TCREUR_Public/150513.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, May 13, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 93

                            Headlines

A U S T R I A

HETA: Commerzbank Files Suit Following Non-Payment of Debt
HYPO TIROL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Senior Unsecured Rating


B E L G I U M

TRUVO NV: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+' After Capital Restructuring


B U L G A R I A

AGRO FINANCE: Abandons Liquidation Plan
CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Prosecutors Probe Central Bank Officials


F R A N C E

AUTODIS GROUP: Moody's Affirms 'B1' CFR, Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to US$513.7MM Loan
UNIFY HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws 'CCC+' CCR


G R E E C E

GREECE: Taps Reserves at Escrow Account to Avoid Default


I C E L A N D

MURRAY HOLDINGS: Files Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Petition


L U X E M B O U R G

BREEZE FINANCE: S&P Cuts Rating on EUR287MM Class A Notes to 'B-'


N E T H E R L A N D S

LEVERAGED FINANCE IV: Moody's Lifts Class V Notes Rating to Ba2


T U R K E Y

SEVEN HILL: Declared Bankrupt, Owes TRY80 Million


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DTZ UK: S&P Puts 'B+' ICR on CreditWatch Developing
MORPHEUS PLC: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'BBsf'


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A U S T R I A
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HETA: Commerzbank Files Suit Following Non-Payment of Debt
----------------------------------------------------------
Laura Noonan at The Financial Times reports that Commerzbank has
filed a lawsuit challenging a resolution of Austria's Heta, the
so-called bad bank, which suspended all payments to bondholders in
March so it could work out how much it could afford to pay
creditors.

The bank confirmed it had filed a case in Germany on May 5, a day
after Heta failed to make a bond payment due to the German lender,
the FT relates.  According to the FT, a person familiar with the
situation said the case relates to less than a quarter of the
EUR400 million of Heta bonds Commerzbank holds.

Heta, which was formed from the bad assets of collapsed lender
Hypo Alpe Adria, imposed a 15-month moratorium on all bond
payments from March 1 after the Austrian government announced it
would not help the institution cover a potential EUR7.6 billion
capital shortfall, the FT recounts.

Commerzbank's accounts show it has taken a EUR200 million
provision against its EUR400 million Heta bonds, the FT discloses.
Germany's financial regulator had warned that the countries'
banks, which own the majority of the affected Heta bonds, stand to
lose about half of what they are owed, the FT relays.

Heta Assset Resolution AG is a wind-down company owned by the
Republic of Austria.  Its statutory task is to dispose of the
non-performing portion of Hypo Alpe Adria, nationalized in 2009,
as effectively as possible while preserving value.


HYPO TIROL: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Senior Unsecured Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Aa1 from Aaa the rating on
the mortgage covered bonds issued by Hypo NOE Gruppe Bank AG (Hypo
NOE, not publicly rated). The rating agency also confirmed the
ratings assigned to the mortgage and public-sector covered bonds
of Hypo Tirol Bank AG (Hypo Tirol, senior unsecured Ba1 negative,
adjusted baseline assessment (BCA) ba3, counterparty risk (CR)
assessment Baa3(cr)) and Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypothekenbank
AG (Hypo VBG, senior unsecured Baa1 negative, adjusted BCA baa3,
CR assessment A3(cr)).

The rating action concludes the review of the covered bonds issued
by Hypo Tirol and Hypo VBG. Hypo NOE's covered bonds remain on
review pending the decision of the issuer to post over-
collateralization (OC) in form and amount necessary to support the
current ratings of Aa1 on the mortgage covered bonds and Aaa on
the public-sector covered bonds.

Hypo NOE mortgage covered bonds:

Hypo NOE does not carry a public rating. The CB anchor for the
mortgage covered bonds is the CR assessment plus one notch. This,
with a TPI of Probable, restricts the rating of the mortgage
covered bond at Aa1, hence the one-notch downgrade. However, the
OC in the program is currently only sufficient for a Aa2 rating.
For a Aa1 rating, 21.5% OC would be necessary, of which 14.5%
should be in committed form. For a Aa2 rating, 14.5% of OC is
sufficient, of which 1.5% should be in committed form. Therefore,
Moody's extended its review in order to provide time to clarify
the issuer's plans regarding the implementation of committed OC.

Hypo NOE public-sector covered bonds:

The CB anchor for the public-sector covered bonds is the CR
assessment plus one notch. This, with a TPI of High, allows the
public-sector covered bond to achieve a Aaa rating. However, the
OC in the program is currently only sufficient for a Aa1 rating.
For a Aaa rating, 20.5% OC would be necessary, of which 20.5%
should be in committed form. For a Aa1 rating, 12.0% of OC is
sufficient, of which 1.0% should be in committed form. As with the
mortgage covered bonds, Moody's extended its review in order to
provide time to clarify the issuer's plans regarding implementing
committed OC.

Hypo Tirol mortgage and public-sector covered bonds:

The CB anchor for both the mortgage and public-sector covered
bonds issued by Hypo Tirol is the CR assessment plus one notch.
After assigning a CR assessment of Baa3(cr), the CB anchor has not
changed. Therefore, Moody's has confirmed the ratings assigned to
both covered bonds.

Hypo VBG mortgage and public-sector covered bonds:

The CB anchor for both the mortgage and public-sector covered
bonds issued by Hypo VBG is the CR assessment plus one notch.
After assigning a CR assessment of A3(cr), the CB anchor has not
changed. Therefore, Moody's has confirmed the ratings assigned to
both covered bonds.

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

Expected Loss: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability that
the issuer will cease making payments under the covered bonds (a
CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the cover pool
assets following a CB anchor event.

