50,000 per client,
according to the report. Clients who had more than GBP50,000 on
deposit will likely take at least a small hit, and will not get
all their money back, the report notes.

KPMG on April 15 released more information on the valuation of
trades for those Alpari UK clients who had open positions
involving Swiss Franc CHF pairs, LeapRate adds.

                           About Alpari

Alpari Group is a UK-based foreign exchange, precious metals and
CFD broker headquartered in London.  The company employs around
170 employees at its offices in Bishopsgate, London.

Upon the application of the directors of Alpari (UK) Ltd, on
Monday, Jan. 19, 2015, the High Court appointed Richard Heis,
Samantha Bewick and Mark Firmin of KPMG LLP as joint special
administrators of Alpari (UK) Ltd, under the Special
Administration Regime (SAR).  Alpari (UK) Ltd is a company
incorporated in the UK.

Alpari (UK) Ltd applied for insolvency on Jan. 19, 2015,
following the decision on Jan. 15, by the Swiss National Bank to
remove the informal peg to the euro at around 1.20 Swiss francs.
"The announcement by the SNB prompted volatility across the
foreign exchange markets which saw the company and many of its
clients make large losses.  After a weekend spent in urgent
discussions with various parties with a view to selling the
company, these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful," KMPG said
in a statement.


EXETER BLUE: Fitch Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'Bsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken multiple ratings action on Exeter Blue
Limited as:

  EUR31.9 million Class A notes: affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
  revised to Negative from Stable

  EUR31.9 million Class B notes: upgraded to 'Asf' from 'BBBsf';
  Outlook Negative

  EUR26.6 million Class C notes: upgraded to 'BBBsf' from 'BBsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR10.7 million Class D notes: upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR8.5 million Class E notes: upgraded to 'Bsf' from 'CCCsf';
  Outlook Stable

  EUR16.5 million subordinated note: unrated

Exeter Blue Limited is now a static UK synthetic balance sheet
securitization of project finance and infrastructure loans
primarily located in western Europe.  The senior exposure
(currently EUR261.6 million) is retained by the originator and
must be repaid in full before any of the rated notes are repaid.
The proceeds from the issue of the notes are held in a deposit
account with Lloyds Bank plc (A/Negative/F1).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade of classes B, C, D and E reflect the transaction's
strong performance over the last 12 months.  In this period, the
underlying reference portfolio has amortized to EUR388 million
from EUR597 million, resulting in a significant increase in the
credit enhancement available to the rated notes.  Credit
enhancement for the class B, C, D and E notes has grown to 16%,
9.2%, 6.4% and 4.3%, respectively, from 10.4%, 6%, 4.2% and 2.8%.

In calculating enhancement levels, Fitch has assumed that the
excess cash in the deposit account over the reference portfolio
will be used to repay the senior exposure at the next payment
date, per transaction documents.

Fitch has determined that excessive counterparty risk is now
present in this transaction in regards to Lloyds Bank which holds
cash in a deposit account which will be used to repay the notes
as the reference portfolio amortizes.  In the event that the
Lloyds were to jump to default, Exeter Blue would become an
unsecured creditor of Lloyds and would likely default on
contractual payments due to the noteholders.  As a result of this
excessive counterparty risk, the rated notes are now subject to a
cap equal to Lloyds Bank rating, currently 'A' with Negative
Outlook, leading to today's Outlook revision.

As a result of the reference portfolio amortization, exposure to
Cyprus has been removed from the portfolio (2.2% when last
reviewed).  Cyprus has a Country Ceiling of 'B', and as such in
all stress scenarios above 'BB+', a 100% loss would have been
assumed on any asset in this country.  The amortization of
Cypriot assets is therefore a significant benefit to the
transaction in stress scenarios above 'BB+' (see Fitch's Criteria
for Sovereign Risk in Developed Markets for Structured Finance
and Covered Bonds (February 2015) for further information).

Since inception, there have been two assets in the reference
portfolio which have been subject to a credit event.  The credit
events were first reported in April 2012 and August 2014 and had
a notional value at the time of the credit event of EUR10.8
million and EUR25 million respectively.  Following a loss
determination procedure, the losses applied to the transaction
were EUR4.6 million and EUR2.5 million, indicating recovery rates
of 58% and 90% respectively.  These losses were written off the
subordinated notes and subsequently topped up through an excess
spread mechanism present in the transaction.  As such the
subordinated notes remain fully funded.