Hypo Noe Gruppe Bank AG:

The CB anchor for the mortgage and the public-sector program is
the CR assessment plus one notch. The CR assessment reflects an
issuer's ability to avoid defaulting on certain senior bank
operating obligations and contractual commitments, including
covered bonds. Moody's may use a CB anchor of the CR assessment
plus one notch in the European Union or otherwise where an
operational resolution regime is particularly likely to ensure
continuity of covered bond payments.

For both mortgage and public-sector covered bonds, cover pool
losses are an estimate of the losses Moody's currently models
following a CB anchor event. Moody's splits cover pool losses
between market risk and collateral risk. Market risk measures
losses stemming from refinancing risk and risks related to
interest-rate and currency mismatches (these losses may also
include certain legal risks). Collateral risk measures losses
resulting directly from cover pool assets' credit quality and
Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral score.

The cover pool losses for the mortgage covered bonds are 27.0%,
split between market risk of 18.6% and collateral risk of 8.4%.
The collateral score for this program is currently 12.5%.

The OC in the mortgage cover pool is 122.6%, of which Hypo NOE
provides 2.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
consistent with the Aa1 rating target is 21.5%, of which the
issuer should provide 14.5% in a "committed" form. These numbers
show that Moody's is relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected
loss analysis.

The cover pool losses for the public-sector covered bonds are
18.6% split between market risk of 16.3% and collateral risk of
2.4%. The collateral score for this program is currently 3.6%.

The OC in the public-sector cover pool is 48.8%, of which Hypo NOE
provides 2.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
consistent with the Aaa rating target is 20.5%, of which the
issuer should provide 20.5% in a "committed" form (numbers in
present value terms). These numbers show that Moody's is relying
on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recent
modelling (based on data, as per 31 December 2014).

The TPI assigned to the mortgage covered bonds is "Probable", and
that for the public-sector covered bonds is "High".

Hypo Tirol Bank AG:

The CB anchor for the mortgage and the public-sector program is
the CR assessment plus one notch. The guaranteed senior unsecured
ratings are lower than the CR assessment; therefore the CB anchor
of the CR assessment plus one notch also applies to these
guaranteed covered bonds.

The cover pool losses for the mortgage covered bonds are 27.5%,
split between market risk of 19.6% and collateral risk of 7.9%.
The collateral score for this program is currently 11.8%.

The OC in the mortgage cover pool is 486.1%, of which Hypo Tirol
provides 6.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
consistent with the Aa3 rating target is 11.5%, of which the
issuer should provide 0.5% in a "committed" form. These numbers
show that Moody's is relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected
loss analysis.

The cover pool losses for the public-sector covered bonds are
15.6%, split between market risk of 12.8% and collateral risk of
2.8%. The collateral score for this program is currently 5.7%.

The OC in the public-sector cover pool is 85.1%, of which Hypo
Tirol provides 9.5% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
consistent with the Aa1 rating target is 12.5%, of which the
issuer should provide 4.5% in a "committed" form. These numbers
show that Moody's is relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected
loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recent
modelling (based on data, as per 31 March 2014 for the mortgage
covered bonds and 31 December 2014 for the public-sector covered
bonds).

The TPI assigned to the mortgage covered bonds is "Probable", and
that for the public-sector covered bonds is "High".

Vorarlberger Landes- Und Hypothekenbank AG:

The CB anchor for the mortgage and the public-sector program is
the CR assessment plus one notch. The cover pool losses for the
mortgage covered bonds are 31.7%, split between market risk of
22.7% and collateral risk of 9.0%.The collateral score for this
program is currently 13.4%.

The OC in the mortgage cover pool is 262.8%, of which Hypo VBG
provides 2.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
consistent with the Aaa rating target is 30.5%. To pass at this
rating level, the issuer does not need to provide OC in a
"committed" form. These numbers show that Moody's is relying on
"uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

The cover pool losses for the public-sector covered bonds are
33.1%, split between market risk of 29.4% and collateral risk of
3.7%. The collateral score for this program is currently 6.8%.

The OC in the public-sector cover pool is 99.5%, of which Hypo VBG
provides 2.0% on a "committed" basis. The minimum OC level
consistent with the Aaa rating target is 36.0%. To pass at this
rating level, the issuer does not need to provide OC in a
"committed" form. These numbers show that Moody's is relying on
"uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recent
modelling (based on data, as per 31 December 2014).

The TPI assigned to the mortgage covered bonds is "Probable", and
that for the public-sector covered bonds is "High".

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond program's
rating robustness. A change in the level of the CB anchor could
lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the covered bonds. The TPI
Leeway measures the number of notches by which Moody's might lower
the CB anchor before the rating agency downgrades the covered
bonds because of TPI framework constraints.

Hypo Noe Gruppe Bank AG:

The TPI Leeways for Hypo NOE Gruppe Bank's covered bonds are not
published.

Hypo Tirol Bank AG:

The TPI Leeway for the mortgage covered bonds is zero notches.
This implies that Moody's might downgrade the covered bonds
because of a TPI cap if it lowers the CB anchor, all other
variables being equal.

Based on the "High" TPI, the TPI Leeway for the public-sector
covered bonds is zero notches. This implies that Moody's might
downgrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers the
CB anchor, all other variables being equal.

Vorarlberger Landes- Und Hypothekenbank AG:

Based on the "Probable" TPI, the TPI Leeway for the mortgage
covered bonds is one notch. This implies that Moody's might
downgrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers the
CB anchor by two notches, all other variables being equal.

Based on the "High" TPI, the TPI Leeway for the public-sector
covered bonds is two notches. This implies that Moody's might
downgrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers the
CB anchor by three notches, all other variables being equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain circumstances, such as (1) a country ceiling or sovereign
downgrade capping a covered bond rating or negatively affecting
the CB Anchor and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the
CB Anchor; or (3) a material reduction of the value of the cover
pool.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in March 2015.



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TRUVO NV: S&P Raises CCR to 'CCC+' After Capital Restructuring
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Belgium-based publisher of classified directories
Truvo N.V. to 'CCC+' from 'D'.  Also, S&P assigned its 'CCC+'
long-term corporate credit rating to Stelara PIKco S.A., a
Luxembourg corporation that will be 100% owned by participating
lenders and hold about 20% of Stelara N.V.  The outlooks on both
entities are negative.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the EUR15
million senior secured facility issued by Truvo Belgium Comm. V.
The recovery rating on this facility is '1', reflecting S&P's
expectation of very high recovery (90%-100%) in the event of a
payment default.

In addition, S&P assigned its issue rating of 'CCC-' to the EUR58
million payment-in-kind (PIK) instrument issued at Stelara PIKco
S.A.  The recovery rating on this instrument is '6', reflecting
S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of
a payment default.

In a related action, S&P withdrew its issuer and issue ratings on
Talon PIKco N.V., which no longer has a link to Truvo N.V.  S&P
understands that Talon PIKco N.V. will be liquidated in December
2015 together with the outstanding EUR77 million PIK notes.

The ratings reflect S&P's opinion that, while Truvo's debt
restructuring has lightened its debt load, the group's capital
structure remains unsustainable in the long term.  In addition,
S&P believes that the group's operations in the structurally
declining directories business will remain under pressure, which
will limit free cash flow generation.

Truvo completed its capital restructuring on April 30, 2015,
following unanimous consent from its lenders.  The group's
financial restructuring resulted in a meaningful reduction of its
cash-paid debt burden from EUR287 million of senior facilities to
a EUR15 million term loan A.  Despite the significant debt
reduction, S&P continues to assess Truvo's financial risk profile
as "highly leveraged," with S&P-adjusted debt now standing at
approximately EUR73 million, since S&P includes the EUR58 million
subordinated PIK facilities at Stelara PIKco S.A. in S&P's
calculations.  This results in Standard & Poor's-adjusted 2015-
2016 weighted average leverage of approximately 6.8x post
restructuring (equivalent to 2.9x excluding the PIK facilities).

In addition, S&P continues to assess Truvo's business risk profile
as "vulnerable," reflecting the significant risk of continued
structural decline in the print directories sector.  S&P's
assessment also factors in increased competition, as small
business advertising expands across a greater number of online
marketing channels.

S&P considers that Truvo has material exposure to metropolitan
markets, which could intensify the impact of the structural shift
from traditional classified directories to online services.
Margins will remain under pressure, in S&P's view, due to Truvo's
transition to the highly fragmented, intensely competitive, and
rapidly evolving online market.

S&P believes that in its online business, Truvo will have
significantly less pricing power compared with its former leading
or incumbent positions in the traditional classified directories
business.  In S&P's view, the company will have to establish its
competitive edge in the online market.

Finally, S&P's rating also reflects its uncertainty surrounding
the timing and level of a turnaround in Truvo's revenues and
earnings.  Despite S&P's view that Truvo's highly leveraged
capital structure is unsustainable given the business model, S&P
believes that the risk of default over the next 12 months is
mitigated by the group's low cash interest payment obligation and
the absence of short-term debt maturities apart from the EUR3.9
million unpaid forbearance interest expected to be repaid only
when the cash balance exceeds EUR8 million.

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view of the ongoing pressure
on Truvo's operating performance and the group's highly leveraged
capital structure that S&P sees as unsustainable in the long term.
It also reflects some remaining vulnerability of free cash flow
generation.  In particular, S&P understands that the disruptions
caused by the transition of the invoice/sales systems in 2014,
leading to significant working capital outflows, are not yet fully
resolved.

"We could lower the rating if it appears likely that Truvo is
unable to halt the decline in its business.  In such a scenario,
we believe that the group could implement additional debt-
restructuring measures that we would deem tantamount to a default.
A material weakening of cash balances and free operating cash
flow, leading to very short-term default prospects, could also
trigger a downgrade," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if Truvo stabilizes EBITDA
and maintains high cash interest coverage.  We believe this
scenario would entail an increase in online revenues, since we
anticipate that print advertising sales will remain under
significant structural pressure," S&P added.



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AGRO FINANCE: Abandons Liquidation Plan
---------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Agro Finance said it has abandoned plans for
its liquidation.

According to SeeNews, data from a protocol of a general
shareholders' meeting showed Agro Finance's shareholders
unanimously voted against the proposed liquidation of the company.

In April, Agro Finance said it planned to sell the land it owns
and delist from the Sofia stock exchange, SeeNews relates.  The
move was proposed by Agro Finance's majority shareholder Agrion
Invest, the reason being that under Bulgarian legislation the
company would be fined in case foreigners acquire agricultural
land in the country, yet it cannot control real time trade in its
shares on the bourse, SeeNews discloses.  However, under legal
amendments adopted in late April, such fines would not be imposed
on public companies, SeeNews says.

Agro Finance is a Bulgarian real estate investment trust.


CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Prosecutors Probe Central Bank Officials
--------------------------------------------------------------
Tsvetelia Tsolova and Angel Krasimirov at Reuters report that
Bulgarian prosecutors have launched an investigation into two
central bank officials suspected of deliberate mismanagement as
they took over the running of insolvent lender Corporate
Commercial Bank (Corpbank) in November.