As a result of the amortization, obligor concentration has
increased as the portfolio now consists of 25 obligors compared
with 33 previously.  The top obligor now represents 9.8% of the
outstanding portfolio compared with 8.5% a year ago.
Additionally the top five obligors have grown to 37.4% from 31.9%
of the portfolio.  When conducting its asset analysis, Fitch
attributed a 75% recovery multiplier and a 150% correlation
multiplier to the largest five obligors.

The Fitch estimated recovery rates on the underlying portfolio
range between 65% and 95%.  The analysis is based on asset-
specific recovery assumptions in tiers of 85% (base case) to 60%
(AAA stress case).  Additionally, the correlation assumptions for
the analysis were based on a relative ranking of project finance
correlations, which are lower than for corporate debt obligations
due to structural features.  Correlation for projects within the
UK, but from different sectors is considered to be 7%, whereas
the correlation for two projects in the UK and the same sector,
such as healthcare can be up to 13%.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

As part of its analysis, Fitch considers the sensitivity of the
notes' ratings to additional stresses on default and recovery
rate assumptions undertaken as part of the rating analysis.

The agency tested two additional sensitivities, one by increasing
the assumed default rates by 25% and the other by decreasing the
assumed recovery rates by 25%.  In both cases, there would be a
downgrade of up to two notches on the rated notes.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

The majority of the underlying assets have ratings or credit
opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally Recognised
Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European Securities and
Markets Authority registered rating agencies.  Fitch has relied
on the practices of the relevant Fitch groups and/or other rating
agencies to assess the asset portfolio information.

Prior to the transaction closing, Fitch conducted a review of a
small targeted sample of the originator's origination files and
found the information contained in the reviewed files to be
adequately consistent with the originator's policies and
practices and the other information provided to the agency about
the asset portfolio.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


MONEY PARTNERS 3: Moody's Lifts on 2 Note Classes to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of 20 notes and
left on review for upgrade the ratings of 6 notes in 2 UK non-
conforming residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions: Money Partners Securities 2 Plc (MPS 2) and Money
Partners Securities 3 Plc (MPS 3).

The rating action follows the review of 13 notes placed on review
on Dec. 9, 2014.

The rating action reflects (1) the better than expected
collateral performance and (2) the increased credit enhancement
since the previous rating action.

The placement on review for upgrade of six notes reflects the
review for possible upgrade of the swap counterparty and the
expected level of its Counterparty Risk ("CR") Assessment.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions:

Moody's has reassessed its lifetime loss expectation taking into
account the collateral performance of the transactions to date.
The portfolios show decreasing growth rate in delinquencies. In
MPS 2, the level of loans delinquent by more than 90 days
decreased from 32% in May 2010 down to 18% currently. As a
result, Moody's reduced the Expected Loss to 7.7% in MPS 2 down
from 8.7% of the original pool balance. In MPS 3, the level of
loans delinquent by more than 90 days decreased from 32% in June
2010 down to 18% currently. As a result, Moody's reduced the
Expected Loss to 9.6% in MPS 3 down from 10.2% of the original
pool balance. Moody's has also revised down the MILAN CE
assumption to 37.5% in MPS 2 and 38.4% in MPS 3 from 45.0% for
both transactions.

Increased Credit Enhancement:

The sequential amortization of the notes and the non-amortizing
reserve funds led to the increase in available credit enhancement
in both transactions. The notes have been amortizing sequentially
following the breach of the 90 days arrears performance trigger
set at 22.5% of the current pool balance. Principal amortization
has reverted to pro-rata in August 2014 for MPS 2 and June 2014
for MPS 3 after the 90 days delinquencies fell below 22.5% of
current pool balance. The reserve funds in both transactions are
non-amortizing since 2008 following the breach of the cumulative
losses performance trigger set at 1.25% of the original pool
balance.

Counterparty Risk Exposure and Updates to Moody's Structure
Finance Rating Methodologies:

The ratings of the Classes A2a, A2c, M1a, M1b and MERCS notes of
MPS 2 and the Classes A2a, A2b, A2c, M1a, M1b and MERCS in MPS 3
are constrained by operational risk. Moody's considers that the
current back-up servicing arrangements are insufficient to
support payments in the event of servicer disruption.

The back-up servicer in the affected transactions are Western
Mortgage Services Limited (NR), which targets full servicing
function transfer in 120 days from the relevant appointment. In
absence of servicer reports, Moody's considers that the cash
managers may not be able to perform the calculation necessary to
process payments in a timely fashion. In addition, current back-
up cash management arrangements are not compliant with Moody's
operational risk criteria. Homeloan Management Limited (HML) acts
as a back-up cash manager in the affected transactions. In
particular, Moody's notes that there are no automatic termination
of cash manager, no automatic appointment of back-up cash manager
and the current timeline on the transfer of cash management
function does not contain provisions to address the timely
payment of required amounts.

Moody's also believes that this risk is further exacerbated
because the senior notes are denominated in another currency. A
failure to make timely payments to the swap counterparty could
lead to a termination event under the swap documentation.

Moody's concludes that the maximum achievable rating for the
Class M1a and Class M1b in MPS 2 and Class M1a and Class M1b in
MPS 3 is Aa2(sf) in consideration of this risk. Moody's concluded
that the maximum achievable rating for Class A2a and A2c in MPS 2
and Class A2a, Class A2b and Class A2c in MPS 3 has increased
from Aa2(sf) to Aa1(sf) due to the partial mitigation of the
payment disruption risk through increased credit enhancement.

Moody's also assessed the exposure to The Royal Bank of Scotland
plc (Baa1, on review for upgrade/P-2) and Barclays Bank PLC
(A2/P-1) acting as swap counterparties when revising ratings
constraining the Classes M2a and M2b of MPS 2 and Classes B1a,
B1b, M2a and M2b of MPS 3. Moody's analysis considered the risks
of additional losses on the notes if they were to become unhedged
following a swap counterparty default by using the CR Assessment
as reference point for swap counterparties. In addition, Moody's
uses internal guidance on the CR Assessments to assess the rating
impact on outstanding structured finance transactions. The
internal guidance is in line with the guidance published in its
updated bank rating methodology and its responses to frequently
asked bank methodology-related questions. As a result, Moody's
has placed on review for upgrade the Classes M2a and M2b of MPS 2
and the Classes B1a, B1b, M2a and M2b of MPS 3.

Moody's incorporated the updates to its structured finance
methodologies in its analysis of the transactions affected by
today's rating actions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
January 2015.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected, (2) deleveraging of the capital
structure and (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is worse than Moody's expects, (2) deterioration in the notes'
available credit enhancement and (3) deterioration in the credit
quality of the transaction counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: Money Partners Securities 2 Plc

  -- GBP188.5M Class A2a Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
     on Feb 14, 2012 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- USD78M Class A2c Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
     Feb 14, 2012 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- GBP10M Class M1a Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     Dec 9, 2014 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR26.2M Class M1b Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously
     on Dec 9, 2014 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- GBP16M Class M2a Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf) and Remains On
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 9, 2014 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR4M Class M2b Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf) and Remains On
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 9, 2014 Baa3
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR15M Class B1 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
     Dec 9, 2014 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- MERCS Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 14,
     2012 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: Money Partners Securities 3 Plc

  -- GBP150.85M Class A2a Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf);
     previously on Feb 14, 2012 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- EUR247.5M Class A2b Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
     on Feb 14, 2012 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- USD50M Class A2c Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously
     on Feb 14, 2012 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  -- GBP26.65M Class M1a Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously
     on Dec 9, 2014 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR18M Class M1b Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     Dec 9, 2014 Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- GBP15.3M Class M2a Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf) and Remains
     On Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 9, 2014
     Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR17M Class M2b Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf) and Remains On
     Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 9, 2014 Baa2
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- GBP9.1M Class B1a Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains
     On Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 9, 2014 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR9.5M Class B1b Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remains
     On Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Dec 9, 2014 B1
     (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- GBP10.6M Class B2a Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously
     on Dec 9, 2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR6M Class B2b Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
     Dec 9, 2014 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- MERCS Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 14,
     2012 Downgraded to Aa2 (sf)


MYTRAH ENERGY: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws 'B' CCR
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Mytrah Energy Ltd. with a stable
outlook.  S&P then withdrew the rating at the company's request.
Mytrah is a Guernsey-based company that operates wind power
assets in India.