Corpbank was felled by a run on deposits in circumstances that
have never been fully explained, Reuters recounts.  Its owner was
subsequently charged with embezzlement but he denies any
wrongdoing, blaming the run on a plot hatched by his business
rivals, Reuters notes.

The central bank took control of Corpbank after the run and shut
down its operations, Reuters relays.  It put its own
administrators in charge of the lender until late March, when they
were replaced by temporary receivers, Reuters discloses.

"The investigation against them is because between November and
March as administrators they deliberately did not take enough care
of the assets of bank, which resulted in serious damage to the
bank," Reuters quotes prosecutors as saying in a statement on May
11.

The Bulgarian state has become Corpbank's main creditor after
shelling out more than BGN3.5 billion (US$2 billion) in guaranteed
deposits to clients following the collapse, Reuters states.

According to Reuters, prosecutors suspect the administrators
amended the contracts of account holders who had enjoyed
preferential interest rates and were therefore not entitled to
compensation.

The two administrators denied wrongdoing, Reuters says.  They said
they had adhered to both the law and the recommendations of the
central bank and of the state's Deposit Insurance Fund, Reuters
relays.  They said they were ready to cooperate with the
investigation, Reuters notes.

                About Corporate Commercial Bank AD

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.



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AUTODIS GROUP: Moody's Affirms 'B1' CFR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Autodis Group S.A.S.'s
('Autodistribution' or the 'company') corporate family rating of
B1, and the probability of default rating of Ba3-PD. Concurrently,
the rating agency has affirmed the instrument rating of B2 on the
EUR240 million existing senior secured notes issued by Autodis
S.A., and assigned a B2 instrument rating to the EUR60 million tap
issued by Autodis S.A. The ratings outlook is stable.

On May 11, Autodistribution announced the launch of a EUR60
million tap issuance. The proceeds of the tap issuance are to pay
a EUR40 million dividend and raise EUR20 million cash for general
corporate purposes. "The transaction positions Autodistribution
weakly in the B1 CFR category and amongst its direct peers, based
on more aggressive financial policy with a dividend
recapitalization within the first 18 months of the initial notes
issuance, a relatively weaker business and liquidity profile with
large exposure to France and focus on debt funded acquisitions to
generate revenue growth", says Pieter Rommens, lead analyst for
Autodistribution.

The B1 CFR rating reflects Autodistribution's (1) leading position
in the French automotive aftermarket, which is characterized by
higher customer loyalty and less cyclicality compared to the
automotive sector; (2) relative size compared to other independent
players, manifesting itself in a dense distribution network and
leading to economies of scale; (3) fragmented customer base,
consisting of local distributors and garages; (4) track record of
improving operational performance in the most recent years, most
recently driven by the integration of ACR; and (5) strong current
trading in the last 3 months ending March 2015, driven by the
light vehicles and collision parts segments and 12 months trading
of ACR.

The B1 CFR rating also takes into account the company's (1) large
exposure to France which represents about 90% of the company's
sales in 2014; (2) the intense competition in the sector
characterized by expected weak total market growth; (3) the
company's modest size compared to some of its large automotive
part suppliers, which could potentially limit its bargaining
power; and (4) risks relating to potential further debt-funded M&A
activity in order to grow revenue through acquisitions.

Moody's expects Autodistribution's Moody's-adjusted Debt/EBITDA
ratio to be in the region of 5.5x at December 2015 (pro-forma for
the tap issuance) which is fairly high, but takes comfort from the
company's recent track record of EBITDA growth through margin
improvement through continued focus on operational synergies, cost
efficiencies and purchase savings.

Moody's considers Autodistribution's near-term liquidity position
as adequate. The company's liquidity position is supported by a
cash reserves of EUR68 million at the end of December 2014, an
additional expected EUR20 million cash raised by the tap issuance
for general corporate purposes and a fully undrawn EUR20 million
RCF.

The B2 rating on the notes, one notch below the CFR, reflects the
limited amount of guarantees from operational entities for the
notes, and Moody's view that the super-senior RCF and operating
liabilities (mainly trade payables and operating leases) rank
ahead of the notes in the capital structure. Both the notes and
RCF benefit from first ranking security interests. The notes are
guaranteed by part of the subsidiaries which, for the twelve
months ended December 31 2014, represented 37.2% and 34.3% of the
group's EBITDA and total assets, respectively. The RCF ranks super
senior in the enforcement waterfall and benefits from a guarantor
coverage test of not less than 80% of consolidated EBITDA and
gross assets.

The stable outlook reflects our view that the company's financial
metrics will improve over the next 12-18 months. Moody's expects
profitability enhancement would be driven by full year impact of
ACR integration, ongoing productivity efforts across the company
and higher investments to enhance its distribution network and IT
systems.

What could change the ratings UP:

Positive pressure on the ratings, could arise if Moody's-adjusted
gross Debt/EBITDA ratio falls below 5.0x and (EBITDA-
Capex)/Interest ratio moves towards 2.0x.

What could change the ratings DOWN:

Negative rating pressure could arise if due to underperformance,
Moody's-adjusted gross Debt/EBITDA ratio rises above 6.0x for an
extended period, (EBITDA - Capex)/Interest ratio falls below 1.5x
or free cash flow generation turns negative. Any substantial debt-
financed acquisitions could also have a negative effect on the
ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Distribution & Supply Chain Services published in November 2011.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Autodis Group S.A.S. is the holding entity of the Autodistribution
group. The company is a leading distributor of aftermarket parts
for light vehicles and trucks in the independent automotive
aftermarket in France. The company also has a regional presence in
Poland. The company generated revenue of EUR1,170 million in 2014,
through its network of 48 wholly-owned and 44 affiliated
independent distributors in France, operating together on 489
distribution sites and around 3,200 affiliated garages in France.



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KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to US$513.7MM Loan
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive B1 rating to
Klockner Pentaplast of America, Inc.'s US$513.7 million senior
secured first lien term loan with a maturity of 5 years, KP
Germany Erste GmbH's EUR113 million and US$219 million senior
secured first lien term loans with a maturity of 5 years, Klockner
Pentaplast GmbH's EUR100 million senior secured term loan also
with a maturity of 5 years and KP Germany Erste GmbH 's EUR100
million revolving credit facility (RCF) with a maturity of 4.75
years following a conclusive review of final documentation. In
addition, Moody's has assigned a definitive Caa1 rating to the
EUR300 million senior notes with a maturity of 5.5 years issued by
Klockner Pentaplast of America, Inc.

Concurrently Moody's has withdrawn Klockner Pentaplast of America,
Inc.'s Ba3 rating on the US$500 million senior secured facilities
due 2016, KP Germany Erste GmbH's B3 rating on the EUR255 million
second lien senior secured notes due 2017 and Kleopatra Holdings 1
S.C.A.'s Caa1 rating on the EUR225 million PIK notes due 2017.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings because obligations are no
longer outstanding. Please refer to Moody's Investors Service's
Withdrawal Policy.

Final changes to the credit facilities of Kleopatra Holdings 2
S.C.A., the parent holding company of Klockner Pentaplast and the
top holding company of the restricted group have no impact to
current ratings.

The outlook on all ratings is stable. It reflects our expectations
that Klockner's solid market positions and high share of sales
towards non-discretionary pharmaceutical and food end-markets will
continue to support the group's operating performance. It also
incorporates Moody's assumption that the company will not embark
on any large debt-financed acquisitions, or engage in shareholder-
friendly initiatives that will increase adjusted leverage above
6.0x.

What Could Change the Rating -- UP:

The ratings could be upgraded if Klockner manages to maintain
adjusted leverage below 5.0x on a sustainable basis. Furthermore,
the rating could enjoy upwards pressure were Klockner to maintain
free cash flow generation above 5% of total debt.

What Could Change the Rating -- DOWN:

A deterioration in profitability, caused for instance by
increasing competition or challenges to manage volatile raw
material costs, or material negative free cash flow, or an
increase in adjusted debt/EBITDA above 6x could put negative
pressure on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Packaging Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containers
published in June 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.


UNIFY HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws 'CCC+' CCR
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Unify Holdings B.V., a Germany-
headquartered provider of enterprise communications-related
technology and solutions.  S&P subsequently withdrew the rating at
the company's request.

At the time of the rating withdrawal, the outlook was stable.

At the time of the withdrawal, the rating on Unify primarily
reflected S&P's view that the financial support it received from
its 49%-owner, Siemens AG, helps address Unify's near-term
refinancing needs and equips the company with sufficient liquidity
for operations and its new restructuring and business-
transformation program over the next 12 months.  Nevertheless, S&P
believes that Unify's liquidity could weaken thereafter,
particularly if the company is unable to implement the proposed
issuance of a EUR100 million senior secured facility and, at the
same time, significantly turn around its weak revenues in fiscal
2015 and achieve at least zero organic revenue growth in the
fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2016.

In January 2015, Siemens committed to injecting EUR130 million in
cash in the form of new preference shares and to backing a new
EUR163 million facility.  Unify used some of the proceeds to
redeem all of its outstanding senior secured notes due November
2015 (about EUR120 million as of Dec. 31, 2014) on March 9, 2015,
and the balance will fund the company's new transformation plan.
Unify also rolled over its fully drawn revolving credit facility
of EUR40 million for another year, and it is now due May 2016.

Unify's "vulnerable" business risk profile remains constrained, in
S&P's view, by the company's relatively weak operating margins,
continued very high restructuring costs, volatile customer demand,
and significant competitive pressure from larger industry players,
such as Cisco Systems, Microsoft, Alcatel-Lucent Enterprise, and
Avaya, in the dynamic and volatile enterprise communications
market.  These factors are partly offset by Unify's diverse
customer base and its position as an established provider of
communications systems, applications, and services for enterprise
customers, with leading market shares in Europe and particularly
in Germany.

Unify is a joint venture between the former enterprise
communications business of Siemens AG and private equity investor
The Gores Group (not rated; 51% ownership).  S&P's assessment of
Unify's stand-alone credit profile did not benefit from additional
group support from Siemens, primarily because S&P assess Unify as
a nonstrategic subsidiary of Siemens under S&P's criteria.

Before the withdrawal, the stable outlook reflected S&P's
expectation that the company will stabilize its revenue growth to
at least zero by fiscal 2016, implement its latest restructuring
program on time and on budget, improve its operating margins, and
significantly strengthen its FOCF generation before restructuring
and business-transformation costs in the next 12 months.  In
particular, S&P expected cash balances of about EUR100 million at
year-end fiscal 2015.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Taps Reserves at Escrow Account to Avoid Default
--------------------------------------------------------
Mehreen Khan at The Daily Telegraph reports that Greece avoided an
unprecedented default to the International Monetary Fund on May 12
after raiding an emergency cash account at the Fund, in a major
sign the country is edging ever closer to stiffing its senior
creditor.

Athens tapped EUR650 million from an escrow account held by the
Bank of Greece at the IMF, scraping together a further EUR100
billion in cash reserves to avoid going into arrears, The Daily
Telegraph relates.

The move to effectively shift funds from different accounts at the
IMF signals Greece has all but run out of cash to meet its
international and domestic obligations, The Daily Telegraph notes.