At the time of the withdrawal, the affirmed rating reflected
S&P's view that Mytrah would maintain its priority dispatch
position in supplying power and the efficiency of its operational
wind farms. In S&P's opinion, the company's significant expansion
plans and high leverage would have continued to constrain its
financial risk profile.  The modifiers did not affect the final
rating because Mytrah does not face material currency risk with
the non-issuance of its proposed guaranteed notes and the
company's credit profile is comparable to that of peers.

Prior to the withdrawal, the stable outlook reflected S&P's view
that Mytrah would continue to benefit from a supportive
regulatory framework for wind power in India over the next 12
months.


PHONES 4U: HMRC, Unsecured Creditors to Get 0.4% Payout
-------------------------------------------------------
Ellie Clayton at economia reports that unsecured creditors,
including HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), of Phones 4U Limited
will see a return of just 0.4%, PricewaterhouseCoopers said in
its latest progress report on April 14.

economia relates that PwC, which was appointed administrator of
the mobile retailer after it collapsed in September last year,
said secured creditors, who own GBP430 million of senior secured
notes which were listed on the Irish Stock Exchange, will receive
20% to 24% of their money, as their debt ranks higher in legal
terms.

However, unsecured creditors like HMRC, which PwC said is owed
about GBP75 million in VAT and Corporation tax, are only likely
to receive about 0.4%, or 0.4p in every pound owed, economia
relays. The total debt to unsecured creditors is about GBP168
million.

According to economia, PwC has recovered GBP27 million from the
sale of stock, most significantly through the sale of Apple
handsets.

It expects preferential claims from staff to be paid in full in
the next 6-9 months, the report notes.

                         About Phones 4u

Phones 4u was a large independent mobile phone retailer in the
United Kingdom.

On Sept. 15, 2014, Rob Hunt, Ian Green and Rob Moran of PwC were
appointed as joint administrators of these nine companies: Phones
4u Limited, Life Mobile Limited, 4u Wi-Fi Limited, 4u Limited,
Jump 4u Limited, MobileServ Limited, Phosphorus Acquisition
Limited, Phones 4U Group Limited and Phones4u Finance Plc.

On Sept. 16, 2014, Dan Schwarzmann, Nigel Rackham, Rob Hunt and
Ian Green were appointed joint administrators of Policy
Administration Services Limited.

On Oct. 8, 2014, Rob Hunt, Ian Green and Paul Copley were
appointed joint administrators of Phosphorus Holdco plc.

The companies are part of Phones 4U group.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* 40% of the Value of B2B Invoices in Western Europe in Default
---------------------------------------------------------------
Despite notable differences in the insolvency environment across
countries, B2B payment default rates in Western Europe remain
quite significant. This is expected to slow the still weak
economic recovery, particularly of the Eurozone, and keep
insolvency rates well above 2007 levels.

Around 40% of the total value of domestic and foreign B2B
invoices issued by respondents of the latest edition of the
Atradius Payment Practices Barometer survey for Western Europe,
was defaulted on. On average, 7% remained outstanding after 90
days past due, raising the likelihood of becoming collections
cases, and 1.2% was uncollectable. Survey respondents in Italy
and Greece appear to struggle the most with overdue and
uncollectable receivables. Respondents from Denmark and Sweden
show the strongest focus on receivables management.

The Atradius survey of B2B payment practices surveyed
approximately 3,000 businesses in 13 Western European countries.
In addition to the payment behaviour of domestic and foreign
customers, the survey looked at challenges to profitability and
DSO.

Within the still difficult business climate in many Western
European countries, liquidity problems remain the primary reason
for payment delays (51.4% of survey respondents in respect to
domestic and 37% in respect to foreign customers). This is most
often experienced by respondents in Greece (84.0% in respect to
domestic and 57.1% in respect to foreign customers) and Italy
(73.0% domestic and 48.3% foreign). Nearly the same percentage of
the respondents in Western Europe, who reported late invoice
payment due to customers' liquidity issues, expressed the opinion
that outstanding invoices are used as a source of financing. This
was noted most often in Austria (54.2% of respondents in respect
to domestic and 49.2% in respect to foreign customers).

Regardless of the reason for B2B customers delaying invoice
payment, the administrative and financial costs of overdue
receivables can be considerable for suppliers, and can erode
business profitability. It also supports the contention of 24% of
the respondents in Western Europe that cost containment will be
their biggest challenge to profitability in 2015. This is of
greatest concern in Switzerland, the Netherlands, France and
Italy. Respondents in Great Britain and Ireland, in contrast,
expect maintaining adequate cash flow to be their biggest
challenge this year.