According to estimates, Greece only has a paltry EUR90 million in
spare cash reserves, making it unable to fulfil its monthly wage
and pensions bill of EUR1.7 billion for May, The Daily Telegraph
states.

Greece owes the IMF a total of EUR9.7 billion this year and will
need to repay a further EUR2 billion over the course of June and
July, The Daily Telegraph discloses.

But officials from the Fund said the Bank of Greece was under no
obligation to replenish its escrow account and could use the cash
as wishes, The Daily Telegraph relays.



=============
I C E L A N D
=============


MURRAY HOLDINGS: Files Chapter 15 Bankruptcy Petition
-----------------------------------------------------
Michael Bathon at Bloomberg News reports that a unit of failed
Icelandic bank Kaupthing Bank hf, Murray Holdings Ltd., sought
bankruptcy protection from creditors in the U.S. listing as much
as US$500 million in both assets and debt.

The company formerly known as Isis Investments Ltd. filed under
Chapter 15 of the bankruptcy code, which is used by companies
restructuring abroad to protect assets and shield it from lawsuits
in the U.S., Bloomberg relates.

Murray Holdings, which is 100% indirectly owned by Kaupthing,
according to court filings, initiated the bankruptcy to carry out
a restructuring plan approved last year in an Isle of Man court,
Bloomberg discloses.

The case is In Re Murray Holdings Ltd., 15-bk-11231, U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


BREEZE FINANCE: S&P Cuts Rating on EUR287MM Class A Notes to 'B-'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's lowered its ratings on the EUR287 million class
A senior secured amortizing notes issued by Breeze Finance S.A. to
'B-', equal with the Standard & Poor's underlying rating (SPUR).
The outlook is stable.

The issue rating follows a commutation agreement between MBIA U.K.
Insurance Ltd. (MBIA) and the class A bondholders on Dec. 3, 2014.
Under this agreement, MBIA's rights and obligations under the
transaction documents have been terminated.  It no longer provides
a guarantee for the class A notes and the MBIA annual guarantee
fee -- 0.35% of the value of the outstanding class A notes -- will
now be paid to the class A bondholders.

   -- The project comprises 43 wind farms in Germany and France.
      Individual wind farms started operations between 1999 and
      2008.  The project is exposed to wind resource risk and
      higher-than-forecast repair and maintenance costs, as only
      27% of the portfolio benefits from a long-term fixed-price
      operations and maintenance contract.

   -- Volatile wind supply has been below historical averages
      over the past few years and availability has consistently
      been below S&P's original base-case assumption of 97%.  In
      2014, revenues were 15% lower than S&P had anticipated due
      to lower wind than it expected during the summer.  As a
      result, for the first time, the issuer withdrew EUR1
      million from the debt service reserve account (DSRA) to
      cover the shortfall in the debt service payment on the
      class A notes due on Oct. 19.  Nevertheless, on April 19,
      2015, the issuer paid debt service of EUR12.6 million on
      the class A notes in full.  In addition, it paid the EUR2
      million portion of deferred interest on the class B notes,
      but deferred the debt service on the class B and C  notes
      due on April 19 in full.

   -- The project is exposed to a structural weakness as
      replenishment of the senior DSRA is subordinated to payment
      of the class B debt, including repayment of deferred
      principal and interest.  S&P forecasts that the class B
      debt will continue to defer its coupon for the remainder of
      the term of the senior debt and therefore any withdrawals
      made from the DSRA are unlikely to be replenished.

   -- S&P forecasts that the senior debt will continue to be
      serviced in full and on time throughout the project's life.
      Debt service is due in two equal annual payments on
      April 19 and Oct. 19.  However, given the low wind during
      the summer months, cash flow available for the senior debt
      service payment in October is tight.  S&P forecasts that
      the project will continue to make modest withdrawals from
      the DSRA to meet its October-scheduled debt service
      payments.  S&P forecasts that the annual senior debt
      service coverage ratio (ADSCR) will remain above 1x, and
      our analysis continues to focus on liquidity because of the
      project's reliance on the DSRA to meet its October
      scheduled repayment.  The project is also exposed to market
      price risk.  In the French regulatory system, the off-take
      period runs for 20 years.  However, the fixed, guaranteed
      off-take price runs for only 15 years and is related to a
      reference yield.  The project managers must negotiate the
      off-take price for years 16-20 with the off-taker, which
      exposes wind farm operators to market price risk during
      those years.

   -- The 'D' rating on the class B notes reflects S&P's criteria
      for hybrid instruments with a coupon deferral or
      cancellation feature or principal write-down or deferral
      feature.  S&P rates such instruments 'D' when payments are
      deferred or reduced on a permanent basis according to terms
      of the instrument, without causing a contractual (legal)
      default.  This reflects the sustained losses absorbed by
      the instrument.

S&P's business assessment of the project's operations phase is '6'
(on a scale of '1' to '12', with '1' being the strongest
assessment), reflecting S&P's view of the moderate operational
complexity of on-shore wind turbines; moderate resource risk, as
wind may not be available as expected at all times; and the market
price risk toward the end of the life of the debt.  The current
regulatory regime in Germany provides the project with price
certainty for the wind energy produced over the life of the debt.
In France, the regulatory regime provides certainty for the first
15 years of the debt's life.

Under S&P's base-case scenario, the minimum ADSCR for the class A
notes is below 1.2x, indicating a preliminary operations phase
stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of 'b-'.

S&P views Breeze Finance's transaction structure as "weak," as
replenishment of the senior DSRA is subordinated to class B debt
service.

S&P considers that the project is materially exposed to the
revenue counterparties and to the suppliers of critical equipment,
namely turbines and their components.  However, the
creditworthiness of the counterparties is not currently a
constraining factor for the issue rating.

At financial close, project liquidity consisted of a EUR14 million
DSRA for the class A notes, which would cover about one of the two
annual debt service payments, and a EUR1.7 million reserve for the
class B notes, which covered about half of one of the annual debt
service payments.

EUR1 million has been drawn under the class A notes DSRA to meet
debt service, leaving a current balance on the DSRA of EUR13
million, which is below the target balance.  The class B DSRA is
fully depleted.  Therefore, S&P assess the liquidity as "less than
adequate."

The stable outlook on the class A notes signifies that S&P do not
foresee a default under its base-case scenario, although it
considers that the class A notes' DSRA is likely to deteriorate
further in future.

S&P does not expect to raise the rating because of the project's
"weak" transaction structure assessment and S&P's view of its
likely reliance on the senior DSRA to meet its October scheduled
senior debt service payment in each year.

S&P could lower the rating if the operating performance of the
project or the liquidity deteriorates, causing Breeze Finance to
draw more from the class A notes' DSRA than S&P currently
anticipates.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


LEVERAGED FINANCE IV: Moody's Lifts Class V Notes Rating to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Leveraged Finance Europe Capital IV B.V.:

  -- EUR11.7 million Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 18,
     2014 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

  -- EUR19.9 million Class IV Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
     Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 18,
     2014 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  -- EUR7.4 million (Current outstanding balance: EUR3.7M) Class
     V Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
     Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2014 Affirmed B1
     (sf)

Moody's also affirmed approximately EUR 48.5m CLO notes:

  -- EUR26 million (Current outstanding balance: EUR2.7M) Class
     I-D Senior Floating Rate Delayed Funding Notes due 2022,
     Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2014 Upgraded to
     Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR158.3 million (Current outstanding balance: EUR16.4M)
     Class I-N Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa
     (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR26.3 million Class II Senior Floating Rate Notes due
     2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 18, 2014 Upgraded
     to Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR30 million (Current outstanding balance: EUR3.1M)
     Revolving Facility Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
     Jul 18, 2014 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Leveraged Finance Europe Capital IV B.V., issued in October 2006,
is a Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by BNP Paribas. The transaction ended its reinvestment
period on 11 November 2012.

The upgrades of the notes is primarily a result of significant
deleveraging arising from the last payment date in November 2014.
As a result, the Class I-D notes, Class I-N notes and the
Revolving Facility have collectively paid down EUR60 million (28%
of their initial balance) resulting in increases in over-
collateralization levels. As of the March 2015 trustee report, the
Class III, IV, and V overcollateralization ratios are reported at
156.35%, 117.51%, and 112.32% respectively compared with 130.12%,
111.65%, and 108.78% in October 2014.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
EUR pool with performing par and principal proceeds balance of
EUR94.5 million, a defaulted par of EUR4.4 million, a weighted
average default probability of 27.32% (consistent with a WARF of
4079 over a weighted average life of 3.82 years), a weighted
average recovery rate upon default of 50% for a Aaa liability
target rating, a diversity score of 14 and a weighted average
spread of 3.84%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's
assumed that 100% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured
corporate assets would recover 50% upon default. In each case,
historical and market performance and a collateral manager's
latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's
incorporates these default and recovery characteristics of the
collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them
to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO
liability it is analyzing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in the
portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs that were
within two notches of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
     this transaction is the pace of amortization of the
     underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending
     on market conditions and have a significant impact on the
     notes' ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a
     consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral
     sales the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in
     loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization
     would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning
     with the notes having the highest prepayment priority.

(2) Around 40% of the collateral pool consists of debt
     obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by
     using credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's
     has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing
     a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the
     Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions", published
     in October 2009.

(3) Recoveries on defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
     trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
     have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
     collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
     and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
     defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
     Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
     the market price or the recovery rate to account for
     potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher
     than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
     the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


SEVEN HILL: Declared Bankrupt, Owes TRY80 Million
-------------------------------------------------
Daily Sabah reports that Seven Hill was declared bankrupt by a
court decision on May 12.

The firm has been administered through trusteeship for the last
one and a half years, Daily Sabah relays.

According to Daily Sabah, seven Hill's TRY80 million (US$29.8
million) worth of debt will be paid from its assets, although it
has been reported that the assets would not be enough to cover the
debts.

Seven Hill is one of Turkey's largest clothing companies.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DTZ UK: S&P Puts 'B+' ICR on CreditWatch Developing
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'B+' issuer
credit rating on DTZ UK Guarantor Ltd. on CreditWatch with
developing implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows DTZ's announcement that it has
entered into a definitive agreement to acquire Cushman &
Wakefield, including cash and liabilities.  The transaction is
expected to close toward the end of 2015, subject to customary
closing conditions including regulatory approvals.  The
CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's uncertainty regarding the
credit impact on the combined entity following the acquisition.
"Nevertheless, we believe this transaction has the potential to
weaken DTZ's risk profile via increased leverage and reduced cash
flow stability," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Richard
Zell.  Alternatively, if DTZ chooses to finance the transaction
mostly with equity and the contribution from stable, recurring
revenue sources remains robust, S&P may raise the rating or revise
the outlook to reflect a stronger credit profile.