Andreas Tesch, Chief Market Officer of Atradius N.V. stated, "The
modest economic recovery seen last year, and continuing this
year, has only limited impact on the high levels of payment
defaults and insolvencies, particularly in the Eurozone. We
expect improvement in some markets like Spain, the Netherlands,
Belgium and United Kingdom, but in most markets our 2015
forecasts are for insolvency levels levelling off, and in some
cases deteriorating. In the current business climate, it is
therefore essential that companies focus on receivables
management and credit insurance, to avoid cash flow problems that
might set back their business."

The complete report highlighting the findings of the 2015 edition
of the Atradius Payment Practices Barometer for Western Europe
can be found in the Publications section of the atradius.com
website.

                            About Atradius

Atradius provides trade credit insurance, surety and collections
services worldwide through a strategic presence in 50 countries.
Atradius has access to credit information on 200 million
companies worldwide. Its credit insurance, bonding and
collections products help protect companies throughout the world
from payment risks associated with selling products and services
on trade credit. Atradius forms part of Grupo Catalana Occidente
(GCO.MC), one of the leading insurers in Spain and worldwide in
credit insurance.


* BOOK REVIEW: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
-------------------------------------------
Author: Frank H. Knight
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 381 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Order your personal copy today at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/risk_uncertainty_and_profit.
html

The tenets Frank H. Knight sets out in this, his first book,
have become an integral part of modern economic theory. Still
readable today, it was included as a classic in the 1998 Forbes
reading list. The book grew out of Knight's 1917 Cornell
University doctoral thesis, which took second prize in an essay
contest that year sponsored by Hart, Schaffner and Marx. In it,
he examined the relationship between knowledge on the part of
entrepreneurs and changes in the economy. He, quite famously,
distinguished between two types of change, risk and uncertainty,
defining risk as randomness with knowable probabilities and
uncertainty as randomness with unknowable probabilities. Risk,
he said, arises from repeated changes for which probabilities
can be calculated and insured against, such as the risk of fire.
Uncertainty arises from unpredictable changes in an economy,
such as resources, preferences, and knowledge, changes that
cannot be insured against. Uncertainty, he said "is one of the
fundamental facts of life."

One of the larger issues of Knight's time was how the
entrepreneur, the central figure in a free enterprise system,
earns profits in the face of competition. It was thought that
competition would reduce profits to zero across a sector because
any profits would attract more entrepreneurs into the sector and
increase supply, which would drive prices down, resulting in
competitive equilibrium and zero profit.

Knight argued that uncertainty itself may allow some
entrepreneurs to earn profits despite this equilibrium.
Entrepreneurs, he said, are forced to guess at their expected
total receipts. They cannot foresee the number of products they
will sell because of the unpredictability of consumer
preferences. Still, they must purchase product inputs, so they
base these purchases on the number of products they guess they
will sell. Finally, they have to guess the price at which their
products will sell. These factors are all uncertain and
impossible to know. Profits are earned when uncertainty yields
higher total receipts than forecasted total receipts. Thus,
Knight postulated, profits are merely due to luck. Such
entrepreneurs who "get lucky" will try to reproduce their
success, but will be unable to because their luck will
eventually turn.

At the time, some theorists were saying that when this luck runs
out, entrepreneurs will then rely on and substitute improved
decision making and management for their original
entrepreneurship, and the profits will return. Knight saw
entrepreneurs as poor managers, however, who will in time fail
against new and lucky entrepreneurs. He concluded that economic
change is a result of this constant interplay between new
entrepreneurial action and existing businesses hedging against
uncertainty by improving their internal organization.
Frank H. Knight has been called "among the most broad-ranging
and influential economists of the twentieth century" and "one of
the most eclectic economists and perhaps the deepest thinker and
scholar American economics has produced." He stands among the
giants of American economists that include Schumpeter and Viner.
His students included Nobel Laureates Milton Friedman, George
Stigler and James Buchanan, as well as Paul Samuelson. At the
University of Chicago, Knight specialized in the history of
economic thought. He revolutionized the economics department
there, becoming one the leaders of what has become known as the
Chicago School of Economics. Under his tutelage and guidance,
the University of Chicago became the bulwark against the more
interventionist and anti-market approaches followed elsewhere in
American economic thought. He died in 1972.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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