The current issuer credit rating reflects the high leverage and
integration risk resulting from DTZ's acquisition of Cassidy
Turley and DTZ's private equity ownership.  A successful
integration of both Cassidy Turley and Cushman & Wakefield may
position the company as one of the largest providers of global
commercial real estate (CRE) services, behind CBRE and Jones Lang
LaSalle.  S&P believes that the primary revenue source for Cushman
& Wakefield is sales and leasing related, which tends to be
cyclical, following general trends in commercial real estate.  The
inclusion of this revenue stream into the combined entity could
result in less stable cash flows than those DTZ previously
exhibited, which had been largely dependent on stable, recurring
fee revenue from property and facility management services.  In a
time when CRE services firms are benefitting from more
multinational corporations outsourcing and continued economic
growth, S&P views the combination of DTZ and Cushman & Wakefield
favorably, tempered by the possibility of increased leverage and
volatile cash flows.

DTZ and Cushman & Wakefield reported they expect the resultant
entity to have total revenues of about US$5.5 billion and a strong
global presence with more than 250 offices in about 50 countries.
The combined firm will be called Cushman & Wakefield, given the
popularity of its brand name in the U.S. and Europe.

S&P will continue to monitor developments related to the
transaction and resolve the CreditWatch placement when more
information regarding the new capital structure, revenue mix, and
global penetration strategy becomes available.

"Upon the completion of our review, we could lower the ratings if
we believe the company's risk profile will be materially weaker
for an extended period as a result of the proposed transaction and
the introduction of volatile cash flows.  For instance, we could
lower the rating if we believe that pro forma debt to EBITDA will
exceed 6x, on a sustained basis, or if EBITDA-to-interest coverage
falls below 2x.  We could also lower the rating on DTZ if
integration issues endanger client relationships and ultimately
the firm's cash flows," S&P said.

Alternatively, S&P could affirm its ratings on DTZ if it believes
that leverage will not increase meaningfully.  If leverage rises
moderately, S&P will weigh the benefits of increased geographic
diversity and a larger global presence against the proportional
shift in revenue toward more volatile sources.

While perhaps least likely, S&P would consider raising the rating
if it expects DTZ to finance the transaction in a way that lowers
leverage to less than 5x.  S&P would also consider affirming the
rating, but with a positive outlook, if leverage was little
changed and the improved diversity more than offsets the change in
revenue mix.  At that point, S&P would look for evidence that the
integration of DTZ, Cassidy Turley, and Cushman & Wakefield had
been successfully implemented before raising the rating.


MORPHEUS PLC: Fitch Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'BBsf'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Morpheus (European Loan Conduit
No.19) plc's class D notes due 2029 and affirmed the class C and E
notes, as follows:

  GBP8.6 million class C (XS0198458266) affirmed at 'A+sf';
  Outlook Stable

  GBP11.3 million class D (XS0198459157) downgraded to 'BBsf'
  from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

  GBP7 million class E affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate 90%

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Since the last rating action on May 13, 2014, the class A and B
notes have been repaid in full. The affirmation of the most senior
tranche still outstanding is driven by the effect of sequential
allocation of principal and the strong underlying loan performance
to date. Delinquencies and defaults have been minimal due to high
debt service coverage across the portfolio and low leverage, due
to seasoning (most vintages are pre-2004) and amortization.

As well as improving the credit quality of the senior bonds, the
sequential allocation of principal receipts has also increased the
issuer's cost of funds. Together with a relatively static level of
senior costs, this has meant revenue funds are insufficient to
fully meet scheduled interest payments to the class D and E notes.
However, a mechanism is in place to defer any interest shortfalls
stemming from prepayments (which account for all shortfalls to
date and expected). Unlike standard available funds caps, in this
case deferred interest remains ultimately due and payable in full.

Fitch's interpretation of transaction documentation is that these
deferred amounts become due and payable when the related class of
notes is redeemed (for principal). Therefore once the class D
notes have redeemed, Fitch assumes the issuer will switch to its
post-enforcement waterfall, subject to which the class D deferred
interest amounts will rank senior to class E interest and
principal.

While this route to repayment hinges on a technical event of
default, given the amount in question is expressly deferrable, is
not payable periodically (or even predictably) and is "pass
through" in nature, it is treated in Fitch's analysis as principal
rather than interest. The rating tests for ultimate repayment of
this amount using diverted junior principal. So far the shortfall
accumulated for the class D notes is GBP396,000 and for the class
E GBP600,000. Fitch expects this to continue to grow, with the
eventual magnitude (including interest accruing on the shortfall)
dependent on the (p)repayment profile of the remaining loans.

The largest loans have all been repaid, and were generally in the
higher margin buckets. In parallel the weighted average (WA)
margin of the notes has quadrupled since closing (to 1.75% from
0.43%) and will rise further until the class C notes have been
redeemed. At the May 2015 interest payment date, the pool
consisted of 41 loans with an aggregate balance of GBP26.8
million, down from 419 loans/GBP581.9 million as at closing in
August 2008. The majority of the pool provides for some scheduled
amortization, while seven loans mature by the end of 2015.

Most loans have a remaining balance of less than GBP1 million and
are secured on a single asset. The low reported WA loan-to-value
ratio (LTV) largely relies on pre-crisis valuations, conducted
between 1990 and 2005. Two loans have a reported LTV of above
100%. Although almost all loans continue to make debt service
payments, a few borrowers are supporting these payments from
equity as the collateral is vacant. Given past performance, heavy
exposure to the London asset market, modest leverage and further
amortization, Fitch believes that losses will be minimal.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Overcollateralization is currently GBP1.6 million. Adverse
prepayment profiles could lead to greater interest shortfalls that
might not be recoverable, especially if accompanied by higher
losses. These drivers could cause the class D to be downgraded
further. The junior notes would be downgraded in the event
expected or realised losses exceeded overcollateralization.

Fitch estimates 'Bsf' recoveries of GBP23.8 million.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *